Public Attorney’s Office vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 154297-300.

February
15, 2008]

Ponente: AZCUNA, J.

FACTS:

Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be Relieved as Court-Appointed

Counsel with the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, praying that she be relieved of her
duties and responsibilities as counsel de oficio for the said accused on the ground that she
had a swelling workload consisting of administrative matters and that the accused are not
indigent persons; hence, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO.
Respondent Court found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney to be plausible and
relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de oficio of former President Joseph Estrada
and Mayor Jose Estrada. The remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Be
Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the
accused are not indigents; therefore, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the
services of PAO. Respondent Court issued a Resolution denying the motion, but retaining
two of the eight PAO lawyers, namely, the   petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Andres.

Later, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance which informed the Court that petitioners
Atty. Usita and Atty. Andres were appointed as Assistant City Prosecutors of the Quezon
City Prosecutor’s Office sometime in August 2002, and that PAO is left as the lone petitioner
in this case. PAO asserts that while its lawyers are also aware of their duties under Rule
14.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, PAO lawyers are limited by their mandate
as government

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in issuing the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers to act as
counsels de oficio for the accused who are not indigent persons.

HELD:

NO. Petition dismissed for being moot.

RATIO:

The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the subject
Resolutions as the issuance is not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness.  At the time of
PAO’s appointment, the accused did not want to avail themselves of any counsel; hence,
respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the cases.

Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent the
accused, in view of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of the eight
PAO lawyers obviously to meet such possible exigency as the accused again relieving some
or all of their private counsels.
In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been finally
resolved, this petition seeking that PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be relieved as
counsel de oficio therein has become moot.

EN BANC

A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.

EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred
member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case,
public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had
purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was
disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the
late.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be
reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was
there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2chanrobles
virtual law library

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent
may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro:
"On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1
(In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then
President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which.
reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice
of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary
of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On
March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter,
the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required
to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution." 3chanrobles virtual law library

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to
the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys. 4chanrobles virtual law library

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing,
to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed
to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5It was pointed
out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court,
entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered
all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous conclusion reached by the
Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is
therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively." 7chanrobles virtual law library

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was
rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a
motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in
his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not
unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8It was the consensus that he
continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does
not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that
deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this
Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he
had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and
sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more
than justified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different
attitude on his part was discernible. 9The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a
mitigating character invoked - the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise
spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence
apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable,
defender of the causes entrusted to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in
the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his
part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the
legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the
fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his
profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the
inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment,
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11chanrobles
virtual law library

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far
as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must
ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if
the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed
and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the
transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.
Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De

Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Endnotes:

1 In re Atty, Marcial A. Edillon, AC-1928, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 554.

2 The minute resolution reads in full:- "Acting on the petition of Mr. Marcial Edillon for
reinstatement to the Roll of Attorneys and it appearing that he had fully paid his delinquant
membership fees due the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and submitted to the IBP Board
of Governors a verified application for reinstatement together with an undertaking to abide
by all By-laws and resolutions by said Board in the event of reinstatement, the Court
Resolved to GRANT the petition of Mr. Marcial A. Edillon for as member of the Philippine Bar.
He is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after
payment of the required fees. This resolution is without prejudice to is an extended opinion.

3 84 SCRA 559.

4 Section 10, Rule of Court 139-A.

5 84 SCRA 561.
6 Ibid, 561. The reference is to Administrative Case No. 526. In ,he Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22.
7 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 33.
8 The resolution denying the motion was issued on November 13, 1978.
9 Letters dated June 5, 1979, August 7, 1979, November 13, 1979, April 12, 1980.

10 39 Phil. 778 (1919).

11 People v. Estenzo. L-24522, May 29, 1975, 64 SCRA 211; Fontelera v. Amores, L-41361.
March 8, 1976, 70 SCRA 37; Royeca v., Animas, L-39584, May 3, 1976, 71 SCRA 1;
Blancaflor v. Laya, L-31399, March 17, 1978, 82 SCRA 148; Calo v. Tapucar, L-47244,
January 16, 1979, 88 SCRA 78.

AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass
oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission
to the Bar.

 The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

 Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.

 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.
As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent

of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:
 the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use
of legal knowledge or skill.

 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

 True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

BAR FLUNKER’S ACT CASE: IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The
title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to
and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the
title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955
Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was
also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953
to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based
under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of
World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the
said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice
law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will
not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7907               December 15, 2010

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA, Petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by the spouses Virgilio and
Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission
on Bar Discipline, charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty. Elayda), with gross
negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case. The spouses Aranda were the defendants in
Civil Case No. 232-0-01, entitled Martin V. Guballa v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio Aranda, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72.

In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006, 1 the spouses Aranda alleged that Atty. Elayda’s handling of
their case was "sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary norms of civil
procedure and evidence,"2 to wit:

4. That on February 14, 2006 hearing of the said case, the case was ordered submitted for
decision [the spouses Aranda] and [Atty. Elayda] did not appear; certified copy of the order is
attached as Annex "C";

5. That the order setting this case for hearing on February 14, 2006 was sent only to [Atty.
Elayda] and no notice was sent to [the spouses Aranda] that is they were unaware of said
hearing and [Atty. Elayda] never informed them of the setting;

6. That despite receipt of the order dated February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda] never informed
them of such order notwithstanding the follow-up they made of their case to him;

7. That [Atty. Elayda] did not lift any single finger to have the order dated February 14, 2006
reconsidered and/or set aside as is normally expected of a counsel devoted to the cause of
his client;

8. That in view of the inaction of [Atty. Elayda] the court naturally rendered a judgment dated
March 17, 2006 adverse to [the spouses Aranda] which copy thereof was sent only to [Atty.
Elayda] and [the spouses Aranda] did not receive any copy thereof, certified xerox copy of
the decision is attached as Annex "D";

9. That they were totally unaware of said judgment as [Atty. Elayda] had not again lifted any
single finger to inform them of such adverse judgment and that there is a need to take a
remedial recourse thereto;
 10. That [Atty. Elayda] did not even bother to file a notice of appeal hence the judgment
became final and executory hence a writ of execution was issued upon motion of the plaintiff
[Martin Guballa] in the said case;

11. That on July 18, 2006 Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag implemented the writ of execution
and it was only at this time that [the spouses Aranda] became aware of the judgment of the
Court, certified xerox copy of the writ of execution is attached as Annex "E";

12. That on July 19, 2006, they wasted no time in verifying the status of their case before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo City and to their utter shock, dismay and
disbelief, they found out that they have already lost their case and worst the decision had
already become final and executory;

13. That despite their plea for a reasonable period to take a remedial recourse of the
situation (the Sheriff initially gave them fifteen (15) days), Sheriff Madarag forcibly took
possession and custody of their Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. 529;

14. That they were deprived of their right to present their evidence in the said case and of
their right to appeal because of the gross negligence of respondent." 3

In its Order4 dated August 15, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed Atty. Elayda to
submit his Answer to the complaint with a warning that failure to do so will result in his default and
the case shall be heard ex parte.

Atty. Elayda filed his Answer5 dated September 1, 2006, in which he narrated:

7. That this case also referred to [Atty. Elayda] sometime December 2004 after the [spouses
Aranda] and its former counsel failed to appear in court on February 7, 2005;

8. That from December 2004, the [spouses Aranda] did not bother to contact [Atty. Elayda] to
prepare for the case and in fact on May 30, 2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to ask for postponement
of the case for reason that he still have to confer with the [spouses Aranda] who were not
around;

9. That contrary to the allegations of the [spouses Aranda], there was not a single instance
from December 2004 that the [spouses Aranda] called up [Atty. Elayda] to talk to him
regarding their case;

10. That the [spouses Aranda] from December 2004 did not even bother to follow up their
case in court just if to verify the status of their case and that it was only on July 19, 2006 that
they verified the same and also the only time they tried to contact [Atty. Elayda];

11. That the [spouses Aranda] admitted in their Complaint that they only tried to contact
[Atty. Elayda] when the writ of execution was being implemented on them;

12. That during the scheduled hearing of the case on February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda] was
in fact went to RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City and asked Mrs. Edith Miano to call him in
Branch 73 where he had another case if the [spouses Aranda] show up in court so that [Atty.
Elayda] can talk to them but obviously the [spouses Aranda] did not appear and Mrs. Miano
did not bother to call [Atty. Elayda];
 13. That [Atty. Elayda] was not at fault that he was not able to file the necessary pleadings in
court because the [spouses Aranda] did not get in touch with him;

14. That [Atty. Elayda] cannot contact the [spouses Aranda] for the latter failed to give their
contact number to [Atty. Elayda] nor did the [spouses Aranda] go to his office to leave their
contact number;

14. That the [spouses Aranda] were negligent in their "I don’t care attitude" towards their
case and for this reason that they alone should be blamed for what happened to their case x
x x."

At the mandatory conference hearing held on March 14, 2007, all the parties appeared with their
respective counsels. The parties were then given a period of 10 days from receipt of the order within
which to submit their position papers attaching therewith all documentary exhibits and affidavits of
witnesses, if any.

After the submission of the parties’ position papers, Investigating Commissioner Jordan M. Pizarras
came out with his Decision6 finding Atty. Elayda guilty of gross negligence, and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months, which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt of
the finality of this DECISION. He is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
merit a more severe penalty.7

Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-128 8 dated March 6,
2008, adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Pizarras’ report, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondent’s negligence and unmindful of
his sworn duties to his clients, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more
severe penalty.9

Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a Petition for Review maintaining that he was not
negligent in handling the spouses Aranda’s case as to warrant suspension, which was too harsh a
penalty under the circumstances.

After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate
from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was negligent
and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients.

In Abay v. Montesino,10 this Court held:

The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public service and secure
justice for those who seek its aid. Thus, the practice of law is considered a privilege, not a right,
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications required for the conferment of such privilege.
Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and of
morality – which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of
the legal profession, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found
wanting in these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them
to disciplinary action. In the present case, the failure of respondent to file the appellant’s brief was a
clear violation of his professional duty to his client. 11

The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests
of his clients. He should be conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his clients’ cases. Atty.
Elayda should give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases he is handling. As the
spouses Aranda’s counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said spouses’ case
and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect
the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda.

Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda
never knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not
know the spouses’ whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility
between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status
of their case and the orders which have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his
clients to make an inquiry about the developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel
and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor
the progress of the case. Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to
exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant communication with each
other. Again, Atty. Elayda’s excuse that he did not have the spouses Aranda’s contact number and
that he did not know their address is simply unacceptable.

Furthermore, this Court will not countenance Atty. Elayda’s explanation that he cannot be faulted for
missing the February 14, 2006 hearing of the spouses Aranda’s case. The Court quotes with
approval the disquisition of Investigating Commissioner Pizarras:
Moreover, his defense that he cannot be faulted for what had happened during the hearing on
February 14, 2006 because he was just at the other branch of the RTC for another case and left a
message with the court stenographer to just call him when [the spouses Aranda] come, is lame, to
say the least. In the first place, the counsel should not be at another hearing when he knew very well
that he has a scheduled hearing for the [spouses Aranda’s] case at the same time. His attendance at
the hearing should not be made to depend on the whether [the spouses Aranda] will come or not.
The Order submitting the decision was given at the instance of the other party’s counsel mainly
because of his absence there. Again, as alleged by the [the spouses Aranda] and as admitted by
[Atty. Elayda] himself, he did not take the necessary remedial measure in order to ask that said
Order be set aside.12

It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses Aranda’s
case for decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a sum of money.
Notice of said judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file any notice of appeal or
motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and executory. Atty. Elayda did not
also inform the spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case. The spouses Aranda came to know of
the adverse RTC judgment, which by then had already become final and executory, only when a writ
of execution was issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff. 1avvphi1

Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal
profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his
clients’ case but in fact abandoned his clients’ cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients,
but also to the Court of which he is an officer.13

On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a
fee or free.14 Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas,15 the Court held:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.16

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the Decision of
the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL
F. ELAYDA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Elayda’s personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice