Rule 113

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 127755 • April 14, 1999

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus

An act done by me against my will is not my act

FACTS:

The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to
death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who
claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as
their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and
he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived
at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of
the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precinct where his
statement was taken on May 14, 1996.However, this was only subscribed on May 22,
1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-
Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time up
on orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities’ belief that the accused might
attempt to escape otherwise.

ISSUES:

(1)

Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

(2)

Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

RULING:

(1)

YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The
Court held that the accused should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the
moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial
investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers in the scope of
custodial investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited the
accusedappellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case.
Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved
crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime.
However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary,
express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.

(2)

NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless
arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made
immediately after the crime was committed; and when the one to be arrested is an
escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not f all in any of these
exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the consummation of the
crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied
on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was
not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the
accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he
waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
Reyes vs. People, GR 229380, 6 June 2018 

FACTS:

 At around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a group of police
officers from Cardona, Rizal was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc,
Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a
woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just
bought shabu in Barangay Mambog in which a woman identified to be Reyes.

 The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes
answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned
her back, pulled something out from her breast area and held a small plastic
sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and
brought it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-1”.

 Thereafter, PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory

and turned over the seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector
Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed10 that the substance inside the
 sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerousdrug.

 Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5,
2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and
was about to board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a
certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was
blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one
PO1 Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her
possession which she denied having. She was then brought to the police station
where the police officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in
exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police
officers took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings.

 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the petitioner is lawful.
 
RULING:
No. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it identifies
three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully affected. These are: (a) an
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
 
Here in this case, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1
Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or
doing anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could
be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that
she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is
bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of
liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.
Rule 114

P 453
Lavides vs. CA, GR 129670, 1 February 2000 

FACTS:
 
Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and that his
arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. Based
on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were
submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed
on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
 
On April 10, 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein
Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged On
April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by the Quezon
City Prosecutor’s Office by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor
children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting

No bail was recommended for the cases. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for
bail in the nine cases. The court resolved the Omnibus Motion on May 16, 1997 wherein it
allowed Lavides to post bail amounting to Php 80,000.00 per case for a total of Php 800,000.00
subject to the following conditions to wit: 
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases.
He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled
and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to
trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
3. Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
 
On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those
filed in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he
asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.Then on May 22,
1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment.
 
On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court of
Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May 23,
1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of May
16, 1997, respectively.
 
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against
petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated.

T he appellate court eventually invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997
order for the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the
condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioner's bail bonds to be
moot and academic. 
ISSUE/S: 
 
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his presence
during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.
 
RULING:

In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and
the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely
by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of
bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court
or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is
required.
 
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

https://pdfcoffee.com/chua-vs-ca-pdf-free.html
Rule 115

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

RULING:
No. We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing
law or jurisprudence.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful
act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the
drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting
that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the
law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous
drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He
also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of
his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing
under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down
offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous
drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their
authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless
elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its
citizens including even members of its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth
Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 205741, Jul 23, 2014 ]

PEOPLE v. REYMAN ENDAYA Y LAIG +

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
For review of this Court is the 11 May 2012 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04872. The CA affirmed the
conviction of Reyman Endaya y Laig (appellant) for the offenses of illegal
sale and illegal possession of the prohibited drug methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, respectively punishable under Section 5 and
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

Antecedents

Appellant was charged under two separate informations filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Branch 12, with violation of
Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, committed as follows:

The Issues

Appellant raised the following errors in his brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 5 OF R.A.
NO. 9165 NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE RECEIPT
FOR PROPERTY SEIZED WHICH THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
FORCED TO SIGN IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SACHETS

OF SHABU AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II

Signature of appellant on "Receipt for Property Seized"

inadmissible in evidence

Appellant contends that he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the
"Receipt for Property Seized;" therefore, the document cannot be admitted
in evidence against him as his act of signing the same is a form of
confession or admission.

We find merit in appellant's contention. There is no showing in the records

of this case that appellant was assisted by a counsel when he signed the
"Receipt for Property Seized."

It is settled that the signature of an accused in the receipt of property seized

is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of
counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration
against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged; [53] hence, the
constitutional safeguard must be observed.

Nevertheless, as aptly found by the CA, while it is true that appellant signed
the receipt of property seized without the assistance of a counsel, the same
only renders inadmissible the receipt itself.[54] Thus, according to the CA:

x x x the evidentiary value of the "Receipt of Property Seized" in the present

circumstances is irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving
[appellant's] guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As [w]e have earlier stated, the
prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted to entrap [appellant]. The testimonies of the arresting police
officers clearly established [the illegal possession] and that the sale of
shabu by [appellant] was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the
shabu, [were] presented in court and confirmed by the other members of
the buy-bust team and they have acknowledged that they were the same
drugs subject of that particular buy-bust operation [and subsequent body
search on [appellant].[55]

III

Sachets of shabu not fruits of poisonous tree; hence, admissible

in evidence against appellant

Appellant continued to crave for acquittal claiming that, assuming without

conceding that he had in fact sold and possessed the plastic sachets
of shabu, they cannot be admitted in evidence for being fruits of a
poisonous tree, having been obtained after an unlawful arrest and search.

Appellant's insistence on the illegality of his warrantless arrest lacks merit.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under
any of the following circumstances:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, the arrest of appellant was effected under paragraph (a) or
what is termed "in flagrante delicto."[56] For a warrantless arrest of an
accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted
Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[57]

Here, SPO4 Benedicto, SPO2 Babadilla, and PO2 Chavez personally

witnessed the exchange between appellant and the poseur-buyer of the
marked money and the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance which subsequently tested positive for shabu. At the time he was
arrested, therefore, appellant was clearly committing a crime in full view of
the buy-bust team. As held by the CA:

Because [appellant] had been caught in flagrante delicto by the

apprehending police officers, they, as the arresting officers were duty-
bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to search him for anything
that may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The search, being
an incident of a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity. [58]

Beltran v. Samson G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929 53 Phil.

570 (1929)

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner

complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before
the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the
latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose
of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether or
not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in

these proceedings; but the respondents contend that the petitioner is
not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed
for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and
again which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions
of section 1687 of the Administrative Code. Of course, the fiscal under
section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons
cited to appear.

And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded,

seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law
and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.

Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether

the constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits
compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order against
which these proceedings were taken.

Issue: Whether the complainant be compelled to write down what the

fiscal dictates and used the said handwritten letters to compare the
latter with the letter-evidence against the complainant.

Held: No, writing is something more than moving the body, or the

hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act,
because it requires the application of intelligence and attention;
and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is
to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier,
as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. the court said
that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason
for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It
might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the
hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute
the raison d’ etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for
the protection of innocent persons.
Rule 116

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679               August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection

clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Salvador Estipona, Jr.  was indicted for violating Section 11 (illegal

possession of illegal drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act as he was alleged to have been caught in possession of shabu.
Initially, Estipona pleaded not guilty but later, with the assistance of the
Public Attorney’s Office, he filed a motion to withdraw his initial plea and
with a simultaneous motion to enter into plea bargaining. The prosecution
opposed the motions on the ground that plea bargaining is not allowed
under Section 23 of RA 9165. Judge Frank Lobrigo, although he agreed
with the points raised by Estipona, denied Estipona’s motion on the
ground that what Estipona was raising was a question on the
constitutionality of Section 23 of RA 9165. Judge Lobrigo opined that
although Regional Trial Courts have the power to rule on the
constitutionality of laws, he deemed it best not to rule on the matter as it
may have potential ramifications to drugs cases pending before his sala.
Hence, Estipona eventually filed a petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the
 same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and
the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all
violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the

power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.  The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Rule 117
Rule 118
RULE 119
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed by the MeTC in applying
the ruled on deposition-taking in civil case to criminal cases.
Held:
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in
criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the
witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and
deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases,
either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person
authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or
country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for
the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court
where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony
is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda.
de Manguerra where we further declared that –
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its
case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of
a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
Rule 120

