PETITIONER: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.

RESPONDENT/S: HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and

TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PONENTE: SARMIENTO, J.
Facts: The petitioner, engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement, challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS,” in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
“discrimination against males or females;” that it “does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;” and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation “in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law.” 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in
the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter’s non-impairment
clause, in addition to the “great and irreparable injury” that PASEI members face should the Order be
further enforced.
Issue: Whether the Department Order of the Respondent is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
and Discriminatory against Sexes

Held: No, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the
law” under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked
by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights,
the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government’s efforts. The State through the labor Secretary Exercise the police power which is a power
coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” It may
be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”
PETITIONER: LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180
RESPONDENT: JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO,
City Treasurer of Manila
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
PONENTE: LABRADOR, J.
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital
of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons,
and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
(3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision
for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and
labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment
or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration
with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters,
the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial
entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process?

Held: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No.
1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process.
We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance
and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which
and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes
a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country
isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and
powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big
centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them
in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to
the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under
no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of
protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens.
Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.

DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in
any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.

The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction
a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare,
and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . .

To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by
petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future
of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated
the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted
to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation
of reasonableness.

PETITIONER: WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Antonio Jayme Ledesma
RESPONDENT: J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. L-7859 December 22, 1955
PONENTE: REYES, J.B L., J.
Facts: Appellant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of
the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the
total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as
taxes, under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the
crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while
section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of the land devoted to the cultivation of sugarcane and
ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the
money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the
assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the
aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for
which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the greatest industry of
our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to
thousands of laborers in the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the
important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a
regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore,
redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general
welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power,
the law-making body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.
The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police
power.
PLAINTIFF: SEBASTIAN LOZANO
DEFENDANTS: CARMEN MARTINEZ and JOSE DE VEGA
APPELLEE: CARMEN MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-12834 October 10, 1917
PONENTE: JOHNSON, J.
Facts: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law).
They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute
an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts,
except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The
parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue/s:

1. Does BP 22 is violating the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?

2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?

Held: 1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22
is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order
addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which
the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an
element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason,
checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal
tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and
financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is
shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil.
Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand-fold, can very wen pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful” contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks
cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age,
has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not
entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee
is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of
the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
PETITIONER: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and
DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
RESPONDENT: ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.
Facts: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. Zoology,
had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was applying to take another test. NMAT
Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional Trial Court
held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education.

Ruling: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. The regulation of practice of
medicine is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means
of achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and
of “improving the quality of medical education in the country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirement. The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal protection if
some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied
entrance.

The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been reversed.

PETITIONER: RESTITUTO YNOT

RESPONDENT: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.
Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision
to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The
supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of
the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

PETITIONERS: CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON

CITY
RESPONDENT: HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer
required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-
64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They
further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police
power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein.”

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of
property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held: No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that
would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9
cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such
other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use
but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover
from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by
virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and
highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-
ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property in
the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and
safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to
prevent positive wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t)
of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper
place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod
may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate
private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain
areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.
PETIOTIONERS: ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M.
ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO,
FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE,
TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C.
ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE &
NAPOLEON S. FERRER
RESPONDENT: HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.
Facts: The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted
by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating on
intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by
tenants who re actually cultivating such lands. Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding
until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been
determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the
IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
Issues:
• Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
• Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is violative
of the Constitution.
• Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well-accepted principle of eminent domain
by divesting the landowner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation
Rulings:
• Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself,
which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised to the
manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there
is no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only
preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right
to review with finality the said determination.
• No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other,
what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain.
This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The
initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the
time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.
• No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners
of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The
CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR
 of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner.
PETITIONER: MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC.
RESPONDENT: SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts: On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 or the Seniors Citizens Act was passed into law granting 20%
discounts from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the
country, Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA 7432. Sections
2(i) of which provides for the definition of a Tax credit which refers to the amount representing the 20%
discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by all establishments which discount shall be deducted by
the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for
value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes and Section 4 of RR No. 02-94 which provides for the
recording/bookkeeping requirements for private establishments requiring them to keep separate and
accurate records of sales made to senior citizens. In CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corp, 496 Phil 307
(2005), the Court declared Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because these contravene
RA 7432 that specifically allow private establishments to claim a tax credit the amount of discounts they
grant. In turn the IRR issued pursuant thereto provide for the procedures for its availment. To deny such
credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the regulations carrying out that mandate, is indefensible.
In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount. This contrived definition is
improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from gross sales in order to compute the gross
income in the income statement and cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of computing the
income tax. When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that
the amount when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple. The
option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit the
benefit to a sales discount which is not even identical to the discount privilege that is granted by law does
not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The definition must, therefore, be stricken down.

The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates to create a rule out
of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;" it cannot prevail. It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and
should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose
duty it is to enforce it x x x."
In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a
meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. The intent of Congress in granting a mere discount
privilege, not a sales discount. In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A "regulation adopted pursuant to
law is law." Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to law is no law and has
neither the force nor the effect of law.
On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 or the Expanded Senior Citizens Act amended certain provisions of RA
7432, granting 20% discount to qualified senior citizens and the establishments may claim the discounts
granted as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the
cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value
added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject
to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The
Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006 and the DSWD issued its own IRR for their implementation
of the tax provision of RA 9257. Petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc.,
domestic corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial services, feeling aggrieved
by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners prayed that Section 4 of RA 9257 and the IRR issued by DSWD
and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20%
discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from
enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of
RA 7432 be reinstated.
Issues:
1. Whether the petition presents an actual case or controversy
2. Whether Section 4 of RA No. 9257 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, insofar as they
provide that the 20% discount to Senior Citizens may be claimed as tax deduction by the private
establishments are invalid and unconstitutional.
Rulings: The Petition lacks merit.
POLITICAL LAW - actual case or controversy. We shall first resolve the procedural issue. When the
constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review may be availed of only if the following requisites
concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial
interest on the part of the party raising the question of constitutionality; (3) recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the question of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case."
General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011. In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by
petitioners has a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy.
POLITICAL LAW tax deduction scheme is an exercise of police power of the State. Based on the
afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount
privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-
deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Being
a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a
fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the
net income of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers
and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The
permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private
property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would
ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but
the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.

A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not
meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in
promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments
the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act
was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an
integral part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. As a
form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent
discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the
exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment
of property rights in the process.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners
and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the
active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary,
and that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners,
the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. Carlos Superdrug Corp v. DSWD, 553 Phil. 120
(2007). When we ruled that petitioners in Carlos Superdrug case failed to prove that the 20% discount is
arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a financial report, to establish
the impact of the 20% discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show
that they would be operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or that the continued implementation
of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of petitioners. In the case at
bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar
to what the petitioners in Carlos Superdrug Corporation did. We, thus, found that the 20% discount as
well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Hence, the Law is
valid and constitutional.
PLAINTIFF: SILVESTER M. PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
DEFENDANT: THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-4817 May 26, 1954
PONENTE: REYES, J.
Facts: The municipal board of the City of Manila on July 25, 1950, imposes a municipal occupation tax
on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax “by a fine of
not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both such fine
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.” Among the professions taxed were those to which
plaintiffs belong. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila (as amended by Republic Act No. 409), which empowers the Municipal
Board of said city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons
engaged in the various professions above referred to.

Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
plaintiffs, upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance, paid the same under
protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose already stated. The lower court upheld the
validity of the provision of law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but declared the ordinance
itself illegal and void on the ground that the penalty there in provided for non-payment of the tax was not
legally authorized. From this decision both parties appealed to this Court, and the only question they have
presented for our determination is whether this ruling is correct or not, for though the decision is silent on
the refund of taxes paid plaintiffs make no assignment of error on this point.

Issue: whether double taxation of certain classes is authorized by law?

