American Precedent Kawananakoa v.

Polybank, 205 US 349

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage from D. Kawananakoa and J. Kalanianaole to Sister Albertina,
trustee for Stella K. Cockett. The suit was brought by the mortgagee(Polyblank) against the mortgagors and their wives, the German Savings
& Loan Society, a junior mortgagee of a portion of the mortgaged premises, and the Territory of Hawaii, and later discontinued as to the
Territory.

After the execution of the mortgage, the mortgagors(Kawananakoa) conveyed a portion of the mortgaged premises to S. M. Damon, who, in
turn, conveyed it to the Territory. The decree authorized the entry of a deficiency judgment against the mortgagors in case the proceeds from
a sale of the mortgaged premises should be found to be insufficient to pay the amount due.

The first claim of appellants-mortgagor(Kawananakoa) is that the decree should be reversed because a purchaser(Territory of Hawaii),
subsequent to the mortgage, of a portion of the mortgaged premises was not made a party to the suit. It is clear that, unless joined as a
party, the rights of a subsequent purchaser cannot be affected or concluded by the decree. The mortgagors(Kawananakoa) have no reason
to complain because their interest in the mortgaged premises is foreclosed without joining the subsequent purchaser of a portion. It follows
that the foreclosure is good as far as it goes.

It is further claimed that no deficiency judgment should be entered against the mortgagors until all of the mortgaged premises are sold. All
that the mortgagors can claim is that the mortgagee should foreclose on and have sold all of the mortgaged property that is possible, that is,
that she should foreclose all that the law allows her to foreclose, before entering up a deficiency judgment.

In this case all of the mortgaged property is to be sold except that part which is now held by the Territory. The interest of the Territory in that
portion cannot be foreclosed and sold without joining the Territory as a party defendant, and that cannot be done.

The mortgagee has done all that she can, and it would be inequitable that she should suffer through no fault of her own, particularly when
the mortgagors have received a substantial benefit by reason of the transfer.
ISSUES:

W/N the Territory of Hawaii can be a party to a suit as a subsequent purchaser of a portion of the mortgaged property.

RULING:

Thesis

No. The Territory of Hawaii cannot be a party to a suit as a subsequent purchaser of a portion of the mortgaged property.

Rule

A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

A sovereign power which refuses to waive its exemption from suit, the court can, all other parties being joined, except the land conveyed to
the territory of Hawaii, and decree sale of the balance and enter deficiency judgment for the sum remaining due if proceeds of sale are
insufficient to pay the debt.

Analysis

In the case at bar, this doctrine extends to the territories of the United States (the Territory of Hawaii), which in actual administration originate
and change the law of contract and property.

Appellants-mortgagors(Kawananakoa) were incorrect that the claim on decree, in describing the land to be sold, is erroneous as it does not
follow the description in the mortgage. The court ruled that where a part of the mortgage premises has been sold to the sovereign power(in
this case the Territory of Hawaii) which refuses to waive its exemption from suit, the court can, all other parties being joined, except the land
so conveyed(to the Territory of Hawaii) and decree sale of the balance and enter deficiency judgment for sum remaining due if proceeds of
sale are insufficient to pay the debt.

Conclusion

Thus, the Territory of Hawaii cannot be a party to a suit as a subsequent purchaser of a portion of the mortgaged property.

Typologies of Suits Against the State

Suits against the Phil. Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993
Government: dismissible
if the government does
not give its consent

FACTS:
1. The heirs of the deceased (Caylao Group), petitioner, filed a complaint seeking the reversal of Judge Sandoval, respondent,
for dismissing the complaint for damages by the petitioner against the Republic of the Philippines.
2. The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Mr. Tadeo, presented their demands called “genuine agrarian reform” to
the Minister of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Mr. Alvarez:
a. Giving FREE LANDS to farmers
b. ZERO RETENTION of for landlords
c. STOP AMORTIZATIONS of land payments.
3. KMP, instead of negotiating with MAR, proceeded to Mendiola for a rally. However, a clash took place, leaving 12 marchers
dead.
 4. President Aquino created the Citizen's Mendiola Commission to investigate the disorder and death, which reported that during
the clash, there were Marines and Military Units wearing CIVILIAN ATTIRE. The commission recommended compensation for
the deceased and wounded victims of the incident.
5. Petitioners institute an action for damages AGAINST REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
6. The Republic, through Solicitor General, argued that THE STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
7. Petitioners claimed that the STATE IMPLIEDLY WAIVED its IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, considering the recommendation made
by the Commission.
8. Respondent, Judge Sandoval, dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was NO WAIVER BY THE STATE.

ISSUES:

1. WON the case is a suit against the State with its consent?

RULING:
(1) No. The case is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution provides that, the STATE MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. The
principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

In the case at bar, the commission is only a fact-finding body and its recommendation does not bind the state, as such
recommendation does not become final and executory. Moreover, the utterances of the president alone cannot infer that the state
has admitted any liability and it consented the suit.