LEONORA B. RIMANDO v. SPS. WINSTON AND ELENITA ALDABA AND PEOPLE, GR

No. 203583, 2014-10-13
Facts:
An Information... was filed before the RTC charging Rimando of the crime of estafa through
the use of false manifestations and fraudulent representations (estafa case).
According to the prosecution, Rimando enticed Sps.
Aldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that it is stable
Convinced by Rimando's proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship, Sps.
Aldaba gave Rimando a check in the... amount of P500,000.00 as investment in her
business.
In turn, Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) postdated checks... and made them sign an
investment contract with Multitel International Holding Corporation (Multitel).
Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds.
This prompted Sps. Aldaba to demand Rimando to make good the said checks, but to no
avail. Hence, they were constrained... to file a criminal complaint for estafa against her.
Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 22[12] before the Metropolitan Trial Court
Rimando was acquitted[14] in the BP 22 cases on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a
declaration that the act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist.
the RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba
in the amount of P500,000.00. It found the absence of the element of deceit as Sps. Aldaba
were fully aware that... they would be investing their money in Multitel and not in Rimando's
purported business.
Nevertheless, the RTC ruled that as an accommodation party to one of the checks she
issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be held liable to Sps. Aldaba
for the... corresponding amount of P500,000.00.
Aggrieved, Rimando appealed to the CA.
she contended that her acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in the BP 22 cases
should have barred Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in... the estafa case.
the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that a prosecution for violation of BP 22 is distinct,
separate, and independent from a prosecution for estafa, albeit they may both involve the
same parties and... transaction.
As such, Rimando's acquittal and subsequent exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22
cases does not automatically absolve her from civil liability in the estafa case.
Issues:
whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimando's civil liability in the estafa case despite her
acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases.
Ruling:
Rimando's acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from any civil
liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of the
accused does not automatically preclude a judgment... against him on the civil aspect of the
case.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the... liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
on the final... judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him."
In this case, Rimando's civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the
crime of estafa
Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in
Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was... correctly traced from being an accommodation party
to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel.
In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such,
she may be held directly liable for the value of the issued... check.
Rimando's civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of P500,000.00 does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime she is charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the
same despite her acquittal in the estafa... case.
Rimando's acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in the
estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of
facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases
can... proceed to their final adjudication both as to their criminal and civil aspects subject to
the prohibition on double recovery.[
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Decision... of the Court of Appeals... are hereby AFFIRMED.
 Salvador vs. Chua

G.R. No. 212865

Facts:

The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa penalized
under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. On March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for the
promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the promulgation
inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from hypertension. Unconvinced of the reason,
the RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision. RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the said crime.

The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal dated April 13, 2011, and
attached thereto the medical certificate dated March 30, 2011 purportedly issued by Dr. David,
certifying that the petitioner had submitted himself to a medical consultation at the Rizal
Medical Center on March 30, 2011 and had been found to be suffering from hypertension.

RTC Judge Eugenio G. DelaCruz initially denied the petitioner's Motion for Leave to file
Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the July 1, 2011 order.
Judge Dela Cruz granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on October 26, 2011,
thereby giving due course to his notice of appeal.

The private prosecutor, filed its Motion for Reconsideration against the order issued on
October 26, 2011, attaching to the motion the affidavit executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A.
David18 affirming that he had not examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011; that he had not
issued any medical certificate in favor of the petitioner.

The respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to nullify the
October 26, 2011 order. CA granted the respondent's certiorari petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction.

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:
 If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and
the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment,
however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice. [Rule 120, Sec. 6]
RULE 121
People v Dy 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder
before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court
erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police
officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he
used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on
the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process
required in custodial investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt
of the accused.

Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the
court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar
which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is
because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not
under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke
compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule
on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to
satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need
not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral
confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible
in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the
crime. 
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RULE 122

PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT SELLING v. TERESITA L. CARANDANG, GR No.

206958, 2017-11-08
Facts:
Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit[8] for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse
of confidence against Carandang before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
After the preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Job M. Mangente filed an
Information against Carandang before the Regional Trial Court of Quezo
On September 20, 2007, Presiding Judge Jocelyn A. Solis-Reyes of Branch 221, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City ordered that an arrest warrant be issued against Carandang:
After an evaluation of the Resolution and the documents attached thereto, the Court
believes that a prima facie evidence exists to support the charge and the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
WHEREFORE, let a Warrant of Arrest be issued against the accused.[10
Carandang filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,[11] alleging that she did not a... the Office of
the City Prosecutor, through State Prosecutor Liezel Aquiatan-Morales (Prosecutor
Aquiatan-Morales), issued a Resolution[18] recommending that the complaint against
Carandang be dismissed. After reinvestigation, it found that Personal Collection's cause of
action is anchored primarily on Carandang's failure to liquidate her remaining cash
advances.[19] However, the Office of the City Prosecutor was unconvinced that
Carandang's failure to return the cash advances would be sufficient to hold her liable for
estafa
November 19, 2010, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order[25] granting the Motion to
Withdraw Information. It found that Carandang used the cash advances to pay for the
operational expenses of Personal Collection Iloilo City branch and that her unceremonious
termination from employment prevented her from fully liquidating these cash advances,[26]
Thus, Carandang was able to explain her failure to account for the cash advances she had
received in trust. The trial court also noted the general policy of the courts to not interfere in
the conduct of preliminary investigations and to give the investigating officers sufficient
discretion to determine probable cause, It found that no exception existed in the case that
would require the court to intervene in the findings of the preliminary investigation.[27]
Personal Collection's Motion for Reconsideration[28] was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in its Order[29] dated October 12, 2011. Upon Carandang's motion, the Regional Trial
Court, in its Order[30] dated November 16, 2011, released the cash bond posted for
Carandang's ba
Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari[31] with the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Orders
granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and the Motion to Release Bond... the Court of
Appeals issued its Decision,[36] dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit
Personal Collection filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court.
Estafa is a crime committed by a person who defrauds another causing him to suffer
damages, by means of unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, or of false pretenses of
fraudulent acts. From the foregoing, the elements of estafa are, as follows: (1) that the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or deceit; and (2) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third party, and
it is essential that there be a fiduciary relation between them either in the form of a trust,
commission or administration (Carmen Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. No. 114398, October 24,
1997). Demand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a
criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accused may be convicted of the felony under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation
or conversion by the accused of the money or subject of the Information. In a prosecution
for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or
conversion. However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation (Lee v. People, G.R. No. 157781, April 11,
2005).
While it is true that herein accused failed to fully liquidate the cash advance received in trust
from the private complainant, regardless of whether or not a demand was made upon the
former, is only a circumstantial evidence of misappropriation which can be rebutted. As
found by the prosecution, the accused was able to satisfactorily explain her failure to
account or liquidate the cash advance received in trust, as follows: (1) that accused utilized
the cash advance given to her but the same was used to defray the operational expenses of
private complainant's branch in Iloilo City as evidenced by the Cash Advance Summary as
of November 23, 2006 prepared by Marilou S. Palarca, private complainant's
representative; (2) that accused was willing to fully liquidate her cash advances as in fact
she was able to make partial liquidation and that her unceremonious termination of her
employment with the private complainant prevented her from doing so.[94]
Issues:
First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly allowed the withdrawal of the
Information against Teresita L. Carandang upon a finding that there was a lack of probable
