Republic of the Philippines THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
SUPREME COURT EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV
in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view
of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated
box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on
top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making
the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening
on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents
thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of
Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6,
1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and,
in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam
and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana
leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn,
p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job
Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was
also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said
effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address
in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the
latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central
Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried
leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the
Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo,
pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should
be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal
Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20
SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective
search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado
v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by
the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized
the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987
Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down
the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971];
Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510,
March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to
be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a
private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against
the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to
the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted
intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886];
Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in
construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon
the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right
of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible
in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search
and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v.
Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
1
 The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private
citizen — the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which
he left behind a travel case containing the evidence*** complained of. The search
was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became
suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and
made it available to the authorities.
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.
What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written
statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of
evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused
only proscribes governmental action." here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both
instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-
18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused
availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on
cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense
that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we
have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference
made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the
finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that
he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain
Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the
course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave
him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the
country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples
of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he
opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody
thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an
illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State,
429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of
the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274
US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963];
Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous,
self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance
with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the
shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to
readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated
by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at
that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger
like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking
to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-
so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant
failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property
was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the
search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the
constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True,
the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in
the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the
essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is
to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the
Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the
Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated
shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is
just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8,
1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342
[1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651
[1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As
records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete
address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of
the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B",
Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and
shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses,
or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point,
appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest SO ORDERED.
or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in
the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or
private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar,
167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987].
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition
against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the
State and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should
also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private
seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in
convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under
custodial investigation were not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and
found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law
enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is

2
 [G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON.
JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ,
MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN
DOE, Respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista,
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.
lo posible las vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro.
Creo que entre dos males debemos escoger. el menor.
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are
incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge
could issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under
oath the complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and
candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
DECISION
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art.
VILLAMOR, J.:
III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both
of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of
whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a
contrary.
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President,
Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that
enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof,
the complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were
as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
to have been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there
return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ
was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached
of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were
not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual
stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of
1aw library
this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V.
Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time
letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with
warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue
the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness
Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208
Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished
and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to
the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her
make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness,
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or
respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with
instructed them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will
them the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for
be found to be false and without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The
search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of
Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and
respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a
search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
"Q And thereafter?
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and
Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the
"Q Who is this he?
depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge,
read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent
"A The Honorable Judge.
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes,
their search which yielded six boxes of documents.
to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to
the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying
an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the
that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and
examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the
that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and
Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the
attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an
complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the
answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on
judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of
July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the
the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did
meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on
not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that
petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial
mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was
probable cause.
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of
Court are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73,
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
208 and 209." The question is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1,
referred to above. Thus we find the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Constitution.)
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false
things to be seized.
and fraudulent returns.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the
information required under the Tax Code.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record,
any article subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids
in addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
or abets in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any
article subject to specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership,
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III,
or association, the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.
Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
output removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.
witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by
Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax
The following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the
Code. The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax
Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening:j"SR. ORENSE.
returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income
Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.
taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts,
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de
sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even
la justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su
in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles:
Señoria que causaria cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma
Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under
que podria frustrar los fines de la justicia o si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto
Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
casos con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo en su
persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA
383), is not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central
"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria pregunta por
Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search
la siguiente razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y
Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal
ese escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese
Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account
escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo
of the Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took
denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la
effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the
enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra
phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant
solamente a sea peticion sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos
shall issue for more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said
tambin examiner a los testigos.
in Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
escrito siempre requeriria algun tiempo?.
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo

3
specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different
directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.’" footing from the corporations in Stonehill.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No.
2-M-70 in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check
stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering
the years 1966 to 1970."cralaw virtua1aw library
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of
Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe
the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:js"The grave
violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by
petitioners — at least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the
documents seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the
assessments were made some one and one-half months after the search and seizure on
February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for
the assessments. Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined
from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder
are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments
mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the
documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from
using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as
to costs.

‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.’

"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants."cralaw virtua1aw library

While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the
said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include
all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its
business inoperative.

In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to
explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place
to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that
a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made, — that abuses may not be
committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by
American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search
warrant issued in this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57
Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The
herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to
be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily
have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In
this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at
least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of
payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale,
messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign
remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.

Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit.
In the first place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which
were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a
prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule
requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ
of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the
essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and
more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.)
Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners’
fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not
only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)

It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against

unreasonable search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.

"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation
which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of
Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the
books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives
no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under
the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L.
ed. 652.)

"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different
rule applied to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and
papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected
even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber
Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)

In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the
interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents,
papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been

4
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL
BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR.
and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in
the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized
as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and
that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a
seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly,
such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows,
therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an
alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American
common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the
constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of
evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be
provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of
Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led
by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in
a State.
5
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even
Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which
its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last
year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by
removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is
no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in
general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the
majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party
for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-
Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners
and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they
have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United
States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion
for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said
theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or
submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent
with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted
in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in
the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied,
as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

6

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982
by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses
of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used
in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983,
later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had
come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But
this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and
widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies
this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr.
Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress
sis laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the
instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a
period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the
fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners'
premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to
bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The
events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release
of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President,
like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet
asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had
been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the
Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would
yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-
124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find
no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had
abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of
laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and
marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is
now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic
of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants
in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves
conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places:
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that
portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime
of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the
same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of
the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said
warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued
Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it
has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners
Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact,
under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized
is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in
whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of
no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in
fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot
7
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent
judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge
hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and
that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order
to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to
such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but
poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of
the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic
to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the
political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged
in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less
than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the
property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City
and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the
disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed
by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

8
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171465 June 8, 2007
AAA *, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 27,
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O.
ARZADON, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 20052 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the rape case filed
against private respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3,
20063 Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from
February 28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked
her to deliver a book to an office located at another building but when she returned to their
office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to
get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to
go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie
on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail because there was nobody else in the
premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But
when she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the
incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a
Resolution4 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information for rape.
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing held on October 11,
2002, petitioner testified before the investigating prosecutor. However, she failed to attend the
next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.
On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint5 with a comprehensive account
of the alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Georgina Hidalgo. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory
questioning. On June 11, 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution6 finding that
a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending the filing of the information.
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to
review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the clarificatory
questioning, the panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution 7 finding probable cause and
denying Arzadon’s motion for reconsideration.
An Information8 for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando,
La Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415. Thereafter, Arzadon filed
a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest and to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 9 On
March 18, 2004, respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and directed
petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand for determination of probable cause.
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause
before the Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas
Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal
Case No. 6415.10
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales
reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution 11 finding that probable
cause exists. Thus, a new Information12 for rape was filed against Arzadon docketed as
Criminal Case No. 6983.
Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 13 In an Order dated August 11, 2005,
respondent Judge Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to
take the witness stand.
Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that
the documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. Pending
resolution thereof, she likewise filed a petition14 with this Court for the transfer of venue of
Criminal Case No. 6983. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-RTC
and entitled Re: Transfer of Venue of Criminal Case No. 6983, formerly Criminal Case No.
6415, from the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando City, La Union, to any Court in
Metro Manila.
In a Resolution15 dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioner’s request for transfer of
venue. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-242289. However, the proceedings have been suspended pending the
resolution of this petition.
Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:16
I The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND
THE SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ORDERED THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES TO TAKE THE STAND FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
REFUSED TO INHIBIT FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE DESPITE WHISPERS OF
DOUBT ON HIS BIAS AND PARTIALITY
IV
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED
THE ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 2006, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 18, 2006, GRANTING THE
TRANSFER OF VENUE
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. She argues that respondent Judge Carbonell should have taken into
consideration the documentary evidence as well as the transcript of stenographic notes which
sufficiently established the existence of probable cause.
Arzadon claims that the petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of
appeal, it appearing that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under an action
for certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment 17 that the finding of probable cause by
the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring
petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause.
The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed for being the wrong
mode of appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
The petition has merit.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment while the latter concerns
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
where it is alleged that the respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as
in the instant case.18 While petitioner claims to have brought the instant action under Rule 45,
the grounds raised herein involve an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the Court shall treat the same as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly filing the
instant petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby violating the principle
of judicial hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 19 In this case, however,
the gravity of the offense charged and the length of time that has passed since the filing of the
complaint for rape, compel us to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid further
delay.20
We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
We rule in the affirmative.
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on
the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness
stand. Thus –
In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case record and considering that the
Private Prosecutor, despite several admonitions contumaciously nay contemptuously refused
to comply/obey this Court’s Orders of March 18, 2004, August 11, 2005 and eight (8) other
similar Orders issued in open Court that directed the complainant/witnesses to take the
witness stand to be asked probing/clarificatory questions consonant with cited jurisprudential
rulings of the Supreme Court, this Court in the exercise of its discretion and sound judgment
finds and so holds that NO probable cause was established to warrant the issuance of an
arrest order and the further prosecution of the instant case.
Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the scheduled hearings of the case, the
accused had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant failed to appear during
the last four (4) consecutive settings despite due notice without giving any explanation, which
to the mind of the Court may indicate an apparent lack of interest in the further prosecution of
this case. That failure may even be construed as a confirmation of the Defense’s contention
reflected in the case record, that the only party interested in this case is the Private prosecutor,
prodded by the accused’s alleged hostile siblings to continue with the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable cause, the instant case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.21
He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,22 the Court explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. Thus:
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
9
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. 23

We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,24 where we held that before
issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of
an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence
of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. 25

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is
made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged – is the function of the
investigating prosecutor.26

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal examination
of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal
examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the
evidence to show the existence of probable cause.27 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the
report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary
evidence in support thereof.

Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez,28 we
stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but
also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the
accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the
filing of the Information.29 If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient
to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses be conducted.

In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without taking
into consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1,
2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause
against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent
judge’s finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainant’s and her
witnesses’ absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial
determination of probable cause.

Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang Salaysay30 dated
July 24, 2002 and Complaint-Affidavit31 dated March 5, 2003. She attended several
clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic
notes32 of the hearing held on October 11, 2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon
as her assailant, and the specific time and place of the incident. She also claimed that she
bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support of her contentions, presented the child and
her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi
which is the weakest of all defenses.

After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.33 Petitioner has categorically stated that Arzadon raped her, recounting
her ordeal in detail during the preliminary investigations. Taken with the other evidence
presented before the investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing
probable cause. It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require that the evidence would justify
conviction. 34

It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner
and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and
sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to
take the further step of examining the petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in
holding that petitioner’s absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of
interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the
same.

Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. 35 As it were, the
incidents of this case have been pending for almost five years without having even passed the
preliminary investigation stage. Suffice to say that the credibility of petitioner may be tested
during the trial where the respective allegations and defenses of the complainant and the
accused are properly ventilated. It is only then that the truth as to Arzadon’s innocence or guilt
can be determined.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
San Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and February 3, 2006 dismissing Criminal
Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Information in the said case is hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Manila is DIRECTED to take cognizance of the case and let the records thereof
be REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

10
 THIRD DIVISION
February 21, 2018
G.R. No. 196045
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD, Respondents
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It
is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall thus be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of the citizens; for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.1
2
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision, dated
22 September 2010, and Resolution,3 dated 11 March 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 77703. The CA affirmed the Omnibus Order, 4 dated 10 May 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified Search Warrant No. 01-
118.
THE FACTS
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBJ) Special Investigator Albert Froilan
Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant 5 before the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati
City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that respondents were
engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their employees would call
prospective clients abroad whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by
purchasing shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a
transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were actually purchased.
Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana's personal
account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents with
lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan averred
that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation
Code (SRC).6
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed H.
Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia; 7 the affidavits of respondents' former
employees who actually called clients abroad;8 the articles of incorporation of domestic
corporations used by respondents in their scheme; 9 and the sketch of the place sought to be
searched .10
On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63,
Makati City, issued Search Warrant No. 01-118, viz:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Search Warrant No. 01-118
TheFor:
Regulation Code) and Estafa (Art. 315,It RPC)
particularity.
-versus-
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD of 1908 88 Corporate Center,
Valero St., Makati City
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath the applicant NBI
[Special Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his witnesses RONNIE AROJADO
and MELANIE O. BATO, that there is probable cause to believe that AMADOR PASTRANA
and RUFINA ABAD have in their possession/control located in [an] office premises located at
1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City, as shown in the application for search
warrant the following documents, articles and items, to wit:
Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their
personal files; incorporation papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales
agreements with clients; copies of official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from the
clients; copies of credit advise from the banks; clients['] message slips; company brochures;
letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal assets of Amador Pastrana; list of clients
and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the
SEC.which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day of the premises
above-described and forewith seize and take possession thereof and bring said documents,
articles and items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their search within the validity of the
warrant.
This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this Date. 11
Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same. The search was
witnessed by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Denna, Chief Security Officer and Building
Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate Center. Pursuant to the Return, 12 dated 2 April
2001, and the Inventory Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were able to seize the
following:
1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:
a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;
b. List of brokers and 201 files;
c. Sales agreements;
d. Official receipts;
e. Credit advise;
f. Fax messages;
g. Clients message slips;
h. Company brochures;
i. Letterheads; and
j. Envelopes.
2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;
3. Offshore incorporation papers;
4. Lease contracts; and
5. Vouchers/ledgers.
On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it
was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other
for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of
criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause
in connection with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe
with specificity the objects to be seized.14
On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the search warrant,
respondent Abad moved for the inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse
of three (3) months without action on the motion to quash clearly showed Judge Salvador, Jr.
's aversion to passing judgment on his own search warrant. 15
In an Order,16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from
the case. Hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.
The Regional Trial Court Ruling
In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and
void because it violated the requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection
with one specific offense only. It added that the SRC alone punishes various acts such that
one would be left in limbo divining what specific provision was violated by respondents; and
that even estafa under the RPC contemplates multifarious settings. The RTC further opined
that the search warrant and the application thereto as well as the inventory submitted
thereafter were all wanting in particularization. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, 2001 is hereby QUASHED
and NULLIFIED. All documents, articles and items seized are hereby ordered to be
RETURNED to petitioner/accused. Any and all items seized, products of the illegal search are
INADMISSIBLE in evidence and cannot be used in any proceeding for whatever purpose. The
petition to cite respondent SEC and NBI officers for contempt of court is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal before the
CA.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It declared
that Search "Warrant No. 01-118 clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense, because
the application failed to specify what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type
of estafa was committed by respondents. The appellate court observed that the application for
search warrant never alleged that respondents or their corporations were not SEC-registered
brokers or dealers, contrary to petitioner's allegation that respondents violated Section 28.1 of
the SRC which makes unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks in a dealer or broker
capacity without the requisite SEC registration.
CA Violation of R.A. 8799 (The
further pronounced that theSecurities
subject search warrant failed to pass the test of
reasoned that the inclusion of the phrase "other showing that these companies
acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" rendered the warrant all-embracing
as it subjected any and all records of respondents inside the office premises to seizure and the
implementing officers effectively had unlimited discretion as to what property should be seized.
The CA disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Omnibus Order
dated May 10, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its resolution,
dated 11 March 2011. Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER WHICH QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 CONSIDERING
THAT:
I.
READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT GAERLAN'S APPLICATION FOR A
SEARCH WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 SHOW THAT SAID WARRANT
WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 28.1 OF
R.A. NO. 8799.
II.
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED
THEREIN WHICH SHOW A REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING AS
STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LICENSE FROM THE SEC. THE IMPUGNED
STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF ITEMS DID NOT INTEND
TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE
"SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL
REGISTRATION WITH THE SEC."19
Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined that
the punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including or are necessarily
included in the other; that operating and acting as stockbrokers without the requisite license
infringe Section 28.1 of the SRC; that these specific acts of defrauding another by falsely
pretending to possess power or qualification of being a stockbroker similarly
constitute estafa under Article 315 of the RPC; and that both Section 28.1 of the SRC and
Article 315 of the RPC penalize the act of misrepresentation, an element common to both
offenses; thus, the issuance of a single search warrant did not violate the "one specific offense
rule."20
Petitioner further contends that the subject search warrant is not a general warrant because
the items listed therein show a reasonable nexus to the offense of acting as stockbrokers
without the required license from the SEC; that the statement "and other showing that these
11
companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" did not render the
warrant void; and that the words "and other" only intend to emphasize that no technical
description could be given to the items subject of the search warrant because of the very
nature of the offense.21
In their comment,22 respondents counter that the lower court was correct in ruling that the
subject warrant was issued in connection with more than one specific offense; that estafa and
violation of the SRC could not be considered as one crime because the former is punished
under the RPC while the latter is punished under a special law; that there are many violations
cited in the SRC that there can be no offense which is simply called "violation of R.A. No.
8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes of estafa which could be committed through
at least 10 modes, each one of them having elements distinct from those of the other modes.
Respondents assert that Search Warrant No. 01-118 does not expressly indicate that the
documents, articles, and items sought to be seized thereunder are subjects of the offense,
stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense; that it is a general warrant because it enumerates
every conceivable document that may be found in an office setting; that, as a result, it is
entirely possible that in the course of the search for the articles and documents generally listed
in the search warrant, those used and intended for legitimate purposes may be included in the
seizure; that the concluding sentence in the subject warrant "and other showing that these
companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" is a characteristic of a
general warrant; and that it allows the raiding team unbridled latitude in determining by
themselves what items or documents are evidence of the imputation that respondents and the
corporations they represent are violating their registration with the SEC. 23
In its reply,24 petitioner avers that the validity of a search warrant may be properly evaluated by
examining both the warrant itself and the application on which it was based; that the acts
alleged in the application clearly constitute a transgression of Section 28.1 of the SRC; and
that the nature of the offense for which a search warrant is issued is determined based on the
factual recital of the elements of the subject crime therein and not the formal designation of the
crime itself in its caption.
THE COURT'S RULING
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal liberty
and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. 25
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for
the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill),26 the Court stressed two points
which must be considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the judge; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.27 Moreover, in Stonehill, on account
of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants
involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court by providing
that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense."
The search warrant must be issued for one specific offense.
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be
issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one
specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant.28 In search warrant
proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 29
In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which were issued for
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," stated:
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as alleged in the aforementioned
applications - without reference to any determinate provision of said laws; or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the socalled general warrants. It is not difficult
to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels
that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. 30
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez, 31 the Court further ruled:
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether an
offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the personal
properties that may be subject of the search warrant are very much intertwined with the "one
specific offense" requirement of probable cause. The only way to determine whether a warrant
should issue in connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and
circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements of the offense that are alleged to
support the search warrant.
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of
applying for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for
an offense for which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must
satisfy himself that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts and
circumstances relating to this specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued
In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The
Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33 First, violation of the SRC is not
an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said law such as
manipulation of security prices,34 insider trading,35 acting as dealer or broker without being
registered with the SEC,36 use of unregistered exchange,37 use of unregistered clearing
agency,38 and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and
dealers39 among others. Even the charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for
there are three ways of committing the said crime: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent
means. The three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of
abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be easily
discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.
Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the validity of search warrants issued
for violation of R.A. No. 6425 or the then Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
In Olaes v. People,40 even though the search warrant merely stated that it was issued in
connection with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Court did not nullify the same for it was clear
in the body that it was issued for the specific offense of possession of illegal narcotics, viz:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with
Violation of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly
recited in the text thereof that [t]here is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie
and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, [have] in their
possession and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and
other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the
offense stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed
as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement
in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.41 (emphasis supplied)
In People v. Dichoso,42 the search warrant was also for violation of R.A. No. 6425, without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated. The Court upheld the validity of the
warrant:
Appellants' contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He
engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for
more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three
(3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal
possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is
pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class
or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.43 (emphases supplied)
Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit,44 the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), the Court held that while "illegal possession of
firearms is penalized under Section I of P .D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is
penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of
the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal
possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same
species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under
P.D. No. 1866."45
The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its failure to specify
what particular provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01-
118 also covered estafa under the RPC. Even the application for the search warrant merely
stated:
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees scattered throughout their
numerous companies call prospective clients abroad and convince them to buy shares of
stocks in a certain company likewise based abroad. Once the client is convinced to buy said
shares of stocks, he or she is advised to make a telegraphic transfer of the money supposedly
intended for the purchase of the stocks. The transfer is made to the account of the company
which contacted the client. Once the money is received, the same is immediately withdrawn
and brought to the treasury department of the particular company. The money is then counted
and eventually allocated to the following: 42% to Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7% for
the redeeming clients (those with small accounts and who already threatened the company
with lawsuits), 10% for the cost of sales and 8% goes to marketing. No allocation is ever made
to buy the shares of stocks.46
Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a codification of
various rules and regulations governing securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is
a clear delineation between use and possession of illegal drugs, the offenses punishable under
the SRC could not be lumped together in categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what
particular provision of the SRC was violated.
Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118, petitioner insists that
the warrant was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall
engage in the business of buying or selling securities in the Philippines as a broker or dealer,
or act as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or dealer unless registered as
such with the Commission." However, despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a provision of
the SRC which respondents allegedly violated, Search Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null
and void. The allegations in the application for search warrant do not indicate that respondents
acted as brokers or dealers without prior registration from the SEC which is an essential
element to be held liable for violation of Section 28.l of the SRC. It is even worthy to note that
Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to Quash, 47 dated 5 April
2002.
In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was specified in the
application for search warrant, there could have been no finding of probable cause in
connection with that offense. In People v. Hon. Estrada,48 the Court pronounced:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that
could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary
especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense
charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case - and
such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce
the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant
must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of
requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and
personalities.49 (emphasis supplied)
12
Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the
license to operate as brokers or dealers.1âшphi1 Such circumstance only reinforces the view
that at the time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what offense
to charge respondents with.

Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so
intertwined with each other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the
one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each other and neither
one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former
constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.50

The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or third person. 51 On the other hand, Section
28.1 of the SRC penalizes the act of performing dealer or broker functions without registration
with the SEC. For such offense, defrauding another and causing damage and prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation are not essential elements. Thus, a person who is found liable
of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC.
In the same manner, a person acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may be held
liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
is ma/um prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent,
whereas estafa is ma/um in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is
necessary.