The supreme court teaches us, that some instances when a suit against the state is proper are:

a. When the Republic is sued by name;

b. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

c. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the
officer but the government.
 While the republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Though the military
officers were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their function ceased to be official the moment they
exceeded their authority. In this case, the police and military exceeded their authority when they committed a violation against BP
880.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Suits against officials of Ruiz v. Cabahug, G.R. No. L-9990, September 30, 1957
the Phil. Government

FACTS:
1. The Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the Allied Technologists, through architects Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio,
for architectural and engineering services of Veterans Hospital
2. When defendants-officials paid the contract price, they retained 15%, for the reason that Panlilio has asserted that he is the
sole and only architect of Veterans Hospital. [First Cause of Action]
3. Unless the defendants are prevented from recognizing Panlilio as the sole architect, the plaintiff will be deprived of their share
of professional service and their professional prestige will be gravely damaged.
4. Title II of the contract specifies that at any time prior to six months after completion and acceptance of work in Title I, the
Government may direct Allied to perform services stated in Title II, yet the Government refused. [Second Cause of Action]

ISSUES:
1. WON the appeal is meritorious?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The appeal is meritorious.

The doctrine of state immunity. The state cannot be sued without its consent. Consent in government agencies may be
 expressed or implied stated in its charter or the law that registers the agency or instrumentality.

In the case at bar, Republic Act No. 416 converted the Philippine Normal School to Philippine Normal College, which endowed it
with “general powers as set out in the Corporation Law”, entrusting its administration to the board of trustees, which was to
exercise “all powers of the corporation”. It was specifically enumerated in Sec. 13 of Corporation Law the power “to sue and be
sued in any court”.

Therefore, with this express consent, the Philippine Normal College can be sued in court.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

SUITS AGAINST DOH v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013
OFFICIALS OF THE PHIL.
GOVERNMENT

FACTS:

The Department of Health(DOH) issued Administrative Order (AO), setting the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public.

The DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products or violations committed by them during their
accreditation.
A meeting was held under the memorandum No. 209 between the DOH represented by Ma. Margarita Galon (GALON) and the 24
accredited drug companies including the respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI)

During the meeting Galon handed the drug companies a documents entitled “REPORT ON VIOLATIVE DRUGS” issued by the Bureau of
Food and Drugs (BFAD) which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies’ products. Specifically, the
BFAD found that PPI’s products which were being sold to the public were unfit for human consumption.

After the meeting the drug companies were directed to submit their respective explanations on the adverse findings covering their respective
products in the “REPORT ON VIOLATIVE PRODUCTS”

PPI belatedly sent a letter to undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the “Report on Violative Products” to its lawyers with
instructions to prepare the corresponding reply.

In a letter-reply undersecretary Galon found “untenable” PPI’s letter and therein informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation has
been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C

ISSUES:

WON damage suit against DOH officials in the performance of their performance of their respective functions requiring the state to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy a judgment favorable to the plaintiff, e.g., appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages

RULING:

No, the state does not need to perform an affirmative act to satisfy a judgment favorable to the plaintiff.

State immunity extends its protective mantle to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their
duties.

DOH officials namely, Secretary Alfredo G. Romualdez, Secretary Manuel Dayrit and lastly undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon in the
performance of their official functions and in good faith did not violate their authority or jurisdiction, are covered by the state immunity from
suits.

The state will only perform an affirmative act only when public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Lansang v. CA, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

FACTS:
General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) was allegedly awarded a cerebral contract of lease by the National Parks Development
Committee

GABI remitted 40% of the profits [from their food and drinks stalls at Rizal Park] to the NPDC but there was no showing who
received the share of the profits or how they were spent.
·
With change of government, the new Chairman of the NPDC ordered GABI to vacate Rizal Park.
Petitioner insisted that the complaint filed against him is a complaint against the State on the grounds that NPDC is a government
agency, and he was acting in his capacity as chairman of NPDC when he ordered the eviction of GABI.
· The private respondents recognize the authority of the petitioner to terminate the agreement if the said agreement is prejudicial to
the interests of the NPDC. However, they maintain that the root cause of GABI’s ejectment was the petitioner’s personal interest,
not that of the NPDC.

ISSUES:
1. WON this case is a suit against the State

RULING:
1. No, this case is not a suit against the State.
 Although the doctrine of state immunity applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their
duties, it does not apply to cases where the public official is charged for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.

This means that public officials are not exempt in their personal capacity from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.

