Olympiodorus

of Alexandria
Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher

Edited by

Albert Joosse

LEIDEN | BOSTON
Contents

Acknowledgements vii
Abbreviations viii
Notes on Contributors ix

1 Introduction 1
Albert Joosse

2 Olympiodorus and Greco-Alexandrian Alchemy 14

Cristina Viano

3 The Life of Plato in Introductory Schemes: The Preface to Olympiodorus’

Commentary on the First Alcibiades (in Alc. 1.1–3.2) 31
Anna Motta

4 Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 55

Michael J. Griffin

5 Olympiodorus’ Notion of αἴσθησις and Its Historical Context 79

Péter Lautner

6 The Virtue of Double Ignorance in Olympiodorus 95

Danielle A. Layne

7 Olympiodorus’ View of Civic Self-Knowledge 116

Albert Joosse

8 The Neoplatonists Hermias and Olympiodorus on Plato’s Theory

of Rhetoric 141
Bettina Bohle

9 Reconciling Philosophy with Poetry: Olympiodorus’ Interpretation

of the Gorgias Myth 167
François Renaud

10 Olympiodorus on Drama 186

Anne Sheppard
vi Contents

11 Special Kinds of Platonic Discourse: Does Olympiodorus Have

a New Approach? 206
Harold Tarrant

12 Olympiodorus, Christianity, and Metensomatosis 221

Simon Fortier

Index Locorum 243

General Index 260
 chapter 4

Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues

Michael J. Griffin

Olympiodorus maintains that the goal of human life is ‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’

(aretê);1 this leads to ‘likeness to god’ (homoiôsis tôi theôi: cf. Plato, Theaetetus
176B).2 Excellence is sufficient for well-being (eudaimonia), and it is ‘the good
life’ for a human being (see in Alc. 105.2–3). Philosophy itself is a governing
craft,3 distinguished from oratory, medicine, and other crafts by its subject
(the psukhê, or ‘soul’), and especially by its unique project:4 to bring about
excellence, to ‘make people good’ (in Alc. 140.18–22; cf. in Gorg. 45.2).5
Olympiodorus frequently describes philosophy in these broad terms. For
example:

Since we long to benefit from the fountain of goods, we strive to get hold
of Aristotle’s philosophy, which furnishes life with the source of good
things …
Prol. log. 1.3–4

[A]ll human beings reach out for Plato’s philosophy, because all people
wish to draw benefit from it; they are eager to be enchanted by its foun-
tain, and to quench their thirst with Plato’s inspirations.
in Alc. 1.6–7; tr. from in Alc. mine unless otherwise specified.

1 Here and throughout the chapter, I have generally translated aretê as excellence.
2 See Olympiodorus in Phd. 1.2.6, in Gorg. 25.1, 26.18.
3 Cf. in Alc. 87.10 and 65.8.
4 Philosophy, like any craft, might be defined by its subject and its goal (Ammonius, in
Isag. 2.22–9.7). Philosophy addresses itself to the well-being of persons, who are, in the strict-
est sense, their soul or psyche (psukhê) alone. The subject of philosophy is the soul, and its
goal is to achieve the Good of the soul (Olympiodorus Prol. log. 1.4–20; in Alc. 1.6–7, 2.13),
which is ‘likeness to God, as far as human ability allows’ (Prol. log. 16.25, echoing the famous
phrase of Plato’s Theaetetus 176B).
5 To live well—to be spoudaios (in Alc. 229.5–6) or khrêstos—just is to live the ‘philosophic life’
(in Gorg. 0.1, 1.19W).

© Michael J. Griffin, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466708_005

56 Griffin

‘So too if they accuse me, asking why I am teaching the youth, will they
ever be persuaded that I do this in their interests, in order that they may
become good human beings (kaloi k’agathoi)?’ So under such a consti-
tution, one must create a fortress (teikhion) for oneself, and live quietly
(hêsukhazein) within it all the time.
in Gorg. 42.5, 234.10–14 Westerink; tr. from in Gorg. from JLT, here and following

It is worth inquiring in what sense the philosopher ‘frequents the agora’,

for he ought to lead a quiet life (hêsukhian bion)… the philosopher
goes there in order to convert misguided youths and lead them on a
nobler path.
in Gorg. 1.6, 11.13–14, 20–21 Westerink

These were familiar claims of ancient Mediterranean philosophies in their

capacity as socially recognized ‘ways of life’ or bioi.6 But the later Neopla-
tonists traced the acquisition of excellence as a hierarchical path, as several
of the chapters in this volume articulate: the so-called ‘ladder of virtues’
(scala virtutum).7 The classic source of this articulation is Plotinus (AD 204/5–
270), particularly in his treatise On Virtues (Enn. 1.2); following Porphyry
(c. AD 234–c. 305), in the Sentences (32), and Iamblichus (c. AD 240–325),
Olympiodorus could build on a long tradition of attempts to describe this hier-
archy, which built upon an established exegesis of both Plato and Aristotle.

6 See Watts 2006, 2, 7. For a general treatment across these genres, see for example Nussbaum
1986.
7 For the scale of virtues, see for instance Dillon 1996, O’Meara 2003 and 2012, Tarrant 2007.
On the curricular ascent, see also Hoffmann 1987, Griffin 2014, 2015a, 2016, Introduction.
Westerink 1976, 116–18 (n. ad Ol. in Phd. 8.2), offers an excellent summary of the textual sources
for the scale of virtues. The complete hierarchy may have been developed by Iamblichus,
although the list tabulated earlier appears mostly in sources later than Marinus, such as
Damascius (in Phd. 1.138–144), Simplicius (On Epictetus’ Handbook, 2.30–3.2 Duebner), and
Olympiodorus On the Alcibiades (4.15–8.14). Plotinus distinguished the cardinal ‘civic excel-
lences’ (politikai aretai) of Republic 4 from higher aretai which he termed ‘purifying’, a dis-
tinction for which the Neoplatonists cited Phaedo 82A–E (where good reincarnations result
from the practice of ‘civic’ excellences such as moderation and justice, but only philosophy
delivers genuine ‘purification’). Porphyry, drawing on Plotinus, already gives us the basic
stages of ‘civic’, ‘purificatory’, ‘contemplative’, and ‘exemplary’ aretai. And Plotinus, in Enn. 1.3
and elsewhere, already studies a kind of natural excellence which is most basic to our being,
and is shared even by plants.
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 57

There are several Platonic and Aristotelian root texts,8 and quite a range
of significant Neoplatonic sources;9 the scale itself has been widely studied.10
The resulting picture of the path, which is briskly outlined in the Phaedo com-
mentaries by Olympiodorus (in Phd. 8.2.1–20) and by Damascius (in Phd. 1.138),
is a kind of commonplace of fifth- and sixth-century pagan Neoplatonism, and
in a way marks a natural extension of the ‘hierarchy’ of aretê already promoted
by Hellenic paideia, where grammatical, literary, and rhetorical studies culmi-
nated in the discipline of philosophy.11
In the following sections, (1) I set out first to investigate what this scale of
virtues means, when it is understood as a programme for a student’s intended
psychological transformation,12 then (2) how the scale intersects with cur-
riculum, and (3) in closing, I explore a puzzle about the possible simultaneity
of contemplation and good civic action in Olympiodorus.