Finally, the Court's rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA (Columbia)52 and Laud v. People
(Laud)53 even militate against petitioner. In Columbia, the Court ruled that a search warrant
which covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule, viz:

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant
uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to be confused
with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the
one-specific-offense rule.54

In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it was issued only for one
specific offense - that is, for Murder, albeit for six (6) counts.

In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state one specific
offense. It included violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several penal
provisions and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.

Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one
specific offense.

Reasonable particularity of the description of the things to be seized

It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable
particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law
enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus
prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. It is
not, however, required that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. 55

In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 56 it was pointed out that one of the tests to
determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is
when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.57

In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal property may be the subject of a
search warrant: (i) the subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. 58

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense
alleged committed by respondents. Consequently, it could not have been possible for the
issuing judge as well as the applicant for the search warrant to determine that the items sought
to be seized are connected to any crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was
issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and
items enumerated in the search warrant failed the test of particularity. The terms used in this
warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of
respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other
showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" does
not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was indeed issued for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations'
certificate of registration with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as
brokers or dealers.

In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one
offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2010 Decision and 11 March 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

13
 Republic of the Philippines It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure.
SUPREME COURT Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
Manila discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

EN BANC Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO contempt of court or perjury.
L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
AQUINO, respondents. requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988 But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
MANILA, respondents. waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL
OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge
of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because
of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts
and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence
of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely
abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R.
Nos. 82827 and 83979.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R.
RESOLUTION Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April
26, 1988 is LIFTED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
PER CURIAM: Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated
and clarified in this resolution.

14
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents.
William C. Arceno for petitioner.
Casibang, Perello and De Dios for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks the review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 rejecting his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution, as well as its prohibition
against deprivation of property without due process of law. There is no controversy as to the
facts. We quote:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the
City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary
Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila,
seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along
Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published
and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants
and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine
which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
By order dated December 8, 1 983 the Court set the hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction on December 14,1983 and ordered the defendants to show cause not later than
December 13, 1983 why the writ prayed for should not be granted.
On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining
order. against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor
Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order on December 14, 1983.
In his Answer and Opposition filed on December 27,1983 defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted
the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials on December 1 and 3, 1983, but
claimed that the said materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police
authorities, and that the said confiscation and seizure was (sic) undertaken pursuant to P.D.
No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
In opposing the plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminary injunction, defendant pointed out
that in that anti- smut campaign conducted on December 1 and 3, 1983, the materials
confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered
their reading materials, and that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 5,1984, plaintiff filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants and/or their
agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial
finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not".
The restraining order issued on December 14,1983 having lapsed on January 3,1984, the
plaintiff filed an urgent motion for issuance of another restraining order, which was opposed by
defendant on the ground that issuance of a second restraining order would violate the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 11, 1983, providing for the Interim Rules
Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which provides that a temporary
restraining order shall be effective only for twenty days from date of its issuance.
On January 9, 1984 defendant filed his Comment and/or Rejoinder Memorandum in support of
his opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January
16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy
Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are
obscence per se or not".
On January 16, 1984, the Court issued an order granting plaintiffs motion to be given three
days "to file a reply to defendants' opposition dated January 9, 1984, serving a copy thereof to
the counsel for the defendants, who may file a rejoinder within the same period from receipt,
after which the issue of Preliminary Injunction shall be resolved".
Plaintiff's supplemental Memorandum was filed on January 18, 1984. Defendant filed his
Comment on plaintiff s supplemental Memorandum on January 20, 1984, and plaintiff filed his
"Reply-Memorandum" to defendants' Comment on January 25, 1984.
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion
for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. 2
The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among other things, as follows:
We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of allegedly
obscene publications or materials deserves close scrutiny because of the constitutional
guarantee protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and the protection
afforded by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art.IV). It
must be equally conceded, however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint as the
state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications (Sec. I , Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No.
969). Also well settled is the rule that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, (People vs.
Malesugui 63 Phil. 22) or search is an incident to an arrest, (People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169;
Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637) or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure (See Papa vs.
Magno, 22 SCRA 857).3
The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding
that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate
petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding
that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what
was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of
preliminary injunction.4
The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to pronounce
what "obscene" means or what makes for an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on,
in People vs. Kottinger,5 the Court laid down the test, in determining the existence of
obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave
or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." 6 "Another test,"
so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as
an indecency. " 7 Kottinger hastened to say, however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, 8 and that ultimately, the question
is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." 9
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, succeeded merely in
generalizing a problem that has grown increasingly complex over the years. Precisely, the
question is: When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be
offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to beg the question to say that a piece of
literature has a corrupting influence because it is obscene, and vice-versa.
Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same breath, it would
leave the final say to a hypothetical "community standard" — whatever that is — and that the
question must supposedly be judged from case to case.
About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a prosecution under
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go Pin, was also even hazier:
...We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are
shown in art exhibit and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by
people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in
question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other
words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the
cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been
the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if
the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing
so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art
exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous
of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the
youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves
from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures. 11
xxx xxx xxx
As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been
drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in
question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," 12 the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
It was People v. Padan y Alova ,13 however, that introduced to Philippine jurisprudence the
"redeeming" element that should accompany the work, to save it from a valid prosecution. We
quote:
...We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of
still or moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have
condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those
cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of
art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors
might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the
human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux
vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts
of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no
room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated
obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and
causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a
corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. ...14
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions than answers. For one thing, if the
exhibition was attended by "artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art
exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes," 15 could the same
legitimately lay claim to "art"? For another, suppose that the exhibition was so presented that
"connoisseurs of [art], and painters and sculptors might find inspiration," 16 in it, would it cease
to be a case of obscenity?
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin also leaves too much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has
permitted an ad lib of Ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as to what is obscene and
what is art.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,17 the Court, following trends in the
United States, adopted the test: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest."18 Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it
measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated
passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary
community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook
moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity continues to journey
from development to development, which, states one authoritative commentator (with ample
sarcasm), has been as "unstable as it is unintelligible." 19
Memoirs v. Massachusettes,20 a 1966 decision, which characterized obscenity as one "utterly
without any redeeming social value,"21 marked yet another development.
The latest word, however, is Miller v. California,22 which expressly
abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," 23 to wit: "(a) whether 'the
average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
15
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 24
(A year later, the American Supreme Court decided Hamling v. United States 25 which
repeated Miller, and Jenkins v. Georgia, 26 yet another reiteration of Miller. Jenkins, curiously,
acquitted the producers of the motion picture, Carnal Knowledge, in the absence of "genitals"
portrayed on screen, although the film highlighted contemporary American sexuality.)
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been
attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the
problem .27 Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the
guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions
among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to
society. And "[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has reached a state
of rest, or that it will ever do so until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech
nonetheless, although it is subject — as in all speech — to regulation in the interests of
[society as a whole] — but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how human sexuality should
be regarded and portrayed."28
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of
police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut
simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop,
adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What
shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present
generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works are
considered important literature today.29 Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned from public
exhibition but now adorns the world's most prestigious museums.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we
said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded
the problem rather than resolved it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been,
an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We share Tribe's
disappointment over the discouraging trend in American decisional law on obscenity as well as
his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in sight.
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a "perfect"
definition of "obscenity", if that is possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct
faced with the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition.
However, this much we have to say.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although
not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the
exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference
and action.30 But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing,31 "the burden to show the existence
of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on the. . . authorit[ies]." 32
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence
of such clear and present danger."33 "It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or
censorship that the ... authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public
welfare, peace or safety may require."34
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the
clear and present danger test."35
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a solution-so
only we may arrive at one-but rather as a serious attempt to put the question in its proper
perspective, that is, as a genuine constitutional issue.
It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional issues, mainly, due
process and illegal search and seizure.
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the
presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate
the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to
justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech).
It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and
present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that ... freedom of the press is not without restraint, as
the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals."36 Neither do we. But it brings us back to square one: were the "literature" so
confiscated "pornographic"? That we have laws punishing the author, publisher and sellers of
obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960
and P.D. No. 969),"37 is also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found
guilty under the statute?
The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license
to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon,38 We defined police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare ." 39 Presidential Decrees
Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves,
authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the
decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the
Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for
implementation. We quote:
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. — The disposition of
the literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings, or
other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1
hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be governed by the
following rules:
(a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the
Government to be destroyed.
(b) Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree
results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles
involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art.
201) hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the
government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted
by the Chief of Constabulary.
(c) The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of
Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a
copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of National
Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National
Defense shall be final and unappealable. (Sec. 2, PD No, 960 as
amended by PD No. 969.)
Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. — Additional penalties shall be
imposed as follows:
1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who
allows the violations of Section I hereof, the penalty as provided
herein shall be imposed in the maximum period and, in addition, the
accessory penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall likewise be imposed .40
Under the Constitution, on the other hand:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise,
they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 43 We
counter-minded the orders of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises
of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant.
We have greater reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a
warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no
different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech,
whether political or "obscene".
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules
then prevailing), provide:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of personarrested. — A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.44
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest,
and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor
are such charges being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the
Revised Penal Code.
We reject outright the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which
would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no
warrant," 45 and that "violation of penal law [must] be punished." 46 For starters, there is no
"accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Second, to say that the respondent
Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a
lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is
to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this
is the very complaint of the petitioner.
We make this resume.
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
"obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed
for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the
properties seized are indeed "obscene".
These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or
remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code" 47 or the Revised Penal code .48
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. It appearing, however, that the magazines subject of the search and seizure
ave been destroyed, the Court declines to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is
moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
16
 Republic of the Philippines demand the return of the documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the
SUPREME COURT petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not
Manila constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a
submission to the authority of the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol., I, p. 630.) As the
constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
EN BANC not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
G.R. No. L-45950 June 20, 1938 the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181.)

LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, petitioner, As a general proposition, it may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a failure to object
vs. within a reasonable time to a search and seizure illegally made. It must be observed, however,
DIEGO LOCSIN, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac, that the petitioner, on several occasions, and prior to the filing of criminal actions against her,
FELIX IMPERIAL, Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, and the ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents. had demanded verbally, through counsel, the return by the Anti-Usuary Board of the properties
seized. This is admitted by Adolfo N. Feliciano, acting chief of the board, who said that the
demand was refused simply because no habiamos terminado con nuestra investigacion.
Benigo S. Aquino and Marcial P. Lichauco for petitioner (T.s.n., pp. 24-25.) On July 7, 1936, counsel for the petitioner wrote a letter to the Anti-Usuary
Adolfo N. Feliciano for the respondent Anti-Usury Board. Board demanding again the return of the documents withheld. And in connection with the
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for other respondents. criminal cases pending against the petitioner, similar demands were made on January 7, 1937
and on June 4, 1937. In the light of these circumstances, we find that the petitioner did not
waive her constitutional right. The delay in making demand for the return of the documents
LAUREL, J.: seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication.

This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant and In view of the foregoing, the writ prayed for is granted. The search warrant, Exhibit B, is hereby
two orders of the respondent judge, and the restoration of certain documents alleged to have declared void and of no effect; the orders of October 5, 1937 and January 3, 1938 of the
been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board. respondent judge are set aside; and the respondents Anti-Usuary Board and the provincial
fiscal of Tarlac or those acting in their behalf, are hereby ordered to return and restore to the
petitioner all the properties, documents, papers and effects illegally seized from her, within
It appears that on November 10, 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, forty-eight (48) hours from the time this decision becomes final. Without costs. So ordered.
obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant(Exhibit B)
commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at
Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda "that he has and there (is) just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that
Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain
books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all
of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, the
said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the
office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the
petitioner's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill
and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and
a locked filing cabinet containing several Papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to
the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, six
separate criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On
several occasions, after seizure, the petitioner, through counsel, demanded from the
respondent Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized. On January 7. and, by
motion, on June 4, 1937, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the
petitioner in the six criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By
resolution of October 5, 1937, the respondent Judge of First Instance denied the petitioner's
motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver
on the part of the petitioner. "En el caso presente," declared the respondent judge, "teniendo
en cuenta que la acusada Por si o por medio de su representante, no presento protests alguna
contra el registro de autos, at verificarse el mismo, o despues de un tiempo rezonable, el
juzgado declare que la citada con su silencio y conducta, ha renunciado implicitanmente a su
derecho a no ser sometido a un registro irrazonable, por lo que no le es pemitido quejarse
despues, puesto que cualquier defecto queha adolecido lo expedicion de la orden de registro y
su ejecucion, ha quidado implilcitamente subsanado." A motion for reconsideration was
presented but was denied by order of January 3, 1938. Petitioner registered her exception.
The resolution of October 5, 1937 and the order of January 3, 1938 are sought, together with
the search warrant, Exhibit B, to be nullified in these proceedings.

Paragraph 3, section 1 of the bill of right of our Constitution provides as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a
search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in
the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These
requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure (G. O. No. 58), particularly
with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the
officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court (secs. 102-104). On
more than one occasion, since the approval of the Constitution, we had emphasized the
necessity of adherence to the constitutional requirements on this subject (Alvarez vs. Court of
First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 1183; People vs. Sy Juco
[1937], G.R. No. 41957; Rodriguez vs. Villamiel [1937], G.R. No. 44328; and Molo vs. Yatco
[1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1935) and we do not deem it necessary to reiterate what has been said or
observed in these cases.

In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself
but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent
Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and
his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be
sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the
meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the
warrant, as required by law. (See, secs. 95 and 104, G. O. No. 58.) instead, they were turned
over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against the
petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending
against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration
purposes is not without basis. The lower court is, therefore, correct in reaching the conclusion
that the search warrant (Exhibit B) was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac.

The important question presented is whether upon the facts and under the circumstances of
the present case, there has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures. While the Solicitor-General admits that, in the
light of decisions of this court, the search warrant was illegally issued, he maintains "(1) that
the petitioner had waived her constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search and
seizure, and (2) that the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made
after an unreasonable length of time after the date of seizure." Doubtless, the constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. (People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 34 Off. Gaz., pp. 2163, 2164; 56 C.J., pp. 1178, 1179;
Cf. Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, supra.) The waiver may be either express or implied (67 C.J., p.
304). No express waiver has been made in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there
has been a waiver by implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional
right, it must appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (67 C. J., 299.) It is true that the petitioner
did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could not have objected
because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas.
Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. (56 C. J., p. 1183.) Of course, the
petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But this
was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to

17
 SECOND DIVISION and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be
[G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984.] in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the
examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the
SORIANO MATA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her capacity as required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.cralawnad
Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES and REYNALDO
MAYOTE, Respondents. The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment
of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety &
Valeriano R. Ocubillo for Petitioner. Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. — Under the Constitution
"no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and
detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which
provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH; CASE AT BAR. — Nothing can
justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. Thus, in
issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. In the case at bar, the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALTHOUGH ILLEGAL, THINGS SEIZED CANNOT BE RETURNED; CASE AT
BAR. — While the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered.
In Castro v. Pabalan (70 SCRA 478), it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does
not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the
exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government." 6
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured
by the Constitution. 7 No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be
ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not
call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the
motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion
for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal.
Notwithstanding such illegality, the things seized under such warrant, such as stock of
"masiao" tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao" numbers;
stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by
petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION

DE CASTRO, J.:
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged
by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.

Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based
merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which
were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent
Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the
necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal
Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai
Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court." The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of
the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that
the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District
II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents
relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case
is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. 2 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having
been denied, he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this
Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such
warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4
of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine
on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious
by petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers
connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same
from the lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any
certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he
filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was
furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but
which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims
that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show
also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent
Judge’s own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that
"she did not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to
hold a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the
persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations
somewhere else.

Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that
as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable
disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.

Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures
every man, woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends
meet justifies her action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal
"masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is
done usually and publicly in the court room.

Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to
describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense
the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a
judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is
the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a
commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross
interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions propounded
to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon
the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to
believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law,

18
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben
del Castillo assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated December 13,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3
o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud
St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from
the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure
of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second
floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they will
implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed
that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house.
Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the
entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the
subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner
named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently,
the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory
examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information 5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, did then and there have in his possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline
powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any
competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not
guilty.7 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit
Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo,
Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the
electrical wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at
Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening,
but he was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was able to go
home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife that police
operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20
meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older
brother and was used as a storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas
Boy Castillo," GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6)
Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum
of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31
gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated
and shall be destroyed in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED,
with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this
Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following
arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4)
PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE
FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT
SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT
THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM
ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID
NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER AND
THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND
THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE
ELEMENT OF "POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
HAD THE SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION,
IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN
PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009,
enumerated the following counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of
Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence
against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. 11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering
that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge
of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the
application of the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner,
aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section
14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and
convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or
representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away
from his house is no longer within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the police
officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as
one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government
authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded
paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed
to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited
and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a
particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in
violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.12 According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search
warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.13 A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. 14 The judge, in
determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to
him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,15 and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to
disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.17 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to
be seized are in the place sought to be searched. 18 A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized
in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched
to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-
9-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to
be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters
away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place
other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that,
assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who
discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty
19
against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.

A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they
asked the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?

Fiscal Centino:
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.

Q For how long did the chase take place?

Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?

A Just a very few moments.

A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw
that Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?

Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.

A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?

Q What did you do afterwards, if any?

A Yes.

A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?

Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
A Nelson Gonzalado.

A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get? store and furthermore the door was open.

A Two. Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

Q What happened after that? A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.

A We searched the house, but we found negative. xxxx

Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house? Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?

A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing. A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q What about you, where were you? Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other
persons or other person that followed after Masnayon?

A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.

A Then we followed suit.

Q What about the barangay tanod?

Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?

A Together with Milo and Pogoso.

A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.

Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?
Q What about you?

A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his
shop, so we searched his shop. A I also followed suit.

Q Who were with you when you searched the shop? Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?

A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded
Dolly del Castillo. paper which contained four shabu deck.

Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper?
Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?

A We were side by side because the shop was very small.22

A Yes.

SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:

Q What happened at the shop?

FISCAL CENTINO:
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.

Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?

Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?

A At his residence, the two-storey house.

A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.

Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence of
Q Was that the only item? the accused?

A There are others like the foil, scissor. A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?
shop?

A Negative, no shabu.
A Yes.21

Q And what happened afterwards, if any?

The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were
actually seized were found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2
Arriola, thus: A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.

FISCAL: Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?

Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took
place? A It is a nipa hut.

A We cordoned the area. Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen? A 5 to 10 meters.

A We waited for the barangay tanod. Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?

20
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo. A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut? Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?

A I was just outside the nipa hut. A I was just outside the nipa hut.33

Q And who among the team went inside? However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical
shop but denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:

A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23

ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?
agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in
authority and agents of persons in authority as:
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.

x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of

some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A Yes.

A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent

authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and Q How big is the structure?
security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay
leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed
an agent of a person in authority. A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side is
a structure rented by a couple.34

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of
a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government
Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in
each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and
charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and
property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any
barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed
agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were
acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search
conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence,
petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of
the regulated drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence
of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. 35 With
the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion,
there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to
start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.37 1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No.
27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter
has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, 24 unless attended with
arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are
accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal 25 as in the present case.

It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A.
6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements
must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person
is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge
that the said drug is a regulated drug.26

In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:

This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion
over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another. 28

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellant’s control or possession. 29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. 30 The records are void
of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established
that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that
petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner
being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution by the
investigating prosecutor, thus:

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such,

conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is
actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said
structure.31

In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to
the ownership of the structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct
testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of
petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the
electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:

FISCAL CENTINO:

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?

A It is a nipa hut.

Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A 5 to 10 meters.

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?

21
G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
1
This is an appeal from the decision, dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of
§16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing
him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,
000.00. Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on
December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged: That on or
about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license
and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW .2 In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW ,3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty4 whereupon he was
tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic
chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field
operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant 5 in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert
Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1
Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams
of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua
saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The
application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L.
Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house.7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group
started searching the house.8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in
newsprint9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. 10 A receipt of the items seized
was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. 12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. 13 The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with
a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On
the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850
grams, were found to be marijuana.14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated
by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to
leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house.
Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and
descended through an opening in the roof. 15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. 16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money,
a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry , and canned goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on
accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where
accused-appellant was detained.18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano
testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods
and other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks
are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence
custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau
of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE(SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSSED-APPELLANT FOR
VIOLATION §8, R.A. No. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE
FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that
the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third,
the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.22 Nothing can justify the
issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant rea5
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is
probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his
premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex "A", the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA which should be
seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with
sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the
search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of
drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial
court.23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who
acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant
on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A -Yes, sir.
Q – Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A – Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan
St., San Jose Quezon City, Sir.
Q – Do You know the person who occupies the specific place?
A – Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – Are you familiar with that place?
22
A – Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the
former.
Q – In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A – When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir .
Q – Were you able to buy at that time?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A – I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir .
Q – Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the
stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A – Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q – How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A – When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I
saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q – Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A – Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert
is genuine shabu?
A – After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office
and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12, grams of
shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP
Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result
for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-
414-95 dated 19 December 95.
Q – Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A – Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to
buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q – Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A – Yes, sir.24
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that
none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,25 the warrant properly
described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid
as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though
proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective
with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the
authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of
obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered
illegal by the defects concerning other articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to suggest that
invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We
recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in
character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale
seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be
upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could
not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.27 It will suffice to
quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with
"Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly
recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias
'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No.628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their
session and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense
stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed,
there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for
the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of
Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of
"dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He
engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for
more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three
(3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal
possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is
pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class
or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P .D. No.1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the
ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which
punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under §1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under §3
thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant
was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularly of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
.....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City,"
the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.160 contained
several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for
search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No.7
and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which
described the premises as "a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose,
Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact,
the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of Police Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the
same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end
of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably
appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first
ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually
started their operation.32
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched.33 For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a
building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that
there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made
determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was
occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass."34 In this case,
the location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can
be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.1âwphi1.nêt
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence,
Search Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground
that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first.
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can
no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been
explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused -and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search
incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within
his immediate control.18 The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person
arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence
and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether
prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its
recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been
recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify
their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic
bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
23
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the
NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents
of the bag had they not forcibly opened it; Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be
said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
"plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer .40

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he

undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. 41 In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that
the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain
view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.

Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 42 provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused admittance to the place
of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer
or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain
entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and
competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay
officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his
claim.

In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to
open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times.
Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These
circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on
the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of
possession of illegal drugs under §16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
Pl00,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial
court is AFFIRMED .

SO ORDERED.

24
G.R. No. 216922
JAYLORD DIMAL and ALLAN CASTILLO, Petitioners
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 27, 2014 and
Resolution2 dated February 4, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128355. The CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 87, which denied the Omnibus Motion (Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-
11, to Declare the Seized Items as Inadmissible in Evidence) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-12-
175369 to Q-12-175371.
The Facts
At around 6:00 p.m. of September 6, 2010, Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio
were scheduled to visit the compound of petitioner Jaylord A. Dimal in Echague, Isabela, to
negotiate for the sale of palay. At around 7:30 p.m., Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to
Dimal's compound, asking for information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie and
Gemma. Dimal informed Edison that they had left an hour ago. Unable to locate his relatives,
Edison went to the police station in Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were missing, then
proceeded to seek assistance from the police station in Echague.
Thereafter, Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound, where they allegedly
stayed and observed the premises in the absence ofDimal until September 7, 2010. On even
date at around 5:30 a.m., Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched without a
warrant Dimal's compound, but found no evidence linking him to the disappearances.
On September 24, 2010, petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the Echague Police, and
allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killing of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. On
September 25, 2010, a certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement
made by Castillo. Sapipi purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the
three victims, and ordered him, Castillo and one Michael Miranda to cover up the crime by
throwing the bodies in a river.
On September 26, 2010, Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. On September 27, 2010,
the Echague Police filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, a
criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Dimal, Castillo,
Sapipi, Miranda, Marvin Guiao and Robert Baccay.
On October 8, 2010, Police Inspector (P/lnsp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, a commissioned officer
of the Philippine National Police assigned with the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response in Camp Crame Quezon City, filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search
Warrant4 before the R TC Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, in connection with the kidnapping and
multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma.
In his application for search warrant, P/Insp. Malixi stated that "he was informed, and verily
believed that JA YLORD ARIZABAL DIMAL @ JAY, 28 years old, a resident of Felix Gumpal
Compound, Ipil Junction, Isabela and CMJ Building Dubinan East, Santiago City, has in control
of the following items" in the said address, to wit:
a. Personal belongings such as:
1. Driver's License of Lucio Pua;
2. Alien Certificate of Registration Identification cards of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua;
3. ATM Cards such as BDO under Lucio Pua's accounts;
4. Deposit Slips in BDO accounts of Lucio Pua;
5. Receipts of the palay delivered;
6. Blood-stained clothes of the victims:
6.1 Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants;
6.2 Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo shirt;
6.3 Gemma Eugenio y Estrada's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, black striped t-
shirt and a shoulder bag;
6.4 Polo t-shirt and faded pink jacket seen beside the comfort room inside the compound of the
warehouse of Jayson Dimal.
7. Picture of Shaira Mae Eugenio's youngest sister (Queen Sean Eugenio) seen inside the
shoulder bag of the victim, Gemma Eugenio.
b. 1,600 sacks of palay inside a warehouse found in the Felix Gumpal Compound, Ipil
Junction, Echague, Isabela;
c. Long bolo approximately 16 inches in length; and
d. Glock 9mm caliber pistol. 5
P/Insp. Malixi stressed that he has personally verified and ascertained the veracity of the
information and found the same to be true and correct, as narrated and sworn to by Ernesto
Villador, a long-time employee of Dimal, Edison Uy Pua, the nephew of the victims Lucio and
Rosemarie Pua, and Shaira Mae Eugenio, daughter of the victim Gemma Eugenio. P/Insp.
Malixi claimed that the application was founded on his personal knowledge and that of his
witnesses, acquired after conducting surveillance and investigation. P/Insp. Malixi attached to
the application as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D" the Vicinity/Location and Floor Map.
After the hearing of the application on October 8, 2010, Judge Bonifacio T. Ong of the RTC of
Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, issued a Search Warrant, which reads:
The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the form of questions and answers
in writing and [under oath], the applicant Police Senior Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the
witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and Ernesto Villador, who all
collaborated to the fact of death of Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in
Echague, Isabela. That witness Edison Pua went to the house of Jaylord Dimal after the
commission of the crime and was able to see the blood-stained clothes of the victims:
1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and
2) [Rosemarie] Pua's clothes;
On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her mother Gemma Eugenio left
her house, she wore faded pink long sleeves jacket and black T-shirt, and brought with her a
shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which probably are in the house of Jaylord Dimal. In the
case of Ernesto Villador, he testified that he saw Jay lord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol
and testified that he usually keep said firearm under the computer table or drawers. He
likewise testify (sic) that there were 1,600 sacks of palay sold by the victims and brought to the
Felix Gumpal Compound.
With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang Salaysay and deposition of
witness, it would readily show that there is probable cause to believe that in the house,
particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jay lord Dimal located at Ipil Junction, Echague,
Isabela, said items, to wit: blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1,600 sacks of palay inside the
warehouse in the Felix Gumpal Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.
The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this Court due to compelling reasons
for security and confidentiality purposes, considering that possibility of leakages of information
once the application for search warrant is filed with the court within the area having territorial
jurisdiction over it.
In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any time of the day or night the
premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and forthwith
seize and take possession of the following properties: blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua,
Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just to photograph
the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to bring the said articles to the custody of the
Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela under custodia legis, to
be dealt with according to law.6
In the Return on the Search Warrant, P/Insp. Gary Halay-ay Macadangdang, Deputy Chief of
Police, Echague Police Station, Echague, Isabela," manifested that (1) Search Warrant No. 10-
11 was served at the premises of Dimal at Barangay Ipil, Echague, Isabela, on October 9,
2010 at about 9:00 a.m., and (2) the search was conducted in an orderly manner and in the
presence of owner/custodian Carlos Dimal, Barangay Captain Florencio Miguel, Barangay
Kagawads Rodolfo Vergara and Mariano Seriban, and BOMBO Radyo reporter Romy Santos.
P/Insp. Macadangdang enumerated the items recovered:
The following articles, subject of the warrant, were found by the said Office during the search:
a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM markings)
b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM markings)
c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-26 with JAM markings)
d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM
markings)
e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM markings)
f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM markings)
g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM markings)
h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with JAM markings)
i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)
The articles recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct of search are the following:
a. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)
b. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)
c. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)
d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM
markings)
e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM markings)
f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM markings)
g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM markings)
h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM markings)
i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM markings)
j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM markings)
k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM markings)
1. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM markings)
m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM markings)
25
 n. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and
Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio
Pua (mark as E-15 with JAM markings)
o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-18 with JAM markings)
p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM
markings)
q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)
r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM markings)
s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM markings)
t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as E-
27 with JAM markings)
u. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (mark as E-29 with JAM
markings)
v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM markings).7
On February 20, 2012, petitioners Dimal and Castillo, together with Michael Miranda, filed an
Omnibus Motion8 to quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 and to declare the seized items as
inadmissible in evidence. They argued that the search warrant is invalid because it was issued
in connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e., kidnapping and multiple
murder. They also contended that except for witness Ernesto Villador, applicant P/Insp. Malixi
and witnesses Edison and Shaira Mae have no personal knowledge surrounding the two
crimes committed; hence, their statements did not provide basis for a finding of probable
cause, much less for the issuance of a search warrant. With respect to Villador, petitioners
assert that his sworn statement is incredible because he is just an ordinary laborer, who is
unfamiliar with the English language, and there is no showing that the contents of his
statement were fully explained to him by the Judge who issued the search warrant. Petitioners
further posit that the search warrant was invalidly implemented because the raiding team failed
to comply with Section 8, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court on the requisite presence of two
witnesses during a search of premises, and with Section 10, Rule 126 on the issuance of a
receipt of seized properties. Finally, petitioners sought that the items seized which are not
covered by the search warrant, should be declared inadmissible in evidence and be ordered
returned to the accused.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2010, three (3) criminal Informations for Kidnapping for Ransom,
as defined and penalized under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, were filed against petitioners before the RTC of Echague, Isabela,
Branch 24, and later re-raffled to the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17. The accusatory
portion of the Informations similarly read, save for the names of the 3 victims, as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of September 2010, and for sometime thereafter, in the
Municipality of Echague, Province of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Jaylord Arizabal Dimas (sic) and Allan Castillo y Marquez, being
the principals therein, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, kidnap and detain one Lucio Uy Pua (Chinese
name: Xinyi Pan)9 for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of Fifty (50) million
pesos, from him and from his relatives.
That during his[/her] detention, the said accused, in pursuance of conspiracy, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and shot with a caliber 9mm pistol the
said Lucio Uy Pua10 which had directly caused his death and, thereafter, chopped his body
into several pieces and placed them into big plastic containers and ice box, and burned his
head and placed the same into a plastic bag, and threw the same on separate rivers located at
Santiago City and at the Province of Quirino.
That the accused Michael Miranda Genova alias Mike Miranda being an accessory, took part
in the subsequent commission of the crime by providing the vehicle and a container drum used
to dispose the chopped body of said Lucio Uy Pua11 and threw the same on the river, in order
to conceal the body of the crime, to prevent its discovery.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
Pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 12-1-18-RTC, the criminal cases were re-raffled to
Judge Aurora A. Hernandez-Calledo of the RTC of Quezon City, and re-docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. Q-12-175369, Q-12- 175370 to Q-12-175371.
In an Order13 dated September 28, 2012, the RTC of Quezon City denied the Motion to Quash
Search Warrant No. 10-11 for lack of merit. The RTC ruled that a perusal of the application for
search warrant reveals that it was issued by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, after conducting
searching and probing questions upon the persons of the applicant P/Insp. Malixi, and his
witnesses Edison, Shaira Mae and more particularly Villador, and finding probable cause
based on their personal knowledge. In rejecting the claim of unreasonableness of the
implementation of the search warrant, the R TC noted that the records show that the
owner/custodian of the property subject of the warrant by the name of Carlos Dimal, was
present, together with the Barangay Captain, two Barangay Kagawads, and a reporter
from Bomba Radyo.
Considering that no complaint was filed regarding the implementation of the search warrant,
and that a Certification of Orderly Search was issued by the barangay officials, the RTC
declared that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not
sufficiently contradicted. Anent the claim that the search warrant was not issued in connection
with a single offense but with the crimes of Kidnapping and Murder, the RTC said that the
nature of the case and the circumstances at the time the search warrant was applied for, justify
the issuance of such warrant as the two offenses are allied or closely related to each other
because it was reported to the applicant that the victims were kidnapped for ransom and
murdered. Finally, the RTC stressed that the claim that no return on the search warrant was
submitted must fail because such a return was issued by the executing officer, and was
marked as Exhibit "4" for the prosecution during the preliminary conference .
With the RTC's denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA.
In a Decision 14 dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the
subject search warrant was validly issued, thus:
A perusal of the records show that Judge Ong, through searching and probing questions,
personally examined the (sic) P/lnsp. Malixi and the witnesses, Edison Uy, Ernesto Villador
and Shaira Mae Eugenio, on 8 October 2010. The questions that Judge Ong propounded were
sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The facts narrated by the witnesses
while under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient justification
for the issuance of the subject search warrant.
Furthermore, the subject search warrant specifically designated or described Felix Gumpal
Compound, located at lpil Junction, Echague, Isabela as the place to be searched and
enumerated the articles to be seized.
Petitioners['] contention that the subject search warrant which was issued in connection with
two (2) separate offenses, Kidnapping and Murder, as indicated therein, cannot stand.
However, as aptly pointed out by the People through the Office of the Solicitor General, the
crimes of kidnapping and murder are interrelated and points to the commission of a single
complex crime known as kidnapping with murder. They cannot be treated as separate
crimes.15
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
February 4, 2015. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in failing to pass upon petitioners' allegations (1)
that the search warrant is void and its quashal impera1ive; and (2) that the items seized on the
basis of the void search warrant are inadmissible in evidence. They contend that the search
warrant was null and void because it was issued in connection with two unrelated offenses,
without a finding of probable cause, and without specifying the place to be searched and the
items to be seized.
Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-11 was validly issued, but most of the
items seized pursuant thereto are inadmissible in evidence, as they were neither particularly
described in the warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine".
At the outset, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search warrant was applied for
in connection with two unrelated offenses, i.e., kidnapping and murder, in violation of Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which requires that such warrant must be issued in relation to
one offense.
Suffice it to state that where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, there is only one special complex crime for which the last paragraph of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code provides the maximum penalty that shall be
imposed, i.e., death. 16 In People v. Larranaga, 17 the Court explained that this provision gives
rise to a special complex crime:
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex crime" of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was
merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in
the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed
under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
xxxx
x x x Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under
the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping
with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with
homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime." 18
There is no dispute that Search Warrant No. 10-11 was applied for and issued in connection
with the crime of kidnapping with murder. Asked by Judge Ong during the hearing as to what
particular offense was committed, search warrant applicant P/Insp. Malixi testified that Dimal
"allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua
and one Gemma Eugenio on September 6, 2010." 19 It is not amiss to add that a search
warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule.20
Neither can petitioners validly claim that the examining judge failed to ask searching questions,
and to consider that the testimonies of the applicant and his witnesses were based entirely on
hearsay, as they have no personal knowledge of the circumstances relating to the supposed
disappearance or murder of the 3 victims.
The Court explained in Del Castillo v. People21 the concept of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant:
x x x Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of
the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a
flexible totality of the circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no
position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search
warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to
be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
Corollarily, the Court said in Oebanda v. People22 that in an application for search warrant, the
mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full and searching examination of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. "The searching questions propounded to the applicant and
the witnesses must depend on a large extent upon the discretion of the judge. Although there
is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the
said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not merely routinary, general,
periphe.ial or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the intent and factual and legal
justifications for a search warrant. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the
averments stated in the affidavits/deposition of the applicant and the witnesses." 23
Having in mind the foregoing principles, the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in both
ruling that Judge Ong found probable cause to issue a search warrant after a searching and
probing personal examination of applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edison, Shaira
Mae and Villador. Their testimonies jointly and collectively show a reasonable ground to
believe that the 3 victims went to Dimal's compound to sell palay, but were probably killed by
Dimal, and that they may have left personal belongings within its premises.
26
During the hearing of his application for search warrant, Judge Ong was ab.le to elicit from A: They were already dead and their bodies were chopped into pieces, your Honor.
P/Insp. Malixi the specific crime allegedly committed by Dimal, the particular place to be
searched and items to be seized:
Q: And what did you do when you learned that they did not come back anymore?

[COURT:]
A: They were already dead and their bodies were chopped into pieces, your Honor.

Q: And in your application for Search Warrant, what particular place are you going to
search in this Search Warrant if ever it will be granted? Q: And what did you do when you learned that they were already dead and chopped into
pieces?

[P/INSP. MALIXI:]
A: We went to look for the pieces of the bodies because they said it was thrown to the
river, Your Honor.
A: According to the Opponent we are applying to search the Palay Buying Station of
Jaylord Dimal located at Felix Gumpal Compound, lpil, Echague, Isabela, and also to
search the back portion of a vacant lot within the Felix Gumpal Compound, Your Honor. Q: And what did you do after that?

Q: The particular place is Felix Gumpal Compound, in Echague, Isabela, no more? A: We went to the house of Jaylord, Your Honor.

A: No more, Your Honor. Q: And what did you do in the house of Jaylord?

Q: And what particular offense have this Jaylord Dimal committed, if any? A: We saw the T-shirt of my Uncle Lucio Pua and Ate Gemma, Your Honor.

A: He allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Q: Who is that Gemma?
Rosemarie Pua and one Gemma Eugenio on September 6, 2010, Your Honor.

A: My aunt, the one who canvass palay, your Honor.

Q: And what particular items are you going to search in that compound of Felix
Gumpal?
Q: What did you see in the house of Jaylord?

A: Subject of the offense, the personal belongings of the victims when they went to the Felix
Gumpal Compound, where they were reportedly murdered, Your Honor.1âwphi1 A: Polo shirt and Jacket of Auntie Gemma, Your Honor.

Q: What specific items are you going to search from that place? Q: What else aside from the Polo shirt and jacket did you see?

A: Personal belongings such as Driver's License of Lucio Pua, Alien Certificate of A: No more your Honor, we went back to Alicia.
Registration ID of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, A TM Cards such as BDO under Lucio
Pua's account, Deposit slips of BDO accounts of Lucio Pua, receipts of the palay
delivered, blood-stained clothes of the victims, such as Rosemarie Pua's green inner Q: Who were with you when you went to the house of Jaylord?
garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants, Lucio Pua's black short and pink
polo shirt, Gemma Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, black stripe
T-shirt and a shoulder bag of the victim Gemma Eugenio color white, the 1,600 sacks of A: My cousin, Your Honor .
palay inside the Warehouse of Felix Gumpal Compound, long bolo [which] is
approximately 16 inches long, and the 9mm caliber black pistol, your Honor.
Q: What is the name of your cousin?

Q: Where did you get this information regarding the articles found in the Felix Gumpal
Compound? A: Harison, Your Honor.

A: This information was given to me by the Opponents, Your Honor. Q: When was that when you went to the house of Dimal?

Q: And who are they? A: October 5, 2010, Your Honor.25

A: They are Edison Uy Pua, Ernesto Villador y Yakapin and Shaira Eugenio y Estrada, Your xx xx
Honor.

[COURT]
Q: How sure are you that these people were able to see these items in Felix Gumpal
Compound? A: Edison Uy Pua and Shaira Mae Eugenio are the relatives of the victims who
personally saw the victim's clothes they were wearing right before they went to Jaylord's Q: On September 6, 2010, in the afternoon, at about 4:00 o'clock, do you know where was
compound and the victims were seen by Ernesto Villador sprawled lifeless on the floor in the (sic) your mother then? [SHAIRA MAE]
palay buying station of Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said that there is a gun 9mm pistol, how did they come to know that there was a gun in
that place?
Q: Where?

A: It was reported to me by Ernesto Villador, Your Honor. 24

A: She [Gemma] went to Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Judge Ong was also able to draw corroborative testimonies from P/lnsp. Malixi's witnesses.
Edison testified on the circumstances prior to the disappearance of his uncle Lucio and his Q: Do you remember what was (sic) the clothes of your mother and what did she
aunties Rosemarie and Gemma, while Shaira Mae described the clothes and personal brought (sic) with her when she went to Jaylord Dimal?
belongings of her mother before the latter disappeared, thus:

A: Yes, Your Honor, the long sleeves is faded pink, the inner shirt is black, and bag is
[COURT] pink, inside it are two (2) cellphones, the picture of my sister and her Driver's License. 26

Q: On September 6, 2010, where were you?

[EDISON] While it may be noted that applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses Shaira Mae and Edison
have no personal knowledge how the crimes of kidnapping and multiple murder were
committed, their testimonies corroborated that of Villador, who petitioners admitted to have
A: I was at home, Your Honor. known about the incidents surrounding the commission of such crimes. 27

Q: Where? Significantly, Judge Ong's inquiry underscored that Villador has a reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed at the Felix Gumpal Compound on September 6, 2010. In
reply to the queries of Judge Ong, Villador revealed that (1) when Dimal called him inside the
A: At Antonino, Alicia, Isabela, Your Honor? house to receive his payment as classifier of palay, he saw them [Lucio, Rosemarie and
Gemma] talking to each other; and (2) later in the day, Dimal called him to ask for help, but he
backed out upon seeing that Dimal was holding a black 0.9 mm pistol amidst people lying
Q: Where is Lucio and Rosemarie Pua on that day? bloody on the ground. Thus:

A: They went to Jaylord to collect the payment of the palay, Your Honor. [COURT:]

Q: And you were left in your house in Alicia when your Uncle Lucio and Auntie Rosemarie Q: You said you are a classifier, what is the work of a classifier?
when they went to Jaylord to collect payment of palay?

[VILLADOR]
A: Yes, Your Honor, I was.

A: We classify the kinds of palay, Your Honor.

Q: And do you know what happened to your Uncle Lucio and Auntie Rosemarie when
they went to Jaylord's place?
Q: Where are you working as a classifier?

A: I know because when they went to collect payments they did not come back
anymore, Your Honor. A: Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they did not come back anymore? Q: And where is the place of the business of Jaylord Dimal?

