Burnett - Philo On Immortality

Philo on Immortality: A Thematic Study of Philo's Concept of παλιγγενεσία
Author(s): FRED W. BURNETT

Source: The Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (July, 1984), pp. 447-470
Published by: Catholic Biblical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43716731
Accessed: 18-11-2016 15:18 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Catholic Biblical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Catholic Biblical Quarterly
This content downloaded from 132.236.27.217 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 15:18:43 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Philo on Immortality:
A Thematic Study of Philo's Concept
of naXiyyeveoia
FRED W. BURNETT
Anderson College
Anderson, IN 46012
The term TtaXiyyEvsaia has had a longstanding relation in Hellenism

with almost any discussion about the immortality of the soul or the cosmos.1
Consequently, all of the questions which surround the concepts of immortal-
ity in general also orbit TcaXiyysveaia.
Philo's works are no exception. When one speaks of TcaXiyyeveaia in
Philo, one speaks simultaneously of what is perhaps the organizing center of
his thought, viz., the migration of the soul towards immortality.2 If the
1 On the history of TuaXiyYEveaia, see H. Leisegang, "Palingenesia ," PW 18 (1949) 139-

48; F. Büchsei, "TtaXiyyevsaia," TDNT I. 681-88; and J. Dey, IJAAITTENELIA: Ein Beitrag zur
Klärung der religionsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung von Tit 3,5 (NTAbh 17; Münster: Aschendorff,
1937).
2 See e.g., E. R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism
(Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1969) 246-56; S. Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of
Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College, 1956) 100-
104, 141-85; and E. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie
(Etudes de philosophie médiévale 8; 2d ed.; Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1925) 45-66.
Here we are speaking, of course, only of the rational soul. It is commonly known that
Philo distinguishes between a rational and irrational soul, or between a "higher" and "lower"
mind (cf. Leg. All. 2.4-52). The former is divine and immortal, while the latter is mortal and
pulls towards the material {Leg. All. 2.32,42,49,55,88,90; cf. Virt. 205). The higher mind is the
soul which pursues virtue and the immaterial world, while the lower mind cannot consistently
practice virtue, and thus naturally forfeits immortality (Virt. 205). See H. A. Wolfson, Philo
(2 vols.; rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University, 1948), 1. 362-66, 385-92; S. Sandmel, Philo of
Alexandria: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University, 1979) 25, 153-54; and E. R.
Goodenough, "Philo on Immortality," HTR 39 (1946) 94-98.
447
448 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY | 46, 1984
meaning of rcakiyyeveaia in Philo can be clarified, then some understanding

should follow about Philo's general understanding of immortality. For
example, does nahiyyevEoia in Philo mean primarily "immortality," i.e., a
reabsorption of the individual soul into the Universal Soul, or does it mean
"resurrection" in any Jewish sense of the word? At what point does rcaXiy-
yevEoia occur in the life of the migrating soul? Can it occur before or only
after the death of the body? How does Philo relate TiaXiyyeveaia to the
ethical life? Do all souls experience TiaXiyyevsaia or only the virtuous ones?
Is rebirth of the soul for Philo causally related to the life of virtue? What
happens to the soul after Ttaîyysveaia? Is there a judgment of any kind or
does the soul go to Hades and undergo progressive purification? Or, if neither
of these, what does happen to the soul? The purpose of this study is to clarify
Philo's use(s) of rcaXiyyeveaia and attempt to answer these related questions
about his view of immortality.3
In order to understand Philo's use of TtaXiyyeveaia, one particular
passage will be used as a test case. After it is seen how the term functions
within this passage, a comparison will be made with other Philonic passages
in which naXiyyeveoia occurs.4 The passage we have chosen, De Cherubim
113-15, is a context replete with rhetorical questions about the destiny of
the soul.5
Preliminary Observations
De Cherubim is part of Legum Allegoriae , a long series of 21 treatises,
each of which interprets allegorically some part of Genesis. This is a signifi-
cant point methodologically because it will determine our approach to the
material. On the one hand, commentators have agonized in reading this
group of treatises because Philo simply cites a biblical text and interprets it
in a "stream of consciousness" manner. He inserts new citations of Scripture
into his argument and makes excursuses which lead the unwary reader to
believe that he has no discernible system of exposition. The 21 treatises on
Genesis as a whole seem to have no central theme.6 However, the approach
3 It should be noted that this paper will not deal with Philo's sources for the term
7caXiyysv£aia (see n. 84 below).
4 All English translations, unless otherwise noted, will follow Philo (LCL 10 vols.; and
2 supp. vols.). Abbreviations usually follow the list in LCL 1.
5 In the treatises of undisputed Philonic authorship TuaXiyyeveaia occurs four times
{Cher. 114; Post. 124; Mos. 1.65; begatio 325). In De Aeternitate Mundi , for which Philonic
authorship is disputed, the term occurs nine times (9,47,76,85[bis],93,99,103,107).
6 Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 77-78; and E. R. Goodenough, An Introduction to
Philo Judaeus (2d ed.; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962) 47.
PHILO ON IMMORTALITY 449
which is usually recommended is a thematic one, i.e., to trace one c

motif throughout the work.7 We shall do this with the concept
ysvsaia except that we shall first approach it within the thematic c
De Cherubim as a whole. On the other hand, commentators ag
Legum Allegoriae is crucial for any attempt to understand Philo. It
because the treatises are intimately related to Philo's thought as
one concept in them is to be understood (such as TtaXiyyevsaia
necessity one must utilize the entire Philonic corpus.
Second, Legum Allegoriae could be addressed to a particular
the "initiates" (jaúcrcai).8 The "initiates" would most likely be
knew the main points of Philonic doctrine, as presented in The Exp
the Law , and who were ready to proceed into a deeper underst
them. If Legum Allegoriae were written for such persons, then
partially explain its unintelligible nature to the uninitiated.9 Al
can neither be certain that it as a whole was written for the î
whether each treatise was addressed to a different audience each tim
appear that De Cherubim itself was written for the initiated. Philo
says that the instruction in this treatise is "a divine mystery" (xeX
0eíaç), the "holiest secret" (xcov tepcoxdicov), to be taught (àva
only to worthy initiates (àÇíouç . . . |ióaiaę, Cher. 42). In the ne
Philo clearly marks the beginning of the "sacred instruction" (ifjç
on Gen 4:1a.10
Goodenough has attempted to present a plan of organization for part of Leg. All. (Conf
through Fug.). He argues that Philo is describing how the novice becomes initiated into the
Jewish mystery which Philo represents (By Light , 245-55). Sandmel argues that the narrative
nature of the Pentateuch itself binds Leg. All. together ( Philo of Alexandria , 24). A promising
approach is the attempt, just begun, to classify Philo's exegetical methods in order to see what
patterns emerge. For a summary of suggestions, see B. L. Mack, "Exegetical Traditions in
Alexandrian Judaism: A Program for the Analysis of the Philonic Corpus," Studia Philonica 3
(1974-75) 71-112.
7 E.g., S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 78; and E. R. Goodenough, Introduction to
Philo , 47-48.
8 Cf. Leg. All. 1.29; Cher. 42,48,49; Sac. 33,60,62; Post. 173; Gig . 54; Det. 61; Fug. 85;
Som. 2.78.
9 E. R. Goodenough, Introduction to Philo , 47-48; By Light , 213-14, 292. The term

HÚairiç does not necessarily imply an initiate into a mystery religion , but could simply mean, as
we are using it, one who is no longer a novice in Philonic doctrine (cf. H. A. Wolfson, Philo,
1. 51-55). The teaching of Philo which is represented in Leg. All. could have taken place in the
synagogue, or for initiates in a wisdom school of which Philo was a part (cf. R. A. Culpepper,
The Johannine School: An Evaluation of the Johannine School Hypothesis Based on an Inves-
tigation of the Nature of Ancient Schools (SBLDS 26; Chico, CA: Scholars, 1975), chap. 9. For
a summary of the various positions on Philo's possible life-situation, see V. Nikiprowetzky, Le
commentaire de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie (Leiden: Brill, 1977) 170-202.
10 Cher. 43; cf. §40,48-49. Wolfson sees this language as a polemic against the mysteries
{Philo, 1. 50-51), while Goodenough sees it as language of the mysteries (By Light , 202).
To put it succinctly, if Philo addressed De Cherubim to those who were

