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The Holy Logos in the writings of Philo of Alexandria

Article  in  Communio Viatorum · January 2014

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The Holy Logos in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria1

Doc. Jiří Hoblík, Th.D.

Centre for Classical Studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences,
Prague

One of the signs that Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BC – 50 AD) was the most important philosopher
of Hellenistic and especially Alexandrian Judaism is the role of the Logos in his extensive body of
work in interpreting Biblical literature. The opportunity arises again and again to point out his ties
to the history of classical Greek and Hellenistic philosophy and the beginnings of Jewish
philosophy, and to explore Philo’s unique relationship to the history of religious thought, in
particular Rabbinical and early Christian tradition. The impact of his studies of Biblical literature on
the use of philosophical terminology nevertheless remains an open question. 2 This paper will thus
take a look at the far-reaching extent to which Philo’s concept of the Logos has been influenced by
the concept of “the Holy”.
The blending of various influences can be seen in the fact that Philo’s concept of the Logos, influ-
enced not only by the Stoics3 and Plato4 but also by the Bible, presents itself as a universal defining
principle that aims to be a legible expression emerging from the divine. Because Philo treats the
concept of the Logos not only philosophically but also applies it in his interpretation of Hebrew top-
ics, the word is subjected to specific and simultaneously disparate modifications. 5 There is no need
to point out that Philo thus paved the way for early Christian thought starting with the Apostolic Fa-
thers, inspired by analogies between his writings and the New Testament, 6 and that his work must

1 This study is a result of research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as part of project GA ČR
P401/12/G168 “History and Interpretation of the Bible”.
2 Cf. P. Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time, Leiden et al.: Brill 1997, p. 78: “He is an
expositor who both draws on traditions and brings in various current ideas into his interpretations, and at
the same time follows certain identifiable perspectives and uniting threads in his composition.|
3 An overview of Stoic influences can be found in O. Kaiser, Philo von Alexandrien: Denkender Glaube –
Eine Einführung, Göttingen: Ruprecht 2015, pp. 73–75, 201 et seq., 269 et seq.
4 An overview of Platonic influences can be found in Ibid., pp. 71–73; cf. also A. H. Armstrong, The
Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Cambridge Classical Studies,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1940, p. 107: “The Philonian Logos, like that of Plotinus, is the
principle of unity-in-diversity, of the separation and uniting of contraries in the material world. It is the
universal law, the principle of order in the world, distributing to each the lot appropriate to him. These
resemblances by themselves would not be so striking. They could be explained by the common
philosophical heritage of the two thinkers, and especially by their dependence on the Stoic tradition.
What seems to bring Plotinus in these treatises very close to Philo is the fact that his Logos is, more than
any other hypostasis in the Enneads, presented simply as an intermediary between the Divine and the
material world. In the same way the Logos of Philo is simply an intermediary between God and the
material creation...”
5 On the synthesis of Platonic and Stoic philosophy with Jewish thinking in the concept of the Logos, see
H. Thümmel Logos und Hypostasis, in: W. Ulrich, Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der alten Kirche:
Festschrift für Ulrich Wickert zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die
Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 85, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997, pp. 347–398. We should
emphasize, however, that Philo did not enter philosophical tradition through theologizations; after all,
philosophers had been wondering about the divine foundation of the world ever since Pythagoras; cf. O.
Kaiser, Philo von Alexandrien, p. 152. He thus touched upon important interrelationships, cf. F. C.
Bordoy, On the Origin of the Orphic-Pythagorean Notion of the Immortality of the Soul, in: G. Cornelli,
R. McKirahan, C. Macris (eds.), On Pythagoreanism, Berlin: de Gruyter 2013 (pp. 153–178), p. 159:
“Pythagoras constitutes a fundamental link in a chain leading from Orpheus to Plato, which no
Neoplatonist wished to break...” (On Orphism, see below.)
6 Cf. D. T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey, Assen: Van Gorcum – Minneapolis:
Fortress Press 1993, p. 335.
be studied with this in mind. When he writes about Philo in Lectures on the Philosophy of History
and History of Philosophy, Hegel identifies Philo as marking the transition from Greek philosophy
to Christianity, although in History of Philosophy he also says that this transition is represented by
the Logos, which creates a difference in God. 7 Since in a certain sense Philo identifies the Logos
with God as its starting point, (which is apparently the reason that the prologue to the Gospel of
John was indirectly inspired by Philo),8 we can agree with Hegel because within this understanding
God makes himself an archetype for the image according to which he creates his work and thus re-
lates himself to himself – i.e., he internally differentiates himself.
It is worth noting that Philo’s writings consistently speak of God in personalist terms, although
Philo relativizes this form of speech: Although one of the roles of the Logos is to explain, this refers
to an explanation of Creation, not of God as the Being. 9 In view of the fact that God can only be re-
ferred to in improper speech, the character of the Logos corresponds to the Personality of God. 10