1 The Scale of Virtues

1.1 Pre-philosophical Excellence: (1) Natural and (2) Habituated

Adopting the classical Socratic view, philosophical activity fundamentally
entails self-examination, or self-knowledge. As Albert Joosse points out in his

8 For example, Plato, Theaetetus 176B and Republic 500C–D (likeness to God); Republic
441D–443B and Phaedo 82A–B (‘civic’ virtues); Phaedo 69C (‘purificatory’ virtues);
Aristotle, EN 2.1, 1103a14–18 and 6.13, 1144b9 (‘natural’ and ‘habituative’ virtues, and dis-
tinction from practical wisdom); Aristotle, EN 10.7, 1177a12–24 (‘contemplative’ virtue).
9 Plotinus, Enn. 1.2; Porphyry, Sent. 32; Iamblichus, On Virtues [lost]; Macrobius, Somn.
Scip. 1.8,5; Hierocles, carm. aur. 422b5–9; Marinus, Life of Proclus 3; Ammonius, in Int.
135.19–32; Philoponus in Cat. 141.25–142.3; Damascius and Olympiodorus in Phd. (below);
on the equivalence of the Aristotelian and Platonic curriculum, Ammonius, in Cat. 6.9–20;
Philoponus, in Cat. 5.34–6.2; Olympiodorus, Prol. log. 9.14–30; Simplicius, in Cat. 6.6–15.
10 See for example Festugière 1969; Goulet-Cazé 1982, 277–280; Westerink 1990, LXVIII–
LXVIII, and 1976, n. on Ol. in Phd. 116–18; Saffrey and Segonds 2001, lxix–c; Hadot 1990,
i.84–103, O’Meara 2003, §§1.3–6; 2006; 2012.
11 See Watts 2008, ch. 1.
12 Roughly speaking, as I describe it here, this hierarchy charts a course from: (1–2) the decent
but unreasoning habits called by Aristotle êthikos, which are virtuous but not resilient and
not mutually entailing, to (3) genuine, enduring practical wisdom facilitated by the har-
monization of logos, thumos, and epithumia in the tripartite psychê (Republic 4), to (4–5)
the liberation of logos into a consistent observation of its own intelligible paradigms—
wisdom consisting in the understanding of Platonic Ideas, culminating finally in (6–7)
the use of contemplative and embodied methods to transform the psychê into those same
paradigms, enabling an extraordinary degree of divine action (theourgia).
58 Griffin

contribution to this volume, self-knowledge ascends on the ladder of virtues

just described. Thus Olympiodorus writes:

‘[S]elf-knowledge’ is said in many ways (pollakhôs): it is possible to know

oneself with respect to one’s external [possessions]; and of course it is
possible to know oneself with respect to one’s body; and it is possible
to know oneself as a civic or social person (politikôs), when one knows
oneself in the tripartition of one’s soul;13 and it is possible to know one-
self as a purificatory person (kathartikôs), when one knows oneself in the
act of liberation from the affections (pathê); and it is possible to know
oneself as a contemplative person (theôrêtikôs), when a person contem-
plates himself as liberated (heauton … theasêtai); it is possible to know
oneself theologically (theologikôs), when a person knows himself accord-
ing to his paradigmatic Form (idea); and it is possible to know oneself as
an inspired person (enthousiastikôs), when a person knows himself as a
unity (kata to hen) and, thus bonded to his proper god (oikeios theos),14
acts with inspiration (enthousiâi).
in Alc. 172.5–12

This is perhaps analogous to looking at oneself through better and better

lenses—as if at the optometrist’s office—until one finally sees oneself as one
really is, namely, as a divine unity.15 Similar ideas of self-knowledge develop in
Olympiodorus’ commentary on Alc. 132D–133C:

Now by saying ‘look away to me’, he has indicated that the target of the
dialogue is self-knowledge in a civic sense; and by saying ‘not to any
random part,’ that it is also [self-knowledge] in a purificatory sense, for
self-purification is the province of the highest part of the soul; and by
saying ‘you shall see in me intellect’, [he has indicated] that it is also
[self-knowledge] in a contemplative sense, for engaging with the realities
in accordance with his intellect befits the contemplative; and through
saying ‘and god’, [he has indicated] that it is also [self-knowledge] in an
inspired sense, for we are inspired according to the divine in us, which is

13 As reason (logos), spirited emotion (thumos), and appetite (epithumia).

14 Cf. in Alc. 20.4–13, translated below.
15 I (at least tentatively) take texts like this one to suggest that the person really is the unity
or hen of the person. I am grateful to Tim Riggs for several recent conversations, building
on his excellent paper on authentic selfhood in Proclus (Riggs 2015), about whether and
in what sense the individual human person might be viewed as her own unity; on Riggs’
view, I believe, properly speaking a person’s authentic being is their reasoning soul.
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 59

simple, just as is the divine itself. After all, it is through being indepen-
dent and simple that children and country-dwellers experience inspira-
tion to a greater degree: inspiration cannot be captured by imagination
(aphantasiastos), which is why it is undone by imagination, because that
is its opposite.
in Alc. 8.6–14

This ‘ladder’ is a normative or ideal picture of what we will see if we practice

philosophy. We’ll return to it shortly. But Olympiodorus, like Socrates, begins
from a descriptive diagnosis of our problematic ‘default’ state as a human
being, before we really cultivate excellence. This diagnosis runs along the fol-
lowing lines.16
Intuitively, each of us appears at least to ourselves to be a singular moral
agent, possessing synchronic and diachronic unity, and acting for reasons
upon which we have consciously reflected:17 in fact, there seems to be noth-
ing more obvious than this, considering that individual persons were taken
by most philosophers after Aristotle as primary exhibits of beings displaying
unity in number, form, and function.18 In the case of most of us, however, this
is an illusion.19 According to the Neoplatonists who shaped Olympiodorus’
thought about the self, we find in ourselves a moral and psychological plural-
ity, governed by unreflective habits and appetites, and comparable to a city
ruled by a mob, or a many-headed beast. For instance, Proclus describes our
initial condition as follows (adopting the city-soul analogy of Plato, Republic 2,
368D–369A):