The Court is convinced that the petitioner is being sued in his personal capacity, and not in his capacity as chairman of NPDC. This is
evident from paragraph 4 of the complaint that states that, among others,

“Defendant AMADO J. LANSANG, JR., the Chairman of the National Parks Development Committee, acting under the spirit of
revenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal resentment against plaintiff JOSE IGLESIAS,"

Therefore, State immunity from suits is not applicable in this case

(Therefore, this case is not a suit against the State but against the petitioner in his private capacity)

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Effect when public officer Festejo v. Fernando, GR No. L-5156, March 11, 1954
acts without or in excess
of jurisdiction

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Suits against agencies of Bermoy v. PNC, G.R. No. L-8670, May 18, 1956
the Phil. Government

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Arcega v. CA, G.R. No. L-20869, August 28, 1975

Facts:
● Petitioner Alicia Orcega under the firm name, Fairmont Ice Cream Company, filed a complaint to the Court of First Instance against
the Central Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank for the refund from allegedly unauthorized payments pursuant to
the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange.
● The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint invoking that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since it involves a
financial charge against the government, therefore the suit is against the government and it cannot prosper because the State cannot
be sued without its consent.
● The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and was then denied by the same court. Thus, Arcega appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
● The Court of Appeal also dismissed the complaint holding that the suit is indirectly against the State, and it cannot be sued without its
consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Central Bank of the Philippines can be sued.

Held:

Thesis: The suit against the Central Bank of the Philippines is not a suit against the State.

Rule: Incorporated government agencies can sue and be sued if their charter provides. This provision expresses consent from the State to
be sued.

Analysis: In this case, the Court ruled that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint holding that the Central
Bank was non-suable. The Central Bank is an entity authorized by its charter to sue and be sued thus there is also a consent of the State to
be sued.

Conclusion: Therefore, the Central Bank can be sued since the authorization of its charter gives the consent of the State to be sued.

FULL CASE:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/aug1975/gr_20869_1975.html

Rayo v. CFI, G.R. No. L-55273-83, December 19, 1981

FACTS:
1. On October 26, 1978, typhoon “KADING” struck Bulacan. Respondent, acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez
opened simultaneously all the floodgates of the Angat Dam.
2. The opening of all the dams caused flooding to several towns and resulted in hundreds of deaths.
 3. Petitioners filed a complaint.
4. Respondents invoked in each answer a special and affirmative defense that "in the operation of the Angat Dam," it is "performing a
purely governmental function", hence it "can not be sued without the express consent of the State." …
5. Petitioners oppose the defense, contending that the NPC is not performing governmental but merely proprietary functions and that
under its own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in any court.

ISSUES:
Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be
sued for tort.

RULING:
Yes, the charter provision that the NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without a qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it
can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners. As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality
of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the Orders of the respondent court dated December 12, 1979 and October 3, 1980, are set
aside; and said court is ordered to reinstate the complaints of the petitioners. Costs against the NPC.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
 Philippine National Railways v. IAC, G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993

Facts:
The passenger express train of PNR and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit Inc collided at the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit Bulacan, causing damage to the bus and its passengers.
Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the negligence and impudence of PNR and its engineer in operating in a busy intersection
without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching trains that would pass through the
crossing.

Issue:
WON respondent, being government-owned, may avail of immunity from suit.

Ruling:
No, PNR is not immune from suit. By the doctrine of implied powers the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact
private business. PNR is not exercising governmental powers; as such it is not immune from suit.

Wherefore, PNR is not immune from suit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Bureau of Printing v. BOP Employees Ass’n., G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961

FACTS:

ISSUES:
RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Mobil v. Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH, G.R. Nos. 166309-10, March 9, 2007

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
 Air Transportation Office v. Sps. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Mixed suits Republic v. Sandoval, supra (damage suit against the Republic of the Philippines and police and
Marine officers involved in the Mendiola massacre)

FACTS:

This case is connected to the Mendiola Massacre, which was the culmination of the eight days and seven nights of encampment by
members of the Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the Ministry of Agrarain Reform.

The KMP demanded for what they called “Genuine agrarian reform.” Among which are, (A) giving lands for free to farmers; (B) zero retention
of lands by landlords; and (C) stop amortization of land payments.

On January 22, KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, marched to Malacanang to air their demands

When they reach the police lines. No dialog took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. Then, there was suddenly an
explosion followed by the throwing of pillboxes, stones, and bottles. After the riot, 12 marchers were confirmed dead, 39 were wounded by
gunshots, and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging the group of marchers. From the police and military personnel, 3 sustained gunshot
wounds, and 20 suffered minor physical injuries.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, which created the Citizens’
Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of
Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila.

ISSUES:

WON damage suit against the Republic of the Philippines involved in the Mendiola massacre.

RULING:

No, there is no damage suit against the Republic of the Philippines

The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rest on reasons of public policy—that public service would be hindered, and
the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled
in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government.

The inescapable conclusion is that the state cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident.

ISSUE

WON damage suit against police and Marine officers involved in the Mendiola massacre

RULING

Yes, Police and marine officers involved in the Mendiola massacre can be liable.

This Court emphasize that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not
claimed by any other official of the Republic.

Normally state immunity extends to the officials discharging or functioning their governmental functions. The moment they exceeded their
authority their function ceased to be official.
The Court has made it quite clear that even a “high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another.”