7 Cf. D. Wasterkamp, Das Bild der Vernunft: Feuerbach und die jüdischen Hegelianer, in: U. Reitemeyer,
T. Shibata, F. Tomasoni (eds.), Feuerbach und der Judaismus, Münster: Waxmann 2009, (pp. 75–86) p.
83: “Die Philosophie eröffnet mit Philo und dem Prinzip des Logos als der Differenz innerhalb der
Identität des erhabenen orientalisch-jüdischen Gottes eine neue, zweite Epoche des Denkens, die bis zur
Neuzeit reicht. Erst mit ihr wird die Identität von Identität und Differenz als Vertmittlung der Prinzipien
der ersten beiden Epochen (Vater/Identität – Sohn/Differenz) im Begriff Geistes gedacht.”
8 On the adaptation of Philo’s Logos in the prologue to the Gospel of John, see P. Hofrichter, Im Anfang
war der „Johannes-Prolog“: Das urchristliche Logosbekenntnis - die Basis neutestamentlicher und
gnostischer Theologie, Biblische Untersuchungen 17, Regensburg: Pustet 1986, (pp. 337–363), p. 361 et
seq. Philo’s concept of the Logos represents an intermediary stage and linkage between the Logos of
speculation and John’s prologue; cf. C. A. Evans, Word and Glory: on the Exegetical and Theological
Background of Johns Prologue, Journal for the Study of the New Testament. Supplement Series 89,
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1993, p. 112. Despite all the differences, it is good to remember that
first-century interpretations of the first chapter of Genesis used the term Logos, which Philo used in his
exegesis of the Creation, whereas John used it for God the Creator, cf. J. Leonhardt-Balzer, Der Logos
und die Schöpfung: Streiflichter bei Philo (Opif. 20–25) und im Johannesprolog (Joh 1,1–18), in: J.
Frey; U. Schnelle (eds.), Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum
Neuen Testament, 175, Tübingen: Mohr 2004, pp. 295–320. We can identify three stages in Philo’s
Logos: “transcendent-uncreated, transcendent-created, immanent”, cf. D. T. Runia, Philo in Early
Christian Literature, p. 51. By comparison, John describes the immanence of the transcendental Logos in
one single man and does not subscribe to the Philonian concept of the “true man” present in every
person; John thus differs from Philo in his more strongly personal understanding of a Logos that has been
incarnated; cf. C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1953, p. 73. On the history and difficulties of studying the relationship between Philo’s and John’s
concept of the Logos, see J. Leonhardt-Balzer, Der Logos und die Schöpfung, (pp. 307–311) p. 310:
“Mittlerweile läßt sich ein gewisser Konsens erkennen, der die Bezüge zwischen den beiden Authoren
eher über die gemeinsamen jüdischen Traditionen als über direkte Abhängigkeit erklärt. Ein Punkt, der
die beiden verbindet, ist der heute allgemein anerkannte Zusammenhang der Logosfigur mit der
Weisheitspekulation.”
9 When interpreting Genesis 17:1–22 in On the Change of Names (De mutatione nominum 11–14) Philo
writes of Moses, who, when he asked THE BEING for his name in Exodus 3:14, received the answer: “I
am THE BEING”, which is the same as “my nature is to be (einai), no to be spoken (legesthai)”. Philo
thus understands God’s response as a rejection of naming God. One cannot say what God is, but created
time-bound beings (in reference to Exodus 3:15) may, applying the ancient Greek concept of catachresis
meaning “discrepancy, contradiction” (cf. D. Zeller, Gott bei Philo von Alexandrien, in: U. Busse (Ed.),
Der Gott Israels im Zeugnis des Neuen Testaments, Quaestiones disputatae, 201, Freiburg – Basel – Wien
2003, pp. 32–57 = Zeller, Studien zu Philo und Paulus, Bonner Biblische Beiträge, 165, Göttingen: V&R
unipress 2011, [pp. 13–36] p. 26 et seq.), refer to THE BEING by combining the names of the two
powers in “the Lord God of three natures” (kyrios ho theos tōn triōn fyseōn) – these being instruction,
perfection and the exercise of virtue, symbolized by the names of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (De
mutatione nominum 12) – without the “unspeakable” (arrētos) God revealing his proper name (with
reference to Exodus 6:3a).
10 The limits of this analogy can be seen in how Philo speaks of God as the “Cause” (of all), of which we
And so Philo’s Logos allows us to identify its personal features, since it is given various anthropo-
morphic designation. We also find the personality of the Logos in the philosophical tradition from
Heraclitus to Plato (Republic 394d; 402a; 503a; Gorgias 482a).11 We should note, however, that
Philo’s treatise “On the Confusion of Tongues” describes the Logos for example as “Person of God”
(anthrōpos theū). No matter how much this title is reminiscent of the Hebrew honorific title for the
prophets (“man of God” – see, e.g., 1 Kings 13:1,4,5,6), it here does not include humanity but eter-
nity – just like the “word of God”, literally the “word of the Eternal” (tū aidiū logos) (De confu-
sione linguarum 41, cf. 62).12 It thus does not refer to the “Logos” as a distinguished person, but as
the archetype of Man.13 Elsewhere, Philo quotes from the Book of Zechariah (6:12), which an-
nounces the coming of a king from the dynasty of David who will renew the temple, calling him the
“man whose name is the East” (De confusione linguarum 62), where the word “man” can only be
understood as an anthropomorphism. Philo speaks of him as “someone incorporeal” (asōmatos
ekeinos) who does not differ from the “image of God” (eikōn theias). His name “the East” comes
from the Greek version of the Septuagint, which contains the word Anatolé “east / sunrise, dawn”
(whereas the Hebrew version contains the word sæmæch ṣ “sprout, branch”).14 The east is a symbol
of beginning – in this context we read how God as “Father of Eternity” enjoined upon him to arise
as his “older son” (presbyteros hyios) and “first-born” (prōtogonos) (cf. prōtogonos hyios, “first-
born son”, De plantatione 51), who then imitated God’s “archetypal models” (paradeigmata archē-
typa) and created “kinds” (eidē).15
On the one hand, these biblically motivated considerations demonstrate the universal activity of the
Logos, but on the other hand Creation no longer looks like the direct work of God as described in
the Book of Genesis. Perhaps we are seeing here the influence of late Platonic philosophy, for
which a distant god requires a second aspect by which he turns to the lower world. Although Philo’s
Logos does not fully possess the character of the Platonic demiurge as god the creator, he is the first
to associate the goodness of the demiurge from Plato’s Timaeus (29e) with the Jewish concept of the
Creator (De opificio mundi 21).16 (On the identification of the Jewish God and the demiurge, see De
opificio mundi 36, 68 and elsewhere) There is also a clear connection to the Middle Platonic
Alexandrian philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon, who identified the demiurge with the Stoic Logos.17