27
A: Junction Ipil at the former compound of Felix Gumpal, Your Honor.
Q: How long have you been a classifier of Jaylord Dimal?
A: It is already two (2) years that every cropping he calls for me to classify, Your Honor.
Q: On September 6, 2010, are (sic) you still a classifier in the business of Jaylord Dimal.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Where were you on that date?
A: In the compound of Jaylord, Your Honor.
Q: In the afternoon of that date, do you know of any person who went to the place of
businessman Dimal?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Who are they?
A: Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: Do you know their purpose of going to the place of Jaylord Dimal?
A: They were supposed to collect payment of the palay that Jay lord asked me to gather, Your
Honor?
Q: And where are those palay that Jaylord asked you to gather?
A: I was the one discarding the sacks of palay in the bodega of Jaylord, Your Honor.
Q: Who owns these palay that you are discarding?
A: Owned by Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, Your Honor.
Q: And why were they taken to the place of Jaylord Dimal?
A: They asked me to classify those palay and by agreement of Jaylord and the Pua's I
discarded the palay in the bodega of Jaylord, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know how many cavans?
xxxx
A: 1,600 sacks, Your Honor.
Q: And where are they now those sacks of palay?
A: They are in the bodega or warehouse, Your Honor.
Q: Are those sacks of palay still there up to now?
A: Yes, Your Honor, they are still there.
Q: What happened in the afternoon of September 6, 2010 when Lucio and Rosemarie
and Gemma was (sic) there in the house or place of Jaylord Dimal?
A: Jaylord Dimal went out from his house and he called for the three and went inside
the house, Your Honor.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: Jaylord called me up but I was already in our house and I was busy giving wages to
my laborers, when he summoned me to go to his house, "Kuya punta ka sandali dito,"
meaning "Kuya, please come here for a while."
Q: And did you go to the place of Jaylord?
A: Yes, Your Honor, I rode my motorcycle and went to the place.
Q: And what happened next?
A: When I arrived at the gate he asked me to enter the compound with my motorcycle,
Your Honor.
Q: What happened next?
A: I asked him, "Bakit Boss?" meaning, "Why, Boss?"
Q: What happened next?
A: He answered, "Kuya yung mga tao patay na baka pwedeng patulong." Meaning
"Kuya the people are already dead please help?
Q: What did you see from Jaylord [Dimal] when he told you the people were already
dead? A: I saw him holding a black .9mm pistol and when I saw the people lying bloody
on the ground, I told him "Sir, hindi ko kaya", meaning "I cannot do it.
Q: How may times have you seen that gun which he was holding on that day September
6, 2010?
A: That night when he called for me, Your Honor.
Q: After the September 6, 2010 incident, have you went (sic) back to the place of Dimal.
A: No more, Your Honor.
Q: What are the things did you see (sic) when Dimal called for you and told you that
these persons were already dead?
A: I saw these people lying on the ground bloody and they are already dead and I said,
"hindi ko kaya", meaning "I cannot do it" and he replied, "Sige sibat ka na," meaning
"okay, just go."
Q: So, it is (sic) still possible that the gun held by Dimal is still in his house?
A: I think so that is still in his house because he keep (sic) it in one place, Your Honor.
Q: And you said he keep (sic) it in one place are you familiar where he is keeping it?
A: What I usually see, he placed it under the table where the laptop is and there drawers in it,
Your Honor. 28
Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath applicant P/Insp. Malixi
and his witnesses, Edwin, Shaira Mae and Villador, whose collective testimonies would prompt
a reasonably discreet person to believe that the crime of kidnapping with murder was
committed at the Felix GumpaL Compound on September 6, 2010, and that specific personal
properti'es sought in connection with the crime could be found in the said place sought to be
searched.
As to petitioners' claim that the judge did not ask anymore searching questions after
statements were made by Villador, 29 the Court finds that searching and probing questions
were indeed propounded by Judge Ong, and that there is no more necessity to ask Villador to
describe the position and state of the lifeless bodies, and the specific place in the compound
where the bodies were lying. Villador could not have been expected to take a closer look into
the bloody bodies on the ground because Dimal was then holding a pistol, and told him to
leave if he cannot help. Petitioners would do well to bear in mind that, absent a showing to the
contrary, it is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed. 30 The judge has
the prerogative to give his own judgment on the application of the search warrant by his own
evaluation of the evidence presented before him. 31 The Court cannot substitute its own
judgment to that of the judge, unless the latter disregarded facts before him/her or ignored the
clear dictates of reason.32
Petitioners submit that the search warrant is also void for failing to identify with particularity the
place to be searched and the items to be seized. They· assert that Felix Gumpal Compound
consists of a very large area, consisting of two houses, one nipa hut, two external bathrooms,
one garage, one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse utilized to store
a palay drying machinery. They likewise claim that all the items actually seized were either not
among those listed in the warrant or were seized in violation of the "plain view doctrine".
Insisting that the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, petitioners posit that all the items seized in Dimal's compound are "fruits of the
poisonous tree" and inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by Judge Ong identified with
particularity the place to be searched, namely; (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2)
the palay warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague,
Isabela. This is evident from the Search Warrant issued by the judge, which reads:
The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the form of questions and answers
in writing and under oath, the applicant Police Senior Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the
witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and Ernesto Villador, who all
collaborated to the fact of death of Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in
Echague, Isabela. That witness Edison Pua went to the house of Jaylord Dimal after the
commission of the crime and was able to see the blood-stained clothes of the victims:
1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and
2) [Rosemarie] Pua's clothes;
On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her mother Gemma Eugenio left
her house, she wore faded pink long sleeves jacket and black T-shirt, and brought with her a
shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which are probably in the house of Jaylord Dimal. In the
case of Ernesto Villador, he testified that he saw Jay lord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol
and testified that he usually keep said firearm under the computer table or drawers. He
likewise testify (sic) that there were 1600 sacks of palay sold by the victims and brought to
the Felix Gum pal Compound.
With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang Salaysay and deposition of
witness, it would readily show that there is probable cause to believe that in the house,
particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jaylord Dimal located at Ipil Junction,
Echague, Isabela, said items, to wit: blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1600 sacks of palay
inside the warehouse in the Felix Gumpal Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.
The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this Court due to compelling reasons
for security and confidentiality purposes, considering that possibility of leakages of information
once the application for search warrant is filed with the court within the area having territorial
jurisdiction over it.
In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any time of the day or night
the premises of Felix Gum pal Compound located at lpil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and
forthwith seize and take possession of thefollowing properties: blood-stained clothes of
Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or
just photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to bring the said articles to the
custody of the Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela
under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law.33
A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain
and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in
the community. 34 A designation that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.35 To the Court's view, the above-quoted search warrant
sufficiently describes the place to be searched with manifest intention that the search be
confined strictly to the place described. At any rate, petitioners cannot be heard to decry
28
irregularity in the conduct of the search of the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound
because, as aptly ruled by the RTC, a Certification of Orderly Search was issued by
the barangay officials, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was
not sufficiently contradicted by petitioners.
Moreover, the objection as to the particularity of the place to be searched was belatedly raised
in petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Order denying their Omnibus Motion to quash.
The Court has consistently ruled that the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15 36 is
applicable to motion to quash search warrants. 37 In Abuan v. People, 38 it was held that "the
motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress." Accordingly, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that
was not raised in a motion to quash if (1) said issue was not available or existent when they
filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction
over the subject matter.39 Because petitioners' objection as to the particularity of the place to
be searched was available when they filed their omnibus motion to quash, and there being no
jurisdictional issue raised, their objection is deemed waived.
Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1)
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2)
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being
issued.40 The purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those
particularly described in the search warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and
seizures will be committed.41
In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court clarified that technical precision of description is not
required. "It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to
obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for." 43
Under American jurisprudence which has persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, the degree of
specificity required in a search warrant's description of the items to be searched for and seized
is flexible and will vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought.44 A
description is said to be valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the
activity under investigation will permit. But if the circumstances make an exact description of
the property to be seized a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to
describe the generic class of the items sought. The practical guide to determine whether a
specific search warrant meets the particularity requirement is for the court to inquire if the
officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items to be
seized. 45
In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described and sought to be
seized in connection with the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, namely: (1)
blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves jacket and a
black tshirt, and (2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol. Having no direct relation to the said crime, the
1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal and found in his
warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant because they do not fall under the
personal properties stated under Section 3 of Rule 126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b)
stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended
to be used as the means of committing an offense, can be the proper subject of a search
warrant.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in upholding the denial of the Omnibus Motion to
quash because all the Constitutional 46 and procedural47 requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant are still present, namely: (1) probable cause; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 48
Despite the fact that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 10-11 is valid, petitioners are correct
that most items listed in the Return on the Search Warrant are inadmissible in evidence. Since
only 2 items were particularly described on the face of the search warrant, namely: (1) the
blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of faded pink long sleeves jacket and
black t-shirt; and (2) the 0.9 mm caliber pistol, the Court declares that only two articles under
the Return on the Search Warrant are admissible in evidence as they could be the blood-
stained clothes of Gemma subject of the warrant:
c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-26 with JAM markings)
d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM
markings)
It bears stressing that the application for search warrant particularly described the victims'
blood-stained clothes as follows: (1) Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer
and brownish pedal pants; (2) Lucio Pua's black shorts and pink polo shirt; and (3) Gemma
Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, and black striped t-shirt. Considering
that only Gemma's clothes were described in Search Warrant No. 10-11 as specific as the
circumstances will allow, the Court is constrained to hold as inadequately described the blood-
stained clothes of Lucio and Rosemarie. Without the aid of the applicant's witnesses who are
familiar with the victims' personal belongings, any other warrant officer, like P/Insp.
Macadangdang who served the search warrant, will surely be unable to identify the blood-
stained clothes of Lucio and Rosemarie by sheer reliance on the face of such warrant.
The Court could have rendered a favorable ruling if the application for search warrant and
supporting affidavits were incorporated by reference in Search Warrant No. 10-11, so as to
enable the warrant officer to identify the specific clothes sought to be searched. This is
because under American jurisprudence, an otherwise overbroad warrant will comply with the
particularity requirement when the affidavit filed in support of the warrant is physically attached
to it, and the warrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with suitable words of
reference. Conversely, a warrant which lacks any description of the items to be seized is
defective and is not cured by a description in the warrant application which is not referenced in
the warrant and not provided to the subject of the search. 49
The Court further declares that the following items are inadmissible as they do not bear any
direct relation to the 3 items particularly described in Search Warrant No. 10-11:
a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM markings)
b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM markings)
xxxx
e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM markings)
f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM markings)
g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM markings)
h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with JAM markings)
i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)
With respect to the items under Return on the Search Warrant indicated as "articles
recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct of the search," it is well settled that objects
falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject
to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.50
For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are present: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 51 As explained
in People v. Salanguit: 52
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification-
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to a lawful-arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused-and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
The first requisite of the "plain view doctrine" is present in this case because the seizing officer,
P/Insp. Macadangdang, has a prior justification for an intrusion into the premises of the Felix
Gumpal Compound, for he had to conduct the search pursuant to a valid warrant. However,
the second and third requisites are absent, as there is nothing in the records to prove that the
other items not particularly described in the search warrant were open to eye and hand, and
that their discovery was unintentional.
In fact, out of the 2 items particularly described in the search warrant, only the 2 black t-shirts
with suspected blood stain possibly belonging to Gemma were retrieved, but the 9mm caliber
pistol was not found. It is also not clear in this case at what instance were the items
supposedly seized in plain view were confiscated in relation to the seizure of Gemma's
bloodstained clothes - whether prior to, contemporaneous with or subsequent to such seizure.
Bearing in mind that once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain
view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently
found,53 the Court rules that the recovery of the items seized in plain view, which could have
been made after the seizure of Gemma's clothes, are invalid.
It is also not immediately apparent to the officer that, except for the Alien Certificates of
Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie, the BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio, and the live
ammo of caliber 22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings), the following items may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure:
a. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)
b. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)
c. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)
d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM markings)
e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM markings)
f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM markings)
g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM markings)
h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM markings)
i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM markings)
j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM markings)
k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM markings)
l. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM markings)
m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM markings)
xxxx
o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-18 with JAM markings)
p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM markings)
q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)
r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM markings)
s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM markings)
t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as E-27 with JAM markings)
xxxx
v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM markings)
It bears emphasis that the "immediately apparent" test does not require an unduly high degree
of certainty as to the incriminating character of the evidence, but only that the seizure be
presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is a probable cause to associate the property
with a criminal activity. 54 In view thereof, the 10 pieces of spent shell of calibre 0.22 ammo
cannot be admitted in evidence because they can hardly be used in a 9mm caliber pistol
29
specified in the search warrant, and possession of such spent shells are not illegal per
se. Likewise, the following items supposedly seized under plain view cannot be admitted
because possession thereof is not inherently unlawful: (a) 3 tom cloths; (b) black bag pack; (c)
a piece of goldplated earing; (d) a suspected human hair; (e) a piece of embroidered cloth; (f)
3 burned tire wires; (g) empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-shirt.
heirs of said victims, while the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings)
shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal case that may be filed
against petitioner Jaylord Dimal.
SO ORDERED.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed above, the Court sustains the
validity of Search Warrant No. 10-11 and the admissibility of the items seized which were
particularly described in the warrant. This is in line with the principles under American
jurisprudence: (1) that the seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the
whole seizure illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to
seize; and (2) the fact that the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the
warrant, illegally made a search and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not
invalidate the first search and seizure.55 To be sure, a search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. 56 Objects taken which were not specified in
the search warrant should be restored57 to the person from whom they were unlawfully seized.

Although the Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie and the BDO Passbook
in the name of Lucio are inadmissible in evidence, for not having been seized in accordance
with the "plain view doctrine," these personal belongings should be returned to the heirs of the
respective victims. Anent the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings),
which could not have been used in a 0.9mm caliber pistol, the same shall remain in custodia
legis pending the outcome of a criminal case that may be later filed against petitioner Dimal.
In Alih v. Castro, 58 it was held that even if the search of petitioners' premises was violative of
the Constitution and the firearms and ammunition taken therefrom are inadmissible in
evidence, pending determination of the legality of said articles they can be ordered to remain
in custodia legis subject to appropriate disposition as the corresponding court may direct in the
criminal proceedings that have been or may thereafter be filed against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY

GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 27, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128355
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to declare that the following properties seized under
Search Warrant No. 10-11 are inadmissible in evidence for neither having been particularly
described in the search warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine":

1. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-24 with JAM markings)

2. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-25 with JAM markings)

3. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Marked as E-14 with JAM markings)

4. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-16 with JAM markings)

5. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-17 with JAM markings)

6. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (marked as E-28 with JAM markings)

7. Suspected blood stain (marked as E-25-A with JAM markings)

8. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-1 with JAM markings)

9. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-2 with JAM markings)

10. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-3 with JAM markings)

11. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-4 with JAM markings)

12. One (1) bag pack color black (Marked as E-5 with JAM markings)

13. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-6 with JAM markings)

14. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-7 with JAM markings)

15. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-8 with JAM markings)

16. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-9 with JAM markings)

17. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-10 with JAM markings)

18. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-11 with JAM markings)

19. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-12 with JAM markings)

20. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-13 with JAM markings)

21. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1)
BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua (mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

22. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-18 with JAM markings)

23. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (marked as E-19 with JAM markings)

24. Suspected human hair (marked as E-20 with JAM markings)

25. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (marked as E-22 with JAM markings)

26. Three (3) burned Tire wires (marked as E-23 with JAM markings)

27. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (marked as E-27 with JAM markings)

28. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings)

29. One (1) color white t-shirt (marked as E-30 with JAM markings)

Moreover, the two (2) Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and
One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua are directed to be returned to the respective

30
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Fidencio S. Raz for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, under an Information which reads:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting as a
pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to
another and/or distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and without authority of law have in his possession and control
nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried
marijuana leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of
Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves to a
customer. (Rollo, p. 9)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to
the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of
the sale of prohibited drug under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act,
as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and
pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service
of his sentence with the period for which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this judgment. All the items of
marijuana confiscated in this case are declared forfeited in favor of the State.
(Rollo, p. 41)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this appeal,
assigning the following as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:
I to Bati, who, thereafter handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA,
TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME WERE
TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST
SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY
OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO
GUILTY OF THE SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4,
ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND SENTENCING HIM TO
SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P
20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan,
was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP
Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN,
May 2,1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself
under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the
house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat.
Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out
later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and
then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo.
After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with
marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at
this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity
going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring
developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to
report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting
with appellant. (pp. 18-19, Ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the
police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt.
Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught
up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the
Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to
the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June
19, 1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24,
1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of
C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,
The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at
Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18",
Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found positive of marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4,
1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)
As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without
warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from
such arrest is admissible.
We rule in the affirmative.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights
granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was
sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that
Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before
March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.
This contention is without merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(Emphasis supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at
a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to
monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a
chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw
Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some
things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio
would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was
caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the
same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to
Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that
police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it stated:
When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction
would take place and while positioned at a street comer, they saw appellant
Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty
meters away from them (the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something
the object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his
part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their
testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events
that took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within
hearing distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in
hushed tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the movements of
the appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law
enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties
in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing People v.
Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that
Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force.
Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years
and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs
in their locality. Hence, it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to
report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However,
because of reliable information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday,
he was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has
been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, et al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991):
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial
court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would
attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was
based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the
suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from
this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the
accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them
to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is
effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at
checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in
the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former,
it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances
(monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting
officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the
contraband.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule
(Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
31
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that
the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.

As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with
the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence.

Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for
testifying could be merely to escape prosecution.

We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:

The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have
been the reason of (sic) his willingness to testify in court against the accused. But
this does not necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. As
explained by Lt. Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers
are usually their customers, especially if as in this case, there is no other direct
evidence of the selling except the testimony of the buyer. We accept this
observation as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users are, and
should be employed by law enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against
pushers who are the real felons in our society. We have observed the demeanor
of the witness in court, and found him to be straightforward, unhesitating, and
spontaneous in his declarations, so that we are satisfied as to his intention and
disposition to tell the truth (Rollo, p. 40)

Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight
and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked
certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged. that the court below, having
seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their
testimonies (People v. Umali, et al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v.
Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo,
36 SCRA 400 [1970]).

Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public

officers Fulgencio and Seraspi.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive
than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the
presumption being that police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v.
Castiller, supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986]).

The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that
the items seized were all positive for marijuana.

In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's defense is alibi

which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person
from whom he bought marijuana.

Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and
cousin distributing handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. The fact, however, remains that it does
not preclude the possibility that he was present in the vicinity as established by his admission
that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to meet Macabante on the street.

It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the
appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988];
and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])

Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed
committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

32
G.R. No. L-116001 March 14, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUISITO GO y KO alias "KING LOUIE", accused-appellant.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 123943 March 14, 2001
LUISITO GO y CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and
SPO3 Candido Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police,
went to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report
that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there.
Police civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw accused-
appellant Luisito Go, also known as "King Louie", enter the Flamingo Disco House with two
women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in accused-appellant's waist. Together,
the three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a hundred meters
away from the outpost.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were
conducting an "Operation Bakal," whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The
owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. They went up to the second floor
of the disco. The waiter turned on the lights, and the police officers saw accused-appellant and
his lady companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked accused-
appellant to stand up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist.
SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but accused-appellant was unable to
produce any. Instead, accused-appellant brought out the driver's license of a certain Tan
Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm
Walther P88, Serial Number 006784, with a magazine containing ten (10) rounds of live
ammunition. Accused-appellant was invited to the police precinct for questioning.
On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car, which was
parked outside. The police officers accompanied accused-appellant to his car, a Honda Civic
with license plate number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a
Philippine National Police identification card hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked
accused-appellant if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked
accused-appellant for his driver's license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was
unable to produce them. When accused-appellant opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID
card and found that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw
pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked accused-
appellant why he had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant
suggested that they talk the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido
replied that they should talk at the police headquarters. Accused-appellant took out an attaché
case from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant
opened the first bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane. The
second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.
The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police station. When they arrived at the
precinct, they turned over the attaché case together with the two black clutch bags to the
investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be
shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attaché case was opened, the police officers found
that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and
newspapers.1
Consequently, two Informations were filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34. The first Information, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 3308-92-C, charged accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A. 6452
(Dangerous Drugs Act), committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992 at Brgy. I, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba,
province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized/permitted by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
750 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as "SHABU", a regulated
drug, in violation of the above-stated law.2
The other Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, charged accused-appellant
with violation of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992, at Flamingo Beerhouse, Crossing,
Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named not being licensed or authorized by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) caliber .9mm marked "WALTHER" with serial
number 006784 with one (1) magazine loaded with ten (10) live ammunitions of
same caliber, in violation of the aforementioned law. 3
After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant in the two
criminal cases, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused in Criminal
Case No. 3308-92-C, to be GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having in his
possession of 750.39 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug. He is hereby sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine of TWELVE THOUSAND
(P12,000.00) PESOS; and in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, the accused is also
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua.
Considering that the accused appears to be detained at the Makati Police
Station, jailer, Makati Police Station is hereby ordered to commit the accused to
the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The
bond posted by the accused in Criminal Cases No. 3308-92-C & 3309-92-C, are
hereby ordered cancelled.4
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C directly to this
Court, considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, which appeal was
docketed as G.R. No. 116001.
On the other hand, accused-appellant brought his appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case No.
3308-92-C before the Court of Appeals.5 In an Amended Decision dated February 21, 1996,
the Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellant's conviction but modified the penalty imposed
by the trial court by sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years, to pay a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), citing Section 8 of
R.A. 6425, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.6 Hence, this petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 123943.
The two cases were consolidated.7
Accused-appellant assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for the two
crimes. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the arrest and subsequent
seizure were legal. A review of the records at bar shows no reason to depart therefrom.
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest
having been issued prior thereto,8 is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and
jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without a
warrant.9 Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellant's waist when he stood up. The
gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant
could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus,
he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest
was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellant's valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental
to the lawful arrest.10 The subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the
crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where
the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an
illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause, which states
that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used
for any purposes in any proceeding.11 Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to
speak, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug
paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant. Besides, it has been held that
drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence.12
Under P.D. 1866, the essence of the crime is the accused's lack of license or permit to carry or
possess firearm, ammunition, or explosive. Possession by itself is not prohibited by law. 13 In
prosecutions for illegal possession of firearm, the element of absence of license to possess the
firearm may be established through the testimony of or a certification from a representative of
the Firearms and Explosives Bureau14of the Philippine National Police (FEB-PNP), attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm.15 In this case, a representative of the FEB-PNP
testified that accused-appellant was not a holder of any gun license. 16 Moreover, a
certification17to that effect was presented to corroborate his testimony. These pieces of
evidence suffice to establish the second element of the offense of possession of unlicensed
firearms.18 However, in a vain attempt to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presented for
the first time an alleged firearm license, which was described as "Annex 2" of his petition.
Accused-appellant's counsel admitted that said document was not presented below "for some
reason."19 Whatever those reasons are, he did not specify. The document, however, is
dubious. It is too late in the day for accused-appellant to proffer this very vital piece of
evidence which might exculpate him. First, the reception of evidence is best addressed to the
trial court because it entails questions of fact. It should be emphasized that this Court is not a
trier of facts.20 Second, the document marked as "Annex 2" of the petition in G.R. No. 123943
is not the license referred to, but an order of the trial court resetting the date of
arraignment.21 Third, there is attached to the petition a firearm license 22 which is a mere
photocopy and, as such, cannot be appreciated by this Court. Indeed, considering that this
was the one piece of evidence which could spell accused-appellant's acquittal of the
unlicensed firearm charge, and assuming that, as shown in the face of the license, it was
issued on October 7, 1992, there should be no reason for its non-production during the trial.
Fourth, and most importantly, the genuineness of the purported license becomes all the more
suspect in view of the Certification issued by the FEO-PNP that accused-appellant was not a
licensed firearm holder.
Anent the certification issued by the FEO-PNP to the effect that Luisito Go y Ko was not a
licensed gun holder, accused-appellant claims that he was not the person alluded to therein
because the correct spelling of his middle name is not "Ko" but "Co." Whatever the correct
spelling of his name is, the fact remains that he had no license on the day the gun was found
in his possession. All that he could present then was a photocopy of his application for gun
license,23 which is not the equivalent of a license. Appellant testified that he presented a
firearm license to the police,24 but he could not produce that alleged license in court. If
appellant was indeed a licensed gun holder and if that license existed on October 22, 1992, he
could have easily presented it to the police when he was asked for his papers inside the disco,
or if the alleged license was in his car, he could have easily shown it to them when they went
to his car. Otherwise, he could have easily asked his lawyer or relative to bring the license to
the police precinct when he was being investigated. Despite several opportunities to produce a
license, he failed to do so. In fact, during trial, he never presented any such license. And on
appeal, he could only submit for the first time and for unknown reasons an alleged photocopy
of a purported license. The only plausible conclusion that can be drawn is that there was no
such license in the first place. Hence, his guilt of illegal possession of firearm was duly
established.
Accused-appellant's guilt for illegal possession of shabu has likewise been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The white crystalline substance found in his possession, upon laboratory
examination, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.25
The bulk of accused-appellant's defense revolves around the factual findings of the trial court.
It should be recalled that factual findings of the trial court, if supported by evidence on record,
and particularly when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on this Court. 26 As discussed
above, the records substantiate the trial court's and the appellate court's findings as to
accused-appellant's culpability. There is no reason to depart from these findings as no
significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded
which, if considered, would have altered the outcome of the case. 27 Moreover, questions as to
credibility of witness are matters best left to the appreciation of the trial court because of its
unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witness' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the reviewing
tribunal.28
In the case at bar, the trial court found:
The narration of the incident by the police is far more worthy of belief coming as it
does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their
duties and were not demonstrated to have been unduly biased against the
accused.29
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held that:
(T)he findings of fact of the trial court are generally respected by the appellate
court, unless they are found to be clearly biased or arbitrary. We do not find any
in these cases.30
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, committed in 1992, regardless of whether the
firearm is low powered or high powered, was punished with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, as provided in P.D. 1866. However, under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect
on July 6, 1997,31 the penalty was lowered to prision correcional in its maximum period and a
fine of P30,000.00, if the firearm32 is classified as low powered. In this case, the unlicensed
firearm found in appellant's possession was a 9mm Walther pistol, which under the
33
amendatory law, is considered as low powered. Inasmuch as the new law imposes a reduced
penalty and is, thus, more favorable to accused-appellant, the same may be given retroactive
effect.33 Therefore, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00.

