Definition

Proportionate reason is what distinguishes a premoral or ontic evil from a moral evil and a

morally right from a morally wrong action. The more adequate notion of "proportion" refers to what truly

gives an action its moral meaning: the relation of the means to the end. More broadly speaking,

"proportionate" refers to the relation between the specific value at stake and the pre moral evils (the

limitations, the harm, or the inconvenience) which will inevitably come about in trying to achieve that

value. So a "proportionate reason" refers to both a specific value and its relation to all the elements

(including the premoral evils) in the action.1

From this perspective proportionate reason truly defines what a person is doing in an action and not

something merely added to the action already defined. Perhaps an illustration can clarify the matter. In

health care, for example, a surgeon may seek the value of saving the life of a patient by means of

amputating a leg. If the premoral evil of losing the leg is properly related to saving the life of the patient,

then we would define the surgeon's action as a lifesaving act, since the surgeon has a proportionate reason

for causing the harm. But if the patient's life could have been saved by injecting serum into the blood

stream, then the amputation would be disproportionate to the value of saving life. We would then define

the surgeon's action as mutilation, since no proportionate reason exists for such an act. Even so, the

analysis of proportionalism makes no claims about the surgeon's being virtuous or sinful (morally good or

bad). It only claims that an action is morally right or wrong. 2

Criteria

What criteria help us to decide whether a proper relation exists between the specific value and the other

elements of an act? Establishing these criteria has been one of the most difficult parts of developing the

proportionate reason approach to the morality of human action.

1
Walter, "Proportionate Reason and its Three Levels of Inquiry: Structuring the Ongoing Debate," p. 32.
2
Hoose, Proportionalism, Chapter Three, "The Moral Goodness/ Moral Rightness Distinction," pp. 41-67.
1.The means used will not cause more harm than necessary to achieve the value. In other words, the

specific value being sought must be at least equal to the value being sacrificed. For example, in the

illustration of self-defense, the values in conflict are equal: the defender's life is in conflict with the

attacker's life.

this criterion raises the difficult issue of the theory of value which underpins the proportionate reason

approach in order to define a proper hierarchy of values and to determine which can be weighed one

against another.

2. No less harmful way exists at present to protect the value. This criterion demands that we choose the

best means available to us at the time, even though this may have to change in the future. In medicine, for

example, many people who suffer from cancer may have to experience the pains of chemotherapy or

radiation treatment now until something is discovered which produces less pain or discomfort with equal

or more effect.

3. The means used to achieve the value will not undermine it. This criterion suggests that in the case of

trying to protect innocent life, for example, we do not engage in indiscriminate killing. The American

bishops reflect this criterion in their pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, when they call for non-

combatant immunity in war. Their point is that we are not morally protecting the value of life when we

attack life indiscriminately.

Conclusion

The proportionate reason thought-pattern is a relatively recent development in Catholic moral theology,

though its roots are well established in the tradition. It began to receive critical attention shortly after the

Second Vatican Council and has been the focus of ongoing development and criticism ever since.

The method of proportionalism leads to a rethinking of the meaning and function of moral norms. It lends

a greater flexibility to their formulation than past approaches of a natural law method would allow.