Held: Yes, the Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the
exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others
untaxed.
Separate Opinion: PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the decision of the majority upon the ground that the Municipal Board of
Manila cannot outlaw what Congress of the Philippines has already authorized. The plaintiffs-appellants
— two lawyers, a physician, an accountant, a dentist and a pharmacist — had already paid the occupation
tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code and are thereby duly licensed to practice
their respective professions throughout the Philippines; and yet they had been required to pay another
occupation tax under Ordinance No. 3398 for practicing in the City of Manila. This is a glaring example
of contradiction — the license granted by the National Government is in effect withdrawn by the City in
case of non-payment of the tax under the ordinance. I fit be argued that the national occupation tax is
collected to allow the professional residing in Manila to pursue his calling in other places in the
Philippines, it should then be exacted only from professionals practicing simultaneously in and outside of
Manila. At any rate, we are confronted with the following situation: Whereas the professionals elsewhere
pay only one occupation tax, in the City of Manila they have to pay two, although all are on equal footing
insofar as opportunities for earning money out of their pursuits are concerned. The statement that practice
in Manila is more lucrative than in the provinces, may be true perhaps with reference only to a limited
few, but certainly not to the general mass of practitioners in any field. Again, provincial residents who
have occasional or isolated practice in Manila may have to pay the city tax. This obvious discrimination
or lack of uniformity cannot be brushed aside or justified by any trite pronouncement that double taxation
is legitimate or that legislation may validly affect certain classes.
My position is that a professional who has paid the occupation tax under the National Internal Revenue
Code should be allowed to practice in Manila even without paying the similar tax imposed by Ordinance
No. 3398. The City cannot give what said professional already has. I would not say that this Ordinance,
enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to paragraph 1 of section 18 of the Revised Charter of Manila,
as amended by Republic Act No. 409, empowering the Board to impose a municipal occupation tax not to
exceed P50 per annum, is invalid; but that only one tax, either under the Internal Revenue Code or under
Ordinance No. 3398, should be imposed upon a practitioner in Manila.

PETITIONER: REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner,

RESPONDENT: The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The COURT of TAX
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965
PONENTE: PAREDES, J.

Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the
locality, as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner
issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment
and requested the withdrawal thereof.

Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.

Held: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as
contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed
on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an
excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties.
The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment
of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.

PETITIONER: ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA

RESPONDENT: HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M.
CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued,
Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE
G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988
PONENTE: PARAS, J.
Facts: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of
Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of
real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents
Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the
said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned
decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being
used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively
for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said
petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
Ruling: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental
to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building
or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar,
the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation
is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed
tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being
used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education
(residence of the director).

PETITIONER: ANTERO M. SISON, JR.

RESPONDENTS: RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue;
ROMULO VILLA, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; TOMAS TOLEDO
Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget,
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commissioner on Audit, and CESAR E. A. VIRATA,
Minister of Finance
G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984
PONENTE: FERNANDO, C.J.
Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly
discriminated against him by the imposition of higher rates upon his income as a professional, that it
amounts to class legislation, and that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process and equal protection clauses, and the rule on uniformity
in taxation.

Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that there was
a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses. Absent such showing, the presumption of
validity must prevail. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the differentitation conforms to the
practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of equal protection, it is not discriminatory
within the meaning of the clause and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against professionals. Recipients of
compensation income are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes as there is no
practically no overhead expense, while professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or expenses
necessaryh to produce their income. There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of income
taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards
professional and business income.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring: I concur in the result. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting: This is a frivolous suit. While the tax rates for compensation income are
lower than those for net income such circumstance does not necessarily result in lower tax payments for
these receiving compensation income. In fact, the reverse will most likely be the case; those who file
returns on the basis of net income will pay less taxes because they claim all sort of deduction justified or
not I vote for dismissal.

PETITIONER: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO

RESPONDENT: THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
Facts: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives
but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on
separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.
 Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.

Ruling: No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue
law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may
undergo extensive changes in the Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not
only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

PETITIONERS: PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,

NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE
LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD
RESPONDENTS: PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PONENTE: MAKASIAR, J.
Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against
the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers
in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7
A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after learning
about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by
the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their
business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that
the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith.
The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations
for being filed two days late.

Issues:

• Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as a
violation of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress
of grievances

• Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition of the employers

Ruling:

• Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or
otherwise.

The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was
purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly
and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it
was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from
the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance
its productivity as well as profits.

• To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the “duty … to observe regular
working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working
shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual
aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.

The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial Relations. The Supreme
Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date
of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they
might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.

