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Special Civil Actions
RULE 62
Interpleader
G.R. No. 70145 November 13, 1986
MARCELO A. MESINA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ARSENIO M.
GONONG, in his capacity as Judge of Regional Trial Court — Manila (Branch
VIII), JOSE GO, and ALBERT UY, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC for short), now the Court of Appeals (CA) in AC-G.R. S.P.
04710, dated Jan. 22, 1985, which dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Marcelo A. Mesina against the trial court in Civil Case No.
84-22515. Said case (an Interpleader) was filed by Associated Bank against Jose
Go and Marcelo A. Mesina regarding their conflicting claims over Associated
Bank Cashier's Check No. 011302 for P800,000.00, dated December 29, 1983.
Briefly, the facts and statement of the case are as follows:
Respondent Jose Go, on December 29, 1983, purchased from Associated Bank
Cashier's Check No. 011302 for P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Jose Go left said
check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank. The
bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain
Albert Uy, who had then a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to
answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the
men's room. When he returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone.
When Jose Go inquired for his cashier's check from Albert Uy, the check was not
in his folder and nowhere to be found. The latter advised Jose Go to go to the
bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order, which suggestion Jose Go
immediately followed. He also executed an affidavit of loss. Albert Uy went to
the police to report the loss of the check, pointing to the person of Alexander
Lim as the one who could shed light on it.
The records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for
clearing on December 31, 1983, coming from Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch.
The check was immediately dishonored by Associated Bank by sending it back
to Prudential Bank, with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it. However,
the same was again returned to Associated Bank on January 4, 1984 and for the
second time it was dishonored. Several days later, respondent Associated Bank
received a letter, dated January 9, 1984, from a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navarro
demanding payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held
by his client. He however refused to reveal the name of his client and
threatened to sue, if payment is not made. Respondent bank, in its letter, dated
January 20, 1984, replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost it in
the bank and is laying claim to it.
On February 1, 1984, police sent a letter to the Manager of the Prudential Bank,
Escolta Branch, requesting assistance in Identifying the person who tried to
encash the check but said bank refused saying that it had to protect its client's
interest and the Identity could only be revealed with the client's conformity.
Unsure of what to do on the matter, respondent Associated Bank on February 2,
1984 filed an action for Interpleader naming as respondent, Jose Go and one
John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client. On even date, respondent bank
received summons and copy of the complaint for damages of a certain Marcelo
A. Mesina from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City filed on January
23, 1984 bearing the number C-11139. Respondent bank moved to amend its
complaint, having been notified for the first time of the name of Atty. Navarro's
client and substituted Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe. Simultaneously,
respondent bank, thru representative Albert Uy, informed Cpl. Gimao of the
Western Police District that the lost check of Jose Go is in the possession of
Marcelo Mesina, herein petitioner. When Cpl. Gimao went to Marcelo Mesina
to ask how he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to him by
Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further. An
information for theft (Annex J) was instituted against Alexander Lim and the
corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued (Annex 6-A) which up to the
date of the filing of this instant petition remains unserved because of Alexander
Lim's successful evation thereof.
Meanwhile, Jose Go filed his answer on February 24, 1984 in the Interpleader
Case and moved to participate as intervenor in the complain for damages.
Albert Uy filed a motion of intervention and answer in the complaint for
Interpleader. On the Scheduled date of pretrial conference inthe interpleader
case, it was disclosed that the "John Doe" impleaded as one of the defendants
is actually petitioner Marcelo A. Mesina. Petitioner instead of filing his answer
to the complaint in the interpleader filed on May 17, 1984 an Omnibus Motion
to Dismiss Ex Abudante Cautela alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the
absence of an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lack of
personality to sue. Respondent bank in the other civil case (CC-11139) for
damages moved to dismiss suit in view of the existence already of the
Interpleader case.
The trial court in the interpleader case issued an order dated July 13, 1984,
denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner Mesina and ruling that respondent
bank's complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for itnerpleader.
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court on September 26, 1984. Upon motion for respondent Jose Go dated
October 31, 1984, respondent judge issued an order on November 6, 1984,
declaring petitioner in default since his period to answer has already expirecd
and set the ex-parte presentation of respondent bank's evidence on November
7, 1984.
Petitioner Mesina filed a petition for certioari with preliminary injunction with
IAC to set aside 1) order of respondent court denying his omnibus Motion to
Dismiss 2) order of 3) the order of default against him.
On January 22, 1985, IAC rendered its decision dimissing the petition for
certiorari. Petitioner Mesina filed his Motion for Reconsideration which was also
denied by the same court in its resolution dated February 18, 1985.
Meanwhile, on same date (February 18, 1985), the trial court in Civil Case #84-
22515 (Interpleader) rendered a decisio, the dispositive portion reading as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering plaintiff Associate Bank to
replace Cashier's Check No. 011302 in favor of Jose Go
or its cas equivalent with legal rate of itnerest from date
of complaint, and with costs of suit against the latter.
SO ORDERED.
On March 29, 1985, the trial court in Civil Case No. C-
11139, for damages, issued an order, the pertinent
portion of which states:
The records of this case show that on August 20, 1984
proceedings in this case was (were) ordered suspended
because the main issue in Civil Case No. 84-22515 and
in this instant case are the same which is: who between
Marcelo Mesina and Jose Go is entitled to payment of
Associated Bank's Cashier's Check No. CC-011302? Said
issue having been resolved already in Civil casde No. 84-
22515, really this instant case has become moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion
sholud be as it is hereby granted and this case is
ordered dismissed.
In view of the foregoing ruling no more action should be
taken on the "Motion For Reconsideration (of the order
admitting the Intervention)" dated June 21, 1984 as well
as the Motion For Reconsideration dated September 10,
1984.
SO ORDERED.
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Petitioner now comes to Us, alleging that:
1. IAC erred in ruling that a cashier's check can be countermanded even in the
hands of a holder in due course.
2. IAC erred in countenancing the filing and maintenance of an interpleader suit
by a party who had earlier been sued on the same claim.
3. IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner as in default
when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader complaint.
4. IAC went beyond the scope of its certiorari jurisdiction by making findings of
facts in advance of trial.
Petitioner now interposes the following prayer:
1. Reverse the decision of the IAC, dated January 22, 1985 and set aside the
February 18, 1985 resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
2. Annul the orders of respondent Judge of RTC Manila giving due course to the
interpleader suit and declaring petitioner in default.
is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming. On the very day that the
bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for
damages filed by petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the
interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe,
but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe when his name
became known to respondent bank.
In his third assignment of error, petitioner assails the then respondent IAC in
upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner in default when there was
no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case. Again, such
contention is untenable. The trial court issued an order, compelling petitioner
and respondent Jose Go to file their Answers setting forth their respective
claims. Subsequently, a Pre-Trial Conference was set with notice to parties to
submit position papers. Petitioner argues in his memorandum that this order
requiring petitioner to file his answer was issued without jurisdiction alleging
that since he is presumably a holder in due course and for value, how can he be
compelled to litigate against Jose Go who is not even a party to the check? Such
argument is trite and ridiculous if we have to consider that neither his name or
Jose Go's name appears on the check. Following such line of argument,
petitioner is not a party to the check either and therefore has no valid claim to
the Check. Furthermore, the Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file
their answers is to all intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially
and essentially and therefore in compliance with the provisions of Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court. What else is the purpose of a law suit but to litigate?

Petitioner's allegations hold no water. Theories and examples advanced by The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details in
petitioner on causes and effects of a cashier's check such as 1) it cannot be support of its action for Interpleader. Before it resorted to Interpleader,
countermanded in the hands of a holder in due course and 2) a cashier's check respondent bank took an precautionary and necessary measures to bring out
is a bill of exchange drawn by the bank against itself-are general principles the truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the circumstances known to
which cannot be aptly applied to the case at bar, without considering other him and now that private respondent bank brought these circumstances out in
things. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he is a holder in due court (which eventually rendered its decision in the light of these facts),
course and for consideration or value as shown by the established facts of the petitioner charges it with "gratuitous excursions into these non-issues."
case. Admittedly, petitioner became the holder of the cashier's check as Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent RTC committed an abuse
endorsed by Alexander Lim who stole the check. He refused to say how and why of discretion or not, without being apprised of the facts and reasons why
it was passed to him. He had therefore notice of the defect of his title over the respondent Associated Bank instituted the Interpleader case. Both parties were
check from the start. The holder of a cashier's check who is not a holder in due given an opportunity to present their sides. Petitioner chose to withhold
course cannot enforce such check against the issuing bank which dishonors the substantial facts. Respondents were not forbidden to present their side-this is
same. If a payee of a cashier's check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud, the purpose of the Comment of respondent to the petition. IAC decided the
or if there is some other reason why the payee is not entitled to collect the question by considering both the facts submitted by petitioner and those given
check, the respondent bank would, of course, have the right to refuse payment by respondents. IAC did not act therefore beyond the scope of the remedy
of the check when presented by the payee, since respondent bank was aware of sought in the petition.
the facts surrounding the loss of the check in question. Moreover, there is no
similarity in the cases cited by petitioner since respondent bank did not issue WHEREFORE, finding that the instant petition is merely dilatory, the same is
the cashier's check in payment of its obligation. Jose Go bought it from hereby denied and the assailed orders of the respondent court are hereby
respondent bank for purposes of transferring his funds from respondent bank AFFIRMED in toto.
to another bank near his establishment realizing that carrying money in this
form is safer than if it were in cash. The check was Jose Go's property when it
was misplaced or stolen, hence he stopped its payment. At the outset, SO ORDERED.
respondent bank knew it was Jose Go's check and no one else since Go had not
paid or indorsed it to anyone. The bank was therefore liable to nobody on the
check but Jose Go. The bank had no intention to issue it to petitioner but only
to buyer Jose Go. When payment on it was therefore stopped, respondent bank
was not the one who did it but Jose Go, the owner of the check. Respondent
bank could not be drawer and drawee for clearly, Jose Go owns the money it
represents and he is therefore the drawer and the drawee in the same manner
as if he has a current account and he issued a check against it; and from the
moment said cashier's check was lost and/or stolen no one outside of Jose Go
can be termed a holder in due course because Jose Go had not indorsed it in
due course. The check in question suffers from the infirmity of not having been
properly negotiated and for value by respondent Jose Go who as already been
said is the real owner of said instrument.

In his second assignment of error, petitioner stubbornly insists that there is no

showing of conflicting claims and interpleader is out of the question. There is
enough evidence to establish the contrary. Considering the aforementioned
facts and circumstances, respondent bank merely took the necessary
precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader
was its proper remedy. It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by
respondent bank because petitioner and Jose Go were both laying their claims
on the check, petitioner asking payment thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser
or owner. The allegation of petitioner that respondent bank had effectively
relieved itself of its primary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint
for interpleader is belied by the willingness of respondent bank to issue a
certificate of time deposit in the amount of P800,000 representing the cashier's
check in question in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be awarded to
whoever wig be found by the court as validly entitled to it. Said validity will
depend on the strength of the parties' respective rights and titles thereto. Bank
filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it but because petitioner

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inherit may, not be disputed, as at present, by the other Defendants who are
the legitimate children of his father. In fact, in paragraph 2 of complainant’s
RULE 63 prayer he asks that Defendants be ordered to recognize his status as illegitimate
child with right to inherit. It is true that there is no express provision in the new
Civil Code which prescribe the step that may be taken to establish such status as
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies in case of a natural child who can bring an action for recognition (Article 285),
but this silence notwithstanding, we declare that a similar action may be
brought under similar circumstances considering that an illegitimate child other
than natural is now given successional rights and there is need to establish his
[G.R. No. L-8964. July 31, 1956.] status before such rights can be asserted and enforced. This right is impliedly
recognized by Article 289 which permits the investigation of the paternity or
JUAN EDADES, Plaintif-Appellant, vs. SEVERINO EDADES, ET AL., Defendants- maternity of an illegitimate child in the same manner as in the case of a natural
Appellees. child. Considering that the rules of procedure shall be liberally construed to
promote their object and avoid an expensive litigation (section 2, Rule 1), we
hold that the present action may be maintained in the light of the view herein
DECISION expressed.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Wherefore, the order appealed from is revoked. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings in connection with the determination of the
Plaintif brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan alleged status of the Plaintif as an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades, without
seeking a declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights in the property of his pronouncements as to costs.
alleged father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate
son of Emigdio Edades. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
In his complaint, he alleges that he is an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades with
Maria de Venecia, having been born when said Emigdio Edades was legally
married to Maxima Edades with whom Emigdio had eight legitimate
children; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he had always enjoyed the continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the status of illegitimate child by direct and
positive acts of his father and of the legitimate children of the latter; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat as such illegitimate child he is entitled to share in the
inheritance of his father under the law; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that as
the legitimate children of his father will deny, as in fact they have denied his
right to inherit, and such denial may ripen into a costly litigation, he brought the
present action for the determination of his hereditary rights.

Defendants, instead of answering, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
court sustained the motion holding that “An action for declaratory relief just for
the purpose of clearing away doubt, uncertainty, or insecurity to the Plaintif’s
status or rights would seem to be improper and outside the purview of a
declaratory relief. Neither can it be availed of for the purpose of compelling
recognition of such rights, if disputed or objected to.” Consequently, the court
dismissed the complaint, without costs. From the order of
dismissal, Plaintif has appealed and the case was certified to this court because
only questions of law are involved in the appeal.

Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is
interested “under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute or ordinance” in order to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or
to declare his rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule 66). Moreover, the
action should be predicated on the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interest are adverse; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial
determination. (Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil., 83).

The present case does not come within the purview of the law authorizing an
action for declaratory relief for it neither concerns a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the
construction or validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any
justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of inheritance
which Plaintif desires to assert against the Defendants as basis of the relief he
is seeking for have not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father
Emigdio Edades has not yet died. In fact, he is one of the herein Defendants.
And the law is clear that “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent” (Article 777, new Civil Code). Up to that
moment, the right to succession is merely speculative for, in the meantime, the
law may change, the will of the testator may vary, or the circumstances may be
modified to such an extent that he who expects to receive property may be
deprived of it. Indeed, the moment of death is the determining point when an
heir acquires a definite right to the inheritance (5 Manresa, 5th ed., 324). This
action therefore cannot be maintained if considered strictly as one for
declaratory relief.

But the present action, though captioned as one for declaratory relief, is not
merely aimed at determining the hereditary right of the Plaintif to eventually
preserve his right to the property of his alleged father, but rather to establish
his status as illegitimate child in order that, should his father die, his right to

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Special
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RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
G.R. No. L-15509 March 31, 1962
SEBASTIAN SARMIENTO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
HON. ELEUTERIO CAPAPAS, as Commissioner of Customs, et al., respondents-
appellants,
GREGORIO GAMULO, ET AL., intervenors-appellees.
Ferdinand E. Marcos for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellant Eleuterio Capapas.
Manuel C. Chan for respondent-appellant Harry S. Stonehill.
Deogracias E. Lerma for respondent-appellant Ernesto T. Jimenez.
Conrado Rubio for intervenors-appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Delfin
B. Flores, presiding, in Civil Case No. 2790 of that court, declaring the nullity of
Barter Permit No. BT-1380 (SP) issued to the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and
Redrying Corporation (hereinafter called PTFRC) and all the importations made
thereunder, and ordering the forfeiture to the Government of said
importations.
The original action in this case was presented on May 28, 1958 and the petition
seeks the issuance of an injunction against the respondent Collector of Customs
and Commissioner of Customs to prohibit them from releasing the importations
made under the Barter Permit No. BT-1380 (SP) in the name of the Philippine
Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, and to order the respondents
Collector of Customs and Commissioner of Customs to institute seizure and
confiscation proceedings of the importations of tobacco under said Barter
Permit No. BT-1380 (SP).
On June 9, 1958 the petitioners filed a motion to be permitted to file new
petition for declaratory relief, in substitution of the petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction. The principal allegations of the amended petition are as
follows: .
That on May 1 to 6, 1958, shipments of 666 hogsheads of Virginia Type Leaf
Tobacco, worth $314,675.62 were imported by the Philippine Tobacco Flue-
Curing and Redrying Corporation under the Barter Permit No. BT-1380 (SP)
issued on January 21, 1958; .
That on May 8, 1958, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued an authority to
release the said imported goods, which authority was addressed to his co-
respondents Hon. Eleuterio Capapas, as Commissioner of Customs and/or Hon.
Isidro Angangco as incumbent Collector for the Port of Manila, declaring that
said 666 hogsheads of tobacco were imported under the Barter Permit No. BT-
1380 (SP) dated January 21, 1958 by the No-Dollar Import Office; .
That on May 13, 1958 the administrator of ACCFA addressed a communication
to the Commissioner of Customs, Manila, stating that he had no objection to
the release of the imported Virginia leaf tobacco or the release of said 666
hogsheads of tobacco; .
That the said shipments of 666 hogsheads of tobacco form part of several other
shipments of Virginia Type Leaf Tobacco, which are due to arrive at the Port of
Manila under the same Barter Permit No. BT-1380 (SP) which tobacco will
aggregate in value to the sum of $4,900,000.00; .
That the respondent, Mr. Juan Echiverri, in his capacity as President of the
Ilocos Norte Federation of Facomas, failed miserably to protect the virginia
tobacco producers in failing to register the objections of the different members
of the Ilocos Norte Federation of Facomas against the said importations of
virginia leaf tobacco; .
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That the Barter Permit No. BT-1380 (SP) issued by the No-Dollar Import Office
on January 21, 1958, in favor of the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and
Redrying Corporation, was issued in violation of the provisions of existing laws,
particularly Republic Act Nos. 1194 and 1410; .
That the certificates issued by the ACCFA and/or the Bureau of Internal Revenue
were false because we have surplusage of indigenous production of Virginia
type leaf tobacco in the Philippines, which is sufficient to maintain the
manufacture of tobacco production; .
That the importations in question are not actually covered by any Central Bank
license whatsoever; .
That as early as January, 1958, petitioners had already protested with the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry against the issuance of barter permits for
such kind of tobacco; .
That the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs for Manila are
in possession, custody and control of any and all documents pertaining to the
importations made under the aforesaid Barter Permit No. BT-1380 (SP); .
That the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs threaten to
release the whole or part of said shipment to the Philippine Tobacco Flue-
Curing and Redrying Corporation, some 60 hogsheads having been already
released in violation of existing laws, more specifically Republic Act Nos. 1194
and 1410.1äwphï1.ñët
It is prayed that the court determine —
1. Whether the barter permit in question is legal or valid; .
2. Whether Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 1194 in relation to Republic Act No. 1410,
permits barter of virginia leaf tobacco; .
3. Whether the administrator of ACCFA can issue a certificate under the law in
view of the actual and existing fact of surplusage in the production of Virginia
leaf tobacco; and .
4. Whether the Virginia leaf tobacco so imported may be forfeited to the
government.
The respondents filed their respective answers. Respondent Echiverri, on June
25, 1958, denied the charge that he failed miserably to protect the interests of
tobacco growers.
Harry Stonehill likewise denied all the material allegations of the petition, but
admitted that the barter permit was issued to the PTFRC, after favorable
indorsements were made for its issuance; that several shipments have already
been made to the company under said barter permit; and that a part of said
shipments has already been delivered to the consignee. As special defenses, he
claimed that he is not the real party in interest, the barter license having been
issued to the PTFRC, of which he is only the President, and that the amended
petition is not proper because there was already a breach of the law upon the
issuance of the barter permit.
Respondent Jimenez denied all the material allegations of the petition, except
the issuance by the No-Dollar Import Office of the barter permit and his
certification authorizing release of the shipment; and as special defense he
alleged that the subject matter is not justifiable for declaratory relief.
Respondent Quirino also filed his answer, claiming that the barter permit was
issued by him in compliance with a Presidential Directive dated January 13,
1958.
On July 14, 1958, respondents Capapas, Angangco and Arañas filed their joint
answer, denying, like their co-respondents, all the material allegations of the
petition. As special defenses, they claim that the petition states no cause of
action against them individually, and that the petition is improper because
there is no justiciable controversy and there is no violation of law.
On November 19, 1958, respondents Capapas, Arañas, Quirino and Stonehill,
filed a joint motion asking the court to set a preliminary hearing on the special
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defense that the petition does not state a cause of action for declaratory relief,
but the motion was denied.
After the hearing and on March 12, 1959 the court rendered the decision,
which is now sought to be reviewed, thus;
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds and so holds that: (1)
the report (indorsement), Exhs. "3-Jimenez", "3 Capapas" and "hh-
Intervenors", of respondent Jimenez recommending the approval of
respondent Stonehill's request to import 10,000,000 lbs. of Virginia
leaf tobacco by means of barter is manifestly against the spirit and
letter of Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 1194 construed in relation to Sec.
6 of Republic Act 1410 and is, therefore, illegal (2) The Barter Permit
No. BT-1380 (Special), Exh. "JJ-1" and "JJ-2"; Exhs. "2" and "2-A" and
"4" and "4-A", issued by respondent Carlos Quirino to the Philippine
Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation of which respondent
Stonehill is the President must necessarily be without legal basis. (3)
The home grown Virginia leaf tobacco cannot be bartered with
Virginia leaf tobacco coming from abroad because the entrance of
Virginia leaf tobacco to the Philippines unless there is insufficiency
of home-grown Virginia tobacco for local consumption is prohibited
by Sec. 1 of Republic Act 1194 construed in relation to Sec. 6 of
Republic Act No. 1410. Therefore, the Virginia leaf tobacco
imported by the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying
Corporation of which respondent Stonehill is the President from the
USA by virtue of the said Barter Permit No. BT-1380 (Special) has
entered this country in flagrant violation of the above-mentioned
laws and, that being the case, (4) all of the said Virginia tobacco so
far imported as above stated must be confiscated in favor of the
Government in accordance with Sec. 1-e of Republic Act No. 1194.
In view of the penal provision of Republic Act 1194, the Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to furnish the honorable Secretary of
Justice with a copy of this decision for his information. .
The most important error assigned on the appeal is the ruling of the trial court
that although there has been a breach of the law, as the breach continued and
could continue up to January 21, 1960, when the barter permit would expire,
the breach is not yet complete.
The above ruling of the court is an express violation of Sec. 2 of Rule 66, which
reads as follows:
SEC. 2. — A contract or statute may be construed before there has
been a breach thereof.
Following the above-quoted decision, if an action for declaratory relief were to
be allowed in this case, after a breach of the statute, the decision of the court in
the action for declaratory relief would prejudge the action for violation of the
barter law.
The institution of an action for declaratory relief after a breach of contract or
statute, is objectionable on various grounds, among which is that it violates the
rule on multiplicity of suits. If the case at bar were allowed for a declaratory
relief, the judgment therein notwithstanding, another action would still lie
against the importer respondent for violation of the barter law. So, instead of
one case only before the courts in which all issues would be decided, two cases
will be allowed, one being the present action for declaratory relief and a
subsequent one for the confiscation of the importations as a consequence of
the breach of the barter law.
The impropriety of allowing an action for declaratory relief, after a breach of the
law, can be seen in the very decision of the court itself, which is now subject of
the appeal. Whereas the case at bar was purported to bring about a simple
declaration of the rights of the parties to the action, the judgment goes further
than said declaration and decrees that the importation by the respondent
corporation violates the law, and further directs that legal importation be
confiscated under the provisions the law (Section 1 (c), R.A. No. 1194.) This
confiscation directed by the court lies clearly beyond the scope and nature of an
action for declaratory relief, as the judgment of confiscation goes beyond the
issues expressly raised, and to that extent it is null and void.
That the proper remedy under the circumstances was an action for injunction,
and not one for declaratory relief, is evident from the fact that the original
petition was for injunction; petitioner herein only changed the nature of the
action into one for declaratory relief when, as they explain, they found out that
they did not have funds for the writ of preliminary injunction..
As a final reason for dismissing the present action, we have the undeniable fact
that as of this date (March 1962) the permit had expired two years before (its
life extended to January 21, 1960 only), and all the shipments under the permit
had already been delivered to the consignee and used in the manufacture of
tobacco. The petitioner did not secure a writ of preliminary injunction, as this
remedy is not proper in an action for declaratory relief; as a result, aside from
the complete violation of the barter law, the importations have already been
completely used up in the manufacture of tobacco during the pendency of
these proceedings.
Under the circumstances and at present, of what use will a declaration of the
rights of the parties under the barter law be? In fact as of the date of this
decision the issues have become moot and academic and the court can do no
other than declare the action to be so and of no practical use or value.

In the case of De Borja vs. Villadolid, 85 Phil., pp. 36-39 we held: .

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment appealed from is set aside
and the action for declaratory relief dismissed. Without costs.
... We are only concerned with the question whether or not the
complaint for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff, and which the
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed for lack of merit, should
be given due course in this Court.

It appears that the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries demanded

that plaintiff pay the license provided in that Act and in view of the
insistent refusal of plaintiff to comply with such demand, he finally
turned over the case to the Office of the Fiscal of the City of Manila
for appropriate action. However, plaintiff, upon learning of the step
taken by the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries countered by filing
this complaint for declaratory relief, but this attitude of the plaintiff
will only result in multiplicity of actions which should always be
avoided and the Rules of Court obviously seeks to prevent when, in
section 2 of Rule 66, it provides that the action for declaratory relief
must be brought "before there has been a breach" of a contract or
statute the construction of which is sought.

The facts in this case are so clear and unambiguous, that in the light
of said section 2 of Rule 66, there is nothing left for the courts to
adjudicate or construe regarding the legal rights, duties and status
of appellant in the premises. The general purpose of a declaratory
judgment act is to provide for adjudication of the legal rights,
duties, or status of the respective parties. (1 C.J.S., p. 1022; see also
16 Am. Jur., 284; (De Borja vs. Villadolid, 85 Phil., pp. 36-39).

Special
Proceedings

RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
[G.R. No. L-5101. November 28, 1953]
ANGELES S. SANTOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. PATERIO AQUINO, as Municipal
Mayor of Malabon, THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABON, A. A. OLIVEROS,
as Municipal Treasurer of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Respondents-Appellees.
Arsenio Paez for Appellant.
Ireneo V. Bernardo for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DECLARATORY RELIEF. — The action is not for
declaratory relief if the terms of the ordinances assailed are not ambiguous or
of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN SUCH ACTION MAY BE FILED. — Granting that the validity or
legality of an ordinance may be drawn in question in an action for declaratory
relief, such relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance be
committed (section 2, Rule 66).
3. ID.; ID.; PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. — The rule that actions must be
brought in the name of the real party in interest (section 2, Rule 3) applies to
actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. As to a theater, its owner,
and not its manager, is the real party in interest.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL BODY.
— Municipal councils are not constitutional bodies but creatures of the
Congress. The latter may even abolish or replace them with other government
instrumentalities.
5. TAXATION; THEATERS, TAXES ON; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; ACTION OF
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE ON ORDINANCES IMPOSING TAXES. —
Commonwealth Act No. 472 grants to the Department of Finance the authority
to disapprove, implied in the power to approve, an ordinance of a municipal
council imposing a tax on theaters which is more than 50 per centum of the
existing tax, or to reduce it, also implied in the same power. This, of course, is to
forestall abuse of power by the municipal councils. If the Congress has granted
to the Department of Finance the power to reduce such tax, implied in the
power to approve or disapprove, there seems to be no cogent reason for
requiring the municipal council concerned to adopt another ordinance fixing
the rate as reduced by the Department of Finance. The action of that
Department in approving an ordinance of a municipal council at a reduced rate
is not in excess of the powers granted to the Department by law.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This action purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer of the petition
seeks to have Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, and Ordinance No. 10, series of
1947, of the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, declared null and void;
to prevent the collection of surcharges and penalties for failure to pay the taxes
imposed by the ordinances referred to, except for such failure from and after
the taxpayer shall have been served with the notice of the effectivity of the
ordinances; and to enjoin the respondents, their agents and all other persons
acting for and in their behalf from enforcing the ordinances referred to and
from making any collection thereunder. Further, petitioner prays for such other
remedy and relief as may be deemed just and equitable and asks that costs be
taxed against the respondents.
The petitioner is the manager of a theater known as "Cine Concepción," located
and operated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, and the
respondents are the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council and the Municipal
Treasurer, of Malabon. The petitioner avers that Ordinance No. 61, series of
Page 7 of 86
1946, adopted by the Municipal Council of Malabon on 8 December 1946,
imposes a license tax of P1,000 per annum on the said theater in addition to a
license tax on all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas in Malabon, pursuant to
Ordinance No. 58, series of 1946, adopted on the same date as Ordinance No.
61, the same series; that prior to 8 December 1946 the municipal license tax
paid by the petitioner on "Cine Concepción" was P180, pursuant to Ordinance
No. 9, series of 1945; that on 6 December 1947, the Municipal Council of
Malabon adopted Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, imposing a graduated
municipal license tax on theaters and cinematographs from P200 to P9,000 per
annum; that the ordinance was submitted for approval to the Department of
Finance, which reduced the rate of taxes provided therein, and the ordinance
with the reduced rate of taxes was approved on 3 November 1948; that notice
of reduction of the tax rate and approval by the Department of Finance of said
graduated municipal license tax provided for in said Ordinance No. 10, as
reduced, was served on the petitioner on 12 February 1949 when the
respondent Municipal Treasurer presented a bill for collection thereof; that
Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, is ultra vires and repugnant to the provisions
of the Constitution on taxation; that its approval was not in accordance with
law; that Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, is also null and void, because the
Department of Finance that approved it acted in excess and against the powers
granted it by law, and is unjust, oppressive and confiscatory; and that the
adoption of both ordinances was the result of persecution of the petitioner by
the respondents because from 20 July 1946 to 8 December 1947, or within a
period of less than one and a half years, the Municipal Council of Malabon
adopted four ordinances increasing the taxes on cinematographs and theaters
and imposing a penalty of 20 per cent surcharge for late payment.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, but upon
suggestion of the Court at the hearing thereof, the respondents were prevailed
upon to file their answer.
In their answer the respondents allege that both ordinances adopted by the
Municipal Council of Malabon are not ultra vires, the same not being under any
of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 472; that
the ordinances were adopted pursuant to the policy enunciated by the
Secretary of the Interior in a circular issued on 20 June 1946 which in substance
suggested and urged the municipal councils to increase their revenues and not
to rely on the National Government which was not in a position to render any
help and to make such increase dependent upon the taxpayer’s ability to pay;
that both ordinances assailed by the petitioner had been submitted to, and
approved by, the Department of Finance, as required by section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 472, and took effect on 1 January 1947 and 1 January
1948, respectively; that the petitioner had filed a protest with the Secretary of
Finance against such increase of taxes, as fixed by the municipal ordinances in
question but the Department of Finance although reducing the amount of taxes
imposed in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, and changing the date of
effectivity of both ordinances, upheld the legality thereof; and that the
petitioner brought this action for declaratory relief with the evident purpose of
evading payment of the unpaid balance of taxes due from the "Cine
Concepción." By way of special defense the respondents allege that the petition
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; that the Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for declaratory relief; that
the petitioner should have paid under protest the taxes imposed by the
ordinances in question on "Cine Concepción" and after payment thereof should
bring an action under section 1579 of the Revised Administrative Code; that this
being an action for declaratory relief, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal should have
been notified thereof but the petitioner failed to do so; that the petition does
not join all the necessary parties and, therefore, a judgment rendered in the
case will not terminate the uncertainty or the controversy that is sought to be
settled and determined.
After hearing the Court rendered judgment holding that the ordinances in
question are valid and constitutional and dismissing the petition with costs
against the petitioner. The latter has appealed. This is not an action for
declaratory relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed are not
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the
Court. And granting that the validity or legality of an ordinance may be drawn in
question in an action for declaratory relief, such relief must be asked before a
violation of the ordinance be committed. 1 When this action was brought on 12
May 1949, payment of the municipal license taxes imposed by both ordinances,
the tax rate of the last having been reduced by the Department of Finance, was
already due, and the prayer of the petition shows that the petitioner had not
paid them. In those circumstances the petitioner cannot bring an action for
declaratory relief.
Angeles S. Santos, the petitioner, does not aver nor does he testify that he is the
owner or part-owner of "Cine Concepción." He alleges that he is only the
manager thereof. For that reason he is not an interested party. He has no
interest in the theater known as "Cine Concepción" which may be affected by
the municipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not entitled to
Special
Proceedings
 Page 8 of 86