The moment Police and Marine officers fired their firearms against the Kilusang magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) during the riot exceeded
their authority and jurisdiction in peacefully dispersing the crowd.

Thus the court having been found that the public officers have acted beyond the scope of the authority, may be held liable for damages.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

DOH v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., supra (damage suit against the DOH and the DOH officials)

FACTS:

The Department of Health(DOH) issued Administrative Order (AO), setting the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public.

The DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products or violations committed by them during their
accreditation.

A meeting was held under the memorandum No. 209 between the DOH represented by Ma. Margarita Galon (GALON) and the 24
accredited drug companies including the respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI)
During the meeting Galon handed the drug companies a documents entitled “REPORT ON VIOLATIVE DRUGS” issued by the Bureau of
Food and Drugs (BFAD) which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies’ products. Specifically, the
BFAD found that PPI’s products which were being sold to the public were unfit for human consumption.

After the meeting the drug companies were directed to submit their respective explanations on the adverse findings covering their respective
products in the “REPORT ON VIOLATIVE PRODUCTS”

PPI belatedly sent a letter to undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the “Report on Violative Products” to its lawyers with
instructions to prepare the corresponding reply.

In a letter-reply undersecretary Galon found “untenable” PPI’s letter and therein informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation has
been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C

ISSUES:

WON damage suit against the DOH

RULING:

No, DOH cannot be held liable for a damage suit.

A unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested
with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot proser; otherwise, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated.

DOH performs functions of governmental character thus it is classified as an unincorporated agency.

The DOH can validly invoke state Immunity.

ISSUE:

WON damage suit against DOH officials.

RULING:

No, DOH officials cannot be liable for damage suit.

"The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and
whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government.”

"public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they
have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith."

The DOH officials in compliance with the AO No. 27 suspended the accreditation of PPI due to failure in compliance with the directive’s of the
DOH. The DOH officials were merely discharging their governmental function in good faith.

Wherefore, the DOH officials were dismissed from damage suit against them

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

“The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be sued for acts done in the performance of their official
functions or within the scope of their authority.”

Indirect suit against a Pacific Products, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. L-33777, January 30, 1990
government agency

FACTS:

- Pacific Products, Inc filed an action for sum of money against H.D. Labrador, who is doing business under the name and style
 of BML Trading.

- BML Trading won in a bid to supply the Bureau of Telecommunications with 15,000 pounds of bluestone copper sulfate worth
P10,500.00. Before the Bureau could release the payment to BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila (HD Labrador) garnished P9,111.70 of
the P10,500.00

- Unknown to Pacific, BML Trading assigned its rights over the P10,500.00 to herein respondent, Vicente S. Ong .

- It appears that it was Ong who advanced the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate and the parties agreed that the profits will
be shared by BML Trading and Ong on a 40-60 percent basis.

- It was also their agreement that BML Trading will waive its share in the net profits which may be realized from the transaction should it fail
to secure the release of the payment from the Bureau of Telecommunications within seven (7) days from the delivery of the compound

- Pacific filed a motion to strike out the third-party claim of Vicente Ong, but the same was denied for lack of merit.

- H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was ordered to pay Pacific the sum of P9,111.70 in a decision which was rendered by the trial
court

- The corresponding writ of execution was issued and the Sheriff of Manila further garnished P1,181.65 of the P10,500.00 in the
possession of the Bureau.

- Ong's third party claim was frustrated when Pacific filed an Indemnity Bond with the Office of the Sheriff. Thus, the action for damages
against the Sheriff, Pacific Products and First Quezon City Insurance filed by Ong to vindicate his claim on the amount garnished.

ISSUES:

1. WON the garnishment of the amount payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the Bureau of
Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void.
2. WON immunity from suit was waived.

RULING:

1. Yes, garnishment of the amount payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the Bureau of
Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void.

It is a rule that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due to the defendant in a private litigation, is not liable to the
plaintiff in that private litigation in the process of garnishment. The State may not be sued except by express authorization by the
Legislature. To subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. (Director of Commerce and
Industry v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 386)

The Bureau of Telecommunications is a government agency created under Section 78 of Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1974. It
has no charter and no distinct personality of its own. Being a government agency, the rule mentioned above applies.

In this case, the amount against which the notice of garnishment was issued was still in the possession of the Bureau.

Therefore, the garnishment of the amount while still in possession of the Bureau was illegal.

2. No, immunity from suit was not waived.

Suability would follow only if the contract entered into by the government is in the exercise of a proprietary function.

There is nothing in the records of this case from which it can be concluded that the Bureau was engaging in business in the purchase
of copper sulfate.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
“x x x. By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor stranger becomes
a forced intervenor. The Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, an officer of the Government of the Philippine Islands, when
served with the writ of attachment, thus became a party to the action. (Tayabas Land Co. vs. Sharruf (1921), 41 Phil. 382).