On the other hand, the crime of illegal possession of regulated drug, under the law in force at
the time of the commission of the offense in this case, was punished by imprisonment of from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from P6,000.00 to
P12,000.00,34 regardless of the amount of drugs involved. Hence, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00. The decision of the trial court
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 750.39
grams of shabu and drug paraphernalia, is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.00. The shabu and subject drug
paraphernalia seized from appellant shall be destroyed as provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

34
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018
LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
1
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Leniza
Reyes y Capistrano (Reyes) assailing the Decision2 dated May 20, 2016 and the
Resolution3 dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated June 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12-0627 finding Reyes guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possess and have in her custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which substance was
found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a
group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jefferson
Monteras (PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal
when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a
dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes,
a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like
liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to
bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point,
turned her back, pulled something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on
her right hand.8 PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police
station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents,
conducted the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain Manolito
Angeles.9 Thereafter, PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and
turned over the seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI
Villaraza), who confirmed10 that the substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.11
For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5,
2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to
board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After
answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in
motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and
bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She was then brought to the
police station where the police officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in
exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police officers took her
to Taytay for inquest proceedings.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision13 dated June 16, 2014, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165. Accordingly, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with an order for her immediate arrest. 14
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and
thereupon, found to be in possession of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to the police
officers upon her arrest. Likewise, it observed that the chain of custody of the seized item was
sufficiently established through the testimony of PO1 Monteras, which was not ill-motivated.15
Aggrieved, Reyes appealed16 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision17 dated May 20, 2016, the CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime
charged.18 It held that the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet of shabu was
valid as she was caught in flagrante delicto in its possession and was legally arrested on
account thereof.19 The CA likewise found substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule
and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item were properly preserved. 20
However, it corrected the quantity of shabu stated in the RTC's dispositive portion to 0.04 gram
in order to conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza and accordingly, modified the penalty
imposed to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months, as maximum. 21
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 22 "The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision
of the penal law."23
24
"Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become]
'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),25 Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 26
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.27In this instance, the law requires that there first be
a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed.28
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a
general rule – be complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause
that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an
arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.29
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had
in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the accused had committed it.30
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is essential. [The scenario under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure [contemplates that] the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section
5 (b) of the same, [the officer] knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed." 31
Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test,
showing that "the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers
suggesting that [she] was in possession of illegal drugs at the time [she] was
apprehended."32 Absent any overt act showing the commission of a crime, the warrantless
arrest is rendered invalid, as in a case where a person was apprehended for merely carrying a
bag and traveling aboard a jeepney without acting suspiciously. 33 Similarly, in People v.
Racho,34 a search based solely on a tip describing one of the passengers of a bus was
declared illegal, since at the time of apprehension, the said accused was not "committing a
crime in the presence of the police officers," nor did he commit a crime or was about to commit
one.35
In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do
anything as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime when she was just passing
by.36 During cross-examination, PO1 Monteras revealed:
[Atty. Cynthia D. Iremedio]: Mister Witness these two youngsters, the only information that
they gave you is that there is a woman with a tattoo?
[PO1 Monteras]: Yes ma'am.
Q: No further description regarding this woman was given to you?
A: Long haired and with tattoo on the left arm ma'am.
Q: And no description of the tattoo on her left hand?
A: None ma'am.
COURT: What is the tattoo on her left arm?
A: I think it was a Dragon sir.
Q: These two persons did not mention to you the name of the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Aside from those description, you will agree with me that this long hair and a dragon tattoo
can be possessed by any other person aside from the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Now Mister Witness you did not conduct further investigation on these two persons?
A: Not anymore ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Now, Mister Witness, can you describe to us when you saw this accused?
A: While we were at the corner of the Diversion Road we saw a female persons (sic) coming
towards us who fits the description given by the two teenagers ma'am.
Q: And despite the description, this accused merely passes in front of you and did nothing
wrong against you?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxxx
Q: But when you greeted her "good evening" there is nothing unsual with this accused?
A: She smelled of liquor ma'am.
Q: She was not holding anything or acting in a suspicious manner which will elicit a
response from you?
A: None ma'am.
x x x x37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1
Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing
anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor. 38 As no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal
35
basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be
considered a criminal act.39

Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined
from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not
justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on
their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime." 41 In this
case, records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2)
teenagers' tip and that, everything happened by "chance." 42 Surely, to interpret "personal
knowledge" as to encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a dangerous
precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under Section 5 (b), Rule 113. 43

Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the subject
item as lacking in credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the testimony of PO1
Monteras, claimed that when the police officers asked Reyes if she purchased shabu, she
turned her back and voluntarily showed the plastic sachet containing the same which she
retrieved from her brassiere. According to jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of a witness's
testimony is determined by its conformity with knowledge and consistency with the common
experience of mankind.44 As the Court observes, it is rather contrary to ordinary human
experience for a person to willfully exhibit incriminating evidence which would result in his or
her conviction for a crime, absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt him or her
to do so.

In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the sachet
of shabu to the police officers. In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that at the time of arrest,
Reyes was so intoxicated that she "simply let her senses down" and showed the shabu to PO1
Monteras;46 but later, in the same Comment, the OSG argued that Reyes was actually "in her
right senses when she reminded the police officers" that they were not allowed to frisk a
woman.47 These material inconsistencies clearly render suspect the search conducted on
Reyes's person and likewise, destroy the credibility of the police officers who testified against
Reyes.48 In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities
expressly ask, and in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched
and the consent thereof established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown
in this case.

In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from
Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

Besides, the Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, through their
admission that only the Barangay Captain was present during the marking and inventory of the
seized items.51 Records are further bereft of any showing that efforts were made by the police
officers to secure the presence of the other necessary personalities under the law or provide
any justification for their absence, which could have excused their leniency in strictly complying
with the said procedure.52 Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA
10640,53 requires, among others, that the apprehending team shall immediately after seizure
and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the
PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 54 It is
well-settled that unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody procedure would result in
the acquittal of the accused,55 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2016 and the
Resolution dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
cause her immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

36
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL.
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA
AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU,
petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:
ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD,
and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu
vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without
warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations
obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with
shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or
sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the
Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule
113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the
persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be
abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to
their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy
and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the
special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that
if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the
Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned
arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in
accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized
by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be
conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567)
without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113,
he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7
and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a
continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
...
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle
for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as
part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given
another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers
of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported
by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person
to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the
one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests
without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or
private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the
said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded
man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the
same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan,
Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said
hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City
by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital
records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a
gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his
address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality
Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the
effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the
attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14
and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural
are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are
presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers
did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the
arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without
warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in
authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case
No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro
custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this
Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without
warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court
of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons.
They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without
warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned
here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against
said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore,
Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the
hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the
authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about
the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one
Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said
house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
37
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato
Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms,
ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at
the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions,
and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on
13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of
said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were
found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May
1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of
the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At
the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found
ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that
the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine
and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the
search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named
Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their
arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as
in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or
irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor.
21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest
without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are
met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers,
in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest
without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu
spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National
Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not
for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which,
in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as
falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the
right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to
free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of
the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or
soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which
obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of
authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has
ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest
without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities
came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the
arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and
despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without
warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging
Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was
filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as
Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by
the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed
by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said
court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad
taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set
forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier.
On the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to
her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance
with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is
not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons
arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of
the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly
ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly
challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that
everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This
Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same —
the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113,
Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith
be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to
languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted
or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the
suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these
petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are
probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as
the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the
allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive
evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with
the, majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the
warrantless arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and
petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of murder.
In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang
sa magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers,
inciting to sedition. While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is
indeed possible that Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution
nonetheless supports the authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."
I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions
warrantless arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu
mav not be considered as having "just committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered
seditious remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The
second allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same
afternoon (Decision, pp. 23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had
time, short though it might seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension
may not therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows
warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact just been committed."
The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14
days after the commission of the crime imputed to him.
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what
particular provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is that law
en.orcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the However, errneous
perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would result in the
violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right
to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a
right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person
should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived
his action.
Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested
without a warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging
others to commit any of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may
suffice to hold anyone liable for inciting to sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and
radicalism and presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]),
it should be remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the
fundamental freedoms of speech and expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of
balancing interests; those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the
urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the
determination of what may incite other people to sedition. Hence, while the police should act
swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in view of the jeopardy it may cause the
government, speedy action should consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants
for such arrests.
38

On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be
underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator is
knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs.
Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested
even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of
government offices trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause
to believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves upon the
accused to prove membership by force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll
without undergoing the concious act of enlistment.
It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent
application. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an
offense "has in fact just been committed. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes
cases under the old rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago.
Similarly, the arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee]
has committed it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed
it' under the old rule)." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21,
1985, 139 SCRA 349, 408).
I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without
warrants. In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court
considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's
personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be
strictly construed. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall
within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was
provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually (has just) been committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of
the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only
to the identity of the perpetrator. (Supra, at p. 15).
Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court
laid out the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see
to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arressted, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition on his behalf, or appointed the court upon the petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part shall be inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at 554).
These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and
civilian components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary
citizen who faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in
the community.
I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes
with a political or ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not, triggered by the
difficulty in finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive, police
officers usually have to make long persistent surveillance. However, for the orderly
administration of government and the maintenance of peace and order in the country, good
faith should be reposed on the officials implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in
laws to hold any offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in
the performance of their duties. Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to redress
their grievances.
If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government may be
exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court, mandated b the
Constitution to uphold the law, can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit
behind them. Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is
disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases
coming before us.
People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages
freedom and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that
enhancing order through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty
corrode the very values Govenment pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the
people of the world who are fast liberating themselves.
I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without
warrant, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
xxx xxx xxx
Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt,
the tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.
Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia
Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are
concerned, the petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession
of illegal firearms and ammunitions. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. I
concur in the denial of their motions for reconsideration.
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was
arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the
ground that that was inciting to sedition.
This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of
speech. "Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ
when applied to actual cases. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the
whole country who would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the
nation's interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one
hand and the application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of
national security and public safety are asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of
knowledgeability would go down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the
ability to define, among other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the term
"inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously; (3,) when does a certain effort
amount to force, intimidation. or illegal method; (4) what constitute the five objects or ends of
sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines. If we allow public speakers to
be picked up simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace
officer or critical of government policy and action, we will undermine all pronouncements of this
Court on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of expression. At the
very least, a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is essential in this
type of offense.
Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their
observations regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of
continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion.
Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and
simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused
of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved
guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a
rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority
opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not
this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are
critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up
arms against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past events, that
the petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate
warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await
the petitioner's surfacing from underground, and pounce on him with no legal authority instead
of securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension. The subsequent conviction of a person
arrested illegally does not the warrantless arrest.
In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information that
Narciso Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on
December 28, 1988 or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense "has in fact just been
committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into
ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion for
reconsideration.
The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and
render legal what was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is
not cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was
seized. A government of laws must abide by its own Constitution.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:
(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84; and
G.R. No. 83162;
(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;
(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and
(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.
CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:
I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who
were arrested in flagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the
military, or voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. I do not think that
under the applicable circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being
unlawfully detained.
But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,
121 SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the
ground that they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied
crimes.
We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was quoted with
approval in the original ponencia:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them
in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govenment forces, or
any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a
recognition of beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in
the application of the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. The rebels are then
considered alien enemies-to be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke
the municipal law of the legitimate government they have disowned. It is in such a situation
that the processes of the local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot demand the
protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have renounced by their defiance of the
government.
But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate govenment must treat
the rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided
thereunder, including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among
these — in our country — are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those
guaranteeing due process, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing bail, and
presuming the innocence of the accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the
suppression of these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an
intemal matter governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants — is not justified in
the present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own
laws. Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as
rebels are by such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the
unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision itself says
that the arrest "need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the
absence of a judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by
the authorities of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes.
International law is thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic
with its own citizens in a purely domestic matter.
As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following pronouncement which
this Court has also adopted as its own:
. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof,
or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are
all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
front their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities, usually by
simply placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension.
Once so placed, he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that
he is in the process of committing the "continuing offense," no matter that what he may be
actuallly doing at the time is a perfectly innocent act.
In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous
act of undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay
supine in his sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In
further justification, the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information"
that he was in the hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have
validated the determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the
absence of a warrant.
My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance
of a warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the
judge issuing the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly
seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the
Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were
supposed to continue their effects even to the following day. The offense was considered as
having been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court)
despite the considerable time lapse.
39
It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less than
fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the day
of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the
validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense
but from the time of the Identification of the suspect.
Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the
latter "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an
offense "has in fact just been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the
word "just," which, according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be
made almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the
arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.
I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not
be the start of another dangerous doctrine:
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon wmch the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e., that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance
with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs.
Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that there was
probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was
carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it
was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that
validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean
the tree itself."
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal
arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights
were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us
have short memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As
the ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those
who, out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national
security. Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to
the protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country.
That is what democracy is all about.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the
majority principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the
problem of arrests without warrants. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter
dicta, since they are quite unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority
Resolution. This was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result
reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent developments
in several of the cases here consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the majority
Resolution, make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the majority Resolution has taken the time
and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of
warrantless arrests. Although the above statements are obiter, they have been made and, I
believe, need to be addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes"
doctrine with constitutional rights explored.
1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
seizures of persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphais supplied)
Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual
members of society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of
arrest, the rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III
Section 2. Arrests made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the
constitutional procedure, are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning
of Article III Section 2.
2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests
are unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in
Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the
situations where an officer of the law, or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a
person without previously securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall
that judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for
what they are: they are exceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
Exceptions to such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and
meaningless the constitutional rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of
individuals may be lawfully constrained and seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to
statutory provisions is that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what
the language in which they are cast fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the general provision, rather than the exception. 1 This rule must apply with special
exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an ordinary statutory provision, but with a
constitutional guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a guarantee must be read with especial care
and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language so to keep vital and significant the
general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 3 this
Court, stressing that:
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties should be given a
liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer
County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the
proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and
seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189;
Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So.,
613. (emphasis supplied)
held that:
. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are reasonable. 4
In People vs. Burgos, 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok.
The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must
clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would
infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often vilated and so deserving of
full protection. 6 (emphasis supplied)
4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed
in the presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the
attempt to commit an offense, in the presence of the arresting officer, may be seen to be the
substitute, under the circumstances, for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation,
there is an obvious need for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting
officer to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there.
Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place
in the presence of the arresting officer. The term "presence" in this connection is properly and
restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory
perception of the arresting officer. 7 If no overt, recognizably criminal, acts occur which are
perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer could not, of course,
become aware at all that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his
presence. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena, not externalized
in overt physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a
crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an
actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the presence or within the sensor
perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample time to go to a magistrate
and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that imperious necessity
for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the crime being committed, or to
capture the doer of the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification in
law of warrantless arrests under Section 5(a).
5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may
be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the
arresting officer arrived in the scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating tha the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different
terms, the first requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been
committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a
person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not
ha seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said
to have been committed "in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the
part of the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained
directly from sense perception the arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion
conveyed by another person, no matter what his reputation for, truth and reliability might be. 9
Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a person
running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal
knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the
criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive through his own senses
some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of
a crime which has "just been committed."
6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the
time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer
must be brief indeed. In the first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section
5(b) by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here
being made. In the second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been
committed" would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime
must have been committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the
warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of the killing with which he
was charged along with other persons, cannot by any standard be justified under Section 5(b).
In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was arrested without warrant while being treated in a hospital the day
after the shooting of the policemen in which he was suspected to have been a participant.
While 1-day may be substantially different from 14-days, still it must be pointed out that at the
time Dural was arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City far
away from the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not reasonably be said to have been
just committed. There was no showing, nor did the Court require it, that the arresting officers
had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and ending the next day
in the hospital.
7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting
officer who is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more
exacting than the standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of
his chambers, ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him.
The arresting officer must himself have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon
the personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest.
In the present Resolution, the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal
knowledge" in Section 5(b), but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of
"reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. The stricter standard is
properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without a warrant of arrest, for they are
acting in derogation of a constitutional right. That the person unlawfully arrested without a
warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected of in the first place is,
course, quite beside the point. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is
constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact committed
physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust committed
such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene.
8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing
crimes," shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under
Section 5(a) that the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but
rather because the person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the
future. The pertinent portion of the majority Resolution reads:
. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF ARREST,
simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. . . . That Dural
had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or
would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government.
It is in this sense that subversion like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a
continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson,
etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence
until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized government is attained. (Emphasis
supplied)
9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually
found in our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically,
that doctrine, in my submission, does not dispence with the requirement that overt acts
recognizably criminal in character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or
must have just been committed when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to
be lawful. The "continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla
vs. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested is, as it were,
merely resting in between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to
do so.
Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to
two (2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is
that of determining whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the
defense of double jeopardy is raised.
10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the
ingredients or elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court
and some other ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another
40
court, (e.g., estafa or malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the
offense. Where all of the essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one
court but "by reason of he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is
deemed to be "continuing," then the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense
continues to be committed, has jurisdiction to try a person charged with such offense. In the
latter case, the offense is deemed to be continuing because some or all of the elements
constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the second court (e.g., kidnapping and
illegal detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The criminal acts are regarded as
repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the defendant was found and
arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of the crime charged
must be shown to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where he
is charged.
11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of
whether one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of
acts actually alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one
and the same crime, the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second
information is filed covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts of the
accused constituted discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and separate
offense, the double jeopardy defense is non-available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in
passing upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed, the overt acts
of the accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses, must be
shown.
12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own
legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening
and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts
comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been
committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not
be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be
committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for
mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where
the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and
end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal
dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation
with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases,
the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the
acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance, the
following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive
association:" 13
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form
whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans
or in any other forms;
xxx xxx xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance
of any plan or enterprise thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to
promote the objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such
association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests
and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It
is not our Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy
for police forces but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must
simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities
which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy,
whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our polity
worth protecting and saving.
REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:
While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate
such concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in
G.R. No. 86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December
1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14
days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December
1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty
in the killing of Bunye II."
I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while
authorizing a peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest, specifically
conditions that grant of authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it."
It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were
amended in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of paragraph (b) of
the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense
which has just been committed.
Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the
said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during
the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents
arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."
Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one
of the suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b)
that the person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications
regarding the complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring
such personal knowledge must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of
warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information
obtained from third persons who merely professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such
reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded on truth.
Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a
warrant may result from imputations based on dubious motives, it is now required that the
crime must have just been committed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the
making of the warrantless arrest, is the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the
time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the person making the
arrest learned or was informed of such commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to
reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime
committed, say, more than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information
only today.
The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now
required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by
reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer
acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is
necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the
chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the
obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily
undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he
is acting upon and to acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification.
It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on
probable cause and it was not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to say that
prevailing conditions affecting national security and stability must also be taken into account.
However, for the reasons above elucidated, I take exception to the conclusion that the
conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case. It is true that the
corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that,
precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the rules on arrest are scrupulously
observed, there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for
unwarranted incursions into civil liberties.
SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:
I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1 the majority has not
shown why the arrests in question should after all be sustained.
According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a
warrant and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5,
paragraph (b), Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. According to the majority, he, Dural, was after
all committing an offense (subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the
military did have personal knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge,"
according to the majority, is supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . .
of suspicion," and suspicion is supposedly reasonable:
. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilty of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2
As I said, I dissent.
First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as
amended by Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3 is made up of
"overt acts." 4 In People vs. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as follows:
. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing government by force,
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a
foreign power.
As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer
has taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive
organization to make the accused liable. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest
without a warrant, that above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if
that is possible), otherwise the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within
the contemplation of the Rules of Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have
made "subversion" to mean mere "membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means
more that mere membership.
I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would
interpret it, as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . .
based on actual facts . . . [and] founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I
submit that personal knowledge means exactly what it says — that the peace officer is aware
that the accused has committed an offense, in this case, membership in a subversive
organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their
amendment, the Rules (then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would
have arguably encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to
by the majority. Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I
respectfully submit that to give to "personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable
ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise.
What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man"
had been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando
Dural. Clearly, what we have is second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to
say, not personal knowledge.
I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar
arrest because of lack of personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge
was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by
[another] . . ." 8 I do not see how We can act differently here.
I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be well-taken.
Santos involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest
without a warrant). Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved
the peace officer on grounds of good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace
officer, was acting in good faith, as the majority here says that the military was acting in good
faith, the arrest is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that notwithstanding good
faith on the part of the police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.
As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite
evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an
information, and that it was reliable, and that "it was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the
second place, the hospital authorities (the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the
military under existing laws. We have, it should be noted, previously rejected such a species of
information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges
under pain of criminal prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who
that informant was.
The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending
Presidential Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of
violence to "government health authorities" — not to the military.
I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have
personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for
the military to ignore the courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue
warrants. As People vs. Burgos held:
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the
accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 12
I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162) could have been
lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had
(again) acted on a mere tip-the military had no personal knowledge (as I elaborated what
personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think that the majority can say that since Amelia
Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests
were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the
question before the trial court and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent
for this Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all, and as the majority
points out, we are talking simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests.
More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the
military, and evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we can not approve
an arrest simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's
anyway")— that would be abdication of judicial duty and when, moreover, the very basis of the
claim rests on dubious "confidential information."
41
According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as
a "sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."
It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me
immaterial that the guilt of the accused still has to be established, since meanwhile, the
accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if
in the opinion of the majority, it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative measure").
I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno
(G.R. Nos. 85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition, in uttering
supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the following:
Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13
28 First and foremost, and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact
dealing with "Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves
subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the dictator's own
excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old
excuses. Third, Garcia and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly
justified in a regime that respects the rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a
defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth and finally, it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor
"national security" are valid grounds for warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.
I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent
jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no
longer be defended, if they could have been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own
peers in the bar.

Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to
sedition" a continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that it is either, but that:
. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as
falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu has not lost the
right to insist, during the trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace
officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the
bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14
And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all,
protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of
defense; (2) we are talking of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are concerned, "the Court
has, in this case, titled in favor of authority," 15 and (3) we have, anyway, given a reduced bail
to the accused.
First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my
mind, it is a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without
shirking the Court's constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain, because it does not contain
enough "fighting words" recognized to be seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before
the Court—whether or not the statement in question constitutes an offense for purposes of a
warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can
not answer it.
What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a
continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of
course, the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to
make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked up the following day, and in no way is "the
following day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have stretched the authority of peace
officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the
contemplation of the Rules of Court.
"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its
legality, via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also
to patronize the petitioners and simply, to offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is
validating their continued detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which
the public should be elated.
A Final Word
As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I
reiterate one principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right
against arbitrary State action. "The right of the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The State," the Charter
likewise states, "values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." 32 The Constitution states the general rule — the majority would make the
exception the rule, and the rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what
constitutionalism is all about.
I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the first place,
doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information"
(manufactured or genuine, we have no way of telling) and in the second place, any information
with which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay, not personal,
information. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not
justify the arrests in question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority insists is the
applicable rule.
Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso
Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu
was arrested one day after the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up
fourteen days after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would approve the police's actions
nonetheless because the police supposedly "found out only later." I submit that the majority
has read into Section 5(b) a provision that has not been written there.
"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority,
"what is important is that the Court be right." 33

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or
escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes,
as there was none in the case of Burgos.
In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to
be committed or had just been committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a
moving vehicle is involved, instant police action can not be justified.
"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case,
titled in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange
declaration, first, because it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side
of Government), and second, because this Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty
— as the custodian of the Bill of Rights — even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.
I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this
case," 22 as if to say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do
not understand why these cases are apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is
not telling us neither. I am wondering why, apart from the fact that these cases involved,
incidentally, people who think differently from the rest of us.
The majority goes on:
Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or
palatability. Umil is a question, on the contrary, of whether or not the military (or police), in
effecting the arrests assailed, had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless
arrests. Umil is a question of whether or not this Court, in approving the military's actions, is
right.
In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances,
torture, hamletting, bombings, saturation drives, and various human rights violations increase
in alarming rates. In its update for October, 1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
found:
An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;
Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to
September, 1990, 4,419, illegally;
Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated
salvage, and 109 remained missing after their arrest;
Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157
were wounded;

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;
without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;
came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. 23
From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;
With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its
pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in general), and I feel I am One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence
appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 34
of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may, rightly or wrongly, be in time made to defend such
an indefensible pronouncement. It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am
also disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving. Nonetheless, I am
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" hopeful that despite my departure, it will not be too late.
and the authorities must have "personal knowledge."
Motions denied.
In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in
fact (allegedly) committed. In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge"
two weeks thereafter; whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal
knowledge" of a crime that had "just been committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they
have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before.

In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional

provisions of the Rules.

I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose
that I am saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected
criminal, if he can not be arrested without a warrant, can not be arrested at all — but that the
military should first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. It is not too much
to ask of so-called law enforcers.

As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have
purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the
Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. As it is, the
majority has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies
even judges 24 — today it is fourteen days, tomorrow, one year, and sooner, a decade. I
submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact unreasonable, following the theory of the
majority, since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only later," as the majority did
not find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know that Nazareno
was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II" 25—and none of us can possibly
dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure"
alone—we are talking of arrests, of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of
whether or not people are guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly
the point, I respectfully submit, and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners'
predicament.

With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia
Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled
confession) was precisely, the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I
respectfully submit, to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed,
because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely, pounced on him. I am
not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be
presumed) but I can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the
military that he was an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him.

I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27 have been
better days. I do not see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security
and stability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels."

42
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution
dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the
prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00
o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban
Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused
is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing
a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused
to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it;
that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was
a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said
container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic
sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the
charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September
2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of
planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to
show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain
shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required
respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment
dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful
arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was
not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming
there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon
him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by
Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance
requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga
and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not
wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he
had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending
officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime
in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the
accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be
lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x. 8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the
trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither
the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other
agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this
Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not
contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue
a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date
of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall
become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the
date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual 12 provides the following
procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule
is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall
undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic
Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument
with the driver or any of the vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be
said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There
was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether
the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be
considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the
questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the
procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of
action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most
States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having
stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be
enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.,
at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and
brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s
expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged
to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely
will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic
stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in
which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his
interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist
feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an
armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding
whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to
questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop,"
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in
our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive
aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant
to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is
settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler,
463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a
traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical
purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to
modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed
under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
43
Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic
citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner,
the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under
the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the
latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility
of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a
driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of
a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate
control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full
search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a
custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the
need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued
a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further
evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in
the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to
the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.22

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of
arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. 14 It may also be
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.24

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very
person apprehended due to a traffic violation: corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.26

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling
pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s
will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual
cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February
2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case
No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a SO ORDERED.
traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him
to be arrested for a second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as
he was already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search;
and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered,
was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s
pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.16

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that
petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to
take out the contents of his pocket.18

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1)
the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3)
whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe
that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.20

In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person
for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this
procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein
held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:

In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest"
exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the
need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales
for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x
x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than
in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
"danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect
into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized
that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to
a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest
. . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic
stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while
the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,

44
G.R. No. 200396
MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN, Petitioners
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose.1 A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the
authority to barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search
warrant. While there are instances where arrests and searches may be made without a
warrant, the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches
and seizures was violated in the case at bar.
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the June 13,
2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the
October 25, 2006 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Virac,
Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464) convicting both petitioners for Violation of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1602 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9287, otherwise
known as "An Act Increasing the Penalties for Illegal Numbers Games Amending Certain
Provisions of PD 1602 and for Other Purposes." Petitioner Martin T. Villamor (Villamor) was
convicted as a collector of bets in the illegal numbers game of "lotteng" under Section 3(c) of
RA 9287, while petitioner Victor G. Bonaobra (Bonaobra) was convicted as a coordinator,
controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) of the said Jaw. The RTC sentenced Villamor to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine (9)
years as maximum, while Bonaobra was sentenced to suffor the penalty of imprisonment of
ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum.
Factual Antecedents
Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets
for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng' and possessing a list of various
numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash. The charge stemmed from the following
lnformation:4
That on or ahout the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of
Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, \vi thin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
said accused with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [ willfully ], unlawfully
and feloniously engage, collect [and] solicit x x x bets for illegal numbers game locally known
as "Lotteng" by having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and
money and lotteng paraphernalias.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Another Information5 was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same
law, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality
of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the said accused with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully
and feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" while in
possession of gambling paraphernalias, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, list of various
numbers and cash in the amount of ₱1,500.00 representing collection of bets.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners filed t1eir respective Motions for Reinvestigation, which were both granted by the
RTC. Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued separate Resolutions both
dated September 13, 2005 amending the Informations in both cases.
In the Amended Information, the phrase "acting as a collector" was included to charge Villamor
as a collector in an illegal numbers game. The Amended Information 6 provides:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality
of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the said accused acting as a collector with intent [to] gain thru illegal means[,] did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and foloniously engage, collect and solicit bets for illegal numbers
game locally known as "Lotteng" by having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of
various numbers and money and lotteng paraphernalias.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the other hand, Bonaobra was charged as a manager or operator in the Amended
Info1mation,7 the incriminatory paragraph of which states:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality
of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the said accused acting as manager and operator with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did
then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers
game locally known as "lotteng" while in possession of gambling paraphernalia, such as [a]
calculator, cellphone, lists of variott5 numbers and cash in the amount of ₱l,500,00
representing colleciion of bets.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When separately arraigned, Villamor, on October 4, 2005 and Bonaobra, on November 29,
2005, both pleaded not guilty to the respective charges filed against them. After the pre-trial
conference, a joint trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Domingo Tejerero (Tejerero), Provincial
Director, Police Superintendent Francisco Penaflor (PD Peñaflor), SP04 Severino Malasa, Jr.,
and POI David Adrian Saraspi (POI Saraspi). Culled from the records were the following facts:
On June 17, 2005, at around 9:00 a.m., PD Peñaflor received a call from an infonnant
regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes,
specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO 1
Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the
report.
Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound
fenced by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on
inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets,
described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in
"papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets.
When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers
and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to ₱l,500.00 in
different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners
were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal
gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented six witnesses, namely Villamor, Bonaobra, Demetrio Bonaobra. the
brother of Bonaobra, Florencio Bonaobra (Florencio), the father of Bonaobra, Juan Vargas,
and Jonah Bonaobra (Jonah), the wife of Bonaobra. Their testimonies are summarized below.
On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30 a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he
owed to the latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father
Florencio inside their house. Villamor gave Bonaobra ₱2,000.00 which the latter placed on top
of the table. Bonaobra then went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra
was at the door, a man later identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house,
grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the act ka!" Florencio went outside and
asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men entered the house and took the
money from the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service vehicle and brought in
for investigation at the police headquarters.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 25, 2006, the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally
known as ''lotteng," a variant of the game Last Two,8 respectively as a collector or agent under
Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287.
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners
were caught in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng,"
a variant of Last Two. The RTC held that petitioners were seen by the arresting officers in the
act of counting bets before the arrest was made inside Bonaobra' s compound. 1he petitioners
were also caught holding "'papelitos," which contained the three rows of two-number
combinations. Since the winning combination in "lotteng" is taken from the first two numbers of
the winning combinations in the daily draw of the lotto in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes,
the RTC held that the number combinations shown in the ''papelitos" were meant to
correspond to the lotto results.
The RTC further held that Villamor's participation in the illegal numbers game was that of a
collector since he brought bet money to Bonaobra while the latter was that of a coordinator,
controller, or supervisor after it was shown that he received the money from Villamor.
The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby SENTENCES
Martin Villamor to suffer a penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as
minimum to nine (9) years as maximum, and Victor Bonaobra to suffer a penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum. Likewise, the money
amounting to ₱l,500.00 and the other personal properties used as gambling paraphernalia, like
the calculator, ballpen and cellular phone are confiscated in favor of the state.
SO ORDERED9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA brushed aside Bonaobra's
argument that his right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime different
from that with which he was charged. The CA held that the classification of a maintainer,
manager, or operator includes a coordinator, controller, or supervisor. 10 The CA ratiocinated
that to hold a maintainer guilty of the lesser offense of acting as a coordinator will not be
violative of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation since the graver
offense of acting as a maintainer necessarily includes being a coordinator.
With respect to Villamor, the CA gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the
arresting officer who were presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official
functions. The CA held that Villamor' s denials cannot prevail over the positive assertions of
the police officers who caught him in the act of revising and counting bets.
The CA disposed the case as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this Petition.
Issue
The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as
collector or agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor
m1der Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition meritorious.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire "case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the
trial court's decision [based on] x x x grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors."12
The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a
valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a
warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the
evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same
having been obtained in violation of the said right.
Section 2, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence
of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents.
45
Without the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the
Constitution and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and
seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 13 "Evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree." 14
In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or
caught in the act of committing an offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers claim
that petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were arrested
without a warrant.
We are not persuaded.
Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even
without a warrant of arrest in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur,
namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 15
After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid
warrantless arrest on petitioners.1âwphi1 It was not properly established that petitioners had
just committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act
or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1
Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners.
PO 1 Saraspi's testimony during cross examination reveals the following:
ATTY. SAMONTE:
Q While you were outside the compound of Bonaobra, what was your distance to accused
Martin Villamor and Victor Bonaobra?
A More or less fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters.
Q Is it not that the compound of Bonaobra is surrounded with fence?
A Yes, sir.
Q Bamboo fence, right?
A Yes, sir, without a gate.
Q Are you sure it's without a gate?
A Probably it was open.
Q Can you determine the height of the fence?
A Between 5'7" to 5'9".
Q More than your height?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell us whether you can see what the person is doing inside the compound while
you are outside?
A The fence is made up [sic] of bamboo and there were gaps as far as the fence is concerned
that is why when we alighted from the Frontier we saw what was inside the compound.
Q And the space of each bamboo, can you determine [sic]?
A One and half to two inches apart.
Q When you were already outside the compound what were the accused doing?
A They were sitting and they were revising.
Q Were they seated with [sic] a table?
A They were sitting and Victor Bonaobra was without a shirt.
Q What were they holding?
A 'Papelitos'.
Q What else?
A While they were holding 'papelitos' the monies were just on the table.
Q At the distance of 15 to 10 meters can you determine the contents of the 'papelitos'?
A No, sir.
Q So you are not sure whether those are gambling paraphernalia?
A No, sir.
Q Because you do not know the contents of that and you are not sure whether those are
gambling paraphernalia you went inside, is that right?
A After we introduced ourselves that we are [sic] police officers we entered the compound.
Q Meaning to say you were outside the compound and saying you are policemen?
A We entered first and we introduced ourselves.
Q Which is first, going inside or introducing yourselves?
A While entering we were also introducing ourselves simultaneously.
Q When you reached inside, what did you determine?
A We determined that there were lotteng paraphernalia on the table.
Q That is the only time that you determined that those were gambling paraphernalia?
A No, even on the [sic] outside we identified it already.
Q A while ago you said at a distance of 15 to 10 meters you can determine whether they were
in possession of the illegal gambling paraphernalia?
A What I am trying to say is that I cannot identify those that are written on the 'papelitos' at the
distance and I saw the calculator, the money bets.
Q So what you saw within a distance of 15 to 10 meters are calculators, money and
cellphone?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you consider money gambling paraphernalia?
A Yes, sir.
Q So every time you see money you will consider that a gambling paraphernalia?
A In other situations.
Q How about calculator, do you consider calculator gambling paraphernalia?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you go to a department store there are calculators, do you consider those calculators
gambling paraphernalia?
A If you are going to consolidate all these items in a table all of these are gambling
paraphernalia
Q So when you consolidate these items and papers and calculators, if you see those items at
Century Trading, will you consider those as gambling paraphernalia? 16
Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the
petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a
c1iminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even
admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which
made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It appears that the police
officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not
on personal knowledge that a crime had just been c01m11itted, was actually being committed,
or was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police
officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately
preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound,
he could not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator,
phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling
paraphernalias.
On the part of PD Peñaflor, he likewise admitted that from his position outside the compound,
he could not determine the activities of the persons inside. It was only after he had illegally
entered the compound, since he was not armed with a warrant, that he supposedly saw the
gambling paraphernalia. PD Peñaflor's testimony in this regard is as follows:
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness, the distance of the house of Victor Bonaobra
to that place where you parked your vehicle when you arrived in the vicinity?
A When I parked my vehicle in front of the compound because that is a street, the distance
from the street to that place where there is an on-going 'revisar' of 'lotteng', more or less 15 to
20 meters, I believe, from the gate.
Q So, you did not immediately go inside the compound of Victor Bonaobra?
A Yes, sir. I verified first if there is really [sic] persons in the compound.
46
Q So, at that distance of 15 to 20 meters, you were able to verify what they were doing on the
particular 1ime, Mt. Witness?
A No, sir.17
During his direct examination, Bonaobra testified that he was only answering his cellphone
when PD Peñaflor barged into his compound and arrested him. The relevant portions of his
testimony reveals the following:
ATTY SAMONTE:
Q At around 9:00 a.m. of June 17, 2005, what were you doing if you still remember?
A I stood up and I went out and made [sic] three steps from the door to answer the cellphone
and later on I was surprised when the police whom I could not identify, kicked the door.
Q Mr. Witness, which door [are you] referring to [that] was kicked by the police?
A The gate outside of our fence.
xxxx
Q You said a while ago that the policeman kicked the door of your fence x
xx who was that policeman, if you know him?
A: Provincial Director Peñaflor.
Q: Who was with PD Peñaflor on [sic] that particular time, if any, Mr. Witness?
A Two (2) persons in civilian clothes.
xx xx
Q After PD Peñaflor kicked the door of your fence, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A He held my hand and he seized my cellphone.
xxxx
Q After PD Peñaflor seized your cellphone, what else did he do?
A He said, "caught in the act."
Q Which comes first, Mr. Witness, the utterance made by PD Peñaflor that you were caught in
the act or the utterance made by your father whether they had a warrant?
A When my father asked them whether they have a warrant.
Q And what was the answer of PD Peñaflor when your father asked that question?
A He said, "caught in the act."
Q And what was the reply of your father?
A My father said that what you am doing is wrong, that is prohibited.
Q And what did PD Peñaflor answered [sic] to your father?
A He shouted at my father, "Di na kailangan yan" (That is not needed). 18
From the circumstances above, it is highly suspect that PD Peñaflor had witnessed any overt
act indicating that the petitioners were actually committing a crime. While PD Peñaflor claims
that he caught the petitioners in the act of collecting bets and counting bet money, this
observation was highly improbable given the distance of the police from the petitioners and the
fact that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence.
For his part, Villamor claimed that he was at the Bonaobra compound to repay his loan to
Jonah. The prosecution, through Prosecutor Tañon, even admitted this fact during Jonah's
direct examination. The following exchange between the prosecution and the defense was
quite revealing:
ATTY. SAMONTE:
Your Honor, please, [may] I respectfully offer the testimony of Jona[h] Bonaobra to show that
she is the ·wife of Victor Bonaobra; that at around 8:30 a.m. of June 17, 2005 she was inside
their residence at Bonaobra's compound, Francia, Virac, Catanduances and on that particular
time and date, Martin Villamor arrived to pay his debt and she personally witnessed the
unlawful act committed by the policemen who entered their dwelling on that particular lime and
date and such other matters relative thereto, Your Honor.
COURT:
Any comment from the prosecution?
PROS. TAÑON:
We will admit that she is the wife of Victor Bonaobra; that on Jw1e 17, 2005 at 8:30 in the
morning she was inside the residence of Bonaobra's compound; that accused Martin Villamor
arrived to pay his debt. We are to contest on that she personally witnessed the unlawful act.
A1TY. SAMONTE:
To clarify that, the prosecution is admitting the fact that Martin arrived to pay the loan on that
particular day?
PROS. TAÑON:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Okay, so that we can proceed to the other matters. 19 (Emphasis supplied)
From the exchange above, it is clear that the prosecution admitted that Villamor went to
Bonaobra's house to pay his loan to Jonah. Thus, at the exact moment of the arrest, neither
Bonaobra, who was answering his cellphone, nor Villarr1or, who was paying his loan. was
performing any overt act constitutive of a crime.
Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the
same does not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the
search and seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since
there could be no valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized
from Bonaobra's house is inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.
The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be
raised before arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the
legality of the arrest especially when the accused actively participated during trial as in this
case. However, we have clarified that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest
and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest. In People v.
Racho,20 the Court held that:
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree', hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution, 'any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding'.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant's conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right
to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of
the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of
illegal gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller,
or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said law, a collector or agent is "any
person who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal
numbers game who is usually in possession of gambling paraphernalia." 21 On the other hand,
a coordinator, controller, or supervisor is defined as, ''any person who exercises control and
supervision over the collector or agent."22 The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal
gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the
specific overt acts that constitute the offense.
All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in
evidence since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the Court acquits petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457
which affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 in
Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Martin
Villamor y Tayson and Victor Bonaobra y Gianan are ACQUITTED and are ordered to be
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
47
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL
WHEN ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE
ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested
Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They
saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to
the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and
of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant,
he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS
AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. — The search conducted on Gerente's
person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section
12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.
In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991
Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed
weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his
person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR.
— There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of
having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the
testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have
been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only
one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That
circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of
Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of
all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she
overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they
attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When
there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err
in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General
correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in
People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum;
and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in
Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A.
6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one
day as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor
mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as
funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive
imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a
transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was
charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and
signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
together with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary
investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of
wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault
and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly
caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel
Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and
smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the
house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three
men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo
Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly
seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly
agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00
p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she
witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by
Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and
when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the
three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station
received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital
officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull
caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police
Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the
mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block
and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men
who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him
to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia
frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in
cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects,
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial
of the two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged
despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence
in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the
dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police
officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession
were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of
the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block
which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could
lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could
obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected
one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this
Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape
in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47
U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was
48
ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be
used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony
of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been
inflicted by one person only.

What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete
hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not
absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to
commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his
companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece
of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that
the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna
Reyes' testimony.

Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.

