1. Flores vs. People [G.R. No. L—25769, December 10, 1974] FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was filed in
December 1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was
filed in December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CA, a resolution remanding
the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed
material for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted
the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received
and a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court
but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7
dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony
was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and
even failed to identify the 2 accused.
The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more
years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to
inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was unresponsive
notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second MR dated
January 1966. CA’s defense is that the case was not properly captioned as “People of the Philippines”
and without “Court of Appeals” being made a party to the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD:
YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to
Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.
Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does not say that such
right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal.
It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. “Where a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the
manner in which it is authorized to be commenced”.
Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too much
significance attached to the procedural defect (refer to CA’s defense). CA failed to accord respect to this
particular constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.

2. United States vs. Tan Teng [G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912] , JOHNSON, J.

FACTS:
The sister of Oliva Pacomio (7-year old girl) discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal
disease known as gonorrhea. Oliva related to her sister that in the morning of the 15th of September
1910, after she took a bath, Chinaman Tan Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some face
powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw
her upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some little
time. 

The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were
collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. Tan Teng was not
present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to
violate her.

Upon this information Tan Teng was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing
and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his body bore every sign of the
fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion
of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science
for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed
that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.

During the trial, the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the
Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such
evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. 

The trial court found Tan Teng guilty of the crime of rape.

ISSUE:
Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has gonorrhea, cannot be used as
evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against self-
incrimination.

HELD:
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a
witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is
to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of
extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.

The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant
even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion
certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses,
can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused
as a witness — it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. The evidence
obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself.
 The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that
an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than would
the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.

Defendant is therefore to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision correccional, and to pay the
costs. So ordered.

3. Villaflor vs. Summers [G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920] MALCOLM, J

FACTS:
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty. In a criminal case
pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino
Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro
Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the
court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to
the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused
refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court
and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination
required by the court.

ISSUE:
Whether the order to the accused to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent
doctors to determine if she was pregnant is a violation of her constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

HELD:
No, The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested
physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is
absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor
of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.

As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the
laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and
constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No
rule is intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to
ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to
establish the truth.

Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law cause of the
Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own
body. It is extremely abhorrent to one’s sense of decency and propriety to have the decide that such
inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another’s gaze. “To
compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger,
without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass.” Conceded, and yet, as well
 suggested by the same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the
inherent which the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently
the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions
which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not
exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice
cannot hesitate.
The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So
ordered.

4. Beltran vs. Samson [G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929] ROMUALDEZ, J

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein, the petitioner complains that respondent judge,
Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own
handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of
comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified. The respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the
remedy applied for. The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge,
upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of
misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of
persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge
in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58
which reads: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." As to its
scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether the violates the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination was violated when he was
compelled to write for the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether
he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified

HELD:
YES. Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may or may not, on cross-examination, write in open court in
order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. Here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which
may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain
a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering
the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained, that is not reason for trampling
upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons. In the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that
the defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not
refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege. “The privilege
not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one entitled
 to invoke it." The writ of prohibition was GRANTED and it is ordered that the respondents and those
under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take
down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison

5. Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968] SANCHEZ, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle,one Thunderbird car, with accessories
amounting to P22,000. That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the help of one, Asistio
have completed a deed of sale of Thunderbird which belongs to Johnson Lee. Chavesz telephoned Lee
and made an appointment for the sale of Thunderbird with Sumilang as a introduced buyer.

As payment was made to Eugene’s restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove to the place.
Chavez and Sumilang, pretending to get the money for the perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car, left
the two Chinese alone, Johnson Lee and his brother.

When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chavez and Sumilang, they could no longer locate the
former and the Thunderbird car was also from the parking lot. Nevertheless the Thunderbird was
impounded however, it has already been repainted.
An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with
intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the
accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be the
first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only
be an ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his
client. But the judge ruled in favor of the fiscal.

Accused was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during
the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he
broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met
with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to have
the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner
had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing
situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.

Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People is
at once apparent. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to
affirm his statement given to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And
this statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to
deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open
court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case

ISSUE:
Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated
 HELD:
YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to
remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand
and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It
cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid.
For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to

release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are
disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial
and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the
defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not
preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as
explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally
given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given
the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to
failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty,
and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with,
the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court
without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a
clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the
writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.

6. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [G.R. No. L-25018, May 26 1969] FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from an administrative case filed against herein petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. for
alleged immorality being heard by the respondent Board of Medical Examiners (BEM). In this
administrative case against petitioner, he was asked to be the first witness for the complainants – thus
compelling him to be a witness against himself. Petitioner objected to the said act of the complainants,
hence the BEM required Pascual to secure a restraining order from a competent authority so as he
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
 question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right against self-incrimination may be invoked in administrative proceedings.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of herein petitioner citing the case of Cabal v. Kapunan. In that
proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an
administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft
Act, the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the
witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner’s refusal to be sworn as such witness, a
charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash
and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the
well-settled principle that “the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.”

It was noted in the opinion penned by the then Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of
whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out of proportion to his salary
and his other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture
while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not
dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property
but the revocation of his license as medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.

7. Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 100295, April 26 1994] – (SKIPPED)

Facts:
Petitioner together with other officers of PNB, National Investment and Development Corp. and/or
Pantranco North Express Inc (all GOCCs) where charged (Case No. 11960) with of violating the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) for conspiring with accused Gregorio Araneta III, son-in-law of
former Pres. Marcos with:
• The sale of a major portion of the utility assets of PNEI to the North Express Transport,
Inc. which Araneta knew to be a newly organized paper corp;
• Through misleading, inducing and/or unduly influencing the Board of Directors of PNB,
NIDC and PNEI into approving a Memorandum of Agreement and later a Purchase Agreement
with manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions;
• That made possible the premature delivery of said PNEI assets to NETI and thereby
giving accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III unwarranted benefits, advantages and/or preferences
and causing undue injury to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
400M.

In the interim, Marcos was charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (RICO) Act by transporting to the US the investment of money through offshore orgs; the
case was entitled United States of America vs Marcos. To insure conviction, the prosecution solicited the
testimonies of petitioners and were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the former First
Couple.
• They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution and thus there was an
agreement that was formed with the PCGG which included the fact that they would not
interpose any objection to the Motion to Dismiss to be filed by the petitioners. However, despite
their availability, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand.
Thus, the legal struggle shifted back to Case No. 11960. After filing a Joint MTD, and without any
objection from the PCGG, the Sandiganbayan still denied the said motion by a vote of 4-1. Thus, the
petitioners argue that respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their MTD.
Moreover, upon the appointment of Atty. Castro as the new Chairman of the PCGG, it made a new stand
that since they failed to provide their testimonies during the trial, their immunity becomes nullified.

Issue:

Whether or not Mapa Jr. and Vergara are indeed immune from prosecution.

Held:

The powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. 14, as amended, to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution. The pertinent sections provide:

SEC. 2. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

‘SEC. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other
information in a proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the witness believes that such testimony or provision of
information would tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution. Upon such refusal, the Sandiganbayan
may order the witness to testify or provide information.

The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony, or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.’

SEC. 3. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

‘Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission
to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the
property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or
prove the latter’s guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness
who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
Commission.’"
  The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under section 5, supra. Petitioners are
not hostile but friendly witnesses.

Respondent court, thru the Solicitor General, pushes the proposition that said power of review is
plenary in reach. It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to reverse the
grant of immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting the latter’s judgment. The submission will warrant
the respondent court in examining the intrinsic quality of the given information or testimony, i.e.,
whether it truly establishes the "unlawful manner" in which the respondent, defendant or accused has
acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question. Likewise, it will give a warrant to the
respondent court to change the judgment made by the PCGG that the witness’ information or testimony
is "necessary" to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.