know that “God is not as a man”, whereas the God who gave Man the Law “is as a man” (Quod deus sit
immutabilis 1:53 et seq.).
11 Cf. G. Martin, Platons Ideenlehre, Berlin-New York: de Gruyter 1973, p. 102 et seq.
12 Our source here is P. Borgen; K. Fuglseth; R. Skarsten (eds.), Works of Philo (Greek Text, Morphology,
and English Translation), Bellingham / Washington: Logos Research Systems, Inc. 2005 a Philo,
Questions and Answers on Exodus, transl. R. Marcus, Harvard University Press: Cambridge /
Massachusetts 1953. Quotations from Philo’s works are in the author's translation.
13 Cf. D. Zeller, Philonische Logos-Theologie im Hintergrund des Konflikts von 1Kor 1-4?, in: R. Deines;
K.–W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchugen zum Neuen
Testament, 172, Tübingen: Ruprecht 2004, pp. 154–164 = Zeller, Studien zu Philo und Paulus, Bonner
Biblische Beiträge, 165, Göttingen: V&R unipress 2011, (str. 101–118) p. 123: “... der Logos als 'Mensch
Gottes' (hat) seinen Platz zunächst in der vom Urbild zum Abbild führenden Bewegung der Konstitution
des menschlichen Geistes. Er meldet sich im konkreten Mensch als Gewissen ( ἔλεγχος).”
14 Our source here is Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia, eds. K. Elliger - W. Rudolph, Stuttgart: Deutsche
Bibelgesellschaft 19975.
15 Himself being the most universal (genikōtatos), cf. Legum allegoriarum 3:175.
16 Cf. D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and The “Timaeus” of Plato, Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill 1986, p.
135.
17 Cf. P. Borgen, Philo of Alexandria, Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill 1997, p. 7 et seq.
In its role as mediator,18 the Logos nonetheless recalls God’s mediators of the Bible, such as the
“messengers of God” who express the connection and distance between God and the world, but also
the hypostasized Wisdom assisting God in creation (Proverbs 8:22–31). 19 Wisdom was also a popu-
lar term in Alexandrian theology (see, e.g., The Book of Wisdom, in particular. 9:1.2). Philo can di-
rectly identify wisdom with the Logos (cf. Legum allegoriarum 1:65).20 In connection with wisdom
as a virtue, the description of the path of wise men such as Abraham (with a reference to Genesis
31:3) refers specifically to “the divine Logos” as something like a father for practitioners of wis-
dom, as the best “abode for the souls that love virtue” (filaretai), whose bearers have escaped pas-
sion and the senses and returned to their “fatherland” of the sacred Logos” (eis tēn patrōan gēn [...]
hierū logū) (De migratione Abrahami 28).
The title “son of God” recalls a king, an exclusive human mediator of God’s power; because he is
an incorporeal being he finds himself closer to God than a king, although here we cannot under-
stand sonship in the literal sense. The Logos is thus not only personalised but also fundamentally
associated with God, more than an instrument held in the hand and continually subservient to him.
All these examples show that neither religious nor philosophical thinking will be satisfied with the
idea of a simple relationship between God the creator and his creation. And so Philo in particular at-
tempts to qexplicate the idea of creation and to find a relationship between the Creator, the process
of creativity and its result. In this regard, the personal character of the Logos goes well with the per-
sonal relationship between God and Man.

Therefore, when he combines philosophy with a reflection on Biblical themes in order to explore
the principles of creation as an event between God and the world, Philo also makes use of the con-
cept of archetypes (the term “archetype” made it into philosophy mainly through Middle Platonism,
which apparently made frequent use of the word archetypos.)21 This is also the case in the treatise
“On the Migration of Abraham”, which in one section discusses the high priest’s garments, in par-
ticular the upper and lower parts, all the while equating the high priest with reason (logos) (De mi-
gratione Abrahami 102) – which recalls the instructions on the form of the priest’s garments from
the Book of Exodus (Exodus 28), according to which the priest was to wear a leaf of gold on his
turban with an engraving like that of a signet: “holiness to the Lord” (hagiasma Kyriō, 36),22 where
this signet is equated with the “idea of the ideas” (idea tōn ideōn; see also below)23 according to
which God “formed” (typoō) the world (Peri apoikias 103). Note the metaphor of the signet, which
tells us that the “idea of the ideas” is imprinted, meaning that it is not just a distanced model (the
same concept is expressed by the word typos, which Philo uses elsewhere, see below).

18 On the various aspects of the role of the mediator, see J. Leonhardt-Balzer, Der Logos und die
Schöpfung, str. 297. Peter Frick agrees with other researchers in that “Philo envisions the Logos on the
highest level as the noetic mind of God and on the lower level as the immanent or hypostatized aspect of
that mind in form of the divine powers by which the Logos brings into existence and mainains the order
of creation.” He then conjectures: “It is, therefore, precisely on the Logos' lower level through the divine
powers that God is in relation with what he has created,” cf. Providence in Philo of Alexandria, Text and
Studies in Ancient Judaism, 77, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck 1999, p. 76. See also O. Kaiser, Philo von
Alexandrien, pp. 175–177.
19 Even in Philo’s writings, wisdom sometimes plays a role similar to that of the Logos in the “ordering of
the universe”, cf. P. Frick, Providence in Philo of Alexandria, str. 114.
20 On the identification of the Logos and Wisdom in Philo, see J. Zandee, Die Person der Sophia in der
vierten Schrift des Codex Jung, in: U. Bianchi (ed.), Le origini dello gnosticismo: colloquio di Messina
13-18 aprile 1966, Leiden: Brill 1967, (pp. 203–214) pp. 208–210.
21 Cf. J. Hüllen, Archetypus, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 1, Basel: Schwabe 1971, (pp.
497–500) p. 497.
22 On the Logos as signet, see also De ebrietate 133, De migratione 103; De fuga et inventione 12; De
somniis 2:45; De specialibus legibus 3:207; Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim 4:138.
23 The signet expresses the identity of the priest, if we consider that in De opificio mundi 25 the idea of
ideas is identified with the “model” (paradeigma) or “God’s Logos” as an “archetypal signet” (hē
archetypos sfragis) called the “intelligible cosmos” (kosmos noētos).
The priest represents and simultaneously is the earthly personification not of cold reason but of the
holy God’s Logos.24 Similarly, in several of his treatises Philo identifies the Logos with priests, who
according to the “Allegory of the Sacred Laws” is the heir to the spectacular ideas of God (Legum
allegoriarum 3:82). Philo consistently refers to the Torah as the “Holy Word “ (hieros logos; cf.,
e.g., De somniis 1:229 et. seq., also hagioi, literally “holinesses, holy things” in De mutatione
nominum 100),25 as if it were an expression of the Logos, something like its essence, and also a
bearer of a mystery, if we take seriously the Mystery roots of the term “holy word”. 26 In addition,
Philo himself only rarely calls the Logos “holy” (see above) and occasionally also hierōtatos logos,
“the most holy Logos” (De confusione linguarum 97.147; cf. De fuga et inventione 117). In this
light, we may understand the above mentioned image of the priest as analogous to the Logos.
Whereas holiness is primarily related to the divine origin of the Logos, the figure of the priest – as
an actor in sacred ritual events – serves for its explication and demonstration. After all, the decora-
tion of the priest’s turban occurs above the personification of the Logos while pointing “up”. The
motif of the signet suits Philo for expressing the idea of the archetype of a world formed by God.
The archetype and form of the world are brought together by the actions of the Logos. Seen from
the world, this means that the forms of the world let us know its rationality.

In correspondence with Old Testament and Stoic thought, Philo’s Logos is an active Logos. It repre-
sents God’s thought aimed towards manifestation. Here, however, Philo encountered a highly deli-
24 Cf. archierreus, “high priest” as the Logos in De fuga et inventione 108; De migratione Abrahami 102;
De somniis 1:215.
25 Cf. J. N. Bremmer. From Holy Books to Holy Bible: An Itinerary from Ancient Greece to Modern Islam
Via Second Temple Judaism and Early Christianity, in: M. Popović (ed.), Authoritative Scriptures in
Ancient Judaism. Leiden: Brill 2010, (pp. 327–360), p. 337: “In other words, at the time of Aristobulus
some Hellenized Jews, like Philo later (...), called the Pentateuch Hieros Logos, probably in order to
appropriate the huge prestige of Orpheus.” On the theory of Philo’s predecessor Aristobulus that Orpheus
in his Hieros logos (The Sacred Discourse, the name for the pseudo-Orphic poem included in the set of
Orphic Hieroi logoi) imitated Moses, see F. M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian
Culture, New York: Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 68 and Ch. Riedweg, Jüdisch-hellenistische
Imitation eines orphischen Hieros Logos: Beobachtungen zu OF 245 und 247 (sog. Testament des
Orpheus), Classica Monacensia, 7, Tübingen: Narr 1993, pp. 44–46 and p. 54: the pseudo-Orphic poem
is an imitation of the hieroi logoi, through which initiates were introduced to the Mysteries. Walter
Burkert defines hieroi logoi as “that which not to be disclosed to the uninitiated” – see Greek Religion,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1985, p. 277. In connection with Orpheus, Iamblichus
Chalcidensis speaks of Pythagoras as the author of the Hieros Logos, cf. VP 146 (Iamblichi De Vita
Pythagorica Liber, ed. L. Deubner, Leipzig: Teubner 1937). For Philo, see also the plural hoi hieroi
logoi, “the sacred words” (De sacrifiis Abelis et Caini 130) and hē fyseōs hieroi logoi – “sacred words of
nature” (De specialibus legibus 2:13).
26 Philo has no exclusive designation for the Torah, and so makes disparate use of sacred written speech: to
hierōtaton gramma, “the most sacred scripture” (Quod deus sit immutabilis 6 and elsewhere), to gramma
theion, “holy scripture” (De migratione Abrahami 85), hieros nomos, “sacred law” (De specialibus
legibus 3:119, 120, 4:205). The plural usage apparently refers to the Torah as a collection of texts: hai
hierai grafai, “sacred scriptures” (De opificio Mundi 77 and elsewhere), hai hierōtatai grafai, “most
sacred scriptures” (De Abrahamo 4), but also hai hierai bibloi, “sacred books” (De confusione linguarum
3 and elsewhere), hai hierōtatai bibloi, “most sacred books” (De vita Mosis 2:45 and elsewhere), hierai
anagrafai, “holy records” (De congressu eruditionis gratia 175 and elsewhere), hai hierai tū nomū
stēlai, “holy tablets of the law” (De specialibus legibus 1:280 and elsewhere), hai hierōtatai tú nomú
stēlais, “most holy tablets of the law” (De opificio mundi 1:128). In addition, the fact that the sacred
scriptures were a well-known phenomenon typical to marginal and alternative religious schools can be
found in both Christian and Jewish tradition, which refer to the Bible as hieros logos, cf. A. Henrichs,
Hieroi Logoi and Hierai Bibloi: The (Un)written Margins of the Sacred in Ancient Greece, Harvard
Studies in Classical Philology 101 (2003), (pp. 207–266) pp. 240–242. But the first reference to a “holy
book” is with the Egyptian “books of the gods” and “divine books”, which Greek literature starting in the
4th century BC century refers to as “holy books”; this trend is then adopted by Jews living in Egypt, cf.
J. N. Bremmer. From Holy Books to Holy Bible, pp. 333–336.
cate problem – how can someone think a divine thought if God is wholly incomparable to Man?
Philo was aware of the limitations of thinking of God in personalist terms; in addition, he describes
the relationship between God and Man as an event – i.e., not as something static – which allows the
reader not to get stuck on limitations. As a result, the Logos often has the character of something
special in relation to God27 that at the same time is the least improper to God. It is incomprehensible
in its activity. For instance, we read that it is incorporeal, not mixed with anything and “in no re-
spect different from the unit” (adiaforōn monados) (Quod deus sit immutabilis 83).28 In his treatise
“On the Creation of the World”, Philo writes that, just as an architect has an idea before the house is
built, so there first came the idea of the world within divine reason (theion logon), which was then
followed by its creation (De opificio mundi 20). God thus first created a model (paradeigma) and
then its imitation (mimēma) (16).29 For Philo, God himself may not be knowable, but one can talk
about the process of creation that precedes the world as it appears to Man. Here the Logos as the Di-
vine Logos is inherent to God and not his mere mediator. Furthermore, we should be aware that
analogous speech allows us to speak of God and see human thought as being dependent on divine
thought, and both of them always as thought of a different order.
Elsewhere, Philo says of a world resulting from divine thought: “...the intelligible world (kosmos
noētos) is nothing other than the God’s Logos, who is the one that creates the world” ( De opificio
mundi 24). Philo here somewhat boldly refers to Genesis 1:27, according to which God created Man
in his own image (25: kat' eikona theū, “in God’s image”, cf. Gn 1:27: “So God created man in his
own image [Hebrew: besalmō] ṣ – in the image of God [Hebrew: besælæm
ṣ elōhīm] created he him...”;
LXX: kai epoiēsen ho theos ton anthrōpon kat' eikona theū epoiēsen autū, “And God made man;
according to divine image he made it...”), and claims that what is true for the part can be said of the
whole: the world is thus an imitation of a divine image (of something that preceded creation).30
The first chapter of the Book of Genesis does not speak of “the word”, but of God creating by
uttering his pronouncements. We should not entirely forget this dynamic, even though we should
also remember that the Bible describes God’s pronouncements using “word” (dāḇār) or “words”.
“Word” was understood as an expressible active power, intelligible to the prophets, that manifested
itself and caused certain things to happen.31 In the Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 55:11), this power even
acts independently, although from divine impetus. In this regard, we can say that Philo here equates
the Hebrew “word” as God’s instrument of creation (organon)32 with the Platonic world of ideas as
a pattern for the visible world. And so God’s Logos not only creates the world but also includes its
intelligible aspect. It is thus of importance not only for the process of creation as such, but is a