PETITIONERS: BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND

GENEROSO OCAMPO
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
PONENTE: VITUG, J.
Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and
members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were
given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the premises of North
EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo, et. al. were informed by Quimpo that
their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by
their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo,
and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-
sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR
issued an Order, directing Simon, et. al. "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering
Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. Onthe basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo,
et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990
Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls,sari-sari stores and carinderia, the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not
more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materials and food under
the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition,
with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A
motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12
September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss
set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they would bring the
case to the courts. In an Order, dated25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt
for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to
desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an
Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order,
dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al. filed the
petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning the
extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case 90 —1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the “order to desist” against the demolition of
Fermo, et. al.’s stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said
stalls despite the CHR order.
Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission
on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations; such areas as the
"(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagingsand hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
human rights that should fall withinthe authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which
is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, theland adjoins the North EDSA
of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that
a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked,
if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining herein, the Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers,
the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "tocite or hold any person in
direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) herein,
however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The
constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legalaid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction
for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive
measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts
on behalf of the victims of human rightsviolations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of
any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or
of the Supreme Court.
Separate Opinions: PADILLA, J., dissenting: I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs.
The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in
relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR
can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case
involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in
situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as
posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil
rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp.
20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at
street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not
enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit
the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may
not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.

PLAINTIFF: EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO

DEFENDANT: VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
PONENTE: STREET, J.
Facts: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng secured a debt with various parcels of real property in
Manila. The debt amounted to P218,294.10 at 8% per annum, payable quarterly. Property's
estimated value was about P292,558. After the instrument's execution, mortgagor returned to
Amoy, China and died on January 29, 1810. The foreclosure proceeding needed publication
pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Publication was made in a newspaper
of Manila and an order of the court deposited in the post office in a stamped envelope of the
summons and complaint directed to defendant. The clerk, however, failed to comply with the
mail publication requirement.
The bank was able to foreclose the property without the defendant.
After seven years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested the
court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3,
1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set
forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of
the action. His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.
His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been prejudiced.

Held: xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that
the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1)
There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity
to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in
addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect
it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may
never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as
upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the
provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of
notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is
known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of
this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification
which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of
due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a
denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not
avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the
only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was
absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference
whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process
of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little.
The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice
should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no
escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the
judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly
unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law
thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly
made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice
was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to
reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the
principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of
these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall
be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed.

Separate Opinion: MALCOLM, J., dissenting: I dissent. It will not make me long to state my
reasons. An immutable attribute — the fundamental idea — of due process of law is that no man
shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity of being heard in
his defense. Protection of the parties demands a strict and an exact compliance with this
constitutional provision in our organic law and of the statutory provisions in amplification.
Literally hundreds of precedents could be cited in support of these axiomatic principles. Where
as in the instant case the defendant received no notice and had no opportunity to be heard,
certainly we cannot say that there is due process of law. Resultantly, "A judgment which is void
upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want
of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do
exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to the defendant." (Mills vs.
Dickons, 6 Rich [S. C.], 487.)

PETITIONERS: HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO

RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor.
DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP
P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO F. DE LEON, Camp Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial
Group, Camp Crame, Cubao, Quezon City
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.
Facts: On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez and Godofredo Diego werecharged in
three separate information’s with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide.The said
petitioners posted their bail bonds and in effect, were released from detention.On November 15,
1993, in order for him to review the evidence on record, BulacanProvincial Prosecutor Liberator L.
Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment. Pursuant to aDOJ Department Order, respondent
Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio was designated ActingProvincial Prosecutor of Bulacan with the
instructions to conduct a re-investigation of theaforementioned criminal cases. Thereafter, the
proceedings were again suspended by JudgeVillajuan until after the prosecution’s request for
change of venue shall have been resolved bythe Supreme Court and the termination of the
preliminary investigation.On December 15, 1993 before petitioners could be arrainged for the
respective cases,respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations, which
was granted by Judge Villajuan. On the same day, the prosecutor filed four new information’s
againstherein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and for illegal possession
offirearms, which were raffled to Judge Victoria Pornillos. No bail having been recommended by the
said Judge, the arraignment of the accused was issued for December 27, 1993.On December 27,
1993, the arraignment was reset due to the absence of therespondent prosecutor. On the same
date, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of theorder granting the withdrawal of the srcinal
information’s. In addition, a Motion to Quashthe new information’s for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners. Judge Pornillosthereafter denied said motion and directed that a plea of not guilty be
entered for petitionerswhen the latter refused to enter their plea.In the meantime, on January 20,
1994, Judge Villajuan granted the motion forreconsideration by petitioners and thus reinstating the
previous criminal cases. However, thecorresponding arraignment was suspended and, in the
meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court
of Appeals which denied petitioners’s motion to quash. Respondent court dismissed this petition,
hence the case athand.
ISSUE: Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the srcinal information’s is null and voidon the
ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5, and 6,Rule 15 of Rule
of Courts; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution was
to amend the information by charging the proper offenses pursuat toSection 14 of Rule 110
HELD: No. Petitioner’s assert that the failure of the prosecution to serve them a copy of themotion to
withdraw the srcinal information’s and to set said motion for hearing constitutes aviolation of their
right to be informed of the proceedings against them. Furthermore, the ex parte motion should be
considered null and void because Judge Villajuan had no authority toact on it.The Court stresses
that once a complaint or information is filed in court, anydisposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of theaccused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.
As explained in Crespo vs. Mogul,
 “Amotion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has theoption
to grant or deny the same.” It cannot therefore be claimed that the prosecutor exceededhis authority
in withdrawing those information’s because the same bore the imprimatur of thecourt.
As regards the correctness of the court’s decision in dismissing the srcinalinformation’s rather than
ordering the amendment thereof, the Court asserts that there has been no grave abuse of discretion
considering that the motion to withdraw was filed andgranted before the petitioners were arraigned.
Hence, the risk of double jeopardy is non-existent. Even if a substitution was made at such stage,
petitioners cannot claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be prevented under
the rule on substitution, forthe simple reason that no first jeopardy has as yet attached. Petitioner’s
right to speedy trialwas never violated since the new informations were filed immediately after the
motion towithdraw the srcinal information’s was granted. Thus, the petitions for certiorari, mandamus
and habeas corpus are denied.

COPMPLAINANTS: STATE PROSECUTORS

RESPONDENTS: JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
PER CURIAM
Facts: Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was
charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with
ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of
the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent
judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.

The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous
interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the
accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the
matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking
judicial notice on the published statement of the President in the newspaper (Philippine Daily
Inquirer and the Daily Globe)which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect
of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published
in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

Held: YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements
before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent
judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No.
1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was
issued.

When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge admitted
of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take
judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based
on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of
the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge
of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that
involves unquestioned demonstration.

This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act
of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is
not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative
of bad faith and partiality.

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is
possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a
presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in
the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the
arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court
notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.

The SC cited several cases where judges were ordered dismissed from the government service
for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law and the Court after considering such premises,
it thus, finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.

Separate Opinion: DISSENTING OPINION: BELLOSILLO, J.:

In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil
suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes,
rules, and cases has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so
erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent
extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The rule is
consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the
protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might become unduly cautious in his work, since he
would be subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to be drawn from an erroneous
decision.
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to
exercise his judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits
provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct
. . . the judge cannot be held administratively responsible . . . for no one, called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be nothing short of harassment or
would make his position unbearable.
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts,
no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. He cannot be held to account or answer,
criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. As a
matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. It is a
general principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon
consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary." This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant case.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge
Manuel T. Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an
atrocity, and thus his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records
that the respondent's assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose,
and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed
order, dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not proper.
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence of
judges and send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without fear of
reprisal, merely for expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain
eventual justice only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but these
are necessary evils which must be endured to some extent lest judicial independence and the
growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in
handing down his decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while
this Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a
brother in the profession, it must also step forward and take the lead to defend him against
unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only the magistrate on trial but the
entire judicial system as well. As champion — at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate
judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must
also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to harass
them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it
penalizes them for exercising their independent judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience shows,
are no longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with
creditable distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith
and then shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the
ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.