 We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Neither the text nor the
texture of E.O. No. 14, as amended, lends color to the suggested interpretation. Section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, vests no such role in respondent court. The rule is crafted as to leave
no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere with the discretion of the prosecution
on the matter. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended, is eloquently silent with regard to the
range and depth of the power of the respondent court (Sandiganbayan) to review the exercise
of discretion by the PCGG granting a section 5 immunity.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section 5
immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the respondents court can go no further
than to pass upon its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain: (a) whether the
person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the
PCGG in the discharge of its functions; (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the
information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent,
defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c)
whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain
or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused. Respondent court cannot
substitute its judgment to the discretion of the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and without
ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice.

o Applying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted by the
PCGG under section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.

The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution
of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. They gave the information in the course of
interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US prosecutor Charles
La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Sec. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which PCGG can prosecute as
 mandated by the Constitution and E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does not limit said information
to be given only in a case where the informant is himself an accused or a Respondent. Such a
reading adopted by the respondent court is unduly restrictive of the intendment of section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language.

It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the
judgment of the PCGG, establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired or
accumulated their properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt. The totality of the
circumstances of the case established this element. Thus, after their interview, the PCGG was
obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the petitioners. It
forthwith signed and sealed an agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from
prosecution. In the case of petitioner Mapa, "the Republic shall cause the dismissal or exclusion
of MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal
proceeding or investigation." In the case of petitioner Vergara, "the Republic shall cause the
dismissal of Vergara from Criminal Case No. 11960." This commitment was reiterated by former
Chairman Mateo Caparas of PCGG in his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, as related
above. The parties’ agreements were then implemented. Petitioners travelled to New York to
testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses. It was even the PCGG that shouldered their
expenses. All these circumstances prove the judgment of the PCGG that the pieces of
information given by petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner" with which the
Marcoses acquired their wealth.

Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO
cases against the Marcoses in New York cannot nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the
requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Under section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution, and they did.
Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make themselves available as
witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were
not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO cases. Their failure to testify was not of
their own making. It was brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have
thought that their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses. Since petitioners’ failure to
testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice and equity
forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity.

8. Philippine Refining Company Worker’s Union vs. Philippine Refining Co. [G.R. No. L-1668,
March 29, 1948] HILADO, J.

Facts:

On September 26, 1946, Case No. 32-V, Philippine Refining Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Refining
Company Workers' Union (CLO), was scheduled for hearing before the Court of Industrial Relations.
Upon that date, said court renewed its efforts to effect a temporary settlement of the case before going
on the merits of the petition. A series of conferences with both parties was held by the court, assisted by
Atty. PacianoVillavieja of the Division of Investigation.

Thereafter, considering the circumstances and facts of the case at that stage of the proceedings, the
Court of Industrial Relations came to the conclusion that, "for the welfare of everybody concerned, for
the interest of the public," and because the court might not be able to decide the case promptly, in view
of the issues involved, the striking laborers should be directed to return and resume their work in the
Philippine Refining Company on September 27, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the
management of the respondent company should accept them beginning that date; and it was so
ordered by the court.

The order contained the following injunction: "The striking laborers, pending the final determination of
this case, are enjoined not to stage any strike or walk out from their employment without authority
from and without first submitting their grievances to the Court. The Petitioning Company is likewise
enjoined not to lay-off, dismiss, discharge, or admit any new employees or laborers in its employment
during the pendency of this case, without beforehand notifying and obtaining the authority of the Court.
The controversial points involved in the petition will be heard by this Court at the opportune time."

The petitioning company filed with the court an urgent report to the effect that a strike was declared by
the union at the plant of the company in Manila starting at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1947.
In view of this development and of the other facts and considerations set forth in the lower court's order
of July 24, 1947, it ruled that the strike staged by the union or by the workers of the company therein
mentioned on April 30, 1947, "is contemptuous and illegal because it is a violation of the law and the
order of the court. Consequently, as prayed for in the said report submitted by the company, the court
authorizes the said company to hire such of the striking laborers and employees and new labor force, as
in its discretion it may see fit."

Pursuant to section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, Atty. Juan Maralit of the court was thereby
designated to take charge of the contempt proceedings and to present such action as might be
warranted therein against the party or parties who might be responsible for the violation of the law and
the order of the court dated September 26, 1946. The court dismissed the answer and counter-petition
for contempt filed by the union against the company.

