Modern Nation Building and Political Participation during

the XIX Olympiad in Mexico City

Axel G. Elías Jiménez

King’s College London, United Kingdom

Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Department of History

Final report for

the IOC Olympic Studies Centre

PhD Students Research Grant Programme

2016 Award
5 December 2016

In collaboration with Olympic Solidarity and

with the support of the Comité Olímpico Mexicano

1
Table of Contents
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... 3
Key Words .................................................................................................................................. 3
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5
Seeking international visibility: Sport mega-events in 20th Century Mexico ................................. 7
Securing Olympism and the Modern Nation: The election of Mexico City ................................... 8
Building Modern Mexico during the XIX Olympiad ................................................................... 11
The student movement and Games of the XIX Olympiad ........................................................ 19
Negotiating the Games: Imposition, Patriotism and Politics of Silence ....................................... 20
‘Everything is possible in Peace’? ............................................................................................ 29
‘Olympic hangover’? Mexico City and the political legacies of the XIX Olympiad ................... 32
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 34
Abreviations .................................................................................................................................. 36
References ..................................................................................................................................... 36
Archives .................................................................................................................................... 36
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 37

2
Abstract
The 1968 Olympic Games were of great interest for the Mexican Government and the IOC. Both
had interests behind their celebration. The IOC wanted to secure Olympism during a ‘shaken
world’, whilst the Mexican government saw the Games as a platform to communicate that
Mexico was a modern country ready for any project that it set eyes on. The preparation for the
event went according to plan from October 1963 to July 1968; however, the Mexican student
movement unintendedly jeopardised these goals. The negotiation of the social unrest from July
1968 to October 1968, during the last period of Olympic preparations, highlighted the political
divisions among the groups. This paper looks at sources from the IOC, government and the
student movement to map the political discussions and negotiations among these three actors.
The research touches on cultural diplomacy, nationalism, resistance, and security and
surveillance. This research contributes to scholarships with two findings. Firstly, it found that
IOC’s governance and politics of silence had a direct repercussion on the political participation
of Mexico City’s citizenry; secondly, that besides governmental repression and fear, the
protester’s patriotism, enhanced by the Olympic Games, was an element that allowed the Games
to continue as planned.

Key Words
Modern nation building, Cultural Diplomacy, Political participation, Governance and
Governmentality

3
Executive Summary
The main goal of this research is to rethink how Olympic Games are implemented and the ways
in which the host destinations are immediately impacted. Scholarship on the Olympic Games has
focused on the International Olympic Committee, the local government, media and the global
partners, but whilst it recovers an important aspect of the phenomenon by studying these actors,
scholarship has overlooked a key player: the host population. This research includes Mexico
City’s citizenry in the equation and considers that Olympic cycles are political arenas where the
abovementioned actors engage in debates and discussions. Every Olympic Games preparation
period has a consequence on each of the involved actors; however, the direct repercussion on the
lives of the citizenry has been overlooked.
This report mostly reflects the findings of four weeks of field work in Lausanne. The
revision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) archives in March 2016 was possible
thanks to the grant from the Olympic Studies Centre. During this period, I reviewed files
dedicated to the XIX Olympic Games and the Mexican IOC members, but I also had the chance
to retrieve information from the digitised Avery Brundage Collection. This revision allowed me
to map IOC’s actions from 1963 to 1968. This report reflects the findings of this archival
revision, and shows IOC’s actions during these years, but the report also includes material from
Mexican archives to pinpoint and contrast the actions of the IOC with those from the Mexican
Government and a sector of Mexico City’s citizenry (the student protestors).
This research found that Mexico City’s citizenry was a significant actor in the
implementation of the XIX Olympic Games, not only by engaging politically and showing signs
of resistance during the Olympic year, but also by accepting the Olympic Projects from 1963 to
1968. The politics of silence of the IOC and the violent repression of the government in 1968
were important elements that explain how the XIX Olympic Games took place, but we also have
to include Mexico City’s patriotism as part of the phenomenon. This research suggests that
governments and Organising Committees appeal to national values and identity as part of the
mega-event implementation on host destinations and that this has a direct repercussion in the
political activity. The actions of local governments and the IOC can generate political turmoil
and increase the political engagement of host populations. These report suggests that the history
of Olympism goes beyond the outstanding athletic performances. The development of Olympism
is also the history of host destinations and the actions they take.

4
Introduction
The Games of the XIX Olympiad were celebrated in Mexico City from the 12th to the 27th of
October 1968. Despite the critique of the altitude and the size of the Mexican economy compared
to previous hosts, among others, the sixteen days of competition were considered successful at
the time because they witnessed impressive athletic performances from Bob Beamon, Věra
Čáslavská and Leonid Zhabotinksy, among many others. Furthermore, the XIX Games were the
scenario of events with great sociocultural transcendence such as the so called, “black power
salute” of Tommie Smith, John Carlos and Peter Norman. Nevertheless, beyond the Olympic
venues, the XIX Olympiad was also very significant because it was the first to be celebrated in
Latin America and in a developing country. Given these features, the decision of choosing
Mexico City as the host of the 1968 Olympic Games was meant to be unique on its own terms,
but the developments from 1963 to 1968 went beyond the expectations of the IOC and the
Mexican government, and had a repercussion on Mexican political culture and Olympic history.
This paper will go beyond analysing the Olympic Games solely and will analyse the XIX
Olympiad as a six-year process (1962-1968). I am aware that Olympiad refers to a period of four
years, but in this text I will use it to refer to the moment when the bid was placed in December
1962 until the closing ceremony in October 1968. I took this decision because using the concept
of the ‘Olympic Games’ tends to highlight the competition period as the goal and disregards the
build-up which is as important given the transformations that take place during those years.
Scholarship requires studies of impacts and legacies, but also of immediate repercussions such as
the political negotiations where the host population also participates.
The scholarship on the XIX Olympiad, as in other scholarship of the Olympics prior to
1984, has focused on two actors: the IOC and the Mexican government. Given this focus, the
scholarship has contributed greatly to international relations, tourism, economics and security
studies, among others, where the IOC and the Mexican government are key players.
Nevertheless, few authors have looked at the role that Mexico City’s citizens played during the
Mexican Olympiad. As Claire and Keith Brewster noted: ‘Mexican student movement has had
the effect of drawing almost all attention away from the Olympic Games themselves and what
they meant for the Mexican people.’1 Beyond the IOC, local governments and from the eighties

1
Keith Brewster and Claire Brewster, 'The Mexican Student Movement of 1968: An Olympic Perspective', The
International Journal of the History of Sport, 26 (2009), 814.

5
onwards the global partners; the host population, ‘the people’, the citizenry have been an actor in
building Olympism.2 Including the host destination in these debates reshapes the scholarship.
The XIX Modern Olympiad will be understood in this paper as a political arena where
the IOC, Mexican government and Mexico City’s citizenry engaged in significant discussions
around nationhood, political participation and Olympism. Including the citizenry as an actor
allows us to reflect on a different side of the Olympics, one that goes beyond a cultural
diplomacy strategy, and looks at the reception of the Olympics and the political participation it
generated. Furthermore, given the fact that the 1968 Olympics were the first to present great-
scale domestic political activity prior to the Games, its study will allow us to explore elements of
critique of the Olympic Games by the host population. In this respect, the reflections of Michel
Foucault around the concept of governmentality were crucial to rethink how Mexico City’s
citizenry engaged with social unrest during the Olympiad.3
By including Mexico City’s citizenry as a significant actor in the XIX Olympiad (1962-
1968), this paper will revaluate the preparation, celebration and post-event periods and will add
other elements in the discussions around country branding and cultural diplomacy, citizenship
and democracy, security and surveillance, and Olympic resistance. This text is part of an
academic research and is meant to reflect on these aspects, but it can also work as a document
that raises awareness and can lead to rethinking public policies around sport mega-events. One of
the necessary issues to work on is on reducing the negative political impacts that Olympic
Games have on host destinations.

2
Scholars such as Joseph L. Arbena, Claire and Keith Brewster, Allen Guttmann, Alan Tomlinson and Kevin B.
Witherspoon have provided significant perspectives by analysing the urban and economic policies that the alliance
of the IOC and the Mexican government developed during the XIX Olympiad (a trend that the remarkable work of
David Harvey promoted, David Harvey, 'The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural
Change', Nueva York, NY: Blackwell.[Links], (1989).); nevertheless, the actions that enabled Olympism within the
Mexican population and which were are also part of the phenomenon have been overlooked, despite their immediate
effects. For extensive research regarding cultural diplomacy see Joseph L Arbena, 'Hosting the Summer Olympic
Games: Mexico City, 1968', Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean, (2002); Claire Brewster and Keith
Brewster, Representing the Nation: Sport and Spectacle in Post-Revolutionary Mexico, (Routledge, 2013); Keith
Brewster, Reflections on Mexico '68, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010); Luis Castañeda, 'Beyond Tlatelolco: Design,
Media, and Politics at Mexico′ 68', Grey Room, (2010); Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage
and the Olympic Movement, (Columbia University Press, 1984); Alan Tomlinson and Jonathan Woodham, Image
Power and Space, (Meyer & Meyer Verlag, 2007); Kevin B Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico
and the 1968 Olympic Games, (Northern Illinois University Press, 2008).
3
In his Lectures at the College de France, Foucault spoke of power as an exercise not only imposed from above, but
also accepted or rejected. This allowed me to consider the Olympic Games as a power exercise were not only the
IOC and the local governments have a say, but were host populations can take an active role by accepting these
claims. Michel Foucault and others, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège De France 1981--
1982, (Macmillan, 2005).

6
Seeking international visibility: Sport mega-events in 20th Century Mexico
On the evening of October 18th, 1963, during the 60th session of the IOC, Mexico City won the
first round of elections to host the 1968 Games. The Mexican bid obtained 30 of the 28 necessary
votes winning the elections by majority. The highly industrialised city of Detroit followed with
14, one France’s largest cities, Lyon obtained 12 and the Argentinian capital, Buenos Aires took
2.4 On the following day, Mexico City’s inhabitants read the following headlines in their
newspaper stands: ‘Mexico obtains the Olympic Games!’; ‘…international acknowledgement for
the Mexican People’; ‘Mexicans offer a party to celebrate.’5 Mexico seemed to be in the
spotlight. A year later, a similar reaction was perceived when Mexico was chosen to host the
1970 World Cup. The Mexican government and some individuals were deeply interested in
communicating a positive image of Mexico to the world and by winning the elections to host
these sport mega-events in a two-year period there were many interests at stake.6
The Mexican government’s interest to host the Olympic Games can be traced back
to1949, but Mexico’s interest in hosting the Games was finally successful in the sixties. By
October 1963, Mexico had undergone two decades of economic progress and appeared as
democratic for holding regular elections. The government and the hegemonic party behind it
were proud of these achievements and were interested in communicating them and continuing in
that path. José de Jesús Clark Flores and Marte R. Gómez were two of the main figures that
persuaded members of the Mexican government to back the bid for the Olympic Games. José de
Jesús Clark Flores was the chairman of the Mexican Olympic Committee and after returning

4
According to Ariel Rodriguez Kuri, the IOC also received bids from Cairo, Lausanne, Manila and Vienna, but
Avery Brundage and other members of the IOC discarded them for unknown reasons. IOCA, Vil-1968, S/SD in
Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, 'Ganar La Sede. La Política Internacional De Los Juegos Olímpicos De 1968', Historia
Mexicana, 64 (2014), 247.
5
Selection taken from the XIX Olympic Games report and the National Archives in Mexico (AGN, Archivo
General de la Nacion). AGN G2 DGIPS B901 ‘Prensa Latina’, F2, p. 69. References from archives are composed of
the Name of the archive, AGN; the location and name of the collection, G2 DGIPS; Box number, B901; and lastly
file, document number and further information, if available (‘Prensa Latina’, F2, p. 69).
6
The use of the sportive events was not exclusive of Mexico, other Latin American countries such as Argentina,
Brazil and Chile also placed several bids for sportive events to highlight their development throughout the 20th
century, but in the sixties only Mexico and Argentina had the capacity and interest in contending to hold the Games.
Concerning the World Cup, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have all placed four World Cup bids (only behind
Germany and Spain with 6 and 5 respectively); while for the Olympic Games, Brazil is one of the countries with
more bids with five, whilst Mexico and Argentina have also had an intense participation with three and four. In
addition, it is relevant to observe that economic issues have reduced the bids placed for these events (mostly after
the eighties). It was until Brazil’s emergence in the 21st century that the bids continued and were successful. Chile
was an exception, as it did not place as many bids; however, it did host the World Cup in 1962.

7
from the 1952 Summer Olympic Games, he declared: ‘Helsinki gave Mexican sport something
more valuable than utilitarian triumphs: It gave the exact route to achieve success.’7
Clark Flores thought he had found the ‘route to achieve success’ during the Olympic
Games in Helsinki. Nevertheless, he was not able to strongly persuade the Mexican government
until Adolfo López Mateos’ presidency (1958-1964). López Mateos was keen in using public
festivities to communicate the uniqueness of Mexican development. The celebrations of the 50th
anniversary of the Mexican revolution, as well as the nationalisation of the electric industry in
1960 were key moments for López Mateos to deliver the message that Mexico had economic
growth without having an authoritarian or military government. These conditions were
considered the country’s exceptionality. When Clark Flores and Gomez proposed the Olympic
Games as a ‘path to success’ during this period, the government agreed to this idea.8 The
government saw itself as following a model that would transform the country into a developed
one, and the Olympic Games were the perfect opportunity to do this.

Securing Olympism and the Modern Nation: The election of Mexico City
Alongside the Mexican economic growth, relative political stability and the government’s
increasing interest to hold the Games, the sixties were a fertile ground for the Mexican Olympic
project given the geopolitical interplay that the country was able to capitalise. Concerning this
perspective, there were at least two important factors that favoured the election of Mexico City:
the displeased ‘Emerging forces’ that felt left out of international politics (including Olympic
organisation); and the cold war tension in Latin America after the Cuban Revolution in 1959.
The XIX Olympiad, as others, was full of political interests and negotiations. The
opening speech of the IOC Executive Board meeting in Copenhagen in February 1967 captured
some of the main discussions that the IOC had during this period. In that session, Avery
Brundage, stated that the most important problem of the IOC was to ‘maintain the authority and
prestige of the IOC and the Olympic Movement’ while there was a growing threat of political
interference.’9 Among the threats, the IOC had to deal with the Games of the New Emerging

7
Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, 'Hacia México 68. Pedro Ramírez Vázquez Y El Proyecto Olímpico', Secuencia, (2003), 41.
8
Jaime Pensado considers that the Mexican government perceived the economic growth and political stability as
exceptional characteristics. Jaime Pensado, Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture
During the Long Sixties, (Stanford University Press, 2013).
9
Avery Brundage, ‘Welcome’ in IOC, Executive Board Meeting, Copenhagen, February 1967, p. 1, IOCA
CE19211984 1960-1969 1967-02-Copenhague.

8
Forces, the Afro-American threat to boycott the Games and the battle against the South African
apartheid.
By the time the elections for the 1968 Games took place, one the main threats were
precisely the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO). This multi-sport event was
scheduled to take place in Jakarta from November 10-22, 1963, just one month after the host
destination elections for the of the XIX Olympic Games. According to the President of
Indonesia, Dr Soekarno, who led the organisation of the GANEFO, these were against
colonialism and imperialism, and would create ‘a force that will create a new world that nobody
can resist.’10 Soekarno also explained that the goal would be achieved by gathering a
‘community of peoples, who want to be free, who want to be independent, who do not want to be
exploited…’11 Soekarno had high expectations with the sport event and considered that sport was
political. This openly political sporting event was against everything that Avery Brundage
wanted for the IOC.12
According to the formal invitation from the Indonesian government, the GANEFO were
not aimed to replace the Olympics, but to complement them. Nevertheless, they challenged the
IOC’s domain over international sport and included politics in the discussion table. This proved
to be a challenge for the IOC, but also to the countries that aspired to host the Olympic Games in
1968. The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in Mexico received the formal invitation to take part in
GANEFO in 1963 and left the decision to the Mexican Olympic Committee.13 In private
correspondence, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Tello, warned the representative of the

10
The plan in the organisation was to have a vice president that represented each region (Africa, Europe, Asia and
Latin America). General Direction of the Diplomatic Service to the Embassy of Indonesia, 31 August 1963, Archivo
Diplomático Mexicano (ADM, Mexican Diplomatic Archive). ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5
11
In the invitations for the event it was stated that the objectives were to establish a strong Indonesian Republic,
where ‘men would not exploit other men, and to create a new world-order of friendly brotherhood among nations.’
HE D. Soekarno, ‘Keynotes of President of Indonesia’ in Invitation for GANEFO, 29 April 1963, ADM SFA-DCA,
“Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5.
12
For instance, the GANEFO were discussed under the broad theme of ‘the several cases of politics interfering with
sport.’ IOC, Bulletin du CIO, Lausanne, 15 February 1963, p. 43. ADM DCA 56-1-1(1a), 1963-1966 Juegos
Olímpicos México 68, B23-F56-1(1aP).
13
The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs considered the opinion of the ambassador of the United Arab Republic that
Mexico should not compromise to the GANEFO since that would reduce Mexico’s chances to host the Olympics.
This recommendation was sent to Clark and Gómez. Manuel Tello to Marte R. Gómez, 12 August 1963, ADM SFA-
DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5.

9
Mexican Olympic Committee in the IOC, Marte R. Gómez, to be careful of the decisions and
opinions concerning GANEFO since there were political interests behind them.14
The GANEFO were an important diplomatic affair. The Mexican Olympic bid was
placed before the callings of GANEFO, the government was careful to not create a bad
reputation in the IOC and endanger its possibilities to be elected.15 The Mexican Olympic
Committee and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs planned wisely and decided to send athletes to
compete in Indonesia, but only those in professional sports. By doing this, Mexico did not
challenge the amateur character behind Olympism nor its aspirations to be elected host.16 This
strategy seemed to be effective since it did not challenge the IOC’s domain in sport nor the
invitation to be part of the Emerging Forces.
Christopher Wagner considers that the GANEFO helped Mexico’s case and ‘appeared to
challenge the self-assumed position of the IOC as the leader of world sports.’17 We can agree
with Wagner that Mexico’s association as an ‘emerging force’ helped to obtain more votes in the
elections.18 Nevertheless, we also have to consider the hypothesis of Ariel Rodríguez Kuri that
Mexico benefitted from being a ‘neutral’ country in the cold war conflict. The ‘east block’
favoured the Mexican bid against the possibility of having France or the United States organising
the Games of the XIX Olympiad. As Pedro Ramírez Vázquez mentioned: ‘Mexico beat Detroit
in the elections, and when the election was questioned, Los Angeles asked to substitute Mexico
as a host. Nevertheless, since the eastern countries did not want the Games to be awarded to the

14
Marte R. Gómez considered that the GANEFO would not eclipse the Games. In his view, the countries excluded
from the Olympics would not be missed and that accusing the IOC of imperialistic was false because they fought to
keep their autonomy. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Tello, 19 August 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”,
III/2888-5
15
Mexico did not take part in the preparatory conferences for the GANEFO competitions and did not take a clear
position along the planning. The ambassador to Indonesia, Albarrán López, said that Mexico would take part in the
GANEFO, but on the 30th of August, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs communicated that Mexico would not have
enough time to send athletes, but they would help Indonesia’s case to get reincorporated to the IOC. Mexico tried to
stay ‘neutral’ and not endanger the relations it had with the ‘Emerging Countries’ nor with the IOC. Manuel Tello to
Foreign Affairs, 30 August 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5. This news was also reported in
Excelsior on the 29th of August 1963, ‘El Comité Olímpico Mexicano ofrece mediar en el problema COI-Indonesia’;
[Rosenzweig Díaz], Memorandum for the President, 31 July 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5
16
José Luis Laris to Clark Flores, 4 October 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5
17
Christoph Wagner, 'Representing the Nation: Sport and Spectacle in Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Book Review)',
Sport in History, 33 (2013), 217.
18
The minutes of the 60th session show that the GANEFO were still a topic of debate by 1968, Avery Brundage
spoke against the ‘issues in regions such as Kenya, Central America, South Africa and Indonesia.’ International
Olympic Committee, 'Minutes of the 60th Session', (Baden-Baden: International Olympic Committee, 1963), (p.
68).

10
US, they gave us their full support. Issues of the Cold War.’19 In the end, the election of Mexico
to host the XIX Olympic Games was multifactorial and included the cold war, the GANEFO
discussions and the cultural diplomacy campaign carried by the Mexican government.

Building Modern Mexico during the XIX Olympiad

Mexico’s successful path to obtain the Olympics formally began on December 7th, 1962 when
Mexico City’s mayor, Ernesto P. Uruchurtu, travelled to Lausanne to request the XIX Olympic
Games. The request was submitted as a 180 page document titled ‘Mexico’ which contained
‘official documentation, answers to IOC’s questionnaire, a report on the existing venues in the
city, medical opinions on the “effects” of altitude in athletes, an exposition of international
events celebrated in recent years and a collection of Mexican art and culture.’20 The bid book
commenced with official documentation such as Uruchurtu’s formal request and letters from the
presidency, ministers of the interior, education and tourism which showed full federal support.21
In the first pages of the bid book, the invitation committee was able to give a clear
message of the country and its intentions with the Games: ‘We are a developing country, we are
building a modern country and precisely because of that, we don’t want anyone to destroy it […]
México is spending, and will spend more if it was necessary, to organise the Games because they
resemble the next step of our development.’22 This description was well received by IOC
members since there was a threat of developing countries to hold their own multi-sport event, the
GANEFO. Mexico was seen as a good option to balance that threat.23
The ‘Invitation Committee for the Olympic Games’, led by José de Jesús Clark Flores
and Marte R. Gómez,24 was the group that represented Mexico in the bidding process to obtain

19
M.J. Ortega, T. Ragasol, and Museo de Arte Moderno, Diseñando México 68: Una Identidad Olímpica, (Museo
de Arte Moderno, Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, 2008), p. 30.
20
Organising Committee of the XIX Olympic Games, Official Olympic Report, (Mexico, 1969), p. 11.V. II
21
Lorenzo (Ed.) Carrasco, 'México Solicita, Xix Juegos Olímpicos', ed. by Departamento del Distrito Federal
(Mexico City: Litográfica Machado, 1962).[p. 6]
22
Organising Committee of the XIX Olympic Games, 'Olympic Bulletin', (Mexico City, 1964), (p. 3).
23
We cannot forget that other factors such as personal relations also played a role in the election. For instance, on
July 28th, 1962, Avery Brundage was promoted to be the holder of the “Aguila Azteca.” This award was the highest
award that a ‘non-national’ could receive. Manuel Tello gave the Award to Brundage in the ceremony. This action
had a repercussion on the links of Brundage with the Mexican bid. Clark Flores to Antonio Carrillo Flores, Mexico
City, 28 July 1966, ADM DCA 56-1-1(1a), Juegos Olímpicos México 68, B23-F56-1(1aP).
24
Committee, p. 69. Marte R. Gómez was born in Reynosa, Tamaulipas and studied to be a Hydro-agricultural
Engineer in the National School of Agriculture. Gómez served the Mexican government as depute, senator,
governor, agriculture and finance Secretary, and Mexican representative in France and Austria. By the time he took

11
the XIX Olympic Games.25 The ‘Invitation Committee’, as it was referred to in the
correspondence, was in charge of persuading IOC members that the Mexican capital was the best
option for the XIX Olympics. Clark and Gómez were ideal for the task since they had persuaded
the city and federal government to back the Olympic bid. On 29 June 1963, a few months before
the IOC elections, the federal government showed its compromise to the IOC members by
officially creating the Organising Committee. The federal support ratified the authorisation given
to Mexico City’s major to request the XIX Olympic Games.26
Mexico City was elected host of the 1968 Olympic Games in the first round of elections
during the 60th IOC session in Baden Baden. After the results were announced, Gomez and
General Clark, who were in charge of the Mexican bid, ‘offered their thanks and formally
pledged themselves to carry out all that had been promised.’27 Just after the elections, Avery
Brundage was interviewed and he gave important insights behind the election of Mexico when
he declared: ‘You must remember there are more than a score of Spanish-speaking countries and
this will be a great inspiration to them. What helped Mexico was that it is one of the smaller-
scale countries and some members felt they could do more for the Olympic movement on the
whole by giving encouragement to such a country.’28 Mexico was chosen as a way to ‘inspire
smaller-scale countries’ to continue supporting Olympism as managed by the IOC.
Mexico was chosen to organise the XIX Olympic Games, but this did not mean that its
projects and concerns were reduced to two weeks of athletic competition in October 1968;
behind the Games there was a five-year preparation period in which the Mexican government
and the IOC had expectations and goals. For the IOC it was an opportunity to expand and secure
Olympism, but in order to do that they had to persuade people that choosing a developing
country as the host was of benefit to all. For the government it was a chance to obtain

part in the organising committee, he was the chairman of Worthington of Mexico and member of the IOC. Games, p.
3.
25
Besides Clark and Gómez, the group was integrated by Alejandro Carrillo, Josué Sanz, Federico Mariscal, Manuel
Guzmán, Eduardo Hay, Armando Moraila, Antonio Estopier and Lorenzo Torres. ABC B178, Ernesto P. Uruchurtu
to Brundage, 7 December 1962.
26
The creation of the Organising Committee required the participation of several Secretariats. One of the most
important aspects it highlighted was that the inclusion of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Interior would
‘facilitate the athletes and their teams to access and remain in the country legally.’ Furthermore, it stated that even
though Mexico had the necessary elements to organise the Games, ‘it would include adaptations and constructions if
found necessary for the best development of the Olympics.’ Diario Oficial. Organo del gobierno constitucional de
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Saturday 29 June 1963, Volume CCLVIII, No. 51.
27
Committee, p. 69.
28
'Mexico City Picked over Detroit, Lyon and Buenos Aires for 68 Olympics', The New York Times, (1963).

12
international recognition and start a modern building project that would brand the whole country
as modern and developed, and not only the capital. Fulfilling these goals was not easy and the
government through the Organising Committee tried to appeal to all Mexicans to fulfil this goal.
As expressed by the Chairman of the Organising Committee: ‘The commitment of these Games
is not of the Government nor of a group, but of all Mexicans… The Mexican youth shall be the
image of our country … that is their responsibility.’29
From the moment Mexico was elected the host of the XIX Olympic Games, there was
international critique and therefore difficulty to fulfil some of the intended goals. The critical
views questioned IOC’s decision, but also the Mexican nation building projects associated with
the Games. A review of the international press from 1962 to 1968 shows that many believed
Mexico was not qualified to host the Games. Whether it was Mexico City’s altitude or because
of an incipient economic development, many believed that the host destination of the XIX
Olympiad did not have proper conditions for the Games. This drove the Organising Committee
to hold a continuous campaign to persuade the international and domestic publics that the XIX
Games had everything to be successful. As The Telegraph reported: ‘Ever since they the XIX
Games were granted … the Mexicans have found themselves obliged to defend the decision.’30
The ‘invitation committee’, led by Clark and Gómez, highly active for the election of
Mexico as the Olympic city, had to be disintegrated in order to let the Organising Committee
plan the Games for the following years. This was a political transformation in its own right
because not all the people continued working in the official committee. Mexican president
Adolfo López Mateos who had not taken part directly in the first group was appointed as the
head of the Organising Committee in 1964. The most visible changes in this period came
precisely from the communications department. Through regular publications, the Organising
Committee tried to refute the critiques that the altitude of Mexico City endangered the athlete’s
health and that the venues would not be finished in time, among others. The Organising
Committee was keen on insisting that Mexico was fulfilling the protocols and would organise
one of the best Olympics of modern times. As John Sayre reported, ‘Mexico is preparing to
silence the sceptics and delight the world … Mexico will present an example of how to build a

29
‘Asociación Nacional de Prensa Estudiantil’ AGN G7 COXIXJO B76-196.
30
The author referenced international issues with Mexico City’s thin air, the boycott of South Africa, the Afro-
American threats, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and lastly the student movement. Donald Saunders,
‘Hopes now that XIXth Olympics will be “an Oasis of sanity”’, Daily Telegraph, 12 October 1968, IOCA 1968SOG
C-J01-1986/2.

13
nation … Mexico CAN and WILL stage the Olympics and they will be one of the most exciting
Games ever held.’31
The government was optimist during most of the preparation for the Olympic Games and
tried to communicate it international and domestically. Miguel Alemán Velasco, director of the
National Tourism Council in the sixties, declared in 1966 that as the host of the XIX Olympic
Games, Mexico would ‘gain lasting international prestige’ and would take its place ‘among the
great and important nations.’32 Alemán, along Heriberto Vidales, Raimundo Cuervo and Antonio
Méndez were in charge of preparing a triennial project, 1966-1968, that communicated the
meaning of the Olympiad for the population, as well as the ‘enormous sense of commitment’ that
Mexican people had to consider and feel.33 The team expressed that the XIX Olympiad was the
basis for a new era,34 and tried to fulfil three goals by educating the population: disseminating
Olympic Sport in Mexico, establishing a sense of national responsibility and waking the ‘natural
hospitality of Mexicans.’35
The triennial program proved to be successful and it began to be internalised soon.
Mexican journalists increasingly repeated the messages that the triennial project aimed for as the
Games approached. For instance, El Nacional published: ‘we must get ready to receive the whole
world in our home and this means two types of preparation: the material and the spiritual. From
these two, the spiritual is the most important, because the poverty of the host does not mean
anything, if in their attitude, features, feelings, they express the pleasure of receiving guests.’36
The message was clear, the Olympics were an important commitment for the country, despite the
scarcity, and everyone had to be involved in Mexico’s positive image.
The planning for the 1968 Olympic Games began since Mexico City was elected, but its
actions were not that visible. The construction of new venues and the changes in the city began
in 1965, but the planning and the transformation of the citizenry had begun since 1963. The

31
John Sayre, ‘Preparing for the Olympics, Mexico surprises the sceptics’ in Pace, June 1966, p. 9, IOCA 1968SOG
C-J01-1968/14 14181. Sayre also stated that the beyond the plans of the government, the youth was searching for
ways ‘to extend the revolutionary principle to the sphere of human aims and motives.’ In his perspective, the
student’s would learn how to modernise ‘mankind.’ Ibid. p. 24
32
Eddy Mulder (compiler), In those days. Olympic Games, Mexico, 12-27 October 1968, KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, p. 21, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1968/14 206494 .
33
Felipe Bustamante, ‘Proyecto para crear en el pueblo conciencia Olímpica’, Novedades, 29 August 1965, AGN
G2 DGIPS B429 F8.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid. The project received the help of the Section of Educative Publicity and the National Council of Publicity
36
Editorial, ‘Preparativos Olímpicos’ in El Nacional, August 6, 1965, AGN G2 DGIPS B429 F8.

14
publications provide physical evidence of what the Organising Committee worked on, but also
on its intentions. The Mexican government through the Organising Committee were interested in
showing the ‘rich historical traditions’ of the country whilst showing the possibilities of a
modern country in the future. According to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, ‘The publications
of the Organising Committee of the Games of the XIX Olympiad should reflect all organisation
aspects of the Games… Attention will be placed in the cultural aspects, as much pre-Hispanic as
current, and of Mexico’s life in general.’37
The Organising Committee printed two regular publications: the bimonthly ‘official
bulletin’ and the ‘Olympic Newsletter’, delivered every fortnight. The latter had an image that
took the whole centre page with the idea of making it collectible. The Newsletter was
accompanied by a ‘Graphic Review’, a publication with many images that complemented the
information of the two former. These publications were printed in French, Spanish and English
and were handed to the IOC, NOCs (National Olympic Committees), ISF (international sport
federations), NSF (National Sport Federations), cultural centres, universities, clubs, embassies
and the press. During the first editions of these publications, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs
decided where these would be distributed.38 It was part of a cultural diplomacy strategy to
improve the image of Mexico internationally.39 Mexico’s diplomatic service was constantly
promoting the Olympic Games in every country where Mexico had a consulate or embassy.40
Nevertheless, after some time the Organising Committee took full responsibility of the
distribution.
The Organising Committee displayed what they considered the most characteristic
features of the country. An analysis of these publications shows that the 20th century was the
most represented period. The colonial and the pre-Columbian period followed, and the 19th

37
Luis Aleleyra Arroyo de Anda, Director of Arts and Culture, to Jesús Cabrera Muñoz Ledo, Director of Cultural
Affairs of SRE, Mexico City, 22 January 1967, ADM B23 F60-1.
38
José S. Gallástegui to Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, Mexico City, 10 November 1966, ADM B23 F56-2.
39
Leobardo Reynoso to Manuel Carrillo, 28 July 1967, ADM SFA-DCA 65-3 1965-1968 Juegos Olímpicos México
68, XV/8217(2)1369.
40
Nevertheless, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez thought that this task was not always done as he envisioned. In 1967 he
wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs asking him about the lack of publicity in European airports since this was a
great opportunity to advertise the Games. Pedro Ramírez Vázquez to José S. Gallástegui, Mexico City, 6 July 1967,
ADM B23 F56-2.

15
century was the most ignored epoch. The organising committee’s intention was clear, Mexico’s
heritage was important, but promoting a modern image of Mexico was fundamental.41
The Mexican government and the Organising Committee used Conferences, newspaper
reports, radio programs and flyers as a constant strategy to prepare Mexico City’s citizens for the
Olympic Games. For the international perspective, however, they used the Olympic Newsletters
and other publications as the main cultural diplomacy channels to communicate the Mexican
progresses and Olympic development. The first Olympic Newsletter captured the importance of
the Games for the Mexican government: ‘“This distinction is a new form of world recognition of
Mexico’s progress and the importance of our great metropolis … It implies an obligation of the
government, the inhabitants of Mexico City and the nation as a whole, to do whatever may be
necessary to give the greatest possible brilliance to this event and offer unforgettable hospitality
to those who will come to Mexico to attend the Games.’42
Once again, the text appealed to the ‘nation as a whole’ to support the organisation of the
Games. This call was repeated over the years and it took an even greater impact when Ramírez
Vázquez was appointed chairman of the Organising Committee. The ‘Program of Olympic
Identity’ was created in this period and built their projects from where the publishing department
had left the work. Beatrice Trueblood, a pioneer in graphic design from the United States, was
appointed as the head of the program,43 and worked directly with designers such as Eduardo
Terrazas44 and Lance Wyman.45 The idea was to promote a new image of Mexico, away from all
stereotypes, as well as promoting the advances of the Organising Committee.46

41
An image analysis of these publications showed that 183 images represented the 20th century, 93 and 44 the
colonial and pre-Columbian period respectively, and the 19th century was only represented in 18. Publications found
in the Private Archive of Pedro Ramírez Vázquez.
42
Organising Committee of the XIX Olympiad, Mexico Informs, 1964, p. [24] IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1968/9.
43
Beatrice Trueblood met the Chairman of the Organising Committee, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, while developing a
book about the Museo de Antropología in Mexico City which Ramírez had designed. Trueblood was invited to the
‘Olympic Identity’ team when Ramírez Vázquez took the reins of Olympic organisation in 1966. Ortega, Ragasol,
and Moderno, p. 48.
44
Eduardo Terrazas was involved in the project because he had worked with Ramírez Vázquez in the construction of
the Mexican Pavilion for the 1964-1965 World Fair in Detroit. Terrazas stayed in Detroit and worked as a professor
of architectonic design in the University of Columbia and as a graphic designer for George Nelson. Ibid.
45
Lance Wyman would later be involved on creating important logos in Mexico, such as the public underground
system (metro), Hylsa, the Suburban train, among others.
46
According to José Luis Ortiz Téllez, Lance Wyman’s assistant during the XIX Olympiad, no one on their own
was capable of generating as many projects for the Olympics; many students that drew or worked in publicity (the
term Graphic Designer was not frequently used at the time). Trueblood supervised their work and was in charge of
sending the proposals to the print. José Luis Ortiz Téllez, 'Acerca De La Creación Del Sistema De Diseño De Los
Xix Juegos Olímpicos De México 1968', (.925 Artes y Diseño, Revista de la facultad de artes y diseño plantel
Taxco).

16
 In retrospective, Terrazas and Trueblood consider that ‘Mexico 68 went far beyond a
“graphic” identity.’ Their main goal was to ‘present Mexico’s vast and unique culture to the
world.’47 The message was repeated across various supports such as publications, ads, media,
among others. Trueblood and Terrazas would also mentioned that the Olympic Identity program
did become the image of Mexico thanks to action and repetition. In their own words, they
became Mexico: ‘“You are what you think”, “what you say”, “what you do”. We did become
Mexico 68. Mexico could stage the games! Mexico could become Mexico 68 – a great fiesta
capturing the spirit of a whole nation.’48
Newspapers and speeches were also an important part of delivering this message. For
instance, in the state of nation address in 1968, president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz acknowledged that
Mexico was not rich country, but it was full of hardworking people. Concerning the Olympic
Games, the President mentioned: ‘we have undertaken great sacrifices and important
expenditures so that all the necessary venues for the celebration of this mega international event
are finished and ready to be used, as they already are.’49
There was excitement around the preparation Games given the international attention, but
this was not obtained because of the economic outcomes of holding the mega-event. As José
Irineo García mentioned: ‘In that time, there were no revenues, it was more like a house party
where one spends everything one in order to have a nice party, nothing else mattered.’50 Most of
the citizenry of Mexico City embraced the idea that the goal of the Olympic Games was to show
the real image of Mexico to the world. Esmeralda Reynoso mentioned that there were a lot of
journalists covering the event and what was happening around it, according to Reynoso, the
Games made Mexico visible to the world.51

47
Eduardo Terrazas and Beatrice Trueblood, 'This Is Not Mexico [Reply to Daoud Sarhandi’s Article ‘This Is
1968… This Is Mexico’] ', (EYE magazine, 2016).
48
Ibid.
49
Furthermore, Díaz Ordaz would also declare: ‘We did not hesitate in any expenditure to fit the International
Olympic rules, but we do not wish to exceed the cost of venues in other cities, in ours you won’t find greater luxury
–genuine and truthful–, than that of the genius, knowledge, good taste and spirit of the hard work of Mexicans who
thought, projected and built them.’ Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, ‘IV informe de gobierno’, 1 September1968 in Obras
Públicas, Dirección General de Información de la Secretaría de Obras Públicas, Centro SCOP, Year 3, No. 4=31,
October 1968, p. 7
50
García stated in his interview that the Olympic Games were not perceived as a money-making enterprise at the
time. ‘En aquella parte no había ganancias entonces, pero era como una fiesta domestica que uno gasta todo lo que
tiene para que la fiesta salga bonita y no interesaba más allá…’ José Irineo García (track and field judge) in
discussion with the author, 6 July 2015 in Mexico City.
51
‘Los Juegos Olímpicos estaban llenos de periodistas reportando el movimiento y lo que estaba pasando. Yo tengo
periódicos italianos que hablan del 2 de octubre, del 68 y de todo ¿no? No con los titulares de aquí de México. Que

17
 The communications in real time through radio and colour television in the sixties had an
impact on the reflections on visibility, at least to the urban sector that experienced an increase in
their capacity to acquire electronic equipment for their homes as a result of the economic growth
of the country. An interviewed student movement leader mentioned the importance of receiving
news quite quickly thanks to the technological advances. According to her, ‘Nuestro mundo’
showed various events, such as the Beatles playing ‘All you need is love’ for the first time to the
whole world. This brought awareness that Mexico was being observed in real time all over the
world.52
Beyond the global perception, the XIX Olympic Games caused excitement among
Mexico City’s inhabitants. As José Irineo García mentioned, ‘We were proud to organise the
Olympic Games and that everything went according to plan…. The government used time in TV
and radio to persuade the people to clean their streets, to maintain the order, to paint their houses,
in general terms, ‘that the city looked pretty.’53 Cuauhtémoc Lamas would add that the Games
‘demonstrated that Mexico had the capacity to hold Olympic Games, as it would later do with
the World Cup, with good qualities and success.’54
The Olympic Games were a great opportunity to communicate images of the country to
the rest of the world in real time. Mexico City’s citizenry was excited about these circumstances.
Cuauhtémoc Lamas mentions that ‘everyone agreed that the Olympic Games were held here in

si puso a México en el mundo, sí, sí.’ Esmeralda Reynoso (student movement leader) in discussion with the author
17 July 2015 in Mexico City.
52
The interviewee also raised the question if this meant that people all over the world saw the contradiction between
the motto ‘Everything is possible in peace.’ According to her, it must have had some sort of impact on how the
people viewed the world. ‘Pero el caso es que en 1967 se hace un programa que para nosotros fue impactante,
porque eso también fue muy importante, nos llegaban las cosas más rápido, se llamó ‘nuestro mundo’, donde hubo
transmisiones de diferentes países y los estábamos viendo en el momento, fue la primera vez que, digo para ustedes
que agarran el teléfono, se comunican a Londres y se están viendo, pero para nosotros ver el estreno de “All you
need is love” de los Beatles y saber que los estábamos viendo en vivo fue… no tienes idea de la maravilla, eso hace
un poco es la globalización, las cosas llegan más rápido y más directamente, antes tardaban mucho. En ese sentido,
los deportistas de todos esos países que estaban aquí, estaban reportando el movimiento, no tengo la idea de cómo
era en otros países de si ver la fiesta, porque además fueron las primeras olimpiadas donde se hizo la olimpiada
cultural y que el slogan era ‘todo es posible en la paz’, entonces evidentemente yo no sé la repercusión en otros
países, pero que algo debió haberles chocado, algo debió haber sido.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015.
53
‘‘No, lo que había era gran efervescencia entre toda la gente porque se sentía, o nos sentíamos orgullosos de
organizar unos juegos olímpicos y que todo fuera en orden, que todo fuera bien hecho. Incluso los medios
desplegaban mucho tiempo en radio y televisión para que la gente limpiara sus calles, que mantuviera el orden, que
pintara sus casas, incluso, es decir, que se viera bonita la ciudad.’ José Irineo García, 6 July 2015.
54
‘No, fíjate que no. Los juegos olímpicos demostraron que México tenía la capacidad para realizar unos juegos
olímpicos, como posteriormente hizo con el mundial de fútbol, con buena capacidad y con buen éxito.’ Cuauhtémoc
Lamas (security guard) in discussion with the author, 18 July 2015 in Mexico City.

18
Mexico’; and although we can question his perspective, because not everyone embraced the
Games, we can agree that the student movement came to most as a disruption and as a surprise.55

The student movement and Games of the XIX Olympiad

The student movement began in the end of July 1968 after the police repressed several students
during a demonstration in Mexico City’s central area. The constant and increasing repression
reciprocally dissatisfied more students. From July to October 1968, high school and university
students of Mexico City took to the streets, printed banners and flyers to show their discontent
with the government. Their activities around the city attracted other students and sectors to join
the struggle. By the first week of August, students created the Consejo Nacional de Huelga
(CNH, National Strike Council) as a representative council for the movement. The CNH was
comprised of representatives of the involved schools; it was the most important organised body
behind the student movement.
The student movement began in the end of July 1968 as a reaction to the excessive use of
violence to control political demonstrations. The student movement had no visible connection to
the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, the government and the IOC perceived it as a threat to their
projects. This idea was strengthened by occasional comments of the students. For instance,
student movement leader, Gilberto Guevara declared that Mexico was a ‘disguised dictatorship,
to the interior and to the exterior´ and implied that the Olympics were just a scam to disguise the
domestic issues.56 The student movement began a few months before the planned opening
ceremony and as a response the government ordered Mexico City’s riot police to control the
student protests.57 The increasing violence from these groups reciprocally increased the students’
activity. The fact that students communicated lines as the following pressured the government

55
‘Sí mira aceptar los juegos olímpicos le dio una gran alegría al pueblo. Sí, de hecho, todos estaban de acuerdo que
“los juegos olímpicos aquí en México”, era la primera vez y había mucho entusiasmo, mucha colaboración, mucho
todo… mucho ánimo. Y pues nadie se imaginaba que unos meses antes de que llegaran los juegos olímpicos, hubo
un pleito estudiantil.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015.
56
AGN G2 DGIPS B482 F1 D233 (Gilberto Guevara on the Olympic Games)
57
According to Leopoldo Ramirez, the Mexican government was divided between those that looked for a positive
solution, the “palomas (doves)” and the hard-wingers, the “halcones (hawks).” ‘…imagínate un sistema que tiene
sexenios de existir, que se presenta muy sólido casi sin fisuras, por decirle así, y que de pronto el movimiento
estudiantil da un vuelco en contra del autoritarismo que reinaba. Tomó por sorpresa a muchos políticos
tradicionales, por eso nos dividimos en dos, nosotros las dizque palomas y ellos los dizque halcones.’ Leopoldo
Ramírez Limón (Secretariat of the Presidency) in discussion with the author, Online Interview, 10 January 2016.

19
even more to eradicate the dissidence: ‘The world should know that the economic and political
stability of Mexico is a myth.’58
At the time, the movement was labelled as a communist plot to discredit the country
given the proximity of the Games. Although there were some militants of the Communist Party
within the movement, not all who joined the student protests or the organisation of student
demonstration had a clear political inclination. For Cuauhtémoc Lamas, ‘the movement came to
a high point when… the unions, the students, all the schools, people from everywhere…
marched from Chapultepec to National Palace.’59 Indignation seemed to be the element that
gathered up to 500,000 in the biggest demonstration in Mexico City.
Mexico City’s citizenry was divided regarding the student movement. Many people in
Mexico City supported the students and was visible in the demonstrations; however, there were
also many that did not support them. The latter showed their allegiance through correspondence
and telegrams to the government, but also through the press. Javier Najera’s article captures one
of the main interpretations. According to Najera, the protesting students were people ‘with exotic
images and ideas’ that committed illegal acts. For Najera, the military interventions were just
measures to stop the students from ‘conspiring and pressuring for the satisfaction of their
demands.’60 According to these groups, violence was justified in the sake of a better nation
during and after the Olympic Games. This belief proved to be an important element in the events
that took place in October 1968.

Negotiating the Games: Imposition, Patriotism and Politics of Silence

In the end of September 1968, the State Department of the United Stated considered that the
Mexican Government was ‘“completely determined to restore order by any means”’61 The
student movement lasted several months and the government was running out of options. The

58
Christopher Brasher and Hugh McILvanney, ‘Games men warn Mexico as civil war looms’, The Observer, 6
October 1968, p. 24, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1986/2.
59
‘El movimiento tuvo una culminación, llegó en su momento más alto cuando todas las agrupaciones, comerciantes
de Tepito y todos los lados, todos los sindicatos, los estudiantes, todas las escuelas, de todos lados, era una cantidad
de gente tremenda, empezaron a marchar de Chapultepec al Palacio Nacional y las consignas que gritaban ya no
eran solamente contra el jefe de policía si no ya en contra inclusive del presidente de la república y del secretario de
gobernación.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015.
60
Javier Nájera Torres, ‘El partido ante el movimiento estudiantil’ in El Universal, 26 September 1968, p. 2, AGN
G2 DGIPS B1579B F5 D423.
61
State Department memo, 26 September 1968 in Kevin B. Witherspoon, ‘Repression of Protest and the Image of
Progress (Mexico City 1968)’ in Vida Bajc, Surveilling and Securing the Olympics: From Tokyo 1964 to London
2012 and Beyond, (Springer, 2015), p. 122.

20
latter had experience dealing with dissidence and used the press to discredit the movement, the
army and the military police to repress the protestors, and the secret police to disable the leaders
of the movement. As Cuauhtémoc Lamas mentioned: ‘They did not only break up protests but
they also imprisoned leaders. They locked them in the Military Fields… not only to the leaders,
but to many and they kept them imprisoned for a long time before they were set free.’62
The increase of repressive measures that the abovementioned actors referenced was
visible in Gustavo Diaz Ordaz’ State of the Nation Address on the 1st of September 1968.
Concerning the student movement, President Diaz Ordaz emphatically declared:
The dilemma is irreducible: Should the police intervene or not? We have
arrived to debauchery in the use of the mediums of expression and diffusion;
we have enjoyed extensive freedoms and guarantees to manifest, ordered in
certain aspects, but contrary to article 9 of the constitution; we have been
tolerant until excessive criticism; but everything has its limit and we cannot
allow to keep breaking the juridical order as it appears to the eyes of the whole
world.63

Díaz Ordaz emphatically declared that the protests would not be tolerated any longer and
that there were legal grounds to use the army to control the protests. The army took some of the
main spaces where students gathered and increased repressive measures; however, not many
expected the government’s reaction on October 2nd. On that tragic day, the army and the
‘Olympia battalion’ massacred the attendees of the student meeting in the Plaza de las Tres
Culturas in Tlatelolco. Many students and circumstantial spectators lost their life between
panicking crowds and crossfire.
Very few people were informed on what happened that day, but many now consider that
it was a strategy from the Secretariat of the Interior and of the Presidency. As Cuauhtémoc

62
‘…los granaderos eran brutalmente salvajes. No solamente deshacían manifestaciones si no que apresaban a los
líderes. Los metían al campo militar. Eso les pasó a varios maestros, ferrocarrileros, no sólo a los líderes si no a
muchos y les dieron mucho tiempo detenidos antes de ser liberados.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015. Alonso
Valles mentioned that the government tried to disseminate the idea that the students wanted to boycott the Games,
harm the venues and even the athletes. ‘…el gobierno empezó a correr la noticia de que querían boicotear los juegos,
querían agredir a los deportistas, querían impedir adelante con los juegos y pretendían que las delegaciones a sus
países…Eso no era cierto, no pretendían boicotear ni mucho menos dañar físicamente a un deportista.’ Alonso
Valles (Gymnast) in discussion with the author, 30 June 2015 in Mexico City.
63
[‘El dilema es pues, irreductible: ¡Debe o no intervenir la policía? Se ha llegado al libertinaje en el uso de todos
los medios de expresión y difusión; se ha disfrutado de amplisímas libertades y garantías para hacer
manifestaciones, ordenadas en ciertos aspectos, pero contrarias al texto expreso del artículo 9o constitucional;
hemos sido tolerantes hasta excesos criticados; pero tiene su límite y no podemos permitir ya que siga quebrantando
irremisiblemente el orden jurídico, como a los ojos de todo mundo ha venido sucediendo’ Camara de Diputados
Mexico, 'Informes Presidenciales, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz', ed. by Servicio de Investigación y Análisis (2006).

21
Lamas mentioned: ‘The Secretariat of the Interior considered that if people gathered again, it
would be very dangerous. Therefore, the Secretariat, and everyone knows this, ordered a
counterattack. There were many plans, but the most known one is when students were
surrounded by the army in the Plaza de las Culturas.’64 Mexican newspapers did not go into
detail about the massacre because the government controlled the paper supply and therefore the
news content. Only a few of international journalists, many of which were covering the
Olympics, wrote about the massacre. The massacre of Tlatelolco resulted in many dead, the
figure is unknown until this day, but sadly it was not the only repressive measure as suggested by
Lamas. Student movement, Esmeralda Reynoso, considered that the government implemented a
regular tactic of continuous attacks to the student movement; many active students were
disappeared or imprisoned.65
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz believed that he took the best course of actions. Almost a
decennium after the XIX Olympics, when Díaz Ordaz was appointed as ambassador of Spain in
1977, the ex-president declared that what he felt more proud of during his six years of presidency
was solving the student movement in 1968 the way he did, because he was able to ‘save the
country’ on time. The president angrily declared that the losses during the student movement
were not significant compared to the successes achieved in the long run and Tlatelolco was just a
‘sad event in the history of the people.’66
Diaz Ordaz was not the only person that justified the repression. Many considered that it
was necessary to stop the protests. For instance, Maria Luisa Nava mentioned: ‘Can you imagine
the discredit of Mexico if the Games would have been cancelled? Besides, no one can take the
Olympic Games not even the United States. Everything that is required around them, nobody can
take them. Then he said [the president], we “we have to extirpate it from the root” and he did.’67

64
‘Entonces la Secretaria de Gobernación vio que si se juntaba otra vez la cantidad de gente que se juntó, iba a ser
muy peligroso. Entonces la SEGOB, y eso lo sabe todo el mundo, dio planes de contraataque, fueron muchos los
planes que hizo, pero el que más fue conocido, fue cuando estaban reunidos todos los estudiantes en la plaza de las
culturas fueron rodeados por el ejército.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015.
65
‘Yo creo que fue un proceso. Fue un proceso de golpeo continuo del gobierno, pues como te digo, sólo se habla
del 2 de octubre, pero hubo una represión constante cada vez más fuerte y cada vez más dura, desde la última
manifestación en agosto cuando entran los tanques eso ya iba en serio, o sea, no eran corretizas, era a matar.’
Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015.
66
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, 'Press Conference as Appointed Ambassador to Spain', (Mexico, Secretariat of Foreign
Affairs,, 1977).
67
‘¿Tú te imaginas el descredito de México de cancelar unos juegos Olímpicos? Aparte nadie puede agarrar unos
juegos Olímpicos un mes antes, nadie, ni Estados Unidos, todo lo que se requiere alrededor de él, nadie lo puede

22
Nava’s testimony shows her belief that the Games were going to benefit the country and political
activity was a threat that had to be eradicated. Curiously, even though the student protesters and
their sympathisers did not agree with the violence, there were many students that considered that
the political activity had to be interrupted given the proximity of the Games.
Ultimately, the government was the one who ordered repression and tried to justify it;
nonetheless, the IOC played a relevant role on how these events were handled, especially Avery
Brundage. The Executive board met several times and discussed at great length ‘the difficulties
which had arisen in Mexico City in connection with the demonstrations which have been
broadcasted all over the world.’ In the session of October 6th 1968, IOC Vice-President Clark
Flores expressed his confidence in the Mexican people and ‘stressed that this was not a strictly
Mexican matter but rather an international one.’ Clark Flores stated that the protests were
happening all over the world and not only in Mexico and that the demonstrations were never
meant to disturb the Olympic Games.68 Clark’s intention was clear, he intended to minimise the
student protests in order to assure IOC members that the Games would take place.
Avery Brundage supported the ideas that Clark Flores expressed. Brundage was a firm
believer that politics should not interfere with sport, and because of this, he did not publically
speak about the political discussions in Mexico. Ever since Avery Brundage took the presidency
of the IOC in 1952 he tried to keep what he considered political activity outside the IOC. Three
years after he took office, the Charter was altered and included a special article against political
demonstrations. The 1955 Charter stated: ‘Invitations must state that no political meetings or
demonstrations will be held in the stadium or other sport grounds, nor in the Olympic Village,
during the Games, and that it is not the intention to use the Games for any purpose other than the
advancement of the Olympic Movement.’69 This section was present in the charter until 1974
and was written to express that the Games would not be used as a platform to deliver political
messages. The IOC would not tolerate any demonstrations considered as political.

agarrar. Entonces, dijo, “esto se tiene que sacarse de la raíz”, y de la raíz lo sacó.’ Maria Luisa Nava (Mexican
Volleyball team member), 12 May 2016 in Mexico City.
68
The participants of the meeting felt it was necessary to obtain an ‘assurance from the government authorities that
the Olympic Games could be staged peacefully.’ After the Chairman of the Organising Committee, Ramírez
Vazquez, spoke to the members of the IOC, the latter had guarantees that the Games would be staged as planned.
Brundage communicated the results of these discussions in a press conference aimed to calm the doubts about
Mexico organising the Games. IOC Executive Board, ‘Other business’ in IOC, Minutes of the Executive Board
Meeting, Mexico 30 September – 6 October 1968, p. 19 [It is important to notice that the minutes seemed to be
written after the event since the issue with Tommie Smith and John Carlos were discussed.]
69
IOC, The Olympic Games Charter, Lausanne, 1955, p. 31.

23
 A similar point was included in the section of Regional Games during this period: ‘There
must be no extraneous events connected with the Games, particularly those of a political nature
… The loud speaker must be used for sport purposes only and no political speeches are to be
permitted. In fact, there must be no commercial or political intervention whatsoever.’70 These
clauses appeared for the first time during Brundage’s presidency.71 The latter tried to make the
Games a peaceful period where political interests and hostilities would not be represented. In
words of Avery Brundage: ‘At quadrennial intervals, the IOC arranges a friendly festival of
Olympic sport designed to promote international amity and quite free from discrimination of any
kind, racial, social, religious or political, an oasis in an over-charged and over-heated world.’72
Brundage repeated the analogy of the Olympic Games with an oasis several times during the
XIX Olympiad.
In August 1968, Brundage gave a press communique which showed more explicitly how
he envisioned the Games as a period of peace where those seeking political changes had to
renounce to their claims during the Olympic competitions in order to hold the ‘most priceless
instrument of our present civilization’:
The world, alas, is full of injustice, aggression, violence and warfare, against
which all civilized persons rebel, but this is no reason to destroy the nucleus of
international cooperation and good will have in the Olympic movement … we
invite the youth of the world, who are certainly not responsible for its evils, to
accept our regulations and to participate and we hope the youth of the world
will accept … is it not the most priceless and powerful instruments of our
present civilization?73

Brundage was able to communicate these ideas beyond the IOC and the Mexican
government adopted this idea as its own in the immediate months before the Games. This was
not done because of shared ideas, but as a way to reach a common end. The government’s
modern nation building strategies also required that the projects associated with the Games were
not challenged by external political activity. Mexico had to make the best out of the international
spotlight.

70
IOC, The Olympic Games, Fundamental Principles, Rules and Regulations, General Information, Lausanne,
1962, p. 90 and 92.
71
IOC, Rules and regulations for Regional Games, Lausanne, 1952, p. 7.
72
Avery Brundage in IOC, Newsletter, Lausanne, No. 11, August 1968, p. 345. [The highlighting is mine]
73
Avery Brundage to J. Liska (Associated Press) and J. Sainsbury (United Press), Chicago, Illinois, 23 August 1968,
IOCA CAB 7609

24
 Besides the attempt to have Games free of political demonstrations, Brundage promoted
the idea of the Olympics as an ‘oasis in an overheated world.’ In a letter to Marte R. Gómez,
Avery Brundage communicated that he was ‘very careful to avoid mentioning the disturbances in
Mexico City, preceding the Games…’74 His silence appeared as if the IOC did not interfere with
the Games, following the Olympic Charter; however, by not recognising the issues, his actions
had a direct political repercussion in Mexico City. 75
Avery Brundage was not the only member in the IOC who tried to minimise the student
movement in Mexico City. Giulio Onesti, one of the most active IOC members at the time, said
that the Italian and Mexican protests were similar, and declared to the international press that the
revolts were a worldwide phenomenon, but that he was sure that the youth would enjoy the
festivity that the Games represented.76 Brundage was better informed about the situation in
Mexico City than Onesti, but they both minimised the political discussions in order to open way
for the Olympic Games.
One day after the Tlatelolco massacre, Brundage stated: ‘As guests of Mexico, we have
full confidence that the Mexican people, universally known for their sportsmanship and great
hospitality will join participants and spectators in celebrating the Games, a veritable oasis in a
troubled world.’77 The testimonies of Brundage and Onesti showed that they both believed that
when the Olympic Games were celebrated, people would embrace them and would forget about
their political motivations. Both the IOC and the Mexican government benefitted from the idea

74
Avery Brundage to Marte R. Gómez, 11 September 1969, ADM DAC-92-2 B37 1970. This correspondence began
as a debate about the inclusion of the black power salute in the Olympic Film of 1968. Brundage argued that if he
had been silent about the student movement and its repression, there was no reason to include the 200 meter victory
ceremony in the film’s final cut.
75
According to Liam Stockdale, the IOC and the Olympic Movement (and I would add FIFA and the World Cup)
have been apolitically self-constructed, as well as impersonal and neutral. Nevertheless, despite their attempt to
construct themselves as neutral and apolitical, we cannot deny that mega-events have altered the global order
politically. Liam Stockdale, 'More Than Just Games: The Global Politics of the Olympic Movement', Sport in
Society, 15 (2012), 840. Rachel Briggs, Helen McCarthy, and Alexis Zorbas, 'Days: The Role of the Olympic Truce
in the Toolkit for Peace', (London: Demos), (p. 39).
76
Armado Estrada Nuñez, ‘Sesionarán aquí los Comités Olímpicos’, Excelsior, 27 September 1968, IOCA
1968SOG C-J01-1986/3 206489. Onesti believed in a progressive evolution of the youth concerns instead of
revolution and did not give a judgement of value of the Mexican movement because he thought that as a guest in
Mexico, he had to respect the hosts.
77
Avery Brundage on behalf of the Executive Boards of the International Olympic Committee, 3 October 1968,
ABC, Frederick Ruegsegger Documents, F11 D02.

25
of an Olympic peace, a truce. According to Ramírez Vázquez, the idea of the ‘truce’ around the
Games was a Greek legacy that everyone accepted.78
The violent repression and the way the government and the IOC handled it had a diverse
reception. José Luis Ortíz Téllez worked in the ‘Olympic Identity’ program and considered that
the group he worked with had a dilemma. ‘On one hand some drank wine and tequila, but on the
other University students lost their autonomy. We were all in a disjunctive: Who were we
working for? Were we part of the justice elite? Were we accomplices? Lots of questions, not
many answers.’79
The governmental repression was one of the reasons that the student movement fought
against; however, many were surprised of its actions on October 2nd. The massacre has been
considered as the turning point where students decided to not protest during the Games. Fear and
shock were an important element in the pause of political activity during the Olympic month. As
a student movement participant mentioned: ‘It is like when you realise that something that you
never thought possible, just happens; that your country’s army comes to a pacific demonstration
and starts to shoot…it just stuns you.’80
Ten days after the massacre, the opening ceremony of the XIX Games of the Summer
Olympiad took place. As reported in a newspaper report collected from the National Archives in
Mexico: ‘Despite everything, the Games will be held in bloody Mexico City.’ Beyond the
headline, the newspaper captured in a few sentences the complexity of the reactions prior to the
Games: ‘Mexico City shows a double life today. In the Olympic Village, athletes from all over
the world are getting ready for a pacific competition. From the other side of the city, armed
troops and bulletproof cars are camping around nine blocks of flats which turned into a
78
Ramírez Vázquez said that he respected the Greek Olympic heritage, and the truce was part of it. Pedro Ramírez
Vázquez in Ortega, Ragasol, and Moderno, p. 44.
79
‘México estaba en una algarabía contagiable. Por una parte se tomaba vino y tequila, por la otra los universitarios
perdían su autonomía. Todos nosotros nos encontrábamos en medio de una disyuntiva: ¿para quién estamos
trabajando?, ¿éramos parte de la elite justiciera?, ¿éramos cómplices? Muchas preguntas, pocas respuestas.’ Ortiz
Téllez. From a different perspective, left wing artists and intellectuals, considered that the government had not acted
correctly and reacted against it. Philosopher and diplomat, Leopoldo Zea spoke about the citizenry’s silence and the
government’s violence: ‘…someone has to put an end on violence and cannot be the most violent, it cannot be the
strongest gorilla … it has to be the strongest, but also the most rational, balanced, shouldn’t it be the State?’
Leopoldo Zea, ‘La violencia como política’, [Newspaper not reported] AGN G2 DGIPS B967 F3 D166 and Clark
Flores to Zea, 30 January 1964, Mexico City, ADM B23 F56-2.
80
‘Fue como cuando tú te percatas de algo que no habías supuesto que pudiera suceder, que es que tu ejercito de tu
país llegue a una manifestación pacífica y empiece a disparar, bueno después, ya en ese momento la confusión era
enorme, sepas que aparte había un grupo de paramilitares que estaba provocando, realmente jugando en este horror
para que el ejército supusiera que había agresiones del lado estudiantil, sí te pasma.’ Maria Guadalupe Ferrer
(student movement participant) in discussion with the author, 5 August 2015 in Mexico City.

26
battlefield.’81 As a matter of fact, there was tension in the air in October and diverse reading of
the circumstances. Many students were fearful about the governmental repression, while
government officials considered that there was a possibility that students tried to boycott the
Games. Leopoldo Ramírez worked in the Secretariat of the Presidency and considered that the
tension continued as the Games were inaugurated, in his words the fears were very diminished,
but ‘there were still fears and angst.’82
Repression certainly had an impact on the student protests and the following of Olympic
Protocols. Nevertheless, since early September, the students had already considered putting a
pause on their political activity during the Olympic Games. The IOC did not have a Truce
program at the time, but students spoke about the idea and how they were approached by the
IOC. In a CNH flyer printed in October, the students expressed:
Regarding IOC’s calling to the people of Mexico, we must insist that if the
truce means no more violence from our part, we have never resorted to it; if it
refers to the suspension of making use of our constitutional freedoms, we must
say that we won’t resign to our rights with or without Olympic Games. We
consider that if we have not intervened in the affairs of the Olympic Games,
neither should the IOC intervene in ours.83

Even though the idea of Olympic Truce appeared a few days before the Olympic Games,
the students had already expressed that they did not want to boycott the Olympics. Another CNH
flyer in October communicated: ‘As another sign that our purpose was not to subvert the public
order, the CNH decided to take a unilateral truce of our democratic activities, public gatherings
and demonstrations during the Olympics to avoid the characteristic clumsiness of the
Government.’84 Their recurrent messages, however, did not seem to calm the doubts of the
international press, IOC and the Mexican government. As Henry Giniger reported: ‘The trouble
is not yet over, and although student leaders say they have no intention of sabotaging the

81
AGN G2 DGIPS B484 F2 D601-603
82
Leopoldo Ramírez Limón, 10 January 2016. ‘Sí, naturalmente siguió la tensión, claro ya muy disminuida, había
una gran inquietud, había muchos temores, etc. Etc.,’
83
Press Bulletin (CNH), October 1968, p. 2, AHUN B58 D94. This message was communicated because there was
an understanding that the IOC required a period of 40 days without political demonstrations. ‘Students stated that all
governments that host the Games must guarantee forty days of stability and political tranquillity before the
competitions. “We must use this to create pressure and have our claims solved, but this does not mean that we are
against the Olympic Games.’ Antonio Ortega, ‘Se pide diferir clases y exámenes. El consejo de Huelga dispuesto al
dialogo con las autoridades’, Excelsior, 20 August 1968.
84
AHUN B58 D103 [Tlatelolco: 2 de Octubre]

27
Olympics to further their conflict with the Government, the Government is worried that some of
the more extremist groups might try just that.’85
Vida Bajc considers that Mexico was quiet during the Olympic Games ‘not so much
because its populace was content, but rather because it was too terrified to protest publicly.’86
This idea is well disseminated among scholars; however, this paper considers that we cannot
only take in account the governmental repression as the element that allowed the Olympic
Games to be held according to IOC protocols. We also have to consider national identity. Ever
since the student movement began, many believed that it was a plot to discredit the country given
the international attention received with the Olympics. This led the students to try to legitimise
their demands, recognising the national interests and stating that the Games were not part of their
struggle.87
Students constantly tried to persuade people that the movement was nationalistic and did
not intend to harm Mexico’s image with the upcoming Games. The students internalised the idea
that Mexico had to provide a good image with the Olympic Games in order to benefit in the
future. This implied that their protests had to be paused during the Olympic Games. Their
understanding of the Olympic Games as beneficial even led some to express after the massacre
that ‘Gustavo Díaz Ordaz does not want Olympics.’88 This message considered that the President
was against the idea of peace that was so central to Mexico’s positive image.89
The students respected the idea of the Olympic Games serving the country, and even
though they did not intend to boycott them, they constantly referenced the Olympics in their
communications. For instance, one of their flyers ‘awarded medals’ to the Mexican government
for their actions. According to the students, the government was ‘First place in the massacre of
85
Henry Giniger, ‘Olympics 1968: Mexico City is ready’, in The New York Times, 6 October 1968.
86
Bajc, p. 110.
87
One of the first flyers of the student movement communicated: ‘Even though we know the great investment that
the Olympic Games is unjustified in a country like ours where the needs of the population are great and urgent, the
student movement has never tried to boycott the Olympic Games.’ ‘Manifesto to the students of the world’, 1 July
1968, p. 5, AHUN B58 D085.
88
AGN G2 DGIPS B484 F2 D357.
89
The occupation of Ciudad Universitaria in September upset writers, artists and professors, many of who signed a
document that criticised the military occupation; the violation of individual guarantees and the University’s
autonomy; the imprisonment of people, and in general the lack of democracy in the country. The document was
signed by figures such as Emmanuel Carballo, Carlos Monsivais and Carlos Prieto, among many others, and was
published in one of the most distributed Mexican newspapers: El Universal, AGN G2 DGIPS B967 F3 D3. A
similar document was published a few days later by the professors from El Colegio de México that requested the
release of prisoners, the end of the military occupation in Ciudad Universitaria and the return to a friendly
atmosphere to solve the issues that the students were pushing forward in the political agenda. AGN G2 DGIPS B967
F3 D18.

28
young students by the army’, ‘First place in the repression of young students by the gorilla riot
police’ and ‘First place in communicating lies’. The flyer concluded with the text: ‘Dear people:
But these sports are not recognised by the IOC, so we suggest that the students and the
Organising Committee send them to Vietnam so they can compete against armed people, not
against unarmed students.’90 The flyer showed the students awareness of the international issues
and traced comparisons with what occurred in Mexico. The students considered that although the
government wanted to disseminate an idea of peace to the world, it presented violent conditions
such as those observed in the Vietnam war.
The idea that the Games had to be respected for the sake of Mexico’s future were not
unique to the student movement. The Olympics were linked with patriotism. As Esmeralda
Reynoso remembers: ‘There was then that nationalist pride that Mexico had to be seen as the
best thing.’ This belief allowed the Games to be embraced as a platform to communicate the
uniqueness of Mexico, but it also allowed the unwanted to be discarded and justified.91 The
people that did not sympathise with the movement were happy to see that the students had been
controlled, whilst the protestors considered that Mexico had to provide a good image abroad and
their protests would be resumed after the Games. Student movement leader, Esmeralda Reynoso,
spoke about this discussion in her interview: ‘…we [the CNH] had already planned to not affect
[the Olympic Games]. That decision was already taken because it was something that everyone
said: “what they want is to sabotage the Games”, well that had nothing to do with it.92

‘Everything is possible in Peace’?

The XIX Olympic Games were able to take place thanks to fear and repression, but also to
patriotism. As Brian Glanville reported at the time, ‘the students themselves “look on the
Olympiad with a favourable eye.’93 The students’ flyers proved Glanville right. Most students

90
AGN G2 DGIPS B482 F1 D115.
91
‘Entonces había ese orgullo nacionalista de que se viera de México era lo máximo. Pues ante eso, yo siempre he
dicho que es esconder bajo el tapete la porquería; que se vea que la casa está bonita y así lo ves en una familia y lo
ves en un país. Cualquier pueblecito muerto de hambre, se endroga toda la familia para hacer la pachanga. Así
somos.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015.
92
‘No bueno, lo que tienes que ver son dos cosas: una que nosotros teníamos ya planeado el hecho de no afectar.
Esa decisión ya estaba tomada porque era algo que cantaban y decían en todos lados: ‘lo que quieren es afectar,
sabotear, los Juegos’, pues para nada, y no se va a hacer nada. Eso por un lado y por otro lado, Toman la Ciudad
Universitaria, toman el Politécnico, una agresión terrible en la calle y todos lados, y el 2 de octubre, o sea, ahí murió
todo…’ Ibid.
93
Brian Glanville, ‘Why the Mexican students won’t stop the Olympics’, NN, 29 September 1968, IOCA 1968SOG
C-J01-1986/2.

29
wanted Mexico to have a good image abroad and this was the ultimate idea why they never
intended to continue their protests during the Olympic Games. As María Guadalupe Ferrer
mentioned: ‘…nobody wanted to create a bad image of Mexico before the world, nobody, not
even the students.’94 This widespread reaction in Mexico City drove Le Figaro to question if the
Olympic Truce actually took place in Mexico or if people simply denied the political issues.95
Le Figaro reported an important process in Mexico City. After witnessing huge political
discussions, the Olympic Games seemed to take over Mexico City. According to Cuauhtémoc
Lamas: ‘Undoubtedly, people remained very unsatisfied, upset, upset about the acts and they
protested in a thousand ways, in their testimonies, in the press, in television. They criticised the
government for the excess, but the Olympic Games arrived, and the opening ceremony, and the
movement was practically forgotten… temporarily.’96 We can add that although no major
protests were held in Mexico during the Olympic Games, this did not mean that Mexico City’s
citizenry forgot about the movement. Maria Guadalupe Ferrer remembers that many students
attended the Games, but they ‘did not forget about the injustice in the country.’97 The resistance
and opposition took other forms.
For many of the student protestors, Mexico City’s citizenry embraced the Olympic
Games without questioning them. For instance, Esmeralda Reynoso questioned: ‘How is possible
to see so many people rooting with us and ten days after October 2nd they are applauding?’98
Reynoso considered that there was a huge support for the student movement from diverse sectors
of the population from July to October, but that when the Games began on October 12th,
everyone embraced the Games. Patriotism was in fact an element that allowed this behaviour to
prevail. Nevertheless, the spectators that did not accept the government’s actions showed
94
‘No fue específicamente una tregua, fue un pasmo, sobre todo provocado por la sorpresa. Digo, la indignación, el
dolor, lo que quieras, pero el primer impacto sí te deja sin palabras.’, Maria Guadalupe Ferrer, 5 August 2015.
95
Roland Mesmeur, ‘Trêve Olympique’, Le Figaro, 7 October 1968, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1986/2.
96
‘Indudablemente que la gente quedó muy insatisfecha, enojada, enojada con los actos y se manifestaban de mil
formas, en declaraciones, en la prensa, en televisión. Criticaban al gobierno por los excesos, pero llegan los juegos
olímpicos y la inauguración y prácticamente se olvidó, se olvidó del movimiento, por lo pronto.’ Cuauhtémoc
Lamas, 18 July 2015.
97
‘Es interesante para el que estudia movimientos sociales el pensar que muchas de las gentes, de los estudiantes
que fueron a los Juegos Olímpicos no habían perdido de vista la injusticia en este país. Es interesante porque tú
podrías decir ¿por qué no todos se resguardaron? ¿nadie fue? ¿por qué no se hacían alborotos afuera de los estadios?
La represión fue horrible.’ Maria Guadalupe Ferrer, Mexico City.
98
‘No, no, no, pero ahí no era el movimiento, era la gente, era la gente. Eso sí hay que considerar, así como al
principio no teníamos mucho eco en la sociedad, al final teníamos mucho. Fue algo que personalmente nos golpeó
mucho. Es decir ¿cómo es posible que estoy viendo que la gente se vuelca con nosotros y a los diez días del 2 de
Octubre están aplaudiendo. Así es México, pero para unos chavos que los están viviendo por primera vez, fue
brutal.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015.

30
resistance by whistling at the President, while others such as Esmeralda Reynoso displayed
untraceable signs of resistance by not engaging with the Games. Olympian Maria Luisa Nava
even considered that the president’s life was in risk during the opening ceremony. Even though,
no major scale demonstrations were held during the Olympic Games, the unhappy spectators
displayed untraceable and permitted forms of resistance in the Olympic Venues by rejecting the
political figures.
Signs of resistance such as the whistling at governmental figures took a whole new
dimension after the medal ceremony of the 200-meter dash. After John Carlos, Tommie Smith
and Peter Norman protested while the anthem of the United States played. Students realised that
the Olympic Games provided the opportunity for other discourses. Student movement
participant, María Guadalupe Ferrer mentioned: ‘They did not raise their fist for the 68
movement, they vindicated the topic of the Civil Rights in the United States, but that made us
feel part of the world, it made you recognise little signs and gave you a small hope.’99 Esmeralda
Reynoso communicated a similar idea to Ferrer’s and added that it gave a sense of wellbeing
when the athletes protested: ‘It was not our struggle, it was their thing, but somehow the fact that
something did not properly work out or that someone spoke of a setting that was not ideal as
presented in the Olympic Games was a bit exciting for us.’100
The IOC did not mention anything about the rejection of political figures; however, they
discussed the so called “black power salute.” Avery Brundage tried to punish the athletes as
much as possible to set an example for potential protestors and also tried to eradicate their
expression from the Olympics. This was a huge object of discussion in the Olympic Film,
because Alberto Isaac decided to leave the images of the ‘black power salute’ in the final cut.
Brundage criticised this action because it challenged the politics of silence that he had followed.
In Brundage’s perspective: ‘The use of pictures of the nasty demonstration against the Unit[ed]
St[ates] flag by negroes… it has no more place in the record of the Games than the gunfire at

99
‘Así es, pero tú de pronto ahí entendías ahí que de pronto aparecían ahí; ellos no levantaron el puño por el
movimiento del 68, ellos reivindicaron el tema de los derechos civiles en Estados Unidos, pero entonces eso te hacía
sentir parte del mundo, te hacía reconocer guiños, señales y te daba una esperanza pequeña, pero así, ¿no?’ María
Guadalupe Ferrer, Mexico City, 5 August 215.
100
‘Pero otro momento que fue emotivo para los que estuvimos en el movimiento del 68 fue cuando los corredores
norteamericanos levantaron el puño. No era por nuestra lucha, era su rollo, pero de alguna manera el que algo no
saliera bien o se hablara de que la situación no era tan ideal como se presentaba en unos juegos olímpicos fue un
poquito de emoción para nosotros.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, Mexico City, 17 July 2015.

31
Tlatelolco…’101 Brundage tried denying the athlete’s protest from the Olympic records, but the
Organising Committee did not back this decision. In Ramírez Vázquez’s opinion, there was no
reason to leave out an event that had occurred during the Olympics, while there were many
reasons to not include the protests that occurred before the event.

‘Olympic hangover’? Mexico City and the political legacies of the XIX Olympiad
The XIX Olympic Games ended with many records broken and fantastic athletic performances.
This helped to give the 1968 Games a sense of success. The spectators’ behaviour during the
Olympics also helped the Mexican Case. On the closing ceremony, for instance, athletes and
spectators joined in an enthusiastic celebration while thousands of mariachis played traditional
Mexican songs. This actions made Brundage declare: ‘What a marvellous people and what a
fabulous party’ to which Díaz Ordaz replied: ‘It is a marvellous people and the party has been
very Mexican.’102
Beyond the festive environment described by Brundage, the Olympic Games and the
build up to them had huge political consequences on the population. The IOC and the Mexican
government favoured a period of exception during the Olympic Games and the immediate weeks
before them. We can agree with Bajc that the Mexican Government and the IOC, as in all mega-
events, tried to create a ‘maximally controlled environment.’ By minimising political
demonstrations, the Mexican government and the IOC intended to ‘reduce complexity in order to
minimize uncertainty.’103 This state of exception allowed the Games to be held according to
protocol and it highlighted the goals that the IOC and the government had concerning the
Olympic Games.
The direct consequence of this construction was that Mexico City’s citizenry immediately
resumed its large scale political activity after the Games were held. As José Irineo García
referred to the post-event period: ‘… just as in a drunken night, it was after a week later that we
thought, “well, what happened? Now how are we going to work this out? Will we go back to

101
Brundage to Ramírez Vázquez, ADM DAC-92-2 B37 1970.
102
Homero Bazán Víquez, ‘La Fiesta ha sido muy a la Mexicana…’ [newspaper and date not reported] IOCA
1986OG C-J01-1968/7 14406
103
Bajc, p. 23.

32
school?”’104 The way that the government and the IOC dealt with the implementation of the
Olympic Games increased the political engagement of the population before and even more
visibly after the Olympic flame stopped burning in the cauldron. As María Guadalupe Ferrer
mentioned, this period ‘intensified the political activity in diverse expressions.’ Ferrer spoke
about people engaging with the political system or even joining armed struggles.105
The student movement had clear demands with their protests, but none of these were
fulfilled immediately. Nevertheless, there were clear contributions to the political activity of
Mexico City. The Olympic Games were a significant element because the enhancement of
nationalism was reflected upon and engaged people with political activity beyond traditional
political participation areas. We can agree with Esmeralda Reynoso that the events of 1968 in
Mexico did not directly open the way for a political transition in 2000.106 The events of 1968 had
a direct repercussion on the political organisation of Mexico City’s citizenry and on cultural
aspects such as the open participation of women in politics and the redefinition of the family
roles. In a country with no rotation of parties in the presidency, these were more significant
changes.
From IOC’s perspective, we can coincide with Kevin B. Witherspoon that the 1968
Olympic Games were a transition from ‘a genuinely peaceful international sporting event to one
requiring ever more stringent security measures imaginable.’107 The events in the XIX Olympiad,
along with those in the XX, changed the course of the Olympic Games and their implementation.
The XX Olympiad shaped security around Olympic Games as a way to impede external threats,
while Mexico 1968 showed the IOC that domestic issues could threaten the Games. The XIX

104
‘Ahí termina todo e igual que cada borrachera, hasta la semana fue que se pensó “Bueno, ¿qué pasó? ¿Ahora
cómo vamos a resolver? ¿Vamos a regresar a la escuela? ¿cómo vamos a solucionar todo eso?”’ José Irineo García,
6 July 2015.
105
‘Entonces la represión del movimiento estudiantil, te lo digo porque es importante no mata al deseo de cambio en
los estudiantes, no lo aniquila, lo intensifica en diversas expresiones, gente que trabajó en el movimiento obrero
después del movimiento del 68, gente que se fue a la lucha armada, gente que se dedicó al tema político, pero
también al tema de los derechos humanos. La idea de que a muchas personas se le abrieron los ojos, o ya los tenía
abiertos, descubrías que simpatizaban con el anhelo de cambio pues eso era un gran aliciente.’ Maria Guadalupe
Ferrer, 5 August 215. Esmeralda Reynoso coincided with Ferrer and also considered that many that felt deceived in
1968 took part in the guerrilla…’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015.
106
‘El 68 no es como ellos lo cuenta, cuando dicen que con el 68 logramos la apertura democrática, yo digo ¡¿cuál?!
Sin embargo, logramos muchos cambios en la sociedad.’ Ibid.
107
Kevin B. Witherspoon, ‘Repression of Protest and the Image of Progress (Mexico City 1968)’ in Vida Bajc
(Editor), Surveilling and Securing the Olympics, from Tokyo 1964 to London 2012 and beyond, London, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2016, p. 124.

33
Olympiad proved to be a relevant variable in the transformations of the Olympic Charter after
the IOC Congress in Varna 1973 as well as the IOC sessions in 1974.

Conclusion
The XIX Olympic Games were meant to be of great significance for the IOC and the Mexican
government. The IOC tried to secure Olympism and promote it among ‘smaller-scale countries’
by choosing Mexico as the host destination, while the Mexican government tried to disseminate
a modern image of Mexico during a period of economic growth. The underlying message was
that Mexico was capable of fulfilling any task it set eyes on and the Olympics were open to all.
The apparent compatibility of these goals as well as the cold war tension made IOC members
prefer Mexico City over Lyon, Detroit or Buenos Aires.
The projects of the IOC and the Mexican Government were implemented rather smoothly
from the moment Mexico was elected the Olympic destination in October 1963 until mid-1968.
Nevertheless, the student movement that began in the end of July 1968 appeared as a threat. The
Mexican government saw the protests as a challenge to the modern image that Mexico wanted to
communicate to the world, especially during the Olympic year. For the IOC, the protests meant a
disruption of the Olympic charter where no political demonstrations had to take place in the host
destination.
The XIX Olympiad worked as a political arena where the IOC, Mexican government and
Mexico City’s citizenry discussed significant topics such as national representation, governance,
security and surveillance, among others. The preparation for the Olympic Games increased the
political divisions among these groups, but by doing so, it highlighted the active role of Mexico
City’s citizenry and it increased its political participation.
The most visible period of discussions was the Olympic month. The fast changing actions
from the government and the IOC to secure the Games, received a similar response from the
protesting students and Mexico City’s citizenry. The government implemented violent repression
to control the protests and the IOC applied a politics of silence to secure the Olympic Games. As
a response, students did not plan massive scale demonstrations, partly because of fear, but mostly
because they considered their movement to be nationalistic. The protesting students, as most

34
Mexicans, considered that the country had to provide a positive image to the world which would
benefit everyone. Interestingly, this meant no political activity.
The XIX Olympiad had a significant repercussion on the political participation in Mexico
City. The student movement that began in this period was deeply influenced by the actions from
government, but also from the IOC. For the Government, the XIX Olympiad was another step in
the attempt to brand the country as modern, it did not prove to be the ultimate goal. For the IOC,
the XIX Olympic Games changed security and surveillance drastically. The IOC discussed ways
to avoid domestic threats such as the student movement in future Olympic destinations.
This research suggests that the IOC and the local government, and in the last decades the
involved companies, are not the only actors that shape Olympism. The host populations have a
direct repercussion in how the Olympic Games are implemented. The Olympic Games tend to be
considered as the goal, but the host destinations are transformed significantly from the moment
the city is elected to host the Games until several years after these events take place. This
research invites both scholars and IOC members to consider the role of host destinations in
Olympism for future reflections.

35
Abbreviations
CNH Consejo Nacional de Huelga (National Strike Council)
COXIXJO Comité Organizador de los XIX Juegos Olímpicos (Organising Committee of the
XIX Olympic Games)
DGIPS Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (General Direction of
Political and Social Investigations)
GANEFO Games of the New Emerging Forces
IOC International Olympic Committee
ISF International Sport Federations
NOC National Olympic Committee

References
Archives
Avery Brundage Collection (ABC)
Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos (AAM, Archive of Mexican Architects)
Archivo de la Palabra (ADP, Oral History Archive)
Archivo Diplomático Mexicano (ADM, Mexican Diplomatic Archive of the Secretariat of
Foreign Affairs)
Archivo General de la Nación (AGN, National Archives, Mexico)
Archivo Histórico de la Universidad Nacional (AHUN, Archive of the National University,
Mexico)
Archivo Privado de Pedro Ramírez Vázquez (APPRV, Private Archive of Pedro Ramírez
Vázquez)
International Olympic Committee Archive (IOCA)

36
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