MEMORANDUM

To : EDUARDO G. CORRO
Principal IV, Agusan National High School
Division of Butuan City
Caraga Administrative Region

From : ATTY. ALBERTO T. MUYOT

Undersecretary
Legal and Legislative Affairs

Subject : Request for clarification on the terms of office of the General

Parents Teachers Association Board of Directors and its Officers.

Date : September 6, 2017

This refers to your request for clarification on the terms of Office of the
PTA Board of Directors and its Officers as embodied in DepEd Orders 54 and 77,
s. 2009, considering that this matter has been a recurrent issue and a pressing
concern in your school.
For reconciliation, a certain Mr. Glenn Bequibel, President of GPTA
Butuan Central Elementary School and Agusan National High School wrote a
letter addressed to Atty. Tonisito Umali, requesting for the same clarification.
As a briefer and per your letter, a legal opinion was already rendered on
this matter by the Regional Legal Officer, Atty. Jose B. Guibone, stating that
since there are no inconsistencies between the questioned items in the said
Department Orders, there is no express repeal, hence, both orders should stand.
However, a conflicting view was presented by Atty. Alberto T. Escobarte,
the Regional Director of Caraga Administrative Region, stating that DO 77, s.
2009 expressly repealed the provisions of DO 54, s. 2009, but it is silent as to
the terms of Office of the PTA Board of Directors and its Officers.

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 To arrive at a plausible resolution on the above request, below are the
three (3) focal issues which need to be resolved:
1. Whether or not DO 77, s. 2009 expressly repealed
paragraph IV, item 11 of DO 54, s. 2009;
2. Whether or not DO 54, s. 2009 can still stand
despite the fact that a later Order was enacted; and
3. Whether or not the two (2) Department Orders can
be harmonized together is such a way that both
Orders supplement or complement each other.

DO Number DO 54, s. 2009 DO 77, s. 2009 DO 83, s. 2010

Title Revised Guidelines Guidelines for the Amendments to

Governing Parents- Conduct of Elections of Deped Order No. 77,
Teachers Associations the Parents-Teachers S. 2009 [Guidelines
(PTAs) at the School Associations (PTAs) at for the Conduct of
Level the School Level and Elections of the
Their Federations Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAS)
at the School Level
and Their
Federations]

Effectivity June 1, 2009 July 20, 2009 June 18, 2010

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Questioned Paragraph IV 11. The term of office of No mention about
paragraph/item e. The term of office of the Board of Directors the terms of Office of
the Board of Directors (BOD) and the officers the BOD and its
(BOD) and its Officers shall be one year from Officers.
shall be one (1) year the date of election or
from the date of until a new set of BOD
election. In no case has been elected and
shall a PTA Board qualified.
Director serve for more
than two (2)
consecutive terms;
Repealing clause 19. All existing DepED
Memoranda, Orders
and other
administrative
issuances of similar
nature which are
inconsistent with this
Order are hereby
deemed repealed and
superseded
accordingly.

To further understand the issues at hand, below is a table showing the

comparisons between the two (2) Department Orders, DO 83 was only included
as an added reference.
TABLE OF COMPARISON BETWEEN DO 54, s. 2009 AND DO 77, s. 2009
1. Whether or not DO 77, s.
2009 expressly repealed
paragraph IV, item 11 of
DO 54, s. 2009________

The Civil Code of the Philippines provides: “Laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones and their violation and non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.” [Article 7 (1),
Civil Code of the Philippines] Based on the above-mentioned provision of
the Code, a law may only be repealed by a succeeding law. But there are
instances where a succeeding law does not necessarily state that it repeals
an existing law. How then would we know that the subsequent law indeed
repealed a former law? There are two kinds of repeal. A repeal may either
be express or implied. An express repeal is one where it literally states
that it repeals a certain provision or section of a law or the whole statute
itself. On the other hand, an implied repeal is one where a subsequent
law is irreconcilable with a first law. Implied repeals do not specifically
state that they repeal a certain provision or section of a law or a statute
itself.
Applying the said principle to the issue at hand, it can be adduced
that DO 77, s. 2009 did not expressly repeal the questioned item in DO
54, s. 2009 because it did not specifically mention in the repealing clause

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of DO 77, s. 2009 that said item was repealed. The subject repealing
clause states that, “All existing DepED Memoranda, Orders and other
administrative issuances of similar nature which are inconsistent with this
Order are hereby deemed repealed and superseded accordingly.” (italics
and emphasis, ours), meaning it is not specific or express repeal but
rather a general repeal as it leaves room for further interpretation on what
item or items in the said previous Order can be considered as inconsistent
with the new one. Morever, the failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and old laws.
In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Semirara Mining
Corporation, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc reiterated the
Decision of the CTA Division, the pertinent portion of which reads:
“…If the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act should be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the
earlier act. The legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws; if it intended a repeal of the earlier law, it should have
so expressed that intention in the subsequent statute.
Thus, a statute will not be deemed to have been impliedly
repealed by another enacted subsequent thereto unless
there is a showing that a plain, unavoidable and
irreconcilable repugnancy exists between the two. Absent
an express repeal, as in this case, a subsequent law cannot
be construed as repealing a prior one unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the
terms of the new and old laws. An express repeal, is one
wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause,
that a particular and specific law, identified by its number
or title, is repealed. Absent this specific requirement, an
express repeal may not be presumed. Further, well-
entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored.
The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws
should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each
shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law,
the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former
must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter
act.”

2. Whether or not paragraph IV,

item 11 of DO 54, s. 2009 can
still stand despite the fact that a
later Order was
enacted____________

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 It was already settled in the previous issue that the repealing clause
in DO 77, s. 2009 did not expressly repeal paragraph IV, item 11 of DO
54, s. 2009. The issue now is whether there is an implied repeal to
determine if the questioned DepEd Order can still stand.
In the case of Antonio A. Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
103982 December 11, 1992, the Supreme Court stated that:
“…Repeal by implication proceeds on the
premise that where a statute of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature
to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. Hence, before there
can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on
the part of the lawmaker that the intent in
enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one.
The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the
later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will
continue so far as the two acts are the same from
the time of the first enactment.
There are two categories of repeal by
implication. The first is where provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of
the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers
the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal
the earlier law.
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency
takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent
and incompatible with each other that they
cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both
cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot
be enforced without nullifying the other.”
Applying the above mentioned principle to the second issue at hand
and comparing the two items it will show that both are consistent with the
mandate that, “the term of office of the Board of Directors (BOD) and its
Officers shall be one (1) year from the date of election.” However,
ambiguity and conflict arises as to the prohibition mentioned in the
second sentence under paragraph IV, item 11 of DO 54, s. 2009, which

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states that, “in no case shall a PTA Board Director serve for more than two
(2) consecutive terms as compared to DO 77, s. 2009, which states that.
The term of office of the Board of Directors (BOD) and the officers shall be
one year from the date of election or until a new set of BOD has been
elected and qualified.”
The prohibition which was imposed in the questioned item in DO 54,
s. 2009 is a specific limitation on the term of Office of the previously
elected Board of Directors (BOD) and its Officers. On the other hand, DO
77, s. 2009 does not impose the same prohibition but rather it sets the
condition that the term of office of the current Officers will only expire
until a new set of BOD has been elected and qualified. It is well settled
that per provisions of DO 77, s. 2009, that every school year all PTA’s
(homeroom, school, Municipal, City and Provincial Federations) are
mandated to conduct an election, therefore, the possibility of not holding
an election is nil. Although, the schedule for holding an election varies, a
cursory study of the periods mentioned in DO 77, s. 2009 will show that
nothing exceeds sixty (60) days more so one (1) year. Hence, following this
line of reasoning, there is no way that a previous BOD or its Officer will
hold a position in perpetuity unless the same Officers are re-elected every
year.

it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of

statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows:
"Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it
is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was
not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some
matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable,
but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language
used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier,
or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed.
Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier.

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