bring this action either for declaratory relief or for prohibition, which apparently
is the purpose of the action as may be gleaned from the prayer of the petition.
The rule that actions must be brought in the name of the real party in interest 2
applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. 3 The fact that
he is the manager of the theater does not make him a real party in interest. 4
Nevertheless, laying aside these procedural defects, we are of the opinion and
so hold that under Commonwealth Act No. 472 the Municipal Council of
Malabon is authorized and empowered to adopt the ordinances in question,
and there being no showing, as the evidence does not show, that the rate of the
municipal taxes therein provided is excessive, unjust, oppressive and
confiscatory, their validity and legality must be upheld. The rate of the taxes in
both ordinances, to wit: P1,000 a year for "Class A Cinematographs having
orchestra, balcony and loge seats" in Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, 5 and
P2,000 for each theater or cinematograph with gross annual receipts amounting
to P130,000 or more in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, 6 under which the
"Cine Concepción" falls, is not excessive but fair and just. It is far from being
oppressive and confiscatory. Pursuant to said Commonwealth Act if the increase
of the municipal taxes is more than 50 per cent over the previous ones already
in existence, the Municipal Council adopting such increase must submit it for
approval to the Department of Finance which, although it cannot increase it,
may reduce it and may approve it as reduced, or may disapprove it. It is
contended that as only municipal councils are authorized by law to adopt
ordinances, after the reduction by the Department of Finance of the tax rate
imposed in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, duly adopted by the Municipal
Council of Malabon, the latter should adopt another ordinance accepting or
fixing the rate tax as reduced by the Department of Finance. The contention is
without merit, because the rate of taxes imposed on theaters or
cinematographs in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, was the only one reduced
by the Department of Finance and the reduction was for the benefit of the
taxpayer as it was very much lower than the rate fixed by the Municipal Council.
The authority and discretion to fix the amount of the tax was exercised by the
Municipal Council of Malabon when it fixed the same at P9,000 a year.
Certainly, the Municipal Council of Malabon that fixed the tax at P9,000 a year
also approved the tax at P2,000 a year, this being very much less than that fixed
in the ordinance. The power and discretion exercised by the Municipal Council
of Malabon when it fixed the tax at P9,000 a year must be deemed to have
been exercised also by it when the Department of Finance reduced it to P2,000
a year, for the greater includes the lesser. The adoption of another ordinance
fixing the tax at P2,000 a year would be an idle ceremony and waste of time.
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that municipal councils are not
constitutional bodies but creatures of the Congress. The latter may even abolish
or replace them with other government instrumentalities. Commonwealth Act
No. 472 grants to the Department of Finance the authority to disapprove,
implied in the power to approve, an ordinance imposing a tax which is more
than 50 per cent of the existing tax, or to reduce it, also implied in the same
power. This, of course, is to forestall abuse of power by the municipal councils.
If the Congress has granted to the Department of Finance the power to reduce
such tax, implied in the power to approve or disapprove, there seems to be no
cogent reason for requiring the municipal council concerned to adopt another
ordinance fixing the tax as reduced by the Department of Finance. Therefore,
the action of the Department of Finance in approving Ordinance No. 10, series
of 1947, at a reduced rate, is not in excess of the powers granted it by law. The
evidence does not show that the adoption of the ordinances in question by the
Municipal Council of Malabon was the result of persecution of the petitioner.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
G.R. No. 91500 October 18, 1990
ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
Yulo, Aliling & Macamay for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 576-A with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
The allegations of the petition are that on January 19, 1960, Republic Act No.
3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or franchise to construct,
maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Petitioner
was able to construct, maintain and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting stations
all over the country. Through said broadcasting stations, petitioner was able to
provide adequate public service which enabled the government to reach the
population on important public issues, and assist the government in programs
relating to public information and education. Its radio stations have never been
used for the broadcasting of obscene or indecent language or speech, or for the
dissemination of misleading information or willful misrepresentation, or to the
detriment of the public health, or to incite, encourage or assist in subversion or
treasonable acts.
Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit
"shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the
Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..."
On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A entitled "Decree
Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And
For Other Purposes" was issued and duly published in the December 2, 1974
supplemental issue of the Official Gazette. 1
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Decree provide as follows:
Sec. 3. No person or corporation may own, operate, or
manage more than one radio or television station in one
municipality or city; nor more than five AM and FM
radio stations; nor more than five television channels in
the entire country, and no radio or television station
shall be utilized by any single-interest group to
disseminate information or otherwise influence the
public or the government to serve or support the ends
of such group.
Sec. 4. Any person or corporation which owns more
than the number of radio or television stations
authorized in the preceding section shall divest itself of
the excess stations or channels. Any excess station shall
be sold through the Board of Communications.
The divestiture provided herein shall be made not later
than December 31, 1981. Thereafter, a person or
corporation shall make such divestiture within one year
from the discovery of the offense.
Page 9 of 86
Sec. 5. Failure to divest as provided in the foregoing
section shall, in addition to the penalties provided in
Section 6, subject the person or corporation guilty of
such failure to cancellation of the franchise of every
excess station and to confiscation of the station and its
facilities without compensation.
Sec. 6. All franchises, grants, licenses, permits,
certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio
or television broadcasting systems shall terminate on
December 31, 1981. Thereafter, irrespective of any
franchise, grant, license, permit, certificate or other
forms of authority to operate granted by any office,
agency or person, no radio or television station shall be
authorized to operate without the authority of the
Board of Communications and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications or their successors who
have the right and authority to assign to qualified
parties frequencies, channels or other means of
Identifying broadcast systems; Provided, however, that
any conflict over, or disagreement with, a decision of
the aforementioned authorities may be appealed finally
to the Office of the President within fifteen days from
the date the decision is received by the party in interest.
Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all franchises, grants, licenses, permits,
certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or television
broadcasting systems/stations, including the franchise or permit of petitioner
under Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed terminated or revoked
effective December 31, 1981.
Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod
City and Roxas City.
Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable damage,
because — (a) it divested petitioner of its franchise without due process of law
and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it deprived
petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio
broadcasting stations in other cities or municipalities of the country; 2 (c) it
deprived petitioner of its right to avail of loan facilities or renew its existing loan
availments from any bank or financial institution in order to expand and
continue the operation of its radio broadcasting business; and (d) petitioner
suffered loss of income.
Hence, this petition to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as
unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. The grounds of the petition are as
follows:
I THE ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 576-A
SUMMARILY TERMINATING THE PETITIONER'S
FRANCHISE OR PERMIT ON DECEMBER 31, 1981
CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DEPRIVATION
OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS (FRANCHISE OR PERMIT) OF
PETITIONER WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND/OR
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION;
II. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED
THE PETITIONER TO DlVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS
RADIO STATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ITS
CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES A
VIOLATION AND IMPAIRMENT OF PETITIONER'S OR THE
PEOPLE'S RIGHT OR FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION
AND/OR OF THE PRESS;
III. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED
THE PETITIONER TO DIVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS
RADIO STATIONS AND THE ARBITRARY TERMINATION OF
ITS CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES AN
UNLAWFUL IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE PETITIONER;
AND
IV. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE
RESTRICTING PETITIONER OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR
ENTITY TO OPERATE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF RADIO OR
Special
Proceedings
 Page 10 of 86

TELEVISION STATIONS IN ONE CITY OR MUNICIPALITY, of prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not a corrective remedy. It
OR IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY FOR THAT MATTER, AND cannot correct an act that is a fait accompli. 9
FURTHER TERMINATING THE CONGRESSIONAL
FRANCHISE OF PETITIONER CONSTITUTES AN
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT OF TRADE; 3

SO ORDERED.
Without giving due course to the petition, the respondents were required to
submit their comment thereto within ten (10) days from notice. After the
comment of the respondents was submitted, the petitioner was required to file
a reply thereto. As said reply was filed the Court required respondents to
submit their rejoinder. The rejoinder of respondents had been duly submitted
so the case is now due for resolution.

After a careful deliberation on the petition, the Court finds the same to be
devoid of merit.

The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of

Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking
declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be
brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court. A
petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. 4

Thus, the present petition should be dismissed on this score.

Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be

annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a license
to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and
that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been
penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is,
likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated
or shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the
constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or
controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that petitioner
seeks is the nullification of Presidential Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement
of its rights under Republic Act No. 3001.

Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to

determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." 5

The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and

not to give advisory opinions. 6 The power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the
statute sought to be reviewed. 7

Petitioner alleges that it used to maintain and operate at least ten (10) radio
broadcasting stations but pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 576-A it divested itself of the "excess stations" thus leaving it with
three (3) radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City.
Petitioner did not allege that it challenged the constitutionality of the decree at
any time since it took effect on December 31, 1981. It does not appear that
petitioner's compliance was made under protest. In view of its acquiescence
with Presidential Decree No. 576-A, the petitioner is now estopped from
challenging the same under the principle of estoppel that "one who sleeps on
his rights shall not be heard to complain."

The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for
prohibition does not place petitioner in any better position. The petition cannot
be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further
proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising judicial or ministerial functions. 8

In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding
being conducted by public respondent which adversely affects its interest.
Petitioner does not claim that it has a pending application for a broadcast
license which is about to be denied under Presidential Decree No. 576-A.
Apparently, what petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible denial of an
application it may make to operate radio or television stations on the basis of
the restrictions imposed by Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the
petition is premature.

Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under its original franchise.
Reinstatement is an affirmative remedy and cannot be secured through a writ

Special
Proceedings

RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
G.R. No. L-23645 October 29, 1968
BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster General, HON. BRIGIDO R.
VALENCIA, in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
and DOMINGO GOPEZ, in his capacity as Acting Postmaster of San Fernando,
Pampanga, respondent-appellants.
Lorenzo P. Navarro and Narvaro Belar S. Navarro for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine
C. Zaballero and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for respondents-appellants.
CASTRO, J.:
This appeal puts in issue the constitutionality of Republic Act 1635, 1 as
amended by Republic Act 2631,2 which provides as follows:
To help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the
Director of Posts shall order for the period from August nineteen to
September thirty every year the printing and issue of semi-postal
stamps of different denominations with face value showing the
regular postage charge plus the additional amount of five centavos
for the said purpose, and during the said period, no mail matter
shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal
stamps: Provided, That no such additional charge of five centavos
shall be imposed on newspapers. The additional proceeds realized
from the sale of the semi-postal stamps shall constitute a special
fund and be deposited with the National Treasury to be expended
by the Philippine Tuberculosis Society in carrying out its noble work
to prevent and eradicate tuberculosis.
The respondent Postmaster General, in implementation of the law, thereafter
issued four (4) administrative orders numbered 3 (June 20, 1958), 7 (August 9,
1958), 9 (August 28, 1958), and 10 (July 15, 1960). All these administrative
orders were issued with the approval of the respondent Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
The pertinent portions of Adm. Order 3 read as follows:
Such semi-postal stamps could not be made available during the
period from August 19 to September 30, 1957, for lack of time.
However, two denominations of such stamps, one at "5 + 5"
centavos and another at "10 + 5" centavos, will soon be released for
use by the public on their mails to be posted during the same
period starting with the year 1958.
xxx xxx xxx
During the period from August 19 to September 30 each year
starting in 1958, no mail matter of whatever class, and whether
domestic or foreign, posted at any Philippine Post Office and
addressed for delivery in this country or abroad, shall be accepted
for mailing unless it bears at least one such semi-postal stamp
showing the additional value of five centavos intended for the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society.
In the case of second-class mails and mails prepaid by means of
mail permits or impressions of postage meters, each piece of such
mail shall bear at least one such semi-postal stamp if posted during
the period above stated starting with the year 1958, in addition to
being charged the usual postage prescribed by existing regulations.
In the case of business reply envelopes and cards mailed during said
period, such stamp should be collected from the addressees at the
Page 11 of 86
time of delivery. Mails entitled to franking privilege like those from
the office of the President, members of Congress, and other offices
to which such privilege has been granted, shall each also bear one
such semi-postal stamp if posted during the said period.
Mails posted during the said period starting in 1958, which are
found in street or post-office mail boxes without the required semi-
postal stamp, shall be returned to the sender, if known, with a
notation calling for the affixing of such stamp. If the sender is
unknown, the mail matter shall be treated as nonmailable and
forwarded to the Dead Letter Office for proper disposition.
Adm. Order 7, amending the fifth paragraph of Adm. Order 3, reads as follows:
In the case of the following categories of mail matter and mails
entitled to franking privilege which are not exempted from the
payment of the five centavos intended for the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, such extra charge may be collected in cash, for
which official receipt (General Form No. 13, A) shall be issued,
instead of affixing the semi-postal stamp in the manner hereinafter
indicated:
1. Second-class mail. — Aside from the postage at the second-class
rate, the extra charge of five centavos for the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society shall be collected on each separately-
addressed piece of second-class mail matter, and the total sum thus
collected shall be entered in the same official receipt to be issued
for the postage at the second-class rate. In making such entry, the
total number of pieces of second-class mail posted shall be stated,
thus: "Total charge for TB Fund on 100 pieces . .. P5.00." The extra
charge shall be entered separate from the postage in both of the
official receipt and the Record of Collections.
2. First-class and third-class mail permits. — Mails to be posted
without postage affixed under permits issued by this Bureau shall
each be charged the usual postage, in addition to the five-centavo
extra charge intended for said society. The total extra charge thus
received shall be entered in the same official receipt to be issued for
the postage collected, as in subparagraph 1.
3. Metered mail. — For each piece of mail matter impressed by
postage meter under metered mail permit issued by this Bureau,
the extra charge of five centavos for said society shall be collected in
cash and an official receipt issued for the total sum thus received, in
the manner indicated in subparagraph 1.
4. Business reply cards and envelopes. — Upon delivery of business
reply cards and envelopes to holders of business reply permits, the
five-centavo charge intended for said society shall be collected in
cash on each reply card or envelope delivered, in addition to the
required postage which may also be paid in cash. An official receipt
shall be issued for the total postage and total extra charge received,
in the manner shown in subparagraph 1.
5. Mails entitled to franking privilege. — Government agencies,
officials, and other persons entitled to the franking privilege under
existing laws may pay in cash such extra charge intended for said
society, instead of affixing the semi-postal stamps to their mails,
provided that such mails are presented at the post-office window,
where the five-centavo extra charge for said society shall be
collected on each piece of such mail matter. In such case, an official
receipt shall be issued for the total sum thus collected, in the
manner stated in subparagraph 1.
Mail under permits, metered mails and franked mails not presented
at the post-office window shall be affixed with the necessary semi-
postal stamps. If found in mail boxes without such stamps, they
shall be treated in the same way as herein provided for other mails.
Adm. Order 9, amending Adm. Order 3, as amended, exempts "Government
and its Agencies and Instrumentalities Performing Governmental Functions."
Adm. Order 10, amending Adm. Order 3, as amended, exempts "copies of
periodical publications received for mailing under any class of mail matter,
including newspapers and magazines admitted as second-class mail."
Special
Proceedings

The FACTS. On September l5, 1963 the petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a
letter at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. Because this letter,
addressed to a certain Agustin Aquino of 1014 Dagohoy Street, Singalong,
Manila did not bear the special anti-TB stamp required by the statute, it was
returned to the petitioner.
In view of this development, the petitioner brough suit for declaratory relief in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, to test the constitutionality of the
statute, as well as the implementing administrative orders issued, contending
that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as the rule
of uniformity and equality of taxation. The lower court declared the statute and
the orders unconstitutional; hence this appeal by the respondent postal
authorities.
For the reasons set out in this opinion, the judgment appealed from must be
reversed.
I.
Before reaching the merits, we deem it necessary to dispose of the
respondents' contention that declaratory relief is unavailing because this suit
was filed after the petitioner had committed a breach of the statute. While
conceding that the mailing by the petitioner of a letter without the additional
anti-TB stamp was a violation of Republic Act 1635, as amended, the trial court
nevertheless refused to dismiss the action on the ground that under section 6
of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, "If before the final termination of the case a
breach or violation of ... a statute ... should take place, the action may
thereupon be converted into an ordinary action."
The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be
brought "before breach or violation" of the statute has been committed. Rule
64, section 1 so provides. Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to
treat an action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies only if the
breach or violation occurs after the filing of the action but before the
termination thereof.3
Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been a breach of the
statute before the firing of this action, then indeed the remedy of declaratory
relief cannot be availed of, much less can the suit be converted into an ordinary
action.
Nor is there merit in the petitioner's argument that the mailing of the letter in
question did not constitute a breach of the statute because the statute appears
to be addressed only to postal authorities. The statute, it is true, in terms
provides that "no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such
semi-postal stamps." It does not follow, however, that only postal authorities
can be guilty of violating it by accepting mails without the payment of the anti-
TB stamp. It is obvious that they can be guilty of violating the statute only if
there are people who use the mails without paying for the additional anti-TB
stamp. Just as in bribery the mere offer constitutes a breach of the law, so in the
matter of the anti-TB stamp the mere attempt to use the mails without the
stamp constitutes a violation of the statute. It is not required that the mail be
accepted by postal authorities. That requirement is relevant only for the
purpose of fixing the liability of postal officials.
Nevertheless, we are of the view that the petitioner's choice of remedy is
correct because this suit was filed not only with respect to the letter which he
mailed on September 15, 1963, but also with regard to any other mail that he
might send in the future. Thus, in his complaint, the petitioner prayed that due
course be given to "other mails without the semi-postal stamps which he may
deliver for mailing ... if any, during the period covered by Republic Act 1635, as
amended, as well as other mails hereafter to be sent by or to other mailers
which bear the required postage, without collection of additional charge of five
centavos prescribed by the same Republic Act." As one whose mail was
returned, the petitioner is certainly interested in a ruling on the validity of the
statute requiring the use of additional stamps.
II.
We now consider the constitutional objections raised against the statute and
the implementing orders.
1. It is said that the statute is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. More specifically the claim is made that it constitutes mail users
Page 12 of 86
into a class for the purpose of the tax while leaving untaxed the rest of the
population and that even among postal patrons the statute discriminatorily
grants exemption to newspapers while Administrative Order 9 of the
respondent Postmaster General grants a similar exemption to offices
performing governmental functions. .
The five centavo charge levied by Republic Act 1635, as amended, is in the
nature of an excise tax, laid upon the exercise of a privilege, namely, the
privilege of using the mails. As such the objections levelled against it must be
viewed in the light of applicable principles of taxation.
To begin with, it is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select
the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. 4 This power has aptly been
described as "of wide range and flexibility." 5 Indeed, it is said that in the field of
taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the greatest
freedom in classification.6 The reason for this is that traditionally, classification
has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to
achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden. 7
That legislative classifications must be reasonable is of course undenied. But
what the petitioner asserts is that statutory classification of mail users must
bear some reasonable relationship to the end sought to be attained, and that
absent such relationship the selection of mail users is constitutionally
impermissible. This is altogether a different proposition. As explained
in Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co.:8
While the principle that there must be a reasonable relationship
between classification made by the legislation and its purpose is
undoubtedly true in some contexts, it has no application to a
measure whose sole purpose is to raise revenue ... So long as the
classification imposed is based upon some standard capable of
reasonable comprehension, be that standard based upon ability to
produce revenue or some other legitimate distinction, equal
protection of the law has been afforded. See Allied Stores of Ohio,
Inc. v. Bowers, supra, 358 U.S. at 527, 79 S. Ct. at 441; Brown
Forman Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2d U.S. 56, 573, 80 S. Ct.
578, 580 (1910).
We are not wont to invalidate legislation on equal protection grounds except by
the clearest demonstration that it sanctions invidious discrimination, which is all
that the Constitution forbids. The remedy for unwise legislation must be sought
in the legislature. Now, the classification of mail users is not without any reason.
It is based on ability to pay, let alone the enjoyment of a privilege, and on
administrative convinience. In the allocation of the tax burden, Congress must
have concluded that the contribution to the anti-TB fund can be assured by
those whose who can afford the use of the mails.
The classification is likewise based on considerations of administrative
convenience. For it is now a settled principle of law that "consideration of
practical administrative convenience and cost in the administration of tax laws
afford adequate ground for imposing a tax on a well recognized and defined
class."9 In the case of the anti-TB stamps, undoubtedly, the single most
important and influential consideration that led the legislature to select mail
users as subjects of the tax is the relative ease and convenienceof collecting the
tax through the post offices. The small amount of five centavos does not justify
the great expense and inconvenience of collecting through the regular means of
collection. On the other hand, by placing the duty of collection on postal
authorities the tax was made almost self-enforcing, with as little cost and as
little inconvenience as possible.
And then of course it is not accurate to say that the statute constituted mail
users into a class. Mail users were already a class by themselves even before the
enactment of the statue and all that the legislature did was merely to select
their class. Legislation is essentially empiric and Republic Act 1635, as amended,
no more than reflects a distinction that exists in fact. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said, "to recognize differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard [them]
and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic." 10
Granted the power to select the subject of taxation, the State's power to grant
exemption must likewise be conceded as a necessary corollary. Tax exemptions
are too common in the law; they have never been thought of as raising issues
under the equal protection clause.
It is thus erroneous for the trial court to hold that because certain mail users
are exempted from the levy the law and administrative officials have sanctioned
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Proceedings
 Page 13 of 86

an invidious discrimination offensive to the Constitution. The application of the
lower courts theory would require all mail users to be taxed, a conclusion that is
hardly tenable in the light of differences in status of mail users. The Constitution
does not require this kind of equality.
As the United States Supreme Court has said, the legislature may withhold the
burden of the tax in order to foster what it conceives to be a beneficent
enterprise.11 This is the case of newspapers which, under the amendment
introduced by Republic Act 2631, are exempt from the payment of the
additional stamp.
As for the Government and its instrumentalities, their exemption rests on the
State's sovereign immunity from taxation. The State cannot be taxed without its
consent and such consent, being in derogation of its sovereignty, is to be strictly
construed.12 Administrative Order 9 of the respondent Postmaster General,
which lists the various offices and instrumentalities of the Government exempt
from the payment of the anti-TB stamp, is but a restatement of this well-known
principle of constitutional law.
Indeed, this is one of the grounds on which the lower court invalidated Republic
Act 1631, as amended, namely, that it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
Administrative Order 3, as amended by Administrative Orders 7 and 10,
provides that for certain classes of mail matters (such as mail permits, metered
mails, business reply cards, etc.), the five-centavo charge may be paid in cash
instead of the purchase of the anti-TB stamp. It further states that mails
deposited during the period August 19 to September 30 of each year in mail
boxes without the stamp should be returned to the sender, if known, otherwise
they should be treated as nonmailable.
It is true that the law does not expressly authorize the collection of five
centavos except through the sale of anti-TB stamps, but such authority may be
implied in so far as it may be necessary to prevent a failure of the undertaking.
The authority given to the Postmaster General to raise funds through the mails
must be liberally construed, consistent with the principle that where the end is
required the appropriate means are given. 19

The trial court likewise held the law invalid on the ground that it singles out
tuberculosis to the exclusion of other diseases which, it is said, are equally a
menace to public health. But it is never a requirement of equal protection that
all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.13 As this Court has had
occasion to say, "if the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not
to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied." 14
2. The petitioner further argues that the tax in question is invalid, first, because
it is not levied for a public purpose as no special benefits accrue to mail users as
taxpayers, and second, because it violates the rule of uniformity in taxation.
The eradication of a dreaded disease is a public purpose, but if by public
purpose the petitioner means benefit to a taxpayer as a return for what he
pays, then it is sufficient answer to say that the only benefit to which the
taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the
privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded by the
devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude the levying
of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burden on those who
pay them and would involve the abandonment of the most fundamental
principle of government — that it exists primarily to provide for the common
good.15
The anti-TB stamp is a distinctive stamp which shows on its face not only the
amount of the additional charge but also that of the regular postage. In the case
of business reply cards, for instance, it is obvious that to require mailers to affix
the anti-TB stamp on their cards would be to make them pay much more
because the cards likewise bear the amount of the regular postage.
It is likewise true that the statute does not provide for the disposition of mails
which do not bear the anti-TB stamp, but a declaration therein that "no mail
matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamp" is
a declaration that such mail matter is nonmailable within the meaning of
section 1952 of the Administrative Code. Administrative Order 7 of the
Postmaster General is but a restatement of the law for the guidance of postal
officials and employees. As for Administrative Order 9, we have already said
that in listing the offices and entities of the Government exempt from the
payment of the stamp, the respondent Postmaster General merely observed an
established principle, namely, that the Government is exempt from taxation.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Nor is the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation infringed by the imposition
of a flat rate rather than a graduated tax. A tax need not be measured by the
weight of the mail or the extent of the service rendered. We have said that
considerations of administrative convenience and cost afford an adequate
ground for classification. The same considerations may induce the legislature to
impose a flat tax which in effect is a charge for the transaction, operating
equally on all persons within the class regardless of the amount involved. 16 As
Mr. Justice Holmes said in sustaining the validity of a stamp act which imposed a
flat rate of two cents on every $100 face value of stock transferred:

One of the stocks was worth $30.75 a share of the face value of
$100, the other $172. The inequality of the tax, so far as actual
values are concerned, is manifest. But, here again equality in this
sense has to yield to practical considerations and usage. There must
be a fixed and indisputable mode of ascertaining a stamp tax. In
another sense, moreover, there is equality. When the taxes on two
sales are equal, the same number of shares is sold in each case; that
is to say, the same privilege is used to the same extent. Valuation is
not the only thing to be considered. As was pointed out by the court
of appeals, the familiar stamp tax of 2 cents on checks, irrespective
of income or earning capacity, and many others, illustrate the
necessity and practice of sometimes substituting count for
weight ...17

According to the trial court, the money raised from the sales of the anti-TB
stamps is spent for the benefit of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, a private
organization, without appropriation by law. But as the Solicitor General points
out, the Society is not really the beneficiary but only the agency through which
the State acts in carrying out what is essentially a public function. The money is
treated as a special fund and as such need not be appropriated by law. 18

3. Finally, the claim is made that the statute is so broadly drawn that to execute
it the respondents had to issue administrative orders far beyond their powers.

Special
Proceedings
Page 14 of 86

Special
Proceedings

RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
G.R. No. L-28138 August 13, 1986
MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, AMIR M.
BALINDONG and HADJI PANGILAMUN MANALOCON, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and
MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, respondents-
appellants. PURAKAN PLANTATION COMPANY, intervenor-appellee.
YAP, J.:
On August 24, 1966, the Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, invoking
the authority of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46, entitled "AN
ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30 PER SACK OF
CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF." The
ordinance made it unlawful for any person, company or group of persons "to
ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying
to the Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the corresponding
fee fixed by (the) ordinance." It imposed a "police inspection fee" of P.30 per
sack of cassava starch or flour, which shall be paid by the shipper before the
same is transported or shipped outside the municipality. Any person or
company or group of individuals violating the ordinance "is liable to a fine of
not less than P100.00, but not more than P1,000.00, and to pay Pl.00 for every
sack of flour being illegally shipped outside the municipality, or to suffer
imprisonment of 20 days, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. in a
petition for declaratory relief filed with the then Court of First Instance of Lanao
del Sur against the Municipal Council, the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal
Treasurer of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Alleging among others that the ordinance
is not only ultra vires, being violative of Republic Act No. 2264, but also
unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner prayed that the
ordinance be declared null and void ab initio, and that the respondent
Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts paid by petitioner under
the ordinance. The petitioner also prayed that during the pendency of the
action, a preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the ordinance. The application for preliminary injunction, however,
was denied by the trial court; instead respondent Municipal Treasurer was
ordered to allow payment of the taxes imposed by the ordinance under protest.
Claiming that it was also adversely affected by the ordinance, Purakan
Plantation Company was granted leave to intervene in the action. The
intervenor alleged that while its cassava flour factory was situated in another
municipality, i.e., Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, it had to transport the cassava
starch and flour it produced to the seashore through the Municipality of
Malabang for loading in coastwise vessels; that the effect of the enactment of
Ordinance No. 45-46, is that intervenor had to refrain from transporting its
products through the Municipality of Malabang in order to ship them by sea to
other places.
After trial, the Court a quo rendered a decision declaring the municipal
ordinance in question null and void; ordering the respondent Municipal
Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments it made under the said
ordinance from September 27, 1966 to May 2, 1967, amounting to P 25,500.00,
as well as all payments made subsequently thereafter; and enjoining and
prohibiting the respondents, their agents or deputies, from collecting the tax of
P.30 per bag on the cassava flour or starch belonging to intervenor, Purakan
Plantation Company, manufactured or milled in the Municipality of Balabagan,
but shipped out through the Municipality of Malabang.
After the promulgation of the decision, the Trial Court issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, upon motion of petitioner, requiring the
Page 15 of 86
respondent Municipal Treasurer to deposit with the Philippine National Bank,
Iligan Branch, in the name of the Municipality of Malabang, whatever amounts
the petitioner had already paid or shall pay pursuant to the ordinance in
question up to and until final termination of the case; the deposit was not to be
withdrawn from the said bank without any order from the court. On motion for
reconsideration by respondents, the writ was subsequently modified on July 20,
1967, to require the deposit only of amounts paid from the effectivity of the
writ up to and until the final termination of the suit.
From the decision of the trial court, the respondents appealed to this Court.
A motion to dismiss appeal filed by petitioner-appellee, was denied by this
court in its resolution of October 31, 1967. Subsequently, respondents-
appellants filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the trial court on July 20, 1967. This motion was also
denied by this Court on January 10, 1968.
Of the assignments of error raised by the appellants in their Brief, only the
following need be discussed: (1) that the trial court erred in adjudicating the
money claim of the petitioner in an action for declaratory relief; and (2) that the
trial court erred in declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and void.
The respondents-appellants maintain that it was error for the trial court, in an
action for declaratory relief, to order the refund to petitioner-appellee of the
amounts paid by the latter under the municipal ordinance in question. It is the
contention of respondents-appellants that in an action for declaratory relief, all
the court can do is to construe the validity of the ordinance in question and
declare the rights of those affected thereby. The court cannot declare the
ordinance illegal and at the same time order the refund to petitioner of the
amounts paid under the ordinance, without requiring petitioner to file an
ordinary action to claim the refund after the declaratory relief judgment has
become final. Respondents maintain that under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
the court may advise the parties to file the proper pleadings and convert the
hearing into an ordinary action, which was not done in this case.
We find no merit in such contention. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for
declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action and the parties
allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an...ordinance, should take
place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred.
The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the
ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action
was still proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions
still remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in
an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid (Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd.
vs. Municipality of Sipocot, L-12680, March 20, 1959). In its petition for
declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the enforcement
of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protest
the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the respondents be ordered to
refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the
pendency of the case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition
was not objected to by the respondents in their answer. During the trial,
evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents
were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would
happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
Respondents' contention, if sustained, would in effect require a separate suit for
the recovery of the fees paid by petitioner under protest. Multiplicity of suits
should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the context of the present case, is
clearly uncalled for and unnecessary.
The main issue to be resolve in this case whether not Ordinance No. 45-66
enacted by respondent Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, is valid.
The respondents-appellants contend that the municipality has the power and
authority to approve the ordinance in question pursuant to Section 2 of the
Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264).
Since the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act, a liberal rule has been
followed by this Court in construing municipal ordinances enacted pursuant to
the taxing power granted under Section 2 of said law. This Court has construed
the grant of power to tax under the above-mentioned provision as sufficiently
plenary to cover "everything, excepting those which are mentioned" therein,
subject only to the limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes,
just and uniform (Nin Bay Mining Company vs. Municipality of Roxas, Province
Special
Proceedings
 Page 16 of 86

of Palawan, 14 SCRA 661; C.N. Hodges vs. Municipal Board, Iloilo City, et al., 19 Having found the ordinance in question to be invalid, we find it unnecessary to
SCRA 28). rule on the other errors assigned by the appellants.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the amount collected under the WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The decision of the court a quo is hereby
ordinance in question partakes of the nature of a tax, although denominated as affirmed. No costs.
"police inspection fee" since its undeniable purpose is to raise revenue.
However, we cannot agree with the trial court's finding that the tax imposed by
SO ORDERED.
the ordinance is a percentage tax on sales which is beyond the scope of the
municipality's authority to levy under Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act.
Under the said provision, municipalities and municipal districts are prohibited
from imposing" any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any
form based thereon. " The tax imposed under the ordinance in question is not a
percentage tax on sales or any other form of tax based on sales. It is a fixed tax
of P.30 per bag of cassava starch or flour "shipped out" of the municipality. It is
not based on sales.

However, the tax imposed under the ordinance can be stricken down on
another ground. According to Section 2 of the abovementioned Act, the tax
levied must be "for public purposes, just and uniform" (Emphasis supplied.) As
correctly held by the trial court, the so-called "police inspection fee" levied by
the ordinance is "unjust and unreasonable." Said the court a quo:

... It has been proven that the only service rendered by

the Municipality of Malabang, by way of inspection, is
for the policeman to verify from the driver of the trucks
of the petitioner passing by at the police checkpoint the
number of bags loaded per trip which are to be shipped
out of the municipality based on the trip tickets for the
purpose of computing the total amount of tax to be
collect (sic) and for no other purpose. The pretention of
respondents that the police, aside from counting the
number of bags shipped out, is also inspecting the
cassava flour starch contained in the bags to find out if
the said cassava flour starch is fit for human
consumption could not be given credence by the Court
because, aside from the fact that said purpose is not so
stated in the ordinance in question, the policemen of
said municipality are not competent to determine if the
cassava flour starch are fit for human consumption. The
further pretention of respondents that the trucks of the
petitioner hauling the bags of cassava flour starch from
the mill to the bodega at the beach of Malabang are
escorted by a policeman from the police checkpoint to
the beach for the purpose of protecting the truck and its
cargoes from molestation by undesirable elements
could not also be given credence by the Court because
it has been shown, beyond doubt, that the petitioner
has not asked for the said police protection because
there has been no occasion where its trucks have been
molested, even for once, by bad elements from the
police checkpoint to the bodega at the beach, it is solely
for the purpose of verifying the correct number of bags
of cassava flour starch loaded on the trucks of the
petitioner as stated in the trip tickets, when unloaded at
its bodega at the beach. The imposition, therefore, of a
police inspection fee of P.30 per bag, imposed by said
ordinance is unjust and unreasonable.

The Court finally finds the inspection fee of P0.30 per

bag, imposed by the ordinance in question to be
excessive and confiscatory. It has been shown by the
petitioner, Matalin Coconut Company, Inc., that it is
merely realizing a marginal average profit of P0.40, per
bag, of cassava flour starch shipped out from the
Municipality of Malabang because the average
production is P15.60 per bag, including transportation
costs, while the prevailing market price is P16.00 per
bag. The further imposition, therefore, of the tax of
P0.30 per bag, by the ordinance in question would force
the petitioner to close or stop its cassava flour starch
milling business considering that it is maintaining a big
labor force in its operation, including a force of security
guards to guard its properties. The ordinance, therefore,
has an adverse effect on the economic growth of the
Municipality of Malabang, in particular, and of the
nation, in general, and is contrary to the economic
policy of the government.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 101630 August 24, 1992
VICTOR DE JESUS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, MTCC, Br. II, General Santos City,
CITY PROSECUTOR FRANKLIN GACAL and SALUSTIANO SONIDO, respondents.
Vicente Collantes for petitioner.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Victor de Jesus, then Director and Finance Officer of Southern Island
Colleges, together with his octogenarian stepmother, Eugenia de Jesus, who
was then the Directress-Chairman of the Board of Directors, was charged with
violation of Section 28 (h) of the Social Security Law for failure to remit the SSS
loan amortizations of private respondent Salustiano Sonido, an employee, in the
amount; of P583.35 covering the period from January to August 1988. The
Information, signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Andres Lorenzo, Jr., was
filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. II, General Santos City, docketed
as Crim. Case No. 16886-2, presided by respondent Judge Eddie R. Rojas.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground that (a) the
City Prosecutor was not authorized to file the Information in the absence of
prior authority from the SSS; (b) the SSS and not the MTCC has jurisdiction over
the case; (c) the criminal action has been extinguished by the sale of his shares
in the school before the complaint for estafa was filed against him and his
stepmother; and, (d) damage as an element of estafa was not present in view of
Sec. 22 (b) of the Social Security Law which guarantees enjoyment of SSS
benefits by the employee notwithstanding failure of his employer to remit
deductions.
On 27 February 1991, respondent Judge denied the motion to quash for lack of
merit.1
Petitioner challenged before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus the Order of respondent Judge
denying his motion to quash.
On 31 July 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition holding
thus —
We refrain from any discussion on the merits of this
case since it involves an Order of a Municipal Trial Court
whose decisions are not directly reviewable by this
Court. . . . The instant petition should have been filed
with the Regional Trial Court, the proper and competent
tribunal. 2
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent Court of
Appeals on 28 August 1991, petitioner now comes to Us seeking inter alia to set
aside the resolutions dismissing his petition.
Outright, We discern a procedural misconception by the Court of Appeals of its
jurisdiction over matters brought to it by way of petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus from Municipal Trial Courts. Obviously, it is error to
hold that decisions of Municipal Trial Courts are not directly reviewable by the
Court of Appeals, and that such petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court being "the proper and competent tribunal."
Under Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto,
Page 17 of 86
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is concurrent
with that of Supreme Court 3 and with the Regional Trial Courts, for writs
enforceable within their respective regions. 4
Indeed, the refusal of the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of the petition
would have been proper prior to the effectivity of B.P. 129 5 when the writ
of certiorari was available in the appellate court only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. As explained in Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co. 6
A writ of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari against a
lower court is said to be in aid of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the meaning
of section 30 of Republic Act No. 296, known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, and the corresponding provision
of the former Organic Act of the Court of Appeals, if the
latter has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the former, and
said writs are issued by the Court of Appeals in the
exercise of its supervisory power or jurisdiction over the
wrongful acts or omissions of the lower court that are
not appealable. But if the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction it could not issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari in aid of an
appellate jurisdiction which it does not have . . .
Perforce, the Resolution of 31 July and 28 August 1991 must be reversed for
want of basis in law.
While We are not unaware of the practice of the Court of Appeals of remanding
to the proper Regional Trial Court for appropriate disposition petitions of this
nature, yet, this is done only when there is no cogent reason advanced why the
appellate court should hear the case. Plainly, therefore, respondent Court of
Appeals could still have transmitted the petition to the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City not because the former has no jurisdiction but more of
convenience and propriety as the latter court exercises administrative
supervision over the Municipal Trial Court as the next higher tribunal in the
judicial hierarchy, instead of the Court of Appeals. Indeed, such established
practice is not without basis. For, in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, 7 penned by Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa (then Associate Justice), this Court discussed quite
extensively the concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and Regional Trial Court over judgments and orders of Municipal Courts —
We turn now to the second question posed . . . as to the
propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the remedy
of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a
municipal court, instead of an attempt to initially obtain
that relief from the Regional Trial Court of the district or
the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this
Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ. As a matter of
policy such a direct recourse to this Court should not be
allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are
not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ's procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.
Ordinarily, the next step would be to remand this case to the Court of Appeals
to resolve the propriety of the denial of petitioner's motion to quash. But this is
no longer necessary. Since the records are with Us, We are now in a position to
settle the issue with dispatch. Consequently, We opt to meet the issue right
here if only to obviate further delay in this seemingly uncomplicated case.
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On the first ground raised by petitioner, Sec. 28 (i) of the Social Security Law
provides:
(i) Criminal action arising from a violation of the
provisions of this Act may be commenced by the SSS or
the employee concerned either under this Act or in
appropriate cases under the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That such criminal action may be filed
by the SSS in the city or municipality where the SSS
provincial or regional office is located if the violation
was committed within its territorial jurisdiction or in
Metro Manila, at the option of the SSS. 8
Clearly, prior consent of the Social Security System (SSS) is not essential before
an employee can commence a criminal action arising from a violation of the
Social Security Law. In other words, whether under the Social Security Law or
"in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code," the employee can
institute criminal suits independently of the SSS.
facto presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or amortizations of
the employee and accordingly penalized under Art. 315 of the Penal Code.
Plainly, damage is not an element in the act punished under Sec. 28 (h) as
differentiated from the ordinary estafa wherein deceit and damage are
considered essential elements.
Other arguments advanced by petitioner which were not contained in his
motion to quash may not be passed upon in this extraordinary petition, for no
abuse of discretion may be ascribed to respondent Judge when he was not
provided with the opportunity to rule thereon.
WHEREFORE, as regards the Resolutions of 31 July and 28 August 1991 of
respondent Court of Appeals, the same are SET ASIDE. However, with respect to
the Order of 27 February 1991 of respondent Judge, the writ prayed for is
denied and the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, hereby AFFIRMING his
Order denying petitioner's motion to quash. Consequently, respondent Judge is
directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 16886-2 pending before
his court.

On the second ground, petitioner submits that it is the SSS and not the regular SO ORDERED.
courts which is empowered to prosecute the alleged estafa pursuant to Sec. 5
of the Social Security Law. This is untenable. Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Settlement of Disputes. — (a) Any dispute arising

under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter
related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission,
and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by
the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing
officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided
within twenty days after the submission of the
evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of
dispute shall be governed by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission. 9

The foregoing defines the "dispute" falling within the coverage of the Social
Security Law and lays down the procedure to be followed by the SSS in any case
filed before it with respect to such "dispute." Definitely, prosecution of criminal
offenses is not alluded to above, as this will require further legislation to clothe
the SSS with the necessary jurisdiction. Consequently, the SSS is not vested with
legal competence to adjudicate criminal complaints and must necessarily seek
recourse in the regular courts for the prosecution of criminal actions arising
from violations of the Revised Penal Code and the Social Security Law. 10

On the third ground, it must be stressed that criminal liability is personal to the
offender and cannot be transferred to another by contract. Criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. The time
of filing of the criminal complaint is material only for determining prescription.
Consequently, petitioner's reported transfer of his shares in the Southern Island
Colleges to Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Colleges did not extinguish his criminal
liability nor transfer the same to his vendee or assignee.

On the fourth ground, the argument that there is no estafa for want of damage
since the employee's entitlement to SSS benefits is not impaired by his
employer's neglect to remit loan payments from his compensation is likewise
untenable. It must be noted that petitioner was charged in connection with Sec.
28 (h) of the Social Security Law which states:

(h) Any employer who, after deducting the monthly

contributions or loan amortizations from his employee's
compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the
SSS within thirty days from the date they became due
shall be presumed to have misappropriated such
contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the
penalties provided in Article Three Hundred Fifteen of
the Revised Penal Code, 11

and not under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which is material
only in determining the penalty to be imposed.

Section 28 (h) speaks of two elements which must concur: (1) the employer
deducts monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his employee's
compensation, and (2) said employer fails to remit said deductions to the SSS
within 30 days from the date they fall due, after which the employer is ipso

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RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner filed
this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside
public respondent Sandiganbayan’s Resolution1 dated 29 October 2004 and Writ
of Preliminary Attachment2 dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public
respondents Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further
proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of the assailed
issuances.
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Officer II of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the
Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with
public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation
to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,3 violation of Art. 183 of the Revised
Penal Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service
Law. Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No. 1379, 4 Art. 183 of
the Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713,
docketed as Case
No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner. 5 Petitioner’s wife Clarita
Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy
Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of
R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and
fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-
gotten wealth.
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the Philippines, acting
through public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, filed before the
Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment 6 against petitioner, his wife, and
three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2
of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193,
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, et al." It was
alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar
to a preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined that a prima
facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein
who hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since
during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts
of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer and his other lawful income, if any. 7
Acting on the Republic’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment,
the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed
for. The corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued
on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic. On 17
November 2004, petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss8 in
Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed
the present Petition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction
over the "civil action" for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A.
No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial
Courts as provided under Sec. 29 of the law, and that the jurisdiction of the
Page 19 of 86
Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies
as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, 10 as
amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 1411 and 14-A.12
Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or the law creating it,
was intended principally as a criminal court, with no jurisdiction over separate
civil actions, petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquino’s issuances after
the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2) E.O. No.
14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing
laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606
and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which
may be filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the Sandiganbayan has
been granted jurisdiction only over the separate civil actions filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil
actions were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379
or for restitution, reparation of damages or indemnification for consequential
damages or other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws.
According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to P.D. No. 1606 and R.A.
No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction
over separate civil actions other than those filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies. 13 Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any
separate civil action against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery
of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379.
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture filed
against him is fatally defective for failing to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379, 14 namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecution arm of the government;
(b) a certification to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to
believe that there has been violation of the said law and that respondent is
guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines.15 He argues that only informations for perjury were
filed and there has been no information filed against him for violation of R.A.
No. 1379. Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the Office of the
Ombudsman to certify that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
violation of the said law had been committed and that he is guilty thereof. The
petition is also supposedly bereft of the required certification which should be
made by the investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to the
Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines that it should have been the Office of
the Solicitor General which filed the petition and not the Office of the
Ombudsman as in this case. The petition being fatally defective, the same
should have been dismissed, petitioner concludes.
In their Comment,16 respondents submit the contrary, noting that the issues
raised by petitioner are not novel as these have been settled in Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan17 which categorically ruled that "there is no issue that
jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the
Sandiganbayan." 18 Respondents argue that under the Constitution19 and
prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and jurisdiction
over the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner.
Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as amended, as the prevailing
law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
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….
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher ranks;
….
As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public positions covered by
the aforestated law, the petition for forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioner’s argument that the
petition for forfeiture is "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan, having
allegedly no jurisdiction over civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the
petition, since the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether these cases are civil or
criminal in nature. The petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the
cases initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A,
as these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, in particular Sec. 4.c thereof. 20 Further, respondents stress that E.O.
Nos. 14 and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery of unlawfully
acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies. It would
also not be accurate to refer to a petition for forfeiture as a "civil case," since it
has been held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and
that it is only the proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in nature. 21
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,22 likewise relying
on Republic v. Sandiganbayan to argue that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the petition for forfeiture filed against petitioner. The Ombudsman
explains that the grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of
R.A. No. 1379 did not change even under the amendments of
R.A. No. 797523 and R.A. No. 829424, although it came to be limited to cases
involving high-ranking public officials as enumerated therein, including
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of
higher rank, to which petitioner belongs. 25
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings
against petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman refers to both the
Constitution26 and R.A. No. 6770.27 The constitutional power of investigation of
the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to
investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be "illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient" covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by
public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11) 28 of
R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth. This authority of the
Ombudsman has been affirmed also in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan.29
The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioner’s allegation that the
petition for forfeiture filed against him failed to comply with the procedural and
formal requirements under the law. It asserts that all the requirements of R.A.
No. 1379 have been strictly complied with. An inquiry similar to a preliminary
investigation was conducted by a Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The participation of the Office of the Solicitor General, claimed by
petitioner to be necessary, is actually no longer required since the Office of the
Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to investigate and prosecute the
case as discussed above.30
In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the
present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-shopping. Even as
petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as regards the petition for forfeiture
(docketed as Civil Case No. 0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of
the Sandiganbayan’s alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the
instant Petition raising exactly the same issue, even though the Motion to
Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending resolution.1avvphi1 Worse, it
appears that the Motion to Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the
same day, 17 November 2004.
Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply31 and enunciates that the
Sandiganbayan’s criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil
jurisdiction, and that the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had
been removed without subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil
jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No. 1379 is a special law which is primarily
civil and remedial in nature, the clear intent of which is to separate the prima
facie determination in forfeiture proceedings from the litigation of the civil
Page 20 of 86
action. This intent is further demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which
grants the authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation
being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to file a petition for
forfeiture to the Solicitor General.
Petitioner also points out in his Reply32 to the Comment of the Office of the
Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and
1379" in P.D. No. 1606, as amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are
principally criminal or penal in nature because the concept of "violation" of
certain laws necessarily carries with it the concept of imposition of penalties for
such violation. Hence, when reference was made to "violations of [R.A.] Nos.
3019 and 1379," the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is criminal
jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby highlighting respondent
Sandiganbayan’s lack of jurisdiction over the "civil case" for forfeiture of ill-
gotten wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where the crime
carries with it the corresponding civil liability such that when the criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for enforcement of the civil liability is impliedly
instituted with it, and the court having jurisdiction over the criminal action also
acquires jurisdiction over the ancillary civil action. However, petitioner argues
that the action for forfeiture subject of this case is not the ancillary civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Rather, the petition for forfeiture is
an independent civil action over which the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of independent
civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it
the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred
to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.
Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the charge of forum-
shopping.
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the
Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such
petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.
The petition is patently without merit. It should be dismissed.
The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan33 squarely rules on the
issues raised by petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After reviewing the legislative
history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court
therein resolved the question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over
violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor
General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then
Court of First Instance of the city or province where the public officer or
employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. Upon the
creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, 34 original and
exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the said court.35 P.D. No.
160636 was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil
actions brought in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
said court.37 Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of the
Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery
of instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of
the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379. 38
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 12939 abolished the concurrent jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts and expanded the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Sec.
4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the imposable
penalty. Since this change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases
before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a penalty
not higher than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being
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 Page 21 of 86

of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860 40 and It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of duty.'"
eventually by P.D. No. 1861.41 (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)

On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v. ….

Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and
1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan. 42 It could not have taken into
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no
consideration R.A. No. 797543 and R.A. No. 824944 since both statutes which also
judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil
amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet enacted at the
proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that
time. The subsequent enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the
where the person using the res illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it
Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379.
the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held
to be so far in the nature of
Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and
criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an information
Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
is upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities such proceedings,
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions whether in a
where the owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from being a witness against
offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
himself and to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers. . . ."
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
(23 Am. Jur. 612)
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically
including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city ….
department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the
heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other
proceedings in civil causes shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want
officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and
forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal
senior superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and proceedings for all the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as
against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to
institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 104, p. 368)50
Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez.51 The Court
other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the in Cabal held that the doctrine laid down in Almeda refers to the purely
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.45 procedural aspect of the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the
substantial rights of respondents, particularly their constitutional right against
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of statutory law self-incrimination.52 This was reaffirmed and reiterated in
on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s argument—that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture it being "civil" Republic v. Agoncillo53 and Katigbak v. Solicitor General.54
in nature and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil
actions—collapses completely.
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379,
entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to
The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized in Republic v. Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing
Sandiganbayan, thus: "[T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are For the Proceedings Therefor." What acts would constitute a violation of such a
actions in rem and, therefore, civil in nature."46 Then, Almeda, Sr. law? A reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any
prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a
v. Perez,47 followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 do not penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a
public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. It noted that the property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired
property.55 Section 1256 of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed
procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil upon the public officer or employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully
action.48 acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for making the
unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes
the penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired upon the
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally acquired
respondent public officer or employee. 57
property partakes the nature of a penalty. In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,49 the Court
cited voluminous authorities in support of its declaration of the criminal or
penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, viz: It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil
in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without
penalty. The soundness of this reasoning becomes even more obvious when we
compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense, and the term is used
consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or
in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of
employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the
punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking
respondent officer or employee’s incumbency and in relation to his office. This
power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed
is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-
necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid
graft court—to address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service. 58
in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer
the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am.
Jur. 599) Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous
belief that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture
filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of a
liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the
provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law.' We come then to the question of authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to
investigate, file and

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prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This was the main issue
resolved in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.59
Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized
to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Courts of First Instance. P.D.
No. Decree No. 1486 was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings. Sec.
12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file and
prosecute forfeiture cases. This may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No.
1486 of the jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance and the authority
of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and
the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively. 60 An implied repeal is one which takes
place when a new law contains some provisions which are contrary to, but do
not expressly repeal those of a former law. 61 As a rule, repeals by implication
are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
legislature so intended. Before such repeal is deemed to exist, it must be shown
that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and
that the latter be inconsistent with the former. The language used in the latter
statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly
enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.
What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. 62
P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides that "[A]ny provision
of law, order, rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is
hereby repealed or modified accordingly." 63 This is not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the statutes that are intended to
be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
laws.64
The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the jurisdiction
over the forfeiture proceeding and the authority to file the petition for
forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486 grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, the then Courts of First
Instance and Solicitor General cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction or
authority over such cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are
inconsistent with each other and the former should be deemed to have
repealed the latter.lawphil.net
On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, P.D. No.
148765 creating the Office of the Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan)
was passed. The Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No.
1486, such jurisdiction being vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier
mentioned.
On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing P.D. No.
1486. Issued on the same date was P.D. No. 160766 which amended the powers
of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints 67 and created the
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. 68 P.D. No. 1607 provided said Office of the
Chief Special Prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations
therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said cases. 69 P.D. No. 1607
also removed from the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file actions for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.70
The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed,
the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
From this it may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a
law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself repealed;
and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law,
unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. 71 Hence, the
repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the
Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the
Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary
investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor. 72
The Tanodbayan’s authority was further expanded by P.D. No. 163073 issued on
18 July 1990. Among other things, the Tanodbayan was given the exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases.74 The power to conduct the necessary investigation
and to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative cases
Page 22 of 86
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative agency against
any public personnel who has acted in a manner warranting criminal and
disciplinary action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief Special
Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.75
Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and 1861 76 which
granted the Tanodbayan the same authority. The present Constitution was
subsequently ratified and then the Tanodbayan became known as the Office of
the Special Prosecutor which continued to exercise its powers except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
Constitution.77 The Office of the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A.
No. 6770.78
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A. No. 6770,
corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution, include the authority, among
others, to:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; 79
…
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the
prosecution of the parties involved therein. 80
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture
under R.A. No. 1379. However, the Ombudsman’s exercise of the correlative
powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-
gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.81 As regards
such wealth accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is without
authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan such forfeiture action—since
the authority to file forfeiture proceedings on or before 25 February 1986
belongs to the Solicitor General—although he has the authority to investigate
such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the
Ombudsman’s general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.82
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted well within
its authority in conducting the investigation of petitioner’s illegally acquired
assets and in filing the petition for forfeiture against him. The contention that
the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 were not complied
with no longer deserve consideration in view of the foregoing discussion.
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping
is manifest whenever a party "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely by, some other court."83 It has also been defined as "an act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking
and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition." 84 Considered a pernicious evil,
it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court
dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and
trifles with and mocks judicial processes. 85 Willful and deliberate forum-
shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the complaint or initiatory
pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of court, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in
the same case where the forum-shopping is found. 86
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. The
present petition was filed accompanied by the requisite Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping87 in which petitioner made the following
representation:
….
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3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any other action or

proceeding in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, involving the same issues as that in the above-captioned case.

4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the

Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.

5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been commenced or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency, I undertake to report that fact to this Honorable Court within five (5)
days from knowledge thereof.

However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to
Dismiss88 in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The
existence of this motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by
respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A scrutiny of the Motion
to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and
prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the
Arguments and Discussion89 in the Petition of petitioner’s thesis that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to
Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner
raises the ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the
procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the
annulment of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ
of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these
differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the
same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife
and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his
undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to
dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel and party concerned. 90 The brazenness of this
attempt at forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both
the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17 November
2004. Petitioner should have waited for the resolution of his Motion to
Dismiss before resorting to the petition at hand.

Petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, needs to be

reminded that his primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. As an officer of the court, his duties to the court are more significant
and important than his obligations to his clients. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration thereof contravenes his oath of
office.91 Atty. De Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the
legal profession and the mission of our courts of justice. For this, he should be
penalized. Penalties imposed upon lawyers who engaged in forum-shopping
range from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law.92 In the
instant case, we deem the imposition of a fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00 to
be sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of his naked abuse of
the judicial process.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED. Atty.

Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a
fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days
from the finality of this D E C I S I O N. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Instead of appealing from the above order of dismissal, the petitioner has
chosen to file the instant petition for certiorari. But we have time and again
held that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can not be a substitute for
appeal. The petitioner should have appealed the challenged order to the proper
appellate court, i.e., the Court of Appeals, where alleged errors of fact and law
can be corrected. Accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47270 April 15, 1988

ERNESTO DORIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ARTEMON D. LUNA, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City; & MANUEL
OXIMER, respondents.

Oscar D. Granada for petitioner.

Edmundo L. Palermo for respondents.

YAP, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks to annul the order of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch 1, dated June 30, 1977, dismissing
the amended complaint against defendant Manuel Oximer (herein private
respondent), for specific performance with damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
707, entitled "Ernesto Doria vs. Arcadia Dora, Angelina Bedonia and Manuel
Oximer"; to declare that there is a valid cause of action against respondent; and
to order the respondent judge to try the case on the merits.

It appears from the questioned order: 1) that the defendant Arcadia Doria
owned three (3) lots, Lots Nos. 362, 365-A and 368-A of the cadastral survey of
Saravia, situated in E.B. Magalona Negros Occidental, covered by TCT Nos. T-
4150, T-4151 and T- 4152, which she leased to plaintiff for a period of seven (7)
crop years, starting with crop year 1973-1974 up to 1979-1980 with an annual
rental of P1,500.00; (2) that Arcadia Doria leased the same lots to Angelina
Bedonia on January 10, 1973, for a term of four (4) agricultural years, covering
crop years 1973 to January 1976 with an annual rental of P9,000.00, of which a
down payment of P6,000.00 was made upon the execution of the contract, and
by virtue of which lease contract Angelina Bedonia took possession of the
property; (3) that on July 24, 1975, Arcadia Doria sold the property in question
to defendant Manuel Oximer (herein private respondent) for P67,500.00, the
receipt of which was acknowledged by Doria, and on condition that vendee
would take possession of the property only after the expiration of the lease
contract with Angelina Bedonia; (4) that on August 25, 1975, plaintiff had his
lease contract annotated at the back of the certificates of title covering the lots
in question; (5) that on November 26, 1976 defendant Manuel Oximer
registered the deed of sale in his favor, by virtue of which new transfer
certificates of title were issued in his name, which carried the annotations of
plaintiffs lease contract appearing in the cancelled certificates of title; (6) that
on September 25, 1975, plaintiff filed his complaint against defendant Arcadia
Doria for specific performance with damages, which he amended on November
17, 1976 to include Angelina Bedonia and Manuel Oximer as defendants; (7)
that defendant Arcadia Doria in her answer alleged that her non-delivery of the
leased property to plaintiff was due to the latter's failure to pay the lease rental
agreed upon; that defendant Manuel Oximer on his part maintained that he
bought the properties in good faith and for valuable consideration without
being aware of any lease, except that of Angelina Bedonia, and that plaintiff had
no cause of action against him as he was not a party to the lease contract
sought to be enforced by the plaintiff. In dismissing the complaint against
defendant Manuel Oximer the court a quo stated:

... Unless a lease is recorded, it shag not be binding

upon third persons. Considering that when lots 368-A
and 362 covered by TCT Nos. T-71274 and T-71275 were
sold to defendant Oximer on July 24, 1975, the 1st lease
contract was not yet annotated at the back of the TCT's
aforesaid and it was only a month afterwards, or on
August 25, 1975 that the said 1st lease contract was
registered, inevitably, the said lease shall not be binding
upon third persons including defendant Manuel Oximer.

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RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. L-44980 February 6, 1990
VIRGINIA MARAHAY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance,
Branch VI, Carigara, Leyte; ALIWANAG B. VALLERAMOS, LIGAYA BRAZIL y
PEREZ, FRUTO BRAZIL, MATIBAY BRAZIL Y PALADIN and DALISAY BRAZIL Y
AYASO, respondents.
Buenaventura A. Reposar for petitioner.
Wenceslao Yu for respondents.\
REGALADO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge for issuing an
order, dated February 27, 1976, in Civil Case No. C-1222, entitled "Virginia
Marahay vs. Aliwanag B. Valleramos et. al.," dismissing the complaint; an order,
issued on June 26, 1976, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by therein
plaintiff, and an order, dated September 18, 1976, denying her second motion
for reconsideration.
The records show that on June 20, 1974, petitioner filed with respondent court
an action for recovery of real property against Aliwanag B. Valleramos. Later,
the complaint was amended to implead and include other defendants, the
other private respondents herein, as indispensable parties. 1
After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial on August 9,1974, but
this was deferred to a later date due to the absence of petitioner and her
counsel. 2 On April 4, 1975, the same case was again scheduled for pre-trial but
the same did not proceed due to the fact that petitioner appeared without her
counsel while only one of the defendants appeared with counsel. 3 Later,
informed of her lawyer's inability to attend the pre-trial, petitioner secured the
services of another lawyer, Atty. Dominador Monjardin, who was present at the
next pre-trial conference held on October 9, 1975.
Trial on the merits commenced on November 13, 1975 with the petitioner
taking the witness stand on direct examination. 4 The defense failed to cross-
examine her since the proceedings were cut short for lack of time and the
continuation thereof was set for January 19, 1976.
On January 7, 1976, Atty. Monjardin filed a motion for postponement for the
reason that he was taking the examination for government prosecutors in
Manila on January 15, 1976, with a prayer that the case be reset either in the
first week of January or the second week of February of said year. 5 The court
eventually issued an order resetting the trial to February 18, 1976 with notice to
petitioner and her counsel. 6
On said date, petitioner appeared without counsel prompting private
respondents, through their counsel, to move for the dismissal of the case for
petitioner's alleged inability to prosecute her case and for apparent lack of
interest. 7
The motion to dismiss, which was made orally in open court, was submitted for
resolution by the trial court. As earlier stated, the court below in its order dated
February 27, 1976, dismissed the complaint. Two motions for reconsideration
were filed by petitioner but the same were denied by respondent judge, hence,
the present special civil action.
Page 27 of 86
The sole issue is whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of
the case and, consequently, denying petitioner the right to fully prosecute her
case.
Before resolving said issue, it would be judicious to first clear the air of any
misconception as to the procedural propriety of giving due course to this
petition. An order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is
erroneous, ordinarily the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal, hence the
same cannot be assailed by certiorari. 8
Nevertheless, in the broader interests of justice, this Court has given due course
to the present petition in consideration of the fact that this is not the first time
we have passed upon a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is
appeal, 9 where the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse. This is
especially true where, as in the case, petitioner's affidavit of merits shows that
she has a good cause of action, that her counsel's affidavit of merits avers
justifiable reasons for his non-appearance at said hearing, and the trial court is
faulted with gravely abusing its discretion to the extent of denying due process
to therein plaintiff. Significantly, it was respondent judge himself who advised
petitioner to avail of said remedy in his order dismissing petitioner's second
motion for reconsideration, 10 obviously because appeal would not be a speedy
and adequate remedy under the circumstances and considering that dismissals
on technicalities are viewed with disapproval.
Turning now to the main issue, petitioner asseverates that respondent-judge
acted capriciously in denying her day in court by not postponing the
continuation of the trial to some future time and giving her an opportunity to
secure the services of another lawyer. Parenthetically, it is of record that
petitioner is an invalid and moves around in a wheel chair.
The petition has the imprint of merit and the writ will lie.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that —
If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these rules or any order of the court,
the action may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication on the
merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
It is, therefore, the absence of the plaintiff, and not the absence of the lawyer,
which may warrant the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-suit. 11 In the
case at bar, only the counsel for plaintiff was absent, plaintiff herself being in
attendance in court.
While the aforequoted provision also provides sanctions for failure to prosecute
for an unreasonable length of time, despite the presence of the interested
parties, it cannot be said that such neglect or failing obtains in the present case.
There is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is
unwilling to proceed with the scheduled trial. 12 In the instant case, petitioner
did not in the least manifest unwillingness to proceed with the hearing. Upon
the call for appearances, petitioner responded that her counsel was in Manila
and that he had not yet returned. Unschooled as she is in the vagaries of
procedural law, petitioner indeed could not have responded otherwise nor
done any better.
Considering all the attendant circumstances, the least that the trial court could
have done was to afford petitioner a reasonable time, especially considering her
handicap, to procure the services of another lawyer and, if necessary, with a
stern warning that any further postponement of the trial shall cause the
dismissal of the case.
The counter-argument that petitioner had already moved for postponements in
the past should take into account the fact that the circumstances thereof were
not of her making nor intended to be dilatory and that no substantial prejudice
has been caused private respondents. Besides, judgments of non-suit are
generally disfavored in the same manner that default judgments are
discouraged. Thus, in Padua vs. Ericta, etc., et al ., 13 we had the occasion to rule
that:
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Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation

and determination of causes. It should be their constant
effort to ensure that litigations are prosecuted and
resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and
hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely
in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without
saying, however, that discretion must be reasonably and
wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant
circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end
that cases may be adjudged only after full and free
presentation of evidence by all the parties, especially
where the deferment would cause no substantial
prejudice to any party. The desideratum of a speedy
disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result
in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present
evidence and either in the plaintiffs being non-suited or
of the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex-
parte judgment.

Indeed, after the issues had been duly joined, a plaintiff is entitled
to present his case. Seldom does departure from orderly procedure
bring satisfactory results. 14

While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test
for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. 15 In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition
of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

Further, when a party, without malice, fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not

really prepared for trial, the court would be abusing its discretion if a
reasonable opportunity is denied him for preparing therefor and for obtaining
due process of law. 16

Time and again, we have emphasized that the rules should be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining
not only speedy but, more importantly, just and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. 17

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the order of the
court a quo of February 27, 1976 dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as its
orders dated June 26, 1976 and September 18, 1976 denying petitioner's first
and second motions for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. C-1222 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional
Trial Court which replaced Branch VI of the defunct Court of First Instance
and/or in which this action is now pending is DIRECTED to continue with the
trial of petitioner's action and decide the same on the merits in due course.