16 This discussion largely follows my summary in Griffin 2015a and 2016; I am grateful to
Bloomsbury for permission to reprint these paragraphs.
17 The underlying Greek notions of personhood have been richly studied by Sorabji 2006
and Gill 2006. In general, in Parfit’s (1984, 210–11) terms, it is fair to say that ancient Greek
philosophers were non-reductionist about the self. For the Neoplatonic view, see also
Griffin 2015b.
18 For Aristotle, ho tis anthrôpos (‘an individual person’) is the primary exhibit of a being that
exists naturally, displays unity in number, form, and function, and is obvious to everybody
(Cat. 3, 1b4–5; Metaph. 5, 1016b31–33; Phys. 2.1, 192b9–11). Aristotle stresses the uniqueness
to human beings of self-guided moral action or praxis (Nic. Eth. 6.2, 1139a17–20).
19 I have argued in Griffin 2015b that for the later Neoplatonists, at any rate, we don’t get
unity ‘for free’; it is part of a virtuous project of self-constitution (cf. for example Proclus,
El. Theol. prr. 44, 83, 189). To find our unity is to find our good (Proclus, El. Theol. 9, 13, in
Alc. 1.3–3.2), and to escape from the rending force of multiplicity is to escape our danger
(in Alc. 6.12–17.8; 43.7–44.11).
60 Griffin

[T]he multitude … produces within us from our childhood defective

imaginings and various affections … [T]here is in each of us ‘a certain
many-headed wild beast’ [i.e. appetites (epithumiai) that are often con-
tradictory], as Socrates himself has observed [Rep. 9, 588C], which is
analogous to the multitude; and this is just like the people (dêmos) in a
city, the various, non-rational and enmattered form of the soul, which is
the most pedestrian part of us. The present argument [of Socrates in Alc.
110D–E] exhorts us to withdraw from our boundless appetite (epithumia),
to remove from our lives the multitude and the people (dêmos) within us
as not being a trustworthy judge of the nature of things nor in short capa-
ble of any true knowledge. For nothing non-rational is by nature such
as to partake of knowledge, let alone the most deficient of non-rational
things, which by possessing multiplicity is at strife within itself and fights
against itself …
Proclus, in Alc. 243.13–244.11, translation lightly adapted from O’Neill 1965

Under ordinary circumstances, then, ‘we’ are really complex networks of mostly
unconscious, non-rational behaviours and rules of thumb learned by habit
(êthos)20 and imitation (mimêsis)21 from our community, constrained by our
natural instincts and capacities (phusis),22 which we had only a limited role, if
any, in choosing.23 If an agent’s instincts and habits happen to yield beneficial
results for the agent or their communities, however, the agent might reason-
ably be said, in some loose sense, even in this condition, to possess excellence or
virtue (aretê). This kind of quasi-excellence, arising from inborn instincts and
abilities, is called by the Neoplatonists (1) natural excellence (phusikê aretê)24
when it arises from inborn instincts and abilities, or (2) habituated excellence
(êthikê aretê)25 when it arises from learned habits and behaviours that conform

20 The Neoplatonic notion of character traits habituated in childhood is indebted to

Aristotle Nic. Eth. 2.1, 1103a17; see also O’Meara 2012.
21 For the notion of ‘imitation’ in the Alexandrian school (and its relevance to Platonic
hermeneutics), see Anon. Prol. 4.
22 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 6.13, 1144b3–9 is a key passage for the Neoplatonic interpretation of
natural excellence, mentioned here and discussed below.
23 On the Platonist view, although the physical and psychological traits and privileges asso-
ciated with a life are partially ‘random’, the life is chosen in advance by the soul (from
a selection offered by lot), and therefore the soul does carry responsibilities for at least
some features of its life (Rep. 10, 617D–E).
24 Damascius in Phd. 1.138, Ol. in Phd. 8.2.2–3. Again, the name and the concept derive from
Aristotle Nic. Eth. 6.13, 1144b3–9.
25 Damascius in Phd. 1.139, Ol. in Phd. 8.2.3. Again, the name and the concept are partly
inspired by Aristotle Nic. Eth. 2.1, 1103a17.
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 61

to the socially endorsed ‘cardinal virtues’ of wisdom (sophia), fairness or jus-

tice (dikaiosunê), courage (andreia), and self-control (sophrosunê).26
Why describe so-called ‘higher’ grades of excellence? Because these ‘natu-
ral’ and ‘habituated’ traits seem dissatisfying as exhibits of excellence (aretê).
Firstly, they appear to be morally arbitrary, because they are automatic: their
possessors have no genuine agency in their cultivation or expression, and this is
no way to live a truly good or meaningful life. As the Socrates of Plato’s Apology
would put it, such an ‘unexamined life’ is ‘not worth living’.27 Moreover, a life
of this kind is likely to do harm, because in this condition, we are governed by
‘double ignorance’ (diplê amathiâ: on this term, see Danielle Layne’s contribu-
tion to this volume), the usual state of an interlocutor before an encounter with
Socrates:28 we think we know what we do not know, and act accordingly out of
overconfidence, causing substantial risks to ourselves and the people around
us (a central theme of Alc. 133C–135E, on Olympiodorus’ view: see Lecture 28).
For Olympiodorus, this sort of an unexamined life is fundamentally a non-
rational life, lived by non-rational agents.29 One way of understanding ‘non-
rational’, or alogos, in this context is that such agents are unable to give a
satisfactory account, or logos, of their reasons for acting when pressed by a
good dialectician; only a person with genuine knowledge is in a position to
consistently ‘bring forth proofs’ from within (in Gorg. 6.1, 46.13–14W).30 In fact,
the Socrates of Plato’s Apology has yet to meet a single person who can give
such an account;31 accordingly, the subsequent Socratic tradition concluded
succinctly that ‘everyone is mad’.32
Whereas today we might analyse ‘non-rational’ behaviour by, for instance,
identifying clusters of unconscious biases, ancient Platonists interpret our

26 For the list of virtues at the ‘habituated’ level, which incidentally do not obey the Socratic
rule of the reciprocity of the virtues (unlike the ‘civic’ virtues), see Ol., in Alc. 154–155.
27 ‘[T]he greatest good for a human being [is] to discuss excellence (aretê) every day and
those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others,
for the unexamined life is not worth living for human beings’ (Apology 38A). With Sellars
2014, I think it is very fruitful to read the Apology as a metaphilosophical text.
28 See for example Proclus, in Alc. 7.1–8 and Olympiodorus, in Alc., Lecture 14 (on Alc.
116B–118B).
29 The Greek philosophical tradition is arguably observant of many ways in which we are
non-rational, including confabulation (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) and a range of cognitive
biases and implicit assumptions recognized in modern social psychology and decision
theory (in the wake of Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The Neoplatonic analysis of irratio-
nality is, of course, rather different from ours; see below.
30 See Coope 2019, 12–13.
31 Unless, with Vlastos 1983, we suppose that Socrates himself might have satisfied such con-
ditions in practice.
32 For the quotation, see Chrysippus at Plutarch, De stoic. rep. 1048E.
62 Griffin