“A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the
hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.” (Director of
Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 386; Italics ours)

Suit against a private Shell Philippines v. Jalos, G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010
entity not a suit against
the state

FACTS:

- Respondents filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the RTC claiming that the construction of Shell’s natural gas pipeline
was adversely affecting their livelihood as fishermen.

- Shell, the petitioner, claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the State’s consent. Shell said
that under the Service Contract 38, it served as an agent of the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas
reserves.

ISSUES:

1. WON the suit is actually against the State

RULING:
 1. No, this case is not a suit against the State.

The essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to represent his principal (in this case, the Phil. Govt) and bring about relations between
the principal and third persons.

In this case, Shell’s primary obligation is to perform all petroleum operations including transportation, storage, handling, and sale of
petroleum. It is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons.

Article II, paragraph 9B of Service Contract 38 allows Shell to recover all expenditures paid for by Shell in settlement of all losses, claims,
damages, judgements, and any other expenses not covered by insurance, including legal services. This signifies that the State itself
acknowledges the suability of Shell.

Therefore, this is not a suit against the State.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Arigo v. Swift

Sec. 21 of Art. VII (treaty Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
law)

FACTS:
1. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the USS Guardian(ship of the US Navy) “to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.

2. While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles
east-southeast of Palawan. Vice Admiral Scott Swift as well as US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, expressed their
regrets over the incident and assured that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by
the ship. The US Navy had a salvage team to remove pieces of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
 3. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage. Petitioners filed a petition of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US Respondents.

RULING:
(1) No, the court has no jurisdiction over the US respondents. The immunity of the State from suit, is expressly provided in
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:

- Section 3. THE STATE MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.

The Supreme Court held that while the doctrine of state immunity prohibits only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the Tubbataha Reefs was committed while they were performing official military duties.

Therefore, The court has no jurisdiction over the US respondents.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

If foreign state is not Syquia v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-1648, August 17, 1949
named as defendant but
is ultimately liable,
sovereign immunity
applies

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Officials and Sanders v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988
functionaries of a foreign
state may invoke
sovereign immunity if
they are in the regular
performance of their
functions

FACTS:
1. Sanders, petitioner, was a special services director of US Naval Station in Olongapo City. Rossi, respondent, an American
citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines.
2. The respondents were advised that their employment was converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They
protested to the US Department of Defense and recommended to be reinstated, however, Sanders, noting that the
respondents proved to alienate most co-workers, difficult employees to supervise, and though took an oath not to discuss the
matter with anyone, placed the record in public places.
3. Sander disagreed and rejected the recommendation.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages
by the private respondents?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages
by the private respondents.

The outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically
remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. The mere
invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort
committed without or in excess of his authority.

In the case at bar, Sander, as a director of the special services department of US Naval Station, undoubtedly had supervision over
its personnel, including the respondents. The act is clearly official in nature, as the immediate superior of the respondents. The
petitioners are being sued as an officer of the United States government. Under the doctrine of state immunity, a government
cannot be sued without its consent. This principle is applicable not only to our own government but also the foreign state, derived
by the maxim “par in parem non habit imperium”. (Cite Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution)

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

U.S. v. Ceballos, G.R. No. 80018

FACTS: 1.Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a
buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force
and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
2. Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge.
3. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was because of their acts that he was
removed .
 4.Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases,
pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
5. The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a
suit against the US without its consent
6. Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases;
moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer.
ISSUES: WON the act of the respondents is in accordance with their official duty pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement ?
RULING: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions.
For discharging their duties as agents of the US pursuant to RP-US MBA
Therefore, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Restrictive theory of United States v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985
sovereign immunity:
immunity does not apply
to commercial activities
of foreign states;
entering into a contract is
not determinative, but
nature of the contract
(whether governmental or
proprietary) determines
whether sovereign
immunity applies

FACTS:

ISSUES:
RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

United States v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990

FACTS: 1.On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber
services contracts through its contracting officer James F. Shaw
2. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C.
del Pilar.
3. Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.
4. The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon
the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
5. On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to
cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
6. On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground
that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability
7. On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
8. On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
ISSUES: WON motion of the petitioners to dismiss and oppose to preliminary injunction is valid on the grounds that it suit against
us government ?

RULING:No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the US Armed forces.
Therefore Petitioners cannot plead immunity.
Case should be remanded to the lower court.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:Principle/s used Doctrine of State Immunity Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued.
(US vs Guinto) Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent

U.S. v. Rodrigo and Genove, G.R. No. 79470

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

RESTRICTIVE THEORY The Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994
OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercise sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal
Nuncio.
Private Respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

The Controversy arose from over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A), located in the Municipality of Paranaque,
Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner, Papal Nuncio.

The said lot (Lot 5-A, Lot 5-B, Lot 5-D registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation PRC) was sold to Ramon Licup, through
Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr. acting an agent to the sellers.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
tropicana properties and development Corporation (TROPICANA)

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific
performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants; namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Topicana

ISSUES:

WON complaint for annulment of sale of parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against the Holy See (represented by the
Papal Nuncio.)

