ART.

XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS

STATE IMMUNITY
1. Metran v. Paredes 79 Phil 819 (1948)
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE v. JOSE MA. PAREDES 
79 Phil. 819
Ponente: HILADO, J.
Facts:
2. National Airports Corp v. Teodoro 91 Phil 203 (1952)
Petitioner: National Airport Corporation
Respondent: Jose Teodoro, Jr. (as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and
Philippine Airlines Inc
Ponente: Tuason, J
Facts: On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished by
Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration
was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National
Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No.
2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. The Philippine Airlines, Inc.
countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation,
which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National
Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief
and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the
complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the
operators and maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third party defendant
would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable
rentals for the use of their lands.”. The Solicitor General  filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that as the agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and
not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being
sued.
ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Aeronatuics Administration is suable.
RULING: Yes.  Civil Aeronatuics Administration is suable. According to laws, Not
all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits.
The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business.
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under
Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant
concession rights, and under ;
Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline,
accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its
management.
In the case at bar, These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration
has the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the
power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its
behalf. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is
essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public. Thus, the Civil
Aeronautics is suable
3. Philrock v. Board of Liquidators 180 SCRA 171 (1989)
Petitioner: Philippine Rock Industries
Respondent: Board of Liquidators
Ponente: Gariño-Aquino

Facts: PHILROCK filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint against the Board of Liquidators, as
liquidator of the defunct REPACOM, for: (1) the replacement of the defective rock pulverizing
machinery purchased from REPACOM, or, as alternative, to refund the purchase at 31% of its
contract price; (2) reparation for losses incurred due to the increased expenses of maintaining the
plant at Php5,000 a month and Php4,000 per day as unrealized profits and exemplary damages; and
(3) Php50,000 attorney fees plus expenses and costs of the suit.
The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the State, filed a notice
of appeal on the ground that the payment for damages are public funds, hence, exempt from
attachment and execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued a Writ of Execution. Subsequently
the Board of Liquidators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals where
the Court of Appeals set aside the Writ of Execution by the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Liquidators, as a government agency without juridical capacity,
may be sued and held liable as litigators of REPACOM.

Ruling:
No. The Board of Liquidators is a government agency, created under E.O. 372 to administer the
assets and pay the liabilities of the defunct REPACOM, thus it has no juridical personality, separate
and distinct from the government, and therefore, as a general rule, suing it is akin to suing the State.
The State enjoys immunity from suit except when it conducts business through a government-owned
and controlled corporation or a non-corporate agency set up primarily for a business purpose, and
even then, the State may not be liable for damages since the purse of the State, or the disbursement
of public funds is in the discretion of the Legislature. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate specific objectives, as appropriated by law. Although the liability of REPACOM has been
ascertained, the State is at liberty to determine for itself how to satisfy such liability. Funds should be
appropriated by the Legislature for the specific purpose of satisfying the judgement in favor of
PHILROCK before said judgement may be paid.

4. Republic v. Feliciano G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Pablo Feliciano
Ponente: Yap, J
FACTS: Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The claim
of ownership by Feliciano was derived from deed of sale of the property traced
from informacion posesoria. However, the said property was subject of Proclamation
No. 90 by President Magsaysay for resettlement purposes.The Proclamation contained
the reservation clause” subject to private rights, if any there be. “Feliciano asserts that
the subject property must be excluded from the coverage of the resettlement project.
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of non-suability of the State.

ISSUE#1: Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in an

action for recovery and possession of parcel of land?

HELD#1: YES.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court
just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit
for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an
action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the
State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that
the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use
of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been
dismissed.

ISSUE#2: Would the invocation of Proclamation No. 90 be considered as a waiver of

State Immunity?

HELD: NO. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation.
The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by
Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State
from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative
body.

XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

SEC. 1 Amendment or Revision
1. Lambino v Comelec G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006
Petitioner: Raul Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado together with 6,327,952
registered voters
Respondent: The Commission on Elections
Ponente: Carpio, J

Lambino Vs. Comelec  G.R. No. 174153 Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative

petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino
group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by
modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the
proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA
6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions. 

Issue: 
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people’s initiative. 

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Group’s petition. 

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC
did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People 
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at
the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and
misleading” which renders the initiative void. 

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing

Revision through Initiatives 

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision. 

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary 

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735 

Petition is dismissed.

SEC. 2 Amendment by Initiative

SEC. 3 Constitutional Convention
1. Gonzales v. Comelec 21 SCRA 774 (1967)

2. Tolentiono v. Comelec 41 SCRA 702 (1971)

FACTS:

After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on

November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971.
On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971,
COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold
the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971.
Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed
that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null
and void.
 ISSUE:

1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of
whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly,
violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review.
The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they
are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in
Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution
which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single
election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and
ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the
Constitution, not separately but together.
3. Del Rosario v. Comelec 35 SCRA 367 (1970)

4. Imbong v. Comelec 35 SCRA 28 (1970)

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar, J.

FACTS:

Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as
such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention
which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17,
1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by
providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least
two delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res
Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented
Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a),
 and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and
set the parameters of such convention?

2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the

constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact
implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such
details are within the competence of the Congress in the exercise of its
legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely an
application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a
denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed
the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of
delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running
for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not
arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is
still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic
constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation
is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.
5. Tolentino v. Comelec G.R.No. L-34150, Oct. 16, 1970
SEC. 4 Ratification
1. Planas v. Comelec 49 SCRA105 (1973)
2. Javellana v. Exec. Sec. G.R. No. L-36142, March 31 1973
3. Mitra Jr. v. Comelec 104 SCRA 59 (1981)
4.