Introduction

The term Metaphysics is derived from a couple Greek words, μετἀ (meta), which means

after or beyond and τἀ φυϛίχἀ (ta physic) which signifies the physical, empirical reality.

The term was used officially by Andronicus of Rhodes, who, in classifying the works of

Aristotle, placed the books dealing with immaterial beings after the books of physics or

philosophy of nature.1

Metaphysics for Aristotle meant two inter-related ideas, ‘first philosophy’ and theology.

‘First philosophy’ is given as a name to metaphysics because it deals with the first causes

of things for the other branches of philosophy such as cosmology, which deals with the

causes of things in the first degree of abstraction. Aristotle gives the term Theology 2 to

Metaphysics because Metaphysics ultimately attains God and separated substance.3

According to Kant, Metaphysics is a speculative knowledge of pure reason which in

elevating itself above experience with pure concepts. Metaphysics is a natural tendency,

indestructible and belonging to the sphere of human reason. It has three ideas as object:

God, freedom and immortality.4

When we come to the real definition of Metaphysics, it is the science of being as being,

the science of all beings, such as substance, accident, God, possible being, and being of

reason. Metaphysics deals with God as the common cause of being. He is the material

1
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Vol, II, translated from the Latin of original by J.P.E.
O’Hanley, first ediion, Canada: St. Dunstan’s University, 1948, p.3.
2
Theology is also come from Greek, ϴϵολογία, which means the science of God. In a metaphysical sense it refers
to a speculative knowledge guided by reason alone without mingling it with revelation or super natural intervention.
3
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Metaphysics, op.cit, p.3.

4
Jean-Marie Vaysse, Le Vocabulaire de Kant, Paris: Ellipses Édition MarkatingS.A., 1998, p. 35.

1
object or subject of greatest dignity. 5 The formal object of Metaphysics is the positive

immateriality of real being, which is to say, being abstracted from all matters.

Now that we have said this much about Metaphysics to highlight what it is, let us turn our

attention to the issue of this presentation, which is the Metaphysics of Zär’a Ya‘əqob.

Many would argue that his thinking does not pertain to metaphysical concepts and would

support Hegelian position that Africa is devoid of philosophical speculation. However,

there are also many who, on the contrary, commend him for his theodicy and his ethics;

which is his celebrated concern and other philosophical disciplines excluding

Metaphysics.

Thus, the main endeavor of this research is to unearth Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s Metaphysics,

which even if it was not the first object of his pursuit or philosophical investigation and

maybe he might have been unaware of it, he built tumultuous thoughts that are really

Metaphysical. For instance, as it was mentioned above, his idea of Ethics, in the domain

of his main area of reflection are rooted in Metaphysics.

Thus, to tackle the problem of Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s Metaphysics, these research will focus on

a few of the Metaphysical thoughts of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, such as God, the human person and

nature –cosmos, in order to verify whether or not his philosophical investigations are

familiar to the domain of Metaphysics.

The first chapter concerns the life, the treatise and philosophical method of Zär’a

Ya‘əqob. In the second chapter, a discussion will be presented on the problem of the

existence and nature of Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s Metaphysics. The third chapter will deal with

his Metaphysics of Infinite Being, within which, the existence and nature of God are to

be presented. The forth chapter will be all about his metaphysics based ethics, in which,
5
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Vol, op. cit., p. 4.

2
the human person or the ontology of the human person in the creational aspect and nature

–cosmos or the ontology of nature in link with the problem of evil as well are to be

stated, according to the understanding of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, which leads us to understand his

metaphysical bases of his Ethics.

3
Chapter I
The Life of Zär’a Ya‘əqob

4
Zär’a Ya‘əqob was born in 1599 near Axum, in the northern part of Ethiopia. He attended

the traditional education in scripture and poetry, which were the highest learning levels of

those days. Afterwards, he spent a number of years teaching the Holy Scriptures. In 1626,

king Susenyos was converted from Orthodoxy in to Catholicism, along with this event; a

period of religious and civil unrest took place on the parts of the two religions. Zär’a

Ya‘əqob avoided taking sides, but his neutrality won him no friends. He was eventually

denounced before the king; he was compelled to flee for his life taking with himself little

more than a book of Psalms and three wäqet6 of gold. He spent the next two years in

isolation in a cave near the Takkaze River, meditating and praying over the psalms. On

his way to Shoa in the south, Addis Ababa is the modern capital of the province of Shoa;

he found an Ethiopian, philosophy in uninhabited cave at the foot of a valley, where he

lived for two years. In peace and solitude he developed his philosophy. There he reflected

on the disagreements between the followers of deferent faiths, and this led him to reject

all revealed religions as equally unsupportable by convincing reason, and to adopt instead

a faith found upon pure reason. He remained devout in his own way, convinced of God's

goodness and providential concern, for himself personally and for human beings

generally. His philosophy is presented as the fruit of his own personal reflection and not

as a translation-adaptation from foreign sources as is the case with most Ethiopic

literature.

In 1632, Susenyos abandoned his attempts to impose Catholicism on the country. He

abdicated, and died not much later; his son Fasiladas lost no time affirming his

commitment to the Orthodox faith, drawing the sectarian conflict to a close. Zär’a

6
Dawit Worku Kidane, The Ethics of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, Rome: Gregoriana & Biblical press, 2012, p. 392. ወቄት
, wäqet, A unit of weight: ounce : 1 wäqet is equivalent to 28g.

5
Ya‘əqob came out of hiding, finally making his way to the town of Enfraz, which is not

far from Gondar and Lake Tana. There he found employment doing writing for locals and

teaching their children. One of these children was Wäldä Heywåte. Zär’a Ya‘əqob as he

himself declared, was not a Christian but he was a theist. 7 He married Hirut from whom

he got a son. And after living a prosperous life he died in 1692. 8

The Treatise and Philosophical Method of Zär’a Ya‘əqob

In 1667, with Wäldä Heywåte’s encouragement, Zär’a ya‘əqob wrote his short treatise,

which was simultaneously probably the first autobiography and the first philosophical

work in Ethiopian history. The Treatise of Zär’a Ya’əqob is original in many ways. The

author begins the treatise with the story of his own life. The treatise is primarily

concerned with showing the errors of various religions, and it correspondingly treats of

various moral topics; it is also concerned to put confidence in God on a rational footing,

and so to defend the goodness of God in the face of evil and injustice.

The approach of his treatise is clearly rationalistic in a religious sense. Rationalism is

understood as the view which recognizes as true only that content of faith which can be

made to appeal to reason. In Ethiopia, traditional philosophy in its written form is closely

linked with Christianity in general and monasticism in particular. Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s

rationalism, in contrast, insists precisely on the absolute and exclusive sufficiency of

7
“I lived with people who took me for a Christian. But in my heart I do not believe except in God Creator
of all, who guards all, as He taught me.” HZY. XV, 4.

8
BRENDAN RITCHIE, ETHIOPIAN PHILOSOPHY, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY,
britchie@fas.harvard.edu http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~britchie/

6
human reason and denies all dogmatic assertion that reason is unable to establish by its

own means. Through the application of his method, the light of reason, whose immediacy

enlightened his investigation.

As a contemporary of René Descartes, Zär’a Ya‘əqob is similar to him in many ways,

even though Zär’a Ya‘əqob did not make use of the method of universal doubt. In both

these philosophers we find a method, an occasion for a critical inquiry and the discovery

of a criterion that leads to the establishment of a fundamental principle, which is then

applied in both authors to theodicy, ethics and psychology. Also in both, the method of

inquiry is revolutionary, even if their roots are profoundly theological. The historical

circumstances from which the rationalism of both philosophers originated are equally

similar. They are based in the collapse of scholasticism, the harmony between faith and

reason in Europe, and in Ethiopia, the confrontation with Western culture and violent

religious discord. Zär’a Ya‘əqob, unlike Descartes, was not a mathematical genius. His

philosophy does not develop deductively as a linear growth from a first principle or

original idea, but rather, like the unfolding of the sun’s rays, it emanates from a single

centre and safeguards the complexity and richness of reality.9 Moreover, the situations

were different for these thinkers to engage their methods: Descartes was dealing with

different philosophical orientations but as for Zär’a Ya‘əqob, he dealt with different

statements of belief of several religions.

9
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998)

7
 Chapter II

The problem of Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s Metaphysics

Its existence

Does the Metaphysics of Zär’a Ya‘əqob exist? This inquiry is one of the main concerns

of this paper, which seeks to verify its existence. In order to prove this claim, we need to

analyze his Theodicy or Natural Theology in relation to the concerns of Metaphysics.

Natural Theology or Theodicy has been consigned to a corner of the special metaphysics

which traditionally has the problem of God’s Existence and evil as its central problem. 10

This description is applicable in Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s philosophy because, as is evident from

his treatise, he makes a reference to God as a point of departure for all his assertions.