‘habitual’ behaviour against the backdrop of Plato’s description of the tripar-

tite soul in Republic 4.33 Thus we are motivated by34 (a) the dictates of reason
or rationality (logos), (b) the drive for social status and the supporting ‘spir-
ited emotions’ of pride and anger (thumos),35 and (c) the push and pull of our
sometimes contradictory appetites (epithumia) and aversions. The habitual life
is lived chiefly according to the latter two, non-rational clusters of motivation,
namely spirited-emotion and appetite. Among the psychological ‘constitu-
tions’ discussed by Plato in Republic 8–9 (see also Bettina Bohle’s contribution
to this volume), we usually live under the inner crowd rule of appetitive direct
democracy or a spirited timocracy. Under such inward constitutions, we might
appear to have rational reasons for acting, but these reasons will not stand up
to Socratic cross-examination (elenkhos); they are, in effect, confabulation.36
The two ‘pre-philosophical’ grades of excellence just discussed—natural
and habituative—share a common feature: they tend toward plurality and
incoherence. Through external and internal influences, such as the pressure
to conform to or obey authority,37 we seem to continually run the risk of fur-
ther losing coherence (cf. Proclus in Alc. 56–58)—a collapse of identity that
Olympiodorus colourfully describes as being ‘turned into a wild beast’ (in Alc.
216.4), playing at once on the Platonic image of an inner ‘beast’ comprised
of our diverse appetites, and the Homeric image of Circe’s transformation of
Odysseus’ men into pigs (Od. 10). On the other hand, we also have the poten-
tial to change and pursue unity, especially with the help of Socrates (Ol. in Alc.
216.4) or a philosophical educator like him,38 who is able to ‘refute’ what is
accidental to us, ‘exhort’ us to self-discovery and self-care, and like a ‘midwife’,

33 In Olympiodorus’ terms, the trimereia tês psukhês; e.g., in Alc. 4.10. This point was help-
fully stressed by Sonsoles Costero Quiroga in our conference discussions.
34 For this kind of treatment, see for instance Cooper 1984.
35 Thumos is especially difficult to translate in this context, being open to renderings as
diverse as ‘pride’, ‘emotion’, ‘anger’, and ‘self-esteem’; I focus here on the common notion
of concern for status. Thus Olympiodorus emphasizes ‘love of honour’ or reputation (phi-
lotimia) as the fulfilment or goal of thumos (in Alc. 10.13), the most difficult of the affec-
tions to wash away (50.26).
36 That is, a false or fabricated explanation or memory that is believed by the narrator.
37 Socrates aptly diagnoses the influence of conformity and authority in human motivation
(Nussbaum 2012, 54–55); in a very loose sense, he can be seen as doing a kind of proto-
social-psychological test, noting results similar to Asch’s conformity experiments (1951)
and Milgram’s emphasis on obedience to authority in decision-making (1963).
38 For the Neoplatonic view of Socrates and his paradigmatic role, see the essays in Layne
and Tarrant 2014; for Olympiodorus’ view in particular, see Renaud and Tarrant 2015,
201–203.
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 63

draw our authentic identity and unity out of us.39 To find our unity is to find
our good (Proclus, El. Theol. 9, 13, in Alc. 1.3–3.2), and to escape from the rend-
ing force of multiplicity is to escape our danger (in Alc. 6.12–17.8; 43.7–44.11).
This is the goal of the following, ‘philosophical’ grades of excellence, which are
the products of conscious, reflective reasoning.

1.2 Philosophical Excellence: (3) Civic, (4) Purificatory,

(5) Contemplative
A person who has already formed good habits40 might choose to study phi-
losophy, get to grips with the instrument of reason,41 use reason to cultivate
self-knowledge, and thereby discover how to practice self-cultivation.42 For
there is an authentic unity deeper than the habitual, plural, accidental and
externally informed identity that we have just acknowledged. This authentic
unity is genuinely what ‘we’ are or should be (using ‘we’ in its Plotinian sense at
Enn. 1.1.10.7–8, referring to what the later Neoplatonists call the ‘rational soul’),
and if we can discover it, we can then put it into practice in the particular
moments of choice and action, the praxeis that constitute our lived experience
(Ol. in Alc. 204.3–10, in Phd. 4.4.1–5). In order to do this, the student must (a) first
undergo a process of ‘cross-examination’ or ‘refutation’ (elenkhos), which leads
to a recognition of the patterns of stimulus and response that are currently
guides to one’s behaviour (which will typically fall under the categories of spir-
ited emotion or appetite), and then (b) actively restructure these inward clus-
ters of motivation in such a way that all three work together in harmony, with
pride and appetite included at the table under the overarching jurisdiction of
reason, the state of inner harmony pictured by Plato at Republic 4, 443C–E:

Justice isn’t concerned with ‘doing one’s own work’ externally, but with
what is inside, what is truly oneself and one’s own. One who is just …
puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of
himself [logos, thumos, epithumia] like three limiting notes in a musical

39 ‘Each one of us and of mankind in general is more or less clearly subject to the very same
misfortunes as the son of Clinias [i.e., Alcibiades]. Held bound by the forgetfulness inci-
dent to generation and sidetracked by the disorder of the irrational forms of life, we do
not know ourselves, and we think we know many things of which we are unaware, by
reason of the innate notions present in us according to our being; we stand in need of the
same assistance, in order both to keep ourselves from excessive conceit and to light upon
the care appropriate to us’ (Proclus, in Alc. 7.1–8, tr. O’Neill 1965).
40 Cf. Simplicius in Cat. 6.1–3.
41 Simplicius in Cat. 5.9–6.3; cf. 14.5–20.
42 Proclus in Alc. 1.3–7.
64 Griffin

scale—high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any
others there may be in between, and from having been many things he
becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he
act. And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care
of his body, engaging in politics, or in private business—in all of these,
he believes that the action is just and beautiful that preserves this inner
harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the
knowledge that oversees such actions.
Tr. Grube/Reeve in Cooper 1997

Later Neoplatonists describe this stage as (3) ‘civic’ or ‘constitutional’ excel-

lence (politikê aretê), because it entails, or just is, the successful analysis and
management of the inner ‘city’ or ‘state’ (polis) of the soul,43 with its three
‘classes’ of reason (logos), spirited-emotion (thumos), and appetite (epithu-
mia). From Plato’s Republic the Neoplatonists adopted the view that the four
cardinal virtues or excellences may also describe a constitution (politeia) of the
person’s soul, in which (a) reason (logos) is wise, (b) all three aspects of the
soul are ‘doing their own work’, i.e., behaving with justice, which entails that
non-rational motivation is constrained, but not eradicated, by reason (as
described above, 443C–E), (c) spirited-emotion (thumos) is courageous, and
(d) appetite (epithumia) is managed by self-control or moderation. The person
who manifests these virtues is the ‘civically excellent’ person; in virtue of this
inward organisation, they are also an outwardly ‘good person’ (êthikos), and
identical with the person who will manage a household (oikonomikos) or state
(politikos) virtuously and without undue self-interest.44 Olympiodorus also
stresses that the person with an inward soul thus organized is a ‘good person’
at any scale, communal, family, or individual.