SO ORDERED.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
[G.R. No. L-40464. May 9, 1989.]
POLICARPIO VISCA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, HEIRS OF LEON REYES,
represented by ESCOLASTICA FERNANDO, Respondents-Appellees.
Antonio F. Dasalla for Petitioner.
Roselino Reyes Isler for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; FORMAL REQUIREMENT
OF PETITION. — An applicant for a writ of certiorari must allege with certainty
in his verified petition facts showing that "there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," because this is an
indispensable ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari. "Being a special civil
action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy
and adequate remedy" (Diego v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 54 O.G. No. 4, 956,
cited in Tan v. Director of Forestry; 125 SCRA 302, at p. 322). "Where the
existence of a remedy by appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy precludes the granting of the writ, the petitioner must allege facts
showing that any existing remedy is impossible or unavailing, or that excuse
petitioner for not having availed himself of such remedy (10 Am. Jur.
2d, Certiorari, 811; Emphasis ours).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF
PETITION. — A petition for certiorari which does not comply with the
requirements of the rules may be dismissed" (Iligan Concrete Products v.
Mogadon, G.R. No. 67706, January 29, 1988). Petition was defective for failure
to comply with the formal requirements of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, Rule 65, Sections 1 and 3, respectively. As stated earlier, therefore,
the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition on this ground.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. — Parties requesting judicial action must first
exhaust their remedies in the executive branch. This is premised not only on
practical considerations but also on the comity existing between different
departments of the government, which comity requires the court to stay their
hands until the administrative processes have been completed (Madriñan v.
Sinco, 110 Phil. 160).
4. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute, however. It is not applicable in cases (among many
other exceptions) (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one
(Tapales v. President and Board of Regents of the U.P., L-17523, March 30,
1963); and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or where the respondent
Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. (Mangubat v. Osmeña, L-12837, April 30, 1959, 105 Phil.
1309; and other cases cited)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR FALLS WITHIN EXCEPTIONS. — In the present case,
the petition for certiorari and mandamus was prompted by petitioner’s belief
that both respondent officials had acted with grave abuse of discretion and or in
excess of jurisdiction, — i.e., the Director of Lands, in dismissing the protest,
"not on evidence formally introduced" but on "records and reason alone" (p.
16, Reply Brief, p. 26, Rollo) and the Secretary of Agriculture, by his affirmance
in toto of said Order. Hence, he is not precluded from directly resorting to the
courts for redress.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Page 29 of 86
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals, per its Resolution, dated
March 17, 1975.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not certiorari and/or
mandamus will lie: 1) in the absence of statements in the petition establishing
and proving with certainty that there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; 2) for failure to exhaust the
administrative remedy of appeal to the Office of the President.
Petitioner Policarpio Visca (hereafter VISCA), upon discovering that the
homestead application of one Leon Reyes (H.A. No. 9893) allegedly approved
on August 4, 1948, under Entry No. V-9119, had adversely covered about 24
hectares of the western portion of his 50-hectare land, filed a protest with the
Bureau of Lands on May 28, 1962, claiming that said homestead application is
illegal and unlawful (1) because the land covered thereby is marshy and
swampy and suitable only for fishpond purposes and should be disposed of only
through sale or lease; and 2) for abandonment and non-compliance with the
cultivation requirement of the Public Land Law. On September 22, 1969, he filed
a supplemental protest, based on the dummy relationship between the private
respondent herein, Escolastica Fernando, and one Ceferino Panopio, the person
really interested in the land covered by the homestead application of Leon
Reyes (CA Resolution, pp. 28-29, Rollo).
The Director of Lands dismissed the protest for want of valid and legal ground
on July 29, 1969. VISCA’s "Motion for Reconsideration" was likewise denied on
June 18, 1970. The order of dismissal was affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture on March 9, 1971. A motion for reconsideration was denied on April
28, 1971.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
VISCA filed a direct suit for certiorari and mandamus with the then CFI of
Mindoro to: 1) annul the orders of the Director of Lands and the Decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and 2) direct the Director of
Lands a) to cancel HA 9893 (E.V. 9119), Leon Reyes’ homestead application, and
b) to give due course to his Sales Application over the controverted land. Public
respondents Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture filed separate
answers, both of which contain special and affirmative defenses, among which
is that VISCA has not exhausted the administrative remedies, for not appealing
to the Office of the President.
Private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action for certiorari.
2. The petitioner failed to exhaust all his administrative remedies.
The lower court sustained the Motion to Dismiss the dispositive portion of
which, provides as follow:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After carefully renewing the pleadings submitted by the parties, the court is
inclined to sustain the motion to dismiss because according to the New Rules of
Court, the petitioner should establish and drove (sic) with certainty in the
petition that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law and in the case at bar, the appeal should have been
interposed and filed with the President against the decision rendered by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." (pp. 30-31, Rollo)
Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of
Appeals, alleging in his lone assignment of error that:chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus (to
review and annul decision of the Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources) on the grounds that: (a) the petition does not establish
and prove with certainty that there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, and (b) petitioner failed to exhaust the
administrative remedy of appeal to the President, despite clear showing in said
petition that the decision of the Director of Lands, affirmed by the decision of
the Secretary, was rendered without any formal hearing whatsoever, whereby
said officials acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
jurisdiction, and that, appeal to the President under the circumstances could be
dispensed with" (p. 32, Rollo, Emphasis ours)
On the issue of whether or not the failure to allege in the petition
for certiorari that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law is a jurisdictional defect, it is incumbent
upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege with certainty in his verified
petition facts showing that "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
Special
Proceedings
 Page 30 of 86

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," because this is an

indispensable ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari. "Being a special civil
action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy
and adequate remedy" (Diego v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 54 O.G. No. 4, 956,
cited in Tan v. Director of Forestry; 125 SCRA 302, at p. 322). "Where the
existence of a remedy by appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy precludes the granting of the writ, the petitioner must allege facts
showing that any existing remedy is impossible or unavailing, or that excuse
petitioner for not having availed himself of such remedy (10 Am. Jur.
2d, Certiorari, 811; Emphasis ours). A petition for certiorari which does not
comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed" (Iligan Concrete
Products v. Mogadon, G.R. No. 67706, January 29, 1988).

There is no record of the petition for certiorari filed in the lower court, but on
the basis of the trial court’s ruling that the petitioner failed to allege facts to
show why appeal to the Office of the President was no longer necessary in
seeking judicial relief, then the petition was correctly dismissed on this ground.

This bring Us to the second issue on whether petitioner failed to exhaust

administrative remedies when he filed a direct suit for certiorari and
mandamus.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The rule in administrative law is that parties requesting judicial action must first
exhaust their remedies in the executive branch. This is premised not only on
practical considerations but also on the comity existing between different
departments of the government, which comity requires the court to stay their
hands until the administrative processes have been completed (Madriñan v.
Sinco, 110 Phil. 160).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, however.

It is not applicable in cases (among many other exceptions) (1) where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one (Tapales v. President and Board of
Regents of the U.P., L-17523, March 30, 1963); and (2) where the controverted
act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or where the respondent Secretary had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. (Mangubat v. Osmeña,
L-12837, April 30, 1959, 105 Phil. 1309; Baguio v. Rodriguez, L-11068, May 27,
1959, 105 Phil. 1323; Pascual v. Provincial Board, L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959, 106
Phil. 406; Cortes v. Valentin, 100 SCRA 1; Industrial Power Sales Inc. v. Duma
Sinsuat, G.R. No. L-29171, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 19). In the present case, the
petition for certiorari and mandamus was prompted by petitioner’s belief that
both respondent officials had acted with grave abuse of discretion and or in
excess of jurisdiction, — i.e., the Director of Lands, in dismissing the protest,
"not on evidence formally introduced" but on "records and reason alone" (p.
16, Reply Brief, p. 26, Rollo) and the Secretary of Agriculture, by his affirmance
in toto of said Order. Hence, he is not precluded from directly resorting to the
courts for redress.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

However, while the petitioner did not violate the principle on exhaustion of
administrative remedies and is thus not precluded from seeking immediate
judicial relief from the department secretary’s orders, his petition was
nonetheless defective for failure to comply with the formal requirements of a
petition for certiorari and mandamus, Rule 65, Sections 1 and 3, respectively. As
stated earlier, therefore, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition on this
ground.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court a quo dismissing the petition is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and
immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Case
2
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on March 25,
2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a)
the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order 4 dated
March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive
suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without
pay; and (b) the Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt 6 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139504.
Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of
preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further enjoined
the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the
Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
The Facts
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit 10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati
(Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). 13
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of
Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation
report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special
Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st
Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al,
charging them with six (6) administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six
(6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of
Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).19
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous
activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the
Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present
terms as City Mayor of Makati:
Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20
(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase
III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and the
lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in the
following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;25 (2)
P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25,
Page 31 of 86
2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3,
2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30
(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award 31 for Phase IV of
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed
the corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design, 34 and approved the release of
funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on
October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3)
P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10,
2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award 40 for Phase V of
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed
the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design, 43 and approved the release of
the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on
December 20, 2012; and
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46
(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for
the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for
Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P27,443,629.97;47 and
(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining
balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA)
for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building
project in the amount of P429,011.48.49
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of
Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative
adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50 Thereafter, on March 9,
2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders 51 for each of the OMB Cases,
requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon
the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the
subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency
of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the
preventive suspension of a public officer are present, 54 finding that: (a) the
evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders
and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to
the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the
documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement
vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1)
Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said
charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3)
Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and
allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office
may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against
them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary
Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the
Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay,
Jr.'s staff.57
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5)
phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to
V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of
Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against
him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported
Special
Proceedings

irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that
he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by
landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the
condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges
against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.63
On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the
implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG National
Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion),
who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to
personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City
Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy
C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor
Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor. 64
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution 65 (dated March 16, 2015),
granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of
duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.67 Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr.
v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view
of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised,
considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative
cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying
the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged. 69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .70
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested 71 that the TRO did not state
what act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order
had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to
restrain.72
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, 73 docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the
Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA,
thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of
justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De
Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s
filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt 75 (petition for
contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the
Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously
ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order. 77
In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily giving
due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to
file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on
March 30 and 31, 2015.80
The Proceedings Before the Court
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015,
the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's
March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a
comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504. 81 The
Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of
1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the
Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the
subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction; 83 and (b) the CA's
directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is
illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings. 84
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review
acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued
the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was
incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation
doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was
strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order. 87 In
this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the
implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear and
unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held
administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent
re-election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he
Page 32 of 86
may have committed during his previous term. 88 As regards the CA's order for
the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits
that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot
be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt
imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in
removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt. 89
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral
arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so
ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view
of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found
that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any
administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati
Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that,
although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond
his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24,
2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr.
cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima
v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation
doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after
the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected
pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election. 97 To this, the CA added
that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged
payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015
Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition 99 before this Court,
arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive
suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the
condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by
Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate,
there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB
Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100
On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral
arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their respective
memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her
Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum
the following day.104
Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties
to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment on the
Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the
notice.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's
memoranda.106 Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In
Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the
Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its
desire to state its "institutional position."108 In her Memorandum and Comment
to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this
Court abandon the condonation doctrine. 109 In view of the foregoing, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.chanrobleslaw
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral
arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be resolved in
seriatim are as follows:
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions
for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the
Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy;cralawlawlibrary
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453;cralawlawlibrary
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to
issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation
of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman;cralawlawlibrary
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IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on
the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman
to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.chanrobleslaw
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for
prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the
petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xxxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with
the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for
the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of
the legal and factual circumstances of the case. 110
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ,
that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A
remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner
from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency, x x x."111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior
motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which
exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. 112 These are: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had
no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
Page 33 of 86
where public interest is involved.113
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend
since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of this
Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This
case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of
key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental
public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious
resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the
continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public
officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the
Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court,
notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed
issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is
justified.chanrobleslaw
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, 114 it is
nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in
view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the
same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It
is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court
to be heard on this issue, 116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through
his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum. 117 That being said, the Court
perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, 118 which reads in
full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of
law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court
(except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally
speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party
is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or
merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of
injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence
that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction.
The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary. 121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power
to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials
removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of
the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to
investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 123
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that
no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure
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questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in
arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct
a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is
unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers
to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this
Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task
then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity.
"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature
should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found[,] it
should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful
import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to
ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted;
what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if
any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has
contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has
necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some
considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true
expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled,
although it is not conclusive." 124
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings
of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of
doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted, 125 albeit not
controlling in the interpretation of the law. 126
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770,
particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or findings,
is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations: 127
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the
phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof, insert the
word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the
Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical efect of that? Will it
be more difficult to reverse the decision under review?
Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the
findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket
of the Supreme Court. So, it in efect will be a very strict appeal procedure.
xxxx
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there
are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the respondent himself has
the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing
to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.
Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?
Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?
Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he
is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f
no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his
administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate
action?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the
administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he must exhaust all
administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial
review.
xxxx
Page 34 of 86
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in
changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review to a petition
for certiorari ?
Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here
in the bill to the efect that the finding of facts of the Ombudsman is
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding
Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is more
difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the
court, whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that
not correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President
Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to
whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without jurisdiction and has
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is
that not the consequence, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the
Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but should be limited
only to cases that I have enumerated.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a
distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ; because
before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of
the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the Constitution it is now
by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court
exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence,
because we will not go deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but
its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the administrative
agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse
of discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr.
President.
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is
very well stated, Mr. President.
xxxx
The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render
decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme Court?
Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr.
President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final
determination.
The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.
Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made
a reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the period of Individual
Amendments.
xxxx
The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the
word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is
approved. 128
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however,
unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the
Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of
Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase
"petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the
"review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be
taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between
Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the
method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari -
that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to
the change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was
approved.
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Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed
"petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA
6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second
paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take
in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the
remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was
even commented upon during the oral arguments of this case129 that there was
no debate or clarification made on the current formulation of the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate
deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court
finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA
had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations
refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is
because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested
amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in
a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his
comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if
supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Efectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice
and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;cralawlawlibrary
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest
of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3)
days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty
of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's
salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing
a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the '
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating
that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules.
However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way back
in 1989130 and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. 131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with
Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition
for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at
least in the provision's final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal
by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time,
and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding
docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a
copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory construction can
Page 35 of 86
apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court
shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of
law." ;cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole
range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an
appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any
application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To
clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision,
and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or", 133 refers to
any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following
the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to
be understood in a general sense. 134 By the same principle, the word "findings,"
which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would
therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or
provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general
rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly
deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only
allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule
45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme
Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
xxxx
Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement
of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and
the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be
accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together
with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's
brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when
notice of judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were
received shall accompany the petition.
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set
forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of
the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the
Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the
1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of
procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a)
questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law,
relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules,
which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a
statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have
intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same
subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and
subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility. 135 There should then be no
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confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45
appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this
Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of
the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the
Court on pure questions of law.
C. Validity of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited
restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within
the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be
taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, 136 and not against
"findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress
cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a
Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the
Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal,
the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in
courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased
this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its
consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the
case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure
which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final
orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals,
the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being
a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the
Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application
of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of
A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the
availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27
of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules
implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was
also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides
that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law." We pointedly said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA
under the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against
"decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar
to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively
increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's
posturing, 144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman
Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial review over
issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it
proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This
procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case
law:
Page 36 of 86
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds
must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but
that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its
provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands
or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses
the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare
that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which
are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction
or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on
which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether
or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in
the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or
that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any
time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was
filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order, 148 hence,
unappealable. 149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions
for certiorari against unappelable issuances 150 of the Ombudsman should be
filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a
preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was -
similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the
public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative
for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65." 152
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule
65 petition for certiorari assailing a final and unappealable order of the Office of
the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner
employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals." 154 In this relation, it stated that while
"a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially
filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001),
wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition
to the CA. The same verdict was reached in Ruivivar156 (September 16, 2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA
has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman,
this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against
the implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that main
case.
III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant
that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against
her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's
independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n
order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise
insulated it from judicial intervention,"157 particularly, "from injunctive reliefs
traditionally obtainable from the courts," 158 claiming that said writs may work
"just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." 159
Special
Proceedings

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy
and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the
historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-
like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and for
direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately,
however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the
political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function
as government critic.
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a
constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence and adequate
powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President
Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by
PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint
or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the
Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the
Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given
the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and
control the prosecution of these cases.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was
created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives
are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of
accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at
all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's
mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept,
abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints
and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman
practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and
guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to
Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No.
6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of
RA No. 6770 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except
over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has
upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers
granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are
reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the
Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts
of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including
Page 37 of 86
Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To
support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of
the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent"
office, x x x.
xxxx
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a
very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch
above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both
constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of
enforcing accountability of public officers. 162 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other
constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the
Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe
their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution
itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers
of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated
from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would
result in the impairment of their core functions" 163;cralawlawlibrary
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative
not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards
the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which
the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based"; 164 and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions'
need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the
delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-
created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise
that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the
tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the
past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from
political pressure."165
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing
independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the
Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended
by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any
form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned,
jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these
bodies prevents presidential interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358),
we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been
characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the
control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in
nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's act of
temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the
[Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court
categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent
Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary
power of the President.
xxxx
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly
cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the independence
similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions
since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that
are crucial to its existence and proper functioning. 166 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Special
Proceedings

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides
that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman,
and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the
Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President for violating
the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770
was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned
since said office was not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of
the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter
enjoys under the Constitution.167
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of
the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal
authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics."169
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be
invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the
Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power -
that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order -
clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence
notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay
any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general
phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court. 170 As
support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is
necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record whether below the
Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the
Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph
for that?
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will
prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of
the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only to certiorari to the
Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in
order but no lower courts should be allowed to interfere. We had a very bad
experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is
supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural
Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the
country.
The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that efect?
Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.
The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the
Supreme Court.
Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
Page 38 of 86
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is
approved.171
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory orders,
are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the
Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in
the exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however,
the Ombudsman begs to differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this
Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman
investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this
case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its
constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of these
proceedings. 173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the
complete disposition of this case.174
In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral
Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the
judicial departments of the government." 176 The constitutional demarcation of
the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as the
principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.
(Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers
principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of
another."178 In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another
department's functions."179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is
allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other
lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress. Thus, through
the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals, 181 the Regional Trial
Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183 were established. Later, through the passage of
RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185 the Court of Tax Appeals,
and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of all courts, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over
the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission on
Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court
and defines its powers.'"
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject
matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned constitutional
limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of
BP 129, as amended.
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s
Special
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main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of
BP 129, as amended:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not
only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section
21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these
courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained
as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy
of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. 189
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as
conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired
over that case, which is called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established
by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court exercises when it
assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial
power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.192
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the
jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and
parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other
words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised.
In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated that "[t]he
power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change
that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully
and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised
in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not
mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter." 194
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to
this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Page 39 of 86
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the
evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973
Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules,
thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the
Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent
judiciary."199
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would
show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making
powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to
insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right
after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and,
instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by
"the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members
agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino
agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of
the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the
present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent
powers."201
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced
in Echegaray:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules
of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the
reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the provisional remedies
of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus
provided.
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action.
They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are
dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole
object of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the
merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of
them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act
that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy
before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they
are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests,
Special
Proceedings

and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main
suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from
being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional
remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under Section
1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its
issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a
precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain
procedural parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with
its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means
necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule
135 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is
not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of
the said law or rules.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory
power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the
RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power
"should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to
review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have
complete supervision over the acts of the latter:" 212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the
decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any
act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed
with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers
which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its
jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of
practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any
attempted thwarting of such process.
x x x x cralawlawlibrary
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary
for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable
to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain
the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-
entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case
of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of
the other is also conferred."215
In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by
which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are thought to have
intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial
housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court
must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific
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purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary
to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."216
In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a
statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a revocation
order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal, 218 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and
the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power
[rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a
necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the
administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)
Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive
relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end, stated that
any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was
constitutionally impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language
framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all make
clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as
an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In
the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or
preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to
make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid
of or ancillary to the principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the
injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such,
it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is
it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances
under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or
denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power
of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of
constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x
xxxx
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having
obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general
jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the
administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent
power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to
appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could control the
appellate judicial proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does
not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers of the
judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal
arises the legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate
judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have
preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the
courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional
rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional
reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court,
are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this
Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right
but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right 220 since it
only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse
which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In
the case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but
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 Page 41 of 86

if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you please read
merely with procedure.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you
kindly read that provision?
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."
Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees; 223 and
JUSTICE LEONEN:
(c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v.
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting
procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence, the jurisdiction of
government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying
what constitutional organ?
filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on
Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
even establish new rules of procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the
The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. On this
score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading,
JUSTICE LEONEN:
practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its]
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which
institutional independence."226
we've already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not
correct?
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article
Correct, Your Honor.
VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5),
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is
institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere
that not correct?
of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the
procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a
Correct, Your Honor.
jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, 227 because it
does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of
JUSTICE LEONEN:
courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not
the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to
correct?
have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a
provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court's
Correct, Your Honor.
exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
JUSTICE LEONEN:
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
part of litigation in an ordinary case?
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770,
It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.
does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also
practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
JUSTICE LEONEN:
particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?
injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly,
the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the
Correct, Your Honor.
present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate
what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when
JUSTICE LEONEN:
jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will
by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the
not be rendered moot and academic, is that not correct?
judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's
duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this,
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in
Correct, Your Honor.
whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly
promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?
The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F.
Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN: xxxx

Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?
JUSTICE LEONEN.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule
Rule 58, Your Honor. 16?

JUSTICE LEONEN: ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies,
mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our resident x x x.
expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So
provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x. JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power
xxxx to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It cannot,
because that's part of procedure...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

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That is true.
JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not
correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part
of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction...
(interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they
create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does not attach
particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:
When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO?
It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an]
ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor.
xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)
In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed
that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers
are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then
follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down
for being unconstitutional.230
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle,
the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import.
Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court,
under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it
proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the
Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto,
it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay,
Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to
the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1),
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
IV.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely
abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity
of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first provides the
context of the assailed injunctive writs.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension
order.
Page 42 of 86
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a
preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, 231 the Court
explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his
office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as
preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering
the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have
different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to
prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives
of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such
investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended,
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for
misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive
suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So
Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is
placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual
penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.232 (Emphases
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in
Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to
justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an
investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first
requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.233ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show
that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section
24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.
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The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed
TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia,
Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the
acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during
petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no
longer be administratively charged." 235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the
application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said
case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have,
at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the
seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x
x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.
Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the
assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case
of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension
order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension
against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati
condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative
to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA
observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24,
2013,239 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr.
cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima
v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation
dobtrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made after the
official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant
to contracts executed before said re-election.242
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have
considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which
should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the
administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the
CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity
with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at
that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note
that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him
was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, 245 it appears that the CA
found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to
enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is
nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor
Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative
complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following
the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In
other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an
exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the
purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs
herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely
abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or
implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if
there had been no offense."246
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on
statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was
therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the same
position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting
Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial
functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on
December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be
made liable for the acts charged against him since they were committed during
his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him
during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case
reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel
issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a
Page 43 of 86
wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court,
in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the
matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and
constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect
to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones
the prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these conflicting
views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the
right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to
which we fully subscribe. 249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that
there is really no established weight of authority in the United States (US)
favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes
that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from office due to a
misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral
arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned
the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of
various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to
demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state
jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:
(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a
public officer from his current term or office for misconduct which he allegedly
committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or
constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re
Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas statute, on
the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a
present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or removed from office for any act
he may have committed prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel.
Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
allows removal from office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect
committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office"
(see State v. Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is
silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation
of the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly
construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance
in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative language
making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which the
offense charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v.
Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state
constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so
that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to
the taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was
construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an
officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain
offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the fact
that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense
(see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York,
Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office"
to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that
the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question could
easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an
unworthy official could not be removed during one term for misconduct for a
previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257
(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer
was a successor in the same office for which he has been administratively
charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States
as an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each
term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather,
regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a
previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected incumbent has no
prior term to speak of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v.
Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v.
Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing
nature of an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine was invoked. In
State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with
malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally
collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel.
Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity"
of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the
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present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this
money on demand of the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel.
Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as
nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains a
continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country
x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and neglect to discharge it
constitutes misconduct."
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion
in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation
doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had
accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an
outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been
proper.
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this
Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as
guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or
not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in
numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that
the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing
doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not
operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its
application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only
when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. 269 As the
Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid,
atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves
along with the society within which it thrives. 270 In the words of a recent US
Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide." 271
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the
time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which
dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting,
including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public
accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which
the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not
to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution
provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond
the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term
for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs.
State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex
rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher
County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A.
67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting of the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am.
Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS)
553.273 (emphasis supplied)
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known
the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So.
559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases supplied)
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The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the
condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated passages from Pascual
in verbatim.
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified
that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. It was
explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that
the former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a
public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of
the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only
the President who may pardon a criminal offense.
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under
the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was applied in favor of
then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely
supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the
Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is justified
by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the
elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by his
"political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself "to
the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the
administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of the
contract and the incidents related therewith. 279
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein
the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B.
Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous
contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days
before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing
of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the
petitioner's background and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his
subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions.
More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in
applying the condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was
perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during a
prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if done during
a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine
in favor of the elective official.
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman 281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23,
2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in
the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the
doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if
the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections,
respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed
during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not
further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public
official's culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection. 282 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them,
there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the
Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate court therein
to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the
condonation doctrine.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March
16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs - would show that the basis for condonation under the
prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for.
What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for
condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-
cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where
condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its
applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is,
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an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an
administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line,
and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was
never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of
condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the
adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our
current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued
application of the doctrine of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme
law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should be read
in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a
workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the
complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political
branches of government. 286
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it
was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with
respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public
trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with
public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State
is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may
be required by law to render personal military or civil service." 287 Perhaps owing
to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the
dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the
policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting
the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from
select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public
officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire
article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof
positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a
public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall
remain accountable to the people."
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed
and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt
public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the
integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a
State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and
solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Belgica, it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that
every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only
in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the
parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the
section of the Civil Service Commission, 290 and also, in the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. 291
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or
remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic
Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1,
1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction
Page 45 of 86
of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary
(e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in
the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;cralawlawlibrary
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the
status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of
dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from
taking the civil service examinations.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall
not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar
to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the
penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
xxxx
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor
shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as
long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions
now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is
actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term
can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or
even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis
in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to
administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency
may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment
cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in
criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
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Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why
the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for
discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective
local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In
fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an
elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-
elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running
for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State
jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was
supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that
an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous
term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond
the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the
absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike
Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another
case,297 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under
their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our
present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even
one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only
invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not
reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the
evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and
therefore, was deemed to be incompetent. 299 Hence, owing to either their
variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the
continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of
suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior
term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is
similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v.
Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot
be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as
previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's
administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all
events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is
condoned.
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation
that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their
officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election
pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual
to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to
conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any
legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent
regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative
liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should
have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at
the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a
law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore,
inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will
has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a
local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any
statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that
the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The
Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public
officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct
committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always
unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to
be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New
Jersey Supreme Court:
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Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his
removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the
theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because
condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the
absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive
something of which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it
was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus,
out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine
that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such
as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all
relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 305 Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and
all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v.
Judicial Bar Council.306
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
them.307
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be,
as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The
landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they
are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in
the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or
impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from
hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to
think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in
our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new
membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation
doctrine.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 311 It has also been held
that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating
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the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing
the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr.,
while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was
based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor
Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation
doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be
concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order was correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve
the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits.
However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already
found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the
said CA petition appears to have been mooted. 313 As initially intimated, the
preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves
the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It
therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination
of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the
issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this
case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its
abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot
and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise
moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review." 314 All of these scenarios
obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the
Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its
infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued
application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office
is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all
times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has
persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is
the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to
light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must
ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle
against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local
officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is
involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public.
The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law
principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the
accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the
bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came
about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on
the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by
elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To
provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the
period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office
and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged
misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect
of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the
Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers." 315 Evidently, this
fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore,
not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of
the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may
therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution,
revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of
discussion moot.chanrobleslaw
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V.
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court
now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's Resolution 316 dated
March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition
for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable
officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt 317 because
this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her
effective removal from office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20,
2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to
contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that
notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not
necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for
Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are
hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental
Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of
three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment,
wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt proceedings by
virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt
petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication
that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then
be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the
Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this
Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of
provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first
paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued therefor;cralawlawlibrary
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment
is PROSPECTIVE in effect;cralawlawlibrary
(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin
S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of
the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated
October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6)
administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059,
OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-
0063; and
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's
comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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Page 48 of 86

Special
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RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 74454 September 3, 1998
ALFRED PEARSON, for himself and as the attorney-in-fact of his co-heirs/co-
successors-in-interest, namely: ELSIE PEARSON-FUENTES, HENRY PEARSON,
WILLIAM PEARSON, JR., ROBERT PEARSON, EDUARD PEARSON, CHARLES
PEARSON, FREDRIECH PEARSON and HARRY F. GASSER, Petitioners,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Hon. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch
155, Pasig, Metro Manila, Hon. Presidential Executive Assistant; Hon. Minister
of Natural Resources; Hon. Director of Mines; DIAMOND MINING
CORPORATION, ROSARIO MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and A.
SORIANO CORPORATION, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction and Prayer for a Restraining Order seeks to annul the following:
1. Decision dated September 30, 1983 of respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. No. 15439 which in effect upheld
herein private respondents' mining claims and directed respondent Regional
Trial Court to resolve the motion to dismiss in Civil Case
No. 45053. 1
2. Order dated July 31, 1984 of the Court of First Instance, Branch X (now
Regional Trial Court, Branch 155), Pasig Metro Manila, dismissing Civil Case No.
45053 on the basis of an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the
findings of fact of the Minister of Natural Resources; 2
3. Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President, Minister that
petitioners had abandoned their "BAROBO" mining claims and accordingly
dismissed their appeal; 3
4. Decision dated October 29, 1979 of the Minister of Natural Resources,
affirming the decision of the Director of Mines; 4
5. Consolidated Decision dated May 12, 1976 of the Director of Mines in Mines
Administrative Case Nos. V-817 and V-818, upholding the preferential rights of
private respondents to lease, possess, explore and develop their respective
"DIAMOND" and "MARTIN" mining claims in question; 5
The petitioners also pray that their mining claims be declared valid and that
private respondents' mining claims be declared null and void.
The petitioners Alfred Pearson, et al. (hereinafter "Pearsons") claim to have
inherited the beneficial interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc.
(hereinafter "Tambis Gold") upon its dissolution, owing to the fact that the
biggest stockholder of said company and the sole owner of the claims was their
ancestor, William F. Pearson, Sr. 6
Private respondents Diamond Mining Corporation, Rosario Mining Development
Corporation and their assignee A. Soriano Corporation (hereinafter "Mining
Companies") are domestic corporations organized and existing under Philippine
laws.
The public respondents are the Director of Mines, the Minister of Natural
Resources, the Presidential Executive Assistant, the Court of First Instance (CFI),
and the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). 7 Each of them had ruled in favor of
the Mining Companies.
Page 49 of 86
The facts as found by the respondent Minister of Natural Resources and
confirmed by the respondents Presidential Executive Assistant and the IAC are
as follows:
From the records and the documentary evidence at hand, it appears that the
Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed in 1919, under the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, declarations of location covering the "BAROBO-1" to "BAROBO-5" placer
claims located at the barrio of Bahi, municipality of Lianga, province of Surigao
del Sur. These declarations of location were destroyed or lost during the war.
In 1948, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Mines
affidavits to reconstitute the declarations of location for the "BAROBO" placer
claims. The affidavits were recorded with the mining recorder on January 19,
1949.
On February 29, 1960, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. was dissolved.
Appellants (herein petitioners) were at that time stockholders of the
corporation.
From May 10 to June 11, 1970, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining,
through its agent Marcelino Manabat, discovered and located the, "MARTIN-1",
"MARTIN-2", "MARTIN-5", "MARTIN-6" and "MARTIN-27" placer claims in the
barrio of Bahi, municipality of Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. On June 25,
1970, the declarations of location therefor, and the Special Power and (sic)
Attorney appointing Marcelino Manabat as attorney-in-fact, were registered
with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del Sur.
On August 31, 1970, the applications for the survey of the "MARTIN" claims
were filed, and, on March 13, 1973 and December 18, 1973, the corresponding
orders for survey were issued.
On June 22, 1973, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining filed the lease
application covering the "MARTIN" placer claims. After the survey returns of
said placer claims were approved on January 3, 1975, the notice of lease was
published in February 20 and 27, 1975 issues of the "Mindanao Times" and in
the February 25 and March 4, 1975 issues of the "Times Journal".
Meanwhile, from February 24 to March 5, 1974, appellee (now also
respondent) Diamond Mining, through its agent Justiniano Deloso, discovered
and located the "DIAMOND-1" to "DIAMOND-7" placer claims in the barrio of
Bahi, municipality of Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. On March 25, 1974,
the declarations of location therefor, including the Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Justiniano Deloso, were registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao
del Sur.
On April 17, 1973, the application for survey of the "DIAMOND" placer claims
were filed, and, on May 21, 1974, the order for survey was issued.
On April 22, 1974, appellee Diamond Mining filed the lease applications
covering the "DIAMOND" placer claims. Subsequently, after the survey returns
of said claims were approved on December 24, 1974 and January 3, 1975, the
notice of lease application was published in the February 25 and March 4, 1975
issues of the "Times Journal" and in the February 27 and March 6, 1975 issues
of the "Mindanao Times".
On 10 March 1975, appellants (petitioners herein) filed the adverse claims
against appellees (now private respondents).
After the case was heard by the Panel of Investigators of the Bureau of Mines,
the Director of Mines rendred (sic) the decision appealed from.
In his decision, the Director held that appellants (petitioners) failed to establish
the existence of the conflict among the placer claims involved; that the
"BAROBO" placer claims are null and void because their tie points, as described
in the affidavits to reconstitute the declarations of location therefor, are not the
natural objects of permanent monuments prescribed under the law and their
geographical positions cannot be accurately determined; that, even if said
"BAROBO" claims were validly located, the same have been abandoned due to
the failure of the original locators thereof to perform assessment works therein,
to file the corresponding affidavits of annual work obligations, and to pay the
real estate taxes thereon; and that appellants (petitioners) are not the
successors-in-interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc., hence they have no
legal personality to institute the adverse claims. 8
Special
Proceedings