Sumner has said that Theodicy is the privileged domain of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, in which the

very important problem of the existence of God is tackled by him and he propounds a

philosophical demonstration of God’s existence.11 For him, this was necessary in order to

lay a firm foundation for his main philosophical concern, which is ethics, he had to prove

the existence of God in the first place, with which, he tried to treat moral issues in a

philosophical manner. In this case it is sound to say that his ethics is based upon his

Natural Theology as Dawit also said that Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s Theodicy is the foundation

stone for his ethical thought.12 As it has already been sated, to accept the idea that Zär’a

Ya‘əqob’s ideas are in the realm of Theodicy is logical.

10
The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, second edition, edited by Robert Audi, USA: Cambridge
University Press, 1999, p. 911. & JacWonkim and Ernest Sosa, A Companion To Metaphysics, USA: Blackwell
Publishing Ltd, 1995, p. 310.
11
A Companion to African Philosophy, edited by Kwasi Wiredu, Blackwell publishing Ltd, 2004, pp. 176-77.
12
Dawit Worku Kidane, The Ethics Of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, op.cit., p. 224.

8
Statement: If Zär’a Ya‘əqob has Natural Theology, it follows that he has really

Metaphysics.

The meaning of the statement:

It accepts that Natural Theology or Theodicy is the continuation of Metaphysics. And it

denies that Natural theology is really distinct from Metaphysics as other Braches of

philosophy are.

Explanation of the statement

It must be noted that Natural Theology is an integral part of Metaphysical speculation and

it is impossible to consider it an independent discipline. Although it is specific in its

scope, it studies its object in the same way Metaphysics studies it. It is under the general

category of Metaphysics as the Metaphysics of Infinite Being.

Smith has argued that Natural Theology is an extension of Metaphysics and has the same

nature. He has also stated that it cannot be considered as though it were separated or

distinct from Metaphysics like other branches of philosophy are; those, even if they lay

their root in Metaphysics, are distinct from it.

These things being so, it becomes quite impossible to speak of Theology as though it
were a speculative science specifically distinct from Metaphysics. Sciences are
distinguished by a specific difference of their formal object, which is the term in which
they account for their domain. Plainly, Theology is accounting for its domain, all things,
in terms of being, viz., uncaused being. True, the knowledge that multiple being has an
uncaused cause of it is not knowledge of that uncaused cause as it is in itself –if it were,
Theology would be specifically distinct from Metaphysics. The knowledge that multiple
being has an uncaused cause is rather knowledge about beings as dependent upon a
first cause. Theology knows God as the First Cause of being; it is not a Beatific vision....
however to call Natural Theology the knowledge about God in the light of human
reason seems to distinguish it from Metaphysics, as if Natural Theology knew about God
whereas Metaphysics did not. This is not so. To speak of Natural Theology is to
distinguish it from Revealed Theology. To speak of simply Theology is to name a
speculative science about things in terms of their dependence upon the First Cause....

9
 Theology is a continuation of Metaphysics and that Natural Theology names the same
science as Metaphysics but as distinguished from Revealed Theology. 13
Metaphysics is all inclusive, extending to everything and every aspect of whatever is or

can exist; it can be empirical or of a higher, nonmaterial nature. 14 These things did not

escape Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s reflection. Klubertanz agrees with the above statement that

Natural Theology is considered as an inseparable part of Metaphysics, since it studies

Divine Being not as its subject matter but as the principle of the subject matter.

“In order to be a complete knowledge of the real, metaphysics must also deal with the
absolutely first principle of all other beings, that is, God. The philosophical study of God
is often given a special name, that of natural theology, and is usually studied in a distinct
course under that name. Is it distinct, though, from the philosophy of being in the same
way that logic, the philosophy of human nature, or ethics is? Natural Theology treats of
divine things not as the subject matter of the science but as the principle of the subject
matter ...; consequently, it cannot be adequately distinct from the philosophy of being.
The philosophy of being taken in its full sense, deals with whatever is in its entirety and
with all the principles of the real. For convenience, however, the philosophy of being is
often divided into ‘integral parts introductory philosophy of being and natural theology,
which is the complementary and crowning part of the whole philosophy of being’.” 15
In a similar consideration, the metaphysics of Duns Scotus clearly shows that it is a

principal concern of metaphysics to establish the existence and attributes of God, so

natural theology is a branch of the discipline –metaphysics.16

In addition to these citations, for Heidegger, the composition of Metaphysics is Onto-

theological: Ontology is a science of being, which develops itself systematically into

13
Gerard Smith, Natural theology, Metaphysics II, USA, New York: the Macmillan Company, 1955, pp. 17-
8.
14
NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, second edition, Vol. 9, USA: The Catholic University of America,
2003. p 547
15
George P. Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, second edition, USA, New York: Merdith
publishing company, 1963. Pp.13-14.
16
Anthony Kenny, NEW HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, volume 1, OXFORD: CLARENDON PRESS,
2005, p.201.

10
metaphysical knowledge, but Metaphysics is also a theology, natural, a discourse on God,

because God enters into philosophy. His place is marked by that which is missed in the

discourses.17

Proof-1

Zär’a Ya‘əqob has formulated Natural Theology.

Evidence: it is evident from what has been stated so far.

Proof-2

Zär’a Ya‘əqob has Metaphysics, if Natural Theology or Theodicy is not really distinct from

Metaphysics.

But Theodicy is not really distinct from Metaphysics, because it is included in it.

Therefore, Zär’a Ya‘əqob has Metaphysics.

Evidence: The disjunction is complete.

A possible objection: if Natural Theology had not been distinct from Metaphysics, it

would not have had another name.

Counter opposition: first of all, it can be called Metaphysics, as it is a continuation of

Metaphysics.18 Second, a special part of a subject needs a special name so as to specify it

from the other areas of the subject’s study, and since Natural Theology is a body of

knowledge in which metaphysical thought is found at a certain point to be known

knowledge of first being.19

Here, we demonstrated the existence of his metaphysics by appealing to his theodicy and

there is also another important one which is his metaphysical based ethics which we are

about to deal with it in the last chapter, which has two parts.

17
André Akoun, La Philosophie, Les Encyclopedies Du Savoir Moderne, Paris: Retz press, 1977, p.100.
18
Gerard Smith, Natural theology, Metaphysics II, op.cit, p. 17.
19
Ibid.

11
 The Nature of his Metaphysics

One thing that must be taken into consideration is that Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s Metaphysics is

not presented in a systematic and fully elaborated way, however, this does not mean that

in substance, it is not metaphysics, for not putting ideas in a more logical flow, as

Nkrumah has said, is something secondary to the main point. In fact, there is no a clear

and generally accepted definition or a specified agreement on either the scope or

divisions of Metaphysics.20 Although his Metaphysics appears obscure in relation to the

common understanding of Metaphysics, it might well be erroneous to deny him a place

beside established writers of Metaphysics. Moreover, to value a philosopher as a

contributor to any philosophical discipline, does not demand that he or she has touched

on all things which are studied under that specific discipline, i.e., in ethics, aesthetics,

cosmology, etc.

Zär’a Ya‘əqob addressed not only the problem of the Ultimate Reality –God but also

other metaphysical issues like the soul, evil, freedom, goodness and so on. Some of his

writing pertaining to these issues will be offered as proof within this current research.

most certainly, he was not ignorant of the Metaphysical domain. Thus one cannot

dispense Zär’a Ya‘əqob as though he had not developed Metaphysics valuing him in a

frame work which is maintained by others or by self without treating the case in itself

which leads to a negative conclusion. Such a way influences the mind by preconceptions

and prejudices which bear upon our interpretation of experience and distort our

20
JacWonkim and Ernest Sosa, a Companion to Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 310.

12
judgments. Such judgments Bacon calls the 'idols of the theatre', idola theatri, speaking of

when our judgment is merely founded on an external authority’s suggestions.21

Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s Metaphysics has the nature of theism. In spite of his rejection of

revelation, like the deists, he accepts the divine operation of God, which continues in

nature but not including Himself like that of pantheism.

Chapter III
Part I
The Metaphysics of Infinite Being of Zär’a Ya‘əqob

The part of Metaphysics that deals with infinite being is commonly known as Natural

Theology.22 The word theology comes from a couple of Greek words, θЄολογία = θЄος

which means God and λογος , discourse or study. Thus, the etymological meaning is the

science of God.

It is necessary to note that theology in a philosophical context is different from that

pertaining to the religious aspect, which studies God with the aid of revelation.

Philosophers like Aristotle were concerned with natural theology as the philosophical

investigation of God guided by reason.

Many philosophers following the example of Leibniz named the Metaphysics of Infinite

Being as Theodicy, but it is an inappropriate designation, as Theodicy (θεουῠ, δίκη)

signifies rather the justification of God.23

21
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Vol. III, New
York: Image books Doubleday, 1993, p. 303.