familiar with his teachings, then we cannot expect him to give a complete
presentation of rcakiyyeveaia in this treatise. We shall, of necessity, have to
utilize the entire Philonic corpus in order to understand what he implies by
this term in De Cherubim .n The first step, though, is to investigate the use of
rcaXiyyeveaia within the context of De Cherubim itself.
The Context of Cher . 113-15
A. Philo begins Cher. 1 13 in a way which clearly shows that this section
is a continuation of his previous discussion (Oôxcoç oöv). This passage is part
of a discussion which begins at Cher. 40. Philo quotes Gen 4: 1, alludes to 4:2,
and proceeds to expound the meaning of v. 1. The dominant theme of Philo's
exposition is that God himself, as opposed to the "mind in us" (ó èv Ý'' iïv
voûç, §57), causes the growth of virtue in the soul (§44). The growth of virtue
and the union of voõç with ata0r|aiç are both due to the creative activity of
God. The voõç thinks that these activities are its own handiwork.12 The point
Philo makes is that the soul and its growth in virtue are God's work (§44),
and this theme is sounded repeatedly in the treatise.13
B. Philo also makes the point that the mind (vouç) at one time was
incomplete, i.e., it "had no contact with body (aco jiatoç)," and it had no
sense-perception (aïa0r|aiç, §58). The mind "was but half the perfect soul
(Tļjiiai) '1a>XT1ç isXeíaç) . . . bereft of its mate ... the sense-perceiving organs"
(§59). God, then, completed the soul by uniting mind with sense-perception
(§60; cf. §44).
Philo is speaking within the larger context of his psychological dualism.
For Philo "we" are born as a mixture of body and soul.14 The passions and
senses are found in the body, and the virtues in the soul. The soul is immate-
1 1 It seems that one must assume, as does Sandmel, that "the individual allegorical items
in Philo all fit into what we might call his 'grand Allego ry'" (Philo of Alexandria , 24). If this is
not the case, then interpretation of any part of Leg. All. would become more difficult than it
already is, if not impossible.
12 See Cher. 57,65,66,71,77. Even in the examples of the patriarchs, Philo points out that
they "need/ request" (ÔEonévcp) sophia (§45-46), and then they receive certain virtues from God
(cf. §41) in order to unite with sophia.
Philo says that in Moses' case, however, Zipporah was found pregnant, i.e., Moses achieved
union with sophia "without supplication or entreaty" (§47). This could imply that Philo some-
how places Moses above the patriarchs (see Goodenough, By Light , 201; and parts 1 and 2
below).
13 Cf. Cher. 40-47,49,65,71,77,83,84,106-9.
14 This is apparently what we today would call the "personality" or "ego." See E. R.
Goodenough, By Light , 375-76.
rial, and thus capable of perceiving the intelligible world of ideas (K

vor|TÓç), while the body is material and perceives only the material
(Koaôç ata0r|TÓç).15 The soul, or the higher mind, is to regulate the bod
that good results.16 If the soul continues to control sense-perceptio
grow in virtue, it will ultimately be freed from the body and its influen
In De Cherubim Adam is presented as mind which exists before s
perception (§60). In this condition the mind is "neutral."18 When
(Adam) mingles with body (Eve), bodily perceptions are allowed to d
nate so that the mind "was filled and puffed up with unreasoning pride
thus thought that all things were its own possessions."19 Adam, then, n
his son "Cain," which means "possession."20 The mind, therefore, fo
believes that it is self-sufficient. The parenesis in De Cherubim is t
oneself from "Cain" and recognize that God is the cause of the unio
109). In other words, the soul must accept its passive role in its mig
towards virtue. The soul must realize that God, not itself, is the actor.2
C. Philo's point is that "we" are a mixture (aúyKpijaa) of the ma
and the immaterial, of body and soul. "We," like Adam, do not exis
the mixture of body and soul occurs.22 It is in that mixture that the ac
of perception begins, but the soul itself is the locus of one's awar
and consciousness.23
D. Philo also points out that the body and soul, the rational and ir-
rational parts of "us," stand in a complementary relationship with each
other. The rational soul uses sense-perception to form the rational concepts
which are necessary for its ultimate escape from the world of sense-per-
ception.24 God intended the mixture of the mind with sense-perception to be
15 Cf. Op. 16; Mos. 2.127; and H. R. Willoughby, Pagan Regeneration: A Study of
Mystery Initiations in the Graeco- Roman World (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960) 233-37.
16 Cf. Leg. All. 1.50; 3.221-45.
17 See Plant. 45; S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 25, 100. On synonyms which Philo uses
for the mind as a rational soul, see H. A. Wolfson, Philo 1.389-95.
18 Cher. 59; cf. Leg. All. 3.246-47.
19 Cher. 64 cf. §10; Leg. All. 1.55; 2.34-35,49; Plant. 46.
20 Cher. 53,65-66; cf. Leg. All. 2.68-70. For a full discussion of "Adam," see LCL 10.280-86.
21 Cf. Leg. All. 1.82; H. R. Willoughby, Pagan Regeneration , 249.
22 Cher. 1 13; cf. 657,60.
23 Cher. 60-61; cf. Leg. All. 2.35-37, 40; Cong. 98; S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 100;
E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 375; J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus (2 vols.; London: Williams and
Norgate, 1888), 1. 343-44. In Cher, this refers to the human soul (the "Adam" formed out of the
earth), not to Adam as primal mind (cf. Leg. All. 2.4,13).
24 Cf. Leg. All. 2.5,49-52; H. A. Wolfson, Philo , 1. 392-93. The mind "mingles with"
(elaKpivó(i6vov) but is "not yet blended with (elcKEKptuévov) body" {Leg. All. 1.32; cf. Ebr.
101). Philo makes the point explicit in Cher. 1 14 that after death the mind which is mixed with
the body shall become unmixed, the aúyicpiToi become àaúyicpiToi (cf. Ebr. 101).
a harmonious and joyous one {Cher. 109-12; cf. 86). The mixture is harmo-
nious when the soul dominates and results in virtues,25 but it is evil when the
senses dominate the soul (e.g., Leg. All. 2.49-52).
riaîyyeveaia in Cher. 113-15

Philo begins Cher. 1 13 with a summary of the above-mentioned themes.
He says:
In this way combining all things (B) He claimed the sovereignty of all for
Himself (A); to His subjects He assigned the use and enjoyment of themselves
and each other (D). For indeed we have ourselves and all that go to make these
selves (D) for use (xprjcnç). I am formed (auveaicoç) of soul and body (C), I
seem to have (ëxew ôokûv) mind (voOv), reason (Xóyov), sense (aïa0r|aiv), yet I
find none of them is really mine (A).
It is within the context of these motifs that Philo wishes 7uaXiyyEvsaia to

be understood.
Philo then asks a series of rhetorical questions:
Where was my body before birth (rcpò yevéoEtûç), and whither will it go when I
have departed? What has become of the changes produced by life's various
stages in the seemingly permanent self? Where is the babe that once I was, the
boy and the other gradations between boy and full-grown man? Whence came
the soul, whither will it go, how long will it be our mate and comrade? Can we
tell its essential nature? When did we get it? Before birth? But then there was no
'ourselves. ' What of it after death?
The function of these questions is not to say that his readers are totally
ignorant about the soul before its birth (cf. Cher. 58-64). Their function is to
reiterate that the mixture of mind and body, as well as the growth of virtue in
the soul, is not our doing (cf. Cher. 116-19). The soul is simply not under
our control:
Even now in this life, we are the ruled rather than the rulers, known (yvcopiÇó-
ļi£0a) rather than knowing (yvcopíÇoîev). The soul knows (olÔe) us, though we
know it not (oi> yvcûpiÇo1ié^r| ); it lays on us commands, which we must fain
obey, as a servant obeys his mistress.26
It is not always clear whether Philo simply envisions a bipartite soul consisting of rational
and irrational parts or whether he posits two souls, one rational and the other irrational. The
former seems more likely. At any rate, when Philo speaks of the soul's immortality, he means by
"soul," as we do in this essay, the rational part of the soul or the rational soul itself (see, e.g.,
John Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 [Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University, 1977] 174-78; S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 99-100).
25 Cf. Leg. All. 1.50; 2.7-8; 3.221.
26 Cher. 1 15. Philo seems to be building upon an earlier contrast of yvõaiç and ¿TuaTiļjiiļ.
The term rcaXiyysveaia occurs within the context of these questions:
What of it [the soul] after death? But then we who are here joined to th
creatures of composition and quality, shall be no more, but shall go for
our rebirth (rcaXiyyeveaiav), to be with the unbodied, without composi
without quality.
1. Philo's first point is that rebirth consists of the soul beco

"unbodied" (dacojiorrcov), being "without composition" (àaúyicpiT
"without quality" (arcoioi). Before rebirth can occur, the "mixture" (aú
toi) of body and soul must cease to exist. Philo seems to mean that the
which was incorporeal before mixing with the body, will be able to re
the place of incorporeal ideas.27 Philo defines God (0eóç) as "a ho
incorporeal dwelling-place of incorporeal ideas" (aaíDjiáxíov iSecov
Xcopa, §49). This incorporeal "house" is the ultimate dwelling-plac
incorporeal soul, and it is a goal to which God himself, by the procrea
virtues in the soul, is attempting to move it. The question Philo asks o
soul is:
The mingling of mind (Adam) with sense-perception (Eve) is spoken of as Adam "knew" (čyvto)
Eve. The sexual imagery connoted by Philo's use of yivcboKio is contrasted with ¿TuaTTļjiTļ, the
knowledge of sophia, which came about in the patriarchs because they did not "know"
(yvœpiÇovxaç) women, or sense-perception {Cher. 40-41). If Philo intends this distinction to
apply in Cher. 1 15, then his meaning is that "we" did not cause the birth of virtue in the soul, nor
do "we" exercise any control over it now. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Philo
uses sexual/nuptial imagery to emphasize the autonomy of the soul: "And when it will, it will
claim its divorce (à7ióXeiyiç) in court" (Cher. 1 15; cf. LCL 2. 486 n. 1 15).
27 Cf. Cher. 58; Leg. All. 1.91; Phaedo 80 A,B. The text could read aúyicpixoi rcoioí, as
Colson and Whitaker note (LCL 2. 485 n. 1 14). If Philo is following the Stoic understanding of
TtaXiyyevEoia, then the soul, "though áoàâxoç, would still be aúyicpixoç (of fire and water)
and tcoíoç" (ibid.). Stoic materialism posited that the qualities (tcoioí) of the soul are "bodies"
(see J. Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta [4 vols.; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964], 2. 797; and
E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics [rev. ed.; New York: Russell & Russell, 1962]
210-13).
However, it cannot be decided with certainty that Philo is in agreement with Stoic cate-
gories here. In fact, just the reverse seems to be the case. Philo's use of àaconaxoç does not
imply, as it does for the Stoics, that the reborn soul could still be aúyicpixoç and noióç (see
E. Zeller, ibid., 210 n. 1; 218 n. 1). E.g., Philo alludes to God as áoónaxoç and he clearly means
"incorporeal" (Spec. 2.176). He describes the ideas created by God as "incorporeal" (áatójacrcoi
I5éai, Spec. 1 .327). Philo also describes angels and demons as àoíónaxoç, and he seems to mean
that they are of the same substance as mind, i.e., they do not consist of any elements (H.A.
Wolfson, Philo , 1.370; cf. 2.94, 151). If this interpretation can be applied to Cher. 1 14-15, then it
appears that áoáiiaxoç would mean that the rational soul or mind is incorporeal, i.e., it is freed
from being aúyicpixoç at its rebirth and again assumes the incorporeal nature of the ideas (cf.
Phaedo 79C,D; 80D-81E; H. A. Wolfson, Philo , 2. 101-10).
Why then, soul of man, when thou shouldst live the virgin life in the house of
God and cling to knowledge (è7uaTT11ir|ç), dost thou stand aloof from them and
embrace outward sense (aïa0r|aiv), which unmans and defiles thee?28
The objective of God is to unite (ouvGeíç) all things of the soul to himself
(Cher. 1 13). Rebirth is the reunion of the soul with the place of incorporeal
ideas, but it cannot occur until the body/soul mixture has been dissolved.
In De Cherubim , then, one meaning of rebirth is that the soul moves
from yvõaiç, the mingling with (Eve), to ¿7ūiaxiļļar|, the union with sophia.
In his opening comments on Gen 4:1 Philo points out that "knowledge"
(67iiaxrļ|iTļ) is not sexual union (yivcoaKco) with sense-perception. "Knowl-
edge" (erciaTiļuri), he says, comes into being through estrangement from
sense and body.29 The patriarchs, who achieved ¿tciotiíiít), rejected the union
with sense-perception in order to effect a marriage with sophia (Cher. 41),
which for Philo means perception of the intelligible world.30 'ETuaTTļļrrļ is
the recognition that "we" do not possess or produce the growth of virtue in
our souls. It is to get rid of "Cain," the delusion that "we" cause virtue to
grow in the soul. Those souls "of the same spirit" (xiç amo ïç ó|ióÇr|Xoç) as
the patriarchs can also marry sophia and be reborn into the intelligible world
(cf. Cher. 40-41,45-46,49-50). riakiyyeveaia, then, is the soul's return to its
pre- Adamie state,31 yet this time the soul can perceive immaterial things
clearly (Cher. 71-72; cf. 58-60,64-66). Rebirth of the soul is to become
pure mind.
Philo makes this clear in his presentation of Moses. Moses, who repre-
sents the mind in its purest state (voõç ó Kaôapóxaioç),32 at the point of
death has his "twofold nature of soul and body" resolved by God "into a
28 Cher. 52; cf. §49-51,98-101.

29 Cher. 41; cf. §40. Although the contrast between yvoiaiç and ¿7uiaxiinr| seems to be
clear in this particular passage, it is neither clear that Philo consistently contrasts the two nor
what his source for the contrast might be. Plato, e.g., consistently contrasts ¿Tuiaiiiniļ with ôóÇa
and aÏCT0r)aiç but not with yvœaiç (see I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines ,
vol. 2: Plato on Knowledge and Reality [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963] 33-135; R. C.
Cross and A. D. Woozley, "Knowledge, Belief, and the Forms," in Plato: A Collection of
Critical Essays [ed. Gregory Vlastos; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971] 70-96). In this instance
Philo probably derives the contrast of yvcîjaiç with ¿7riaxTļ^rļ from the use of yivcoaica) as a
euphemism for sexual intercourse in the LXX passage itself (cf. Gen. 4:1,17,25).
30 Sophia is at once the goal (= ¿Triat^nri Geoö) of the migrating soul ( Deus 143; cf.
Plant. 23; Mig. 171,218; Her. 14), and the guide to the goal. The goal is the perception of "the
divine Word" (tòv Geïov Xóyov, Som. 1.66; cf. Mig. 26-30), or the intelligible world (Op. 20;
Som. 1.66-68,1 17,227-29). Goodenough points out that è7tiaxi1nr| is usually synonymous with
sophia for Philo (By Light , 251).
31 It is a return to the state before the "man moulded of the earth" (Adam) united with his
helpers (sense-perception and passions). Cf. Leg. All. 2.4-5; and Republic 61 1B-612A.
32 Mut. 208; cf. §107; Leg. All. 1.40.
single unity" (etę jôváSoç avsaioiêiou <pi3aiv).33 God transform

"whole being into mind, pure as the sunlight" (Mos. 2.288; cf. Sa
In De Cherubim Moses is presented as being in the same spir
patriarchs, i.e., wedded to sophia.34 The goal of Moses, of the patria
of all the souls which follow them, is rebirth into an incorpor
pure mind.35
2. In Cher. 1 14 naXiyyevzoia occurs after the literal death of th
(|i6íà tòv 0ávaxov). This might seem like an innocuous point, but
argue that rebirth occurs mystically in one's present life. It is
known, e.g., that the presentation of rebirth in the Corpus Hermet
similarities with Philo's description of the patriarchs' attainment of
Tat is told that God has planted sophia's seed in the soul, and one da
reach maturity. When the seed does mature, Tat is reborn meta
and essentially into a divine being. This rebirth occurs while he is s
human body.37 In Philo the experiences of Abraham and Moses
be interpreted as an experience of rebirth before literal death
Tat's rebirth.
Abraham's union with Sarah, who is generic virtue (Mu
Qu. Gen. 3.57), could be described as a rebirth in the sense that
divine.38 However, Philo presents Abraham's experience with
birth of virtue in the soul, not as a rebirth of Abraham into a divi
His experience is described as "a late birth" which is "established fir
at the very close of life's day" (Her. 307). It is also called a "co
restoration (àrcoKaiácrcaaiv) of the soul which comes only after
ment of the four cardinal virtues (Her. 293). In other words,
attainment of the virtues comes at the threshold of his literal death, and
33 On nováç, see E. R. Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," Yale

Classical Studies 3 (1932) 133-34.
34 Cher. 40-41. Although Philo does present Moses as greater than the other patriarchs
(Sac. 8; Conf. 192), the goal, the rebirth of the soul into incorporeal existence, is essentially the
same for all (Leg. All. 3.42-44; Qu. Gen. 1.86; Mut. 38). A differentiation is made in the way
which Moses gains sophia (cf. n. 12), but the goal Moses reaches (sophia) is the same (Cher. 45-
47; cf. S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 24-26, 51, 56-62, 84-88).
35 Philo means the "higher mind," which is not the mind of our earthly creation (see ibid.,
25, 99-100; E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 384-86; and especially Qu. Exod. 2.46).
36 E.g., E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 1 18-19 et passim.
37 C. H. 10.6,9; 12.7; 13.21. Cf. H. R. Willoughby, Pagan Regeneration , 207-23; S. An-
gus, The Mystery- Religions and Christianity: A Study in the Religious Background of Early
Christianity (New York: Scribner's, 1925) 95-135; W. C. Grese, Corpus Hermeticum XII and
Early Christian Literature (Studia ad corpus hellenisticum Novi Testamenti 13; Leiden: Brill,
1979) 62-152, esp. pp. 72-73, 134-35.
38 See E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 144; cf. pp. 136-52; and "Philo on Immortality,"
97-98.
Philo seems to reserve the term TcaXiyyeveaia for the soul's rebirth after
literal death.39
Abraham's experience was a vision of the "divine Word" (tòv 0eïov
Xóyov), i.e., the intelligible world of the Logos (Som. 1 .66; cf. Op. 20). Philo
emphasizes that Abraham:
. . . does not actually reach Him Who is in very essence God, but sees Him from
afar: or rather, not even from a distance is he capable of contemplating Him; all
he sees is the bare fact God is far away from all Creation, and that the apprehen-
sion of Him is removed to a very great distance from all human power of
thought. Nay, ... it was a long way off from God for Whom no name or
utterance nor conception of any sort is adequate (Som. 1 .66-67).
Philo is careful to say that Abraham experienced "one of the potencies"

(Hiãç tü)v . . . Suvá^scov), not the God (to ov) itself (Mut. 15; cf. 7-18). This
seems to be different from the experience of Tat since Tat experiences Hermes
directly and is reborn essentially into a divine being.
In summary, Philo portrays Abraham's experience as one in which
Abraham is reborn ethically, not essentially. It is an experience of self-
realization on the part of the rational soul that it should migrate toward the
goal of seeing "the Existent" (xòv ovia) with clear vision (Mut. 82). The
purified soul, which has acquired the cardinal virtues through its union with
sophia, has attained a glimpse of what awaits it after physical death, viz.,
release from the body and taking its place in the intelligible world. Abra-
ham's vision is clearly not identical in a metaphysical sense with his soul's
ascent to the incorporeal forms after the dissolution of the body.40 The most
that can be said about Philo's presentation of Abraham is that the migrating
soul, while still in the body/soul mixture, can perceive the intelligible world.
The soul, however, cannot unite itself with the incorporeal world in any
permanent sense until the dissolution of the mixture at physical death.41
After the dissolution of the body/soul mixture, the rebirth of the soul into
the intelligible world (TcaXiyysveaia) occurs.
39 Cher. 1 14. Although àjcoKaTâaxaaiç and TiaXiyyeveaia could be synonymous else-

where (see H. Leisegang, "Palingenesia " 139), this does not appear to be true in Philo (cf.
Decai 164). In Aet. 8-9, which might not be Philo's work, diroKaiaoxaoiv is synonymous with
TcaXiYYEVECTÍa and refers to the reborn world.
40 Qu. Gen. 3.1 1. This is not to denigrate the experience in Philo's thought. For Philo
such an experience was crucial for the migrating soul, and, on the emotional side, he could use
the language of enthusiasm to describe the soul's experiences (e.g., Her. 69-70; Leg. All. 1.82;
Ebr. 146-47; cf. H. R. Willoughby, Pagan Regeneration , 247-49). The soul, however, still only
perceives the intelligible world and never becomes metaphysically united with God so that the
mystic himself/ herself becomes a divine being.
41 See S. Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism, 169-82.
Moses, however, would seem to be an exception. Others who ha

ecstatic experiences "become kin to God and truly divine" (Qu. Exo
but the divine Spirit does not stay with them permanently (Gig. 20; c
In Moses' case the divine Spirit stays permanently "at his side" (Tu
Gig. 53). But does this mean that Moses is essentially divine and
sense to be equated with God?42
In the same passage where it is said that Moses has the divine
permanently, Philo is careful to point out that Moses, like all oth
have possessed the Spirit, must die.43 Philo believes that Moses' literal
was necessary before his twofold nature of body and soul was perm
transformed into the single unity of mind.44 Furthermore, there is n
in this passage that Moses is divine because he has the divine Spirit
sage and a prophet. In this passage at least, Philo's meaning is tha
unlike others, could always prophesy because the Spirit was cons
leading him.45
It would seem that to call Moses a god would be contradictor
Philo's monotheism.46 In a much debated passage, though, it is often p
out that Philo does describe Moses as "a God to Pharaoh" (Leg. All.
Exod 7:1). Philo comments on this in greater detail in another pass
he clearly says that Moses is not to be equated with God. While exp
on the fact that Moses took his tent and set it up outside the ca
Exod 33:7), Philo says:
42 E.g., E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 224-27.

43 Gig. 56. Cf. Sandmel's remark about Philo's statement that Moses is a g
Pharaoh {Leg. All. 1.40): "But Philo cannot acquiesce in deifying a king, even a Mo
point of removing him from the mortality of all men" {Philo of Alexandria , 105-6). E
passage where Philo depicts Moses' passing as a "perfect soul to Him that 'Is'" (rtpòç
Hexaváataaiv) there is a reference to Moses' grave {Sac. 10).
44 Cf. Mos. 2.288. In two other passages Philo portrays the end of Moses' life
perceived clearly the intelligible world. It is interesting that Philo speaks of one
Moses' transformation at his death. Moses is now able to prophesy "to each tribe in
the things which were to be and hereafter come to pass"(A/os. 2.288). It would seem
uses the story of Moses' transformation at death as, so to speak, a "post-transformat
which he places back at the beginning of the wilderness journey (contrast E. R. Goode
Light y 227). The completed life of Moses stands at the beginning of the journey as a
for the migrating souls ("Israel") to follow (cf. Mos. 1.59; see B. L. Mack, "Imitat
Patterns of Cosmology and Soteriology in the Hellenistic Synagogue," Studia Ph
[1972] 27-55). This interpretation is also suggested by Philo's comment on Exod
Qu. Exod. 2.40 (cf. W. A. Meeks, "Moses as God and King," Religions in Anti
J. Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1968] 359-61, 367-70).
45 Wolfson, Philo , 2. 34.
46 Ibid., 2. 94-100.
Of this tent he says that it has received the title of Tent of Testimony,' using
his words quite advisedly, to show that the Tent of the Existent One really IS,
and does not merely receive the title. For, among the virtues, that of God really
IS, actually existing, inasmuch as God alone has veritable being. This is why
Moses will say of Him as best he may in human speech, 'I am He that IS'
(Exod 3:14), implying that others lesser than He have not being, as being indeed
is, but exist in semblance only, and are conventionally said to exist. To Moses'
tent, however, which figuratively represents human virtue, must be accorded not
existence but only a title, seeing that it is a copy and likeness of that divine
virtue. It follows as a consequence of this that, when Moses is appointed 'a god
unto Pharaoh,' he did not become such in reality, but only by a convention is
supposed to be such; for I do indeed know God as granting favours and giving,
but I am unable to conceive of Him as being given; yet it is said in the sacred
books, *1 give thee as a god to Pharaoh' (Exod 7:1), that which is given being
passive not active; but He that really IS must needs be active not passive. What
then do we gather from these words? That the wise man is said to be a god to the
foolish man, but that in reality he is not God (0eóç), just as the counterfeit
four-drachma piece is not a tetradrachm ( Det . 160-62).
It would seem, then, that statements in which Moses is called divine would
have to be qualified by Philo's statement here (e.g., Qu. Exod. 2.11). It
appears that he means that Moses is "God-like" in the sense that he repre-
sents the epitome of the quest for virtue. Philo seems to suggest this himself
in the next line of our passage:
But when the wise man [Moses] is compared with Him that IS, he will be found
to be a man of God (fivôpcoTEOç 0eoö); but when with a foolish man, he will turn
out to be one conceived of as a god, in men's ideas and imagination, not in view
of truth and actuality.47
In summary, it seems that both Moses and the patriarchs, though they
are Philo's archetypes for other migrating souls, still do not experience
KaXiyy£veaia until their body/soul mixture is dissolved at their physical
deaths. Their experience should not be the basis for interpreting the dissolu-
tion of the mixture in Cher. 113-15 as death in a figurative sense. riaXiy-
47 Det. 162. It is, of course, one thing to say that Moses is God and quite another to say
that he is divine. While it seems clear that Philo does not equate Moses with God, it is possible
that he could conceive of Moses as divine, especially in Moses* role as the hierophant in the
quest for virtue (see M. Phillips, "The Deification of Moses in Philo," an unpublished paper
presented to the 1980 NEH Summer Seminar, "The Greek Encounter with Judaism in the
Hellenistic Period"; E. R. Goodenough, By Light , chap. 8; D. L. Tiede, The Charismatic Figure
as Miracle Worter [SBLDS 1; Chico, CA: Scholars, 1972] 108-37; C. H. Holladay, Theios Anēr
in Hellenistic Judaism: A Critique of the Use of this Category in New Testament Christology
[SBLDS 40; Chico, CA: Scholars, 1977], chap. 3; R. Williamson, "Philo and New Testament
Christology," ExpTim 90 [1979] 361-65.
yeveaía, the essential and metaphysical rebirth of the soul, occurs