On appeal, the Minister of Natural Resources in a Decision dated October 29,
1979, affirmed the judgment of the Director of Mines. 9 He agreed with the
Director's finding on the issue of abandonment.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, the
Pearsons appealed to the Office of the President. They filed a Manifestation
requesting the Office to require the Mining Companies to file a bond in such
amount as may be necessary to protect the interests of the Pearsons during the
pendency of the case before it. Also, they prayed for an order for immediate
ocular inspection of the area to determine the fundamental issue of the correct
tie point of the controverted mining claims. 10
In an Order dated June 23, 1981, the Office of the President granted the motion
concerning the bond but denied the request for ocular inspection. In the order,
it was stated that "the investigation conducted by the Presidential Investigating
Committee of the Bureau of Mines has already considered and determined the
issue which require no more (sic) further verification and clarification." 11 The
Pearsons and the Mining Companies separately moved for reconsideration. 12
Subsequently, the Office of the President granted the motion for ocular
inspection, and ordered the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee
on June 23, 1989. 13 The Mining Companies moved for reconsideration of this
order. 14
In a Decision dated August 31, 1981, the Office of the President revoked the
order allowing ocular inspection, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, and
released all monies that might have been deposited by the Mining Companies.
The pertinent grounds of its dismissal are hereunder quoted: 15
. . . We agree with the findings of the Ministry of Natural Resources that
Appellant's mining claims are abandoned, if not null and void. Evidence on
record clearly establishes the fact that appellants failed to conduct the
necessary works on their claim, to file the affidavits of annual work obligations,
and to pay the real estate taxes. These ommissions (sic) by appellants constitute
abandonment of their claims. Executive Order No. 141 dated August 1, 1968,
explicitly states that unpatented mining claims which were located more than
thirty years ago under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended,
and which have not complied with the annual assessment requirement are
considered abandoned and their declaration of location cancelled. On this
score, this Office finds no legal justification to modify, much less reverse, the
appealed decision."
On January 18, 1982, the Office of the President issued a Resolution denying
the Pearsons' motion for reconsideration. 16
After said denial, the Pearsons filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with a writ of preliminary injunction, before Branch X of the CFI of
Pasig to annul the aforementioned decisions of public respondents and to
restrain private respondents from entering and developing the mining claims
involved. 17 This was docketed as Civil Case No. 45053. The Mining Companies
filed their joint motion to dismiss and opposition to the preliminary injunction
alleging, among others, that the Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of
the President is already final and executory pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
463, Section 50 which states that:
Appeals - Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director, may,
within five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of
the Secretary are likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof
by the affected party to the President of the Philippines whose decision shall be
final and executory.
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of expressly resolving the said motion to dismiss, the CFI ordered on
October 15, 1982 the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee "to
determine the correct tie-point of private respondents' mineral claim". Both the
public and private respondents moved for reconsideration of said order. 18 The
CFI denied both motions and issued the Order dated December 21, 1982
scheduling the ocular inspection for January 3, 1983.
In view of this last order, the Mining Companies filed with the IAC their Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition, assailing the abovementioned orders dated
October 15, 1982 and December 21, 1982 allowing the creation of and setting
the schedule for ocular inspection by the Ad Hoc Committee, and praying that
Page 50 of 86
the latter court be prohibited from further proceeding with Civil Case No.
45053. The Mining Companies argued that when P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463
were promulgated, it became unquestionable that the procedure of
adjudicating mining claims was made completely administrative with the
President as the final authority. 19 In their Answer, the Pearsons assailed the
propriety of the petition since its subjects are two interlocutory orders. 20
The IAC issued a Restraining Order dated January 31, 1983, restraining the CFI
judge from implementing his order directing the Ad Hoc Committee to conduct
an ocular inspection. 21 Later on, the IAC granted the writ of certiorari, set aside
the orders of the CFI with regard to the Ad Hoc Committee and ocular
inspection, and directed the CFI "to resolve the joint motion to dismiss filed by
the private respondents in said case in light of what has been stated in this
decision." The decision of the IAC was promulgated on September 30, 1983,
and the same became final and executory with an entry of judgment issued by
the said IAC on February 17, 1984.
As directed by the IAC, the CFI issued an Order on July 31, 1984 dismissing the
petition of the Pearsons before it.
Hence, the petitioners now come before this Court raising in their petition the
following issues: 22
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT IN CA-G.R. NO. 15439 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE;
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO AND
DECIDED SAID PETITION DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING BY HEREIN PETITIONER
THAT THE ORDERS IN QUESTION ARE MERELY INTERLOCUTORY AND ARE,
THEREFORE, NOT PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT; AND
III. ASSUMING AGAIN ARGUENDO THAT THE QUESTIONED INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS ARE PROPER SUBJECT OF CERTIORARI, WHETHER OR NOT THE
DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1983 OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT IS A PATENT NULLITY FOR BEING DEVOID OF ANY FACTUAL
OR LEGAL BASIS.
Petitioners maintain that the Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction over
all cases where the jurisdiction of a lower court is in issue, as well as all cases
decided by lower courts involving pure questions of law, 23 pursuant to
paragraph 2(c), Section 5, Art X of the present Constitution which states that:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in -
xxx xxx xxx
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, they assert that the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), as amended,
also clearly provides that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case, pursuant to Paragraph (3), Sec. 17 thereof, to wit:
Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. -
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided in -
Special
Proceedings

xxx xxx xxx
(2) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court in issue.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, they argue that the IAC Decision dated September 30, 1983 is a
patent nullity for utter want of jurisdiction.
They further argue that the questioned orders of the CFI dated October 15,
1982 and December 21, 1982 allowing the creation of and setting the schedule
for ocular inspection by the Ad Hoc Committee were merely interlocutory, and
therefore, cannot be subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC. 24
Lastly, they claim that the IAC, in its September 30, 1984 decision sustaining the
Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President dismissing the
appeal of petitioners, has no factual and legal bases. They stress that they have
lived in their ancestral home in the mining area up to the filing of this petition;
they continued performing the assessment work on their mineral claims up to
1975 when this case arose, and they were enjoined to stop their operations by
respondent Bureau of Mines; that they have performed assessment work
continuously up to 1975; that they filed religiously their affidavits of assessment
work; and that they paid their realty taxes due, although they admitted that
certain affidavits were filed and certain taxes were also paid in later years. 25
Private respondents, in their Comment dated June 26, 1986, allege that the IAC
has jurisdiction to entertain the original petition for certiorari filed by them
against respondents CFI and the Pearsons under Rule 65 of the New Rules of
Court. They argue that under P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309 and 463 governing the
procedures of adjudicating conflicting mining claims which were made
completely administrative, the decision of the President on appeal to his Office
is final and executory, and therefore, not subject to judicial review. 26
The different issues raised in the instant petition may be subsumed in two
principal issues:
1. Whether or not respondent IAC committed reversible error in assuming
jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for certiorari assailing the
trial court's interlocutory orders?
2. Assuming the IAC had validly assumed jurisdiction, whether or not it
committed reversible errors of law in its decision now before us?
We find the petition entirely devoid of merit. Thus we see, in regard to the first
principal issue, no reversible error committed by the IAC when it assumed
jurisdiction over private respondents' petition for certiorari involving
interlocutory orders of the trial court.
The petitioners launch a two-pronged attack against the jurisdiction of the
respondent appellate court, to wit: first, the IAC could not adjudicate cases
where the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue; and second, the orders of the
CFI, being merely interlocutory, could not be the subject of a petition
for certiorari in the IAC.
The petitioners err on both counts.
Firstly, the IAC correctly invoked the ruling of this Court in Uytiepo vs.
Aggabao 27, to wit:
As regards the claim that the issues raised by Aggabao in her action filed with
the respondent Court of Appeals involve only questions of law and are
therefore exclusively reviewable by this Court, the petitioners apparently
confuse the remedy of special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court in relation to section 30 of the Judiciary Act as amended and an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 42 also of the Rules of Court in relation to the
fourth paragraph of section 17 of the same Act. The first is a remedy available in
the Court of Appeals, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, essentially to correct
errors of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The second lies within the competence of this Court for the review of errors of
inferior courts involving only questions of law. . . .
Page 51 of 86
What private respondents availed of was the first remedy, placing in issue the
jurisdiction of the trial court to create an Ad Hoc Committee and schedule an
ocular inspection.
Considered in relation to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980), now incorporated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which vested the then IAC with original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari and prohibition, among other auxiliary, writs, "whether or not in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction", we find that respondent appellate court
correctly assumed jurisdiction over CA-G.R. No. 15439.
It has also been emphasized in a number of cases 28 that while this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
(for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking
a direct recourse to this Court. Instead, they should initially seek the proper
relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the
CA or RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. This
Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary, or where serious and important reasons therefor
exist.
Secondly, petitioner's contention that the lower court's orders of October 15,
1982 and December 21, 1982, being merely interlocutory, are not correctible
by certiorari, ignores this Court's consistent ruling, to wit:
On the procedural issues raised, we hold that where an interlocutory order was
allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before the Court on a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of
the order until the appeal from the decision of the main case would not afford
the party adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate
remedy. 29
In Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 30 we held that although, as a general rule, an
interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment
on the merits, an exception is made where the remedy of appeal cannot afford
an adequate and expeditious relief. In such exception, certiorari can be allowed
as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party. We
further held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition
for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence
of the remedy of appeal. 31 This we reiterated in Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of
Appeals. 32
Does the controversy at hand fall under the exception where interlocutory
orders may be the subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC? In our view, it
does. For the trial court clearly acted outside of its jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed orders creating the Ad Hoc Committee and scheduling the ocular
inspection.
To begin with the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the mining dispute.
With the issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463, 33 the
procedure of adjudicating conflicting mining claims has been made completely
administrative in character, with the President as the final appeal
authority. 34 Section 50 of P.D. 463, providing for a modernized system of
administration and disposition of mineral lands, to promote and encourage the
development and exploitation thereof, mandates on the matter of "Protests,
Adverse Claims and Appeals," the following procedure:
Appeals - Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may,
within five (5) days from receipt there of appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of
the Secretary are likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof
by the affected party to the President of the Philippines whose decision shall be
final and executory.
It should be noted that before its amendment, the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137)
required that after the filing of adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines, the
adverse claimant had to go to a court of competent jurisdiction for the
settlement of the claim. With the amendment seeking to expedite the
resolution of mining conflicts, the Director of Mines became the mandatory
adjudicator of adverse claims, instead of the Court of First instance. 35 Thus, it
cannot escape notice that under Section 61 of the Mining Law, as amended by
Republic Act Nos. 746 and 4388, appeals from the decision of the Secretary of
Special
Proceedings

Agriculture and Natural Resources (then Minister of Natural Resources) on
conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations may be made to the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be. In contrast, under the
decrees issued at the onset of martial law, it has been expressly provided that
the decisions of the same Secretary in mining cases are appealable to the
President of the Philippines under Section 50 of the Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. No. 463) and Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 in
relation to P.D. No. 309. 36
The trend at present is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely
administrative matter. 37 This does not mean that administrative bodies have
complete rein over mining disputes. The very terms of Section 73 of the Mining
Law, as amended by R.A. No. 4388, in requiring that the adverse claim must
"state in full detail the nature, boundaries and extent of the adverse claim"
show that the conflicts to be decided by reason of such adverse claim refer
primarily to questions of fact. The controversies to be submitted and resolved
by the Director of Mines under the sections referred only to the overlapping of
claims and administrative matters incidental thereto. 38 Questions and
controversies that are judicial, not administrative, in nature can be resolved
only by the regular courts in whom is vested the judicial power to resolve and
adjudicate such civil disputes and controversies between litigants in accordance
with the established norms of law and justice. 39 Decisions of the Supreme Court
on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between (1) the primary
powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or
administrative nature, such as "granting of license, permits, lease and contracts,
or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding
conflicting applications," and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or
contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature
that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice. 40
This distinction is carried on even under the present law. 41 Findings of fact by
the Mines Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over
decisions or orders of the panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding
on the parties, and its decision or order shall be final and executory. 42 But
resort to the appropriate court, through a petition for review by certiorari,
involving questions of law, may be made within thirty days from the receipt of
the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board. 43
With regard to the second issue, the query boils down to whether the IAC
committed reversible error in concluding that petitioners had abandoned their
mining claims.
As found by the IAC:
It will not be amiss to state here that the basis of abandonment of the Pearsons
of their mining claims is well established by the evidence already presented to
the Bureau of Mines and to the Ministry of Natural Resources. We need only to
refer to the following reasons found in the decision of the Ministry of Natural
Resources, dated October 29, 1975, to wit:
. . . assuming, in gratia argumentis, that the "BAROBO" placer claims were
validly located, said claims have been abandoned for failure of the claim owners
thereof to conduct works therein, to file the affidavits of annual work
obligations, and to pay the real estate taxes.
The evidence indicate that affidavits of annual assessment works have been
filed for the "BAROBO-2" to "BAROBO-5" placer claims from 1946 to 1951.
However, the affidavits for the years 1957 to 1974, respectively were all filed
only on April 8, 1975. Thus, during the latter years, no proof was submitted to
show compliance with the annual assessment works. So, at the time the
"DIAMOND" and "MARTIN" placer claims were located and registered, the
"BAROBO" claims had already been deemed abandoned and the areas covered
thereby open to relocation."
Said decision also took into account Executive Order No. 141, dated August 1,
1968, which provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the vested in me by law, do hereby declare unpatented mining claims
which were located more than thirty years ago under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended, and which had not complied with the
annual assessment requirement, as abandoned and their declaration of location
cancelled. 44
Page 52 of 86
Well established is the rule that findings of fact made in the decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources (then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources) appealed from will not be reviewed by this Court unless there has
been a grave abuse of discretion in making said findings by reason of the total
absence of competent evidence in support thereof. 45 As shown above, the
public officials' judgments are well supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, by the Pearsons' own admission, they failed to file the affidavit of
annual assessment works and to pay the real estate taxes from 1957-1974,
which were filed and paid only later in 1974. 46
In Santa Rosa Mining Co. vs. Hon Minister of Natural Resources Jose Leido, Jr.
and Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez 47, this Court held that while it is
recognized that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, such
right is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right, more so where petitioner's
claims are still unpatented. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership
over the affected land or located claim. It merely segregates the located land or
area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating
the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule
otherwise would imply the location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain
rights over a located mining claim. This cannot be approved or sanctioned
because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should
faithfully and consistently comply with the requirement for annual works and
improvements in the located mining claims. 48 Not only should there be a valid
and subsisting location of the mineral land but also there should be, thereafter,
continuous compliance with all the requirements of law such as the
performance of annual assessment works and payment of real estate taxes. 49
While it is understandable that petitioners would want this Court to reassess
the evidence presented before the mining officials to support their plea of not
having abandoned the mining claim involved, this cannot be done now in this
proceeding, for this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, we find no cogent,
much less compelling, reason to depart from established practice and
precedents. For where, as in the case at bar, there is no showing that there was
fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the
Office of the President or a department head in rendering a questioned
decision; nor a total lack of substantial evidence to support their administrative
decisions, their factual findings and conclusions are entitled to great weight and
respect, and will not be interfered with. 50
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed Orders and
Decisions, particularly the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-
G.R. No. 15439, including the Order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 45053, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as
Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS
CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA, respondents.
Defante & Elegado for petitioner.
Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors' Consortium,
Inc.
RESOLUTION
CORTÉS, J.:
The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings
initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent
Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty
Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements
thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati and registered in
the name of Arceli P. Jo under TCT No. S-5499.
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986,
docketed as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a
certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been
opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the
sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42.
After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports
regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision
on June 4, 1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00,
and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of
P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent.
After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution. This motion was granted by respondent RTC
judge. After issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated
January 14, 1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the
manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was
informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner. As a result
of this, private respondent filed a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that
an order be issued directing the bank to deliver to respondent sheriff the
amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under the RTC decision dated
June 4, 1987.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner
of payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which
the respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision. Private respondent filed
its opposition to the motion.
Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20, 1988 a
"Manifestation" informing the court that private respondent was no longer the
true and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the
property had been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB)
Respondent RTC judge issued an order requiring PSB to make available the
documents pertaining to its transactions over the subject property, and the PNB
Buendia Branch to reveal the amount in petitioner's account which was
garnished by respondent sheriff. In compliance with this order, PSB filed a
Page 53 of 86
manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its ownership over
the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held
on April 20, 1987. After several conferences, PSB and private respondent
entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between
themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings.
Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated September 8, 1988
which: (1) approved the compromise agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia
Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which
corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property
under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, from the garnished account of
petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB and private respondent to execute the
necessary deed of conveyance over the subject property in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner's motion to lift the garnishment was denied.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by
private respondent. On the other hand, for failure of the manager of the PNB
Buendia Branch to comply with the order dated September 8, 1988, private
respondent filed two succeeding motions to require the bank manager to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. During the hearings
conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the PNB Buendia
Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed the court that he was still waiting for
proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling him to make a
disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its part, petitioner contended that
its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without
the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of
the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899].
Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine
enunciated in Republic v. Palacio did not apply to the case because petitioner's
PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened for the
expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres. Decree No.
42. Respondent RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of
contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated
September 8, 1988, and thus ordered his arrest and detention until his
compliance with the said order.
Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate
petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which were eventually
consolidated. In a decision promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dismissed both petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of
respondent RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's PNB Account No.
265-537154-3, and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner now files the present petition for review with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondent RTC judge, respondent sheriff, and their
representatives, from enforcing and/or carrying out the RTC order dated
December 21, 1988 and the writ of garnishment issued pursuant thereto.
Private respondent then filed its comment to the petition, while petitioner filed
its reply.
Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the
Court of Appeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually two
accounts with the PNB Buendia Branch, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 — exclusively for the
expropriation of the subject property, with an
outstanding balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for statutory
obligations and other purposes of the municipal
government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of
July 12, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
Special
Proceedings
 Page 54 of 86

[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.] The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of
fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has
been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full
Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of
possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the
two bank accounts, it may fairly be asked whether the second account was
Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full
opened only for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed
compensation.
orders of respondent RTC judge and the decision of the Court of Appeals, and
strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that public funds are exempted from
garnishment or execution as enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.] At any WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to
rate, the Court will give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the
resolve the principal issues presented based on the factual circumstances thus amount of P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a
alleged by petitioner. report of its compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible
period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of receipt of this resolution.
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened
for expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988, which was
petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of rendered in Civil Case No. 13699, is SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining
the funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is order issued by the Court on November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT.
petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent
RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by
SO ORDERED.
respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked
for the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are exempted from
execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.

There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In
this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v.
Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-
30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use
cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment
against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose
of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of
Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86
Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds application in the
case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed
an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to
the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of
P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no
legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason,
to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The
Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960);
Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)].

In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not
disputed by petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now,
petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay
just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property
since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school
year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle
its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated.
It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's inherent
power of eminent domain,

. . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct

determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of
the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for
the property owner is made to suffer the consequence
of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
[Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also
Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya,
G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291].

Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 76028 April 6, 1990
SPOUSES JOSE R. LANSANG, JR. and ELSIE D. LANSANG and ROBERTO
CO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL L. GUMBAN, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch XXIII,
RENATO SALANGSANG and INTERWORLD ASSURANCE CORP., represented by
EVANGELINE B. BACONGCO respondents.
Niceto C. Joaquin for petitioners.
Rosalio Carino for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
What at the beginning was a simple action for damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 ended up in the fantastic amount of P600,000.00 simply because
the trial court denied defendant another day in court and the appellate court
did not believe that a petition for certiorari can be filed after a case had been
appealed.
The antecedents are undisputed. Private respondent Renato Salangsang filed an
action for damages arising from a vehicular accident against petitioners in the
Regional Trial Court of South Cotabato. In his answer, petitioner filed a third
party complaint against private respondent insurance corporation. The pre-trial
was held but no settlement was reached. Trial commenced and private
respondent Salansang presented his evidence.
On September 12, 1984, the court issued an order resetting the hearing of the
case to November 8, 1984. At said date of hearing neither petitioners nor their
counsel appeared. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on same day.
Petitioners explained to the trial court the reasons for their absence at the
November 8 hearing to be (a) their counsel, Atty. Rufino Bañas who was then a
member of parliament failed to appear at the hearing due to pressing and
urgent work at the Batasang Pambansa; and (b) petitioner Jose Lansang, Jr. was
in Manila and since his mother died in September, 1984, he was still in Manila
when the order of September 12 was issued setting the case for hearing on
November 8. Petitioner Roberto Co was out of town since 1983.
Nevertheless, on December 8, 1984, the trial court rendered a judgment, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants, ordering them to pay jointly and
severally to plaintiff, the following:
1) NINETEEN THOUSAND PESOS(P19,000.00) as costs of
repairs and TWENTY PESOS (P20.00) per day as storage
the from October 11, 1982;
2) TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P250.00) per day from
December 19, 1981 until the car is returned, as
unrealized income;
3) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as attorney's
fees and
4) Expenses of litigation and costs of this suit. 1
Page 55 of 86
On January 25, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to
set aside order or decision dated December 8, 1984 and to allow them to
present evidence reiterating the foregoing reasons, and a supplement dated
February 6, 1985 alleging that the damages awarded are excessive and
unwarranted, so that if they are given the chance to present evidence, they can
show that private respondent did not suffer such damage in his business of
buying and selling of cattle as he has a motorcycle and a van which he uses for
his business in lieu of his car that was damaged.
The motion was denied in an order dated March 11, 1985. On March 14, 1985
petitioners filed their notice of appeal/certiorari as follows:
COME NOW the defendants/third party plaintiffs, through counsel
and hereby respectfully serve notice that they are appealing the
decision dated December 8, 1985, copy received on January 14,
1985, and the order dated March 11, 1985 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or set aside order and the decision dated
December 8, 1984 and to allow defendants to present evidence,
copy of which was received on March 13, 1985, and/or to file a
petition for certiorari contesting the LATTER order, to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, Manila. 2
On March 19, 1985, the trial court approved the appeal and ordered the
records of the case forwarded to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
On April 3, 1985, petitioners filed in the appellate court a petition
for certiorari directed against the order of the trial court dated March 11, 1985
which denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and which in effect is
one for a new trial. The petition was docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 05856. In the
petition, it is alleged that petitioners have perfected their appeal and that they
are not abandoning it, but the same is not an adequate, speedy and plain
remedy because of the P250.00 daily penalty mentioned in the award.
In a decision dated April 29, 1985, the appellate court denied due course to and
dismissed the petition. Without awaiting the Finality of the decision, private
respondent Salangsang filed in the trial court a motion for execution of its
judgment and this was granted on July 6, 1985. On July 18, 1985, it denied the
motion for reconsideration of said order filed by petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. No.
06746-SP. On June 30, 1986, the Court of Appeal rendered a decision denying
due course to and dismissing the petition. 3 A motion for reconsideration
thereof filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution dated September 17,
1986.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari, wherein the issues raised are
—
1. Is appeal inconsistent with the remedy of certiorari?
2. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, was the
appeal taken by the petitioners from the decision of the trial court
deemed abandoned when they filed a petition
for certiorari contesting the order denying their motion for
reconsideration and to allow them to present evidence which in
effect is for new trial?4
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the appealed decision, it was held that by the filing of the petition
for certiorari petitioners in effect abandoned their appeal and that the
perfected appeal is inconsistent with the remedy of certiorari. It was further
ruled that petitioners cannot be permitted to first resort to appeal and then
shift the remedy to certiorari.
The purpose of an appeal is to bring up for review a final judgment or order of
the lower court. The remedy of certiorari is to correct certain acts of any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions performed without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 5 A certiorari proceeding may be instituted during the pendency of a case
or even after judgment.
Special
Proceedings
 Page 56 of 86

If after judgment, the petition for certiorari is availed of when appeal is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, then the petition must fail as certiorari may not
be resorted to as a substitute for appeal much less for a lost one. In such a case,
the right to appeal is deemed abandoned.

However, after a judgment had been rendered and an appeal therefrom had
been perfected, a petition for certiorari relating to certain incidents therein may
prosper where the appeal does not appear to be a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Hence, appeal and certiorari are not remedies that exclude each other.

In De Vera vs. Santos, 6 this Court held —

Although the petitioner Mercy Amonidovar had already perfected

an appeal from the judgment of the respondent court, she is not
barred from applying for the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari since appeal is not an adequate remedy to correct lack
or excess of jurisdiction because appeal cannot promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of an invalid order.

In Jaca vs. Davao Lumber Company, 7 We ruled:

The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute

sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is
the inadequacy — not the mere absence of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari.

Indeed, there are instances when this Court relaxed the application of Rule 65
on certiorari and allowed the writ to issue even while appeal was available in
the interest of justice, 8 or due to the dictates of public welfare and for the
advancement of public policy. 9

In this case, after judgment was rendered, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which is in effect a motion for the trial. The failure of counsel
and petitioners to appear on November 8, 1985 in order to present its evidence
was duly explained and which may be considered excusable. The courts are
called upon to be liberal in the assessment of the non-appearance of counsel or
the party if only to promote the greater interest of justice.

While it appears that the vehicle of petitioners hit the car of private respondent
while parked it is contended by petitioners that it was parked in a prohibited
zone. Assuming the petitioners to be at fault, they contend the additional
damage of P250.00 per day is unconscionable in addition to the actual damage
to the car of P19,500.00 and P10,000.00 attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. They estimate the damage awarded can run up to the amount of
P600,000.00.

These circumstances justify the grant to petitioners of another day in court. It is

a pity that this case has been pending in court for so long. But this is what
happens when an overly strict and narrow interpretation of the rules is
undertaken. The liberal application of the rules must always be in the mind of
the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals

dated June 30, 1986 and its resolution dated September 17, 1986, as well as the
decision of the trial court dated December 8, 1984, the order of execution
dated July 6, 1985 and the order dated July 18, 1985 which denied the motion
for reconsideration, are hereby set aside, and another judgment is hereby
rendered granting the motion for new trial. The records of the case are
returned to the lower court for further proceedings with deliberate dispatch by
giving petitioners their day in court and thereafter rendering the judgment
based on the evidence and applicable law.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 101428 August 5, 1992
DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, in her official capacity as MEDICAL CENTER CHIEF
OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA
FUENTE, respondents.
Gregorio San Agustin for private respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action
of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of
damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer, is the chief issue
raised in the certiorari action at bar. Also put the issue is whether or not the
Solicitor General may represent the defendant public officer in
the mandamus suit, in so far as the claim for damages is concerned, in light of
the Court's rulings in Urbano , et al. v. Chavez, et al., and Co v. Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, et al. 1
There is no dispute about the facts from which these issues arise.
In the early months of 1987 — and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued
on January 30, 1987 by President Corazon Aquino — reorganization of the
various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were
abolished, transfers of personnel effected.
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of
the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that
position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical
Specialist II, a position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as
Medical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of
Health that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this is
to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr.
de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his
protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where
it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the meantime "the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to
and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla,
Jr." 2
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a
Resolution dated August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the
following conclusion and disposition, to wit:
. . (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of
appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to
Medical Specialists II as null and void: hence, illegal.
Considering further that since the National Children's
Hospital was not abolished and the position therein
remained intact although the title or the position of
Chief of Clinics was changed to "Chief of Medical
Professional Staff" with substantially the same functions
and responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders
that:
1. Appellant de la Fuente, Jr. be retained or considering
as never having relinquished his position of Chief of
Page 57 of 86
Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without
loss of seniority rights; and
2. He be paid back salaries, transportation,
representation and housing allowances and such other
benefits withheld from him from the date of his illegal
demotion/transfer.
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal
therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period
prescribed therefor by the Constitution. 3 Consequently, the resolution became
final, on September 21, 1988.
De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical
Center Chief of National Children's Hospital, 4 demanding the implementation of
the Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred "de la Fuente's claims to the
Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate
advice and/or action . . (She did this allegedly because, according to the
Solicitor General, she was) unaware when and how a CSC Resolution becomes
final and executory, whether such Resolution had in fact become final and
executory and whether the DOH Legal Department would officially assail the
mentioned Resolution." 5 But she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters, not
even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary. She chose
simply to await "legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department." On the other
hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la
Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the
final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In fact, de la
Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had "actually threatened to stop paying . . . (his)
salary and allowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved'
appointment even as 'Medical Specialist II' . . . 6
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in
her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988
would be obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries and
allowances otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund, Dr. de al
Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its
judgment. He was however "told to file in court a petition
for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission had no coercive
powers — unlike a court — to enforce its final decisions/resolutions. 7
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of
"mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon,
and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply
with the final and executory resolution of the Civil Service Commission. He
prayed for the following specific reliefs:
(1) (That) . . a temporary restraining order be
issued immediately, ordering the principal and other
respondents to revert the funds the of the NCH
corresponding to the amounts necessary to implement
the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor
of herein petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr.,
and to pay such sums which have accrued and due and
payable as of the date of said order;
(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary
injunction, that the restraining order be converted to a
writ of preliminary injunction; and that a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering
principal respondent and the other respondents to
implement in full the said final resolution; and
(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that
judgment be rendered seeking (sic) permanent writs
issued and that principal respondent be ordered and
commanded to comply with and implement the said
final resolution without further delay; and, furthermore,
that the principal respondent be ordered to pay to the
sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 for litigation
expenses and attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
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 Page 58 of 86

The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a resolution CSC Case No. 4 (and) . . . Dr. Jose D.
temporary restraining order as prayed for, and required the respondent to show Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled to the office, . . . to
cause why it should not be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The immediately cease and desist from further performing
record shows that the respondents prayed for and were granted an extension of and acting as OIC Professional Service.
fifteen (15) days to file their answer "through counsel, who," as the Court of
Appeals was later to point out, 8 "did not bother to indicate his address, thus
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages — founded essentially on the refusal of
notice was sent to him through the individual respondents. . . . (However, no)
Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service
answer was filed; neither was there any show cause (sic) against a writ of
Commission, which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a different forum —
preliminary injunction." It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who appeared in Vital-
was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the "petitions
Gozon's behalf. 9
(for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . . (said)
claim of damages."
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a
"Supplemental/Amended Petition" dated February 2, 1989. The second petition
Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate
described as one for "quo warranto" aside from "mandamus", added three
Tribunal's Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. 12 Respondent de la Fuente
respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter alia that he (de
acknowledged receipt of his own copy on June 15, 1989. 13 Neither Vital-Gozon
la Fuente) had "clear title" to the position in question in virtue of the final and
nor her co-party, Dr. Merencilla, Jr., moved for reconsideration of, or attempted
executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; that even after the
to appeal the decision.
Commission's judgment had become final and executory and been
communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed "Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as 'OIC
Professional Service' to further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold and It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by motion
exercise the public office/position of petitioner, (under a duly approved filed through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. 14 He insisted that the Appellate
permanent appointment as 'Chief of Clinics' since 1978). De la Fuente thus Court had competence to award damages in a mandamus action. He argued
prayed, additionally, for judgment: that while such a claim for damages might not have been proper in
a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court "before the enactment of B.P.
Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals had authority to issue such writs only 'in
(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D.
aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation was changed by said BP 129 in
Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office of
virtue of which three levels of courts — the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial
"Chief of Clinics" (now retitled/known as "Chief of
Court, and the Court of Appeals — were conferred concurrent original
Medical Professional Staff," NCH), ousting him
jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power to
therefrom and ordering said respondent to immediately
conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him
cease and desist from further performing as "OIC
to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued, would lead to that
Professional Service" any and all duties and
multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
responsibilities of the said office; (and)

While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to

(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la
enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 — directing his
Fuente, Jr., is the lawful or de jure Chief of Clinics (now
reinstatement pursuant to the Civil Service Commission's Resolution of August
known as "Chief of the Medical Professional Staff") and
9, 1988, supra. He filed on July 4, 1989 a "Motion for Execution," alleging that
placing him in the possession of said office/position,
the judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final and executory for failure of
without the need of reappointment
Gozon, et al. — served with notice thereof on June 16, 1989 to move for its
or new appointment as held by the Civil Service
reconsideration or elevate the same to the Supreme Court. 15 His motion was
Commission in its resolution of August 9, 1988, in CSC
granted by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated July 7, 1989, 16 reading as
Case No. 4.
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Copy of the "Supplemental/Amended Petition" was sent to Atty. Jose A. Fabia,
Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc., National
Children's Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not
being indicated or mentioned in his motion for Extension of
Time). 10
Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again, none
was filed. The petitions were consequently "resolved on the basis of their
allegations and the annexes." The Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on
June 9, 1989. 11 It held that —
The question of whether petitioner may be divested of
his position as Chief of Clinics by the expedient of
having him appointed to another, lower position is no
longer an issue. It ceased to be such when the
resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The said
resolution is explicit in its mandate; petitioner was
declared the lawful and de jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of
the Medical Professional Staff) of the National
Children's Hospital, and by this token, respondent Dr.
Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office.
Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had
no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution
had to be complied with. It was ill-advised of principal
respondent, and violative of the rule of law, that the
resolution has not been obeyed or implemented.
and accordingly ordered —
. . . respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, . .
. to forthwith comply with, obey and implement the
The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and
executory, as prayed for, let the writ of execution issue
forthwith.
The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, 17 on the invoked
authority of Section 9, Rule 39. 18 The writ quoted the dispositive portion of the
judgment of June 9, 1989, including, as the Solicitor General's Office points out,
the second paragraph to the effect that the petitions "are not the vehicle nor is
the Court the forum for the claim of damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is
denied."
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989
judgment was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989,
an "Urgent Ex Parte Manifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents for
Contempt," complaining that although Gozon and her co-parties had been
served with the writ of execution on July 14, they had not complied therewith.
By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court required Gozon and Merencilla to
appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer the charge and show cause "why
they should not be adjudged in contempt for disobeying and/or resisting the
judgment." 19
At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves, accompanied
by their individual private lawyers — one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for
Merencilla (Bernardo S. Nera and Moises S. Rimando). One other lawyer
appeared in their behalf, from the Health Department, Artemio Manalo, who
stated that he was there "in behalf of Jose A. Fabia." 20 They explained that they
had no intention to defy the Court, they had simply referred the matter to their
superiors in good faith; and they were perfectly willing to comply with the
judgment, undertaking to do so "even in the afternoon" of that same day. The
Court consequently ordered them "to comply with their undertaking . . .
without any further delay," and report the action taken towards this end, within
five (5) days.