27 The extent to which this difference is important to Philo can be seen in the differentiation between the
nameless God and the Logos, which has many names (De confusione linguarum 146), or the
differentiation between God and “the powers which attend” (doryforouseis dynameis) God (De
specialibus legibus 1:45).
28 See also De fuga et inventione 101 and Daniélou, J., Philo of Alexandria, transl. J. Colbert, Eugene /
Oregon: Wipf and Stick 2014, p. 121 et seq. The unique analogy of God and Logos – i.e., connection in
diversity – is expressed by the phrase “second god” (deuteros theos) in Quaestiones et solutiones in
Genesim 2:62 (see below).
29 This idea also accompanies several other mentions of the Logos in the mentioned text, for instance
25.139.141.
30 It would be naïve to speak of “image” within the context of Hellenistic philosophy, so when Philo writes
that God made Man “according to the Logos”, he took a step past the differentiation of Jewish and
Hellenistic thinking, cf. J. Arieti, Man and God in Philo: Philo’s Interpretation of Genesis 1:26, Lyceum,
4 (1992), (pp. 1–18) p. 18.
31 Cf. J. Hoblík, Proroci, jejich slova a jejich svět, Praha: Vyšehrad 2009, pp. 396–400.
32 Following from Aristotle’s theory of four causes, Philo speaks of God as cause, the four elements as
material, divine logic as instrument, and the Creator’s goodness as final cause, Cf. Peri tón Cherúbim
127, P. Frich, Providence in Philo of Alexandria, p. 109 and M. Šedina, Logos a pneuma: Filón
Alexandrijský a „gramatika“ hellenistické filozofie na počátku křesťanské éry, in: Filón Alexandrijský, O
stvoření světa. O gigantech. O neměnnosti boží, přel. M. Šedina, Praha, OIKOYMENH 2001, (pp. 7–
201) p. 124.
constant factor – about which Philo says, with critical reference to the Stoic version of the teaching
of the elements, that it is “establishing itself as a bond like vowels for something like consonant
elements” (De plantatione 10).

In “Who is the Heir of Divine Things” (Quis rerum divinarum heres sit) Philo structures the agency
of the Logos into two logoi and three levels. He does so using the story from the chapter 15 of
Genesis about the covenant that was established by the Lord with Abraham. We may assume that
what the Bible calls a covenant established by the Lord with Abraham, Philo understands as a
commitment that the Logos creates between God and Man – although he is thinking of Man in
general, whereas the Bible speaks of the patriarch of Israel through whom the Lord founds his union
with Israel. In so doing, he focuses on the passage in which the Lord commands Abraham to
prepare sacrificial animals for him – a three-year-old cow, three-year-old goat, three-year-old ram, a
turtledove and a pigeon (LXX states peristera). Abraham divided the mammals but not the birds (v.
10), which Philo interprets as follows: “As birds called he the two logoi which are winged and
soaring to concern themselves with high things; one of them as the archetypal pattern (archetypos)
above us, and the other as the imitation (mimēma) of the former among us. Moses calls the one
which is above us the image (eikōn) of God and the one which is among us the impression
(ekmageion) of that image. He says: ‘God made man’ not an image of God’s Logos ‘but after that
Image’. So that the mind which is in each of us, which is in reality and truth the man, is a third
pattern (typos) from the Creator. But the intermediate one is a model (paradeigma) of the one and a
copy (apeikonisma) of the other” (230 et seq.). Whereas Philo interprets the undivided pigeon
(domesticated bird) as the indivisible mind (nūs; i.e., soul) analogously with the heavens, or with
the turtledove as the divine Logos, (233 et. seq.), he understands the three divided mammals as the
six irrational components of the soul: the five senses and voice. In his interpretation, Philo also
outlines psychology in correspondence with cosmology (cf. 232 et seq.). The universality of the
Logos thus culminates in the Logos acting as a power connecting the divinity with the inner life of
Man, while also structuring this relationship.

Philo also comprehends the archetype as a basic form of connection between God and Man in “That
the Worse is Wont to Attack the Better”, although here he does so using the Stoic concept of the
pneuma,33 which allows him to move on to a reflection on Biblical themes while pondering the
rejuvenating power independently of the Stoic vision of the cosmos as a living being. He may have
found inspiration for a connection between the Logos and the pneuma in the Old Testament (in
Psalm 33:6, although the Hebrew word rūach here does not mean “spirit” but “breath”) and in the
deuterocanonical Book of Wisdom, which i.a. in the hymn 7:22b-8:1 speaks of an all-encompassing
and guiding breath of the spirit.34 The connection to the Old Testament is also clear in how Philo
speaks of God as the source of “the oldest Logos”, which is rational faculty (logikos) (as compared
to vital faculty, which Man has in common with all other living beings) and is ruled by God. This
faculty has the flowing form of “spirit, not moving air” (to pneuma, ūk aera kinūmenon). Here Philo
is apparently distinguishing between two meanings of the Greek word pneuma (cf. also the Hebrew
word rūach, “spirit”). Rational faculty is the divine pattern, an impression (typos), character,
expression, representation (charaktēr), which Moses (considered to be the author of the entire
Torah) calls “image”. From here it results that God is the “archetype of rational nature”, of which
Man is an imitation and the best form of soul, which is called “intellect and reason” ( ho nūs kai
logos) (Quod deterius potiori insidiari 81–83). The relationship between God and Man is thus more
than a relationship between creator and creation, for they are brought together by the agency of the
Logos and the spirit, and their relationship is governed by the analogy between divine and human
reason, which can be talked about only on the basis of the intermediary level that is rational faculty

33 On the relationship to the Stoic conception of pneuma, see M. Šedina, Logos a pneuma, p. 156 et seq.
34 On the influences visible in the hymn (Stoicism, Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, Isidian aretologies, perhaps
even Middle Platonism), see O. Kaiser, Odkaz alexandrijských Židů, tranl. J. Hoblík, Praha: Vyšehrad
2006, p. 158.
and that unconditional refers to its creator.
Generally speaking, Philo points out that the Logos relates to Man. In this regard and in its cosmic
aspect, talk of its activity can be seen to refer to its dynamic (or rather, hyperdynamic) nature,
because the Logos rules by active powers (dynameis), sometimes identified with “ideas” (ideai),35
with the intelligible world present in the “divine Logos” (De opificio mundi 20). Of the various
powers, the most important are the two called kyrios (“lord”) and theos (“god”) (De somniis 1:163:
“God is the name of the beneficent power, and lord is the title of the royal power”). Both these
powers appear to be interrelated (see Exodus 20:2, Deuteronomy 4:1, and De mutatione nominum
23) and sometimes even inherent to God.36 There is no need here to engage in the subtle differences
found in various treatises. More important for our purposes is the congruence of the concept of
dynameis not only with divinity, but also with holiness, which authors writing about Philo usually
fail to mention.
A relatively consistent meditation on God, Logos and powers in relation to the Holy can be found in
Philo’s exegetical treatise “Questions and Answers on Exodus”, which offers a good example of
how sacral symbolism became the subject of a rationalizing (Philo aptly differentiates between
“dianoetic” and “literal” meaning, cf., e.g., Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum 2:47) allegorical
interpretation that leads to clear differentiations. In 2:68, he describes the main parts of the Holy of
Holies or, as Philo calls it, “inner sanctuary” (esōtatūs hagiūs; in 2:53 and elsewhere adyton), which
represent cosmic principles – and not only that; since these principles are concentrated in the Holy
of Holies, it is here that cosmic events unfold as holy events, hierarchized using seven elements into
five levels, starting with God and ending with the intelligible world.
The Holy of Holies is home to the Ark of the Covenant, which symbolizes the intelligible world
(according to 2:53, it is the repository of the Law) and contains the incorporeal world and laws. Its
cover was the “mercy-seat” (hilastērion), a symbol of propitious and beneficent power (cf. 2:60).
Above the Ark are two cherubs (cf. Exodus 25:18–20 and De cherubim 27–28), symbolizing the
two powers of God, which are also “ideas of ideas” (ideai ideōn) (cf. 2:62–64). These are the
creative power (poiētikos), which is the source of propitious (hileōs) a beneficent (euergeros)
power, and the kingly power (basilikos), which is the source of punitive (kolastērios) and legislative
(nomothetikos) power. These are something like secondary powers that exist next to the primary
powers, which are also known as “god” and “lord”. Through the primary powers is divided what
only God can combine as Creator and King (cf. 2:66). Located above them is the divine Logos, and
above the Logos is “the Speaker” or “the one acting through speech” (ho legōn). The divine Logos
is the agent (technitēs, 2:53) of all events (at one place in 2:68, it is mentioned in conjunction with
fōnē, “voice”), the primary medium for a God who acts through speech, who is the subject of the
Logos as action; it is the beginning of external differentiation vis-à-vis God in general. The Logos

35 God created all things using “incorporeal powers” (asōmateis dynameis) whose “proper name is ideas”
(etypon onoma hai ideai), making full use thereof, thus giving each genus (genos) its form (morfē) (De
specialibus legibus 1:329). This is one of the consequences of Philo’s Platonic interpretation of the Bible,
cf. Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 174.
36 See also De cherubim 27–28: the single God possesses two primal powers, of which the first is the
cretive agathotēta, (“goodness”), whereas the second, exousia (“authority”) manages the creation, but
both are brought together by Logos as a third element of the good and ruling God. The first two powers
are symbolized by cherubs, whereas the Logos is symbolized by a flaming sword. In connection with his
discussion of Israel’s six cities of refuge in De fuga et inventione 94–99 (cf. Numbers 35:10–29 and De
fuga et inventione 5 and 12–14), which belonged to the “ministers of the temple”, Philo speaks of five
powers that are led by “God’s Logos” (94; to metapher ēniochos, “charioteer” cf. 101) as the main refuge
from evil, and which leads Man to know God, with a foundation in “fear” (fobos) and a focus on zoē
aidia (“eternal life”), which Man draws from “God’s Logos” as the “fountain of wisdom” (97); he also
equates dynamis eleōs (“merciful power”) with a the cover of the Ark in the Temple of Jerusalem, and
equates dynamis poietikē (“creative power”) and dynamis basilikē (“kingly power”) with the cherubs on
the Ark (100; the two remaining powers are those that enjoin what is to be done and those prohibiting
what ought not to be done, 104); in Legatio ad Gaium 6–7, he enumerates five powers that surround God
as a king without hierarchical organization – creative, kingly, foreknowing, beneficent and punitive.
and its subject have no counterparts in the symbolic equipment of the sanctuary – and this special
nature of theirs hints at divine transcendence and the Logos’ related mediating function.37
The Logos’ localization within the Holy of Holies of the Temple in Jerusalem, the holy center of
Israel, is strong evidence that Philo saw the Logos as a holy entity. Further proof can be found in
Philo’s other Biblical interpretations in which the Logos is associated with the idea of priest or
angel. Taken as a whole, the Logos can be understood as active reason emanating from God,
imbued with holy power, with which it rules through the particular powers while exceeding but not
violating the difference between God and Creation. “The Holy” corresponds with the paradoxical
nature of this relationship.
God’s relationship to Creation does not mean his dependence. Philo insists on God’s aseity, immov-
ability and immutability, none of which pertains to “creative power” (poiētikē dynamis) or to “a
god” (theos with no article in the Greek) who belongs to someone (cf. Genesis 17:1: “I am thy
God”) and is the creator of something, for God is not determined by any relationship to anything,
being full of himself and sufficient for himself (De mutatione nominum 27–31; on God’s lack of ties
to Creation, see De specialibus legibus 329). At the same time, divine transcendence qualifies di-
vine revelation – and, by analogy, the powers active in the world possess something transcendent. 38
In the modern era, “the Holy” has been assigned to the realm of the “irrational”, but when we look
at Philo’s work, although it exists in tension with human intellect, in pertaining to the Logos it tran-
scends it.
The holiness of the Logos is also visible from the fact that it is manifested through wonders. It was
the Logos that in chapter 3 of the Book of Exodus appeared to Moses 39 in the burning bush (v. 2–4)
– which lets us associate it with that which expresses itself through (but not with expressions of) a
fiery and thus impersonal respect-evoking presence, with God’s utterances, and with the messenger
who appeared in the burning bush (v. 2).40 Perhaps Philo relies on this, too, in his effort at personify-
ing the Logos. In any case, for Philo the angel personifies the interface in God’s relationship to Man
(see in particular De agricultura 51), and thus fulfills its role as angel in the Hebrew tradition.
The other miraculous motif is manna as a gift from heaven and symbol of earthbound beings’

37 This mediating function can be seen in Philo’s much-discussed use of “second god” (deuteros theos) to
describe the Logos, cf. Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim 2:62 (with reference to Genesis 9:6, where
God says that he made Man in “God’s” image and not “his” image; Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum
2:68. The Logos mediates that which Man cannot mediated directly himself – his share in THE BEING,
cf. M . D. Litwa, The Deification of Moses in Philo of Alexandria, in: D. T. Runia – G. E. Sterling,
Studia Philonica Annual, XXVI, Atlanta / Georgia: SBL Press 2014 (pp. 1–28), pp. 9. Also D. T. Runia,
A Note on Philo and Christian Heresy, in: Runia, Philo and the Church Fathers: A Collection of Papers,
Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 32, Leiden et. al.: Brill 1995, (str. 144–154) str. 153: “Philo’s
exegesis (…) in calling the Logos ‘the second god’ subordinates the Logos to God himself more clearly
than anywhere else in his writings...” We should add, however, that it is not enough to spe ak only of
differences.
38 They are agenētois (“unoriginated”) and – vis-à-vis God, not vis-à-vis Creation – akritois, “unmixed”; cf.
Quod Deus sit immutabilis 78; like God, they are aperigrafoi (“uncircumscribed”, cf. De sacrificiis
Abelis et Caini 59; in De specialibus legibus 1:47 Philo writes that the powers are akatalēptoi
(“incomprehensible”) in their essence, but that they reflect their energeia (“activity”). Thus, A. Kamesar
writes: “... while the Logos illuminates the revealed aspect of God, the powers allow at least a glimpse of
the mysterious essence of God, which is power in unity, in as much as God is one and unique,” cf. The
Cambridge Companion to Philo, p. 101
39 Philo considers him to be the hierophant who “inscribed the one entire holy book (hiera biblos) of the
legislation, Exodus” (De migratione Abrahami 14; see also De posteritate Caini 16, 173; De Gigantibus
54; De somniis 2:3, 29, 109 and elsewhere). We should nevertheless add that in Quod omnis probus liber
sit 13 Philo speaks of the “most sacred Plato” (hierōtatos Platón).
40 Cf. De vita Mosis I:66: the angel recalls eikōn tū ontos (“the image of being”, apparently a reference to
the nexus of the Logos with God), 67: angelos, “messenger” as a symbol of divine providence, and De
mutatione nominum 87: angellos jako logos tū theū; De confusione linguarum 146 apparently references
Exodus 3:14, where the highest angel (archangelos) from Exodus 20:14 is identified with God’s name
and with the Logos.
dependence: “For [the good man] raises his eyes to the sky, beholding the manna, the divine Logos,
heavenly, incorruptible food of the soul, which is food of contemplation (psychē filotheamona)...”
(Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 79). The image of manna shows the Logos as something that is
important for life and that Man takes in. The Logos is thus not just an external power related to the
cosmos and all that surrounds Man, but is spiritual food for Man, something that nourishes his inner
spiritual life. Thus the thinking of God is connection to that of Man.
This connection in no way makes God human, but acts on human experience. If the mention of a
contemplative soul can be associated with Philo’s possible mysticism, 41 we can hypothetically relate
his sense for the Holy and his indirectly expressed understanding of the Logos as a sacred entity to
an experience of the Holy that is in some ways similar to prophetic inspiration, which Philo
addressed several times.42

Conclusion

The Logos is not just a sign, nor is it mere verbal utterance. Philo is in agreement with both Greek
philosophy and Hebrew tradition in that it is something “more”. The Logos is a rational cosmic
power,43 although unlike the Stoics the Bible does not speak of the elements and materiality.
But from Philo’s reflections of the Bible, there follows another way of seeing in which sense the
Logos as divine power is capable of bearing this “more”. We can infer its dynamic nature from its
status as something between interiority of God and the differentiated powers. It is not only rational
power, but holy power, finding expression in the “holy texts”, thus allowing for a reflection of the
manifestations of the Holy in the temple, in revelations and wonders. But for Philo, “holiness“ is
only rarely an express of the Logos, apparently in particular because hieros logos was one term used
for the Torah, as it was for the texts of the ancient Mysteries.
Nor is it the mere potentiality of power. It is an active power, a kind of agent, and as such can be
reflected through personalist symbolism. As such, it prefigures the human mind in what it is and in
what it should do – and thus also presaging it in its possible “godliness”.
As a link between God and the world, the Logos also expresses and overcomes the distance be-
tween the two.44 This is important because the ideas of a “distant” God are metaphors that tempt us
towards religious alienation, although their actual intent is to express God’s majesty and incompara-
bility, and the inability to identify the divine in the world. They are nevertheless insufficient for an
expression of divinity.
If the Logos manifested itself in the burning bush, this means combining divine distance with divine
expression. In addition, what is particularly noteworthy in the identification of the Logos with the
burning bush (but not directly with it) is that it creates and reveals an intersection between religion
and philosophy: Reason is revealed to reason. With this in mind, human reason cannot think that
only it is reason. There is far more that is rational in the world than just human reason. This notion
also anticipates Hegel’s later religious-philosophical attempts at demonstrating reason in religion.45

41 Cf. Chadwick, H., Philo and the Beginnings of the Christian Thought, in: A. H. Armstrong (Ed.), The
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 20087, (pp. 133–192) pp. 151–154.
42 Ibid., p. 149 et seq.
43 Cf. J. Leonhardt-Balzer, Der Logos und die Schöpfung, p. 302: “Der Logos als Ort der Ideen ist das
machtvolle Schöpferwort, das schafft, was es sagt.“
44 The need to overcome this distance exists for Man, not for God.
45 Hegel also analyzed Philo’s philosophy, criticizing it for a lack of dialectics, Cf. Vorlesungen über die
Geschichte der Philosophie, II, Werke, 20, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1986, p. 423 et seq., where Hegel
writes, though somewhat brusquely: “Überhaupt ist diese Philosophie weniger Metaphysik des Begriffes
oder Denkens selbst, als daß der Geist nur im reinen Denken erscheint, nicht hier in der Weise der
Vorstellung ist und die Begriffe, Ideen als selbständige Gestalten vorgestellt sind.”
 Summary:

This study looks at the impact that the study of the Hebrew bible had on the philosophical thinking
of the most important Hellenistic Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria. This impact is
demonstrated using the example of the motif of holiness in relation to the concept of the Logos.
Only rarely did Philo directly call the Logos “holy”, perhaps because he called the Torah the “Holy
Logos” in connection with the Mystery tradition. For Philo, the holiness of Logos was not the
question, although there was a significant association. This is clear where the Logos is symbolized
by a priest, where it acts as an agent that causes revelations and miracles, but also through its
connection with God. The Logos appears supremely as the highest sub-divine power of reason in
Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum, where it is described as an agent of sacred action in the Holy
of Holies of the Temple in Jerusalem, where the processes of the cosmos were represented. The
transcendent character of the Logos as externalized as a character of God’s reason also involves a
crossing distance between God and the world that in its paradoxical character closely corresponds to
its holiness.

Keywords:

Philo of Alexandria – Logos – Holiness – Holy Logos

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