The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil
indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

49
G.R. No. 136267 July 10, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FIDEL ABRENICA CUBCUBIN, JR., accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on automatic review of the decision, 1 dated October 5, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr.
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about August 26, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with an unlicensed
homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver, with no serial number, with intent to
kill, acting with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of the darkness of
[the] night, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, assault, attack and shoot
with the aforesaid unlicensed firearm a certain HENRY PECHO PIAMONTE, hitting and
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in the head which caused the latter's instantaneous
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon trial on the merits ensued.
Eight witnesses were presented by the prosecution: police officers Florentino M. Malinao, Jr.,
Enrico A. Rosal, Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr., and Virgilio L. Pilapil, all of whom belong to the
Cavite City Police Department; National Bureau of Investigation ballistician Isabelo D.
Silvestre, Jr.; NBI Forensic Chemist II Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum; Dr. Regalado D. Sosa, City
Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of Health (DOH) in Cavite
City; and Danet D. Garcellano, a food server at the Sting Cafe in San Antonio, Cavite City. The
testimony of Police Chief Inspector Edwin G. Nemenzo, Chief of the Records, Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was
dispensed with in view of his certification, dated October 7, 1997 (Exh. N), 3 that accused-
appellant is not a licensed/registered holder of firearm of any kind and caliber.
The prosecution evidence is to the following effect:
At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City
police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along
Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed
of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded
to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked
on the road. Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene (Exhs. A, A-1,
A-2, and A-3)4 showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. 5 PO3 Rosal testified
that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that accused-appellant and the
victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the
gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene.
Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano,
a food server/waitress in Sting Cafe.6 The other policemen at the police station called up City
Prosecutor Agapito Lu who also proceeded to Sting Cafe. Garcellano told the police
investigators that she had seen accused-appellant arrive at Sting Cafe at about 12:00 midnight
and drink beer; that at about 2:30 a.m., the victim arrived and joined accused-appellant; that
the two stayed in the cafe until 3:30 a.m.; and that she did not know if they left together as she
was serving other customers. Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean, dark-
complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants.7
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that
Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce." Armando Plata, who knew
where accused-appellant lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to
accused-appellant's house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen knocked on the
door for about three minutes before it was opened by a man who answered the description
given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be accused-appellant. The police operatives
identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the
shooting near the cemetery. Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal
and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house. 8
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the
brand name "Hanes" (Exh. H)9 and the name "Dhenvher" written in the inner portion of the
shirt's hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he
found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it.
PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant while he conducted a search. They then took the t-
shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked accused-appellant to go with
them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was positively
identified by Danet Garcellano as the victim's companion. The police investigators asked
accused-appellant where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said accused-appellant refused
to tell him where he hid the gun so he sought his (accused-appellant's) permission to go back
to his house to conduct a further search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by
Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded
thereto.10 Inside the house, they saw accused-appellant's 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy,
Jr. found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith
and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial number (Exh. F). He found the
gun loaded with five live bullets (Exhs. M, M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4). PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he
inscribed his initials "RDE" (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of
a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3
Rosal stayed with accused-appellant in the sala.11 The .38 caliber gun (Exhs. B, B-1),12 the
white "Hanes" t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B),13 and the two spent .38 caliber shells (Exhs. B-
2, B-2-B)14 were all photographed. Accused-appellant was then taken to the police station,
where he was photographed (Exh. B-3)15 along with the things seized from him.
SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division, testified that on
August 26, 1997, the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho Piamonte was forwarded to him
by PO3 Rosal together with the evidence consisting of a bloodstained white "Hanes" t-shirt, a
.38 revolver with five live ammunitions, and two deformed slugs. After an evaluation of the
evidence, he formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant. He took
blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the NBI for laboratory examination.16
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of
Health in Cavite City, conducted a postmortem examination of the cadaver and prepared an
autopsy report (Exh. O)17 which showed the following findings:
AUTOPSY REPORT
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
A medium built fair complexioned male adult human body in its cadaveric state with gunshot
wounds . . . described as follows:
= Gunshot wound, 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., oval in shape with powder burns more on top of the
wound to 2.5 cms. elevation/height located at the angle of the right jaw and/or 5 cms. below
the inferior level of the right ear. The wound has irregular and inverted borders. It is directed
inwards fracturing the lower edge of the angle of the right mandible and the lead slug is
embedded at the right lateral portion of the first (1st) cervical vertebrae hence extracted.
= Gunshot wound, 1 cm. in d[iameter] with inverted irregular borders located at the left frontal
region 5 cms. above the temporal end of the left eyebrow. It is directed inwards and
downwards fracturing the bone (frontal) underneath into [the] intracranial cavity.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
= Presence of circular complete fracture, 0.8 cm. in d[iameter] at the left frontal region.
= The left frontal lobe of the brain is perforated and the frontal lobe is enveloped with liquid and
clotted blood.
= The lead slug is found at the inner surface of the left frontal lobe.
= The right mandibular region was incised near the gunshot wound and the area is severely
hematomatous and explored until a lead slug [was] found at the 1st cervical vertebrae at the
right side.
= Stomach contains liquid and little rice and with alcoholic (beer) smell.
= Other internal organs are significantly normal.
Slugs extracted:
1. 0.6 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug with one end is markedly deformed. The length of the slug is
1.6 cms.
Note: One diagonal incised line was marked on the slug.
2. A 0.7 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug . . . roundly/ovally deformed [on] one end. The length of the
slug is 1.8 cm.
Note: Two diagonal incised lines [were] marked on the said slug.
Dr. Sosa testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds (Exh. R), 18 the first one located
on the right jaw below the ear while the second wound located at the left temporal side above
the left eyebrow. The slug from the first gunshot wound remained at the base of the neck, near
the spinal column. There were powder burns, called "tatooing," surrounding the first wound
which showed that the victim was shot point-blank. The second slug was also embedded at the
front lobe of the brain.19 Dr. Sosa indicated in the Certificate of Death (Exh. Q) that the victim
died of "shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot
wounds."20
Upon written request (Exh. C)21 of Prosecutor Lu, the NBI conducted a ballistics examination to
determine whether the two slugs taken from the body of the victim were fired from the firearm
recovered from accused-appellant.
Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., an NBI ballistician, conducted on September 10, 1997 a comparative
examination of the two "evidence bullets," marked as "HPP-1" (Exh. E) and "HPP-2" (Exh. E-
1), which had been recovered from the victim's head and the three "test bullets" (Exhs. G, G-1,
G-2) fired from the seized .38 caliber firearm. The tests showed that the "evidence bullets"
were fired from the subject firearm.22 The empty shells from the three "test bullets" fired were
duly marked (Exhs. G-3, G-4, G-5). No photographs were taken. Silvestre's findings were
confirmed by four other NBI ballisticians: Chief Ballistician Rogelio Munar, Supervising
Ballistician Ernie Magtibay, Senior Ballistician Elmer Pieded, and, Flor Landicho, another
ballistician. The two .38 caliber empty shells recovered from accused-appellant were no longer
examined.23
Prosecutor Lu also made a written request (Exh. J) 24 for a laboratory examination of the
bloodstains on the white "Hanes" t-shirt of accused-appellant to determine whether such were
identical to the blood of the victim.
Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, NBI Forensic Chemist II, testified that on September 26, 1997, she
conducted three kinds of laboratory examinations, namely, (a) benzidine test, to determine the
presence of blood; (b) precipitin test, to determine if the bloodstains came from human or
animal blood; and (c) ABO grouping test, to determine the blood group. When tested and
matched together, the bloodstained white "Hanes" t-shirt and the blood sample of the victim
yielded positive results for human blood belonging to blood type "O" (Exh. K).25
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself, his son Jhumar, and his sister
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua.
Accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. testified that he enlisted in the Philippine
Constabulary as a soldier in 1974 but was discharged in 1977 for being AWOL. He said he left
for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a driver and came back in 1979. He was later employed
as a driver by a friend, who owned a junk shop in Cavite City. He admitted knowing the victim
whom he addressed as "Kuya." Accused-appellant testified that from 10:00 in the evening to
12:00 midnight of August 25, 1997, he and some friends played a card game called "tong-its"
on Molina Street, Cavite City. Afterwards, he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he had some
drinks while waiting for food to be served. Henry Piamonte, a tricycle driver, arrived and had
drinks with him. After a while, the victim left as a passenger was waiting to be given a ride. The
victim came back to the restaurant before 1:00 a.m. and had another bottle of beer with
accused-appellant. At about 1:30 a.m., the victim again left to transport another passenger.
After that, the victim did not come back anymore. 26
Accused-appellant said he left Sting Cafe at about 2:00 a.m. and took a tricycle home to 1151
Garcia Extension, San Antonio, Cavite City. He was sleeping on the sofa in his bedroom when
he was awakened by the arrival of three policemen, two of them he recognized as SPO1
Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Estoy, Jr., who pointed their guns at him and told him to lie face down.
He said he was handcuffed while the policemen searched his room, turning the sala set upside
down and opening the cabinets. His son, Jhumar, stood beside him. Before leaving, the
policemen took from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son Denver. Accused-
appellant said that he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he was afraid
they would maltreat him. He denied the claim of the policemen that the white t-shirt had blood
stains. He claimed that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest
when they took him into custody. Nor did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain
silent and to be assisted by counsel. He also said that he was made to stay in a police patrol
car for almost two hours before he was brought inside the police station. He denied owning the
.38 caliber revolver presented to him by Prosecutor Lu and SPO4 Pilapil or that the same had
been recovered from his house. He also denied the prosecution's claim that he was taken to
the Sting Cafe where he was allegedly identified by Danet Garcellano as the person last seen
with the victim before the latter was killed.27
Jhumar Cubcubin, son of accused-appellant, testified that at about 4:00 in the morning of
August 26, 1997, he was sleeping on the second floor of the house when he was roused from
his sleep by loud knocks on the door. When he opened the door, he saw three policemen who
were looking for his father. He told them that his father was not around, but he was shoved
50
away. They proceeded upstairs to the room of his father where they took from the clothes
stand a white "Hanes" t-shirt belonging to his brother Denver. They put his father in a police
patrol car waiting outside. Jhumar immediately went to his aunt, Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, and
reported to her what had happened. He went back to the house and saw some policemen still
conducting a search. As the policemen were about to leave, a van with some other policemen
on board arrived. They asked him where the water container was located. They went inside the
house and, when they came out, one of them announced that he had found a gun, which was
then photographed. Jhumar said that while his father was inside the police patrol car, his aunt
was arguing with the policemen. At that instance, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. spread the t-shirt and told
Jhumar's aunt "Eto, puro dugo damit niya," although the t-shirt had no bloodstains. He said
that he and his father never gave permission to the policemen to search their house.28
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, accused-appellant's sister, testified that at about 5:30 in the
morning of August 26, 1997, she was told by her nephew, Jhumar, that accused-appellant had
been apprehended by some policemen. She and Jhumar then went to the police patrol car
where she saw her brother in handcuffs. She said she protested to the policemen that there
was no evidence that accused-appellant had killed the victim. Yolanda said she saw the
confiscated white Hanes t-shirt, but she claimed the same did not have any bloodstain on it.
She went back to her house to call up her mother in Gen. Trias, Cavite to let her know what
had happened. She then went out to see accused-appellant and saw Jhumar, who told her that
some policemen were searching accused-appellant's house and found a gun.29
On October 5, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
murder. It based its finding on circumstantial evidence, to wit: (1) That Danet Garcellano, a
waitress at the Sting Cafe, saw accused-appellant arrive at about 12:00 midnight of August 25,
1997 and drink beer, while the victim arrived at about 2:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997 and joined
accused-appellant in drinking beer at the bar. She said that she served them beer and they
stayed for about an hour, that the two later had an argument as accused-appellant wanted to
have two more bottles of beer which the victim paid for, and that at about 3:30 a.m., the victim
and accused-appellant left and boarded the victim's tricycle; (2) That PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. testified that they saw the lifeless body of the victim, with bullet wounds on his
head, slumped on the handle of his tricycle, that the crime scene was about 50 meters away
from the house of accused-appellant, and that when they were told by an unidentified tricycle
driver that the victim and accused-appellant were seen leaving the Sting Cafe together, they
went to Sting Cafe and interviewed Danet Garcellano who described the appearance of the
victim's companion. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver who knew accused-appellant as the
person being described by Garcellano, accompanied the policemen to the house of accused-
appellant; (3) That after SPO1 Malinao, Jr. was allowed to enter the house, he found a white
"Hanes" t-shirt with bloodstains on it and also recovered two spent .38 caliber shells; (4) That
when accused-appellant was taken to the Sting Cafe, he was positively identified by Danet
Garcellano as the victim's companion moments prior to his death; (5) That when the
investigators returned to the house of accused-appellant, PO3 Estoy, Jr. found a .38 caliber
revolver placed on top of a plastic water container located outside the bathroom; (6) That
laboratory examination conducted by the forensic chemist, Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, showed
that the bloodstains on the white "Hanes" t-shirt were human blood, type "O," which matched
the blood type of the victim; and (7) That per ballistic examination of NBI ballistician, Isabelo D.
Silvestre, Jr., the two slugs recovered from the head of the victim were fired from the .38
caliber revolver seized from accused-appellant's house.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's alibi, giving full credence to the testimonies of
Danet Garcellano and the police investigators whom it found to have no motive to falsely
implicate accused-appellant. It admitted the prosecution evidence consisting of the white
"Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 caliber revolver, on the ground that these items
had been seized as incident to a lawful arrest. It ruled that since Dr. Sosa testified that the
victim was shot point-blank while on his tricycle and was not in a position to see the assailant,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present, not to mention that the victim was
unarmed and thus totally defenseless. The trial court theorized that while the victim was on his
tricycle, the assailant went around and shot him on the left temple. It held that the use of an
unlicensed firearm in killing the victim constituted an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the trial
court found accused-appellant guilty of murder and accordingly imposed on him the penalty of
death. Hence, this appeal.
On April 18, 2000, the Court received a letter, dated April 5, 2000, 30 from Victoria Abrenica
Dulce, mother of accused-appellant, with an attached affidavit of desistance entitled
"Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Uurong," dated November 14, 1997,31 executed by Marilou B.
Piamonte, widow of the victim, stating that accused-appellant had been mistakenly identified
as the assailant, and, by reason thereof, sought the dismissal of the criminal case against him.
In her letter, Dulce said that the affidavit of desistance was supposed to be submitted to the
trial court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, but, for unknown
reasons, the same was not done by accused-appellant's counsel. This affidavit of desistance,
however, not being formally offered before the trial court, has no probative value.
We now consider accused-appellant's assignment of errors.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26, 1997 without a
warrant, was illegal. On this point, Rule 113, §5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another."
Under §5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender
has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has
been held that "'personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." 32
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed.
The question, therefore, is whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We
hold that there was none. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that
accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which
they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what
they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio,
Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been
killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-
appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the
Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-
complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle
driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano
fitted accused-appellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where accused-appellant
lived and accompanied them to accused-appellant's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others.
In an analogous case,33 the police was informed that the accused was involved in subversive
activities. On the basis of this information, the police arrested the accused and, in the course of
the arrest, allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and some subversive materials from the
latter. This Court held that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge since their
information came entirely from an informant. It was pointed out that at the time of his arrest,
the accused was not in possession of the firearm nor engaged in subversive activities. His
arrest without a warrant could not be justified under §5(b).
In another case,34 the accused, in a case of robbery with rape, were arrested solely on the
basis of the identification given by one of the victims. This Court held the arrest to be illegal for
lack of personal knowledge of the arresting officers. More recently, in Posadas v.
Ombudsman,35 this Court, in declaring the arrest without warrant of two University of the
Philippines students to be illegal, held:
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting
officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students
fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is
whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that [the students] were probably guilty.
[T]he NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest [the students] four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate
that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest
without a warrant by the NBI.
Indeed, at the time [the victim] was killed, these [NBI] agents were nowhere near the scene of
the crime. When [the NBI agents] attempted to arrest [the students], the latter were not
committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they
were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, [they], under the supervision of the U.P. police,
were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused-
appellant to be guilty of the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt, a .38
caliber revolver, and two spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time accused-appellant
was arrested, he was not doing anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun
came after his arrest. Moreover, as will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized
from accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a
warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on
November 11, 1997. It is true that on August 28, 1997, he filed a petition for reinvestigation in
which he alleged that he had been illegally detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest.
In its order, dated September 9, 1997, the trial court granted his motion and ordered the City
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation and submit his findings within thirty (30) days
thereof.36 On October 7, 1997, City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu moved for the resetting of
accused-appellant's arraignment from October 8, 1997 to the first week of November, 1997 on
the ground that the findings on the laboratory and ballistics examinations had not yet been
received from the NBI.37 Accused-appellant did not object to the arraignment. The City
Prosecutor's request was, therefore, granted and the arraignment was reset to November 11,
1997.38 Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the information on the ground that his arrest
was illegal and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person. Instead, on
November 11, 1997, at the scheduled arraignment, accused-appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.39 On the same day, the trial court issued an order
stating that, as a result of accused-appellant's arraignment, his motion for preliminary
investigation had become moot and academic and, accordingly, set the case for
trial.40 Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest. 41
Second. Accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the
arresting police officers to search his house and, therefore, the "Hanes" t-shirt, the two spent
slugs, and the .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence.
The prosecution, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of
his house.
To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There
must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. A mere failure on the
part of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. For
as Justice Laurel explained in Pasion Vda de Garcia v. Locsin,42 "As the constitutional
guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is
not consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration or regard for the supremacy
of the law."
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who
conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the
accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. It is noteworthy that the
testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal, on the
search show laborious effort to emphasize that accused-appellant gave them permission to
search his house. At every turn, even when they were not being asked, they said the search
was made with the consent of the accused. As Shakespeare would put it, "the lady doth
protest too much, methinks." Indeed, not only does accused-appellant stoutly deny that he
ever consented to the search of his dwelling but the prosecution has not shown any good
reason why accused-appellant might have agreed to the search.
The prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming
the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid
arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and
seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evidence or from using the
weapon against his captor. It is clear that the warrantless search in this case cannot be
justified on this ground. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accused-
appellant's immediate control. In fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun
only after going back to the house of accused-appellant.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine. As this
Court held in People v. Musa:43
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)]
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the
doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification —
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502
(1983)]
Here, the search of accused-appellant's house was illegal and, consequently, the things
obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white "Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and
51
the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot be said that the .38
caliber gun was discovered through inadvertence. After bringing accused-appellant to the Sting
Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the victim's
companion, the arresting officers allegedly asked accused-appellant where he hid the gun
used in killing the victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when accused-appellant refused to
answer, he sought accused-appellant's permission to go back to his house and there found the
.38 caliber revolver on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun
was purposely sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it.
Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white "Hanes" t-shirt placed on top of the
divider "in plain view" as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would
lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to
what SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not "bloodied" which could have directed his
attention to take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the t-shirt (Exh. B-2), it is not visible
that there were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt (Exh. H) merely had some small specks of blood
at its lower portion.
Third. There is no evidence to link accused-appellant directly to the crime. Danet Garcellano
said that accused-appellant arrived at about midnight of August 25, 1997; that the victim joined
him at about 2:30 a.m.; and that although both left the Sting Cafe at about 3:30 a.m., she really
did not know if they left together. Thus, Danet testified:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q Were they together when they left Sting Cafe or they left one after the other?
A When they were already bringing along with them the two bottles of beer, they talked and
afterwards, I already left them and I served the other customers.
Q Did you actually see Henry Piamonte leave the Sting Cafe?
A They were about to leave already at that time because they were already bringing with
them the two bottles of beer, Sir.
Q But did you see Henry Piamonte actually leave the Sting Cafe?
A When Henry Piamonte left the Sting Cafe, Henry boarded a tricycle, Sir.
Q How about Cubcubin, how did he leave the Sting Cafe?
A He followed Henry, Sir.
Q How did he follow Henry, on foot, on board a vehicle or what?
A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served the other customers inside.44
On cross-examination, Danet said:
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q When he left, he left alone?
A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served inside.
Q Are you saying to us that you did not see him when he left?
A No, Sir, what I know is that he and Cubcubin were together because of the two bottles of
beer which were paid by Piamonte inside, Sir.
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q The accused Fidel Cubcubin left Sting Cafe at 3:30?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, how could you be sure of the time when you were serving other people at that
time?
A That is only my estimation, Sir.
Q You only estimated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And, what was the basis of your estimation?
A Because at that time there were only few customers in that place, Sir.
Q So, you are not really sure what time Fidel Cubcubin left?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You also did not see him leave?
A No, Sir.45
46
In People v. Gallarde, it was explained that positive identification refers essentially to proof of
identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the
crime. This constitutes direct evidence. Or, he may not have actually seen the crime
committed, but is nevertheless able to identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of the
crime, as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others.
This rule, however, cannot be applied in the present case because Danet Garcellano did not
actually see accused-appellant and the victim leave the Sting Cafe together. There is thus
serious doubt as to whether accused-appellant was really the last person seen with the victim.
Her testimony is insufficient to place accused-appellant in the scene of the crime so as to form
part of the chain of circumstantial evidence to show that accused-appellant committed the
crime. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond
reasonable doubt.47
Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant testified that he could not have killed the victim because the latter was his
friend whom he considered his "kuya" or elder brother.48 There is no showing that the killing of
the victim was by reason of a supposed altercation they had as to who would pay for the two
bottles of beer ordered while they were at the Sting Cafe. The beer was later paid for by the
victim. Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after
the commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or words that may express the motive or from
which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred. 49
Rule 133, §4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires the concurrence of the following in
order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the case at bar, there are serious doubts as to whether the crime was committed by
accused-appellant in view of the following: (1) As already stated, Danet Garcellano, a waitress
at the Sting Cafe, did not actually see accused-appellant and the victim leaving the cafe
together at about 3:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997; (2) PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified
that when they arrived at the scene of the crime, they were informed by a tricycle driver that
the victim and the accused-appellant had earlier left the Sting Cafe together, but the tricycle
driver was not presented to confirm this fact; (3) SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that the white
"Hanes" t-shirt was "bloodied," but the evidence shows that it had some bloodstains only on its
lower portion (Exh. H), while the photograph of the t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B),
supposedly taken at the time of the search, shows that it had no bloodstains and this
discrepancy was not explained by SPO1 Malinao, Jr.; (4) The fact that the t-shirt was tested
positive for type "O" blood does not necessarily mean that the bloodstains came from the
victim who also had a type "O" blood; (5) Accused-appellant was never given a paraffin test to
determine if he was positive for gunpowder nitrates; (8) The .38 caliber gun allegedly found in
his house was not examined for the possible presence of accused-appellant's fingerprints; and
(9) The allegation that the gun was placed on top of a water container in accused-appellant's
house is unbelievable as it is improbable that accused-appellant could be so careless as to
leave the fatal weapon there when he could have hidden it or thrown it away.
Nor can we rest easy on the prosecution's claim as to where the two empty shells and the t-
shirt were allegedly found. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that these were placed beside the white
"Hanes" t-shirt and fell when he took the shirt. On direct examination, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q What else did you tell Cubcubin at that time?
A We asked him to allow us to go inside the house and he let us go inside the
house, then after entering the same, while we were in the sala near the kitchen
we saw the white Hanes t-shirt there, Sir, that was near the kitchen.
Q Where exactly was the white t-shirt placed at that time when you saw the
same?
A Because after entering the house you will see the entire portion of that
house and there is a table there and that t-shirt was placed on the table.
Q Was that t-shirt visible from the front door of the house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?
A Before I got the t-shirt, I even asked his permission for me to be able to get
the t-shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after getting
the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was
with blood stains.
Q This white t-shirt, can you tell us the brand of the t-shirt?
A Hanes, Sir.
Q How about the blood spot or blood stains, can you tell us how many, if you
can remember?
A We were in a hurry, I did not count the blood stains anymore but there were
blood stains on the t-shirt, Sir.
Q How about these 2 empty shells that fell when you lifted the t-shirt, can you
describe to us these 2 empty shells?
A Empty shells of .38 cal. bullets, Sir.
Q What did you do with the empty shells?
A I got the t-shirt as well as the 2 empty shells and I showed them to him,
Sir.50
However, on cross-examination, he said he found the empty shells on top of a cabinet
(tokador) in the bedroom on the second floor of the house. Thus, he testified:
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q Where was this t-shirt again when you first saw it?
A In the kitchen area, Sir.
Q Where in the kitchen area, on the floor or on the wall?
52
A It was immediately in front of the door because the house has no divider "Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?
anymore, Sir.

A Before I got the t-shirt I even asked his permission for me to

Q And that t-shirt was immediately near the door, on the floor? be able to get the t-shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission
to get the same, after getting the t-shirt there were even 2 empty
shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains."
A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir, I remember it.

Q What did you do after that, when you saw the t-shirt there?

Q I am just referring to two empty shells that fell, which you said, is that true?
A I asked his permission so that I could take a look at the t-shirt, Sir.

A Yes, Sir, there were empty shells that fell, but I first placed them on top of
Q And you said, you looked at it? the t-shirt because I was planning to wrap these empty shells in the t-shirt.

A Yes, Sir. Q You also testified here on page 40 that the t-shirt was visible from the front
door of the house, is that true?

Q When you said, you looked at it, how did you look at it?
A Yes, Sir.

A I spread it out in front of him, Sir.

Q And you were referring to the time that you entered the house?

Q And when you spread it out in front of him, did you ask him whose t-shirt is
it? A Yes, Sir.

A I asked him if that t-shirt belongs to him, Sir. Q And that was the time that you lift[ed] the t-shirt when you saw it and you
got it?

Q What did he say?

A What I said before was that, I got the t-shirt, I lifted it, after that, I placed it
on its original place, Sir, and I asked him about the firearm but he was not
A According to him, the t-shirt does not belong to him, Sir. commenting anything on that, so I asked permission from him to go upstairs to
look around.

Q You also testified that you found two empty shells?

Q When you said you placed that from the place where you found it, how did
you put it on the place where you found it?
A Yes, Sir.

A I placed it there the way I saw it before, the way it was previously placed
Q Where did you find these two empty shells? there, Sir, because I was planning to bring the t-shirt.52

A From the bedroom upstairs, Sir. Thus, caught in his own contradiction, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. prevaricated but in the process
committed more contradictions. He said he found the empty shells on top of the tokador on the
second floor of the house, brought them downstairs, and then placed them on the t-shirt. When
Q Bedroom upstairs? he got the t-shirt, the empty shells fell on the floor. But how could he have gotten the shells
from the second floor if, according to him, he found them by accident when they fell from the t-
shirt which he found immediately after entering accused-appellant's house and before going up
A Yes, Sir. to the second storey? It is also noteworthy that whereas at first SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said he
found the t-shirt placed on the table near the kitchen, he later said he found it on the floor.

Q You mean, it is a two-storey house?

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding
accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder, is REVERSED
A Yes, Sir, there is a bedroom upstairs. and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Q You found it when you went up?
A I first asked his permission to look around inside the house, Sir, because I
was asking him also about the whereabouts of the firearm he had.
Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to
report to the Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Q And he allowed you?

A He allowed me, sir.

Q And when you went upstairs, you found the two empty shells?

A Yes, Sir, they were placed on their tokador on a place where there is a
curtain.

Q In your previous testimony and this is found on page 41 of the TSN, you
stated that you got the t-shirt and when you lifted the t-shirt, two empty shells fell
off?

A After finding the two empty shells for a .38 caliber, Sir, I placed them
together with the t-shirt.

Q What you are telling us now is that you went upstairs, you found two empty
shells and you put them together with the t-shirt, that is what you are telling us
now?

A After finding and taking a look at the t-shirt, I put it on the original place
where it was, Sir, and after finding the two empty shells, it so happened that the
investigator was behind me so after that, I showed to him the t-shirt as well as
the empty shells.51

....

Q Also in your previous testimony, you got the t-shirt and you asked the
permission to get the t-shirt, after getting the t-shirt, there were 2 empty shells
which fell. The question is, do you remember that this happened?

A These two empty shells which I recovered upstairs, sir, I placed them on
top of the t-shirt.

Q You said, when you got the t-shirt, something fell, in your direct testimony?

A While Fidel Cubcubin was just beside me, Sir, I got the t-shirt, I spread it
out and nothing fell yet at that time, then I asked him about the firearm that he
used.

....

Q Do you remember having been asked this particular question:

53
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10,
finding accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and
costs.1
However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the prosecution of
criminal cases, recommends the acquittal of appellant for the reasons stated in his
Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief) filed with the Court. We have reviewed
and analyzed the testimonial and documentary evidence in this case and we find said
recommendation to be well taken.
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-accused, Samuel
Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, with allegedly having in their custody and possession 100
grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00. 2
During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. At the
trial, the prosecution and the defense presented several witnesses after which the court a
quo rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras but convicting and
penalizing herein appellant as hereinbefore stated.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court and the evidence presented by
the prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi
City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding
officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived and told them that
there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was given P200.00 in different
denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the
Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran
who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of
prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel
Segovia. He asked Segovia where be could find Don and where he could buy marijuana.
Segovia left for a while and when be returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later
on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant. 3
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing
tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he
came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified
as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. 4
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to
apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe
proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested appellant, Antonio Lonceras and
Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the three accused. The arrestees were brought to the headquarters for
investigation. 5
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they
were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The
search, however, was not authorized by any search warrant. 6
The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but appellant
was detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken from and executed by him, was sworn to by him
before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no counsel when his sworn statement was
taken during that custodial investigation. The arrestees were also examined by personnel of
the PCCL and were found positive for ultraviolet powder. 7
The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations.
Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the evening of July 1, 1987 listening to
the radio. Later, he ate his merienda and then went out to buy cigarettes from the store. While
he was at the store, a jeep stopped behind him. Several armed men alighted therefrom and
ordered him to get inside the jeep. He refused but he was forced to board the vehicle. He was
even hit by the butt of a gun. 8
He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was investigated and was
repeatedly asked regarding the whereabouts of Rodrigueza. He was manhandled by the
NARCOM agents and was detained while inside the camp. He was then made to hold a
P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he was taken to the PCCL and examined he
was found positive of the ultraviolet powder. He was also made to sign some papers but he did
not know what they were all about. 9
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in San
Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day
when his brother arrived and told him that their father was taken by some military men the
preceding night. Appellant went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00
o'clock in the morning of July 2, 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew anything
about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the negative. Like Segovia, he
was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From
that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also
tortured in order to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana. 10
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1)
admitting in evidence the sworn statement of appellant which was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the 100
grams of dried marijuana leaves allegedly bought from him were not properly identified; (3)
convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the evidence for the prosecution
is weak and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling
or at least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of marijuana to CIC Taduran late in the
afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 11
We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In disposing of this
case, however, we feel that the issues raised by appellant should properly be
discussed seriatim.
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. 12 Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante
delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling
marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet
this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged
consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of CIC
Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly
contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-
bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been
subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the
law.
2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by appellant was squarely
placed in issue and, as correctly pointed out by the defense, said sworn statement is
inadmissible in evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during custodial examination.
He was also asked if he was waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and he answered in
the affirmative. However, while the rights of a person under custodial investigation may be
waived, such waiver must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in
the presence and with the assistance of counsel. 13 In the present case, the waiver made by
appellant being without the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is sufficient to invalidate
said sworn statement. 14
3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in admitting in evidence
against appellant the articles allegedly confiscated during the raid conducted in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by
a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. 15 True, in some instances,
this Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without
a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against such
incursion; 16 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 when it is made on vessels and
aircraft for violation of customs laws; 18 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 19 when it involves prohibited articles in
plain view; 20 or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations, 21 a search may be validly made even without a search
warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either,
that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have
justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they
should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated
marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against
appellant.
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation
has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and
thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a
transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a
white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana
fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe. 22
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-
up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises as to the
identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. 23 In People
vs. Rubio, 24 this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana
54
leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence
thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to
the cause of the prosecution.

5. It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness will not
affect his credibility. It even enhances such credibility because it only shows that he has not
been rehearsed. 25 However, when the inconsistencies pertain to material and crucial points,
the same detract from his overall credibility.

The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are tainted with serious flaws
and material inconsistencies rendering the same incredible. 26

CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting surveillance of the
place where the buy-bust operation was to take place. It turned out, however, that he did not
even know the exact place and the identity of the person from whom he was to buy marijuana
leaves. Thus:

FISCAL TOLOSA

Q What place in Tagas were you able to

go (to)?

WITNESS

A I am not actually familiar in (sic) that place, in Tagas, although we occasionally passed there.

Q Now, upon your arrival in Tagas, what did you do that afternoon?

A I waited for the suspect because previously, we have already been conducted (sic)
surveylance (sic) in the vicinity.

Q Upon arrival in Tagas, were you able to see the suspect?

A By the road, sir.

Q Who was the first person did you see (sic) when you arrived at Tagas?

A The first person whom I saw is Samuel Segovia.

Q Were you able to talk with this Samuel Segovia?

27
A According to him, we could get some.

The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct examination, he
declared that they arrested the three accused all at the same time on the fateful night of July 1,
1987. But, in his cross-examination and as corroborated by the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest 28 submitted by him and Molinawe, it appeared that Lonceras and Segovia were
arrested on different times and that appellant Don Rodrigueza was not among those who were
arrested. Instead, it was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a much
later time.

With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to give more credibility to the
testimony of appellant Rodrigueza. While it is true that appellant's defense amounts to an alibi,
and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some
evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest
corroborates his testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night of
July 1, 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that appellant Rodrigueza was not with
them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents.

Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the accused was also
revealed during the trial of the case. Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and
Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia, testified that Sgt. Molinawe, who has since been
reportedly dismissed from the service, asked for P10,000.00 from each of them in exchange
for the liberty of the accused. 29 This allegation was never refuted by the prosecution. Hence,
the rule laid down by this Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses are entitled to full
faith and credit 30 has no application in the case at bar.

Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. 31 As clearly shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its cause.
It has not overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case,
appellant should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against
him.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It
is hereby ordered that he be immediately released from custody unless he is otherwise
detained for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

55
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch
168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991,
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards
P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started
travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts.,
petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car,
walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved
an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the
Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop
shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card
used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was
shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot
Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched
a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly
filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor")
informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information
could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor
an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that
the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion,
wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being
granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to
expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of
respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and
ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court
be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion
had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend
cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of
petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the
following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48
hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted
leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July
1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and
void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his
right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by
respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment
of petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his
arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial
Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same
date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous
hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and
22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He
alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition
for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his
detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas
corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to
restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented
its first witness.
14
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing
the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for
which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly committed."
His identity had been established through investigation. At the time
he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing
manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police
Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any
irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary
investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the
Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17
July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent power to
amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable
to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner
and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial judge after
petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was
given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition
for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel
for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's
conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October
1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the
hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a
lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We
consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case,
petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman
who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work,
petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor
General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases
consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc.,
v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although
effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been
arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in
filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated.
Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to
the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to
preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the
circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court
sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen
days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses
constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which
petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and
completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal
shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
56
 judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting
be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed"
within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan.
The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal
knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper
officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days
from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in
his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid
the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise
guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor,
the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether
there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section
7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was
substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should
have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been
arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for
murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends
that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the
Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to
preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation
was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the
time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed
with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of
this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo
v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists to
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper
to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation
the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted
to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has
the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already
been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action
of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.,
or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while
the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with
the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary
investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-
investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the
5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the
trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such
preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised
of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial
court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-
day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been
substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal
or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed
to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a
valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him
the full measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary
investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991.
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke
it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go
had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the
time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced
to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that
appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after
their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not
have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for
release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He
had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the
cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we
cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact,
when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord
preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the
statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor
affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to
bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the
evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July
1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to
surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering
that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to
respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days
before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case,
trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4)
witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly,
petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled
to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains
entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on
the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he
may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant
a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner
was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was
forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation,
with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of
speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set
for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's
vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of
preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests
and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or
walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the
prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his
objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record
his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court
on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced
to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he
cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be
represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to
have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled
to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning
petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may
move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court,
after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion
for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into
the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government
to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of
accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out
ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate.
And, in any case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State
of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and
determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The
Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the
merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to
any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
57
SO ORDERED.

58
G.R. No. 128822 May 4, 2001 In tile case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a
search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house.25 He was acquainted
with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, house were marijuana plants.26 Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the
vs. plants. They were three months old27 and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they
ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG @ "BERTING, accused-appellant. would be uprooteds on that same day.

PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Branch 46,
Urdaneta finding accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
cultivation of marijuana2 and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00, without subsidiary penalty and accessories of the law.
In People vs. Valdez28 the Court ruled that search and seizure conducted without the requisite
judicial warrant is illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution's evidence clearly established that
the police conducted a search of accused's backyard garden without a warrant; they had
sufficient time to obtain a search warrant; they failed to secure one. There was no showing of
urgency or necessity for the warrantless search, or the immediate seizure of the marijuana
plants.

On December 17, 1996, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan Emiliano M. Matro
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Urdaneta an Information 3 charging accused
Alberto Pasudag y Bokang with violation of R.A. No. 6425, Sec. 9, reading as follows:
"That on or about September 26, 1995 and prior dates thereto at barangay
Artacho, municipality of Sison, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate, and culture seven (7) hills of marijuana
in the land tilled by him and situated beside the house of the accused, without
authority or permit to do so.
"Contrary to Sec. 9 of R.A. 6425 as amended."
"Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce." 29
"The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the
illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehension of
malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights." 30 We need not underscore
that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only
under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants." 31 "The mantle of protection
extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions."32
With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.33

The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The testimony of
On February 10, 1997, the trial court arraigned the accused. He pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial SPO3 Jovencio Fajarito34 reveals that appellant was not duly informed of his constitutional
ensued. rights, thus: "

On September 26, 1995, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, SPO2 Pepito Calip of the PNP Sison, "ATTY: ESTRADA:
Pangasinan, went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy
bamboo fence behind the public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about
70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He Q: In fact, you went to the house of Alberto Pasudag?
inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The
storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it. 5
A: Yes sir.

SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero. The
latter dispatched team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3 Alcantara and PO3 Q: And in fact you invited him to the place where marijuana plants were planted?
Rasca) to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 in that same afternoon, the team arrived at
Brgy; Artacho and went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for
accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about A: Yes sir.
five (5) meters away.6

Q: Then and there, you started asking question from him?

Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures
of accused Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants. 7 They uprooted seven (7)
marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police A: Yes sir.
station.8

Q: In fact you started asking questions to elucidate from him information of

At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, admission regarding the ownership of the plants in question?
that he owned the marijuana plants.9 SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report 10 which
accused Pasudag signed.11 He kept the six marijuana plants inside the cabinet in the office of
the Chief of Police and brought the tallest plant12 to the PNP Crime Laboratory for A: I only asked who really planted and cultivated the plants sir.
examination. 13

Q: Before you propounded questions to Alberto Pasudag, as according to you,

Major Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, receive you were already informed that he was the cultivator by some per sons whose
the specimen14 on October 11, 1995. She testified that she took some leaves from the name until now you do not know?
marijuana plant because the leaves had the most concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol. As
per her Chemistry Report No. D-O87-95,15 the examination was positive for marijuana
(tetrahydrocannabinol).16 A: Yes sir.

On March 18, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged Q: Did you not inform Alberto , Pasudag his constitutional rights?
and, taking into consideration his educational attainment (he reached only grade IV), imposed
the minimum of the imposable penalty, thus:
A: I did not inform him because only when I will took (sic) his statement in the
presence of his counsel and to be reduced in writing, sir.
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is rendered CONVICTING ALBERTO PASUDAG
of the crime charged in the information and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without Q: What you want to impress, you will inform only a person of his constitutional
subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the law. rights if you take his statement in writing?

"The 7 fully grown marijuana plants are confiscated in favor of the government. A: Yes sir.

"The Warden of Urdaneta, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, is hereby Q: Is that your method?
ordered to commit the body of Alberto Pasudag to the National Bilibid Prison
immediately upon receipt hereof.
A: I informed the accused if l have to place it is statement into writing, sir.

"SO ORDERED.
Q: According to you, you invited Alberto Pasudag to the alleged place where the
marijuana were planted, then and there, you asked him who planted the same,
"Done this 17th day of March, 1997, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan. and according to you, he said he planted the same?

(Sgd. ) MODESTO C. JU A: Yes sir.

ANSON

xxx xxx xxx

Judge"17

Q: According to you, you brought Alberto Pasudag to the Office of the Chief of
Hence, this appeal.18 Police of Sison, Pangasinan?

In his brief, accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in finding that the marijuana A: Yes sir.
plant submitted for laboratory examination was one of the seven (7) marijuana plants
confiscated from his garden; that the trial court erred in concluding that the confiscation report
was not an extrajudicial admission which required the intervention of his counsel; and in Q: In fact the Chief of Police was there?
convicting him on the basis of inference that he planted, cultivated and cultured the seven (7)
plants, owned the same or that he permitted others to cultivate the same.19
A: Yes sir.

The Solicitor General contended that accused-appellant admitted before the lower court that
tile specimen20 was one of the plants confiscated in his backyard; that appellant was not under Q: Romeo Ast.rero was the Senior Inspector? ,
custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation report; and that the inferences
deduced by the lower court strengthened the conviction of accused-appellant..21
A: Yes sir. Q: In other words, SPO2 Calip, Alcantara, Romeo Rasca and Alberto
Pasudag were inside the office of the Chief of Police?
We find the appeal meritorious.

A: Yes sir.
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may
validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. 22 The
Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers Q: And according to you, Alberto Pasudag was interrogated by the Chief of
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any Police ?
purpose shall be inviolable, x x x."23 Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible.24

59
 A: Yes sir:

Q: In fact the Chief of Police was asking Alberto Pasudag in your presence? who
planted the marijuana plants and according to you, Alberto Pasudag admitted in
your presence that he planted the alleged marijuana plants?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Before Chief Inspector Romeo Astrero interrogated Alberto Pasudag, he did

not also inform Alberto Pasudag his constitutional rights, particularly the rights of
a person under custodial interrogation?

A: What I know, he just asked Alberto Pasudag the veracity whether or not he
planted the said plants.

Q: In other words, your answer is, your Chief of Police did not inform Alberto
Pasudag his constitutional rights?

A: No sir." (emphasis supplied)

After the interrogation, SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report, 35 which was part of the
investigation.36 Accused-Appellant signed the confiscation report.37 In both the interrogation
and the signing of the confiscation receipt, no counsel assisted accused-appellant. He was the
only civilian present in the Office of the Chief of Police. 38

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that
custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission.39 Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team
went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.

"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more that
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." 40 Even if the
confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and
without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence. 41

In light of the foregoing, we uphold the constitutional right of accused-appellant to a

presumption of innocence. The prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG is ACQUITED of the crime charged for
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of Corrections is hereby directed to
forthwith release accused-appellant unless he is held for another case, and to inform the Court
of the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from notice.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt

60
 Republic of the Philippines Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana
SUPREME COURT leaves on that date?
Manila

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that
FIRST DIVISION particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation
which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to
the coming of Wilcon 9?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant. A Yes, sir.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant. A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For
instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:

CRUZ, J.:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did
you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving
him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
of P20,000.00. 1

Q What were those activities?

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon
9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took A Purely marijuana trafficking.
him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were
verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed Q From whom did you get that information?
against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had
also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her reason and we cannot Identify the person.
after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6
Q But you received it from your regular informer?

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was A Yes, sir.
carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It ATTY. LLARIZA:
was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with
then filed against Aminnudin. drugs?

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his A Marijuana, sir.
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search
warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was
the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the
PC headquarters. 14
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he
claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, A Yes, sir.
traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt
but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but
to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23,
rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the
injuries sustained by him. 19 reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling
and shipping marijuana stuff.
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge
who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh COURT:
their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush
of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the
impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
amidst the falsities.

A Yes, sir.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-
appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit
to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never
been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed
for his release. A Yes, sir.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that Q Are you sure of that?
he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not
even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b)
of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already
gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution,
that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying.
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer
who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned
arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may
in your intelligence report?
prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified
as follows:
A No, more.
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel
Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
Q Why not?

A Yes, sir.
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search
warrant anymore?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

61
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of
the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government
of laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments
of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to
be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the
obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that
vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result
of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was
clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling
the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It
was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the
probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is
allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties
its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The
constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense
is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is
the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an
incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest
did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

62