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On August 9, 1989, Gozon as "Medical Center Chief," sent a letter to Associate
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31
dated August 3, 1989, de la Fuente had been directed to assume the position of
Chief of the Medical Professional Staff, and that a voucher for the payment of
his allowances had been prepared and was being processed. 21
More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27, 1989, the Court
of Appeals promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's
motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989. 22 It modified the Decision of June
9, 1989 by (a) deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of
damages, supra), (b) consequently describing and treating it as a "PARTIAL
DECISION," and (c) scheduling "further proceedings for the purpose of receiving
evidence (of damages)," since said question "cannot be resolved by mere
reference to the pleadings." 23 This was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, invoked by de la Fuente, which reads as follows: 24
Sec. 3. Mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or
at some other specified time, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his
appearance for Isabelita Gozon. 25 At his instance, the Court gave him an
"opportunity to . . . file a motion for reconsideration" of the Resolution of
September 27, 1989. 26 That motion he filed by registered mail on November
10, 1989. 27 His basic contentions were (a) that the decision of June 9, 1989
could no longer be altered, having become final and executory and having in
fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129, the Appellate Court had no
jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action.
The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's behalf
at this juncture, saying that the case had been referred to it only on November
14, 1989. It, too, sought reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27,
1989. It filed on November 16, 1989 an "Omnibus Motion; I. For
Reconsideration of Resolution dated September 27, 1989; and II. To defer
hearing on petitioner's claims for damages." 28
Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
January 11, 1991. In that Resolution, the Court —
1) declared that the amended decision had already
become final and could no longer be re-opened
because, although "a copy of the amendatory resolution
was received by counsel who was representing Gozon
on October 3, 1989," the first motion for
reconsideration was not mailed until November 10,
1989 and the Solicitor General's "Omnibus Motion" was
not filed until November 16, 1989; and
2) prohibited the Solicitor General from representing
Gozon "in connection with . . . (de la Fuente's) claim for
damages," on the authority of this Court's ruling
promulgated on March 19, 1990 in G.R. No. 87977
(Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Co
v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig). 29
Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor
General's Office on January 18, 1991. 30 Again the Solicitor General sought
reconsideration, by motion dated January 25, 1991 and filed on January 30,
1991. 31 Again it was rebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on August 7,
1991, 32 served on the Solicitor General's Office on August 20, 1991, 33 the Court
of Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the "question of the authority of the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon . . . (had already)
been extensively discussed," and that its "jurisdiction . . . to hear and determine
issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa 129 as amended."
Page 59 of 86
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of
Appeals — and obtain "the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing
respondent de la Fuente's claim for damages" — the Solicitor General's Office
had instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends that the
Court of Appeals is not legally competent to take cognizance of and decide the
question of damages in a mandamus suit. It argues that —
1) B.P. Blg. 129 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to hear,
as a trial court, claims for moral and exemplary damages;
2) assuming that the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction over the claims for
damages, it lost the power to take cognizance thereof after the Decision of June
9, 1989 had, by its own pronouncement, become final and executory; and
3) the Urbano and Co doctrines cited by the Appellate Tribunal do not disqualify
the Solicitor General's Office from representing government officials sued in
their official capacities and in damage claims not arising from a felony.
It is in light of these facts, just narrated, that this Court will now proceed to deal
with the legal issues raised in this action. But first, a few brief observations
respecting the proceedings in the Civil Service Commission.
I
The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following acts
and events: 34
1) the proceedings commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission
in protest against his demotion;
2) the Commission's Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as the
direction therein that de la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back salaries
and other monetary benefits otherwise due him, this being couched in fairly
simple language obviously understandable to persons of ordinary or normal
intelligence;
3) no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of
the CSC's aforesaid Resolution of August 9, 1988;
4) the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of
the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988;
5) the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file answer,
notice thereof having been sent directly to her and her co-respondents since
the attorney who sought the extension in their behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set
out his address in his motion for extension;
6) the "supplemental/amended petition" subsequently presented by de la
Fuente, copy of which was sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and
7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3,
1989.
To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health
concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the
Health officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She
never bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate de la
Fuente's petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la
Fuente's efforts were being met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief
from the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This
Court will not disturb that Resolution. It is satisfied that no procedural or
substantive errors taint that Resolution, or its becoming final and executory.
II
Now, final and executory judgments are enforced by writ of execution and not
by another, separate action, whether of mandamus or otherwise. Hence,
execution of the Civil Service Commission's decision of August 9, 1988 should
have been ordered and effected by the Commission itself, when de la Fuente
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filed a motion therefor. It declined to do so, however, on the alleged ground, as
de la Fuente claims he was told, that it "had no coercive powers — unlike a
court — to enforce its final decisions/resolutions." 35 That proposition,
communicated to de la Fuente, of the Commission's supposed lack of coercive
power to enforce its final judgments, is incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous
acts of the Commission of actually directing execution of its decisions and
resolutions, which this Court has sanctioned in several cases; 36 and it is not in
truth a correct assessment of its powers under the Constitution and the
relevant laws.
In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in G.R. No. 96938
entitled "Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service
Commission, et al.,"37 this Court declared that in light of the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution and relevant statutes —
. . . it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it
should be stressed, it has been exercising through the
years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to
decide cases in inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried
out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed
to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute
the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.
In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power
of execution has been sanctioned by this Court in
several cases.
Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission's mistaken refusal
to execute its final and executory Resolution of August 9, 1988, extended
proceedings have taken place in the Court of Appeals and certain issues have
been expressly raised in relation thereto, supra. Those issues appear to the
Court to be important enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution,
instead of simply being given short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings
in the Court Service Commission actually had the power to execute its final and
executory Resolution.
III
The first such issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the matter of damages in a special civil action of mandamus.
The Solicitor General's Office argues that since jurisdiction is conferred only by
law, not by agreement of the parties, or acquiescence of the court, and since
the law conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
129, makes no reference to "actions for moral and exemplary damages, as those
claimed by . . . (de la Fuente)," it follows that the Court of Appeals has no
competence to act on said claim of damages. And Section 3 of Rule 65, which
authorizes the petitioner in a mandamus suit to pray for judgment commanding
the defendant inter alia "to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant," is "nothing more than a
procedural rule allowing joinder of causes of action, i.e., mandamus and
damages," and such an award of damages is allowable only in actions
commenced in Regional Trial Courts but not in the Court of Appeals or this
Court.
The argument is specious. It cannot be sustained.
The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P. 129 as the legal
provision specifying the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. The section pertinently declares that the "Intermediate Appellate
Court (now the Court of Appeals) shall exercise . .," among others:
. . . Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction . . . 38
The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit
and specific statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages,"
and finding none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted
Page 60 of 86
competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion
is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral
and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all;
yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for
moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types
or kinds of cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's
theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an
action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a
claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of
a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of
damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus,
which is certainly not the case.
Now, at the time of the enactment of B.P. 129, the issuance of the extraordinary
writs above mentioned was controlled by the Rules of Court of 1964, as they
continue to date to be so controlled. More particularly, the principal writs
of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari were (and continue to be) governed by
Rule 65; the writ of habeas corpus, by Rule 102; and the writ of quo warranto,
by Rule 66. The so-called auxiliary writs were (and continue to be) also
governed by the same code — e.g., preliminary attachment, by Rule 57;
preliminary injunction, by Rule 58, receivership, by Rule 59; writ of seizure or
delivery in a replevin suit, by Rule 60.
At that time, Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it continues to authorize to
date) rendition of judgment in a mandamus action "commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant." 39 The provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or
the result of, the defendant's wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act
required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical
counterpart provision. 40
Moreover, Section 4 of the same Rule 65 authorized, as it continues to
authorize to date, the filing of the petition "in the Supreme Court, or, if it relates
to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer
or person, in a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) having
jurisdiction thereof," as well as "in the Court of Appeals (whether or not) 41 in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
Worthy of note, too, is that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court similarly authorizes
the recovery of damages in a quo warranto action against a corporate officer —
an action within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — as
follows: 42
Sec. 14. Liability of officer neglecting to deliver property
of corporation to receiver. — An officer of such
corporation who refuses or neglects, upon demand, to
deliver over to the receiver all money, property, books,
deeds, notes, bills, obligations, and papers of every
description within his power or control, belonging to the
corporation, or in any wise necessary for the settlement
of its affairs, or the discharge of its debts and liabilities,
may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a
lawful order of the court, and shall be liable to the
receiver for the value of all money or other things so
refused or neglected to be surrendered, together
with all damages that may have been sustained by the
stockholders and creditors of the corporation, or any of
them, in consequence of such neglect or refusal.
An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with the auxiliary
writ of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction or receivership which the
Court of Appeals has the power to issue in common with the Supreme Court
and the Regional Trial Courts, 43 payable by the sureties of the bond given in
support of the writ, upon seasonable application and summary hearing. 44
Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129,
the provision governing the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, the Batasang Pambansa was fully cognizant of the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court just cited, as well as the rule against
multiplicity of actions, it follows that in conferring on the Court of Appeals
original jurisdiction over the special civil action of mandamus, among others, as
well as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or processes, the Batasang
Pambansa clearly intended that said Court should exercise all the powers then
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possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said action
of mandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages to the
petitioner in the action in appropriate cases.
IV
The next issue is whether or not the Solicitor General may properly represent a
public official like Dr. Vital-Gozon, who is sued for damages for allegedly refusing
to comply with a lawful and executory judgment of competent authority. The
doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to, 45 is quite
clear:
. . . (T)he Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized
to represent a public official at any stage of
a criminal case. . . .
This observation should apply as well to a public official
who is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising
from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100,
Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary liability he may be
held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is
for his own account. The State is not liable for the same.
A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has
no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for
damages.
It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or
civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to
her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
V
The last issue is whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 9,
1989 could still be modified after it was pronounced final and executory and
was in fact executed with respect to de la Fuente's reinstatement to his position
and the payment of the salaries and allowances due him.
There would seem to be no question about the timeliness of de la Fuente's
motion for reconsideration of the June 9, 1989 decision. As already narrated,
notice of said decision was served on him on the 15th of June, and his motion
for reconsideration was presented on June 29, 1989, or fourteen (14) days after
receiving a copy of the judgment, i.e., within the fifteen-day period prescribed
by Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for filing a motion for new trial
reconsideration.
This being so, it would certainly have been entirely within the authority of the
Court of Appeals, under normal circumstances, to rule on that motion for
reconsideration and, in its discretion, act favorably on it, as it did through its
Resolution of September 27, 1991 — by amending the decision of June 9, 1989,
declaring it a partial judgment, and setting a date for reception of evidence on
the la Fuente's claim for damages.
It would also appear that the motions for reconsideration of said Resolution of
September 27, 1991 separately submitted in Gozon's behalf, by her own private
attorney and by the Solicitor General's Office, were filed way out of time. As
also already pointed out, notice of that Resolution of September 27, 1991 was
served on Gozon's counsel on October 3, 1989 and on Gozon herself on October
4, 1989; but the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Martinez (Gozon's private
lawyer) was not filed until November 10, 1989, thirty-eight (38) days
afterwards, and that of the Solicitor General, until November 16, 1989, or forty-
four (44) days later. What is worse is that, its motion for reconsideration of
November 16, 1989 having been denied by a Resolution dated January 11,
1991, notice of which it received on January 18, 1991, the Solicitor General's
Office filed still another motion for reconsideration on January 30, 1991,
ostensibly directed against that Resolution of January 11, 1991 but actually
seeking the setting aside of the Resolution of September 17, 1989. In effect it
filed a second motion for reconsideration which, of course, is prohibited by
law. 46
However, disposition of the question simply and solely on the foregoing
premises is precluded by the fact that prior to the promulgation by the
Appellate Court of its Resolution of September 27, 1989. — granting de la
Fuente's motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989 — de la Fuente had asked
for and been granted by the Court of Appeals, authority to execute the decision
Page 61 of 86
of June 9, 1989 and had in fact succeeded in bringing about satisfaction
thereof, in so far as concerned his reinstatement to the position from which he
had been illegally ousted and the payment to him his salaries and allowances.
It has therefore become essential to determine the effect of the execution of
said decision of June 9, 1989 at de la Fuente's instance, on the power of the
Court of Appeals to modify that judgment as earlier prayed for by de la Fuente
in such a way as to concede the latter's capacity to claim damages in
his mandamus action, and consequently authorize him to present evidence on
the matter.
The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond
review, satisfaction being the last act and end of the proceedings, and payment
of satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces permanent and
irrevocable discharge; 47 hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces in and
voluntarily complies with the judgment, is estopped from taking an appeal
therefrom. 48
On the other hand the question of whether or not a judgment creditor is
estopped from appealing or seeking modification of a judgment which has been
executed at his instance, is one dependent upon the nature of the judgment as
being indivisible or not. This is the doctrine laid down by this Court in a case
decided as early as 1925, Verches v. Rios. 49 In that case this Court held that
although "there are cases holding the contrary view," where the judgment is
indivisible, "the weight of authority is to the effect that an acceptance of full
satisfaction of the judgment annihilates the right to further prosecute the
appeal; . . . that a party who has recovered judgment on a claim which cannot
be split up and made the basis of several causes of action, and afterwards
coerced full satisfaction by writ of execution or authority of the court, cannot
maintain an appeal from the judgment against the objections of the judgment
debtor;" and that even partial execution by compulsory legal process at the
instance of a party in whose favor a judgment appealed from was rendered,
places said party in estoppel to ask that the judgment be amended, either "by
appeal or answer to his adversary's appeal, or otherwise." 50
A converso, where the judgment is divisible, estoppel should not operate
against the judgment creditor who causes implementation of a part of the
decision by writ of execution. This is the clear import of Verches and the
precedents therein invoked. It is an aspect of the principle above mentioned
that is fully consistent not only with the dissenting opinion that "(a)cceptance
of payment of . . . only the uncontroverted part of the claim . . . should not
preclude the plaintiff from prosecuting his appeal, to determine whether he
should not have been allowed more," 51 but also with logic and common sense.
In this case, the amended judgment of the Court of Appeals is clearly divisible,
satisfaction of which may be "split up." One part has reference to the
enforcement of the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service
Commission, that de la Fuente should be reinstated to the position of Chief of
Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights
and that he be paid his back salaries and all monetary benefits due him from
the date of his illegal demotion. This part is no longer issuable, and has not in
truth been controverted by Gozon herself. The other part has reference to the
damages which de la Fuente contends he suffered as a result of the unjustified
refusal of Gozon and her co-parties to comply with the final and executory
judgment of the Civil Service Commission, and which the Appellate Tribunal has
allowed him to prove. Obviously, the second part cannot possibly affect the
first. Whether de la Fuente succeeds or fails in his bid to recover damages
against Gozon, et al. because of their refusal to obey the judgment of the Civil
Service Commission, is a contingency that cannot affect the unalterable
enforceability of that judgment. Similarly, the enforcement of the Commission's
judgment (already accomplished by writ of execution of the Court of Appeals
issued at de la Fuente's instance) cannot influence in any manner the question
whether or not there was culpable refusal on the part of Gozon, et al. to comply
with said judgment when first required so to do, and whether de la Fuente did
in fact suffer compensable injury thereby.
It bears stressing that the juridical situation in which de la Fuente finds himself
is not of his making. It is a consequence of circumstances not attributable to any
fault on his part, i.e., the unwarranted refusal or neglect of his superiors to obey
the executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; the erroneous refusal
of the Commission to execute its own decision which made necessary, in de la
Fuente's view, the filing of a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals; the
initial refusal of the latter Court to acknowledge his right to damages in
connection with the mandamus suit; and ultimately, the change of view by the
Court of Appeals, on de la Fuente's motion, as regards its competence to take
cognizance of the matter of damages in relation to the mandamus proceeding.
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 Page 62 of 86

Under these circumstances, there was no reason whatsoever to defer

concession to de la Fuente of the relief of reinstatement — to which he
was indisputably already entitled — in the meantime that issues arising after
finality of the Civil Service Commission's judgment were being ventilated and
resolved — these issues being, to repeat, whether or not the refusal by Gozon,
et al. obey said judgment of the Commission could be justified, and whether or
not, by reason of that refusal to obey, de la Fuente did in fact suffer
compensable injury.

It was therefore correct for the Court of Appeals, albeit by implication, to treat
its judgment as divisible, or capable of being enforced by parts, and to consider
de la Fuente as not having been placed in estoppel to pursue his claim for
damages by seeking and obtaining authority for a partial execution of the
judgment. De la Fuente not being in estoppel, it follows that his motion for
reconsideration, timely filed, was not deemed abandoned or waived by the
partial execution of the judgment, and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
amend the judgment was retained and not lost. It follows, too, that since no
motion for reconsideration was filed against, or appeal attempted to be taken
from, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals amending its original judgment,
within the time prescribed therefor by law, said amendatory resolution has long
since become final and immutable, particularly in so far as it holds itself
competent to take cognizance of the matter of damages and authorizes the
reception of evidence on de la Fuente's claim therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged Resolutions of

September 27, 1989, January 11, 1991 and August 7, 1991 are AFFIRMED,
without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 196140, January 27, 2016
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ELIZABETH MANALASTAS AND
BEA CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
September 9, 2010, and its Resolution2 dated March 14, 2011, denying
petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration be reversed and set aside.
Sometime in 1977 to 1978, petitioner, a government-owned and controlled
corporation involved in the development of hydro-electric generation of power
and production of electricity, and the construction, operation and maintenance
of power plants, transmission lines, power stations and substations, among
others, constructed a 230 KV transmission line for the Naga-Tiwi line and a 69
KV transmission line for the Naga-Tinambac line on respondents' parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 26263, affecting an area of 26,919 square meters. Petitioner
entered said land without the knowledge or consent of respondents, without
properly initiating expropriation proceedings, and without any compensation to
respondents-landowners. Because of said transmission lines, respondents
alleged that they could no longer use their land as part of a subdivision project
as originally intended, which ultimately caused financial loss to their family.
Thus, in July 2000, respondents (plaintiffs below, who were then joined by their
mother, Celedonia, and brother, Mariano; Celedonia and Mariano are no longer
impleaded as parties in this petition as the CA Decision has attained finality as
to them)3 filed a complaint against petitioner and its officers with the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City (RTC). Respondents demanded the removal of the
power lines and its accessories and payment of damages, or in the alternative,
payment of the fair market value of the affected areas totalling 26,000 square
meters of respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter.
On November 17, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, defendant NAPOCOR is hereby ordered to:
1) Pay plaintiffs the amount of PESOS: NINETY-TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND and THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE (P92,827,351.00),
by way of just compensation, broken down as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a) For (he plaintiffs Elizabeth Manalastas and Bea Castillo:
P32,033,610.00 - Value of the land
P53,816,461.00 - Interest at 6% per annum for 28 years
P85,850,071.00 - Total
b) For the plaintiffs Celedonia Mariano and Enrico Mariano:
P1,000,200.00 - Value of the land
P5,887,080.00 - Interest at 6% per annum for 9 years
P6,977,280.00 - Total
2) Pay Attorney's fees to plaintiffs in the amount of Pesos: One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00).
With cost against plaintiff (sic) NAPOCOR.
SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC erred in factoring
the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value of
respondents' land. In a Decision dated September 9, 2010, the CA affirmed the
RTC judgment with modification, reducing the award to Celedonia and Enrico
Mariano (respondents' co-plaintiffs below) to P1,678,908.00. The CA ruled that
petitioner could no longer assail the valuation that petitioner itself
Page 63 of 86
recommended, the same being a judicial admission. Moreover, the CA pointed
out that taking an inconsistent position on appeal cannot be allowed.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated March
14, 2010.
Hence, the present petition where petitioner alleges as follows:
I.
ESTOPPEL IS INOPERATIVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT; THE INFLATION FACTOR
SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION OF JUST
COMPENSATIONchanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II.
THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.
COURTS ARE THEREFORE NOT BOUND TO UPHOLD A PARTY'S FORMULATION OF
JUST COMPENSATION; [and]chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
III.
THE AWARD OF EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND AND
SEVENTY-ONE PESOS (Php85,850,071.00) WILL UNJUSTLY ENRICH THE
RESPONDENTS.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The bone of contention in this case is the inclusion of the inflation rate of the
Philippine Peso in determining the just compensation due to respondents.
Petitioners maintain that such inclusion of the inflation rate in arriving at the
value of just compensation has no legal basis, and it was a palpable mistake on
the part of its representatives and counsel below to make a recommendation
factoring in said inflation rate in the computation of just compensation. None of
the parties contest the finding that the fair market value of the property at the
time of taking was Php 170.00 per square meter.
It should be noted that in Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, et al. v. Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson,6 the Court stressed
that "just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling for purposes of compensation." In a motion for reconsideration of
the Decision in said case, the landowners argued that it would be unjust if the
amount that will be awarded to them today will be based on the value of the
property at the time of actual taking. In its Resolution dated April 21, 2015, the
Court fully explained that:
x x x the State is not obliged to pay premium to the properly owner for
appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss
sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of the circumstances
availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept of just
compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we recognize that the owner's loss is not only
his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when properly is
taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair
exchange for the property and the potential income lost. Accordingly, in Apo,
we held that the rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate the
petitioners for the income they would have made had they been proprely
compensated for their properties at the time of the taking. Thus:
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals the need for prompt payment and
the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the
payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this ease
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the
price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking
by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with
the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interest/sj on its just value to be computed from the time the property
is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment,
legal interest/sj accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as
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Proceedings
 Page 64 of 86

(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
[Emphasis supplied] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89366 is MODIFIED, such that petitioner is adjudged liable
In other words, the just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an
to PAY JUST COMPENSATION to respondents at the rate of Php 170.00 per
effective forbearance on the part of the State—a proper subject of interest
square meter, subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just
from the time of taking in 1978 up to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, six percent
compensation is paid—in order to eradicate the issue of the constant
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction, pursuant to Bangko
variability of the value of the currency over time. In the Court's own
Sentral ng Pilipinas -Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 and
words:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
applicable jurisprudence. Petitioner is, likewise, ORDERED to PAY respondents
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on
exemplary damages in the amount of Php500,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
the zonal value of the property to he computed from the time petitioner
amount of Php200,000.00.
instituted condemnation proceedings and "look" the property in September
1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
property as of the time of the taking computed, being an efective
forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
constant fl net nation and inflation of the value of the currency over time x x
x.7

The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for purposes of
determining just compensation should not include the inflation rate of the
Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated land
is sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest on the market value of
the land as of the time of taking from the landowner.

Moreover, the fact that it was petitioner's own counsel below that
recommended the inclusion of the inflation rate in the determination of just
compensation should not be taken against petitioner. Alter all, it is ultimately
the courts' mandated duty to adjudge whether the parties' submissions are
correct. It is the courts, not the litigants, who decide on the proper
interpretation or application of the law and, thus, only the courts may
determine the rightful compensation in accordance with the law and evidence
presented by the parties. It is incongruous for the court below to uphold a
proposition merely because it was recommended by a party, despite the same
being erroneous. Thus, in Secretary of Finance v. Oro Maura Shipping Lines,8 the
Court emphasized, thus:

x x x Assuming further x x x that the Collector of the Port of Manila similarly

erred, we reiterate the legal principle that estoppel generally finds no
application against the State when it acts to rectify mistakes, errors,
irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials and agents, irrespective of rank. This
ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of the State without any hindrance on
the part of the government from irnplementing laws and regulations, despite
prior mistakes or even illegal acts of its agents shackling government operations
and allowing others, some by malice, to profit from official error or
misbehavior. The rule holds true even if the rectification prejudices parties
who had meanwhile received benefits.9chanrobleslaw

Such important principle was reiterated in the more recent Republic v.

Bacas,10 where the Court stated that even "[g]ranting that the persons
representing the government were negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot
be taken against the Republic."11 Again, in National Power Corporation v.
Samar,12 the Court admonished the trial court to disregard even the panel of
commissioners' recommended valuation of the land if such valuation is not the
relevant value at the time the NPC took possession of the property. 13 The cases
cited by the lower court to justify its ruling that petitioner is bound by the
recommendation made by its counsel before the trial court, are all inapplicable
to the present case as said cases do not involve agencies or instrumentalities of
the State.

Lastly, in addition to the award for interests, Article 2229 of the Civil Code
provides that "[e]xemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good" and Article 2208 of the same code
states that attorney's fees may be awarded by the court in cases where such
would be just and equitable. As held in the Resolution dated April 21, 2015
in Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, et al. v. Spouses
Heracleo and Ramona Tecson,14additional compensation in the form of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees should likewise be awarded as a
consequence of the government agency's illegal occupation of the owner's
property for a very long time, resulting in pecuniary loss to the owner. Indeed,
government agencies should be admonished and made to realize that its
negligence and inaction in failing to commence the proper expropriation
proceedings before taking private property, as provided for by law, cannot be
countenanced by the Court.

To recapitulate, the formula for determination of just compensation to

landowners does not include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly
accounted for through payment of interest on the amount due to the
landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in
cases where there was irregularity in the taking of property.

Special
Proceedings
 Page 65 of 86

RULE 64 the exclusive and original jurisdiction to pass upon the

Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. L-63612 January 31, 1985
SERAFIN DELA CRUZ, ELADIO MACENAS and RODRIGO DIAZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, EDEN
GUEVARA DE BARADI and JOSE BARADI, respondents.
issues raised in petitioners' complaint;
(i) That the private respondents in due time filed their
opposition;
(j) That on January 14, 1983, the Honorable Respondent
Judge, issued an 'Order' denying the petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration which order was received by
petitioners' counsel on January 31, 1983. (pp. 88-89,
Rollo)
Petitioners filed with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus instead of appealing from the order
dismissing the complaint for annulment of titles. The appellate court, on
February 22, 1983, promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition for certiorari,

RELOVA, J.:
Petitioners seek to set aside the orders, dated October 20, 1982, of respondent
judge dismissing their complaint, as well as the order, dated January 14, 1983,
denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court, dated February 22, 1983, denying this petition for
certiorari for lack of merit; and, pray that We order respondent judge to hear
Civil Case No. Q-34657, for annulment of titles with damages.
Respondent appellate court rendered its decision on the basis of the following
statement of facts:
(a) That sometime on March 11, 1982 the herein
petitioners filed a complaint for 'Annulment and
cancellation of T.C.T. Nos. 274534, 274535, 274537 and
274539 with damages' in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI. Said case was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-34657 and was assigned to the
respondent Judge, Hon. Antonio P. Solano;
(b) That after summons was served, private respondents
herein immediately filed their Motion to Dismiss on the
sole ground of 'lack of jurisdiction' of the court below to
take cognizance of the said case;
(c) That herein petitioners in due time filed their'
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,' Annex B, invoking in
support thereof paragraph [b] of Section 44 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended;
(d) That on July 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued an
'Order' denying the private respondents' motion to
dismiss for lack of merit; (Annex C, Petition)
prohibition and mandamus to be without merit, the
same is hereby DENIED any further due course and
DISMISSED. (p. 93, Rollo)
This petition for certiorari filed before Us rests on the allegation that the
respondent judge had abused his discretion in issuing the order of October 20,
1982, and the subsequent order of January 14, 1983; and that respondent
appellate court did abuse its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the petition "without even a comment from the respondents." (p. 22,
Rollo)
Required to comment on this petition respondents averred that "petitioners'
remedy was an appeal from the Order of dismissal of the Hon. Judge Antonio P.
Solano and not a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, (and) it
would be an empty gesture to require the private respondents to comment on
the petition. The Intermediate Appellate Court could validly render a decision,
as it did, and avoid delay in the administration of justice." (p. 116, Rollo)
Indeed, We consider instant petition to be without merit. Time and again We
have dismissed petitions for certiorari to annul decisions or orders which could
have, but have not, been appealed. Where the Court has jurisdiction, over the
subject matter, as respondent judge has in this case, the orders or decision
upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decision within its
jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected
by certiorari. This special civil action does not lie where the remedy by appeal
has been lost because said remedy cannot take the place of an appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition must be denied, as it is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

(e) That on August 13, 1982, the private respondents

filed their 'Motion for Reconsideration' contending
among other things that the respondent Court has no
jurisdiction over the case;

(f) That herein petitioner filed their pleading in

'Opposition' thereto;

(g) That on October 20, 1982, the Honorable

respondent Judge, issued the challenged 'Order' in favor
of the private respondents in this case and therein
granted the Motion for Reconsideration (Annex E,
Petition) thereby revoking his previous order dated July
26, 1982 (Annex D, Petition). As a consequence,
petitioners' complaint was dismissed.

(h) That on November 24, 1982 petitioners filed their

own 'Motion for Reconsideration' wherein they
submitted and insisted that the respondent Court has

Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
PASTOR D. AGO, Petitioner, vs. HON. TEOFILO B. BUSLON, District Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Surigao,
MONICA URBIZTONDO and PEDRO ORCULLO, Respondents.
Tupaz and Ortega for petitioner.
Herculano F. Azarcon for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Original action for certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On or about April 11, 1960, respondent spouses Urbiztondo and Pedro Orcullo,
instituted, against petitioner Pastor D. Ago, civil case No. 1349 of the Court of First
Instance of Surigao, to recover the rentals allegedly due for the use, as a private road,
for his logging petitions in the municipality of Lianga, Province of Surigao, of portion
of a land, allegedly belonging to said respondents in the aforementioned municipality
and province. In the complaint filed in said case respondents prayed judgment in their
favor:
... (a) requiring the defendant to pay rentals for the passage of his private road across
the land of the plaintiffs at the rate of P50.00 a month; chanrobles virtual law library
b. ordering defendant to pay the accrued rentals since February, 1957 up to the filing
of this complaint in the total sum of P1,950.00; chanrobles virtual law library
c. requiring defendant to pay P200.00 for the destroy coconut trees and nipa
palms;chanrobles virtual law library
d. ordering the closing of the road, if the defends fail to pay the rentals;
and chanrobles virtual law library
e. requiring defendant to pay attorney's fees in the of P500.00 and to pay the costs.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the aforesaid road
traverses, not the land of Orcullos, but that of one Olimpia C. Jalandoni, and that
respondent court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Petitioner, likewise,
set up a counterclaim, for alleged damages, aggregating P37,000.00. After the filing of
respondents answer to this counterclaim, the case was set for hearing on October 11,
1960. Petitioner's counsel moved for the postponement of said hearing, for the
reason that he had, on the same date, another hearing in the Court of First Instance
of Manila. On October 1, 1960, this motion was denied upon the ground: (1) that the
notice sent to petitioner's counsel, advising him that the case would be heard on
October 11, 1960, is dated August 13, 1960, whereas the notice of hearing of the
Court of First Instance of Manila had been sent to him on September 3, 1960; and (2)
that the date of hearing appearing in the latter notice was originally October 4, 1960,
but the typewritten digit "4" thereon was exposed out and number "11" hand written
in lieu thereof, in ordinary ink, without any initial to indicate the identity of the
person who had made the correction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Ten (10) days later, respondent court received a telegram of petitioner herein, dated
October 10, 1960, once more requesting postponement of the hearing alleging this
time that he had "just" been informed of the aforementioned order of October 1,
1960, and that he had no time to appear before respondent court, in the Province of
Surigao, he having gone to Manila to attend the hearings in cases Nos. 36770 and
39990 of the "Manila Court". This motion was, likewise, denied because it had not
been served on the opposing counsel, and the Orcullos and their counsel were ready
for trial, they "having come all the way from Lianga to Tandag, thru rough seas, and
their counsel, also, having come all the way from (the municipality of) Surigao to (that
of) Tandag, a distance of 186 kms."chanrobles virtual law library
Thereupon, respondent court proceeded to receive respondents, evidence, but it did
not render judgment until over eight (8) months later, or on June 13, 1961, after
noting that petitioner had meanwhile "done nothing in the premises." On the date
last mentioned, decision was rendered sentencing petitioner to pay to the Orcullos:
(a) P220 as damages for trees cut by petitioner; (b) P2,250 as rentals from February,
1957 to October, 1960; (c) P50 a month from November, 1960, until the disputed land
Page 66 of 86
shall have been vacated by petitioner; (d) P500 as attorney's fees; (e) P90 as
incidental expenses; and (f) the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
On or about July 11, 1961, petitioner filed a motion to set this decision aside and to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied on November 24,
1961. Notice of the order to this effect was received by petitioner on January 6, 1962,
who instituted the present action for certiorari on April 6, 1962, upon the theory that
respondent court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide said case; that the decision
therein rendered is, accordingly, null and void; and that petitioner has "no appeal, nor
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."chanrobles
virtual law library
Being a party in said case No. 1349 and having been duly notified, not only of the
decision therein rendered, but, also, of the order of November 24, 1961, denying his
motion of July 11, 1961, it is obvious that petitioner could have appealed from said
decision, and from the aforementioned order of November 24, 1961, and that such
an appeal would have been a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Yet, he did not avail of such remedy. What is more, it would appear
that the present action has been resorted to in order to offset petitioner's failure to
appeal from the decision and order adverted to above. Indeed, although notice of the
order of November 24, 1961, denying his motion of July 11, 1961, had been received
on January 6, 1962, petitioner took no step whatsoever to seek any relief from said
decision and order until April 6, 1962, or long after the expiration of the reglementary
period to interpose said appeal. It is well settled that the writ of certiorari may not be
availed of to make up for the loss, through omission or oversight, of the right to
appeal (Casilan, et al. vs. Hon. Filomeno B. Ibañez, et al., L-19968-69, October 31,
1962; Santos vs. Vda. de Cerdenola, et al., L-18412, July 31, 1962; Francisco, et al. vs.
Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al., L-15365, December 26, 1961; City of Manila vs. Hon.
Higino B. Macadaeg, et al., L-15134, November 29, 1961; Paringit vs. Honorato
Masakayan, et al., L-16578, July 31, 1961; Hon. Francisco Jose, et al. vs. Zulueta, et al.,
L-16598, May 31, 1961; Profeta, et al. vs. Gutierrez David, et al., 71. Phil. 582, see
also, Grospe, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-11443, September 30, 1959; Ong Sit
vs. Piccio, 79 Phil. 785; Castro vs. Peña, 80 Phil. 488; Gil vs. Gil III, 80 Phil. 791; Gov't.
of U.S. vs. Judge of CFI of Pampanga, 50 Phil. 975, 979; Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 49
Phil. 398; Ello vs. Judge of First Instance of Antique, 49 Phil. 152; Gonzales vs. Salas,
49 Phil. 1; De los Santos vs. Mapa, 16 Phil. 791).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Moreover, although an action for the recovery of not more than P5,000 falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts, the Orcullos premised
their right of action upon their alleged title to the land described in the complaint and
petitioner contested such allegation, thus putting the title to said land in issue, the
determination of which is within the exclusive original competence of Courts of First
Instance. Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00 was, also, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the latter courts, and there are ample precedents to
the effect that "although the original claim involves less than the jurisdictional
amount, ... jurisdiction can be sustained if the counterclaim (of the compulsory type)"
- such as the one set up by petitioner herein, based upon the damages allegedly
suffered by him in consequence of the filing of said complaint - "exceeds the
jurisdictional amount". (Moore Federal Practice, 2nd ed. [1948], Vol. 3, p. 41;
Ginsburg vs. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 69 Fed. [2d] 97; Home Life Ins.
Co. vs. Sipp. 11 Fed. [2d] 474; American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. vs. Winzeler [D.C.], 227
Fed. 321, 324; Brix vs. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co. 41, P. 2d. 537, 2 Cal. 2d. 446;
Emery vs. Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 67 P. 2d. 1046, 8 Cal. 2d. 663.)chanrobles virtual
law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the case dismissed, with cost against
the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Special
Proceedings

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. L-31812 March 17, 1978
JUAN COJUANGCO, petitioner,
vs.
Hon PIO R. MARCOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio, and ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ, respondents.
Antonio N. Lucero, Jr. for petitioner.
Bautista Angelo & Associates for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Juan Cojuangco Mod thin mandamus action to compel the Court of First
Instance of Baguio to order the execution of the judgment rendered by Judge
Jesus de Veyra on April 28, 1959. In that judgment Enrique J. L. Ruiz is required
to demolish the wall which he had constructed on Cojuangco's lot, and to pay
rentals and attomey's fees. The facts are as follows:
In 1934 Cojuangco purchased from the Bureau of Lands Lot 19 of the Kisad
Subdivison, Residence Section A, Baguio, with an area of 3,127 meters fronting
68th Street. After full payment of the price, or on August 2, 1952, the Director
of Lands ordered the issuance of a patent to Cojuangco.
Due to the loss of the records during the war, the lot was eyed. After the
resurvey, Lot 19 was found to contain 3,306 square meters, or an increase of
179 meters. The in area was attributable to the fact that the surveyor, instead of
giving the street the mandatory width of fifteen meters, assumed that its width
was only ten meters.
On the western side of Lot 19 is Lot 85-B-4, with an area of 848 square meters
fronting Legarda Road. Ruiz bought that lot in 1962 from Mariano V. Gaerlan.
After Cojuangco had rejected the offer of Ruiz to buy a portion of Lot 19 to be
used as his (Ruiz's) driveway, Ruiz filed a sales application with the Bureau of
Lands for the purchase of the excess area of 179 square meters. Cojuangco
opposed that application. He applied for the purchase of the same excess area.
While those two sales applications were pending, or in 1953, Ruiz constructed a
retaining wall and driveway on the southwestern portion of Lot 19. He ignored
the warning of the land authorities not to introduce any improvement in that
area.
The Director of Lands in 1954 upheld Cojuangco's preemptive right to purchase
the excess of 179 square meters. He directed Ruiz to remove his improvement
on the contested portion of Lot 19. Cojuangco paid the price of the excess area.
Ruiz appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who in
1957 ruled that Ruiz should be allowed to purchase 49 square meters for his
driveway. Not satisfied with that administrative decision, Cojuangco filed an
action in the Court of First Instance of Baguio against Ruiz and the Secretary. He
prayed that the Secretary's decision be set aside (Civil Case No. 705).
In the same court Cojuangco sued Ruiz for damages, for the recovery of the
excess area of 179 square meters, and for the demolition of the stonewall
constructed by Ruiz (Civil Case No. 478).
The trial court found that Ruiz had encroached upon Cojuangco's lot to the
extent of 84 square meters. As already noted, it ordered Ruiz, as a builder in
bad faith, to demolish his wall to pay P2,520 as accrued rentals and P420 as
rental per year, plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed
that decision.
Page 67 of 86
In the other case, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources but the Court of Appeals reversed it and
ordered that the amount paid by Cojuangco for the excess of 179 square meters
be refunded to him. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
there was no gap or no public land between the lot of Ruiz and Cojuangco's lot.
(CA-G. R. Nos. 26690-R and 27811-R, November 24, 1964).
The petition of Ruiz for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals was
denied in this Court's resolution of July 16, 1965 (L-24451 and L-24552, Ruiz vs.
Cojuangco).
During the pendency of the two cases in the Court of Appeals, or specifically
on October 29, 1959, Atty. Antonio C. Masquel, as of Cojuangco, requested the
Director of Lands to issue a patent for the uncontested portion of Lot 19 without
prejudice to his claim for the disputed portion with an area of 85 (84) square
meters (pp. 129-130, Rollo).
Acting favorably on that request, the Director of Lands issued to Cojuangco
on September 16, 1960 a patent for Lot 19-A with an area of 3,040 (instead of
the original area of 3,127 square meters or a difference of 87 square meters).
Based on that patent, Original Certificate of Title No. P-249 was issued to
Cojuangco on November 4, 1960. The contested area not included in the title
came to be known as Lot 19-C.
On January 6, 1966 Cojuangco, through another lawyer, Antonio N. Lucero Jr.
filed a motion in the lower court for the execution of its final judgment against
Ruiz. Judge Pio R. Marcos, who had succeeded Judge de Veyra, granted the
motion.
However, the execution was not implemented because the lower court, in an
order dated July 30, 1966, gave Ruiz ninety days from that date within which to
pay the money judgment. In a subsequent order Ruiz was given an additional
sixty days to satisfy the judgment.
As Ruiz did not make any payment, an alias writ of execution was issued and
levy was made on one of his lots. The levy was not pushed through. In an order
dated September 26, 1967 the lower court granted Ruiz, who appeared in the
Judge's chambers on that date, sixty days to prepare a sketch plan of the
contested area and to file the proper pleading.
On November 27, 1967 the lower court granted Ruiz's ex parte motion that the
district land officer be authorized to make a resurvey of the lots of Ruiz and
Cojuangco. On January 24, 1968 Cojuangco filed a motion for a second alias writ
of execution. It was not acted upon.
On April 2, 1969, the lower court granted the motion of Ruiz (filed on that day
without notice to Cojuangco) to set aside the alias writ of execution. The lower
court said that it appears from the record that the contested area of 85 square
meters is public land and is not a part of Cojuangco's lot. Thus, by means of that
order, the lower court nullified its judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Cojuangco 's motion of May 6, 1969 for the reconsideration of that order was
resolved by the lower court three months later in its order of August 22, 1969, a
copy of which was sent by registered mail to Cojuangco's counsel seven
months thereafter, or on March 9, 1970 and received by him on March 17,
1970.
In that belated order, the lower court held that its 1959 decision was invalid
because it was bawd on the "erroneous" assumption that the contested area of
85 square meters is a part of Cojuangco's lot, when, according to the re survey
plan, it is public land. The lower court noted that to enforce that decision would
prejudice the State and unjustly enrich Cojuangco.
On March 30, 1970 Cojuangco filed the instant mandamus action to compel the
lower court to execute its 1959 judgment. He claimed damages amount to
P10,000 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. His petition may be treated
also as a petition for review under Republic Act No. 5440 of the lower court's
orders of April 2 and August 22, 1969 which rendered nugatory its 1959
judgment.
Ruiz in his answer invoked the rule that a final judgment cannot be enforced "as
to matters and things which have arisen after the final judgment was rendered
and which would be a valid defense, to the judgment" (Philippine Trust
Company vs. San 53 Phil. 463). He cited that doctrine that a trial court cannot
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 Page 68 of 86

be compelled by mandamus to execute a judgment, where there is evidence of

an event or instance which would affect or change the rights of the parties, and
the holding that a final judgment may be modified to harmonize it with justice
and the facts if its execution becomes impossible or unjust (Abellana vs.
Dosdos, L-19498, February 26, 1965. 13 SCRA 244; City of Butuan vs. Ortiz, 113
Phil. 636, 639).

Ruiz pleaded as a supervening fact his discovery that Cojuangco's (Lot 19- A,
formerly Lot 19) has an area of only 3,040 square meters as shown in his 1960
Torrens title, instead of 3,127 square meters, the area which he claimed to have
originally purchased from the Bureau of Lands in 1934, and that contested area,
Identified now as Lot 19-C, lying between the lots of Ruiz and Cojuangco could
not be a part of Cojuangco's lot if its area is 3,040 square meters.

The petition for mandamus is meritorious. The lower court's orders abrogating
its long final and executory judgment were issued with grave abuse of discretion
and without due process of law and they are devoid of factual and legal
justification.

Although Lot 19-C is not included in Cojuangco's title, it is no longer public land
because it is really a part of Lot 19, with an area of 3,127 square meters, which
was covered by Cojuangco's duly approved sales application and by the 1952
order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of a patent to hint He has an
existing vested right in that contested portion. The rule is that the order for the
issuance of a patent for public land is tantamount to the issuance of the patent
itself. (Tinio vs. Frances, 98 Phil. 32. See Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 and
Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259).

The issuance of the Torrens title to Cojuangco for the reduced area of 3,040
square meters was without prejudice to his claim for the contested area. He did
not waive his vested right thereto. The lower court erred in characterizing Lot
19-C as public land and in not implementing the writ of execution.

The lower court's erroneous assumption that Lot 19-C is public land means that
it proceeded on the wrong premise when it voided its 1959 judgment. In truth,
Cojuangco may be entitled to a supplemental patent or an amended patent in
order that the contested portion may be included in his Torrens title.

It ministerial that it is ministerial and mandatory for the trial court to enforce its
judgment. This case does not fag within any of the exceptions where a stay of
execution is justified (City of Cebu vs. Mendoza, L-26321, August 19, 1975, 66
SCRA 174). Cojuango is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the
judgment in his favor. The execution is compellable by mandamus (San Diego vs.
Montesa, 116 Phil. 512).

The trial court did not have supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the
decision of the appellate court affirming its judgment (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil.
333). Its 1959 decision is the law of the case and is res judicata (See Arnedo vs.
Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil. 257, 263).

Considering that Ruiz resorted to tactics designed to frustrate the judgment

against him and that he constrained Cojuangco to file this mandamus action, he
should be held liable for damages in the form of attomey's fees in the sum of
one thousand pesos (Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court; 3 Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 207; Art. 2208, Civil Code).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of April 2 and August 22, 1969 are set
aside. The petition for mandamus is granted. The lower court is directed to
issue an alias writ of execution to enforce its judgment in Civil Case No. 478.
Respondent Ruiz is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,000 as
attorney's fees and the costs.

SO ORDERED.

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RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
[G.R. No. L-17323. June 23, 1965.]
CLAUDIO GABUTAS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GUIDO D. CASTELLANES, in his capacity
as Municipal Mayor of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, Respondent-Appellee.
Baja & Carreon for Petitioner-Appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Jesus S. Rodriguez and Eufemio A. Parana for Respondent-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; BACK SALARY UPON ACQUITTAL OF SUSPENDED OFFICIAL; CIVIL
SERVICE ELIGIBILITY NOT REQUIRED FOR RIGHT TO COLLECT. — Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 557, in providing (a) for the suspension of a member of a city or municipal
police force who is accused in court of any felony or any violation of law, and (b) for
his right to the payment of his entire salary during the period of his suspension, in
case of acquittal, does not require, as a condition, that such member of the city or
municipal police force should have civil service eligibility and should have been
permanently appointed as such.
2. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR REINSTATEMENT NOT REQUIRED FOR RIGHT TO BACK SALARY
OF SUSPENDED OFFICIAL. — That appellant no longer seeks his reinstatement is no
justification in law to deny him payment of the entire salary he failed to receive
during his suspension if the only condition imposed by law in that connection — his
acquittal — has been fulfilled.
3. ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS THE PROPER REMEDY TO ENFORCE RIGHT BACK SALARY. —
Mandamus is the proper remedy to enforce the right of a suspended official, who is
later acquitted to the payment of his back salary.
4. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT FOR BACK SALARY AGAINST MUNICIPAL MAYOR BINDING
UPON MUNICIPALITY. — Where a municipal mayor has been sued in his official
capacity for the back salary of a suspended policeman who is later acquitted of the
charge against him, it is held that decision rendered against the mayor is binding on
the municipality as the real party in interest, having had its full day in court.
DECISION
DIZON, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Claudio Gabutas from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 4893 dismissing his petition for
reinstatement and recovery of back salaries filed against Guido D. Castellanes, in his
capacity as Municipal Mayor of Calatrava, Negros Occidental.
It is not disputed that on May 2, 1951 appellant was extended a temporary
appointment as member of the Municipal Police Force of Calatrava, Negros
Occidental; that on May 10, 1955 he was suspended from the service as a result of
the filing of criminal cases Nos. 4536 and 4637 against him in the Court of First
Instance of said province; that on June 1, 1955, during the period of his suspension,
he was given a promotional appointment at the rate of P780.00 per annum, with
retroactive effect on July 1, 1954; that on September 12, 1957, while said criminal
cases were still pending, appellee notified appellant of his separation from the service
effective September 15, 1957; and that on the 27th of the same month, judgment
was rendered in criminal cases Nos. 4536 and 4537 acquitting appellant. Thereafter,
appellee having refused to reinstate him to his position as member of the Police Force
of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and to pay his back salary covering the period of his
suspension from May 10, 1955 to September 15, 1957, appellant instituted the
present action for Mandamus. After appellee had filed his answer disputing
appellant’s right to the relief prayed for in his petition, the court, on September 27,
1958, rendered the appealed judgment.
In this appeal appellant seeks nothing more than the recovery of his back salary
covering the period from May 10, 1955, the date of his suspension, up to September
15, 1957, the date when he was separated from the service. He invokes in his favor
the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 557 which read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 4. When a member of the provincial guards, city police or municipal police is
Page 69 of 86
accused in court of any felony or violation of law by the provincial fiscal or city fiscal
as the case may be, the provincial governor, the city mayor or the municipal mayor
shall immediately suspend the accused from office pending the final decision of the
case by the court and, in case of the acquittal, the accused shall be entitled to
payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during his suspension."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On the other hand, appellee denies appellant’s right to the relief sought on the
following grounds: firstly, that the law relied upon does not apply to one who does
not possess any civil service eligibility and whose appointment is temporary in
character; secondly, that appellant having abandoned his claim to reinstatement, he
can not now demand payment of the salary corresponding to the period of his
suspension because the right to it is merely incidental to his right to reinstatement,
and lastly, that mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce appellant’s right to
the payment of the salary corresponding to his period of suspension.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 557, in providing for the suspension of a member of a
city or municipal police force who is accused in court of any felony or any violation of
law, and for his right to the payment of his entire salary during the period of his
suspension, in case of acquittal, does not require, as a condition, that such member
of the city or municipal police force should have civil service eligibility and should
have been permanently appointed as such. We can not read into the law this
condition that the law- maker did not deem wise to include therein, especially if it is
for the purpose of denying a member of the city or municipal police force the right to
receive back salary in case of acquittal.
On the other hand, it is true that appellant no longer seeks his reinstatement, but this
is no justification in law to deny him payment of the entire salary he failed to receive
during his suspension if the only condition imposed in that connection — this
acquittal — has been fulfilled. In this case, appellant having been acquitted of the
charges which had given rise to his suspension, We are of the opinion that he is
entitled to the payment of his entire salary corresponding to the period during which
he was suspended. This period, however, must necessarily end on the date when he
was separated from the service. His appointment being temporary, the same was
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority and such termination naturally
ends appellant’s right to the emoluments appertaining to his office. In the present
case, appellant precisely seeks nothing more than the payment of his entire salary
corresponding to the period from the date of his suspension to the date of his final
separation from office.
Concerning the last point raised by appellee, namely, that mandamus is not the
proper remedy to enforce appellant’s right to his back salaries, We have this to say.
The legal provision mentioned heretofore provides that, in case of acquittal "the
accused shall be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during
his suspension." We believe that, in the light of the facts of this case, this provision
gives appellant a clear legal right demandable from the proper authorities who, in
turn, have an imperative legal duty to respect the same. The present action was
instituted against Guido D. Castellanes, not personally but in his capacity as municipal
mayor of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and he appeared and defended the action in
such capacity. It is therefore clear that the real party in duty bound to pay the back
salaries of appellant, namely the Municipality of Calatrava, had its full day in court
and the decision rendered herein must be deemed binding upon it.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and another is hereby rendered
ordering the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, to pay the entire salary of
appellant from the date of his suspension, May 10, 1955, up to the date of his final
separation from office, September 15, 1957, at the rate of P780.00 per annum. With
costs.
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 Page 71 of 86

RULE 64 the purchase price was actually paid to Paula Arcega and that said amount was
spent by the deceased in the construction of her three-door apartment on the
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
parcel of land in question.
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
Josefina Arcega, the other petitioner, was declared in default for failure to file
RULE 65 her answer within the reglementary period.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of private respondent Quirico
Arcega, viz.:
G.R. No. 103959 August 21, 1997
(a) Declaring as null and void and without legal force
SPOUSES REGALADO SANTIAGO and ROSITA PALABYAB, JOSEFINA and effect the "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan Ng Lupa"
ARCEGA, petitioners, dated July 18, 1971 executed by the deceased Paula
vs. Arcega covering a parcel of land embraced under TCT
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. CAMILO C. MONTESA, JR., Presiding No. T-115510 in favor of the defendants;
Judge of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, and QUIRICO
ARCEGA, respondents.
(b) Declaring TCT No. T-148989 issued and registered in
the names of defendants Josefina Arcega and spouses
Regalado Santiago and Rosita Palabyab as null and void;

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: (c) Ordering the reconveyance of the property including
all improvements thereon covered by TCT No. T-115510
now TCT No. T-148989, to the plaintiff, subject to real
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the November 8, 1991
estate mortgage with the Social Security System; and
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25069. It affirmed in
toto the judgment of Branch 19, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil
Case No. 8470-M. The action therein sought to declare null and void the (d) To pay jointly and severally the amount of
"Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan Ng Lupa" executed on July 18, 1971 by the late P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Paula Arcega, sister of private respondent, in favor of herein petitioners over a
parcel of land consisting of 927 square meters, situated in Barangay Tabing Ilog,
On the counterclaim, the same is hereby dismissed for
Marilao, Bulacan.
lack of legal and/or factual basis (p. 6, decision, pp. 295-
300, rec.).2
Paula Arcega was the registered owner of that certain parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-115510. Her residential house stood there until
In ruling for private respondent, the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the public
1970 when it was destroyed by a strong typhoon.
respondent Court of Appeals, found that:

On December 9, 1970, Paula Arcega executed what purported to be a deed of

On the basis of the evidence adduced, it appears that
conditional sale over the land in favor of Josefina Arcega and the spouses
plaintiff Quirico Arcega and his brother Narciso Arcega
Regalado Santiago and Rosita Palabyab, the petitioners herein, for and in
are the only surviving heirs of the deceased Paula
consideration of P20,000.00. The vendees were supposed to pay P7,000.00 as
Arcega who on April 10, 1985 died single and without
downpayment. It was expressly provided that the vendor would execute and
issue. Sometime in 1970, a strong typhoon destroyed
deliver to the vendees an absolute deed of sale upon full payment by the
the house of Paula Arcega and the latter together with
vendees of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of P13,000.00.
the defendants decided to construct a new house. All
the defendants 3 being members of the SSS, Paula
Subsequently, on July 18, 1971, supposedly upon payment of the remaining Arcega deemed it wise to lend her title to them for
balance, Paula Arcega executed a deed of absolute sale of the same parcel of purposes of loan with the SSS. She executed a deed of
land in favor of petitioners. Thereupon, on July 20, 1971, TCT No. T-115510, in sale to effect the transfer of the property in the name of
the name of Paula Arcega, was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. T-148989 was defendants and thereafter the later mortgaged the
issued in the name of petitioners. same for P30,000.00 but the amount actually released
was only P25,000.00. Paula Arcega spent the initial
amount of P30,000.000 out of her savings for the
On April 10, 1985, Paula Arcega died single and without issue, leaving as heirs
construction of the house sometime in 1971 and after
his two brothers, Narciso Arcega 1 and private respondent Quirico Arcega.
the same and the proceeds of the loan were exhausted,
the same was not as yet completed. Paula Arcega and
Incidentally, before Paula Arcega died, a house of four bedrooms with a total her brothers sold the property which they inherited for
floor area of 225 square meters was built over the parcel of land in question. P45,000.00 and the same all went to the additional
Significantly, the master's bedroom, with toilet and bath, was occupied by Paula construction of the house, however, the said amount is
Arcega until her death despite the execution of the alleged deed of absolute not sufficient. Thereafter, Paula Arcega and her brothers
sale. The three other bedrooms, smaller than the master's bedroom, were sold another property which they inherited for
occupied by the petitioners who were the supposed vendees in the sale. P805,950.00 and one third (1/3) thereof went to Paula
Arcega which she spent a portion of which for the
finishing touches of the house. The house as finally
Private respondent Quirico Arcega, as heir of his deceased sister, filed on
finished in 1983 is worth more than P100,000.00 with a
October 24, 1985 Civil Case No. 8470-M before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
floor area of 225 square meters consisting of four
seeing to declare null ad void the deed of sale executed by his sister during her
bedrooms. A big master's bedroom complete with a
lifetime in favor of the petitioners on the ground that said deed was fictitious
bath and toilet was occupied by Paula Arcega up to the
since the purported consideration therefor of P20,000.00 was not actually paid
time of her death on April 10, 1985 and the other three
by the vendees to his sister.
smaller bedrooms are occupied by spouses, defendants
Regalado Santiago and Rosita Palabyab, and Josefina
Answering the complaint before the RTC, petitioner spouses averred that Arcega. After the death of Paula Arcega defendant
private respondent's cause of action was already barred by the statute of Josefina Arcega and Narciso Arcega constructed their
limitations considering that the disputed deed of absolute sale was executed in own house at back portion of the lot in question.
their favor on July 18, 1971, by which TCT No. 148989 was issued on July 20,
1971, while private respondent's complaint was filed in court only on October
There is a clear indication that the deed of sale which is
24, 1985 or more than fourteen (14) years from the time the cause of action
unconscionably low for 937 square meters in favor of
accrued. Petitioners also deny that the sale was fictitious. They maintain that
the defendants sometime on July 18, 1971 who are all

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members of the SSS, is merely designed as an
accommodation for purposes of loan with the SSS. Paula
Arcega cognizant of the shortage of funds in her
possession in the amount of P30,000.00, deemed it
wise to augment her funds for construction purposes by
way of a mortgage with the SSS which only defendants
could possibly effect they being members of the
SSS. Since the SSS requires the collateral to be in the
name of the mortgagors, Paula Arcega executed a
simulated deed of sale (Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan
ng Lupa) for P20,000.00 dated July 18, 1971 in favor of
the defendants and the same was notarized by Atty. Luis
Cuvin who emphatically claimed that no money was
involved in the transaction as the parties have other
agreement. The allegations of the defendants that the
property was given to them (Kaloob) by the deceased
has no evidentiary value. While it is true that Rosita
Palabyab stayed with the deceased since childhood, the
same cannot be said with respect to defendant Josefina
Arcega, distant relative and a niece of the wife of
Narciso Arcega, who stayed with the deceased
sometime in 1966 at the age of 19 years and already
working as a saleslady in Manila. Did the deceased
indeed give defendant Josefina Arcega half of her
property out of love and gratitude? Such circumstance
appears illogical if not highly improbable. As a matter of
fact defendant Josefna Arcega in her unguarded
moment unwittingly told the truth that the couple
(Regalado Santiago and Rosita Palabyab) had indeed
borrowed the title and then mortgaged the same with
the SSS as shown in her direct testimony which reads:
Atty. Villanueva:
Q Why did you say that the
house is owned by the spouses
Santiago but the lot is bought by
you and Rosita?
A Because at that time, the
couple4 borrowed the title and
then mortgaged the property
with the SSS. There is only one
title but both of us owned it.
(TSN dtd. 19 Oct '88, p. 5)5
On appeal, the public respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the same,
affirming in all respects the RTC judgment.
Hence, this petition.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Verily, this case is on all fours with Suntay v. Court of Appeals. 6 There, a certain
Federico Suntay was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Sto. Niño,
Hagonoy, Bulacan. A rice miller, Federico applied on September 30, 1960 as a
miller-contractor of the then National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC), but
his application was disapproved because he was tied up with several unpaid
loans. For purposes of circumvention, he thought of allowing his nephew-
lawyer, Rafael Suntay, to make the application for him. To achieve this, Rafael
prepared a notarized Absolute Deed of Sale whereby Federico, for and in
consideration of P20,000.00, conveyed to Rafael said parcel of land with all its
existing structures. Upon the execution and registration of said deed, Certificate
of Title No. 0-2015 in the name of Federico was cancelled and, in lieu thereof,
TCT No. T-36714 was issued in the name of Rafael. Sometime in the months of
June to August, 1969,7 Federico requested Rafael to deliver back to him the
owner's duplicate of the transfer certificate of title over the properties in
question for he intended to use the property as collateral in securing a bank
loan to finance the expansion of his rice mill. Rafael, however, without just
cause, refused to deliver the title insisting that said property was "absolutely
sold and conveyed [to him] . . . for a consideration of P20,000.00, Philippine
currency, and for other valuable consideration." We therein ruled in favor of
Federico Suntay and found that the deed of sale in question was merely an
absolutely simulated contract for the purpose of accommodation and therefore
void. In retrospect, we observed in that case:
Page 72 of 86
Indeed the most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the
part of the late Rafael to assert his rights of ownership
over the land and rice mill in question. After the sale, he
should have entered the land and occupied the
premises thereof. He did not even attempt to. If he
stood as owner, he would have collected rentals from
Federico for the use and occupation of the land and its
improvements. All that the late Rafael had was a title in
his name.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The fact that, notwithstanding the title transfer,
Federico remained in actual possession, cultivation and
occupation of the disputed lot from the time the deed
of sale was executed until the present, is a circumstance
which is unmistakably added proof of the fictitiousness
of the said transfer, the same being contrary to the
principle of ownership.8
In the case before us, while petitioners were able to occupy the property in
question, they were relegated to a small bedroom without bath and
toilet, 9 while Paula Arcega remained virtually in full possession of the
completed house and lot using the big master's bedroom with bath and toilet
up to the time of her death on April 10, 1985. 10 If, indeed, the transaction
entered into by the petitioners and the late Paula Arcega on July 18, 1971 was a
veritable deed of absolute sale, as it was purported to be, then Ms. Arcega had
no business whatsoever remaining in the property and, worse, to still occupy
the big master's bedroom with all its amenities until her death on April 10,
1985. Definitely, and legitimate vendee of real property who paid for the
property with good money will not accede to an arrangement whereby the
vendor continues occupying the most favored room in the house while he or
she, as new owner, endures the disgrace and absurdity of having to sleep in a
small bedroom without bath and toilet as if he or she is a guest or a tenant in
the house. In any case, if petitioners really stood as legitimate owners of the
property, they would have collected rentals from Paula Arcega for the use and
occupation of the master's bedroom as she would then be a mere lessee of the
property in question. However, not a single piece of evidence was presented to
show that this was the case. All told, the failure of petitioners to take exclusive
possession of the property allegedly sold to them, or in the alternative, to
collect rentals from the alleged vendee Paula Arcega, is contrary to the principle
of ownership and a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole
transaction void and without force and effect, pursuant to Article 1409 of the
New Civil Code:
The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxx xxx xxx
The conceded fact that subject deed of absolute sale executed by Paula Arcega
in favor of petitioners is a notarized document does not justify the petitioners'
desired conclusion that said sale is undoubtedly a true conveyance to which the
parties thereto are irrevocably and undeniably bound. To be considered with
great significance is the fact that Atty. Luis Cuvin who notarized the deed
disclaimed the truthfulness of the document when he testified that "NO
MONEY WAS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSACTION." 11 Furthermore, though the
notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of
regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate
and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any
binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still is
and always will be the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract. Here, the parties to the "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa," as
shown by the evidence and accompanying circumstances, never intended to
convey the property thereto from one party to the other for valuable
consideration. Rather, the transaction was merely used to facilitate a loan with
the SSS with petitioners-mortgagors using the property in question, the title to
which they were able to register in their names through the simulated sale, as
collateral.
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Proceedings

The fact that petitioners were able to secure a title in their names, TCT No.
148989, did not operate to vest upon petitioners ownership over Paula Arcega's
property. That act has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.
As a matter of fact, even the original registration of immovable property does
not vest title thereto. 12 The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only
confirms and records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a
usurper from the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud.
It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. 13 Where
one does not have any rightful claim over a real property, the Torrens system of
registration can confirm or record nothing.
Petitioners, nevertheless, insist that both the trial court and the respondent
court should have followed the Parole Evidence Rule and prevented evidence,
like the testimony of Notary Public, Atty. Luis Cuvin, private respondent Quirico
Arcega, among others, which impugned the two notarized deeds of sale.
The rule on parole evidence under Section 9, Rule 130 is qualified by the
following exceptions:
However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills."
In this case, private respondent Quirico Arcega was able to put in issue in his
complaint before the Regional Trial Court the validity of the subject deeds of
sale for being a simulated transaction:
6. That in 1971, the defendants, who by then were
already employed in private firms and had become
members of the Social Security System by virtue of their
respective employments, decided among themselves to
build a new house on the property of PAULA ARCEGA
above described and to borrow money from the Social
Security System to finance the proposed construction.
7. That in order to secure the loan from the Social
Security System it was necessary that the lot on which
the proposed house would be erected should be
registered and titled in the names of the defendants.
xxx xxx xxx
9. That in conformity with the above plans and schemes
of the defendants, they made PAULA ARCEGA execute
and sign a fictitious, hence null and void "KASULATAN
NG BILIHANG TULUYAN NG LUPA" on July 18, 1971,
before Notary Public LUIS CUVIN, of Bulacan and
entered in his register as Doc. No. 253, Page No. 52,
Book No. XIX, Series of 1971, by which PAULA ARCEGA
purportedly conveyed(sic) in favor of the defendants
JOSEFINA ARCEGA and the spouse REGALADO
SANTIAGO and ROSITA PALABYAB, the whole parcel of
land above described for the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00), as consideration which was
not actually, then or thereafter paid either wholly or
partially. A copy of said document is hereto attached as
Annex "B" and made integral part hereof.
Page 73 of 86
10. That defendants pursuing their unlawful scheme
registered the said void and inexistent "KASULATAN NG
BILIHANG TULUYAN NG LUPA" with the office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, procured the cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115510, in the name
of PAULA ARCEGA and the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 148989, in their names, a xeroxed
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made
integral part hereof.
11. That still in furtherance of their unjust and unlawful
schemes, defendants secured a loan from the Social
Security System in the amount of P30,000.00, securing
the payment thereof with a Real Estate Mortgage on the
above-described property then already titled in their
names as aforestated (pp. 2-3, complaint, pp. 1-5,
rec.). 14
Moreover, the parol evidence rule may be waived by failure to invoke it, as by
failure to object to the introduction of parol evidence. And, where a party who
is entitled to the benefit of the rule waives the benefit thereof by allowing such
evidence to be received without objection and without any effort to have it
stricken from the minutes or disregarded by the trial court, he cannot, after the
trial has closed and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in
order to secure a reversal of the judgment by an appellate court. 15 Here, the
records are devoid of any indication that petitioners ever objected to the
admissibility of parole evidence introduced by the private respondent in open
court. The court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be
incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of
a party to object thereto. 16 Petitioners have no one to blame but themselves in
this regard.
Finally, petitioners argue that private respondent's complaint filed before the
trial court on October 24, 1985 is already barred by the statute of limitations
and laches considering that the deed of absolute sale was executed in their
favor by the deceased Paula Arcega on July 20, 1971. Indeed, more than
fourteen (14) years had elapsed from the time his cause of action accrued to
the time that the complaint was filed. Articles 1144 and 1391 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 1141. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought
within four years.
This period shall begin:
In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence,
from the time the defect of the consent ceases.
In cases of mistake or fraud, from the time of the
discovery of the same.
And when the action refers to contracts entered into by
minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time
the guardianship ceases.
This submission is utterly without merit, the pertinent provision being Article
1410 of the New Civil Code which provides unequivocably that "[T]he action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe." 17
As for laches, its essence is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a
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 Page 74 of 86

right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 18 But there is, to be
sure, no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand;
each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since
laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice. 19 In the case under consideration, it would not only be impractical but
well-nigh unjust and patently inequitous to apply laches against private
respondent and vest ownership over a valuable piece of real property in favor
of petitioners by virtue of an absolutely simulated deed of sale never, in the first
place, meant to convey any right over the subject property. It is the better rule
that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by
the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong or injustice would result. 20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED with costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. Nos. 103752-53 November 25, 1992
HON. AMADO M. CALDERON in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and MAURO DIONISIO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a joint petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 103753) and mandamus (G.R. No.
103752).
In G.R. No. 103753, petitioner seek the review of the decision dated December
17, 1991 and the resolution dated January 28, 1992 of the Court of Appeals
declaring null and void petitioner's orders dated April 29, 1991 and April 23,
1991 which motu propio increased the bail bonds posted by private respondent
who was accused violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (CA-G.R. SP No. 25801),
without citing justifiable reason therefor.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 103752, petitioner prays for judgment
commanding respondent Solicitor General to forthwith represent him by filing a
petition before this Court by way of appeal from the decision of the Appellate
Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 25801.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On January 29, 1990, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed three separate
informations for violations Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan (Malolos) against accused-private respondent involving the
following amounts: P114,902.00 (Criminal Case 240-M-90), P141,710.00
(Criminal Case 241-M-90) and P110,923.00 (Criminal Case 242-M-90). These
three informations were assigned to different salas.
Subsequently, the Provincial Prosecutor recomended bail of P1,000.00 for each
case, and conformably with the recommendations, private respondent filed
three separate bail bonds of P1,000.00 for his provisional liberty.
On petition of private respondent, the aforementioned cases were consolidated
in the sala of petitioner.
On April 29, 1991, "after noting from the records that the bonds posted by the
private respondent was only P1,000.00 for each of the three case" petitioner
issued an order increasing the bail bond to P25,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 240-
M-90); P35,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 241-M-90) and P25,000.00 (Criminal Case
No. 242-M-90). 1
On May 9, 1991, private respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
of said order contending that the recommended bail in the amount of
P1,000.00 was in accordance with the Bail Bond Guide for the National
Prosecution Service pursuant to the Ministry of Justice Circular No. 36 dated
September 1, 1981. 2 But on August 23, 1991, petitioner denied the motion and
directed the issuance of the warrant of arrest against private respondent. 3
On August 27, 1991, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent prayer for preliminary
injunction to nullify and set aside the orders dated April 29, 1991 and August
23, 1991 issued by the petitioner, reiterating that the recommended bail bonds
were accordance with the guidelines on bail bonds issued by the then Ministry
of Justice and that the increase of the bail bond was violative of his
constitutional rights against excessive bail. 4
Page 75 of 86
On September 4, 1991, the Court of Appeals required the Solicitor General
representing the People of the Philippines to comment on the petition and
show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued within ten days
from receipt. 5
On December 17, 1991, the Appellate Court nullified the questioned orders
issued by petitioner for failure to show the reasons for the increase of the bail
bonds as required by Section 17 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. Moreover, the Court of Appeals added that the
unwarranted increase of amount violated private respondent's constitutional
right against excessive bail. 6
On January 13, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration after he was
refused representation by the Office of the Solicitor General. 7 On January 28,
1992, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 8
Hence, this joint special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
The two issues to be resolved in this case are whether or not petitioner has
standing to file this instant petition for certiorari and whether or not a writ
of mandamus may issue commanding the Solicitor General to appear in behalf
of petitioner.
This joint petition for certiorari and mandamus must fail. We see no necessity in
discussing the merits of petitioner's order dated April 29, 1991 which motu
proprio increased the bail bond or private respondent because this joint
petition for certiorari and mandamus suffers from a procedural infirmity.
To recall, this case originally started as "People of the Philippines v. Mauro
Dionisio," in three separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. After petitioner raised the bail bonds of accused, the latter elevated his case
before the Appellate Court entitled; "Mauro Dionisio v. Hon. Amado Calderon,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan Branch II." Subsequently, petitioner
believing that he was a real party in interest filed this instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus against the Solicitor General and the accused
Mauro Dionisio.
Petitioner, with his years in experience in the judiciary, should have known that
he has no standing to file this instant petition because he is merely a nominal
party as gleaned from Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which
states that:
Defendants and the costs in certain case. — When the
petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a court
or judge, the petitioner shall joint, as parties defendant
with such court or judge, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court;
and it shall be the duty to such person or persons to
appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf or in
behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings,
and cost awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the person or persons in
interest only and not against the court or judge.
(Emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal
party. In such capacity, therefore, he should not appear as a party seeking the
reversal of the decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him. 9
In the case at bar, private complainant being the real party interested in
upholding petitioner's questioned orders increasing the bail bonds, had the
legal personality to file the instant case. Since he did not even bother to assail
the decision of the Court of Appeals holding petitioner's actuations as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, then much less should petitioner go
out of his way to file this joint petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Judge Calderon should be reminded of the well-known doctrine that a judge
should detach himself from case where his decision is appealed to a higher
court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is the fact so the judge is
not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing
parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide
the issues without his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way
ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial instead. 10
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 Page 76 of 86

Considering that petitioner has no standing to file this certiorari proceeding,

then logically his petition for mandamus also deserves scant consideration.
Nonetheless, we feel that we would be making a significant contribution to
jurisprudence if we definitely settled the question of whether mandamus will lie
to compel the Solicitor General to represent a judge whose decision has been
nullified by the Court of Appeals. It is our considered opinion that petitioner
cannot compel the Solicitor General to defend his unwarranted act of increasing
the private respondent's bail. As a special civil action, mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not to compel the
performance of the discretionary duty. 11

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that pursuant to paragraph (1) of Section
35, Chapter 12, of Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the specific
legal duty of the Solicitor General "to represent the government and its officers
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and other courts and tribunals
in all civil action and special proceedings in which the government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party." To buttress his contention, he cites our
recent case Ramon A. Gonzales v. Fransisco Chavez. 12

Petitioner has not read carefully our decision. In the Gonzales case, we held that
the Solicitor General may not just drop a case without any legal and valid reason
because his discretion is not unlimited. To quote, "(L)ike the Attorney General
who has absolute discretion in choosing to prosecute or to abandon a
prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss,
abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation
with the other party." We added that, "upon receipt of a case certified to him,
the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He
may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or
he may opt not to file a case at all. He may do everything within his legal
authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of
the government on the matter at hand."

On the basis of the aforequoted jurisprudence, it is evident that since the

Solicitor General has the right to decide when and how to defend or prosecute
a case, his duty, therefore, is discretionary and not ministerial. A duty is
ministerial when the discharged of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. 13

What would be the consequence if the Solicitor General were compelled to

appear and defend petitioner's act of increasing private respondent's bail?
Obviously, he would acting contrary to the bail bond guidelines of the Executive
Department, specifically the Department of Justice. Taking up the cudgels for
the petitioner would place him at cross purpose with the avowed policies of the
Executive Department of which he is undeniably a part, as expressed in the
different circulars issued by said agency.

Clearly, the pleadings show that petitioner is not entitled to the mandamus he
seeks from this Court, for he has neither shown a clear legal right to the thing
demanded nor demonstrated that it is the Solicitor General's imperative duty to
defend him on the sole ground that he is public officer.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the
writ of mandamus applied for is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 66
Quo Warranto
G.R. No. L-17915 January 31, 1967
TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner of Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA
as Secretary of Finance,
MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, respondents and appellants.
Ramon C. Aquino, Teodoro M. Castro, Leandro C. Sevilla and Antonio M. Castro
for petitioner and appellant.
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and E. M. Fernando for respondent and appellant
Toledo.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for
respondents and appellants Secretary of Finance, et al.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of
Assistant Regional Revenue Director II, Manila, which became vacant on August
24, 1959, upon the promotion of its occupant, Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent
Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in his place, and it is this appointment that is
being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding. The
court a quo annulled Toledo's appointment, but did not grant Castro's prayer
that respondent officials be ordered to appoint him.
Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was made on November 24, 1959,
effective as of October 1, 1959. When he was appointed Toledo's position was
that of Chief Revenue Inspector, or Chief Revenue Examiner, stationed in
Manila. The appointment was protested by Castro in a letter he wrote the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on January 19, 1960, wherein he alleged that
in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he was the one who should
have been considered for the position. Copy of the letter-protest was furnished
the Secretary of Finance. On February 8, 1960 the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, in a first indorsement, informed Castro that "the position of Assistant
Revenue Regional Director II, R-53, at P6,000.00 adjusted to P6,597.60 per
annum, is for Regional District No. 3, Manila, and the appointment thereto had
to be issued to the person actually performing the functions of the position,"
namely, respondent Toledo, who was then acting as Assistant Revenue Regional
Officer II, Manila.
On March 8, 1960 Castro appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who
indorsed the matter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with a request for
a statement of the comparative qualifications of Toledo and Castro. After setting
forth the qualifications as requested, the Commissioner explained that the next
two Assistant Revenue Regional Directors in line for the protested position, as
reported for purposes of Administrative Order No. 171, were Teodoro Lucero,
Assistant Revenue Regional Director I (Regional District No. 4), with a salary of
P6,900 per annum; and Lauro Abraham, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I
(Regional District No. 6), with a salary of P6,000 per annum, but that since the
protested position was for Regional District No. 3, Manila, where Toledo was
next in rank, and since he was actually performing the functions of the
controverted office, there was no need to make a comparison between his
qualifications and those of Castro.
On July 1, 1960 the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered his decision
dismissing Castro's protest on the ground that the contested position belonged
properly to Regional District No. 3, where Toledo was the next ranking
employee, while Castro was in Regional District No. 5, San Pablo City. Hence,
Castro filed the present petition asking that Toledo's appointment be annulled
and that he be declared entitled to the position. As already stated, the trial
court rejected Castro's claim, but at the same time annulled Toledo's
appointment — this last on the ground that his previous appointment as Chief
Revenue Examiner was illegal.
Both sides appealed from the decision. Respondents claim that the lower court
should not have nullified Toledo's appointment. They contend (1) that the
question as to the legality of his previous appointment as Chief Revenue
Page 77 of 86
Examiner was neither raised in the pleadings nor proven at the trial with the
consent of the parties; (2) that petitioner was precluded by laches from
questioning said appointment; and (3) that the same was not contrary to the
Revised Administrative Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lower court should have ordered
respondents Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretary of Finance to
appoint him to the controverted position because (1) he was senior in rank to
Toledo and was the competent and qualified employee next in line for the
position; and (2) the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors I had
waived their rights to the position.
Castro entered the government service in 1931 as a messenger in the Bureau of
Forestry. He became a clerk in the Bureau of Internal Revenue on February 1,
1937. Then he became successively law clerk, income tax examiner, Chief of Tax
Audit Branch and eventually, on July 1, 1957, Assistant Revenue Regional
Director I.
On the other hand , Toledo first worked in the Metropolitan Water District on
July 16, 1948. He became employed in the Bureau of Internal Revenue on
December 4, 1952, when he was appointed distillery agent. At the time he left
the Bureau on January 15, 1958 his position was that of income tax examiner
with a salary of P3,300 per annum. On said date he became a Technical
Assistant to the Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines at P7,200
per annum. On July 1, 1958, when he returned to the Bureau he was appointed
Chief Revenue Inspector (a new position created under the Appropriation Act of
1958-1959, which look effect on July 1, 1958) at P6,787 per annum.
This case is principally a special civil action in quo warranto. A quo
warranto proceeding is one to determine the right to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
well founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. 1 The action
may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or by a
fiscal;2 or a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action in his own
name.3 Where a private person files the action, he must prove that he is entitled
to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of his office.4
Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23, paragraph 3, Republic Act
2260, which provides:
Whenever a vacancy occurs in any competitive or classified position
in the government or in any government-owned or controlled
corporation or entity, the officer or employee next in rank who is
competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an
appropriate civil service eligibility shall be promoted
thereto: Provided, That should there be two or more persons under
equal circumstances, seniority shall be given preference: And
provided, however, That should there be any special reason or
reasons why such officer or employee should not be promoted,
such special reason or reasons shall be stated in writing by the
appointing official and the officer or employee concerned shall be
informed thereof and be given opportunity to be heard by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, whose decision in such case shall be
final. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided herein,
then the same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the
government service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons
separated through reduction in force, or by certification from
appropriate registers of eligibles in accordance with rules
promulgated in pursuance of this Act.
It appears that for internal revenue tax purposes the Philippines is divided into
ten regional districts, with Manila as District No. 3. Each district has a Revenue
Regional Director and an Assistant Revenue Regional Director. The Revenue
Regional Director for the Manila District outranks the nine other Revenue
Regional Directors, while the Assistant Revenue Regional Director for Manila
outranks the nine other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors. These nine
Assistant Revenue Regional Directors therefore usually aspire to be promoted
either to the position of Revenue Regional Director or to that of Assistant
Revenue Regional Director for Manila.
At the time the controverted petition became vacant
Toledo was occupying the position of Chief Revenue
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 Page 78 of 86

Inspector, (or Examiner) while the positions of

Assistant Revenue Regional Director outside the
Manila District were occupied by the following:

Name Salary

1. Teodoro Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . . P6900

2. Lauro D. Abraham . . . . . . . . . . . 6000

3. Ricardo A. Rivera . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000

4. Gaspar L. Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . 5100

5. Jaime Araneta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000

6. Policronio Blanco . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000

7. Francisco Tantuico . . . . . . . . . . 6266.40

8. Pedro D. Uy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000

9. Teodoro M. Castro . . . . . . . . . . . 6000

According to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the next two in line for the
position in question were Lucero and Abraham. Obviously the position of Chief
Revenue Inspector (Examiner) was considered to be of the same rank as the
position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director for regions other than Manila.
And Toledo, who was then Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner), was chosen
because in the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue he was already
in the region where the vacancy occurred and therefore was more familiar with
the work there, and both his salary range and efficiency rating 5 were higher
than Castro's aside from the fact that he was already performing the functions
of the office.

Even on the assumption that Castro possessed, as he claims, better

qualifications and a higher efficiency rating than Toledo, it would avail him
nothing because he has failed to prove that his position was the one next in
rank to the vacant office. He was not even the most senior among the different
Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District. However, he
insists that the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their
rights to the position by their failure to complain against Toledo's appointment.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the

eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a waiver
on their part. Waiver must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The
evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent to
waive is unmistakable.

Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state that the eight
others were not interested in the position.6 Not having shown either seniority in
rank among the nine Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila
District or waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro has failed
to establish a clear right to the office which would entitle him to oust
respondent Toledo.

Upon the other hand, the supposed illegality of Toledo's appointment as Chief
Revenue Officer of the Manila District cannot be a ground for the annulment of
his appointment to the controverted position.7 The legality of that earlier
appointment may not be questioned except in a quo warranto proceeding
brought by the proper person at the proper time. To be sure, as heretofore
stated this is principally such a proceeding, but only insofar as the position of
Assistant Revenue Regional District II is concerned. It is true there is an
allegation in Castro's petition that the earlier appointment of Toledo as Chief
Revenue officer was illegal.8 But Castro does not claim to be entitled to that
other position and consequently the legality of Toledo's appointment thereto is
not properly in issue. Besides, even if Castro were the proper party to raise that
issue, he did so beyond the time limit prescribed by law. 9 Toledo was appointed
to said position on July 1, 1958. Castro had one year from that date to assail the
legality of the appointment. The petition here was filed only on August 6, 1960,
or beyond the one-year period.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom

that portion annulling respondent Toledo's appointment to the position in
dispute, and is affirmed in other respects. Costs against petitioner.

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 Page 79 of 86

RULE 66 question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial
Quo Warranto remedy in his favor.

Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by

private respondent refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is
G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978 also for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is
not correct. As earlier noted in this decision, the allegations supporting
ABRAHAM C. SISON, petitioner, petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down to no more than the removal of
vs. respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has been appointed in
HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service; GERONIMO order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. Necessarily,
LIPUMANO, Mayor, Olongapo City; ALFREDO D. OCAMPO, Officer-in-Charge, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification o
Civil Service, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F. her appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His
MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assesor, Olongapo City, respondent. ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be also
viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes also
after one year. (Cornejo vs. Sec. of Justice, L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA
Domingo & Domingo for petitioner. 663.) And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of
more than one year, he was seeking relief from the corresponding
G. J. de la Llana for respondent City Mayor. administrative outhorities. The resort to such administrative remedy does not
abate the period for the judicial action. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436; Galano
vs. Roxas, G.R. L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8.)
M. S. Gerong for respondent Maliwanag.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the restraining order heretofore

issued is hereby lifted effective immediately. No. costs.

BARREDO, J:

Petition denominated as for certiorari us and quo warranto and (1) seeking the
annulment of the actions of respondents Regional Director and commissioner
of Civil Service in respectively attesting and affirming such attestation of private
respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag's appointment as Assistant City Assessor of
Olongapo City, extended by the respondent Mayor of said city on November 23,
1973, and (2) assailing the validity of said respondent Commissioner's decision
of May 3, 1974 dismissing petitioner's protest and his resolution dated June 24,
1974 denying reconsideration of said decision, and (3) further asking that
respondent Commissioner be mandated to appoint petitioner as such Assistant
City Assessor and that private respondent Maliwanag be declared as unlawfully
usurping said position under a void and illegal appointment.

In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since at the time of the
appointment in dispute, he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising, according to
his allegation, immediate administrative control and supervision over
respondent Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy Assessor, and inasmuch as he
has superior educational and appropriate civil service eligibilities to those of
said respondent, the appointment aforementioned extended to the latter by
respondent City Mayor is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of
next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains that upon the promotion of the Assistant City
Assessor to the position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent
Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.

We have carefully considered petitioner's contentions in his petition as well as

his reply to the answers of the respondents and, at best, We find the issues
raised by him to be rather controversial, with the result that it is difficult for Us
to categorize respondent public official's impugned actuations as tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. Maliwanag's appointment was recommended by the
City Assessor and his reasons therefor, stated in said official's indorsement to
the Mayor recommending dismissal of petitioner's protest thereto and quoted
in the record, are substantial and well taken, as, in fact, they have been
reviewed by respondent Commissioner and found to be sustainable, as he did
sustain them. We are loathe to substitute Our own judgment for that of the
Commissioner of Civil Service who is primarily charged with the administration
of the Civil Service Law and rules and regulations, absent, as in this case,
convincing showing of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. After all as
We see it, petitioner rests his case mostly on the Organization Chart and the
position description or CSC Form No. 122-D of respondent Maliwanag, prepared
by petitioner himself, which do not carry the approval of the Mayor, as
Department Head, contrary to requirement of Memorandum Circular No. 5, S.
1963 of the Commission of Civil Service touching on the basis for determining
the hierarchical relationships of positions, and, therefore, are not necessarily
controlling.

Withal, the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is that he came to the
courts out of time. As already stated, the appointment in controversy was made
on November 23, 1973 and respondent Maliwanag assumed office on the
strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her salary. On the
other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more
than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in

Special
Proceedings

RULE 66
Quo Warranto
[G.R. No. L-34344. February 29, 1988.]
RICARDO AGUIRRE, FELIXBERTO VALDEZ, ESTEBAN RIVERA and ZAMBALES
COLLEGES, INC., Petitioners, v. JOSE DUMLAO, and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; QUO WARRANTO; OFFICIAL
ILLEGALLY OUSTED FROM OFFICE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. — The lone issue is
whether or not damages may be recovered by the private respondents as a
result of his removal from office — an act adjudged to be illegal by the Court of
Appeals. That decision having attained finality, it is a proper basis of a damage
suit, it should be observed that the Court of Appeals (in the quo warranto case)
dismissed the private respondent’s petition not by reason of the fact that his
removal was lawful — on the contrary, it declared in no uncertain terms that it
was illegal — but because the term of the office he claims to have been usurped
had expired. As the respondent Court (in the damages case) would indeed put
it: "The case was dismissed but because it had become moot." But while the
dismissal bars the private respondent’s reinstatement in office, it is no
impediment to a recourse to damages. Under Section 15 of Rule 66, of the
Rules of Court," [t]he person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring
action against such defendant to recover the damages sustained by such person
by reason of the usurpation."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINAL DECISION THEREOF, LAW OF THE CASE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES. — To rule, therefore, on the legality or illegality of the private
respondent’s removal, as the petitioners would now urge us, is to resurrect a
dead issue. The Court of Appeals’ decision declaring that it was illegal is the law
of the case between the parties. This Court admits that the question, under the
provisions of the old Corporation Law of whether or not a director may be
removed without cause had been a controversial one, but as we stated, it is not
the issue presented for our resolution herein.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court disposes of this three-decade old case, one of the older ones pending
herein. The facts, as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are not
controverted. We quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The plaintiff, Jose Dumlao, bought five shares of stock in Zambales Colleges in
1931. In July 1950 the plaintiff was elected as a member of the Board of
Trustees of the Zambales Academy, Inc., now Zambales Colleges, Inc. for a term
of one (1) year or until his successor shall have been elected and qualified.
On October 7, 1950, the stockholders of Zambales Colleges, Inc., at a special
meeting called for the purpose, reduced the number of trustees from seven to
five; removed all the seven members of the school’s board of trustees, and
thereafter elected the five members of the new board. Jose Dumlao was not
elected as a member of the new Board of Trustees.
Jose Dumlao and others instituted a quo warranto proceeding against the
school and its officials contesting the legality of the meeting held by the
stockholders and their election of a new board of five trustees, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1374 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales. The quo warranto
proceeding was dismissed. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 8305-R.
In a decision promulgated on August 7, 1954, the Court of Appeals
ruled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
If it is correct, as we believe it to be correct, that on May 13, 1951, new
members of the Board of Trustees were properly elected, and it is presumed
that in due time they assumed their duties, appellants who had been elected on
July 15, 1950, for a tenure of one year have lost, their right to a restoration.
The question is, therefore, a moot one, and the instance case should be
Page 80 of 86
dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed. The decision appealed from is so modified;
without further costs.
(Exh. C)
On March 7, 1955, Jose Dumlao commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales against Ricardo Aguirre, Felixberto Valdes, Esteban Rivera, and
Zambales Colleges, Inc. the present action for recovery of damages and
attorney’s fees based on the plaintiff’s ouster as a member of the board of
trustees and his prosecution for estafa by the defendants.
The defendants did not deny the material allegations of the second amended
complaint regarding the removal of Jose Dumlao as member of the Board of
Trustees of the Zambales Colleges Inc. and his prosecution for estafa. They
contended, however, that the plaintiff has no right to damages because he was
replaced as member of the board of trustees legally in accordance with the
Corporation Law and there was no malice in his prosecution for estafa.
The trial court rendered on February 8, 1965 its decision the dispositive part
which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, by an overwhelming preponderance of evidence, and in
accordance with law, the Court renders judgment in the first cause of action
by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Ordering the defendant Zambales Colleges, Incorporated, to pay the plaintiff in
the first cause of action:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The amount of P360.00 as actual damages;
(b) The amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) The amount of P1,000.00 as nominal damages.
(d) And to pay the costs.
The second cause of action is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Iba, Zambales, February 8, 1965.
(Sgd). PEDRO D. CENZON
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp. 161-162)
The defendants appealed to this Court assigning the following
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REMOVAL OF APPELLEE AS A
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF APPELLANT CORPORATION IS
ILLEGAL.
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEE.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. a-b) 1
x x x
The respondent Court then rendered judgment holding as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 2
The petitioners, the defendants-appellants below, urge a lone assignment of
error:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISTAKE IN HOLDING THAT A DIRECTOR
OR TRUSTEE OF A CORPORATION CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE BEFORE
HIS TERM EXPIRES UNLESS FOR MISFEASANCE. 3
It should be noted that the incident involved two suits commenced by the
private respondent against the petitioners, Civil Case No. 1374 of the then Court
of First Instance of Zambales, in the nature of an action for quo warranto (later
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 Page 81 of 86

elevated to the Court of Appeals as CR-G.R. No. 8305 thereof), and Civil Case
No. 1714, a subsequent damage suit (subject of the appeal to the respondent
Court) following the quo warranto ruling. In the quo warranto case, the lower
court rendered a dismissal, a disposition modified on appeal:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

If it is correct, as we believe it to be correct, that on May 13, 1951, new

members of the Board of Trustees were properly elected, and it is presumed
that in due time they assumed their duties, appellants who had been elected on
July 15, 1950, for a tenure of one year have lost their right to a restoration.

The question is, therefore, a moot one, and the instant case should be
dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed. The decision appealed from is so modified;
without further costs. 4

x x x

Furthermore, it held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

The by-laws of the corporation do not provide whether any special election may
be had at any time at the will of the stockholders. We believe that after a
member of the Board of Trustees has been selected in an annual election, he is
to continue in office until his successor is chosen and duly qualified after the
succeeding election. Undoubtedly, he can be ousted for misfeasance but
certainly not through the election of another to take his place. The
corporation’s by-laws, in our opinion, do not authorize special election as a
means to depose any member, nor, indeed, could have contemplated it or the
conduct of its affairs would be seriously jeopardized. 5

x x x

The private respondent, as a consequence of such a holding, and the case

having become final and executory, sought to recover damages for his unlawful
ouster from office. The sole issue then is whether or not the petitioners are
liable for damages on account of such an unlawful removal.

We hold against the petitioners. As we said, the lone issue is whether or not
damages may be recovered by the private respondents as a result of his
removal from office — an act adjudged to be illegal by the Court of Appeals.
That decision having attained finality, it is a proper basis of a damage suit, it
should be observed that the Court of Appeals (in the quo warranto case)
dismissed the private respondent’s petition not by reason of the fact that his
removal was lawful — on the contrary, it declared in no uncertain terms that it
was illegal — but because the term of the office he claims to have been usurped
had expired. As the respondent Court (in the damages case) would indeed put
it: "The case was dismissed but because it had become moot." 6 But while the
dismissal bars the private respondent’s reinstatement in office, it is no
impediment to a recourse to damages. Under Section 15 of Rule 66, of the
Rules of Court," [t]he person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring
action against such defendant to recover the damages sustained by such person
by reason of the usurpation."cralaw virtua1aw library

To rule, therefore, on the legality or illegality of the private respondent’s

removal, as the petitioners would now urge us, is to resurrect a dead issue. The
Court of Appeals’ decision declaring that it was illegal is the law of the case
between the parties. This Court admits that the question, under the provisions
of the old Corporation Law 7 of whether or not a director may be removed
without cause had been a controversial one, 8 but as we stated, it is not the
issue presented for our resolution herein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Special
Proceedings

RULE 66
Quo Warranto
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS:
DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ,
NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA, PEDRO C.
CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M. MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F.
CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA and FRANCISCA A.
BAMBA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES,
QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS
AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES,
RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDAL
BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.
Manuel Laserna, Jr. for petitioners.
Florante Pamfilo for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then
Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon,
by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province,
the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along
with their respective sitios.
Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the
President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal
council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959. 1
By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by
President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later
officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality
beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The
executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a)
municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of
Representatives."
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against
the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil Action No.
2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No.
353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San
Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices.3 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez
v. Auditor General,4 the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order
No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the
legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality
or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and
functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding
officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by
way of affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of
petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with
the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be
deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality; 5 that
because the Municipality of San Andred had been in existence since 1959, its
corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the
petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper
party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting
through the Solicitor General. 6
Page 82 of 86
On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs,
the trial court resolved to defer action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a
judgment on the pleadings.
On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to
dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality
cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered
as regular municipalities.
The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending
that the above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality
of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing
municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been
void ab initio.7
In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court8 finally dismissed the
petition9 for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to
the State, adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of
municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and
executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known
as Local Government Code of 1991." In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the
same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 10 argue that in issuing
the orders of 02 December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has
"acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality created by a
null and void presidential order may be attacked either directly or even
collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are affected, and that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is inoperative such as
though its has never been passed. 11
Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari"
under Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they
question the orders of the lower court for having been issued with "grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
available to petitioners to correct said Orders, to protect their rights and to
secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues
involved." 12 Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this
instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a
public office or exercises a public franchise." 13 When the inquiry is focused on
the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. 14 It must be
brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" 15 and commenced by
the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the
Philippines . . . ." 16 Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such
an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the
permission of the court. 17 The Rules of Court also allows an individual to
commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be
done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another." 18 While the quo
warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only
the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually,
however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal
District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of
the Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the
petition.
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 Page 83 of 86

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act

No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de
facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo
warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality
had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353,
and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition
would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of
San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty
(30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally
decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the
Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and
continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local
government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to
question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year
period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19 so also, if not indeed with
greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. 20 Public interest
demands it.

Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result
of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status
uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be
otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when,
on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling
could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary,
certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as
a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San
Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income
requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal
circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978,
issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this
administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the
10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of
Quezon.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must
be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning
the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution,
the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve
(12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon.
Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect
that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of
unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is
proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed.
The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the
Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving
"validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if
existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction,
subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 22

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the
province of Quezon must now be conceded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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Special
Proceedings

RULE 66
Quo Warranto
G.R. No. L-28113 March 28, 1969
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, and AMER MACAORAO
BALINDONG, petitioners,
vs.
PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG, HADJI HASAN
MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V. DUJERTE MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG
ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR LAO. respondents.
L. Amores and R. Gonzales for petitioners.
Jose W. Diokno for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del
Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the
respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same
province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang,
having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then
President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios 1 of the latter municipality.
The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order
386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the
functions of their respective office relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.
Auditor General 2 and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. 3
In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled:
(1) that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January
1, 1960], by vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial board, is a
"statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and]
implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities," and (2) that
section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the
power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against section
10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over
local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion:
"In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it
certainly does, said section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment."
On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the
petition, nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no
application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the
municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been
organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its
officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself
having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the
institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its
existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into
directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an
individual like the petitioner Balindong.
It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a
municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other
direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person
exercise this function of government. 4 But the rule disallowing collateral attacks
applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de
facto corporations. 5 For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto,
but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or
directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests ate
affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they
are estopped by their conduct from doing so. 6
And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de
facto corporation. As earlier stated, the claim that it is rests on the fact that it
was organized before the promulgation of this Court's decision in Pelaez. 7
Page 85 of 86
Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend
color of validity to an attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact
that such statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional.lawphi1.ñet
This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the
United States. Thus, some hold that a de facto corporation cannot exist where
the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional because there can be no de
facto corporation where there can be no de jure one, 8 while others hold
otherwise on the theory that a statute is binding until it is condemned as
unconstitutional. 9
An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:
It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de
facto status lay in the absence of any legislative act to give vitality to
its creation. An examination of the cases holding, some of them
unreservedly, that a de facto office or municipal corporation can
exist under color of an unconstitutional statute will reveal that in no
instance did the invalid act give life to the corporation, but that
either in other valid acts or in the constitution itself the office or the
corporation was potentially created....
The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute
can exist only where there is some other valid law under which the
organization may be effected, or at least an authority in potentia by
the state constitution, has its counterpart in the negative
propositions that there can be no color of authority in an
unconstitutional statute that plainly so appears on its face or that
attempts to authorize the ousting of a de jure or de facto municipal
corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact would
imply the imputation of bad faith, in the other the new organization
must be regarded as a mere usurper....
As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may
be deduced which seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting
decisions:
I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of
a de facto municipal corporation may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face,
which has either (a) been upheld for a time
by the courts or (b) not yet been declared
void; provided that a warrant for its creation
can be found in some other valid law or in
the recognition of its potential existence by
the general laws or constitution of the state.
II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation
unless either directly or potentially, such a de
jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of authority in an
unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is
apparent on its face.
IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place
of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly
be a usurper. 10
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such
despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions
could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other
valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar,
the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not
been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no
other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed,
in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, 11 this Court granted a similar petition for
prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan
in Iloilo on the basis of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality
was created in 1961, before section 68 of the Administrative Code, under which
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 Page 86 of 86

the President had acted, was invalidated. 'Of course the issue of de
facto municipal corporation did not arise in that case.

In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed." Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of
commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.

Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the
acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate
powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed." For the existence of Executive,
Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." As Chief Justice
Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank: 13

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation
of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling
many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that
municipality. 14

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void,

and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.

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