And ‘are statecraft (politikon), good individual character (êthikon), and

household management (oikonomikon) the same, or not?’ [The answer
is that] they are the same: for just as large letters don’t differ from small
letters in form (eidos)… so too practical actions (pragmata) don’t differ
because of their scale …
in Alc. 186.20–23

43 Republic 2, 368D–369A.
44 See Olympiodorus in Alc. 186.20–22 for the identity of the statesman, household-manager,
and individually good character, who are the same in form and differ only in scale (which
is irrelevant).
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 65

Next comes a thoroughgoing ‘liberation’45 of the reasoning person or soul

(logikê psukhê) from motivations and experiences that are not susceptible to
rational analysis (alogos): Olympiodorus describes this liberation as (4) ‘purifi-
catory’ excellence (kathartikê aretê). This accomplishment, he maintains,
issues in a new kind of observational or contemplative activity: the liber-
ated reason is free to contemplate (theôrein) its own internal structure, in an
inwardly directed ‘reversion’ (epistrophê) that illuminates the architecture of
the ‘intelligible world’ within. This contemplation of the mind’s structure by
the mind reveals certain eternal, non-contingent facts and structuring prin-
ciples, the Platonic Forms or Ideas, which structure all beings’ soul and form.
This contemplation, when realized, constitutes (5) ‘contemplative’ excellence
(theôrêtikê aretê); assimilating Aristotle’s views on the value and happiness of
the contemplative life in Nic. Eth. 10.6–8 with Plato’s comments on the con-
templation of aesthetic Forms like Beauty (Symposium 210E) and Goodness
(Republic 5–6, Philebus), the Neoplatonists interpret this contemplation as
the height of philosophical or rational happiness, well-being, and flourishing
(eudaimonia). What is contemplated here is a much higher grade of unity.
But there is at least one (and possibly two) further stages to come beyond
philosophy.

1.3 Excellence beyond Philosophy: (6) Exemplary and (7) Inspired

Olympiodorus maintains that it is possible to achieve at least one and perhaps
two modes of ‘excellence’ that lie ‘beyond’ philosophy, in the sense that this
lies above and beyond the kind of rational reflection that characterizes civic,
purificatory, and contemplative excellence. (Here I would point again to in Alc.
172.5–12 and 8.6–14, the descriptions of self-knowledge cited on pp. 58–59).
Olympiodorus characterizes ‘philosophy’ as a method for achieving unity with
pure intelligence (nous), while ‘theurgy’ and inspiration achieve unity with the
paradigmatic objects of intelligence (in Phd. 8.2), and with one’s proper god
(in Alc. 172.5–12).
Olympiodorus often describes theurgic practice as ‘inspired’ excellence
(enthousiastikê aretê), or simply as ‘inspiration’ (enthousiasmos). In Damascius,
excellence beyond philosophy is analysed into two parts: (6) paradigmatic and
(7) hieratic excellence (in Phd. 1.143–144). This distinction seems to be employed
by Olympiodorus (as at in Alc. 172.5–12), with ‘inspired’ used as the label for
Damascius’ ‘hieratic’ virtue; Olympiodorus’ Phaedo commentary is not explicit

45 See Ol. in Alc. 172.5–12.

66 Griffin

about this tier.46 In characterising this ‘grade’, Olympiodorus is frequently

indebted to Socrates’ depiction of ‘divine madness’ (mania) in Plato’s Phaedrus
(244A–245C), and to his predecessors. (Reflecting on Danielle Layne’s remarks
in her contribution to this volume on the benefits of ‘not-knowing,’ I wonder
if this involves a kind of bare awareness that is not reflexive or antilêptikos, as
Plotinus puts it in Enn. 1.4.9–10).
Theurgy could have an outward, ritual dimension and goal,47 but primarily
worked to heal the practitioner’s soul and uncloud its inner sight (Iamblichus,
On the Mysteries 1.11–12). For Olympiodorus, a person may experience a kind of
‘union’ and ‘identification’ (henôsis) with divine individuals (henades) or gods
(theoi) who also represent one’s truest or most authentic self, the union that
(for later ancient Platonists) Plato indicated when he spoke of ‘likeness to god’
(homoiôsis tôi theôi, Theaetetus 176B).
Olympiodorus suggests that this unity can be experienced as episodes of
‘inspiration’ (enthousiasmoi) (e.g., in Alc. 184.22). Plato sometimes depicts such
‘inspirations’ in the dialogues: Olympiodorus even suggests at the outset of his
Alcibiades commentary that they are a primary attraction of the dialogues.48
(Harold Tarrant, in his contribution to this volume, explores in depth whether
the wider sense of ‘inspiration’ or enthousiasmos relevant to Olympiodorus’
treatment of self-knowledge is also applicable to his hermeneutical analysis of
Plato). An important result of this mode of ‘excellence’ or union with divinity
and unity, the goal of the philosophical life, is what we might describe as an
‘authentic’ life, which brings us to in Alc. 20.4–13:

Well then, they say that those who live according to their own essence
(kat’ ousian)—that is, as they were born to live (pephukasi)—have the
divine daimon allotted to them, and for this reason we can see that these
people are held in high esteem in whatever walk of life they pursue (epitê-
deuein). Now to live ‘according to essence’ is to choose the life that befits
the chain from which one is suspended: for example, [to live] the war-
rior’s life, if [one is suspended] from the [chain] of Ares; or the life of
words and ideas (logikos), if from that of Hermes; or the healing and pro-
phetic life, if from that of Apollo; or quite simply, as we said earlier, to live

46 Compare Olympiodorus (in Phd. 8.2.1–20) and Damascius (in Phd. 1.138–144). See also
below, pp. 70–71.
47 For a summary of theurgic practice, see Chlup 2012, 168–184.
48 Examples include the address of the Demiurge in the Timaeus (41A–D) and Socrates’
‘possession’ by the Muses (Republic 8, 546A–547C), nymphs (Phaedrus 238D–241D), and
philosophy (Theaetetus 173C–177B). Tarrant, in his chapter in this volume, discusses these
episodes in detail.
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 67

just as one was born to live. But if someone sets before himself a life that
is not according to his essence, but some other life that differs from this,
and focuses in his undertakings on someone else’s work—they say that
the intellective (noêros) [daimon] is allotted to this person, and for this
reason, because he is doing someone else’s work, he fails to hit the mark
in some [instances].