The court issued a Resolutiondenying petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the foregoing orders,
and these orders and resolutions are sought to be vacated and reversed by the instant petition.

Petitioner questions the validity of the said order. Petitioner contends that it is null, void and invalid for
it is an infringement of the constitutional rights and liberties of the workers and is moreover repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition prohibiting involuntary servitude in any form.

Issue:

Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 103 is unconstitutional

Held:
 No, it is constitutional. Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 does not offend against the
constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a contract of
employment after said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those
prescribed in said section 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the
employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial
Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or
decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so,
that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing
when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or
settled. . . ."

The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment — he has a free choice
between entering into it or not — with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary
servitude ensuing.

9. In the matter of petition for writ of habeas corpus of segafredo aclaracion [G.R. No. L-39115,
May 26, 1975] AQUINO, J.

Facts:

Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija from 1 October 1969 to 21 November 1971. His appointment expired
on 21 November 1972 while he was working as a temporary stenographer in the CFI of Manila.
Thereafter, he was employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division
of the Insurance Commission, where he is now working. After Aclaracion had ceased to be a court
stenographer, the Court of Appeals required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases
decided by the Gapan court which had been appealed (Muncal vs. Eugenio, CA-GR 49711-R and Paderes
vs. Domingo, CA-GR 52367-R). He failed to comply with the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He was
declared in contempt of court. On May 29 and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose
N. Leuterio, Chairmen of the Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, ordered
the Chief of Police of Makati, Rizal (Colonel Ruperto B. Acle), to arrest Aclaracion, a resident of that
municipality, and to confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript of his notes in the said
cases. Aclaracion was arrested on 21 June 1974 and incarcerated in the municipal jail. In a petition dated
12 July 1974 he asked the Court of Appeals that he be not required to transcribe his notes in all the
cases tried in the Gapan court. He suggested that the testimonies in the said cases be retaken. The Third
Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 7 August 1974 ordered the release of Aclaracion.
Later, he transcribed his notes in the Muncal case. However, the warden did not release him because of
the order of arrest issued by the Seventh Division. On 9 August 1974 Aclaracion filed in the Supreme
Court a petition for habeas corpus. He advanced the novel contention that to compel him to transcribe
 his stenographic notes, after he ceased to be a stenographer, would be a transgression of the rule that
"no involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution).

Issue:

Whether the fact that a former court stenographer was compelled to transcribe his stenographic notes
is a transgression of the right against involuntary servitude.

Held:

An Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his stenographic notes. That
prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers
which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due
administration of justice. The provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that "upon the
approval of the record on appeal the clerk shall direct the stenographer or stenographers concerned to
attach to the record of the case 5 copies of the transcript of the oral evidence referred to in the record
on appeal" includes stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary. The traditional made of exercising
the court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if
he does not comply with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys the
order. Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion,
resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes. This is
provided for in Circular 63 of the Secretary of Justice. Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to
transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary
servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one
who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether
he is paid or not. That situation does not obtain in this case.

Section 19 — Prohibited Punishment

10. People vs. Estoista [G.R. L-5793, August 27 1953] TUAZON, J.

Facts:
Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through reckless imprudence and convicted for illegal
possession of firearm under one information by the CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant
was charged with having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who
held a legal permit for it. Father and son live& in the same house, a little distance from a 27 hectare
estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth
trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a
wild rooster and hit DiragonDima, a la borer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and
whose presence was not perceived by the accused.Estoista is assailing his conviction saying that the 5-10
years penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is cruel and excessive.
Issue:

Whether or not the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment imposed infringe the
constitutional provision against cruel and harsh punishment.

Held:

It is of the court’s opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm
is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to
suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the
Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons,
justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to
10 years is out of proportion to the presentcase in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be
declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be
judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are,
like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to
make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty

In United States v. Samson (16 Phil., 323), cited by defense counsel, it was held that carrying a gun by
order of the owner does not constitute illegal possession of firearm. The facts in that case were that a
shotgun and nine cartridges which belonged to one Pablo Padilla, who had a proper permit to possess
them, were seized by the police from Samson while walking in the town of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
Padilla was to use the shotgun in hunting that day and, as he was coming along on horseback, sent
Samson on ahead.