physical death.
3. Philo clearly says in Cher. 113-15 that the soul survives the dissolu-
tion of the body /soul mixture and proceeds to an incorporeal (áaconaioç)
existence, but it is not clear from this passage whether or not the surviving
soul has "personal immortality." Personal immortality may be implied in the
question: "Where was my body before birth, and whither will it go when I
have departed (jieTaaxávToç ^xou)?" It could also be implicit in the state-
ments: "But then [before birth] there was no 'ourselves.'48 What of it after
death?49 But then we who are joined to the body, . . . shall go forward to our
rebirth to be with the unbodied, without composition and without quality."50
It is necessary to proceed to other passages if the ambiguity here is to
be clarified.
One could begin with this question: What does Philo say about the
soul's destiny after death?51 In one passage Philo speaks of the souls which
hover in the air and says that some of them enter the stream of matter. They
"have been able to stem the current, have risen to the surface and then soared
upwards back to the place from whence they came." He then identifies these
souls as:
. . . those who have given themselves to genuine philosophy, who from the first
to last study to die to the life in the body, that a higher existence immortal and
incorporeal (áaco^áxou), in the presence of Him who is Himself immortal and
uncreate, may be their portion (Gig. 13-14).
In this passage Philo clearly says that virtuous souls return to their source
and implies that their existence is in the presence of God. But it is not clear
whether the souls exist as individual entities or are reabsorbed into their
source so that all distinctions are lost.
Discussion usually shifts from this passage to Philo's comment on the
promise to Abraham that "thou shalt go to thy Fathers" (Qu. Gen. 3.1 1; cf.
Gen 15:15). Philo makes it clear that this promise pertains to the soul's
destiny after physical death. He says, "For when it is said to a dying person,
48 Literally, "but we had not begun to exist" (dXV oux Oir^pxonev).

49 The text has jiexà xòv Gávaxov. I see no syntactical reason why this could not be
translated "What of us after death? "This would carry over the first person plural of UTnjpxonev
and lead into the first person plural of ¿aó|i£0a.
50 Cf. Goodenough's conclusion on this difficult passage (By Light , 375-76).
51 I have tried to avoid spatial terminology such as " Where do souls go after physical
death?" On the question of "space" (xrópa) and "place" (xónoç) in Philo, see H. A. Wolfson,
Philo , 1. 317-22; cf. pp. 250-51, 304, 309; E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 63 n. 1 14.
Thou shalt go to thy Fathers', what else is this than to represent another life
without the body, which only the soul of the wise man ought to live?" He
then says explicitly what "thy Fathers" means: "To me, however, it seems to
indicate the incorporeal Logoi of the divine world, whom elsewhere it is
accustomed to call 'angels.'"
One could conclude that Philo is interpreting "angels" in terms of
"incorporeal Logoi." In that case Philo could mean that souls return to
something akin to Plato's forms. This is Goodenough's conclusion.52 If his
interpretation were correct, this would probably mean that Philo does not
intend personal immortality in any sense. Goodenough's reading implies that
the soul loses all distinctiveness, its "personality," because only the forms
within the soul are eternal.53
This passage too, however, is not decisive. The phrase "the incorporeal
Logoi" has been rendered as " inhabitants of the divine world," and the
phrase does not occur in the Greek paraphrase.54 The Greek says that the
term "'Fathers' seems to correspond to what elsewhere are customarily called
angels."55 This rendering could lead to the conclusion that the "angels" are
not to be equated with ideas but are to be interpreted in terms of Jewish
apocalyptic texts (e.g., 2 Apoc. Bar . 51:10). If this is the correct interpreta-
tion, then one could conclude with Wolfson that Abraham "was indeed
going back to heaven to be among the angels; not to the intelligible world to
be among the ideas."56
By now the lines of interpretation should be clear. It does little good to
adduce more "proof-texts" for either personal immortality or reabsorption
of the soul as a distinctive entity into the ALL.57 It would seem that an
52 "Philo on Immortality," 102.

53 Ibid. Goodenough "hedges" on this point (ibid., 103 n. 69). He probably does so
because he argues that Philo is interpreting Plato, and it is not clear that Plato believed that the
soul lost its individuality when it reached its destiny (cf. J. Adam, The Republic of Plato [2 vols.;
2d ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 1963], 2. 422-27; R. Hackworth, Plato's Phaedrus [Cam-
bridge: University Press, 1952] 64-65; and W. Boyd, An Introduction to the Republic of Plato
[London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962] 1 12).
54 E.g., S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 1 17. This rendering is based upon a variant in
the Armenian text given by Aucher (see LCL supp. 1. 196). Both readings, however, seem to be
conjecture, for neither is supported unambiguously by either the Armenian text or the Greek
paraphrase.
55 The Greek reads ÒXX ëoiicev atvÍTteaôai rcaTÉpaç ofcç EtépcoOi kœXeïv àyyéXouç eícúGev.
Philo is no clearer when he interprets the "fathers" in Her . 280-283. In this passage he sum-
marizes some possible destinies for the Abraham-soul, but it is ambiguous who his referents are
and whether he accepts or rejects the options.
56 Philo , 1. 402; cf. pp. 375-77, 398-404; Qu. Gen. 1.86.
57 In Fug. 18 Philo says that eternal life is "refuge with Him that IS," but, again, it is
unclear whether or not the soul as an individual entity perishes. Cf. Philo's use of ouyyivonai in
Leg. All. 3.42-44 and Spec. 3.1.
impasse has been reached represented by the extremes of Goodenoug

Wolfson. A closer look at their arguments might break the impasse.
Goodenough is intent upon interpreting Philo as a mystic who pa
pated in a Jewish mystery cult. He contends that Philo's contradictory
ments can be attributed to the way a mystic uses language. The mystic
to express the inexpressible, and in doing so contradicts himself/ he
Goodenough's approach to these texts, then, is determined by his convic
that Philo is a mystic. He says:
There is only one way to treat such writings if we would understand the w
we must take all he has to say on a given subject, study the whole as best w
with these incentives to mystical contradictions in mind , and then ultimatel
to arrive at the author's goal with him, which we usually do, if at all, n
discarding one or the other elements in a given contradiction, but by goin
with one, now the other, until our minds too come to the resultant reality
mind between them.58
Commenting on Cher. 113-18, Goodenough explains that Philo must

mean by rebirth that "we shall be reabsorbed, essentially without personal-
ity , in the Source."59 He discusses the passages which we have reviewed in
this regard and concludes: "All of this has built up the impression that
however the heavenly world was described, the goal for man was that he
become absorbed in it, lose his personality. This, I believe, was Philo's
dearest wish."60 It becomes clear that the loss of individuality was Philo's
"dearest wish" because of Goodenough's insistence upon interpreting Philo
as a mystic. He says:
The desire for personal immortality is a desire that 'I' survive, ... He [Philo]
has many passages which seem to promise such a future, but on the whole he is
too much interested in the mystical ascent, in the restoration of his soul or mind
to its divine Source, to care particularly about what happens to his łego.'61
Or again, in the context of his argument about Philo's "dearest wish,"

Goodenough has used passages about the patriarch's destiny (e.g., Gig. 61)
to show that all individuality is lost after death. Goodenough then exclaims
about Praem. 166, "Yet, paradox upon paradox, he does not hesitate to
represent the very Patriarchs, ... as still preserving their individualities in
the sense that in heaven, or before God, they serve eternally as intercessors
for men."62 He explains the paradox as an "invasion of a conception from
58 "Philo on Immortality," 86 (italics mine); cf. p. 85.

59 Ibid., 101 (italics mine).
60 Ibid., 103.
traditional Judaism into his [Philo's] more usual notion of absorption."63

The conceptions of individual survival after death and reabsorption into the
ALL "are literally in complete contradiction," says Goodenough, but he
explains the contradictions as the way of the mystic.64
If, however, one approaches the data without the preconceived notion
that Philo is a mystic who participates in a mystery cult, then it appears that
Philo could believe that the individual soul, which may include the personal-
ity, is freed from the body/soul mixture and returns intact to its source. This
freedom seems to mean individual existence in God's presence rather than
mystic absorption into the ALL. This is precisely what Wolfson argues.
Wolfson, who wants to read Philo according to his conception of what
is traditionally "Jewish," interprets the soul's return to its source as Philo's
blend of Platonism and Judaism. He acknowledges Philo's debt to Plato's
concept, but then he concludes that "in Philo, because of his [Jewish] denial
of a universal soul, immortality means the eternal persistence of the individual
soul as a distinct entity."65
Wolfson agrees with Goodenough that Philo speaks of the immortality
of the soul rather than the resurrection of the body or the spirit. However,
Wolfson argues that Philo understands immortality to mean the individual
soul's survival because his conception is grounded in traditional Jewish
conceptions of resurrection. Highlighting Isa 26:19 and Dan 12:2 (LXX),
Wolfson contends that Philo ". . . constantly draws upon the traditional
vocabulary of resurrection to express his view of immortality."66 Philo, then,
has attempted to restate the general Greek view of immortality in scriptural
terms of the body's (or spirit's?) resurrection. In this regard Philo's her-
meneutical efforts are identical with other Jewish writings (e.g., 1 Enoch
91:10). In all such writings which attempted to restate "the immortality of
the soul in scriptural terms of the resurrection of the body," and which
"consciously turned corporeal resurrection into something incorporeal,"
immortality meant "new life," however it was linguistically expressed.67 Philo
used the term TcaXiyysveaia, then, to express this "new life." riaXiyyeveaia
for Philo means "new birth" in terms of "traditional" Jewish conceptions of
resurrection, particularly individual existence as a reward for righteous con-
duct (cf. Wis 15:3).68
63 Ibid., 104.
64 Ibid., 105; cf. pp. 85-86.
65 Philo , 1. 396. It does not necessarily follow, of course, that the soul survives as an
independent entity because Philo seems to deny Plato's universal mind and soul. The soul
conceivably could lose its individuality even if it ascends only to Philo's "place" in the intelli-
gible world (cf. Op. 20; Som. 1.66-68,1 17,227-29).
66 Philo , 1. 404.
67 Ibid., 405-6.
68 Ibid., 406-13.
My impression of Philo is just the reverse of Wolfson's. If P

dealing with traditional Jewish conceptions of a corporeal resurrection
he has restated them in terms of an incorporeal body /soul separ
other words, Philo has moved more towards the general Greek v
release of the soul from the body at death than Wolfson allows.
This conclusion seems to be supported when it is noted how P
differs from the traditions which Wolfson uses for his argumen
although the passages which Wolfson uses do not exclude the immorta
the individual (7 Enoch 91:10; 92:3; 103:4), they are more concerned wi
afterlife of the righteous in collective terms.69 Philo, on the oth
speaks of individual souls only, unless some of the passages in w
speaks of migrating souls as the "true Israel" might be his interpretat
this collective idea (e.g., Deus 144; cf. Mig. 53-59). Second, the ri
spirits in 1 Enoch are raised to life from Sheol.70 As we have seen, fo
souls at death are not held in Sheol, but are separated from their bodi
return to their source. Third, it is not clear that immortality for Phi
reward for righteous conduct, as it is in 1 Enoch 94-104.71 Wolfson se
obliterate the difference between righteous conduct as obedience to th
and the Platonic overtones of Philo's statement that "the souls of those who
have given themselves to genuine philosophy" attain immortality.72 Philo
clearly urges virtue for its own sake (e.g., Spec. 2.259), and the word which
Wolfson renders consistently as "reward" (áOXov) could mean "prize."73 As
Sandmel has so aptly stated it:
In Philo, immortality does not seem to be a reward for virtue. Rather, immortal-
ity is the ordinary sequel to a man's rising above his body; at death, his soul
simply becomes separated from it. Immortality in Philo seems never to be
conceived of as a reward, but only as a natural destiny.74
Finally, there is no judgment scene in Philo. This seems to have been a

traditional element in the texts on which Philo allegedly depended.75 The
tendency of Jewish texts in Philo's time, whether they spoke of a resurrection
69 D. S. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic 200 BC-AD 100 (Phila-
delphia: Westminster, 1964) 372.
70 1 Enoch 102:4-5; 103:4; 104:2-5; cf. George W. E. Nickelsburg, Jr., Resurrection,
Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism (HTS 26; Cambridge: Harvard
University, 1972) 123-24.
71 Ibid., 114-22.
72 Gig. 3.13-14; cf. Post. 1 1.39. See H. A. Wolfson, Philo , 1. 406-7; 2. 279-303.
73 Ibid., 2. 296-97; cf. Abr. 128.
74 Philo of Alexandria , 1 17; cf. his "Virtue and Reward in Philo," Essays in Old Testa-
ment Ethics (ed. J. L. Crenshaw and J. T. Willis; New York: Ktav, 1974) 215-23.
75 G. W. E. Nickelsburg, Resurrection , 122, 128.
of the body or immortality of the soul, was to emphasize the motif of God's
judgment as part of the formalized topos.16 In one passage which Wolfson
emphasizes Philo does speak of the "eternal death" which awaits "impious
men" {Post. 11.39), but, as Wolfson acknowledges, it is inconclusive since
"eternal death" could be taken in a figurative sense.77 In Philo there is no
clear presentation of either an afterlife with rewards and punishments, as
there is in Palestinian Judaism, or of a heaven and hell.78
Thus, when examined in light of the Jewish traditions which Wolfson
advances, the only thing that one can say with certainty that Philo retains
from them - assuming that he used them - is the concept of the individual
soul's survival after death. In the final analysis, it seems that one cannot be
dogmatic about Philo's view of the soul's destiny, either in terms of the
places to which souls return or whether they retain their individuality.79
Philo gives no unequivocal, systematic discussion of his view of immortality.
His presentation is more like that of an occasional preacher, such as St. Paul,
than it is of a philosopher. The only point we can posit with assurance is that
Philo definitely believes that the virtuous soul will survive death and be
"reborn" into incorporeal existence, however that existence might be defined.
4. The rebirth of the soul which occurs after death seems to be on a

continuum with the migration of the soul towards perfection before death.
The initiates to whom Philo addresses De Cherubim would understand
TiaXiyyEveaia as the arrival at the goal towards which they had been migrat-
ing all along. This understanding could be implied when Philo says that "we
shall proceed (0pniļaoļiev) to our rebirth,"80 and when he asks about the
gradations of the personality (Cher. 114). In other Philonic contexts such
gradations allude to the stages of the soul's migration to the virtues (Her.
76 Ibid., 171-74.
77 Philo, 1. 409.
78 S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria , 1 16. Philo does speak of Hades {Cher. 2; Som. 1.151;
Qu. Exod. 2.40; Cong. 57). Cf. the discussions of H. A Wolfson {Philo, 1 . 42, 410-13) and E. R.
Goodenough ("Philo on Immortality," 89, 105-8).
79 Perhaps one can do no better than H. A. Wolfson's discussion of "thou shalt go to thy
fathers" {Her. 280-83; Qu. Gen. 3.11; see Philo , 1.397-406).
Two caveats should accompany Wolfson 's discussion. First, it is not certain that Philo
rejects ether as the place to which some souls return {Her. 283). He clearly asserts that the soul
of the wise person comes from the ether {Qu. Exod. 3.10). If Philo believed that ether, the fifth
substance, was immaterial, then it would be possible for immortal souls to return there (cf.
S. Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism , 185 n. 381a; and LCL 4. 429c).
80 Cher. 114. Cf. other passages in which óp^áco is similarly used {Conf. 78; Leg. All.
3.16,17,19.94,244; Gig. 13; Plant. 45; Ebr. 51; Som. 1.167,179,251; Mos. 1.22; Praem. 62). See
also G. Bertram, "òpîcuo," TDNT5. 467-71.
293-300; Sac. 15-16). Part of Philo's point is that one's perception of

and of oneself constantly changes in the body/soul mixture. This fluctu
of the soul's perception ends when the mixture is dissolved. riakiyyEvea
the rebirth of the unmixed soul (àad>naT0Ç, arcoioç) into a constant sta
incorporeal existence.
But if 7raXiyyeveaia is the upshot of the soul's migration towards v
then it may be asked whether all souls experience naXxyyeveoia or only
ones which reach the fourth state in their migration, like Abraham. In
113-15 rebirth seems to refer only to the initiates who are progres
virtue in order to rid themselves of "Cain" (cf. §42-43,48,71,74,107
group is contrasted with those who want to cling to "Cain," or to the b
that their souls are their own (cf. §52,66,75-77,1 18-19,127-29). The imp
tion is that the belief that one's soul is one's own possession is an enemy
struggle to free itself from matter. As we have seen, the soul is to take
passive role, God the active role. If a soul does not overcome matter, th
can only end in death (Cher. 75-78).
Philo says elsewhere that:
. . . the evil and sinful man is nourished and lives by strife and ends and
old in evil. But the virtuous man in both his //v^ [italics mine] - in that with
body and in that without the body - enjoys peace, and alone is very good
no one of the foolish is (so), . . . For many foolish men linger on to a long
but to a good and virtuous life only he who is a lover of wisdom (Qu. Gen.
The context refers clearly to death, when the soul removes itself fr
mortal body and returns to the "mother-city" (ļiTļipoTcoîv), and impli
the soul which does not attain virtue and free itself from the "body of
(xoO 0VT1TOÕ GCûnaioç) has only one life, the life in the body.82
There are other passages in Philo which also imply that only the sou
the wise -experience rebirth. For example, he contrasts the souls of
who have given themselves to genuine philosophy" with "the souls of ot
who have held no count of wisdom." The former attain immortalit
incorporeal existence, but the latter "are related to that dead thing whi
our birth-fellow, the body." The souls which are related to the body
sunk beneath the stream [of matter]" (Gig. 14-17). Philo's point seem
that the wise souls attain immortality and incorporeal existence, but un
souls are absorbed into matter and cease to exist as soul. The soul which
81 The Greek fragment has alcòva isívouai. I agree with Marcus that the context almost
demands the translation of desiring (and reaching) a long life, as opposed to an "eternal" life.
82 Cf. Phaedrus 248 A-E; 249C; and Phaedo 80D-81 A.
entangles itself with matter and cannot consistently practise virtue naturally
(eiKÓTCoę) forfeits immortality ( Virt. 205).83
Philo, then, does seem to link causally the attainment of immortality
with the life of virtue. It would appear that his clearest statement on this
matter is his comment on Gen 2:17:
What is the meaning of the words, *Ye shall die by the death?' The death of
worthy men is the beginning of another life. For life is twofold; one is with
corruptible body; the other is without body (and) incorruptible. So that the evil
man dies by death even when he breathes, before he is buried, as though he
preserved for himself no spark at all of the true life, and this is excellence of
character. The decent and worthy man, however, does not die by death, but
after living long, passes away to eternity, that is, he is borne to eternal life
(Qu. Gen. 1.16).
This view is similar to that of some Stoics, most notably Chrysippus,

and it would help a great deal if we could say with assurance that Philo uses
7iaA.iyyev6oia as a technical term of Stoicism.84 Then we could say that Philo
believes the soul at death would return to the ether from which it came and
there await the conflagration. After the conflagration both the cosmos and
83 Philo never says that both righteous and unrighteous souls return to the same source,
or that the soul has to undergo reincarnations because of the body's wickedness. It is interesting
to note how Philo differs from the Myth of Er {Republic 614A-End). Although both Philo and
Plato emphasize the connection between the soul's conduct and its fate, Philo posits no succes-
sive incarnations of the soul according to fate in which the wicked soul will ultimately be
purified and freed from the body (cf. Republic b' 1C-612A; Phaedo 82C-83B). Second, for Philo
there is no crisis choice after death for souls in which they, instead of providence, bear the
responsibility for choosing new lives (cf. Republic 617D-619A). Philo retains the Jewish belief in
God's providence. Philo's rejection of successive incarnations for the soul and his emphasis
upon God's providence lead him to different conclusions from Plato about the soul's fate (cf.
H. A. Wolfson, Philo , 1.410).
84 Cf. H. Leisegang, " Palingenesia 142-45. Goodenough believes that Philo has bor-
rowed the term from the mysteries (By Light , 376 n. 35). Büchsei has noted that the term does
not occur in Orphic writings ("7taXiyYEVEola,"686). It does occur, but it is used by Proclus in a
comment on TimaeusAX D to say that Plato believed in the transmigration of souls (ct. O. Kern,
Orphicorum fragmenta [12th ed.; Berlin: Weidmann, 1963], §205 [three times]). Perhaps what
Biichsel means is that the Orphies had no fixed, technical terms for the "transmigration of souls"
(cf. E. Rohde, Psyche : The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks[ 8th ed.;
New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925] 361 n. 84).
One cannot say with finality from whom Philo has borrowed the term. The concept of
regeneration/ transmigration certainly occurs in the mysteries, among the Pythagoreans, the
Stoics, and the Jews (cf. H. Leisegang, "Palingenesia passim; and Josephus J.W. 2.8,10-11
§150-58). Unravelling the origins of Philo's concept is probably a hopeless task since he is
syncretistic in his understanding of the soul (cf. E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 374). The
approach must be to see how the term functions within its Philonic contexts, and then posit
what it means for Philo rather than proceeding from an evolutionary approach.
the souls, at least of the wise, would be reborn. However, Philo seems to
reject the Stoic concept of an èioiúpcoaiç.85 There is nothing within th
context of this passage which indicates an èicrcópcoaiç,86 and there is nothing
within the context of Cher. 113-15, except the term itself, which suggests a
Stoic interpretation.87 Thus, while Philo causally links the soul's immortality
with the life of virtue, a review of other passages in which Philo uses th
term supports the conclusion that he is not restricting rcaXiyyeveaia to its
Stoic connotations.
5. The term TcaXiyysveaia occurs in Post. 124 where Philo discusses

the rebirth of Abel. Cain represents the self-lover who is under the delusion
that he owns his mind (Post. 21; cf. Cher. 65), and Abel represents the
God-loving principle in the soul (Sac. 2-3; Det. 32,38). In another passage
Philo contends that the Abel-principle should have continued contemplating
God until the soul had acquired perfection in speech. Abel's undoing was
that he engaged Cain in a contest of words before the acquisition of perfect
speech (Mig. 73-75; cf. Det. 37). God, however, who causes the growth of
virtues in obedient souls, will not let the Abel-principle die. His gifts to
obedient souls are full and complete. (Mig. 73).
God, therefore, regenerates (TiaXiyyevsaia) the Abel-principle in the
soul by planting another seed in it (Seth), which is also hostile to the Cain-
principle (Post. 124-25). The rebirth of Abel in Post. 124, then, simply
reiterates the theme of De Cherubim that it is God who causes the growth of
virtues in obedient souls (Post. 127). In this passage rcaîyyEveaia refers
simply to the fact that the Cain-principle can be overcome by the soul which
remains obedient to God. Cain cannot stop the growth of virtue in the
obedient soul. As Philo puts it, "The statement that none of God's seeds fall
to the ground [like human seeds], but all mount upwards rising out of
earthly surroundings, and leaving them behind, is a noticeable statement
that can stand every test " (Post. 170; cf. 171-76).
In this passage rcaîyyevsaia does not appear to reflect the Stoic view of
the soul which survives the EKTrúpcoaiç. At the same time, however, nakxy-
ysvsaia as rebirth of the soul into incorporeal existence is only implied in the
85 Her. 227-88; cf. LCL 4. 572-73 n. 218; Spec. 1.208-9; E. Zeller, Stoics , 164 n. 2.
86 Cf. J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists , 177.
87 Colson and Whitaker suggest that Philo could be using TcaXiyyevsaia in Cher. 1 14 in
the Stoic sense, but they allow the reading daúyKpuoi ãnoioi to stand (LCL 2. 485). This
reading, as we have seen, seems to argue against Philo's use of the term in the usual Stoic sense
(see n. 27 above).
Cain and Abel struggle, particularly in the fact that God will bring the
obedient soul to completion.
The next passage in which 7raXiyyevsaia occurs is more difficult because
it does seem to have Stoic overtones. Philo is speaking of the deluge and says
that Noah's family "became leaders of the regeneration (TcaXiyysveaíaç),
inaugurators of a second cycle, spared as embers to rekindle mankind"
{Mos. 1.65). Philo is possibly alluding to the Stoic view that water will
periodically destroy the earth and purge the sins of humanity.88 However,
when we turn to other passages where Philo speaks of the flood or of Noah's
survival, the Stoic connotations do not seem to explain Philo's point in the
present passage.
Noah, who can be thought of as a man or as a type of soul by Philo
(Abr. 47; cf. §40), consistently represents the birth of righteous reasoning in
the soul. Noah is that virtue which helps the soul rest from unrighteous acts,
retreat from the world of sense-perception, and find favor with God.89 In one
passage the salvation of the Noah-virtue shows God's mercy, i.e., that good
souls become what they are through God's grace ( Deus 70-76).
Philo presents the deluge as "the great ceaseless deluge of life" which
seeks to engulf the soul's perception of "existences as they really are." Noah,
or retreat from the world of sense-perception, says Philo
. . . will 'coat the ark,* I mean the body, 4with asphalt within and without'
(Gen 6: 14), . . . But when the trouble has abated and the rush of waters stayed,
he will come forth and employ his understanding, free from body, for apprehen-
sion of truth (Conf. 105).
In yet another passage, Philo makes it clear that the earth purged by water is
not the Stoic destruction of the world, but it is the soul receiving "a cleansing
from its unutterable wrongdoings by washing away ... its defilements after
the fashion of a sacred purification" ( Det . 170). The flood, in other words,
is the cleansing of the irrational faculties of the soul, or a purgation of
"Cain" (Det. 171-74; cf. 167-68). In still another passage Noah represents the
righteous mind in the soul. The other parts of the soul "had been swallowed
up by the great Flood," but because the Noah-virtue survived, the other
virtues were able to be reborn. In Mig. 125-26 Philo says of Noah:
. . . when he had come safe through all, put forth from himself fair roots and
great, out of which there grew up like a plant wisdom's breed and kind; which,
attaining goodly fertility, bore those threefold fruits of the seeing one, even of
'Israel,' that mark the threefold divisions of eternity, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob; for
88 Cf. Seneca, Quaestiones naturales 3.27-30.

89 Leg. All. 3.77-78; cf. LCL 10.393 n. "a" for additional references.
in the All virtue is, shall be, has been: covered with a dark shadow, it may
men's missings of the due season but revealed again by due season tha
follows in God's steps. In such due season does 'Sarah' who is sound sens
birth to a manchild, putting forth her fruit not according to the changes
year measured by lapse of time, but in accordance with a fitness and fuln
season that time does not determine: for it is said *1 will certainly return
thee according to this season when the time comes round; and Sarah thy
shall have a son' (Gen 18:10).
This passage indicates what Philo probably meant by his statemen

Noah's family "became leaders of the regeneration . . . spared as em
rekindle mankind" {Mos. 2.65). Noah gives birth to other virtues in the
This interpretation is supported by other passages. In one pass
where Philo is discussing the history of the soul with triads (Enos,
and Noah), Noah is presented as "the founder of a new race of men" bec
he survived the Flood {Mig. 46). The thought seems to be that Noah
give birth to the yearning for attainment of the cardinal virtues in th
and, in that sense, he becomes the founder of a new race {Mig. 48). It sh
also be noted that Noah is called perfect only in his generation. He
of a trinity which yearns for virtue but does not attain it {Mig.
cf. Praem. 23). A superior trinity (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob) rep
the acquisition of wisdom and the last stages of the soul's migrat
wards rebirth.
In this context, then, Philo's statement that Noah's family became the
leaders (f|yE|ióveç) of the regeneration is clarified. Noah rekindles the yearn-
ing of the soul to migrate towards TtaXiyyevsaia, but rebirth did not occur
under Noah, nor is it suggested that his preservation was TtaXiyyEvsaia. It is
the attainment of the virtues represented by the patriarchs, not by Noah,
which depicts the soul at the point of rebirth into incorporeal existence (cf.
Praem. 23-24; Abr. 46-48; Mut. 189). It should be clear from this survey,
then, that in no sense does Philo present the Flood, or Noah's survival, in the
Stoic sense of souls which survive the literal destruction of the earth by water.
6. The other occurrences of naXiyyeveaia in the Philonic corpus are

in De Aeternitate Mundi. The Philonic authorship of this treatise has been
questioned primarily on the grounds that whereas "Philo in his other works
has denounced the doctrine that the world is uncreated and indestructible, in
this book he appears to maintain that theory."90 For our purposes the ques-
tion of Philonic authorship is not crucial.
90 LCL 9. 173. F. H. Colson, though, goes ahead to defend its possible Philonic author-
ship (ibid., 173-77; cf. H. Leisegang, "Philons Schrift über die Ewigkeit der Welt," Philologus 92
There is a strong polemic in this treatise against the Stoic theory of a

periodic conflagration of the cosmos and a subsequent rebirth (e.g., Aet. 45-
51). In every passage where rcaXiyyevsaia occurs,91 it is clear that the author
is rejecting the Stoic concept as absurd or false (e.g., §99,107). If Philo is the
author of this work, then it only supports our belief that he is not using
nahiyyeveoia in its Stoic sense.
7. We are now in a position to summarize the meaning of Traîyysveaia

in Philo. naXiyysvsaía is the rebirth of the soul into incorporeal existence.
Although the migrating soul can envision the intelligible world and experi-
ence an ethical rebirth while still in mixture with the body, it is after the
mixture is dissolved, i.e., after physical death, that TiaXiyyeveaia occurs in
any metaphysical or essential way. Philo does not present a clear, systematic
statement about what incorporeal existence for the soul means, but he seems
to imply that the soul continues to exist as a distinct entity in the presence of
God. Incorporeal existence in the presence of God, however, is only for
virtuous souls. Souls which did not allow God to free them from the world of
sense-perception are doomed to perish with it.
Nowhere in Philo could we find the Stoic notion that rcaXiyyeveaia
refers to those souls which are reborn after the general conflagration. His use
of the term cannot fit neatly either into the framework of the mystery reli-
gions, and there is no hint that Philo's use of naXiyyeveaia means reincarna-
tion or transmigration of the soul. naXiyysvsaia in Philo refers to the soul's
immortality, but his is a view which does not fit precisely into any Jewish or
Hellenistic conception. Although he does draw from several traditions, he
never clearly aligns himself with one. He leads the interpreter down many
promising avenues only to contradict himself or to be so syncretistic and
occasional that the interpreter cannot speak with precision. Perhaps Goode-
nough is right when he says: "We shall not have learned to read Philo until
we learn that Philo's group was 'neither Jew nor Greek,' but a new creature
in being both, and in being probably itself unconscious of what it owed
specifically to either parent."92 Philo holds Philo's view of immortality. That,
together with the above summary, may be the most that anyone can say.
[1937] 156-76). On the other hand, S. Sandmel can assert that "precisely because the treatise
affirms the eternity of the world, the majority of scholars deny the treatise to Philo** (/ViiVo of
Alexandria , 76).
91 See n. 5 above.
92 An Introduction to Philo , 122.

Burnett - Philo On Immortality

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Burnett - Philo On Immortality

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Philo on Immortality: A Thematic Study of Philo's Concept of παλιγγενεσία

Author(s): FRED W. BURNETT

The term TtaXiyyEvsaia has had a longstanding relation in Hellenism

1 On the history of TuaXiyYEveaia, see H. Leisegang, "Palingenesia ," PW 18 (1949) 139-

meaning of rcakiyyeveaia in Philo can be clarified, then some understanding

which is usually recommended is a thematic one, i.e., to trace one c

9 E. R. Goodenough, Introduction to Philo , 47-48; By Light , 213-14, 292. The term

To put it succinctly, if Philo addressed De Cherubim to those who were

The Context of Cher . 113-15

rial, and thus capable of perceiving the intelligible world of ideas (K

ria^iyyeveaia in Cher. 113-15

It is within the context of these motifs that Philo wishes 7uaXiyyEvsaia to

Philo then asks a series of rhetorical questions:

The term rcaXiyysveaia occurs within the context of these questions:

1. Philo's first point is that rebirth consists of the soul beco

28 Cher. 52; cf. §49-51,98-101.

single unity" (etę j^ováSoç avsaioi^eiou <pi3aiv).33 God transform

33 On nováç, see E. R. Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," Yale

Philo is careful to say that Abraham experienced "one of the potencies"

39 Cher. 1 14. Although àjcoKaTâaxaaiç and TiaXiyyeveaia could be synonymous else-

Moses, however, would seem to be an exception. Others who ha

42 E.g., E. R. Goodenough, By Light , 224-27.

yeveaía, the essential and metaphysical rebirth of the soul, occurs

48 Literally, "but we had not begun to exist" (dXV oux Oir^pxonev).

52 "Philo on Immortality," 102.

impasse has been reached represented by the extremes of Goodenoug

Commenting on Cher. 113-18, Goodenough explains that Philo must

Or again, in the context of his argument about Philo's "dearest wish,"

58 "Philo on Immortality," 86 (italics mine); cf. p. 85.

traditional Judaism into his [Philo's] more usual notion of absorption."63

My impression of Philo is just the reverse of Wolfson's. If P

Finally, there is no judgment scene in Philo. This seems to have been a

4. The rebirth of the soul which occurs after death seems to be on a

293-300; Sac. 15-16). Part of Philo's point is that one's perception of

This view is similar to that of some Stoics, most notably Chrysippus,

5. The term TcaXiyysveaia occurs in Post. 124 where Philo discusses

88 Cf. Seneca, Quaestiones naturales 3.27-30.

This passage indicates what Philo probably meant by his statemen

6. The other occurrences of naXiyyeveaia in the Philonic corpus are

There is a strong polemic in this treatise against the Stoic theory of a

7. We are now in a position to summarize the meaning of Tra^iyysveaia

You might also like