22
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Vol, II, translated from the Latin of original by J.P.E.
O’Hanley, first ediion, Canada: St. Dunstan’s University, 1948, p. 253.
23
Ibid.

13
The real definition of Natural Theology is the science of God considered under the

common aspect of being, acquired by the natural light of reason.24

The study of Natural Theology treats things that are concerned with the Infinite Being –

God, His existence, His essence or nature and the operation outside Himself.

Demonstrability of the existence of God in Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s mentality

Unlike the atheistic position, which denies the existence of God and its demonstration, or

metaphysical agnosticism like that of Kant who does not deny God’s existence but

declares the impossibility of the demonstration of His existence, Zär’a Ya‘əqob

frequently states the possibility of demonstrating God’s existence by the aid of reason,

which he calls ልቡና lqbuna.

Demonstration is, first of all, either direct or indirect. The direct demonstration proves a

point by referring to the thing itself, whereas the indirect one proves the contradictory

point, the unacceptable. In Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s proofs only the direct means is implemented.

The direct demonstration has two features, a priori reasoning, which goes from cause to

effect, and is independent of present experience or what occurred before it and a

posteriori reasoning, which goes from effect to cause. The latter system is post-

experience.

Zär’a Ya‘əqob had not intention of constructing arguments for the existence of God for

the sake of responding to the atheistic thesis as such, but constructed several proofs for

the existence of God both implicitly and explicitly in order to show that God was the

foundation of his ethical conceptions and in addition, it is to demonstrate the absurdness

24
Ibid.

14
of man’s misbehavior regardless of the fact he is created by God. 25 This manifests the fact

that his ethical frame work is founded on the ultimate reality or the idea of God, which

renders it metaphysical in its base.

God is mentioned in almost every line of his treatise, although his primary concern was

not an extended discourse on God.26 In the treatise, there no explicit assertion that God’s

existence is self-evident, yet Zär’a Ya‘əqob starts his investigation by asking the

philosophical question: “ቦኑ፡ ዘየአምር፡ በአርያም፡፡ Is there truly someone in heaven who

knows?” This question clearly has a metaphysical nature.27

The problem of the existence of God

To Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s way of thinking, as he explicitly states, there is the possibility of

arriving philosophically at an affirmation of God’s existence by utilizing the efficient

power of the soul.28

…our soul is able to think about God and can see him mentally. And again it (the soul) can think
of living forever. And God did not give in vain the ability to think this [living forever] but it may
think as he allows her to and acquires what he gives her. 29

We may wish to ask whether Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s proofs for the existence of God are

developed in the a priori or a posteriori way. Many researchers have presented Zär’a

Ya‘əqob’s proofs of God’s existence as a priori, and he certainly worked out for

himself a priori proofs for the existence of God.30 However, this cannot lead one to

25
Dawit Worku Kidane, The Ethics of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, op.cit, p. 210.
26
C. Sumner, Ethiopian Philosophy, Vol. III, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Commercial press, 1978, p. 120.
27
Dawit Worku Kidane, The Ethics of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, op.cit, p.212.
28
Ibid.
29
HZY. VII, 17.
30
C. Sumner, Ethiopian Philosophy, Vol. III, op.cit, p. 119.

15
 assert that he was limited to only this way, as the Cartesians were; hence he utilized

the a posteriori reasoning as well.

The A posteriori Ways of Proving The Existence of God

An A posteriori truth is a truth which cannot be known or justified independently of

evidence from sensory experience.31 The main features of arguments that utilize this way

are that they are typically commence at the point of some effect and then ascend to the

cause. Accordingly, any proof of the existence of God of this nature goes from

contingency to the necessity.

Proof from Contingent Beings

It is evident from his writing that Zär’a Ya‘əqob recognized very well the events of

phenomenal realities, those which can be perceived, such as coming into being and

passing out, change or mutability, and modality in beings. These features of reality

prompted him to probe the ultimate origin of empirical realities. He thereby developed an

argument concerning the problem of God’s existence based on causality.

He argued:

...let us reflect: Why do all people agree on the affirmation that there is a God who is the
Creator of all? ...Because the intelligence of all people knows that all we see is created

31
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge .1998.

16
 and, it is impossible that a creature may be without a Creator, and it is true that there is
a Creator.32

A contingent being is a being which may or may not exist. 33 The term contingent in a

metaphysical sense, refers to the causal or temporal dependence of an event on the

existence of the other events without which the event will not take place or, in other

words, a contingent being is that which is necessitated to happen.34

As it will be presented soon, Zär’a Ya‘əqob considered any possible existent thing to be

contingent and the word that he used was ፍጡር fəttūrq , which signifies a created being.

The term that he used, in fact, includes in itself, being dependent on existing being,

without which it could not sustain its existence.

Necessary being is being which cannot be nonexistent and a being whose existence is

indefectible.35 Necessary being is that can never become something other than what it is

or itself and can never be caused not to be, in which there is not any corruptibility or

chance. A contingent being is, thus, a being which is not dependent –a being necessary of

itself, Ens Necessarium A Se. This being, for Zär’a Ya‘əqob, is ፈጣሪ fättari, which

implies a creator upon whom all contingent beings depend and draw their existence from

as well as their sustenance. So, God, in Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s understanding, is the Necessary

Being.
32
እስመፍጡር፡ ሶበ፡ ከሉ፡ ሰብእ፡ ተሰነዓዉ፡ በ 1 ነገር፡ ይመስል፡ ጽድቀ: ዝንቱ ነገር፡፡ ...እስመ፡ ልቡና፡ ኵሉ፡ ሰብእ፡ የአምር፡ ከመዝንቱ:

ኵሉ፡ ዘንሬኢ፡ ፍጡር፡ ውእቱ፡ ወከመ፡ ኢይክል፡ ይትረከብ፡ ፍጡር፡ እንበለ፡ ፈጣሪ፡ ወከመቦ፡ ፈጣሪ፡ ጽድቅ፡ ውእቱ፡፡ HZY. Cha.

VI:6-7.

33
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Vol,, op.cit, p. 273.
34
Peter A.Angeles, The Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., New York: HarperCollins
press,1992, p.56.

35
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Vol, II, op.cit , p. 273.

17
The whole argument can be put as follows;

The adequate efficient cause of any contingent effect must either be another contingent

being, or be a sum of such beings, or include at least one being of a totally different

order, which is its Primary Cause, Necessary and Infinite in Being.

But the above two alternatives cannot account adequately for the effect.

Therefore, the adequate efficient cause of any contingent effect must include at least one

Primary Cause, Necessary and Infinite in Being, Whom we refer to as God.36

Zär’a Ya‘əqob was conscious of this kind of argument which he resumed with a few

more words to say that created being cannot come into existence without a Creator. Such

an argument is really post-experience, for it starts with effect to reach the cause.

The Teleological or Design Argument

This argument is non-explicitly expressed in Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s philosophical reflection in

which he admires the creatures of the One of supreme wisdom –God, Whose works are

completed spotlessly with beauty and order or design. He realized that there is the

manifestation of the intelligence of a Creator in the order of created beings, which

seemed to him as though they had, as he says ነፍስ nä’fəsə, which signifies a soul,

meaning that they possessed a rational soul yet were irrational. 37 He not only states the

36
Avery R. Dulles, James M. Demske, Robert J. O’connell, Introductory Metaphysics, New York: Sheed
And Ward , 1955,P.165
37
As the following text indicates, ( HZY. Cha. X.) Zara Yocob is meditating on the creatures excluding
human beings. The reason why he did so is maybe he wanted to show that all which God created is good
and this can be cited as his one of the points of departure of his ethical thesis. This point will be discussed
in the fourth chapter of the paper where his ethics is going to be presented that it is rooted in
metaphysics.

18
goodness of creation in nature, which is a metaphysical idea, but he also tries to

demonstrate their ultimate cause. The discourse goes on like this;

And I admire the beauty of God’s creation each in their order: domestic and wild
beasts. They are drawn by the nature of their creation towards the preservation
of their life and for the communication of their species. And likewise, the plants
in the wilderness and vegetation, created with great wisdom, grow and flourish,
bloom and bear fruit in their respective species without any error as if they had a
rational soul. ...the moon and the stars which you made do not deviate from the
path you made for them ...everything is great and wonderful, and all are created
with great wisdom. ...I thought and said the work of God is very good, and the
thought of His wisdom is ineffable and it is deep indeed.38
Zär’a Ya‘əqob does not stop here admiring the marvelous creatures but returns to the one

who created them, as he said, with a great wisdom. For him, they themselves cannot

account for the origin of their existence.

Such reflection on nature is not a peculiar legacy of Zär’a Ya‘əqob. It was a bare fact for

several thinkers, of whom, St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas of Aquinas must at

least be mentioned.

Question the beauty of the earth, question the beauty of the sea, question the beauty of
the air distending and diffusing itself, question the beauty of the sky. . . question all
these realities. All respond: "See, we are beautiful." Their beauty is a profession. These
beauties are subject to change. Who made them if not the Beautiful One who is not
subject to change?39

Augustine aesthetically manifests in this text the Neo-Platonic Christian consideration of

beauty as orderliness, which is maintained by the Being who is finer than it is. The beauty

in all the things that he mentions shows its limited nature and professes that there is an

38
HZY. Cha. X.

39
St. Augustine, Sermo. 241, 2: PL 38, 1134.

19
ultimate source for its very existence. Much like Augustine, Zär’a Ya‘əqob takes such a

route in order to uncover the existence of a personal Being, who accounts for the design

of the universe.

A similar consideration was also expressed by Aquinas, who in his fifth way of

demonstrating God’s existence uses the teleological argument. The argument is as

follows;

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack
intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting
always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence, it is plain
that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now, whatever lacks
intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed
with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore
some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this
being we call God.40

Aquinas saw that there is an order in the universe, where the irrational beings appear to

act as if they were intelligent beings. In his understanding, these beings cannot really

organize themselves purposely, for they lack intelligence; thus, he inferred that an

intelligent Being was vital to the accomplishment of this action, a Being whom he call

God. In a way correspondingly to that of Aquinas, Zär’a Ya‘əqob recognized that God

renders things to attain their finality or end in a manner which convincingly prompts the

recognition of His existence.

What has been outlined so far is called the teleological argument or argument from

design.41 This argument is the most popular of theistic arguments. The very essence of the

40
Summa Theol. Part I, Q. 2, Art. 3.
41
Teleology is a term derived from Greek words : telos meaning the completion of fulfillment of
something, the completed stage of an activity, end, result, purpose, goal, aim, that final point toward the
achievement of which a process is directed and logos which means study.

20
line of this argument is that it appeals to the fact that the world looks very ordered, as

though ordered by a being of great intelligence and power.42

The Thomistic Metaphysics of Infinite Being puts this argument in a systematic way, but

in Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s presentation, there is not such a systematic presentation. Though

Zär’a Ya‘əqob lacks a systematic approach, his argument does not in any way contradict

the Thomistic methodology.

The Thomistic thesis can be presented as follows;

Natural things, i.e., things which have no knowledge, act for an end. But things which

have no rationality do not tend to an end or finality unless they are directed by some

being which has knowledge and intelligence. Therefore, there must exist a supreme

intelligent being by which all natural things are derived to their end; this Being is called

God.43

Proof from The Nature of Intellect

The particular which exists stimulates the rational being’s mind to go beyond the

particular which it perceives. This fact of consciousness is clearer than the five ways

wherein the intelligence reposes only in the conclusive affirmation: Unconditioned

Mover, Unconditioned Cause, Necessary Being, Greatest Being, and constructing

intellectual nature.44 The cosmological arguments prove God’s existence as the first

efficient cause of the universe whereas this kind of argument proves the existence of God

as the final cause of intellect.

42
JacWonkim and Ernest Sosa, A Companion To Metaphysics, USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1995, p.347.
43
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Vol, II, op.cit, p.278.
44
Luigi Bogliolo, Rational Theology, Italy: Urbaniana university press, 1984, p.54.

21
The truth or the capacity of the intelligence to go beyond the particular truth is called the

sixth way with reference to the five Thomistic ways. 45 In this very way, Hence, Zär’a

Ya‘əqob involves the intellect to demonstrate that God exists. As he says:

...You make me understand, for you have created me intelligent. I meditated and said:
“if I am intelligent, what do I know?” And I said, “I know there is a Creator who is greater
than all creatures and who, from the abundance of His greatness, created great things,
and He is intelligent who knows all. For He created us intelligent from the abundance of
His intelligence. We should adore Him for He is the lord of all; and when we pray to Him,
He listens to us, for He is the One who holds all. 46

Here, it is evident that, for Zär’a Ya‘əqob, the intelligence does not stop only at a certain

or particular reality, but rather transcends it in order to comprehend the absolute or the

highest truth, which lies beyond all other particular truths, a truth which is the source for

them all, whom Zär’a Ya‘əqob considers to be God, and who, for him, created all things

from the abundance of His intelligence.

The main function of this argument is to show that the nature of the intellect leads to

something which is real that is not necessarily confined to phenomenal realities, that can

extend to transcendental realities as well, and the object of intellectual activities must be

something which really exists; it cannot be nothingness. Such position is well accepted by

many thinkers i.e., The Eleatic philosopher, Parmenides said that;

Thought and that by which thought is made possible is the same thing; for thought is
expressed in being, and hence without being there would be no thought. 47

45
Ibid.
46
...አለብወኒ፡ አንተ፡ እስመ፡ ፈጠርከኒ፡ ለባዌ፡፡ ወሐለይኩ፡ ወእቤ፡ ለእመ፡ ለባዊ፡ አነ፡ ምንተ እሌቡ፡፡ ወእቤ እሌቡ፡ ከመቦ፡
ፈጣሪ፡ ዘየአቢ፡ እምከሉ፡ ፍጥረት፡ እስመ፡ እምተረፈ፡ ዕበዩ፡ ፈጠረ፡ ዓቢያተ፡ ወለባዊ፡ ውእቱ፡ ዘከሎ፡ ይሌቡ፡፡ እስመ፡
እምተረፈ፡ ልቡናሁ፡ ፈጠረነ፡ ለባውያነ፡ ወይደልወነ፡ ንስግድ፡ ሎቱ፡ እስመ፡ እግዚኣ፡ ከሉ፡ ውእቱ፡ ወአመ፡ ንጼሊ፡ ኀቤሁ፡
ይሰምዓነ፡ እስመ፡ አኃዜ፡ ከሉ፡ ውእቱ፡፡ HZY. Cha.IV:11-12
47
DK. 28 B8, vol.9 p.34.

22
This implies that nothingness or non-existence cannot be the object of any cognitive or

intellectual activity.

Intelligence is thus something with a concrete output because it has a tendency to engage

reality that cannot be directed towards nothingness. For a tendency towards nothingness

would be the same as having non tendency. Therefore, intelligence must necessarily have

a positive tendency that is to something which exists.48

Accordingly, not to stop at any particular truth means, in the positive sense, to tend to go

beyond every particular truth; to tend to go beyond particular truth means, to tend

towards the truth by essence, to truth in all its fullness – that is, the total truth, the truth by

nature, which we call God.49

Thus, according to Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s understanding of reality every particular realty leads

one to the total reality – God, in whom other partial realities participate, in His Immense

goodness and greatness, and human intelligence itself has been drawn from the absolute

intelligence of the one who is infinitely intelligent. Such an assertion is also accepted by

St. Thomas Aquinas, who said that: “we know God in everything.”50

“Therefore, the nature of intelligence manifests the existence of God as the Total
Truth.”51

The argument can be put, in short, as follows;

48
Luigi Bogliolo, Rational Theology, op.cit, pp.56.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Luigi Bogliolo, Rational Theology, op.cit, p.56.

23
If the intellect’s very nature is directed to a total truth as an end,

This Total truth or truth, by essence, exists in reality.

But the intelligence naturally tends to the truth in itself as its end.

Therefore, a Truth by Itself or a Total Truth exists in reality.

Here we have to note that although Zär’a Ya‘əqob did not systematically demonstrate

such an argument, his idea cited above52 bears out the fact, that there is really a parallel

structure of thought. Moreover, the text seems to say that the intelligence a person has

leads to the comprehension of the existence of God as its final destination. God, for him,

is the object of knowledge, which is the summit of his understanding. That is why he said

“If I am intelligent, what do I know? “And I said”, I know there is a Creator…”

Argument from Causality: God as the First Cause

This argument is characterized by the way it goes about proving God’s existence, from

effect to cause –a posteriori. A cause is anything that contributes in any way to the

producing of an effect or a thing and the constant relationship between cause and effect is

called causality. When the phrase ‘first cause’ is applied to God, He is not being

described as the source which, at some time, started everything, but rather being given

the designation of primary rather than second, ultimate rather than derived cause, or as a

Being on whom all other things depend for their existence.53

52
see HZY. Cha.IV:11-12.
53
Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 2ndedition, USA, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1974, p. 112.

24
Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s First Cause is the same as what has been just described, a cause for all

things which does not need any other cause, a cause which is in no way the sum of other

causes which he referred to as its descendants. This inevitably prompted him to state that

creation has a beginning which was an emergence out of nothingness, which he declares;

እምኀበ፡ አልቦ, qmqhabä alqbo, which is equivalent to creatio exnihillo. This line of reasoning,

in other words, points also to the impossibility of an infinite series of causality, because

according to him, creation was started at a certain time without any existing material or

anything else. His argument goes like this;

...How did I come into this world? And where do I come from since I was not before the
world? I know the beginning of my life and of my knowledge. And who then created
me? Am I created by my own hands? And yet I was not when I was created. If I say that
my father and mother created me, then I must search for the creator of my parents and
of the parents of my parents until they arrive at the first who were not born like us but
came into this world in a different way without having parents. For if they themselves
have been born, I know nothing of their origin unless I say, ‘he created them out of
nothing, one Being who himself is not created but existed and exists for ever, Lord of all
and who holds all ,who does not have beginning or end who does not change and his
years cannot be counted.