RULING:

No, the complaint for annulment of sale of parcel of land, and specific performance and damages against the Holy See is invalid

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy hold on
behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the missions. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which is this case is the Holy See.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. The
state is immune from suite when it is exercising its governmental function (jure imperii.)
 wherefore, the complaint against Papal Nuncio for representing Holy See is dismissed.

ISSUE:

WON sovereign immunity from suits apply because the transaction (sale of parcels of land) was not commercial

RULING:

Yes, sovereign immunity from suits applies because the transaction was not commercial.

According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of sovereign is recognized with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

When Holy See exercised its governmental function not commercial in character by entering into a transaction or contract in selling the
parcels of land it did not impliedly waived its consent to sovereign immunity.

Thus governmental function or acts jure gestionis are immune from suits.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

CNMEG v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:
ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Sanders v. Veridiano, supra (pleadings of the parties before the trial established the official character
of the letters; thus, it was not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial)

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

U.S. v. Alarcon Vergara, G.R. No. 80258, February 26, 1990

FACTS: 1. Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except USA)
2. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on them.
3. Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and
resisting arrest
4.USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be
sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions
5.Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the
defendants.

ISSUES: Whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official functions.

RULING: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be
known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

The Holy See v. Rosario, supra (Holy See provided an executive endorsement of its immunity via a
motion to intervene that the DFA filed; other means: letter from the DFA, telegram from the DFA,
“suggestion” from the DFA embodied in a manifestation and motion from the OSG)

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

GTZ v. CA, supra

Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) v. CA, supra (certification from the DFA
not imperative in all cases, but obtaining such certification would provide a disputable evidentiary
presumption of immunity, which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual
evidence; OSG endorsement of the claim of severing immunity from suits not a sufficient substitute for
the DFA certification absent any proof that the DFA endorsed the claim, or that the OSG had solicited
the DFA’s views on the issue)

FACTS:
1. GTZ hires contract employees which are the respondents to work for SHINE.
 2. In September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager.

3. Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-termination of their
contracts of employment on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting in loss of confidence and
trust."

4. On 21 August 2000, Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC

5. On 25 October 2005, GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over
the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany.

6. Later on, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a private
corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its
diplomatic status.

ISSUES:
(1) WON GTZ enjoys immunity from suit

RULING:
(1) NO, GTZ does not enjoy immunity from suit. The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign
state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the State may not be sued without its
consent."

- Certification from the DFA not imperative in all cases, but obtaining such certification would provide a disputable evidentiary
presumption of immunity, which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual evidence; OSG endorsement of the
claim of severing immunity from suits not a sufficient substitute for the DFA certification absent any proof that the DFA endorsed the
claim, or that the OSG had solicited the DFA’s views on the issue

- The court held that GTZ has consistently been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally
enjoyed by its parent country which is the Federal Republic of Germany.
 THEREFORE, GTZ is not immune from suit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

CNMEG v. Sta. Maria, supra

CNMEG v. Sta. Maria, supra (Certification executed by the Economic and Commercial Office of the
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, stating that the Northrail Project is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, not the kind of certification that can establish CNMEG’s entitlement to immunity
from suit; RULE: determination of immunity must come from the DFA, being the “Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued”; determination by the OSG or by the OGCC does not inspire the same degree of
confidence as a DFA certification)

FACTS:
- Respondents prayed for the annulment of contracts entered into by CNMEG and Northrail. These contracts involved the construction
of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis. CNMEG pray for the dismissal of the suit,
contending that it is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court,and that the contract agreement is an
executive agreement, such that it cannot be questioned by or before a local court

ISSUES:
(1) WON CNMEG is entitled to immunity from suit.

RULING:
(1) NO, CNMEG is not entitled to immunity from suit. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of
the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts
or acts jure gestionis.

- The court's ruling, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and controlled
corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued.
 THEREFORE, CNMEG is not entitled to immunity from suit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

CASE: Arigo v. Swift, supra (Despite non-appearance of the American respondents, the SC had factual
basis to hold that they were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who
had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew; satisfaction of a judgment against
them will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government; thus, state
immunity bars the SC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice, and
Robling)

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Determination of the The Holy See v. Rosario, supra

Executive Department
(i.e., thru the DFA)
whether an entity is
entitled to sovereign
immunity a political
question, conclusive
upon the courts

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) v. CA, G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

CNMEG v. Sta. Maria, supra (CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it
performs governmental functions because it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be
sued under Chinese law)
FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Rule on immunity similar DFA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, September 18, 1996
to foreign states

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Role of the DFA CASE: DFA v. NLRC, supra

FACTS:

ISSUES:
RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Issue of diplomatic World Health Organization v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972
immunity a political
question, courts should
not look beyond a
determination by the
executive branch of the
government

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Role of the DFA CASE: DFA v. NLRC, supra