Underlying this passage’s discussion is the view, previously expressed for

instance by Plotinus (Enn. 3.4), that our allotted ‘guardian daimôn’ operates
from a plane of being immediately ‘above’ our current level of activity—‘above’
in terms of the scale of being, knowledge, and value. As Proclus puts it (in
Alc. 1), we should strive to identify our being in order to understand what is
good for us; as Olympiodorus suggests here and elsewhere (in Alc. 172.5–12),
the recipe for identifying what is good for us is unique to each individual, and
grounded in their relationship with their god (oikeios theos).
As we can see from these sources, I think, one criterion for recognising the
achievement of the highest kind of excellence is acting according to one’s
unique and natural character. As E.R. Dodds points out, the One, the first prin-
ciple and highest god, is ‘the ground of individuality’ for Proclus.49 As Edward
Butler puts a similar point, ‘the cardinal doctrine of Neoplatonism, the pre-
eminence of unity and its identity with the Good, is identified by Proclus with
the primordial nature of individuality in relation to all other determinations’.50
As it happens, such unique characters correspond to individually unique51
gods, an idea deriving from Plato’s Phaedrus (252D–253C); thus, as Proclus
writes in commenting on the Parmenides, ‘there exists there both indescrib-
able unification (henôsis) and yet unique distinctness (idiotês) of each char-
acteristic (for all the unities [henades] are in all, and yet each is distinct)’ (in
Parm. 1049). These unique, henadic gods are also expressed in mythic form as
the literary ‘gods’ of Homer.52
For Proclus and for Hermias, the psychê, turning within, will find its own
elementary unity, which is also a ‘One’ (hen tês psychês, Hermias, in Phdr. 91.18;
cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology 1.3). Although every level of a person’s being can
be ‘inspired,’ the truest form of inspiration occurs directly in relation to this
‘One of the soul’ (Hermias, in Phdr. 91.18; 94.12–13):

49 Dodds 1963, 199.

50 Butler 2003, 75.
51 In the sense advanced by Edward Butler (2005), the gods or henads in the most funda-
mental sense are characterized by both uniqueness (idiotês) and union (henôsis).
52 On the ‘henads’ see for example Chlup 2012, 112–136. On their allegorization in Homer, see
for example Lamberton 1986.
68 Griffin

Inspiration (enthousiasmos) in the true sense occurs in connection with

the one of the soul (hen tês psuchês)… [Hermias describes the follow-
ing kinds of inspired madness: the Muses harmonize the soul; Dionysus
makes whole; Apollo makes one; then] erotic [mania or possession],
receiving the unified soul, joins this one of the soul to the gods and to
intelligible beauty.
Tr. Baltzly and Share 2018

I take Olympiodorus also to be speaking of this kind of revelatory inspiration,

in which the soul rediscovers her intrinsic, irreducible unity, then bonds this
unity to that of the henadic gods. In a sense, I take it, the ‘one of the soul’ is also
her most authentic self.53 The ambiguity experienced in such a fusion, which
still preserves the individuality of each alongside their unification, is vividly
expressed by Plotinus when he describes seeing a god who is both oneself and
another, for example, in Enn. 6.9.9–10:

[9.56–60] There one can see both him and oneself as it is right to see:
the self glorified, full of intelligible light—but rather itself pure light—
weightless, floating free, having become—but rather, being—a god; set
on fire then, but the fire seems to go out if one is weighed down again….
[10.19–21] [H]ow could one announce that as ‘another’ when he did not
see, there when he had the vision, another, but one with himself?
Tr. Armstrong, modified

Such inspirations are similarly articulated by Iamblichus in terms of a scale of

luminosity of beings appearing to the theurgist, as in On the Mysteries.
How does one strive for this goal? First, philosophically. Olympiodorus sug-
gests that the philosopher is an imitator of god (in Phd. 1.2.6). One resembles
god as a contemplator of the truth (cf. in Gorg. 25.1), one who knows beings in
themselves (onta hêi onta: in Alc. 25.2; 175.17–178.6) and nature as a whole (phu-
sis, in Cat. 138.15, in Alc. 2.94). This knowledge resembles divine pleasure (in
Gorg. 26.15, 142.19–20W). Second, as a statesman or civic agent (politikos), he
acts providentially for the best organisation of his inner, psychological ‘city’ (the
‘polity’ of reason, spirit, and appetite, adopting the model of Plato’s Republic),

53 But see also Riggs 2015, who argues compellingly that the rational soul (logikê psy-
chê) is the authentic person. On the view I adopt here, which I think is supported by
Olympiodorus’ ‘scale of self-knowledge’ at in Alc. 172.5–12, one knows oneself as rational
soul at the level of politikê and kathartikê aretê, but beyond this point comes to identify
oneself with nous and eventually with the hen tês psychês.
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 69

and he strives for the analogous improvement of his fellow citizens wherever
he can (in Gorg. 8.1, etc.), healing souls or preventing their injury (in Gorg. 49.6,
261.12–23W; in Alc. 6.5–7). Philosophy, then, has two indispensable phases:
one phase looks ‘upward’ or ‘inward’ (in terms shared by Olympiodorus and
Damascius), and the other looks ‘outward’ or ‘downward’:

The contemplative [philosopher’s] (theôrêtikos) gaze always flies toward

the divine, whereas the [philosopher-]statesman’s (politikos), if he has
worthy citizens, remains and shapes them. If they are not worthy, then
in truth he retreats and makes a fortress (teikhion) for himself … This is
what Plato and Socrates did.
in Gorg. 26.18, 143.5–10W, tr. JLT

During one lifetime, as Olympiodorus seems to suggest, we might develop

from the latter, civic kind of philosopher (the philosopher politikos) into the
former, contemplative kind (the philosopher theôrêtikos).54 (In the third sec-
tion below, I explore the question of whether these modes of life can co-exist
simultaneously). Olympiodorus often cites Homer’s Odysseus as an exemplar
for this transformation, when Odysseus springs to face down the suitors in
Odyssey 22, and ‘strips off his rags’ (Od. 22.1), rags which Olympiodorus identi-
fies with the affections (pathê) of the soul:

For it is possible for beings even here [sc. in the perceptible world] to
exist above [sc. in the intelligible world] in a contemplative manner,
because of a certain kind of sympathy, and also for beings above to exist
here, when the soul sheds its wings, descends here and becomes aflutter
about [this world], because of its love of the body. For the soul of the con-
templative person (theôrêtikos), when it is active (energousa) in accor-
dance with that which is most divine within it, is thereby liberated from
its shell-like, pneumatic vehicle. This is what the poet [Homer] refers to
when he says, ‘Then brilliant Odysseus stripped away his rags’… [Od. 22.1]
In other words, the contemplative person who has separated himself
from such ‘rags’ is genuinely ‘brilliant’ (polumêtis).
in Alc. 5.3–12; and see 51.1–10; 99.16–17

54 ‘Understand that we should always pursue philosophy, when we are young for the sake
of soothing the passions, and especially when we are old, for then the passions begin to
subside, and reason flourishes. We should always have philosophy as our patron, since
it is she who performs the task of Homer’s Athena, scattering mist’ (Ol. in Gorg. 26.13,
142.5–10W, tr. JLT).
70 Griffin