Therefore, I said there is a creator; if there were no creator, no creature would be

found. Hence, we exist, we are not creators but creatures, and we should say that a
creator created us.54

This paradigm has something in common with St. Augustine’s proof of God’s existence,

which is cited as follows;

Look around; there are the heaven and the earth. They cry aloud that they were made,
for they change and vary. Whatever there is that has not been made, and yet has being,
has nothing in it that was not there before. This having something not already existent
is what it means to be changed and varied. Heaven and earth thus speak plainly that
they did not make themselves: "We are, because we have been made; we did not exist
before we came to be so that we could have made ourselves!" And the voice with

54
HZY. Cha.III: 7-10.

25
 which they speak is simply their visible presence. It was you, O Lord, who made these
things.55

As we can see, he interrogates himself, asking whether he was a cause for his existence,

but he comes to the conclusion that this would not have been possible. Then he moves to

his predecessors and these, too, could not have been the possible primary agents of all or

even of their own being. So knowing that an infinite regression was impossible, he

concluded that there must have been a First Cause of all beings which was not itself

caused –God. This thesis it similar to Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover” and Aquinas’

“Uncaused Cause”.

Thus, Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s argument can be summarized like this;

All things we observe need a cause to exist.

However, the cause of all must finally be a cause which is not caused.

So this causeless being must necessarily exist –God.

The a priori Ways of Proving the Existence of God

The term a priori typically signifies a kind of knowledge or justification that does not

depend on evidence, or warrant, from sensory experience. To talk of a priori truth is

ordinarily shorthand for speaking of truth that is knowable or justifiable without any need

55
Confessions, Book XI, Chapter 4,par 6.

26
for evidence from sensory experience; to speak of a priori concepts is to consider

concepts that can be understood without any reference to sensory experience.56

The a priori ways of proving the existence of God are characterized by reference to a

rationalistic nature, without any appeal to effects or experience the course of arriving at

some kind of knowledge of the supreme cause.

Linguistic Proof

Zär’a Ya‘əqob also proves the existence of God by using reason alone, a way which is

based upon the a priori factor. He just draws the affirmation that God exists from the

nature of a phrase which contains the affirmation inherently in itself: “ ወእቤ: እሌቡ፡ ከመቦ፡

ፈጣሪ፡ ዘየአቢ፡ እምከሉ፡ ፍጥረት፡፡ I know there is a Creator who is greater than all creatures.” 57

Here, he reflects only on the greatness that he has assigned to God and on that basis,

argues that God is inevitably needed as Creator of created beings. This statement is

logical in itself, in that the one who creates must necessarily be greater than what he has

created; otherwise it will not be logically valid to state the opposite. The truth of this

statement is necessary like that of analytic judgment, because the idea of being greatness

is already included in the idea of creator like as we say the number 2 is greater than 1. For

this reason, this argument is really rooted in the a priori factor of the mind, which seeks

to prove God’s existence with pure reason, without appealing to any observable

phenomenon of reality.

56
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge .1998.
57
see HZY. Cha.IV:11-12.

27
The argument is in tune, to some extent, with St. Anselm’s ontological argument which

makes use of reason or the power of the mind, apart from the data that might be provided

by the senses. His position is as follows;

A maximally great being exists in the understanding.

It is greater to exist in reality than to exist merely in the understanding.
Therefore, if the maximally great being existed only in the understanding, it would be less
than maximally great.58

Proof from the Nature of the Soul

Here Zär’a Ya‘əqob makes an argument for the existence of God from the nature of the

soul as he and other thinkers considered it, as having the faculty of intelligence and

divine entity.

…our soul is able to think about God and can see him mentally. And again it (the soul) can think
of living forever. And God did not give in vain the ability to think this [living forever] but it may
think as he allows her to and acquires what he gives her .59

According to Zär’a Ya‘əqob, the soul has the divine gift of contemplating and seeing its

Creator.60 This meansl, that to acquire an understanding of the existence of God is within

the soul’s capacity by virtue of its ontological nature. This capacity is inherently and

inseparably integrated within the very nature of the soul itself as it is. If it were not so, it

could never contemplate a Being who exceedingly transcended it. And to understand this

Being which is absolutely unfathomable reality, the soul must be endowed with

intelligence by the one who is infinite. Otherwise, there would be no way to understand

him. He also adds;

58
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge .1998. § 2.
59
HZY. VII, 17.
60
Dawit Worku Kidane, The Ethics of Zär’a Ya‘əqob, op.cit, p. 221.

28
 ...A rational soul understands that a God, who knows all, holds all, keeps all, governs all,
exists; and it is drawn to him so that it may pray to him and ask goodness from him. 61

Generally, his idea is focused on the point that, without the gift of God, a soul could not

come to understand God. Such an idea is close to that of Descartes, who argued that, if

there were no a perfect being, he would not be able to conceive of such a thing.

The significance of his argument

All that has been stated so far gives evidence to the thesis that the Supreme Being –God –

by pure reason, without the aid of supernatural mechanisms, is knowable. The assurance

of the existence of God has a special meaning for his all philosophical arguments and is

the foundation without which his philosophy loses all sense.

Part II

The God of Zär’a Ya‘əqob

What we have been dealing so far was about God’s existence or the question of “that’’.

But here we will be discussing about the nature of God or the question of “what”

according to Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s thinking.

When one talks about nature of anything, must approach it in two aspects; essence and

attribute for these are which state about the whatness of a being. Essence is that which

61
HZY. VIII; 9.

29
makes a thing a thing not something else. Essence also is seen in two aspects, physical or

natural essence and metaphysical essence.

A physical essence is an essence as it exists in the order of things out side of the mind or

a status of a being in itself. 62 And the metaphysical essence a thing is that which makes it

understandable first and for most to the mind, which comprehends it. 63 For Zär’a Ya‘əqob

there are two things which explain God’s essence: unity for the physical or natural

essence and self-subsistence for metaphysical essence.

Unity of God:

It is a fundamental truth of metaphysics that every being is one; in as much as a thing is a

64
thing, it is that one. For none being can be the plurality of itself. Zär’a Ya‘əqob utilized

an all embracing term to explain God’s unity: ፩ ህላዌ , hhd hqllwe ,which means One

Being.65 ፩ is an adjective indicating quantity. And ህላዌ is a noun form of ሀለወ halläwä,

which can be translated as be, exist, be present, abide. ህላዌ, hqllwe bears numerous

significations, i.e., substance, hypostasis, being, essence, nature, presence, position and

condition.66 Zär’a Ya‘əqob is accordingly a monist. And one thing one mus note is that

God is not only one by essence but also unique, means that there is nothing in the order

of beings that can be identified with him or being His plurality. 67

62
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, New York: B.Herder Book Co.,1953,p.110
63
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, p.139.
64
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, p.113.
65
HZY. chapter III, 9.
66
Wolf Leslau, comparative dictionary of Ge’ez, classical Ethiopic, Belgium:Ott Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden,
1987, pp.217-218.
67
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, p.113.

30
Self-subsistence:

Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s conception of God’s nature is implicitly in tune with the aseity-doctrine,

which conciders God’s metaphysical essence as Ens a se, Being who is of Himself. This

means that a being which accounts for its own existence, that is, to declare that God

exists or subsists of Himself stress the truth that He is not dependent upon any cause, but

is Self-sufficient because He is the Necessary Being.68

Thus, Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s term to signify the self-subsistence of God is uncreatedness,

which underlines the essential fact of the none-dependency of God’s essence. He argues

this issue with few words;“…one being who himself is not created but existed

and exists for ever…”69

Now then let us see God’s attributes. An attribute is perfection which necessarily belong

to an essence when that essence is fully constituted. Here one must note that an attribute

cannot be identified with the essence of a certain being to which it belongs, because it is a

property or accident of a being when its essence is fully realized.70

Regarding God’s attribute one can treat it in two dimensions: Absolute Divine attribute

and relative. When we mean by absolute attribute, it is that which we consider in

studying God in Himself without bringing into our consideration any reference to

68
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit,p.138.
69
HZY. chapter III, 9.
70
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, pp.145-48.

31
creatures those depend on God.71 But in Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s method this way is not explicit

but rare and also obscure. Sumner also states;

…strictly speaking there is no such divine attribute in the treatise, however, divine
greatness, perfection and infinity are still attributes of God in Himself even if the via of
their knowledge is creation.72

Although he is not so clear in this way, there are few claims which indicate us that he

intuitively approached it, i.e., he attributes to God immutability or unchangeability,

73
Knowledge, wisdom, eternity, omniscience, and infinity in existence.

Furthermore, this way of explaining God’s attribute is also seen in two ways: negative,

via negatiava, which dines for God all imperfections, i.e., as Zär’a Ya‘əqob manifested

by declaring that God is uncreated, unchangeable, and so on are the negative ways of

explaining God. The other is the positive way, via positiva, which affirms perfections to

God, i.e., Zär’a Ya‘əqob also utilized this way as well by stating that God is intelligent,

omniscient, and so on.

The other dimension is the relative divine attribute, which involves the relation of

creatures to God. 74This is the essential dimension of studying God in Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s

method, which centers on creation, i.e., creation and providence can be mentioned.

Chapter IV

71
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, p.149.
72
C. Sumner, Ethiopian Philosophy, Vol. III, op.cit, p. 130.
73
See HZY. III, 9-16.
74
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, p.150.

32
 Metaphysics Based Ethics

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of the nature of reality,

and which includes what it means to be human as well. Our metaphysical conception of

the human nature has a deep influence on our reflection of how we ought to live 75; i.e.,

we may interrogate ourselves as Zär’a Ya‘əqob did, if God is the guardian of men, how

come their nature is so corrupted? 76 Are human beings evil by nature so that they act

immorally? Or if not what makes them to act like that and what is the root of their

conduct? Are we basically good? Do we have free-will or are we simply determined by

causal laws? Are there fundamental precepts of conduct that bind categorically all

mankind? And if there are, what are they and who is their legislator? What is the

relationship between us –human beings and nature? These and such inquiries have

basically something to do with metaphysics.

Metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality are not just abstract theories; they

can have a profound consequence on both ethical theory and normative ethics.

Metaphysical assumptions play a pivotal role, for better or for worse, in instructing

relations among human beings and between human beings and the rest of the entire

world.77

Koren in his book entitled an introduction to the science of metaphysics, stated the fact

that ethics is profoundly rooted in metaphysics. And he argues:

75
Judith A. Boss, Ethics for Life, a text with readings, 3 rd edition, USA., New York: McGraw-Hill,
Companies,2004, P.12.
76
HZY. III,3.
77
Judith A. Boss, Ethics for Life, op.cit, p.12.

33
 The norms of life ultimately depend upon metaphysical principles. Man is guided in his
life by certain practical philosophic principles, whether these principles are embodied in
an established religious system or remain purely ethical and personal. Now, ultimately,
even practical philosophic principles are based upon metaphysical principles. Therefore,
whether we are aware of it or not, the principles which govern the way we want to live
and act ultimately depend upon our metaphysical principles. 78

Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s philosophy objectively aims at morality. His entire effort is culminated

by finding the ethical principles which were to be observed by each individual person.

He claimed that there are objective moral standards, those work for all individuals at any

time and place. For him, moral laws are irreversible for being inherent within the nature

itself as ways of acting. According to him, these moral laws are legislated by the creator

of all –God. That was why that before he made an extended discourse on the questions of

morality, he had in the first places argued about God’s existence, nature and His divine

actions exterior to Himself. He did such things in order to lay his ethical thoughts on an

unyielding foundation. This is the first metaphysical base of his theory of morality. The

second is the nature of the person, personality: in strictly philosophical usage not as in the

psychological aspect. And the third is the nature of creation.

Ethics finds its foundation in metaphysics. In order to determine the conformity of human
acts to man’s end, one has to consider basic truths about God, creation, the spiritual
nature of man and his freedom, and these are topics studied by metaphysics. Without this
necessary foundation one, cannot get to know the moral order that ought to be observed,
and ethics would be emptied of any real content. Ethics begins its scientific study by
acquiring a rallied notion of the good, and this requires a directly metaphysical
perspective. If one does not perceive the good as an objective aspect of reality, he will
inevitably turn to subjective motives which can never vouch for objective moral order
that can be observed. 79p.68.

78
Hennery. J. Koren, An Introduction to the science of Metaphysics, op.cit, p.12.
79
Mariano Artigas, Introduction to Philosophy, tran. By M. Guzman, 68.

34
Metaphysics scrutinizes and renders secure the ultimate foundations of the normative

moral principles which direct man in his actions. 80 What makes Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s ethics

metaphysical is that God is the legislator of moral laws, man for being endowed with

freedom is a moral being and is capable of grasping the laws which are made by God for

man is also endowed with intelligence, and nature or cosmos is good for its source itself

is infinitely Goodness itself. And nature has laws installed by God and according to

which any act of man must necessarily proceed. Here we begin with what concerns the

human person and then we proceed to the ontology of creation.

Part I

The ontology of the human person

Ever since human being had started philosophizing, human person was the central object

towards which all philosophical methods were tending to deal with. And even still now,

this is not only true for philosophy but also for all other attempts of learning be it natural

or social science.

80
Hennery. J. Koren, An Introduction to the science of Metaphysics, USA., New York : Vail-Ballou press,
1955, p.16.

35
 Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s philosophy has such feature. He approached the human person

metaphysically so as to get a clear understanding of how a person must act in accordance

with his/her very nature. Accordingly it will be our first task to understand Zär’a

Ya‘əqob’s conception of the human person which inevitably leads us to the profound

comprehension of what his ethics is.

The notion of the person has been dealt with different thinkers in different modes of

thoughts. The medieval thinkers like Boethius and Aquinas tried to approach the person

in its ontological aspects. It is believed that Severin Boethius to have the merit of having

furnished the first adequate definition of person in the ontological perspective, 81 and he

states it as follows: “persona est rationalis noturae individua substantia, the person is an

individual substance of a rational nature.”82

Aquinas later on modified Boethius’ statement and said “nam omne quod subsistit in

intellectuali vel rationali natura habet rationem person, everything that subsists83 in

rational nature is a person.”84 Both of them agree that subsistence is not an enough

criteria for a being to be considered as person i.e., animals, plants and non-living things

are subsistent beings: they have their ways of acting. But they do not deserve to be seen

as persons for they all lack rationality and free will. According to this line of

81
Batista Mondin, Philosophical Anthropology, Man: an impossible project? , translated by Moroslaw
A.Cizadyn, Rome: Urbaniana University press, 2004, p.247.
82
Boethius, contra Eutichen et Nestorium, c.4.
83
Aquinas used the word subsistent to replace individuality or autonomy, individual, nature, and
substance, which were utilized by Boethius. Batista Mondin, Philosophical Anthropology, op.cit, p.247.
84
Thomas Aquinas ,Summa Contra Gentiles, IV,35, 1.

36
reasoning, only intellectively qualifies and distinguishes personal autonomy from all

other beings.85

When we come to Zär’a Ya‘əqob, we find an affinity to the Thomistic view of person,

which holds that the individual human substance is a supposit86 or subsistent of a special

type. Human substance (in the concrete individual sense) is a supposit of a rational order,

which means a supposit endowed with rationality, understanding and free-will. Thus such

type of being is known as person.87

Throughout the treatise of Zär’a Ya‘əqob intellectivity or rationality is repeatedly

ascribed to God and to human beings. He used more frequently to human beings than to

God. If we note his treatise, we will see that he was conscious of that except human

beings and God, the other creatures do not have intelligence even if they appear as though

they were endowed with rationality.88 So for him rationality is a characteristic of human

beings, which qualifies them as persons. For he stated it as follows:

…And this creator who created us intelligent and rational cannot be without intelligence
and reasoning. He has created us intelligent form the abundance of His intelligence…For
he created us intelligent from the abundance of his intelligence…God created us
85
Luigi Bogliolo, Metaphysics, translated by Moroslaw A.Cizadyn, Rome: Urbaniana University press, 1985,
p.121.

86
Also known as subsistence: it is that which is complete individual (i.e., primary substance) not merely a
portion or element of a larger substance, which has its own autonomy, or its own ways of acting. Paul J.
Glenn, Ontology, New York: B.Herder Book Co.,1937, p.237.
87
Paul J. Glenn, Ontology, op.cit, p.239.
88
See the teleological argument. …And likewise, the plants in the wilderness and vegetation, created
with great wisdom, grow and flourish, bloom and bear fruit in their respective species without any error
as if they have a rational soul. HZY. X,10.

37
 intelligent so that we may meditate on his greatness and praise and thank him and pray
to him in order to obtain the needs of our body and soul. Our reason, which creator put
in the heart of mankind, teaches us that, so how can all thins be in vain and false? 89

Therefore, according to Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s understanding of a person, rationality is

ontologically inherent within a person and renders him or her a person.

The other characteristic which renders a being a person is that he is endowed with

freedom. The concept of freedom plays a great roll in moral conceptions. Whenever one

talks of rationality, the idea of freedom comes along with it. It is evident that reason

facilitates the ability of making a choice, which involves an unconstrained free-will. In

fact, the problem of freedom is already a metaphysical problem, because the

consciousness that we are free beings requires us always to go farther. 90 Freedom in the

metaphysical sense has got two aspects; the first is the rational freedom: in the order,

either of thought or of the action, the state of being, which judges or acts in full

consciousness and in accordance with the demand of truth and of the good. It opposes the

state of ignorance or under the influence of passions. The second is that th capacity of

deciding for oneself rationally but without there being constrained by an exterior forces.91

In addition, freedom is the property of rational beings. Kant in his work entitled

foundations of metaphysics of morals asserted that freedom must be presupposed as the

89
HZY. III,11,IV,12, VIII,13,
90
M.D. Philippe, qu’est-ce que la mtaphysique? Universit Libre Des Science de L’homme, p.66. ( ce text a
t etabli  partir de lenregistrement d’un cycle de confrences donn par le pre M.D Philippe de 1980-
1981)
91
Luis-Marie Morfaux, vocabulaire de la philosophie et de science humaines, Paris: Librairie armand Colin,
1980, p.194.

38
property of the will of all rational beings.92 It typifies each individual as an ethical being.

Thus without freedom no individual can account morally for his or her actions.

Zär’a Ya‘əqob to his part considers freedom as another requirement which is necessary

for a human person. For him intelligence and freedom naturally pertain to human nature.

This helped him to show that man is not just determined by rigid laws of nature and at the

same time is not ignorant. He argues:

And again God created man to be the master of his own actions so that he may be what
he wills to be, either good or bad. If a man chooses to be bad and a liar, he could be so
until he receives the just judgment which he deserves for his wickedness. Further, a
human being likes what pleases his body for he is of flesh. He looks for fulfilling the
needs of his flesh in any way, be it in the right or wrong way. Nor did God create a
human being evil, but gave him freedom so that he may, be what he wills to be; and in
order that through this choice, he may be worthy of a reward if he becomes good or of
condemnation if he becomes evil.93

Zär’a Ya‘əqob attempted to explain the person in detail in order to show that each

individual is capable of discovering the moral laws which are objective and compelling to

all individuals by the aid of reason, which is naturally inherent to each person. Man is

also free to act according to the law of nature, which is reveled to him by his pure

rationality.

Zär’a Ya‘əqob’s understanding of the human person makes us to rethink juridical

definition of person. Law defines person as ens sui juris: an existent master of self or an

autonomous being. Mastery, the self-possession of self, is the juridical concept of person.

92
Immanuel Kant, foundations of metaphysics of morals, translated by Lewis White Beck, U.S.A.: ITT Bobb-
Merrill Educational Publishing Company, Inc, 1995, p.66.
93
HZY.IV,16-17.

39
Rosmini states that a person is the subsistent law: almost law made person. The person is

therefore, the existent insofar as and in the measure in which he or she is the master of

himself or herself and of his or her own activities. And such mastery has its origin in the

rationality of the person’s nature. The ontological foundation of mastery of self is the

intellective or the rational nature of the person for intellectivety implies ontological self

possession. Thus, a human being insofar as he or she is rational, is existent possessor of

self, not only in moral sense as much as he or she is free being but as an internal

structure. This is the ontological foundation of the juridical sui juris, which is the

consequence of the preceding: man is morally sui juris, the master of himself, because he

is first sui juris ontologically.94 This is also true to Zär’a Ya‘əqob because according to

him, a person is to be seen firs ontologically, naturally, as the master of himself and his

actions before being morally judged in the ethical questions.95

According to Zär’a Ya‘əqob, intelligence is identified with the soul. He made a

distinction between the material, the body and the immaterial, the soul realities in a

person like those of the Platonists in view of that he is explicitly a dualist.96

Although he is not clear enough, soul and body are two different entities having distinct

and complete substantiality. Along with this, Zär’a Ya‘əqob never asserted explicitly

concerning the resurrection of the body in union with the soul like that of the Thomistic

94
Luigi Bogliolo, Metaphysics, translated by Moroslaw A.Cizadyn, op. cit.,pp.121-23.

95
See the above text already cited. HZY. IV,16-17.

96
Ethiopian Review of Cultures, Vol. I, C. Sumner , St. Francis Theological and Philosophical Studies Center,
1991, p.25.

40
thesis.97 But he is quite clear that the soul is immortal and heir eternal happiness so far as

an individual lived in accordance with the moral conducts, which constituted by God.

Thus inevitably for Zär’a Ya‘əqob the substantiality of a human person is his or her soul.

The ethical conduct has an end or finality, which is the state of being immortal for the

fulfillment of eternal happiness. For without the attainment of immortality morality

would be in vain. Regarding this, Zär’a Ya‘əqob presents three arguments to state the

immortality of the soul (man).

As C. Sumner presented,98 the first is metaphysical; it is based on the desire for

happiness, which is inherent to the soul and not stated with finite joys of the actual life.
And he argues:

After our death when we return to our Creator we will see that God made all in truth and in great
wisdom, and all his ways are truth and righteousness. And it is known that after the death of our
body our soul lives, for in this world our desire is not fulfilled: those who have no desire and
those who have want to add to what they already have. A man may not be satisfied even if the
possessed all that is desired in this world. And this inclination of our nature indicates that we are
not created for the life of this world only but for the life to come. Those souls who have done
the will of their Creator will be satisfied there and will not desire anything else… 99

The second is psychological; it is founded on the spiritual power of the human soul. Our

soul is capable of having the mental concept of God and consequently it is capable of

being immortal.

…our soul is able to think about God and can see him mentally. And again it (the soul) can think
of living forever. And God did not give in vain the ability to think this [living forever] but it may
think as he allows her to and acquires what he gives her. 100

The third is moral; it rests on the existence of injustice in this world. The light of reason

requires that an Almighty God re-establishes perfect retribution after death.

97
Ethiopian Review of Cultures, Vol. I, op.cit. p.28.
98
Ibid.
99
HZY. VII, 14-16.
100
HZY. VII, 17.

41
 Again, in this world all justice is not fulfilled. Evil people are satisfied with the good things of this
world and the meek stave. There is a wicked man who is happy and a good man who is sad; there
is an evil one who exults and a righteous person who cries. And therefore, after our death there
should be another life and another justice, [which is] is perfect one, in which it will be given to all
according to their deeds. Those who fulfilled the will of the Creator revealed to them by the light
of their reason and observed the order of their nature He will reward. 101

Part II

The Ontology of Creation, Cosmos

In this part we see the objective reality of all beings created by God in the light of Zär’a

Ya‘əqob’s mentality. Within it we will discuss main problems: the objective goodness of

created beings, the natural law and the problem of evil.

The Goodness of Created Nature

We have dealt with the two main foundations of Zär’a Ya’əqob’s ethics so far: God the
Creator of all and the human person, the intelligent being, for whom God’s plan is
accessible by means of reason, which naturally pertain to the very reality of the person.
By arguing:

And the law of nature is well known for our intelligence tells us clearly if we inquire
about it. But people did not want to inquire but preferred to believe the words of men
rather than investigating in truth the will of their creator. …He gives us intelligence to
know the law of our nature and keep it .102

The last one, which we are to deal with is the goodness of created nature. This theme is

directed towards all creatures and centers on their entire goodness.

As Sumner stated it, Zär’a Ya’əqob has found a fundamental principle, which is the

goodness of created nature. By using this principle, he tried to deal with theodicy, which

101
HZY. VII, 19.
102
HZY. VII, 20 & VIII, 8.

42
is mostly creational; psychology which emphasizes on man’s freedom and superiority

over all creatures; and ethics, which values actions as far as they are not repugnant to the

basic principle, which is often described by him as the order of creation or the law of

nature. That is, he devalues fasting, celibacy, polygamy, hatred, falsehood, injustice and

so on for being contrary to the fundamental principle of nature.103

In order to understand well what he meant by his basic principle, the goodness of created

nature, one needs in the first place to comprehend the notion of goodness and the law of

nature in general and in Zär’a Ya’əqob’s conception as well.

The Notion of Goodness

We may define the good in many different modes of approaches but all that we define

individually must be in accordance with the general character of the good. A good thing

answers a natural appetite, tendency, or desire. Because it answers an appetite or

tendency, or tendency for satisfaction, for fit and useful things, for a suitable end, for

suitable human conduct. Generally a thing to be considered as good it must please and be

useful.104

Let us now investigate the kinds of goodness by classifying them. Goodness is classified

as metaphysical or ontological goodness: also known as transcendental goodness, which

is a phase of being in itself and in reality identified with being itself –any being which

has an act of existence. Thus, metaphysical goodness is a complete synonymous of actual

being. And such being is capable of answering natural desire.105 The other is physical

103
C. Sumner, living springs of wisdom and philosophy, the Ethiopian source of African philosophy, Vol. II,
C. Sumner, 1999, p. 108.
104
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, pp. 154-55.
105
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, pp.154-58.