FACTS:
ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Waiver of Immunity/ Consent to be Sued

General law Lim v. Brownell, G.R. No. L-8587, March 24, 1960

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Special law Merritt v. Government of the Phil. Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
FACTS:
1. Meritt, the plaintiff, collided with a General Hospital Ambulance, claiming that it was due to the negligence of the chauffeur.
2. The General Hospital Ambulance did not follow the prescribed ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, as it turned suddenly and
unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn.
3. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was severely injured and was unconscious according to a physician.
4. The plaintiff claims that because of the incident, he had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability displayed before the accident.
5. The negligence caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the government.
6. Act No. 2457 authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the government of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUES:
1. WON the enactment of Act No. 2457 waived the State's IMMUNITY against suit?

2. WON the enactment of Act No. 2457 concedes the State’s LIABILITY to the plaintiff?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The enactment of Act No. 2457 waived the State’s immunity against suit, but …

(2) No. It did not concede the State’s liability to the plaintiff.

The supreme court teaches us that the state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.

In the case at bar, the General Hospital Ambulance did not follow the prescribed ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, as it turned
suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn. The chauffeur, performing in his personal capacity, is
held personally responsible. The claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Express consent strictly Lim v. Brownell, supra

construed

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

When state commences Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R No. L-6060, September 30, 1950
litigation

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
IMPLIED CONSENT Lim v. Brownell, supra (Sec. 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 allowed an action for the recovery of real
property but not an action for damages, which was not one of those types of actions that Sec. 3 allowed to be
instituted in the appropriate Philippine courts)

FACTS:

The controversy involves the four parcel of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila. (Namely; Lots Nos. 1,2,3,4 with a total area of 29,151
square meters)

After the last World War II, the said lots was found by the Alien Property Custodian of the Unite States Registered in the name of Asaichi
Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan.

Alien Property Custodian issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with an Enemy Act of the United States, vesting in himself the
ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2.

Philippines Alien Property Administrator under the authority of the same, issued a supplementary vesting order, vesting in himself title of the
remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.

Under section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and Executive Order No. 9921 of the president of the United States, the administrator
transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines.

Benito E. Lim, successor of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator.

That the said lots were once a property of Arsenia Enriquez, that the said lot was also mortgaged by her to the Mercantile Bank of China,
that the Mortgage having been foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction during the war to the Japanes Asaichi Kagawa, who, by
means of threat and intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her right of redemption; and that Kagawa never
acquired any valid title to the property because he was ineligible under the Constitution to acquire residential land in the Philippines by
reason of alien age.
ISSUES:

WON Sec. 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 allowed an action for the recovery of real property but not an action for damages

RULING:

No, Sec 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 does not allow an action for the recovery of real property but allows an action for the
damages.

Real Property are governed by the law of the place where the property is located and that prescription, being remedial, is like wise governed
by the laws of the forum.

But the trading with the Enemy Act, by consent of the Philippine Government, continued to be in force in the Philippines and consequently, is
as much part of the law of the land as section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Contrary to plaintiff’s claim, therefore, there is here no
conflict of laws involved. It should be stated that in an action under the Trading with the enemy Act for the recovery of property vested
thereunder, the rights of the parties must necessarily be governed by the terms of that Act.

When the Philippines entered a contract of trading with another state. The Republic of the Philippines impliedly consent to be sued and sue.

wherefore, petitioner Lim cannot recover the property but he can claim the damages against the Attorney general of the United States and
the Republic of the Philippines

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
 CNMEG v. Sta. Maria, supra [agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration in accordance with the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules an implied waiver of immunity (assuming immunity applies in the first
place)]

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Other examples of Ministerio v. CFI, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
implied waiver – violation
of the Constitution,
thereby perpetuating
injustice: immunity does
not apply

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
 Amigable v. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972

FACTS:

● Victoria Amigable (Amigable) is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
● Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters,
for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
○ It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the
wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal
construction in 1925
● Amigable’s counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines and requested payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. This was disallowed by the Auditor General.
● Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca (Cuenca), in his capacity as Commissioner of
Public Highways, for the recovery of ownership and possession of the land plus damages.
● Cuenca’s defenses are:
1. that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General;
2. that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed;
3. that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis
since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and
4. that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango
Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
● The trial court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without
its consent.
○ Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which subsequently certified the case to the SC, there being no question of fact involved.

ISSUE:
WON Amigable can properly sue the government for violation of his legal right i.e. taking of his private property without just compensation.
(adjust Issue - was there an implied waiver of immunity?

THESIS 1:
YES. Amigable can properly sue the government for violation of taking his private property without just compensation.

RULE 1:
The 1987 Constitution states private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Jurisprudence, Ministerio vs. Court
of First Instance of Cebu, also tells us that if the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

ANALYSIS 1:
In this case, Amigable remains the owner of the whole lot. There was no annotation in favor of the government that appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government.
As a constitutional right, a registered owner could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.