cause;Second, whether or not petitioner Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. was
deprived of due process when it was allegedly not given notice or opportunity to be heard
on respondent Teresita L. Carandang's Motion to Release Cash Bond; andFinally, whether
or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Petition for Certiorari was improper,
since it is only the State which may pray for the reinstatement of the criminal case.
Ruling:
In its Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, petitioner claims that it resorted to a
special civil action for certiorari as it had "no recourse to an appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"[61] against the trial court's
orders to withdraw the Information and release respondent's bail bond.Petitioner is
incorrect. Appeal was available and was the proper remedy.
Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Despite petitioner's claim that its petition before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal of
an order dismissing the criminal case against respondent, it is evident that the grant of the
Motion to Withdraw Information dismissed the criminal case. Further, in its Petition for
Certiorari, petitioner assails the Regional Trial Court's findings of lack of probable cause
due to the alleged insufficiency of evidence presented by respondent and because all the
elements of estafa were present.[68] Thus, petitioner questions the trial court's allegedly
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, which are errors of judgment that cannot be
corrected by an extraordinary writ of certiorari.[69]
Despite the use of an improper remedy, this Court proceeds to decide the issues to pursue
judicial economy
Judges must act with cautious discernment when asked to dismiss cases on the ground of
the absence of probable cause to support the withdrawal or dismissal of an information.
While the accused is constitutionally given a guarantee of presumption of innocence, there
is also the concern for the right to due process of the prosecution. The balance in each case
is not theoretical. Rather, it will be the outcome of the proper appreciation of the evidence
presented and a conscientious application by the judge of the proper burdens of proof and
evidence. Likewise, the trial court must consider that trial is always available after
arraignment and is a forum for the accused as much as it is for the prosecution to carefully
examine the merits of the case. As a general proposition, once the information is filed and a
warrant is issued after a judicial determination of probable cause, subsequent technical
dismissals are inequitable and should generally be avoided.
However, the trial court rendered a more satisfactory justification. A reading of the Order
shows that the trial court made its own assessment of the prosecution's evidence as
embodied in its January 29, 2010 Resolution, It sufficiently explained how the elements of
estafa were not met based on the additional evidence presented by the accused at the
reinvestigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor. The trial court also considered the
opposition filed by petitioner to the Motion to Withdraw Information, giving even the private
offended party the opportunity to be heard:... trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it reversed its earlier finding of probable cause. The earlier finding was about the
issuance of the arrest warrant, in which the trial court evaluated the prosecutor's Resolution
and its attached documents. Following this, respondent prayed for the reinvestigation of the
case as she was unable to attend the initial preliminary investigation. It was during the
reinvestigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor that respondent was able to present
her defense against the allegations in the complaint.Clearly, the additional evidence
adduced prompted the prosecutor's reversal of its initial finding of probable cause and the
filing of the motion to withdraw information. It was also this additional evidence that formed
the basis of the trial court's evaluation that there was now a lack of probable cause sufficient
to withdraw the information.There being insufficient evidence showing that the trial court
erred in finding a lack of probable cause, the grant of the withdrawal of the information must
be upheld.
114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for the cancellation of
bail:Section
Among the instances when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when the case is
dismissed.[95] Since cancellation of bail is automatic upon the dismissal of the case, no
notice or hearing is even necessary, as the cancellation takes place when any of the three
(3) enumerated instances takes place.The release of the amount posted as bail is a
separate matter. When the cash bond is m de to answer for any fines or costs, the
automatic cancellation is not succeeded by the immediate release of the cash bond.[96]...
this case, the dismissal of the case due to the withdrawal of the information resulted in the
automatic cancellation of respondent's bail
The trial court correctly granted the release of respondent's cash bond. Petitioner's right to
due process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard on
the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail was
automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case.
The trial court correctly granted the release of respondent's cash bond. Petitioner's right to
due process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard on
the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail was
automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case. Petitioner's hypothetical objections
to the Motion to Release Cash Bond would have been superfluous and unnecessary since
the release of the cash bond to respondent was already warranted under the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner's hypothetical objections to the Motion to Release Cash Bond would have been
superfluous and unnecessary since the release of the cash bond to respondent was already
warranted under the Rules of Court.