43
goodness: this kind of goodness can be reduced to the perfection of a thing which its

nature requires.106 The lack of physical perfection causes physical evil. The last one is

moral goodness: it is the goodness of human conduct which is in line with conscience

and the absence of moral goodness is moral evil.107

When we come to Zär’a Ya’əqob, we find him stuck to the metaphysical aspect of the
goodness of things and then he treats the other kinds with this aspect. Therefore, for him
all things are good in themselves transcendentally for their origin who is God is good.

...all things are good if we are good. … For God does not defile the work of his hand. …
Everything is great and wonderful, and all are created with great wisdom… the work of
God is very good.108

For Zär’a Ya’əqob the ethical conduct must be found on and seen within the light of the

metaphysical understanding of the good. And if any conduct perverts this basic principle,

it will be regarded as a moral evil.

Thus, the whole ethical investigation of Zär’a Ya’əqob aims at the conformity of any

way of life with the objective good, which binds all human beings categorically to be

observed.

The natural law

Natural law, in general is an imperative law inherent to the nature of things. 109 Aquinas

also talks of it: that which is general and universal rules of conduct, both personal and

social derived rationally from nature. This law is known by human reason (as for also

106
ibid
107
Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, op.cit, pp.159.
108
HZY. II, 2, V,4, & X,12-13.
109
Luis-Marie Morfaux, vocabulaire de la philosophie et de science humaines, op.cit. p.198.

44
Zär’a Ya’əqob “…And the law of nature is well known for our intelligence tells us
110
clearly if we inquire about it.” ), which an offspring of divine reason; it provides

direction for natural end, that is its purpose in this world.111

The Ontological Status of Evil

The Problem of Evil

One may ask that since God is the one who created all things, as Zär’a Ya’əqob says,

from his abundance of goodness, greatness, and intelligence then how could be there evil

in both realities, physical and moral. Zär’a Ya’əqob inquires a metaphysical question:

how me become so corrupt?

Before we state Zär’a Ya’əqob’s reply let us say something about evil’s nature and its

existence.

I) The nature of evil:

The problem of evil is not really a question that why God created this world with its

imperfections. It can be considered as imperfection: it is the absence of perfection which

is demanded by a given nature.112

There are two kinds of evil;

i.i) Physical evil: it is a deprivation or inability to perform the expected function in

beings. It can be either material or spiritual.113

110
HZY. VII, 20.
111
ED.L. Miller, Question that matter, an invitation to philosophy, USA. : McGRAW-HILL Book company,
1984, pp.442-43.
112
Avery R. Dulles, James M. Demske, Robert J. O’Connell, Introductory Metaphysics, op.cit, p.294.
113
Ibid.

45
i.ii) Morale evil: such kind of evil is the main part of Zär’a Ya’əqob’s ethical

investigation. Generally, Zär’a Ya’əqob is concerned with it than the above one. Moral or

ethical evil is the lack of due order in the free activities of an agent endowed with free-

choice.114

II) The existence of evil:

As we have being stating so far, evil is a privation and it might be plausibly argued that it

does not exist and hence that there is no problem of evil in the strict sense. 115 For evil

does not have any positive existence but negative. Accordingly, evil is not a being as

such.

Thus, we must note that the defect or privation, the evil as such, is to be distinguished

from the being which is evil. A privation cannot exist by itself; it must always be a

privation suffered by some being. Consequently, absolute evil –a being completely evil –

is a contradiction in terms; insofar it is every being is good. Evil must always be relative

evil –a lack in some subject which, insofar as it is good, is good.116 So, it does not sound

well considering evil ontologically as an absolute evil as far as one like Zär’a Ya’əqob

declares that all things are good for their maker is Absolutely Good Himself.

Zär’a Ya’əqob gave a similar definition of evil like that of Augustinian or Thomistic. He

never talked about the physical evil in his treatise, but only about the moral evil. For him

evil is not a being but simply the lack of moral perfection. So consequently, moral evil

concerns human conducts but as for God, He created all things good. Even human beings

114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
Avery R. Dulles, James M. Demske, Robert J. O’Connell, Introductory Metaphysics, op.cit,p.128.

46
who commit evil acts are not created as evils beings in the absolute sense. But the root of

evil is their perverted will, or their misuse of their freedom. And he argues:

Nor did God create a human being evil, but gave him freedom so that he may, be what
he wills to be; and in order that through this choice, he may be worthy of a reward if he
becomes good or of condemnation if he becomes evil. 117

Critical remarks

 In so far as Zär’a Ya‘əqob has constructed a Natural Theology, and Natural

Theology is not distinct from Metaphysics, he must inevitably be granted a place

among philosophers associated with Metaphysics.

 Although his Metaphysics is deficient in the sense that is not systematic, he

cannot be dismissed as not having entered the Metaphysical domain.

 Most of the issues Metaphysics deals with were not intentionally proposed by him

the way they are presented here, yet they are implicit as well as explicit in his

ideas.

 Even though his ideas are parallel to many well known arguments, they seem to

have emerged independently concerning their form of construction. However, he

was exposed to the philosophies of abroad, as it has been stated by himself, in his

treatise that he conversed with the Portuguese.

 According to Zär’a Ya’əqob, human beings’ mind, as he refers it ልቡና lqbunQ

intelligence, reason or heart, have the capacity philosophical understanding of

God: that his existence and nature; man: that man is spiritual, free and intelligent

being; and nature or cosmos: that it is created and good in itself and the like.
117
HZY. IV, 17.

47
  If God did not create evil, and it is the consequence of man’s freedom, and man is

capable of doing it because of his freedom, may not be God responsible for evil at

the other face, for having created man with all his being, which includes his being

free?

 What makes his ethics metaphysical is that there is a natural law prescribed by a

Divine Being that must never be violated by the arbitrary sophistry of the

ignorant. And this law of nature, which is naturally good, can be comprehended

by a pure season, which ontologically pertains to a person, meaning without

supernatural aid or any sort of revelation.

 Although Zär’a Ya’əqob’s understanding of morality is Theo-centric, all his

reflection is limited to man’s natural end, which is attained by the observance of

nature’s law through the dictation of reason alone. But it has nothing to deal with

the supernatural end of man, which can only be comprehended through revelation

that in his method abandoned it in the first places.

 Zär’a Ya’əqob did not break a new ground in the entire history of philosophy, but

he elaborated his philosophical conceptions in his own ways.

 The resume of all his philosophical investigation can be presented with few words

which he stated

“…the creator put in the heart of man the light of reason so that he may see
good and evil; that he may know what is of worth and what is not; that he may
distinguish truth form falsehood…”118

118
HZY. V, 13.

48
Conclusion

I think, Bertrand Russell was right for having said in his book entitled the philosophy of
John Dewey that in every writer on philosophy there is a concealed metaphysic, usually

unconscious; even if his subject is metaphysics, he is almost certain to have critically

believed system which underlies his specific arguments.119And this is true in the case of

Zär’a Ya’əqob because one can notice that Zär’a Ya’əqob’s treatise is intrinsically rooted

in a metaphysical reflections, even if Zär’a Ya’əqob was interested to find a solution for

the ethical questions of his time, unconsciously engaged himself to treat the problem

metaphysically.

If anyone reads throughout Zär’a Ya’əqob’s treatise, will note a purposeful sequence of
thought as it is presented in this paper, where there come God, man and then nature. This
order has its own significance for him in his argumentations. The three themes are the
foundations of his ethical conception and without them all his ethical principles that he
claims will be at risk. Thus he had to first argue about God’s existence and nature in
relation to creation. Along with this facilitated to him to develop his conceptions on
theodicy. Then he had to also demonstrate the human person in link with its capacity of
understanding its nature as well as other created beings’ nature. As he stated it;

119
Judith A. Boss, Ethics for Life, op.cit, p.12.

49
 To the one who inquires, truth is revealed quickly. Because the one, who inquires with a
pure mind (reason) that the Creator put into the heart of mankind and sees the order
and laws of creation, will discover truth. 120

The last problem that he dealt with is nature itself or the cosmos, which is created by

God, and good in itself and nothing of it is evil. He stated that the world is not without a

law, it is not just chaotic. The law which pertains to it is the frame of reference to any

ethical conducts. So these are how Zär’a Ya’əqob wanted to demonstrate that morality is

not manmade but God. Zär’a Ya’əqob’s main concern was to address problems of

morality but in order to find moral principles that can apply for all humanity, either

consciously or unconsciously developed natural theology or theodicy, which found its

climax at metaphysics even if it is creational. So from this initial point, one can argue that

Zär’a Ya’əqob constructed metaphysical concepts by taking not only his theodicy but

also by presenting that even his ethical conceptions stand on a metaphysical ground.

This paper tried something to state about Zär’a Ya’əqob’s metaphysics. It is at anybody’s

disposition who wants to continue, correct or revise or even to argue against it. For it

does neither pretend to be complete nor absolute.

120
HZY.V,1.

50
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