In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point to United States v. Samson, supra, as
authority for the appellant’s plea for acquittal.

The fundamental difference between the case at bar and the Samson case. Although Samson had
physical control of his employer’s shotgun and cartridges, his possession thereof was undoubtedly
harmless and innocent, as evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore them in full view of the
people he met and of the authorities. Unlike the appellant herein, Samson carried the gun solely in
obedience to its owners order or request without any inferable intention to use it as a weapon. It is of
interest to note that even in the United States where, as stated, the right to bear arms as a means of
defense is guaranteed, possession such as that by Samson is by the weight of authority considered a
violation of similar statutes

Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, in its pertinent provision
is directed against any person who possesses any firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. the Act penalizes
exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish
the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatever.
"Ownership of the weapon is necessary only insofar as the ownership may tend to establish the guilt or
intention of the accused." It is remarkable that in the United States, where the right to bear arms for
defense is ensured by the federal and many state constitutions, legislation has been very generally
enacted severely restricting the carrying of deadly weapons, and the power of state legislatures to do so
has been upheld.
 The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition,
and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary.
The rule laid down by United States courts — rule which we here adopt — is that temporary, incidental,
casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the
possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person
picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at some object."
(Sanderson v. State, 5 S.W., 138; 68 C.J., 22)

11. People vs. Esparas [G.R. No. 120034, August 20 1996]

Facts:

Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged, with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for
importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897 before the
RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114.
After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995, the trial
court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.
As the accused remains at large up to the present time

Issue:
Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparas’s death sentence despite her absence.

Held:

Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a decision imposing the death
penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. There, the Court said, mainly, that the
judgment of conviction (capital punishment of death) entered on trial is not final, cannot be executed,
and is wholly without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. TC
acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same to the Court with its
recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unless and until it has been reviewed by the
Court. An accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled under the law to have the
sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the Court, as the
highest tribunal of the land, to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively
determined. Such procedure is merciful.  It gives a second chance for life.  Neither the courts nor the
accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no
evasions. (The Court here applied Sec. 50, Gen. Orders No. 58.)

A little history on the matter: The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty. Section 2(4) of Art. VIII provided for review by the Court of death penalty cases.  Both the Rules
of Court of 1940 and 1964 require the transmission to the Court of the records of all cases in which the
death penalty was imposed by TC, whether the defendant has appealed or not, for review and
judgment. These rules were taken from the General Orders itself. The 1973 Constitution did not also
prohibit death penalty. Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the procedure for review of death penalty cases by the
 Court.  Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted said procedure of
review and even expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by the Court.

So in People v. Villanueva (1953), the Court held that the withdrawal of appeal by a death convict does
not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to review his conviction. In People v. Cornelio (1971), which
involved the escape of a death convict, the Court held that said escape does not relieve the Court of its
duty of reviewing his conviction. In People v. Daban (1972), the Court said, speaking about convictions
by TC of death penalty on the defendant, that until after the Court has spoken en consulta, no finality
could be attached to said decision. This automatic review cannot be waived by the accused nor by the
courts. The mere fact of escape of the accused cannot be a bar at all. In People v. Saliling (1976), the
Court said that it is not precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. In
People v. Buynay (1984), the Court reiterated the rule that escape of a death convict will not
automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal.

But finally, the 1987 Constitution was enacted. It prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes as determined by Congress. On December 13, 1993,
Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. This revived
the procedure by which the Court reviews death penalty cases per the Rules. It remains automatic, does
not depend on the whims of the death convict, continues to be mandatory, and leaves the Court
without any option.

Sec. 8, Rule 124, authorizing the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps bail, does not apply to
cases where the death penalty is imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This
is the text and tone of Sec. 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule. There is more wisdom in
mandating the review by the Court of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and
regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing
the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. An appellant may withdraw his appeal not
because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law, or because he may want to avail of
the more speedy remedy of pardon, or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not
get justice from the authorities.  Nor should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its
jurisdiction when a convict escapes. The Court has the duty to review all death penalty cases.  No litigant
can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty
which the Court has to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is the main
concern especially in crimes that that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted

An accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in the
Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has
no right to be wrong.

12. Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 132601, October 12 1998] PUNO, J.

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A.
No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary
of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as
Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged
similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of
legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8177 is a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment?

Held:

No, Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out
lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said
drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched
executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.  It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life."  Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"?  The Court believes not.  For reasons discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and
expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict.   As petitioner
already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial  court which convicted the
accused.  The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10
days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment
for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. 
As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the
last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
"not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing
the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he
can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice
and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment.  This is unsubstantiated.
First.  Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise
only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.
Second.  Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such
task.  We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty
will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third.  Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment.  "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel.  But
of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

Section 20 - Non-imprisonment for Debt

13. Serafin vs. Lindayag [A.M. No.297-MJ, September 30 1975] TEEHANKEE, J.

Facts: 
Avelina Serafin, borrowed the sum of P1,500.00 without any collateral or security from an old friend.
When they wrote her a letter of demand, she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep
her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home.

Upon failure to pay the debt, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Serafin. Respondent judge
issued a warrant of arrest; which then was served on Saturday, a time when the bonding companies are
closed, thus cannot raise bail and compelled to be detained for three days.

Complainant originally filed on October 19, 1971 with the Secretary of Justice the instant administrative
complaint for capricious and malicious admission in his court of a criminal complaint for estafa against
complainant and causing her wrongful arrest and detention, against respondent Santiago Lindayag,
municipal judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan. On December 28, 1971, then Executive Judge Andres Sta. Maria
to whom the administrative complaint had been referred sent his indorsement to the Department of
Justice recommending the exoneration of respondent on the ground that complainant, assisted by her
counsel, had filed a motion to withdraw her complaint.

No further action was taken until January 29, 1973 when the Department of Justice forwarded the
record of the case to this Court. After the transfer to this Court of the power of administrative
supervision over all inferior courts with the power to discipline and dismiss judges under the 1973
Constitution,1 the Court, in view of the gravity of the charges as borne out by the documentary
evidence, referred anew on October 29, 1973 the complaint to the District Judge of Baliwag, Bulacan for
investigation and report, notwithstanding the previously reported withdrawal of the complaint. The
Court per its Resolution of December 19, 1973 denied respondent's petition to "consider the matter
close and terminated" by virtue of the previous recommendation in 1971 of Judge Sta. Maria and
directed the District Judge to proceed with the investigation.

The criminal complaint for estafa against complainant was filed on July 21, 1971 with respondent judge
by then Guiguinto chief of police Juan P. Estrella at the instance of Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal
secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza. Said complaint sworn to by said police chief before respondent
judge on its face does not charge any crime but merely recites complainant's failure to pay a simple
indebtedness

Issue: 
Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of
plaintiff for non-payment of debt?

Held:
Yes. Respondent judge is dismissed from the office of municipal judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan.
Respondent judge have grossly failed to perform his duties by issuing a warrant without first examining
the witness personally. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for complaint involved here is a
mere failure to pay a simple indebtedness and yet he found probable cause of the herein complainant's
guilt of estafa. It is elementary that non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, much less
estafa; and that no one may be criminally charged and punished for non-payment of a loan of a sum of
money.

The Court finds from the documentary evidence and established facts of the case that respondent
municipal judge grossly failed to perform his duties properly and is unfit for the office and therefore
orders his separation from the service. It is self-evident  from the very face of the "criminal complaint"
for estafa, and the supporting sworn statements filed with and sworn to before him as well as the very
notes of preliminary examination taken by him that the "criminal" charge against complainant showed
no vestige of the essential elements of estafa but simply recited complainant's failure to pay the
creditors as alleged offended parties a simple indebtedness. Respondent judge's subsequent crass
attempt at exculpation by the submission of spurious evidence to cover up his liability is more
reprehensible than his guilt under the charge and shows his unworthiness for the office.

In admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the
complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his
utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly
failed to perform his duties properly — which in this instance was to dismiss the complaint outright
since it is elementary that non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, much less estafa; and
that no one may be criminally charged and punished for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.