While the ‘scale of virtues’ is more complex than this outline would sug-
gest, both in Olympiodorus and more broadly in later Neoplatonism, it might
serve as a schematic introduction to one of the central organising ideas in
Olympiodorus’ commentary, and in the Platonic curriculum that he teaches.
The path might be summarized as follows: ordinarily, we think that we are
coherent moral agents acting for reflective reasons, but this is false; in fact, we
are acting in an incoherent way from (at best) good natural instincts (phusis)
and good socialized habits (êthos). Philosophy invites an analysis of those
instincts and habits, which leads to the recognition that ‘we’ are a complex soul
acting from one rational cluster of motivations called reason (logos), and two
non-rational clusters of motivations called spirited-emotion (thumos), which
is concerned with status, and appetite (epithumia), which is concerned with
desires and aversions. Presently the latter two, non-rational clusters largely
govern us, perhaps as a tyranny of one appetite, or a ‘democracy’ of many
(often inconsistent) appetites, or a ‘timocracy’ of the drive for social status. By
reorganising this complex in such a way that all three motives play a part under
the shared jurisdiction of reason, we attain ‘moderation’ (metriopatheia), and
civic excellence (politikê aretê)—which applies both inwardly, and outwardly
at the individual, household, or civic scale. But we can go beyond this to con-
template just our reason, in separation from the non-rational aspects of our
being and experience. This study gradually liberates reason (purificatory excel-
lence, kathartikê aretê) until we attain ‘liberation from affection’, or freedom
from the non-rational affections and forms of suffering (apatheia); and with
that liberation, we are free to contemplate the intelligible, eternal, and non-
contingent principles that structure our mind, which is contemplative excel-
lence (theôrêtikê aretê). Building on that achievement, we may experience
moments of ‘inspiration’ from a god; building those inspirations out into a
coherent pattern of actions that accurately represents the unique character of
one’s own god amounts to inspired excellence (enthousiastikê aretê).
We might wonder why, in the Phaedo commentary, Olympiodorus does not
explicitly name the ‘hieratic’ virtues that Damascius identifies in his parallel
discussion (Damascius in Phd. 1.138–144; Olympiodorus in Phd. 8.2). Assuming
an answer internal to Olympiodorus’ own philosophical commitments,55 one
solution is that Olympiodorus may, like Marinus (VP 3), regard ‘silence’ as

55 There may have been political motivations to downplay theurgical practices in public
in Alexandria (see Sorabji 1990, 2005, and compare van der Berg 2004). Here, however,
Olympiodorus shows no discomfort in outlining a capacity for ‘inspired’ self-knowledge
beyond the ‘theological’; and he stresses the importance of following one’s proper god in
the highest levels of virtue (in Alc. 20.4–13). He also tries to explain for his students why
philosophers seem to honour stone images (in Gorg. 47.5).
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 71

necessary concerning the higher virtues; but how should we explain his identi-
fying them in some commentaries and not others? I imagine that Olympiodorus
uses the terminology of ‘inspiration’ (enthousiasmos) to represent the high-
est grade of virtue, a pattern that he shares with Hermias, for example; and
it may be that enthousiasmos is applied synonymously or homonymously to
several different experiences or states of the soul. (Consider Hermias’ account,
reporting Syrianus, of four modes of inspiration—music, telestic, mantic, and
erotic—at in Phdr. 88.15–96.24, and see Harold Tarrant’s contribution to this
volume for a granular discussion of inspiration in Olympiodorus.)

2 Curriculum

The scale of virtues functions as a kind of ‘scaffolding’ for the ascent of individ-
ual philosophers in hagiographical contexts,56 and for the ideal organization
of the curriculum. For example, Marinus (VP 12) gives a celebrated rendition
of Proclus’ studies that alludes to the scale.57 The Neoplatonic commenta-
tors frequently make use of the scale to ‘position’ a text on the continuum. In
the following texts, for example, Olympiodorus and Simplicius identify their
respective subjects—the Alcibiades and Epictetus’ Handbook—as belonging
to a level of civic or constitutional excellence.58

But Damascius conveys its goal more exactly and more truly when he says
that it is not about knowing oneself unqualifiedly, but about knowing one-
self as a civic person (politikôs). And he establishes this from the definition
of the human being in this dialogue as a rational soul (psukhê logikê) that
uses the body as an instrument. Only the civic person uses the body as an
instrument, since he is sometimes in need of spirited emotion (thumos),
for example [in fighting] on behalf of his country, but also of an appetite
(epithumia) for doing his citizens good. But neither the purificatory person
(kathartikos) nor the contemplative person (theôrêtikos) need the body. For
a purificatory person is the soul freeing itself from the body, though the
‘chains’ nevertheless remain and are not released as [they were] from the
Ambracian youth; instead, they are released through sympathy.
Ol. in Alc. 4.15–5.3; cf. in Alc. 5.3–12 cited above, p. 69

56 See for example, O’Meara 2006.

57 See for example Blumenthal 1984, Saffrey-Segonds 2001, O’Meara 2006; this was stressed
helpfully in Sonsoles Costero Quiroga’s contribution to the conference.
58 See Albert Joosse’s chapter in this volume for more detailed discussion.
72 Griffin

But first of all, as I said, we must distinguish the sort of human being
these speeches were intended for, and the sort of human life they lead
someone who is convinced by them to be virtuous in. Well, they are not
directed towards someone who is capable of living cathartically: such a
person wants, in so far as possible, to flee from the body and from the
bodily emotions, and to withdraw into himself. Even less are they meant
for the theoretical person: such a person, rising above even his rational
life, wants to be wholly one of our superiors. Rather, the speeches suit
those who have their essence in accordance with a rational life, which
uses the body as an instrument, and doesn’t consider the body to be a
part of the soul, or it to be a part of the body, or believe that the soul along
with the body completes the human being (as though it were constituted
by two parts, the soul and the body).
Simpl. in Epict. Ench. 2.30–44, tr. Brittain and Brennan 2002

This relationship between curriculum and virtue has been excellently stud-
ied by scholars especially writing in French, including Ilsetraut Hadot and
Philippe Hoffmann.59

3 Simultaneity of Contemplation and Civic Activity

I would like to close by revisiting a question discussed in our conference about

how Olympiodorus might view this scale operating in practice: namely, the
possibility of expressing several ‘stages’ of virtue simultaneously.
Consider the contrast between Olympiodorus’ contemplative philosopher
(theôretikos) and social or political philosopher (politikos) (in Gorg. 26.18,
143.5–7W). Does the politikos also develop her higher, contemplative virtues
while she is actively helping to cultivate the character of youths in the agora,
like Olympiodorus himself (in Gorg. 1.6, 11.20–21W)? Or is that contempla-
tion an intermittent experience, depending on the level of self-knowledge
and activity relevant at the time (in Alc. 5.8–12)? Or do these lives occur in a
sequence (cf. Damascius, Life of Isidore 22 [F40])? The essential condition of
the soul appears, perhaps, to be the same whether it’s acting on many or on a
few or on one (in Alc. 186.20–23).
One clue is in the Phaedo commentary, where Olympiodorus remarks that
the sensible and intelligible worlds can be said to ‘come into being’ or ‘arise’
(ginetai) when the soul lives according to one or the other mode at one time or

59 See for example Hoffmann 1987 and 2006, Hadot 1987.

Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 73

another (pote … pote) (for this passage and its relevance to the scale of virtues,
see also Albert Joosse’s chapter in this volume):

[J]ust as Empedocles [fr. B 17] said that the intelligible and the sensible
world come into existence alternately (para meros), not because the sen-
sible world begins at this moment (pote), the intelligible world at another
(pote) (both, indeed, exist always), but because our soul sometimes lives
in accordance with intelligible reality (pote men kata noêton zêi), and it is
then said that the intelligible world arises (ginesthai), and sometimes in
accordance with sensible things (pote de kata aisthêton), when the sensi-
ble world is said to arise, so, too, these four reigns of Orpheus [fr. 107] [sc:
of Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus, Dionysus] are not sometimes existent, some-
times non-existent, but they are always there and they represent in mys-
tical language the several degrees of virtues that our soul can practice,
having in herself the tokens of all the virtues, contemplative, purificatory,
civic, and ethical.60
Ol. in Phd. 1.4.3–11, tr. Westerink

Other Neoplatonists, like Porphyry, stress explicitly that our modes of life alter-
nate, and are not simultaneous: ‘it is not possible, while being carried hither and
thither, to be there despite being here. We pay attention not with part of our-
selves but with all of ourselves (ou gar merei hêmôn, all’ holoi tas prosochas poiou-
metha)’ (De abst. 1.41). Porphyry subsequently chastises anonymous ‘barbarians’
who think that one can simultaneously attend to the intelligible and the sensible
(1.42). Nonetheless, Porphyry also credits Plotinus with the ability to hold his
concentration in an act of contemplation while simultaneously engaging in ordi-
nary activities, like conversing with his friends: ‘in this way he was present both
to himself and to others, and he never relaxed his self-turned attention (pros
heauton prosochê) except in sleep’ (Life of Plotinus 8.7–24; see Brittain 2003).
Other Platonist commentators envisage multiple modes of life potentially
coinciding at once. To frame this possibility, consider the view of Hermias
(father of Ammonius, in turn Olympiodorus’ teacher), who reports Syrianus’
seminars on the Phaedrus. Like Olympiodorus, Hermias and Syrianus entertain

60 ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς [fr. B 17] ἔλεγε τὸν νοητὸν καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν παρὰ μέρος γίνεσθαι τόπους,
οὐχ ὅτι ποτὲ μὲν οὗτος γίνεται, ποτὲ δὲ ὁ νοητός (ἀεὶ γάρ εἰσιν), ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ποτὲ μὲν
κατὰ νοητὸν ζῇ καὶ λέγεται τότε γίνεσθαι ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ αἰσθητὸν καὶ λέγεται
ὁ αἰσθητὸς γίνεσθαι κόσμος, οὕτως καὶ παρὰ τῷ Ὀρφεῖ [fr. 107] αἱ τέσσαρες βασιλεῖαι αὗται οὐ
ποτὲ μέν εἰσι, ποτὲ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ μέν εἰσι, αἰνίττονται δὲ τοὺς διαφόρους βαθμοὺς τῶν ἀρετῶν
καθ’ ἃς ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ⟨ἐνεργεῖ⟩ σύμβολα ἔχουσα πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν, τῶν τε θεωρητικῶν καὶ
καθαρτικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν.
74 Griffin

the case of the philosopher who could be engaged in contemplation, but is

presently actively engaged in cultivating the character of the young:

… [F]or ways of life of ours that are appropriate and of a particular kind,
appropriate irradiations and inspirations are granted us from the gods,
and we reach affinity (oikeioun) with different gods at different times
according to the nature of our life. This is the meaning of Odysseus’ at
one time consorting with Calypso, at another with Circe, and with other
goddesses at other times: depending on the nature of his life, he partook
of different more [or less] divine powers at different times. So since the
present life of Socrates is purificatory and elevating … Socrates says that
he is ‘in the grip of a divine passion’ … because he is caring for the young
man [sc. Phaedrus] or because he is susceptible to the reception of divine
illuminations.
Hermias, in Phdr. 58.20–59.1, tr. Baltzly and Share 2018, lightly adapted

Later in the same text, Hermias explains different ways that a primary (con-
templative) and secondary (civic) activity might relate to one another:

There being these three things, essence (ousia), power (dynamis), activ-
ity (energeia), the gods for their part conduct their own secondary and
tertiary activities while remaining in their own primary activities and not
departing from them. But if a person (tis), while projecting (proballein)
a secondary or tertiary activity from within himself, neglects his primary
(prôtê) [activity], or even forgets about it, then he errs (hamartanein), in
that he puts aside his primary and proper activities and spends his time
on more superficial (koiloteros) things, as it were.
77.20–25, tr. Baltzly and Share, lightly adapted, my emphasis

I understand Hermias to imply that contemplation is not only the primary

activity of Plato’s Socrates, but also of every human being. As Hermias goes on
to explain, a person might fall short of their ideal potential in a mild way by
‘rejecting [contemplation] and spending his time on civic matters (politeia),’
but doing so with good and kind intentions (77.29). Someone might do much
worse by engaging in civic matters poorly. Initially, it looks as if Socrates—by
dint of his elevating involvement with Phaedrus—will fall under the former
category, as someone who is temporarily failing to engage in contemplation, in
order to engage in good civic works. But pivotally, as Hermias continues:
Olympiodorus on the Scale of Virtues 75

For Socrates, the ascent (anodos) to his own first principles, i.e. to con-
templation, is very easy and smooth. In the first place, he didn’t give up
his primary activity when projecting the secondary one (oude tên deuteran
energeian proballôn aphistato tês protês). And secondly, even if he had
given it up, he would not have been far from it since he conducted him-
self well even in the area of his secondary activity; he only needed to
turn back.
78.4–8, my emphasis

Evidently, Hermias and Syrianus recognize two options for the person whose
primary activity (prôtê energeia) is contemplative, but whose secondary activ-
ity is engagement in civic affairs (including helping the young through the
education of character). If one gets ‘caught up’ with what one is doing second-
arily, yet continues to act with wisdom, it is only a matter of ‘turning around’
to revert to the contemplative life. Nonetheless—and ideally—one could and
should simultaneously be present to both activities, if one does not push away
(aphistato) the primary while engaging the secondary.
Olympiodorus might well follow Hermias in maintaining that in a sense
it is feasible to engage in primary and secondary activities at once: ‘it is pos-
sible for beings even here to exist above in a contemplative manner, because
of a certain kind of sympathy’ (in Alc. 5.3–12, cited above). Broadly, I think that
Olympiodorus’ description of the soul casting off its ‘rags’ implies a sympathy
with the spirit of Socrates’ account of the soul in Republic 10, 611b–612a: when
the soul is liberated and stripped of its accretions, it’s seen as it really was all
along. For Olympiodorus, as for Porphyry’s Plotinus (Life 8.7–24), even the civi-
cally active philosopher may strive to be ‘present both to himself and to others’
at once, never far from contemplation of reality.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Albert Joosse and to my fellow participants in the confer-

ence of 2017 for helpful comments and collaboration that greatly improved
this chapter. The chapter represents an early stage of work in progress on the
Greek Neoplatonic scale of virtues, and builds on findings in the introduc-
tion to my translation of Olympiodorus On the First Alcibiades, Lectures 10–28
(Griffin 2016). Several sections from that introduction also appear here, with
the kind permission of Bloomsbury.
76 Griffin

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