But since the property is now being used for road purposes, the only relief available for the owner is for the government to make due
compensation, which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the
price or value thereof at the time of the taking

CONCLUSION:
So, Amigable can properly sue the government for violation of his legal right i.e. taking of his private property without just compensation.

Notes:
Full Text of the case
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1972/feb1972/gr_l_26400_1972.htm

Santiago v. Government of the Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-48214, December 19, 1978

Facts:
Petitioner donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that lighting facilities and water system will be installed on the
property donated and to build an office building and parking lot.

The Court of First Instance ruled that the state cannot be sued without its consent.

Issue:
WON the respondent has waived its immunity from suit

Ruling:
Yes. The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. donor, with the Republic or
any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right
to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. The government is a beneficiary of
the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms.

Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
When (foreign) state Unites States v. Ruiz, supra
enters into a proprietary
contract (following the
doctrine of
restrictive immunity)

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

When (foreign) state Unites States v. Guinto, supra

enters into a proprietary
contract (following the
doctrine of
restrictive immunity)

FACTS: 1.On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber
services contracts through its contracting officer James F. Shaw
2. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C.
del Pilar.
 3. Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.
4. The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon
the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
5. On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to
cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
6. On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground
that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability
7. On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
8. On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss.

ISSUES: WON motion of the petitioners to dismiss and oppose to preliminary injunction is valid on the grounds that it suit against
us government ?
RULING: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the US Armed forces.
Therefore Petitioners cannot plead immunity.
Case should be remanded to the lower court.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:Principle/s used Doctrine of State Immunity Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued.
(US vs Guinto) Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent

Implied consent must be Republic v. Sandoval, supra

clear and unambiguous

FACTS:

ISSUES:
RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
 Suability vs. Liability

Suability vs. Liability Merritt v. Government of the Phil. Islands, supra

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

United States v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. 79470, February 26, 1990

FACTS: 1. Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter
Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City.
2. It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers.
3. His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF
Clark Air Force Base.
4. Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio.
5. The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as
an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect
against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued
6.Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their
functions called for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning.

ISSUES: WON the defendants motion to moved the dismissal complaint of Genove is Valid on the contention that it is a Suit
against Lamachia an agent of the state ?
RULING:No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity.
The restaurants are commercial enterprises.
Therefore, by entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity
from suit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.

Republic v. Sandoval, supra

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Lansang v. CA, supra

FACTS:
General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) was allegedly awarded a cerebral contract of lease by the National Parks Development
Committee
·
GABI remitted 40% of the profits [from their food and drinks stalls at Rizal Park] to the NPDC but there was no showing who
received the share of the profits or how they were spent.
 ·
With change of government, the new Chairman of the NPDC ordered GABI to vacate Rizal Park.
· Petitioner insisted that the complaint filed against him is a complaint against the State on the grounds that NPDC is a government
agency, and he was acting in his capacity as chairman of NPDC when he ordered the eviction of GABI.
· The private respondents recognize the authority of the petitioner to terminate the agreement if the said agreement is prejudicial to
the interests of the NPDC. However, they maintain that the root cause of GABI’s ejectment was the petitioner’s personal interest,
not that of the NPDC.

ISSUES:

WON the petitioner abused his authority

RULING:

No, the petitioner did not abuse his authority. (Or, the petitioner is not liable)

The fact that the State is suable does not mean that it is liable.

Suability is the result of the consent of the State to be sued. Liability is determined after hearing the basis of relevant laws and the
established facts.

The court found no abuse of authority in record. This agreement had no written contract and GABI was allowed to occupy these
spaces in the park in a matter of accommodation by the previous administration. This being so, the petitioner may validly discontinue
the accommodation extended to GABI. With the absence of any satisfactory proof for which the Court may base the amount of
damages suffered, the award of damages cannot be sustained.

With this, the petitioner, although suable, was not liable.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
 Republic v. Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH, supra

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Customs Arrastre Service, supra

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Republic v. Villasor

Consent to be Sued not Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973
Consent to Execution of
Judgment; Exception
FACTS:
1. A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the Republic of the Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration award of
P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent corporation. After the decision became final and executory, respondent judge issued an order
directing the sheriff to execute the said decision, and the corresponding alias writ of execution was thus issued.

2. The sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks especially the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to
cover the amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank received such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller,
these funds of the AFP with the said banks are public funds for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its military and civilian
personnel.

3. The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges the validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the
decision final and executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance
thereof.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

(2) Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.

RULING:
(1) NO, The state cannot be sued without its consent. The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be
sued without its consent”. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
 (2) NO, The notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is not valid. As a general rule, whether the money is deposited
by way of general or special deposit, they remain government funds and are not subject to garnishment. An exception of the
rule is a law or ordinance that has been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government obligation.

(1) Therefore, The state cannot be sued without its consent

(2) Therefore, The notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is not valid

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

ADDITIONAL NOTES: