RULE 115 (RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AT TRIAL) Mayor Joey Marquez, who was also the Chairman of the Bids
was also the Chairman of the Bids and
R. 115, Rights of the Accused at Trial
To due process
63. Marquez vs Sandiganbayan 641 S 175
GR Number 187912-14 | Jan 31, 2011| J. Mendoza
Doctrine:
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by
necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed
reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and
substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused
reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the
Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of
due process.
Emergency Recit:
Joey Marquez was discovered to be involved in several anomalies while
serving as mayor of Paranaque City. Before the Sandiganbayan 4th Division,
the prosecution then presented various witnesses and documentary
evidence consisting of disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests; afterwhich, they rested their case. Marquez, in an
Omnibus Motion moved for the referral of the disbursement vouchers,
purchase requests and authorization to the NBI. This was not acted upon.
The cases were then raffled to the SB-5th Division. Marquez filed the subject
Motion to Refer Prosecution's Evidence for Examination by the Questioned
Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. In his motion, he
again insisted that his purported signatures on the vouchers were forged.
Thus, he raised this case to the Supreme Court alleging that denial of his
Motion to Refer Evidence for Examination by the National Bureau of
Investigation is in violation of his right to present evidence and his twin
constitutional right to due process and equal protection of law.
The SC ruled in his favor stating that evidence cannot properly be weighed
if not exhibited or produced before the court and that Marquez should not
be prevented from presenting his evidence as part of right to due process.
Facts:
1. As a result of the “Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions and
Walis TingTing” for the City of Paranaque for the years 1996 to
1998, conducted by the Special Audit Team of the Commission on
Audit (COA), several anomalies were discovered involving City
Awards Committee of Paranaque City, and Ofelia Caunan, Head of
the General Services Office of said city.
2. It was also found that through personal canvass and without public
bidding, Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several
thousand rounds of bullets of different calibers that were grossly
overpriced from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an
arms and ammunitions dealer with either the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the
Department of Trade and Industry.
3. The COA Special Audit Team issued Notices of Disallowance for
the overpriced ammunitions. Marquez and Caunan sought
reconsideration of the findings of the team but their plea was
denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the COA but their
appeal was denied.
4. In answer to charges filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman, the two insisted on the propriety of the transactions
and raised the pendency of their appeal with the COA. Having
found probable cause to indict them for violation of Sec 3(e) of the
RA 3019, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), filed three Informations against Marquez and
Caunan.
5. Before arraignment, alleging discovery of the forged signatures,
Marquez sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase
requests and authorization requests to the NBI and the
reinvestigation of the cases against him. These were denied by the
OSP. Before the Sandiganbayan 4th Division, the prosecution then
presented various witnesses and documentary evidence consisting
of disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization
requests; afterwhich, they rested their case.
6. Marquez, in an Omnibus Motion moved for the referral of the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization to the
NBI. This was not acted upon. The cases were then raffled to the
SB-5th Division. Marquez filed the subject Motion to Refer
Prosecution's Evidence for Examination by the Questioned
Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. In his
motion, he again insisted that his purported signatures on the
vouchers were forged.
7. By way of Opposition to the Motion, the prosecution argued that its
documentary exhibits had already been formally offered in January
2006 and had been duly admitted by the anti-graft court. The
prosecution added that, when confronted with the questioned
transactions during the COA audit investigation, Marquez never
 raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he insisted on the propriety
of the transactions.
Issue:
Whether the denial of Marquez’s Motion to Refer Evidence for Examination
by the National Bureau of Investigation is in violation of his right to present
evidence and his twin constitutional right to due process and equal
protection of law.
Held:
Yes, it is.
Ratio:
It is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that
a. the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
b. that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused;
c. that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
d. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by
necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed
reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and
substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused
reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the
Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of
due process.
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his
signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot
be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence
and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact
that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his
burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to
support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the country's premier
investigative force — the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only
evidence on this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally
considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other examination result
because the signatures are on the original documents which are in the
control of either the prosecution or the graft court.
If the Court were to deny this petition and Marquez would be convicted for
having failed to prove forgery, he could not be prevented from crying that
he was prevented from presenting evidence in his defense.
In denying said motion, the SB-5th Division offered no valid explanation
other than the fact that, being the trial court, it may validly determine
forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary
evidence. While it is true that the appreciation of whether the signatures of
Marquez are genuine or not is subject to the discretion of the graft court, this
discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court. Only
after evidence is offered and admitted that the court can appreciate and
evaluate it. The prosecution had already offered its evidence on the matter.
The court should not deny the same right to the defense.
In the conduct of its proceedings, a court is given discretion in maintaining
the delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures
of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes
and rid society of criminals on the other. Indeed, both the State and the
accused are entitled to due process. However, the exercise of such discretion
must be exercised judiciously, bearing in mind the circumstances of each
case, and the interests of substantial justice.
Thus, for having denied Marquez the opportunity to be heard and to
produce evidence of his choice in his defense, the SB-5th Division committed
grave abuse of discretion warranting intervention from the Court. The anti-
graft court should allow him to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the
Questioned Documents Section of the NBI for examination at the soonest
time possible and for the latter to immediately conduct such examination
and to submit the results to the court within a reasonable time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11, 2009 and May
20, 2009 Resolutions of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to allow the
petitioner Joey P. Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the
Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination as soon as possible and, after submission of the results to the
court and proper proceedings, to act on the case with dispatch.

R. 115, rights of the Accused at Trial
To be Informed
64. People vs. Francisco
G.R. No. 192818, November 17, 2010
Velasco, Jr.
Doctrine: Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf.
Emergency Recit: Prince was charged with the murder of Ramil Tablate on
January 23, 2002 at the RTC of Catanduanes. During arraignment, the
appellant pleaded not guilty. But during the pre-trial he withdrew his
former plea and consequently after re-arraignment he pleaded guilty. The
Court proceeded to ask the accused searching questions to determine the
voluntariness of his plea and as to whether he understood the consequences
of the same. Satisfied that the accused willingly and voluntarily pleaded
guilty with full knowledge of the consequence of the same and, in addition
that he was given proper [advice] by his counsel prior to entering said plea,
the Court held another hearing to determine the degree of culpability of the
accused as required under the Rules in cases of capital offenses.
The RTC further ordered the setting of the case for the prosecution to
adduce evidence proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt
and to determine the degree of his culpability. RTC found Prince guilty of
murder after the prosecution was able to produce documentary evidence
(medical reports) that there was treachery when Prince stabbed Ramil.
Prince appealed to the CA contending that he only committed homicide. SC
ruled that there was treachery when Prince stabbed Ramil from the back as
evidenced by the medical reports. His guilt was not only reliant on his plea
but also on the evidence adduced by the prosecution therefore he is not
guilty of homicide as per his plea but according to the evidence adduced
by the prosecution.
FACTS: An information was filed on January 23, 2002 against Prince Zafe for
murder under Article 248 of the RPC. That on October 24, 2001 at around
8:50 pm in brgy San juan in the province of Catanduanes, the accused with
evident premeditation, treachery and deliberate intent to take the life of
Ramil Tablate did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
criminally, attack, assault and stab the latter, with the use of a bladed
instrument (kitchen knife) wounding mortally his chest, abdomen and
different parts of his body which wounds were
necessarily mortal causing the direct and immediate death of said Ramil
Tablate. During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. However, during the pre-trial on March 4, 2003, he withdrew his
former plea. Consequently, on the same hearing, he was re-arraigned and he
pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
Through the March 4, 2003 Order from the pre-trial proceeding, it
was shown that the RTC conducted searching questions to determine that
appellant voluntarily entered his guilty plea and that he understood its
consequences. The RTC further ordered the setting of the case for the
prosecution to adduce evidence proving the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt and to determine the degree of his culpability. Subpoena
duces tecum was issued by the said Court for the medical record of Ramil
Tablate as requested by the prosecution.
RTC convicted Prince of Murder. Accused appealed before the CA,
contending that there was no treachery and therefore he should only be
guilty of homicide. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification
only as to the amount of the damages given by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Prince is guilty of murder?- Yes
Ratio: First, appellant assails the March 4, 2003 Order of the trial court as
being precipitate considering that the trial judge failed to ascertain the
voluntariness of his plea of guilt when he did not fully understand its
consequences and significance, for the records show neither proof nor a
transcript of the proceedings on March 4, 2003 that appellant indeed
voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he fully understood its import.
We are not persuaded.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently
provides:
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the appellant’s conviction for murder stands as duly proved by the
precise degree of culpability. prosecution.
The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
The indispensable requirement of searching inquiry was elucidated in Treachery was proven by the prosecution through the testimony of
People v. Mangila: witnesses who saw Prince stab the victim from the back while he was still in
To breathe life into this rule, we made it mandatory for trial courts to do the his motorcycle. The accused came from the dark and from the back,
following: rendering the victim unable to defend himself thus treachery and evident
(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full premeditation was considered by the court.
comprehension of the consequences of the
accused’s plea; WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
(2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise No. 03041 finding accused-appellant Prince Francisco y Zafe guilty beyond
degree of his culpability; and reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is AFFIRMED with
(3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his MODIFICATION in that he is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Ramil
behalf and allow him to do so if he Tablate, the amounts of PhP 131,313.50 as actual damages, PhP 75,000 as
so desires. civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages.
Moreover, the trial court must be satisfied that: SO ORDERED.
the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
actual threats or physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters, and this it can do either by eliciting from the accused himself the
manner in which he has been brought into the custody of the law and
whether he had the assistance of competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations or by ascertaining from him the conditions of
his detention and interrogation during the investigation.
R. 115, Rights of the Accused at Trial
In People v. Bello, the Court explained that: To present evidence and be heard
"A ‘searching inquiry,’ under the Rules, means more than
informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but so also, the exact 65. People v. Bodoso
length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. RICARDO BODOSO
time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony." Y BOLOR, accused-appellant.
Lastly, it has been mandated that the accused or his or her counsel be G.R. Nos. 149382-149382, 5-5-2003.
furnished with a copy of the complaint andthe list of witnesses against the EN BANC, BELLOSILLO, J.
accused. It has to be made clear that the purpose of the searching inquiry is
"not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court
EMERGENCY RECIT: Bodoso was accused by his daughter of rape and
in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and
sentenced to death. Although his attorneys assail the findings of fact of
comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea."
the lower court, they do not seek relief from the Order of 2 April 2001 that
inexplicably waived their client's constitutional right to present evidence
And most importantly, the conviction of appellant was not made
and be heard. SC said that lower courts ought to take steps to assure itself
solely on his guilty plea—improvident or not—but on the evidence
of accused-appellants' voluntariness and full knowledge of the
adduced by the prosecution proving beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s
consequences of their waiver ie. searching questions/inquiry to avoid
culpability and liability for murder. Consequently, even if his plea of
grave miscarriage of justice (esp. more care where the possible
guilt during the pre-trial on March 4, 2003 be viewed as improvident, still
punishment is in its severest and irrevocable form, namely death)
LEAD: TRIAL COURTS MUST TAKE HEED that in criminal cases involving
capital offenses the waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard
should not be considered haphazardly, perfunctorily, lightly or trivially,
because the right is inherent in due process, but must at all times be
scrutinized by means of a test and procedure to ascertain that the waiver
was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with sufficient awareness
of its relevant cNIRCumstances and likely consequences.
FACTS: Jenny Bodoso (Jenny) filed a case of qualified rape by means of
force and intimidation against his father Ricardo Bodoso (Ricardo). A
warrant of arrest was issued by the court and Ricardo was subsequently
detained. He was subjected by the same court to preliminary investigation
where he failed to submit counter affidavit/rebuttal evidence against his
daughter’s complaint-affidavit.
Prosecution presented two witnesses – Jenny and the doctor who issued the
medical certificate; after which, the defense counsel cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses. Jenny did not substantiate the allegation that she was
only 14 y.o. when the crime was supposedly perpetrated.
The prosecution then submitted documentary evidence , which was
admitted by the court, and then rested its case. Upon the manifestation of
the counsel de oficio, reception of the evidence for the defense was deferred
to the next month.
After a month, as booked in the trial calendar, the defense was summoned to
present its evidence. Lamentably, unlike in the previous settings of the trial
court, the consolidated records of the criminal case do not indicate whether
accused-appellant was present on the scheduled trial date. There were also
no transcript of stenographic notes nor minutes of the proceedings on that
date that would have elucidated on the cryptic order of the trial judge of
even date tersely stating – “Upon the manifestation of counsel for the accused,
Atty. Danilo Brotamonte, that the defense is not intending to present any evidence
and now resting its case today, this case therefore is now submitted for decision.”
RTC: Ricardo guilty of 2 counts of qualified rape against his 14
y.o.old daughter; He was sentenced with capital punishment; hence, the case
was submitted to SC for automatic review.
ISSUE: WON Ricardo waived his right to present evidence and be heard.
HELD: NO. DISPO: RTC decision was set aside and the case was remanded
to it.
RATIO: The counsel de oficio argued that the accusation was just trumped up
by Jenny’s bf, that there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that
there was no evidence supporting Jenny’s claim that she was just a minor
when her father raped her. However, they did not seek relief from the Order
that inexplicably waived their client’s constitutional right to present
evidence and be heard.
Although such was not questioned by the counsel, because a life is
at stake in this case, the issue about the waiver of rights was still considered
by SC in the interest of justice.
Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo – SC pointed out
that this was a civil case where SC set aside the waiver of hereditary rights
because it was not clearly and convincingly shown that the heir had the
intention to waive his right or advantage voluntarily.
The rule on waiver cannot be any less in this criminal case where a life is at
stake.
It is elementary that the existence of waiver must be positively
demonstrated since a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. The
standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must
be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
cNIRCumstances and likely consequences." There must thus be persuasive
evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. Mere silence of the
holder of the right should not be easily construed as surrender thereof; the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence
and validity of such waiver. Necessarily, where there is a reservation as to
the nature of any manifestation or proposed action affecting the rights of
the accused to be heard before he is condemned, certainly, the doubt must
be resolved in his favor to be allowed to proffer evidence in his behalf.
The criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step-by- step formula to
be followed by courts in cases punishable by death. This is to ensure that the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is
preserved and the State makes no mistake in taking life and liberty except
that of the guilty. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial
should always take into consideration that such a different or extraordinary
approach has been undertaken voluntarily and intelligently. For otherwise,
as in the instant case, denial of due process can be successfully invoked
since no valid waiver of rights has been made.
SC said that the RTC is wrong in not assuring if Ricardo really did waive his
rights and this waiver should "not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
cNIRCumstances and likely consequences." RTC should have been more
cautious because this should have already been an automatic procedure, but
more importantly Ricardo did not personally, on a person-to-person basis,
manifest to the trial court the waiver of his own right.
Also, RTC should not have just based the waiver on the counsel de
oficio’s words because he may just have been driven by self-interest of
finishing that cases he is handling. RTC must itself properly inquire if the
waiver was validly done.
In People v. Court of Appeals and People v. Flores SC said that even if
the accused waived his right to present evidence, the court should have still
insured that the accused knows importance of what he is waiving and its
consequence. SC also said that there are some precedents where the accused
was correctly denied the right to present defense evidence after he had
waived his right to be heard. These cases however involved a valid, verified,
clear and convincing renunciation of an accused’s right to offer contrary
proof, cNIRCumstances that are sorely missing in the instant case.
To protect the right to due process of every accused in a capital
offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when
a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to
waive his client’s right to present evidence and be heard, SC adopted, as a
prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a
"searching inquiry" as specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused
pleads guilty:
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with
their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to
waive the right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and
especially the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which
must be recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of
the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to –
a. ask the defense counsel a series of questions to determine
whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the
accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as
well as its meaning and consequences, together with the
significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the
lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give
the latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the
accused whether he wants to present evidence or submit a
memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency
of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default thereof, file a
demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes
that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be
rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial court shall give the
defense enough time for this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter, hence, the record must state
the language used for this purpose as well as reflect the
corresponding translation thereof in English
SC also said that in order to be safe, lower courts may use the above
procedure for non-capital offenses.
General rule: If there is an invalid waiver but that facts were adequately
represented in the criminal case and no procedural unfairness or irregularity
has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense, the guilty verdict may
nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence on record since it would be a useless ritual to return
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The general rule is obviously not applicable in this case and thus remanded
to the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Decision are SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases are
REMANDED to the court a quo for their proper disposition, particularly to
ascertain the voluntariness and understanding of accused-appellant
RICARDO BODOSO's waiver of his right to present evidence as expressed
in the Order of the trial court dated 2 April 2001, his knowledge of its
consequences, and to receive his evidence and further appropriate
proceedings if the contrary is found, in accordance with the procedure
outlined in this Decision. For this purpose, the proper law enforcement
officers are directed to TRANSFER accused-appellant from the New Bilibid
Prison where he is presently incarcerated to the Tabaco BJMP District Jail in
San Lorenzo, Tabaco City, with adequate security escort, where he shall be
DETAINED for the duration of the proceedings in the trial court.
The Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City is directed to dispose of these cases
without further delay SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: To present evidence and be heard
66. Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 172035 | July 4, 2012
DOCTRINE: The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is
to determine the validity of the information so that the TC can have a basis
to 1. either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of
the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case or 2. Correct any part
of the proceedings that impairs its validity.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioner was charged with RA 3019 for bribery on
the construction of the Koronadal City public market for failing to publish
the bid in a newspaper. Sandiganbayan ordered for petitioner to be
suspended from office as mandated by RA No. 3019, Sec. 13 while the case is
pending in court. Petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance
of his suspension order. SC cited Luciano vs. Mariano, stating that there is no
specific rules for a pre-suspension order and what is important is that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the criminal proceedings.
SC ruled that petitioner already filed oppositions (see last paragraph) thus
his continued demand for a pre-suspension hearing no longer holds. He was
already given due process to be heard.
FACTS:
● Vice Mayor Lucido and other local officials of Koronadal City filed
a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner
with RA 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the
architectural aspect, engineering design and the construction
supervision of the proposed Koronadal City public market.
● Ombudsman found probable cause for RA No. 3019 and petitioner
alone for Falsification of Public Documents.
● Petitioner asked for 2 extensions to submit his counter-affidavit but
failed. This prompted the prosecutor to declare that the petitioner
had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence.
● SB ordered for his suspension from office.
● Petitioner moved for his reconsideration of the suspension order
and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. Petitioner claims that
SB gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite
the failure of the information to allege that the giving of
unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made
through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.”
ISSUE:
1. WON the information charging the petitioner with RA No. 3019,
Sec. 3(e) is valid
2. WON Pre-suspension order is valid
Held:
1. Yes, The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is
described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with
reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the
offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly
charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in
the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements
of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.
2. Yes, the order is valid.
Sec. 13, RA No. 3019 provides that any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,
the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the
information” filed against him while taking into account the serious and far
reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even
before his conviction.
The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the
information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the: 1. Validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of
an information against him, and 2. Propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of RA No. 3019 on
bribery.
In Luciano vs. Mariano, it lays down by way of broad guidelines for the
lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension:
1. Upon filing of the information, TC should issue an order requiring
the accused officer to show cause why he should not be ordered
suspended from office. What is indispensable is that the TC duly
hear the parties to determine the validity of the information.
2. No specific rules need to be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. It is suffice to state the the accused should be given a fair
and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him.
In this case, the petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order
issued by SB before his suspension in office was ordered. However,
Luciano considered it unnecessary for TC to issue a show cause order when
the motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been
submitted by the prosecution. While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at
securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the information, Luciano emphasized that no hard and fast rule
exists in regulating its conduct.
In the present case, petitioner already filed his 1. Vigorous Opposition to the
OSP’s Motion to Suspend and 2. Moved for Reconsideration of the
suspension order against him, and 3. Filed a reply to the OSP’s opposition to
plea for reconsideration. Thus, the SC ruled that the petitioner’s continued
demand for an actual pre-suspension hearing does not hold anymore.
67 TOPIC: Rule 115: To confront accusers and witnesses
People vs Sergio and Lacanilao
GR NUMBER | DATE
PONENTE: G.R. No. 240053 | 9 October 2019| Hernando, J.
---------------
DOCTRINE: The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is
to ensure that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the
duty of the government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it
acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal
prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its
evidence in support of a charge.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Mary Jane Veloso is an OFW, she was charged with
drug trafficking and was eventually convicted and sentenced to die by firing
squad. Pursuant to a Treaty, the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely
the execution of Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case
against Cristina, Julius, and “Ike” who were allegedly responsible for
recruiting and exploiting her to engage in drug trafficking. Thereafter, the
State filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written
Interrogatories.” The motion was granted. The CA reversed.
Whether Mary Jane’s testimony may be validly acquired through deposition
by written interrogatories without violating the constitutional right to
confrontation of a witness by the accused?
Yes. The OSG asserts the presence of extraordinary circumstances. There is
no violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure
that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the
government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to
deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal
prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its
evidence in support of a charge.
FACTS:
Mary Jane’s neighbors, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L.
Lacanilao (Julius), taking advantage of the former’s dire situation and
susceptibility, offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia.
Mary Jane believed that the job was a ray of hope so to pay Cristina and
Julius her placement fee, she scraped whatever meager money she had,
borrowed money from her relatives and prompted her husband to sell their
precious motorcycle. Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually left
Malaysia. However, upon their arrival in Malaysia, to Mary Jane’s dismay,
she was informed by Cristina that the job intended for her was no longer
available. After a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia
for a holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her return.
Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket and a luggage to bring on her trip.
squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of an indefinite reprieve in
view of the ongoing legal proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the
Philippines; and the conditions attached to the reprieve particularly that
Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any question
propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds
to have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

Upon arriving at the airport in Indonesia, Mary Jane was apprehended by RATIO:
the police for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage.
The deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary Jane’s right to
She was charged with drug trafficking and was eventually convicted and
due process.
sentenced to die by firing squad. Her execution was originally scheduled on
April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28, 2015. Mary Jane was granted
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure
an indefinite reprieve in light of the arrest of Cristina and Julius who were
that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the
later charged with qualified trafficking in person in violation of Section 4(a)
government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to
in relation to Sections 3(a) and 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208[1], illegal
deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this
recruitment as penalized under Section 6, par. (k) and (1) ofR.A. No. 8042[2]
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal
and estafa in violation of Section 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its
evidence in support of a charge.
Pursuant to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
entered into by Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance
The fundamental rights of both the accused and the State must be equally
Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of
upheld and protected so that justice can prevail in the truest sense of the
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina,
word. To do justice to accused and injustice to the State is no justice at all.
Julius, and “Ike” who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and
Justice must be dispensed to all the parties alike.
exploiting her to engage in drug trafficking.
No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness
The Indonesian authorities however imposed among others, that in taking
Mary Jane’s Testimony, she shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta,
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal
Indonesia and the questions to be propounded to her shall be in writing.
proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold
Thereafter, the State filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Take the
purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written
testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow
Interrogatories.” The motion was granted by the Trial Court in a resolution.
the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
This prompted Julius and Cristina to file a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals for grave abuse of discretion. The CA granted the petition
True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to
for Certiorari and reversed the resolution of the Trial Court.
face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and
conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample
ISSUE: Whether Mary Jane’s testimony may be validly acquired through
opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so
deposition by written interrogatories without violating the constitutional
as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. Finally, it must
right to confrontation of a witness by the accused?
be mentioned that a “dying declaration” is one of the recognized exceptions
to the right to confrontation. In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state
RULING: Yes. The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary
that Mary Jane’s deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her
circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane’s conviction by final judgment and her
dying declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the
detention in a prison facility in Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing
written interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death – or
execution by a firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been
convicted by final judgment and sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary
Jane has already availed of all available legal remedies and there is no
expectation that her conviction will be overturned by the Indonesian
authorities. The only purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for Mary Jane
to assist the prosecution in erecting its case against her recruiters and
traffickers. There was nary any mention that the outcome of the legal
proceedings here in the Philippines will have a concomitant effect in Mary
Jane’s conviction by the Indonesian authorities. That Mary Jane is facing
impending death is undisputed considering the nature of her reprieve which
is merely temporary. It is therefore not a stretch of imagination to state that
Mary Jane’s declarations in her deposition “are made in extremity, [she
being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of this world is gone;
when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth to vindicate oneself and to
secure justice to her detractors.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The
December 13, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
149002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 16, 2016 Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, is REINST A
TED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICA TION that the
deposition will be taken before our Consular Office and officials in
Indonesia pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles ofjurisdiction.
The recommendation by the Office of the Solicitor General for this Court to
promulgate a set of rules for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar in
transnational cases that may arise in the future, where a prosecution's vital
witness in a criminal proceeding is unavailable for reasons other than those
listed in Section 15, Rule 119 ofthe Rules ofCriminal Procedure vis-a-vis the
enforcement of the accused's constitutional right to confront witnesses face-
to- face is NOTED and REFERRED to this Court's Committee on Revision
ofthe Rules for its appropriate action.
70 TOPIC: Rule 115 To Counsel of One’s Choice
CASE NUMBER & CASE TITLE: People vs. Arturo Lara y Orbista
GR NUMBER | DATE G.R. No. 1999877 | August 13, 2012
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
---------------
DOCTRINE: The right of the accused to counsel preferably of his own choice
arises upon custodial investigations, not police line-ups.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Lara was convicted for robbery with homicide. He
argues that that the arrest was void because he was not assisted by counsel
when he was placed in a police line-up. The Court differentiated the right to
counsel during trial vs. during custodial investigation. During trial (i.e.
conducted in public), the purpose is to defend the accused. During custodial
investigation (i.e. conducted in private), the purpose is to prevent the
accused from being coerced into a confession, not to defend the accused. A
custodial investigation requires the presence of counsel, preferably the
accused owns choice. However, the COURT RULED THAT being made to
stand in a police line-up is not part of custodial investigation. Therefore, the
identification of Lara from the police line-up is admissible.
FACTS: Arturo Lara and an unidentified accomplice, armed with a gun and
with intent to gain, stole approximately Php 230k from victim Joselito
Bautista. During the robbery, Lara shot and Bautista. He was later invited by
police officers to go with them to the Barangay Hall, but was brought to the
Police Station instead where he was picked out from a line-up. RTC
convicted him with Robbery with Homicide. CA affirmed the conviction
stating that a police line-up is not part of custodial investigation. An
exception would be if Lara had been the focus of police attention at the start
of the investigation. But, in this case: (1) he was identified by prosecution
witnesses from a group of persons; and (2) he was not interrogated at all and
no statement or confession was extracted from him.
ISSUE: W/N the identification of Lara in the police line-up is inadmissible
because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the identification through line-up is
admissible
RATIO: The right to counsel arises at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins. Being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation. This is because during a
police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from investigatory to
accusatory. It is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated
and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

FALLO: CA Decision is AFFIRMED
Topic: To confront accusers and witnesses
68. Go v. People
G.R. No. 185527 | July 18, 2012 | J. Perlas-Bernabe
Doctrines:
1. For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending.
2. The right of confrontation is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a two-fold purpose: (a) to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-
examination, and (b) to allow the judge to observe the deportment
of witnesses.
Emergency Recit: Petitioners were charged before the MeTC of Manila for
Other Deceits under Art. 318 of the RPC. They pleaded not guilty. Li Luen
Ping, (WITNESS IN THIS CASE) a frail old businessman from Laos traveled
to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing. However, trial dates were
subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor
filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he
was treated for lung infection and that upon doctor’s advice, he could not
make the long travel from Cambodia to Philippines by reason of ill
health. MeTC granted. RTC reversed. CA ruled in favor of the MeTC.
Petitioners alleged that the taking of the Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping in
Cambodia is violative of their constitutional right to confront the witness
face to face.
Question is whether the deposition taking of Li Luen Ping in Laos,
Cambodia is an infringement of the constitutional right of petitioners to
confront the said witness face to face. SC said YES The examination of
witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. For
purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would foreseeable be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before
the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Since the
conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other
place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified
the MeTC’s orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen
Ping before the Philippine consular office in Laos, Cambodia.
Facts:
1. Petitioners Go and Ngo were charged before the MeTC of Manila
for Other Deceits under Art. 318 of the RPC. The information alleged
that all said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to Ping to the effect
that they have chattels in the premises of BGB Industrial in Bataan,
executed a Deed of Mortgage which they said was the first
mortgage when in truth and in fact, they well knew that the same
had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by
Chinabank.
2. Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty.
3. Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos traveled to the
Philippines in order to attend the hearing. However, trial dates
were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
4. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li
Luen Ping, alleging that he was treated for lung infection and that
upon doctor’s advice, he could not make the long travel from
Cambodia to Philippines by reason of ill health. MeTC granted.
5. RTC declared MeTC Orders null and void. CA held that no grave
abuse of discretion can be imputed upon MeTC for allowing the
deposition-taking of Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure
expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases. And
that, in any case petitioners would still have opportunity to cross-
examine and make timely objections during the taking of oral
deposition either through counsel or through consular officer.
6. CA denied petitioners’ MR. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the deposition taking of Li Luen Ping in Laos, Cambodia is
an infringement of the constitutional right of petitioners to confront the said
witness face to face.
Ruling:
YES. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in
open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution
secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses
against him face to face. For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal
cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeable be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the
court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by
the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must
take place at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the
RTC properly nullified the MeTC’s orders granting the motion to take the
deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular office in Laos,
Cambodia.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and
not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only
deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution
witness’ deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case
against the accused.
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness
Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial
and Confrontation of Witnesses
There is a great deal of difference between the face-to-face confrontation in a
public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-
examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the
absence of a trial judge. It secures the other party the opportunity for a cross-
examination and enables the judge as trier of facts “to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness’ deportment while testifying, and a
certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness.”
[Doctrine #2] In People v. Seneris, the Court explained that the
constitutional requirement “insures that the witness will give his testimony
under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing
falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the
demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility. As the right of
confrontation is intended “to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far
as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give
their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of
cross-examination, it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of
unreliable testimony in criminal trials.
Finally, the Court noted that Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial
trial proceedings. The prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in
having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Sec.
15. R119 of the Revised Rules of Court. Obviously, the prosecution allowed
its main witness to leave the court’s jurisdiction without availing of the court
procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such witness.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated February 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 28,
2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which disallowed
the deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED. SO
ORDERED.
Topic: To counsel of own choice
69. People vs. Serzo, Jr.
G.R. No. 118435 | June 20, 1997 | J. Panganiban
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our
Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court. During custodial
investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given the
option to be represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or
refuses to exercise this option during arraignment and trial, the court shall
appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel is
absolute, the accused's option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such
option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with
the Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the state and the
offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
Emergency Recit: Mario Serzo was charged with murder for attacking,
assaulting, and stabbing Alfredo Alcantara at the back with a bladed
weapon, with intent to kill, and with treachery, which directly caused the
death of the victim. Serzo is now alleging that he was denied his right to
counsel. During arraignment, he appeared without a counsel. Hence, the
trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the
arraignment only. Serzo, however, asked that arraignment be reset and that
he be given time to engage a counsel of his own choice - granted. Pre-trial
was waived. During trial, he appeared without a counsel, so Atty. Lina-ac
appeared as counsel de oficio. Atty. Lina-ac was relieved, Atty. Antonano
was appointed as counsel de oficio. After Atty. Antonano, Atty. Garcia of
PAO was appointed. RTC proceeded with the case and rendered him guilty.
Question is whether Serzo was denied of his right to own counsel. SC said
NO. Serzo had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de
parte, but his subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his
act of allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of his
evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was
merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the
prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the orderly
administration of justice.
Facts:
· In 1990, Alfredo Alcantara was watching the television with his
wife inside their house. At around 11:30, Susana Serzo, the mother
of the accused, came knocking at their doorsteps pleading for help
to bring out her grandchildren who were being held in the house of
the accused.
· Alfredo and his wife went to the house of Serzo who was just
across their house. The children were rescued and brought to a
safer place.
· When Alfredo returned home, Serzo attacked him from behind.
Serzo was able to overpower Alfredo causing him to fall in the
canal where Serzo repeatedly stabbed him. Alfredo was rushed to
the hospital, but was declared dead on arrival.
· Mario Serzo was charged with murder for attacking, assaulting,
and stabbing Alfredo Alcantara at the back with a bladed weapon,
with intent to kill, and with treachery, which directly caused the
death of the victim.
· Serzo is now alleging that he was denied his right to counsel.
During arraignment, he appeared without a counsel. Hence, the
trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for
the arraignment only. Serzo, however, asked that arraignment be
reset and that he be given time to engage a counsel of his own
choice - granted
● Pre-trial was waived. During trial, he appeared without a counsel,
so Atty. Lina-ac appeared as counsel de oficio. Atty. Lina-ac was
relieved, Atty. Antonano was appointed as counsel de oficio. After
Atty. Antonano, Atty. Garcia of PAO was appointed.
● RTC proceeded with the case and rendered him guilty.
ISSUE: Whether Serzo was denied of his right to own counsel. – NO
Ruling: The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution,
the supreme law of the land. This right is granted to minimize the imbalance
in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome
prosecutory machinery of the state. In the words of Justice Black, this is a
"recognition that an accused does not have the professional skill to protect
himself before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecutor is an experienced and learned counsel.
The right covers the period beginning from custodial investigation, well into
the rendition of judgment, and even on appeal. Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides this right to an accused not only during trial but even
before an information is filed. However, the right is not absolute.
The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice
against the state's and the offended party's equally important right to speedy
and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to
retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot
afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney
declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e. g. conflict of interest
and the like.
Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so
long as (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made.
In the present case, Serzo claims that he was not given sufficient time to
engage a counsel de parte, thereby preventing him from presenting evidence
in his defense. Serzo had been given ample time to secure the services of a
counsel de parte, but his subsequent appearances in court without such
counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the
presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even
appears that he was merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on
purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the
orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, Serzo did not demonstrate in what way the services of his
counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance
substantiating his claim that he was not effectively represented. In short, he
was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his
own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the mind
to think that, almost two years since appellant first invoked his right to be
represented by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who would suit
his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named
lawyers.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, but the
award of moral damages is DELETED. Instead, appellant is ORDERED TO
PAY the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and actual damages of
P2,000.00 as burial expenses.
TOPIC: Waiver of right to counsel
71. PEOPLE vs. NELIA NICANDRO y VELARMA|G.R. No. L-59378|
February 11, 1986
PONENTE: PLANA, J
Doctrine
Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination,
including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid,
however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made
knowingly and intelligently (People vs. Caguioa, supra), which presupposes
an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to reason
that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious
doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood his
relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is Idle to
talk of waiver of rights.
Emergency recit:
There was an entrapment operation created based on allegations that the
sale of prohibited drugs was done alias 'Nel' in the Commodore Pension
House at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila. After being captured, the police
officers stated that they apprised of her constitutional rights and that the
accused orally admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her
pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing. The RTC convicted
that accused. The SC held that the police officers did not validly inform the
accused of his rights during custodial investigation rendering his confession
inadmissible. The police officers should have stated the rights of the accused
in a manner in which the appellant understood it. This was particularly
significant in the instant case because appellant is illiterate and cannot be
expected to be able to grasp the significance of her right to silence and to
counsel upon merely hearing an abstract statement thereof.
Facts:
That on or about November 6, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell deliver, give away to
another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and knowingly sell or offer for sale four (4) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper, one
(1) roach marijuana cigarette and marijuana seeds and ashes contained in a
white plastic bag, which are prohibited drugs.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Not long before November 6,1981, the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police
Station No. 5, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, Manila,
received complaints from concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs by one alias 'Nel' in the Commodore Pension House at
Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila
Responding to said complaints and reports, Cpl. Salvador Guitan and Pfc.
Romeo Joves of the Drug Enforcement Unit of said Police Station No. 5
placed the Commodore Pension House and its surroundings under
surveillance for about a week. After the complaints and reports were
verified to be true, an entrapment with the confidential informant acting as
the buyer of marijuana was organized.
On November 6, 1981, the police team formed to carry out the entrapment
plan was alerted of the presence of the drug pusher, alias 'Nel', at room 301
of the Commodore Pension House, selling marijuana to drug users.
Immediately Cpl. Salvador Guitan, Pat. Proceso Federes, Pat. Aurora Gomez
and Pfc. Romeo Joves proceeded to the said Commodore Pension House and
met the female confidential informant.

Following later, the informant went to room 301 of the Commodore Pension
House. Upon a given signal she knocked on the door of the room. Appellant
Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, alias 'Nel', opened the door. Thereupon, the
appellant delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette
Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed appellant. Appellant tried
to escape by entering her rented room 301 but was immediately
Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her
constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering
tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing
To support the charges, the prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who
testified that he saw the accused sell marijuana cigarettes to the unnamed
police informant, which allegedly the accused verbally admitted when she
was under custodial investigation.
After trial, the trial court convicted the accused as aforesaid and imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.00
ISSUE: W/N the accused waived his rights during his custodial
investigation? NO
HELD:
Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination,
including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid,
however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made
knowingly and intelligently (People vs. Caguioa, supra), which presupposes
an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to reason
that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious
doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood his
relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is Idle to
talk of waiver of rights.
According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights
when she was under custodial investigation. What specific rights he
mentioned to appellant, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in
which the appellant was advised of her constitutional rights so as to make
her understand them. This is particularly significant in the instant case
because appellant is illiterate and cannot be expected to be able to grasp the
significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon merely hearing an
abstract statement thereof.
As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under
investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of
the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating
officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the
admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be
admitted in evidence.
Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission
of the accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible, although he
had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for
the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights were
explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was
sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accuse.
Similarly, in People vs. Caguioa, the Court sustained the rejection by the
trial court of the extrajudicial admission made by the accused during
custodial investigation, there being no showing by the prosecution that there
was sufficient compliance with the constitutional duty to inform the accused
of his rights to silence and to counsel, without which there could be no
intelligent waiver of said rights. In said case, the accused —a native of Samar
— was interrogated in Tagalog. The prosecution did not show that the
accused's acquaintance with Tagalog was such that he could fully
understand the questions posed to him.
All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and
the appellant is hereby acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt.
TOPIC: Rule 115 Rights of Accused at Trial
72. PEOPLE v YATAR
GR No. 150224 | May 19, 2004
Per Curiam
DOCTRINE: The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
EMERGENCY RECIT: The accused was charged with rape with homicide.
He was found guilty by the court based on his samples in the sperm found
in the victim’s body. In order to escape liability, appellant contends that the
DNA tests were against his right against self-incrimination.
The Court held that the kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
FACTS: Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s house, despite her
intention to go forthTuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-
relatives left in the morning. At 10AM, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was
seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn stayed during said date.
At 12:30PM, Kathylyn’s first cousin Judilyn saw Yatar, who was then
wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descending from the
second floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawang’s
house, but Judilyn did not find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to
live there.
At 1:30PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be
getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that
Yatar is now wearing a black shirt and blue pants, and noticed that his eyes
were “reddish and sharp.” Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts
of Judilyn’s husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Yatar
immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived. In the evening, when
Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off,
the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked
Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. On the second floor, Isabel found that
the door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied
door with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of
her house, she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and naked body, with some intestines
protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to
provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyn’s clothes and
undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt
splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabel’s house.
Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and
was convicted for the same by RTC Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an
appeal to the SC in order to assail the court’s decision. On appeal, Yatar
avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence
DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found
inside the victim’s vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from him is
violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and (3) the
conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post
facto laws.
ISSUE: WON the right of the accused not to be a witness against himself
was violated. – NO.
RULING + RATIO: The kernel of the right against self-incrimination is not
against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. Hence, a person may be
compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Evidence without “plus value” may be logically relevant but not legally
sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the
probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result
from its admission.
FALLO: Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25
sentencing appellant to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide is AFFIRMED.

73. BANGAYAN, JR. v BANGAYAN
GR NO. 172777 AND 172792 | October 19, 2011
Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE: Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present:
(1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Sally Go accused Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. and Resally
de Asis Delfin of having committed the crime of bigamy.Benjamin, Jr. filed
his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy against
him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence
of his guilt. In its December 3, 2003 Order, the RTC dismissed the criminal
case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence.Benjamin,
Jr. and Resally contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued
by the RTC on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of
acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred from appealing the RTC Order
because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners’ right against
double jeopardy. Sally Go counters that the Benjamin, Jr. and Resally cannot
invoke their right against double jeopardy because the RTC decision
acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of discretion, rendering the
same null and void. SC: Double Jeopardy had already set-in. Even if the
trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it
only committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which
could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double jeopardy
had already set in.
FACTS: Sally Go-Bangayan filed a complaint for bigamy against Benjamin
Bangayan and Resally Delfin. On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally
Go in Pasig City and they had two children.
Later, Sally learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine
whom he subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false name,
“Benjamin Z. Sojayco.” Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with Resally.
Furthermore, Sally discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also
married a certain Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City.
After pleading not guilty, Benjamin and Resally both filed their motions for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence. Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to
Evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy against him be
dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his
guilt.
His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally
married to Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to
Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show that he and the
“Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.,” who married Resally, were one and the same
person.
RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for
insufficiency of evidence.
Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA
promulgated its Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of
the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three
marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters
and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin,
Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s
admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship.
CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could
not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void
in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena.
A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to
use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by
the CA when it reversed the December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the
criminal case against them
RULING: YES
RATIO: Double Jeopardy had already set-in. Even if the trial court had
incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only
committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could
not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double jeopardy had
already set in.
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and
the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the
prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not
sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is
one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused.
Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting
the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double
jeopardy.
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right
against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity
to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham.
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present.
Valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners,
resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them before the proper
court.
They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the
case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the
CA erred in reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the case against the
petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy. An acquittal by virtue
of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused
in double jeopardy.
However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of
due process.
74. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FELIX FLORECE, JOSE FLORECE,
AND JUSTINO FLORECE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND
SOCORRO FLORECE, G.R. No. 187409. November 16, 2011 | REYES, J.
Topic: Right against double jeopardy
Doctrine: A verdict of acquittal is immediately final, and a re-examination of
the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused
in jeopardy for the same offense.—A review of the findings of the CA
acquitting Socorro of the charge against her is not warranted under the
circumstances as it runs afoul of the avowed constitutional right of an
accused against double jeopardy. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final,
and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
Emergency recit: Petitioners Felix, Jose, and Justino Florece filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public document against Felix Florece who
erected a nipa hut in a parcel of land that petitioners inherited from their
parents. Felix erected a nipa hut in the said parcel of land however Hilario
protested the same claiming htat the said parcel of land was already
registered under his name. Hilario claimed that he acquired the land from
his parents who acquired it from petitioners. Claiming that they never
executed said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioners filed a complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office for falsification of public document. The
MCTC Convicted Hilario and Socorro of the crime charged. RTC affirmed.
CA acquitted respondents. Hence the instant case. The issue is W/N CA
erred in reversing the lower court’s conviction and thus acquitting
respondent of the said conviction. HELD: No. A review of the findings of the
CA acquitting Socorro of the charge against her is not warranted under the
circumstances as it runs afoul of the avowed constitutional right of an
accused against double jeopardy. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final,
and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in procedure prescribed.
Facts: The instant case stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by the
petitioners against Hilario Florece (Hilario) and his wife Socorro Florece
(Socorro) for falsification of public document punishable under Article 172
of the Penal Code.
In the said complaint, the petitioners alleged that they are the children-heirs
of the late spouses Gavino and Clara Florece, who were the registered
owners of a 1,290 square meter parcel of land in La Purisima, Nabua,
Camarines Sur. After the death of their parents, the petitioners, together
with their other siblings, orally partitioned said parcel of land amongst
themselves.
Sometime in 2003, Felix decided to erect a nipa hut in said parcel of land.
However, Hilario protested the same, claiming that said parcel of land was
already registered under his name and that he acquired the same by virtue
of a deed of transfer from his parents. Hilario’s parents, in turn, acquired the
property from the petitioners as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 21, 1973 signed by the latter.
Claiming that they never executed said Deed of Absolute Sale, the
petitioners filed a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, which
after finding probable cause to indict Hilario and Socorro for falsification of
public document under Article 172 of the Penal Code, filed the
corresponding Information with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur
MCTC: rendered a Judgment convicting Hilario and Socorro of the crime
charged.
● The MCTC of Nabua-Bato opined that accused Hilario and Socorro,
being in possession of and having made use of the alleged falsified
deed of sale, are presumed to be the material authors of the
falsification.
RTC: affirmed the conviction of Hilario and Socorro for falsification.
Thereafter, Socorro filed a Petition for Review with the CA asserting that the
RTC of Iriga City erred in affirming her conviction of the crime charged.
Socorro asserted that the prosecution failed to prove that she indeed falsified
the questioned deed and that her conviction for the offense charged was
merely based on presumption.
CA: acquitted Socorro of the crime charged. The CA concurred with the
lower courts insofar as their finding that the prosecution was able to prove
that the questioned deed was indeed forged. Nevertheless, the CA pointed
out that Hilario and Socorro were not parties and were never shown to have
participated in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and thus, could
not be presumed to be the forgers thereof.
Hence, the instant case.
Issue: W/N the CA had committed reversible error and/or grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the Decision of the RTC which convicted the
respondent Socorro.
Held: No. According to the herein petitioners, in the CA proceedings, they
were deprived of due process as they had not been given the opportunity to
participate in the said proceedings.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away
from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the
defendant never had the knowledge of the
suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.
In the instant case, none of the foregoing circumstances exist that would
justify a finding that extrinsic fraud was extant in the proceedings before the
CA. The records would show that in the CA, the respondent-complainant
was the People of the Philippines represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). The OSG had in fact participated in the proceedings before
the CA. Thus, the People of the Philippines was not prevented from fully
exhibiting its case before the CA.
The fact that the herein petitioners were not able to participate in the
proceedings before the CA is immaterial. Insofar as the petitioners are
concerned, they were not parties to the criminal case.
The petitioners, as private complainants in the case below, were merely
witnesses for the prosecution. The cases cited by the petitioners herein in
support of the instant petition aptly pertain to civil cases.
In the case of Palu-ay vs. CA: If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect
may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such
appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the
civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

While there may be instances where a private complainant or offended party

in a criminal case may be allowed to file a petition directly with this Court,
as when there is a denial of due process, the foregoing circumstance is not
extant here.

The petitioners invoke the principle of substantial justice and beg this Court
to suspend the rules in their favor. We are however loath to heed the
petitioners’ invocation of substantial justice. It bears stressing that the
petitioners utterly failed to advance any cogent or intelligible explanation
for their failure to file the petition on time.

The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of “the

interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their

non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.

Lastly, a review of the findings of the CA acquitting Socorro of the charge

against her is not warranted under the circumstances as it runs afoul of the
avowed constitutional right of an accused against double jeopardy. A
verdict of acquittal is immediately final, and a re-examination of the merits
of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in
procedure prescribed.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions,

the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
Against double jeopardy?
75. People v. Sandiganbayan
GR NO. 173397 | 22 September 2010
PONENTE: Peralta
---------------
DOCTRINE: After trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and
cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception
where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of
mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Panlaqui et. al were charged a criminal case in
violation of R.A. 3019 where they caused undue injury to the Government.
Both the prosecution and the defense were able to present the testimonies of
their numerous witnesses and their respective documentary exhibits to
which the Sandiganbayan acquitted the said accused. The People,
represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, then filed the present petition for certiorari. The SC
ruled that the certiorari was not proper stating that when the trial court
arrives at its decision only after all the evidence had been considered,
weighed and passed upon, then any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. The acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed by the
Court as this would constitute a violation of the constitutional right against
double jeopardy. Moreover, since the alleged error is only one of judgment,
petitioner is not entitled to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
FACTS:
Panlaqui (Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga), Velasco (Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator) and Pelayo (Municipal Treasurer),
Maninang (Barangay Captain), while in the performance of their official
functions, taking advantage of their position, committing the offense in
relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one another
and with Wilfredo Cunanan (representative of J.S. Lim Construction), did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith
cause undue injury to the Government and grant unwarranted benefits to
J.S. Lim Construction (R.A. 3019)
The construction was pursuant to a deepening and dredging of the Palto
and Pakulayo Rivers in Sasmuan, Pampanga project which the accused
caused it to appear that work on the said project had been accomplished and
100% completed per the approved Program of Work and Specifications.
Payments were made to and received by accused notwithstanding the fact
that no work had actually been done
Private respondents were duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge against them. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Both the
prosecution and the defense were able to present the testimonies of their
numerous witnesses and their respective documentary exhibits.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted the accused because of the failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The People, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, then filed the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for certiorari was proper? NO
RULING & RATIO:
People v. Tria-Tirona: After trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately
final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only
exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a
finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. Certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of
the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law.
First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals: In
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and
assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It
does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an
error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. It is not for this
Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.
The aim of the present petition is to overturn the Sandiganbayan's
conclusion that there is no doubt that dredging work was performed along
the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers and the project was actually undertaken and
accomplished by the said contractor, hence the payment made to the latter
was justified. The foregoing is essentially an issue involving an alleged error
of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. The case was only submitted for
decision after the parties had duly rested their case. The Trial Court clearly
stated in its decision which pieces of evidence led it to its conclusion that the
project was actually undertaken, justifying payment to the contractor.
Clearly, petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial resulting in denial
of due process.
When the trial court arrives at its decision only after all the evidence had
been considered, weighed and passed upon, then any error committed in the
evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari.
The acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed by the Court as this
would constitute a violation of the constitutional right against double
jeopardy. Moreover, since the alleged error is only one of judgment,
petitioner is not entitled to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
FALLO: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan is affirmed.
Rule 115: Against Double Jeopardy
77. People vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 137707-11 | December 17, 2004 |
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J:
Doctrine: A judgment of acquittal cannot be reopened or appealed because
of the doctrine that nobody may be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. Hence, even if seemingly erroneous, a judgment of acquittal is the
final verdict. But where the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, it would be grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court
to acquit him.
ER: Brothers Magdaleno and Peña fought over the residential house of the
deceased grandmother Soledad. The court ruled in favor of Bonifacio. This
became final and executory, thus the court issued a writ. Magdaleno applied
for a TRO which was granted, but despite this, the accused (military &
police officers) still proceeded to enforce the writ. They remained in the
premises and harvested kilograms of prawns. Sandiganbayan granted the
accused demurrer to evidence and acquitted them all. Court ruled that such
dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.
The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
Facts:
● Soledad Oppen Montilla (deceased) was the owner of a residential
house and a prawn farm in Barangay Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental. She has two grandsons: brothers Magdaleno and
Bonifacio Peña.
● Bonifacio managed Soledad's properties and businesses and was in
possession of the house.
● Apr 3, 1990: Bonifacio was ejected from the property when Soledad
executed an SPA: Magdaleno as Atty-in-fact and giving him the
powers of general supervision, control, and management of her
family properties.
● Bonifacio then threatened to evict Magdaleno from the residential
house. Thus, Magdaleno applied for a TRO w/ the RTC of Bago
City. This was denied. RTC ordered that Bonifacio be given
possession of the property.
● Order became final and executory and the trial court issued a writ
of execution designating the Commanding Officer of the Criminal
Investigation Services (CIS) at Bacolod City as Special Sheriff to
implement the writ. The Commanding General of the Negros
Island Command of the AFP was also mandated to give full
assistance to the Special Sheriff.
● Magdaleno filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with prayer for a TRO: GRANTED. The Provincial Commander of
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP)
was furnished with a copy.
● However, Respondents (military and police officers) nonetheless
proceeded to enforce the writ. They forcibly entered Soledad's
residential house. Inside the compound, Magdaleno showed them a
copy of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, but they
disregarded it.
● Respondents occupied the premises from November 24, 1990 to
January 3, 1991. On November 27, 1990, they entered Soledad's fish
located some 2 kilometers from the residential house and harvested
2.5 tons of prawns. Despite the directive of former President Fidel
V. Ramos, then the Secretary of National Defense, to respondents to
comply with the TRO, they remained obstinate and harvested more
prawns on December 6, 1990 and January 3, 1991.
 ● Thus, at the instance of Magdaleno, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan, the Informations for robbery,
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and (3)
counts of qualified theft against herein respondents.
● Defense filed, without leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
respondents beyond reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan
GRANTED respondents’ demurrer to evidence and acquitting all
respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The court held that
they were only seeking to implement a lawful order of the trial
court. They came to know of the TRO issued by the Court of
Appeals only after they had implemented the writ of execution.
● Moreover, Sandiganbayan stated that: The series of acts attributed
to the herein accused were intentionally done in order to attain
the desired purpose of filing several cases for Violation of the
Revised Penal Code and the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act.
This is not allowed under our jurisdiction. If ever herein accused
are to be charged of the criminal offense, it must be for only one
crime. It is called a continuous crime.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan, in granting respondents' demurrer to
evidence, acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: No.
Ratio: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is
"filed after the prosecution had rested its case,"and when the same is
granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The
assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) dated January 20,
1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 17282-86 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in the sense that the acquittal of respondents Jesus Clavecilla and Manuel
Malapitan, Sr., is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The records of these
cases are hereby REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper proceedings
against Jesus Clavecilla and Manuel Malapitan, Sr. No pronouncement as to
costs.
EXTRA INFO: (IN-DEPT LOOK AT THE INFORMATION FILED WITH
THE SANDIGANBAYAN)
Criminal Case No. 17282 for robbery:
Nov 24, 1990: Accused Ramon Jarque, Arthur Tupaz, Aguedo Vilches,
Benjamin Marchan, Capt. Raymundo De Joya, Sgt. Leopoldo Marfil, Sgt.
Alexis Gonzales, all public o􏰁ffiers, while in the performance of their official
functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, with evident bad
faith, and conspiring and confederating with one another and with Mayor
Antonio Suatengco and with Eduardo Abaja, a civilian agent of the PC-CIS,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to gain
steal, take and carry away without the consent of the owner Magdaleno M.
Peña one Baume and Mercier wristwatch valued at P65,000.00, one M-16
Colt, one M-16 Hydramatic, one 12-gauge Benelli shotgun, and cash
amounting to P85,000.00, by forcibly opening the cabinets inside the
residential house of Soledad O. Montilla, thus causing damage and prejudice
to Magdaleno M. Peña in the amount of 200k PH currency.
Criminal Case No. 17283 for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act:
Nov 24 1990: All the accused above and with the help of the ff private
individuals: Jesus Clavecilla, Nelson Alvañez, Manuel Malapitan, Sr.,
Rodolfo Talabon, Reming Jovenes and Atty. Allan Zamora, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to one Soledad
Oppen Montilla and her attorney-in-fact Magdaleno Peña through the ff.
manner: despite the TRO issued by the CA in the case entitled "Soledad
Oppen Montilla v. Hon. Marietta Aliño, et al" the accused, with the use of
military vehicles and armaments, with the assistance of 150 military
personnel, and without securing a break-open order from the court, the
accused succeeded in destroying by means of force a portion of the
perimeter fence of the compound where the aforesaid house is situated and
thereafter opened the main gate of the compound, and after gaining entry
thereto, took over the premises and the residential house therein, which act
of de􏰀ance and unauthorized enforcement caused undue injury to Soledad
Oppen Montilla and Magdaleno Peña.
Criminal Case No. 17284 for qualified theft:
Jan 3, 1991: All the accused of 1 st Case (Robbery), willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, illegally entered the fishpond of one Soledad Oppen Montilla,
and with intent to gain harvest, take and carry away on board a dump truck
2 tons or 2,000 kilos of prawns causing damage to her in the amount of 260k.

Criminal Case No. 17285 for qualified theft:

Jan 3, 1991: Took & carried on board a dump truck 2,500 kilos of prawns
from the aforesaid fish without the consent of said Soledad Oppen Montilla
(damage: 325k)

Criminal Case No. 17286 for qualified theft:

Jan 3, 1991: Took & carried on board a dump truck 500 kilos of prawns from
the aforesaid fish without the consent of said Soledad Oppen Montilla
(damage: 65k)
Topic: Rule 115 (Rights of the Accused at Trial)
76. Ysidoro v. Leonardo De Castro
GR NO. 171513 & GR NO. 190963 | February 6, 2012 | J. Brion
DOCTRINE: The constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy
proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the remedies of
ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition. Only judgments of conviction can be
reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition. The rule on double
jeopardy cannot be invoked in a Rule 65 petition predicated on two
exceptional grounds: 1.) in a judgment rendered with grave abuse of
discretion and 2.) where the prosecution was deprived of due process.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Ysidoro was charged for violation of Sec. 3 RA3019.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and ruled that there was no malice
and he was in good faith. As a result, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
was filed by the People to question the validity of the judgment. The SC
dismissed the petition and ruled that while the People was procedurally
correct in filing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not
raise any jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. Rather, the
petition attempts to have the evidence reviewed under a guise of a Rule 65
petition. It relates to factual errors of judgment which are more appropriate
in an ordinary appeal.
FACTS:
● Ysidoro, the municipal mayor of Leyte, Leyte was charged before
the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) The information stated that
Ysidoro failed to give to Nierna Doller, Municipal Social and
Development Officer her RATA in the total amount of P22,125 and
her Productivity Pay of P2,000 despite demands.
● Ysidoro filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and in
the alternative, for judicial determination of probable cause which
were both denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ysidoro was then
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
● On motion of the prosecution, the Sandiganbayan suspended
Ysidoro for 90 days in accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019.
Ysidoro then filed a MR and questioned the necessity and duration
of the preventive suspension.
● The Sandiganbayan denied the MR and ruled that Sec. 13 of RA
3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a
period not exceeding 90 days, any public officer who has been
validly charged with a violation of RA 3019 as amended or Title 7,
Book II of the RPC or any offenses involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property. Ysidoro then assailed the
validity of the ruling before the SC (GR No. 171513)
● Trial on the merits in the principal case continued before the
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution presented Nierma Doller as its
sole witness who testified that Ysidoro ordered her name to be
deleted from the payroll because her husband transferred his
political affiliation. To corroborate Doller’s testimony, the
prosecution presented documentary evidence in the form of
disbursement vouchers, request for obligation of allotment,
excerpts from the police blotter, memorandum, telegram,
certification order, resolution and decision of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman absolving her of the charges. The defense
presented 7 witnesses and documentary evidence. The defense
showed that the withholding of Doller’s RATA was due to the
investigation conducted by the Office of the Mayor.
● The Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held that the second
element which is malice, ill-motive or bad faith was not present and
exculpatory proof of good faith. The MR of the prosecution was
denied.
● Supervening events occurred after the filing of Ysidoro’s petition
which rendered the issue in GR 171513 (propriety of his preventive
suspension) moot and academic. Ysidoro was no longer the
incumbent mayor, the prosecution completed its presentation of
evidence and had rested its case and the Sandiganbayan acquitted
Ysidoro. The only issue left to resolve is the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 filed by the People on the validity of the judgment
acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion and
exceeded its, or acted without jurisdiction when it acquitted Ysidoro?
RULING: No. Petition is dismissed for being procedurally and substantially
infirm.
RATIO:
● Generally, the Rules provide three (3) procedural remedies in order
for a party to appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case.
○ 1. Ordinary appeal under Sec. 3 Rule 122
○ 2. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
○ 3. Filing SCA for Certiorari under Rule 65.
● A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal issues.
Issues which have not been properly raised by the parties but are,
 nevertheless, material in the resolution of the case are also resolved
in this mode of review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a
Rule 45 petition is generally limited to the review of legal issues;
the Court only resolves questions of law which have been properly
raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under
this mode, the Court determines whether a proper application of
the law was made in a given set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the
other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the
propriety of the trial court’s jurisdiction — whether it has
jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the exercise of its
jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
● While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or
a Rule 45 petition is considered an intrinsically valid, albeit
erroneous, judgment, a judgment assailed under Rule 65 is
characterized as an invalid judgment because of defect in the trial
court’s authority to rule. Also, an ordinary appeal and a Rule 45
petition tackle errors committed by the trial court in the
appreciation of the evidence and/or the application of law. In
contrast, a Rule 65 petition resolves jurisdictional errors committed
in the proceedings in the principal case. In other words, errors of
judgment are the proper subjects of an ordinary appeal and in a
Rule 45 petition; errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65
petition.
● As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a
review via a Rule 65 petition, only judgments of conviction can be
reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition. As explained
in People v. Nazareno, the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal
through the remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition.
● The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy
and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively
presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of
the accused has been confirmed by a previous judgment.
● Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is
likewise barred because the government has already been afforded
a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final
judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the
constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes
compelling.
● The reason is not only the defendant’s already established
innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial
consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has
at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness
and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would
then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of
the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had
attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s
power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comes
via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the
standards of reason, justice and conscience.
● However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked in a
Rule 65 petition, predicated on two exceptional grounds, namely:
○ 1.) in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of
discretion by the court and
○ 2.) where the prosecution had been deprived of due
process.
● The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances
because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and
law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the
evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of evidence.
It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation
of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of
whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the
question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words,
the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per
se void on jurisdictional grounds.
● Applying these legal concepts to this case, the Court found that
while the People was procedurally correct in filing its petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not raise any
jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the
contrary, what is clear is the obvious attempt by the People to have
the evidence in the case reviewed by the Court under the guise of a
Rule 65 petition. This much can be deduced by examining the
petition itself which does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith
committed by the Sandiganbayan in its proceedings. The petition
does not also raise any denial of the People’s due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
● The grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of
judgment which are more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather
than in a Rule 65 petition.
 ● The Court refused to review the verdict of acquittal because it does
not impute or show any jurisdictional error by the Sandiganbayan.

FALLO: 1. DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as

G.R. No. 171513, filed by Arnold James M. Ysidoro for being moot and
academic. 2. DISMISS the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
190963, filed by the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, for lack of merit.

Rights of Accused: Double Jeopardy
78. PEOPLE vs. ATIENZA
G.R. No. 171671 | June 18, 2012
J. Peralta
---------------
DOCTRINE: The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or
information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had
pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
EMERGENCY RECIT: An information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
was filed against Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong. They filed a
demurrer to evidence with leave of court and maintained that the evidence
were not sufficient to hold them guilty of the offense charged. The demurrer
to evidence was granted by the SB. On appeal to the SC, the petitioner
contends that the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy does
not apply in this case.
The SC held that all the elements of double jeopardy are present. (1) the
Information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26678
against respondents were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
26678; (3) respondents were arraigned and entered their respective pleas of
not guilty; and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 on
a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the elements of the
offense as charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an acquittal from
which no appeal can be had.
FACTS:
· Mercedita Atienza was the caretaker of Hondura Beach Resort,
a resort owned by Edmundo Evora in Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro.
· On July 3, 2000, Edmundo caused the construction of a fence
made of coco lumber and G.I. sheets worth ₱5,000.00 on his
resort.
· On July 4, 2000, she found out that the fence that was just
recently built was destroyed. Upon the instruction of
Edmundo, she reported the incident to the barangay
authorities.
· On July 5, 2000, Edmundo again caused the construction of a
second fence on the same property worth ₱3,000.00.
· However, on the day following, the fence was again destroyed.
Mercedita stated that she was informed by some people who
were there that a policeman and Engr. Manongsong were the
ones who destroyed the fence.
· An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
against Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong.
· Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite
which was opposed by Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong.
On August 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion.
Mayor Atienza then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
· Thereafter, on October 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza and Engr.
Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion
to Acquit by Way of Demurrer to Evidence. On December 6,
2005, the court a quo issued a Resolution14 which granted the
motion. In the same resolution, the court a quo also held in
abeyance the resolution of Mayor Atienza’s motion for
reconsideration of the resolution granting his suspension from
office.
· On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong
filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Acquit).
Respondents maintain that the evidence presented were not
sufficient to hold them guilty of the offense charged.
· The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) granted the Demurrer to
Evidence and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: WON the Constitutional proscription against double jeopardy
applies in this case.
RULING: YES. Double jeopardy has set in.
RATIO: Clearly, double jeopardy has set in. The elements of double
jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.
The above elements are all attendant in the present case: (1) the Information
filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26678 against
respondents were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 26678; (3)
respondents were arraigned and entered their respective pleas of not guilty;
and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 on a
Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the elements of the offense
as charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an acquittal from which
no appeal can be had.

The grant of demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order

may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double
jeopardy.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Resolution dated February 28, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case
No. 26678, is AFFIRMED.
TOPIC: Rule 115 (Rights of the Accused at Trial)
79. PARADA v. VENERACION| A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353. March 11, 1997
PONENTE: J. Torres, Jr.
---------------
DOCTRINE: The requisites then of a valid trial in absentia are: (1) the
accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial;
and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Parada was charged with 4 counts of estafa. Parada’s
counsel formally notified the court of change of address. Apparently, the
notice of hearing was sent to complainant’s former address. For failure to
appear on the date of hearing, the espondent judge ordered the arrest of the
accused, confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was conducted. No
bail was recommended for his arrest. The SC ruled that 2nd and 3rd requisites
of a valid trial in absentia are absent in this case. Parada’s failure to appear
during the trial was justified by the absence of a valid service of notice of
hearing to him . Hence, the trial in absentia was null and void.
FACTS:
● Complainant herein is the accused in the aforementioned case for
four (4) counts of estafa which were initially raffled to Branch 30,
RTC, Manila presided by Judge Senecio Ortile who later inhibited
himself from trying the said case and thus, the case was re-raffled
to the sala of respondent Judge Lorenzo Veneracion.
● Apparently, the notice of hearing was sent to complainants former
address and that for failure of accused-complainant to appear on
June 3, 1994, respondent ordered the arrest of herein accused-
complainant, ordering the confiscation of the bond and a trial in
absentia was conducted.
● Respondent Judge likewise assigned a counsel de officio, Atty.
Jesse Tiburan of the PAO as counsel for the accused. Furthermore, a
warrant of arrest was issued with no bail recommended.
● On June 6, 7 and 8, 1994, respondent court issued orders noting the
failure of the petitioner to appear and proceeded with the trial in
absentia.
● On the hearing, the motion of counsel de officio of accused-
complainant that defense be allowed to present evidence upon
petitioners arrest, was denied and further held that the failure of
the accused to appear is a waiver of his right to adduce evidence.
● A decision was rendered convicting herein accused-appellant of the
crime and the decision was promulgated despite his absence.
Accused-complainant was arrested and brought to the Makati City
Jail.
● Accused-complainant filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus, Certiorari
and Annulment of Judgment with prayer for immediate relief with
the Court of Appeals
● The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision declaring the
decision of respondent court null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trail in absentia was correctly held
RULING: NO, the circumstantial setting of the instant case as weighed by
the basic standards of fair play impels us to so hold that the trial in absentia
of Parada and his subsequent conviction are tainted with the vice of nullity,
for evidently Parada was denied due process of law.
RATIO:
Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites
then of a valid trial in absentia are: (1) the accused has already been
arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and three (3) of a
valid trial in absentia are clearly wanting. Parada had not been duly notified
of the trial because the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to the
former address of Paradas counsel despite the fact that the latter formally
notified the court of his change of address. His failure to appear therefore in
the June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is justified by the absence of a valid
service of notice of hearing to him.
As a rule, where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a
court of record, all notices required to be given therein must be given to the
attorney of record. Accordingly, notices to counsel should be properly sent
to his address of record and unless the counsel files a notice of change of
address, his official address remains to be that of his address of
record.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is undisputed that Paradas counsel filed a notice of change of address on
October 23, 1993. As such, the respondent judge should have already taken
cognizance of the new address when it sent the notice of hearing dated April
27, 1994. It is thus unwarranted for the respondent judge to still send the
notice of hearing to the old address of Paradas counsel because it is not his
official address nor his address of record. Concomitantly, the sending of
notice of hearing to his former address is an invalid service and cannot in
any way bind Parada.
Likewise, the warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was
issued by respondent Judge on June 3, 1994 is a downright violation of
Paradas constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is
strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the
law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be noted that the crime
with which Parada was charged is estafa9 which is undoubtedly a bailable
offense.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion is FINED
P10,000.00 for disregarding Paradas right to procedural due process and for
showing gross ignorance of the law, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO
ORDERED.
TOPIC: Effect of Death of Witness
80 Fulgado v. CA
G.R. No. L-61570 | February 12, 1990
PONENTE: C.J. Fernan
---------------
DOCTRINES:
● Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances
that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or
his witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has been
obtained in the direct examination.
● The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
● The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-
examination has always been understood as requiring, not
necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an opportunity
to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Ruperto Fulgado initiated a case against the respondents but the
respondents failed to appear at the pre-trial. The respondents were declared
in default, Fulgado presented the testimonies of his witnesses (Ruperto
Fulgado himself and Jose Fulgado) ex parte, and the CFI rendered a
judgment in favor of Fulgado. Respondents managed to reverse the CFI’s
declaration of default. The case was scheduled again but the respondents
again failed to appear. Ruperto Fulgado died and his witness Jose Fulgado
migrated to the U.S. The CFI dismissed the case and struck the earlier
testimonies of Fulgado’s witnesses because the respondents were deprived
of the chance to cross-examine them. The SC ruled that the dismissal was
improper because by the respondent’s repeated failure to appear to cross-
examine Fulgado’s witnesses, they have essentially waived their right to
cross-examine. The right to cross-examine does not mean that the opposing
witnesses should be cross-examined, but rather, it only means an
opportunity to cross examine. Inaction to exercise said right amounts to a
renunciation of said right. Further, Where death prevents cross-examination
under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed
to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that
has been obtained in the direct examination.
FACTS:
● Ruperto Fulgado, a man approaching the twilight of his life, filed
an action in the CFI for the annulment of certain contracts of sale
and partition with accounting against Rufino Custodia, Simplicia
Custodia, Arsenio Piguing, Ismael Porciuncula and Dominga
Macarulay .
● After several deferments, the pre-trial conference was finally set
but Private respondents and their counsel failed to appear on time
at the pre-trial and were subsequently declared as in default.
Ruperto Fulgado was then allowed to present his evidence ex parte
before the Deputy Clerk of Court.
● Private respondents immediately filed a motion to lift the order of
default on the same day that the order was issued. The CFI denied
said motion, the motion for reconsideration, and the petition for
relief from the default order.
 ● CFI then rendered a decision in favor of Ruperto Fulgado. On
appeal, however, the CA reversed the CFI’s decision and found
that private respondents had been deprived of their day in court by
the unjust denial of their motion to lift the order of default.
● The CA decision became final and executory and the records of the
case were remanded to the trial court.
● More than a year after the finality of the CA’s decision, counsel for
private respondents moved that the CFI include the case “in any
date of the August and September calendar of the Court, at the
usual hour in the morning."
● The case was again set for hearing but the presiding judge went on
official leave and the hearing was postponed anew.
● Ruperto Fulgado died and was substituted by his children as party
plaintiffs. While Jose Fulgado (Fulgado's witness) had earlier
migrated to the United States.
● The CFI then dismissed Ruperto Fulgado’s case on the ground that
Ruperto Fulgado failed to present the testimonies of plaintiffs
witnesses (Ruperto Fulgado himself and Jose Fulgado) so that the
defendants could not cross-examine them.
● The CFI also ordered the earlier testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado
and Jose Fulgado stricken off the record.
● On appeal, the CA affirmed the CFI’s dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal of the complaint was proper on the ground that Ruperto
Fulgado failed to present the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses (Ruperto
Fulgado himself and Jose Fulgado) so that the defendants could not cross-
examine them.
RULING:
NO. The dismissal of the complaint was improper.
RATIO:
● The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or
in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived
expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of
the right of cross-examination.
● Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the
right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in
the record.
● The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-
examination has always been understood as requiring, not
necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an opportunity
to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.
● There is no disputing that where there was no such opportunity (to
cross examine) and the want of it was caused by the party offering
(plaintiff), the testimony should be stricken out. However, where
the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the cross
examiner's fault, the lack of cross-examination is no longer a
ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an
opportunity, though waived, will suffice.
● IN THIS CASE, private respondents had enough opportunity to
cross-examine plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado before his death, and Jose
Fulgado before his migration to the United States.
● Conceding that private respondents lost their standing in court
during the time they were in default, they were no longer in that
situation when the CA set aside the default judgment and
remanded the case back to the CFI for trial on the merits.
● Such inaction on the part of private respondents cannot be easily
dismissed by the argument that it is the duty of the plaintiff to
always take the initiative in keeping the proceedings "alive."
● The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is imposed by
law on the party who wishes to exercise said right. This is because
the right is personal and waivable, and thus the intention to utilize
it must be expressed.
● Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation
thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who
should move to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses.
● AS TO THE DEATH OF A WITNESS: Where death prevents
cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility
of any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems a
harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct
examination.
● As to the witness Jose Fulgado who is reportedly abroad, private
respondents could have resorted to the various modes of discovery
under the Rules of Court to cross-examine Jose.
FALLO:
Facts
WHEREFORE, the decision under review of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 62353-R dated June 30, 1982 is SET ASIDE. The trial court is
ordered to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 10256 and to allow the direct
testimonies of plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado and his witness Jose Fulgado to
remain in the record. The court is further ordered to give priority to the
hearing of said case in view of the length of time that it has remained
unresolved on account of procedural differences. This judgment is
immediately executory. No costs.
81 Villareal vs. People
GR No. 151258
February 1, 2012
J. Sereno
Doctrine:
The right to speedy trial is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended
with unjust postponements of trial or when a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.
Factors to be considered are the length of the delay, the assertion or non-
assertion of the right and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant. A
dismissal of a case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is
tantamount to acquittal and an appeal or reconsideration of the dismissal
would amount to double jeopardy.
Emergency Recit
Lenny Villa (“Lenny”) died due to hazing by Aquila Legis fraternity so a
criminal case for homicide was filed. They were found guilty by the trial
court. Escalona et. al were contending that their right to speedy trial was
violated considering that the trial did not commence until almost 12 years
after arraignment. The Supreme Court found that their right to speedy trial
was violated. The absence of the records in the trial court was due to the fact
that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the
prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it
to secure certified true copies of the same. Also, for a period of almost seven
years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the case
remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged
inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution
frowns upon.
· In February 1991, 7 law students (neophytes) of Ateneo
signified their intention to join Aquila Fraternity, and on
February 8, they proceeded to Michael Musngi’s house who
briefed them on what to expect during the initiation rites. They
were informed that:
o there would be physical beatings, and they could quit
at any time.
o Their initiation rites would last for three days
· As soon as they alighted at the Almeda compound, Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites that
included:
o Indian Run – run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes
o Bicol Express – sit on the floor with their backs against
the wall and their legs outstretched while the
Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs
o Rounds – neophytes were held at the back of their
pants by the auxiliaries, while the latter were being
hit fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on
their rights by two aquilans
o Auxies Privilege Round – auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pains on the neophytes
o Comic Plays
o Rough basketball
o Memorize and recite Aquila Fraternity’s principles and
when they would give a wrong answer, they would
be hit on their arms or legs
o Paddling + physical beatings
· After such, neophyte Lenny could no longer walk, and was
carried to the carport.
· Lenny then shivered and mumbled incoherent words. He was
then rushed to the hospital and was pronounced Dead on
Arrival.
· A criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans
· Trial court held that the Accused are guilty
· Petitioner files a petition for Certiorari involving the dismissal
of the criminal charge against Escalona et. al. Due to several
pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for
Escalona et. al after proceedings against the 26 other accused
 shall have terminated. The trial court found the 26 accused
guilty. For various reasons the initial trial of the case did not
commence until almost 12 years after the arraignment of the
nine accused.
· Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case
involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their
right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She
also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the
delay, as the original records and the required evidence were
not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
Issue: Whether the CA commited GADALEC when it dismissed the case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of
the accused to speedy trial.
Ruling: No
Ratio: In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the
reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and
22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993. The Order likewise
stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused
who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all
times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on... their
part to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as
waiver to present evidence."... his Petition corroborate the material facts
relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his
Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the
CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct... participation in the hazing of Lenny
Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of
the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites
was not outside the official activity of the fraternity." He even argues that
"Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the
action or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty
verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to
resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or
irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact,... the arguments set forth by
accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to
decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the
application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner
Dizon admits direct... participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging
in his Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional
rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside
the official activity of the fraternity." He even argues that "Dizon did not
request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned."
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one
judge or justice to another - at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the
Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice... on the parties. This
case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long
overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been
determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
82. Mari vs Gonzales 657 S 414
G.R. No. 187728 | September 12, 2011 | Peralta, J.
Topic: Right to Speedy Trial
DOCTRINE:
An accused’s right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to
consider and balance are the following:
(a) duration of the delay;
(b) reason therefor;
(c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and
(d) prejudice caused by such delay.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Information for rape was filed against PO1 Paloma. He was imprisoned
beginning June 27, 2008. Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment was filed
by Private Complainant due to the pendency of Petition for transfer of venue
-- Denied. Arraignment proceeded. No one appeared for prosecution.
Motion for Cancellation of Pre-Trial was filed again due to same reason. --
DENIED. PT proceeded. No one appeared for prosecution.
Trial was scheduled. However, no one appeared again for the prosecution.
RTC dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to prosecute.
WON there is violation of accused’ right to speedy trial. YES. SEE
DOCTRINE. SC ruled that it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to
delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of
petitioners’ petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where there
is no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by
a higher court against herein public respondent from further proceeding in
the case.
FACTS:
1. An information for Rape was filed against PO1 Paloma. Later on,
he voluntarily surrendered. He was imprisoned beginning June 27,
2008. Arraignment was set for July 31, 2008.
2. Order dated July 10, 2008: RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule
for arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on said
motion for August 20, 2008. However, on the said scheduled date,
nobody appeared for the prosecution.
3. Hence, RTC issued an Order resetting the arraignment for October
31, 2008.
4. October 21, 2008: Private Complainant AAA filed a Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing manifesting that Atty. Felicen (Private
Counsel) had been granted the authority to prosecute by the
Provincial Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled arraignment
on October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the pendency of private
complainant’s petition for transfer of venue before this Court.
5. October 31 Hearing proceeded. RTC ruled that the mere pendency
of a petition for transfer of venue is not sufficient reason to suspend
the proceedings. Counsel for accused invoked the accused’s right
to a speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned in the
presence of the Provincial Prosecutor who was designated by the
RTC to represent the prosecution for the purpose of arraignment.
6. Pre-Trial was scheduled on November 24, 2008. Before the said
date, private prosecutor filed a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing
using as justification the pendency of the petition for transfer of
venue. -- DENIED. Scheduled Pre-Trial proceeding proceeded.
7. Initial hearing for trial was scheduled on December 12, 2008.
However, no one appeared for the prosecution on the said date.
8. Private respondent move for dismissal of the case on the ground of
failure to prosecute. --- DENIED
9. Hearing was reset to January 16, 2009. On the same date, Private
Prosecutor filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Hearing
stating that it was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a
copy of the notice of the January 16, 2009 hearing and he had to
attend a previously scheduled hearing for another case he was
handling, set for the very same date.
10. The RTC disposed:
Considering that the accused has been languishing in jail since June, 2008 up to the
present and to allow him to stay in jail for a single minute, it is quite unreasonable
and would violate his right to speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the accused to be based on
grounds that are meritorious, this Court pursuant to x x x the rule on speedy trial
(RA 8433) [should be “8493”] hereby orders this case dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to prosecute or nolle prosequi.”
ISSUE: WON PO1 Paloma’s (accused) right to speedy trial was violated
RULING: YES.
An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is
guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of Article III of the
Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its “salutary objective” being to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of
a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical
perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old
legal maxim, “justice delayed is justice denied.”
Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their
petition for transfer of venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial
court. Such situation is akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with
the higher courts. The trial court was then correct and acting well
within its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners’ motions for
postponement mainly because of the pendency of their petition for transfer
of venue.
Also, It must be emphasized that private (accused) had already been
deprived of his liberty on two occasions.
First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was
incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of
almost four months; then again, when an Information had already been
issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned
beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or
a period of over 6 months.
Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of
time is quite oppressive. Because of private respondent’s continued
incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice.
Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the
subject criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners’ petition for transfer
of venue, especially in this case where there is no temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against
herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by
the trial court in dismissing the case against private respondent for violation
of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
TOPIC: Right to speedy trial
83. Imperial v. Joson
GR 160067 | November 17, 2010
PONENTE: Perez
---------------
DOCTRINE: The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of a case, four factors must be considered: length of delay, reason
for the delay, defendants assertion of his right and prejudice to the
defendant.
EMERGENCY RECIT: 3 cars collided to each other. During the pre trial of
the criminal case in MTC Sariaya, petitioner moved to stipulate facts in favor
of him which the prosec refused. He moved for the stipulation to be
corrected but was denied again. When the case was reassigned to another
prosec, he filed a petition for certiorari stating his right to a speedy trial was
violated.
FACTS:
- At or about 2am on May 11, 2001, along National Highway in Sariaya
Quezon, a ten-wheeler truck collided with a Fuso 6 wheeler truck. Petitioner
Imperial owned the isuzu which was driven by petitioner Santos Francisco,
while the 6-wheeler was driven by respondent Giganto who as at the time
with a helper, respondent Cubeta.
- After the collision the isuzu truck rammed into a Kia Van which was
driven by respondent Lazo and owned by Tagle who was also on board
with other passengers who are also respondents.
- The accident resulted in the death of Tagle, owner of the Kia Van and 7
other passengers, while the rest of the passengers survived but suffered
serious physical injuries.
- A complaint for Reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide,
multiple serious physical injruies and damage to property was filed against
petitioners Santos and Imperial. MTC Sariaya (May 16, 2001)
- A complaint for damages was also filed by Petitioners against
respondents Cubeta and Giganto, and owner of the truck Joson. RTC Naga
(July 2001)
- Respondents also filed a case against petitioners for damages at the MeTC
in Valenzuela (July 2001)
- Valenzuela court dismissed (feb 2002) respondent’s complaint MR was
filed by respondents.
- In the meantime, respondents and relatives of the deceased passengers of
the Kia Van, filed a complaint for damages in RTC Paranaque.
- Naga RTC dimissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground that the same
was barred by the complaint filed in Paranaque.
- Petitioner appealed to CA Nov 2003: reinstate Valenzuela case, affirm
dismissal in Naga for litis pendentia, and affirming the Pque RTC denying
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners.
- Petitioners then appealed to SC.
- In the meantime, MTC Sariaya proceeded to conduct the mandatory
pretrial.
oThrough his counsel, Petitioner Francisco proposed stipulation on
the facts that the driver of the Kia Van, Lazo, whom he spoke to
during a break, saw the Fuso truck overtake the 10 wheeler but was
unsuccessful.
oProsecutor Zabella refused to stipulate.
- Petitioner then filed a motion style as one “to compel and disqualify
Zabella and to correct the pre trial order” on the ground the latter cannot
refuse to stipulate on matters which he has personal knowledge and the that
the judge’s recollection of the proposed stipulation was different from what
actually proposed.
- This was denied and MR as well.
- Case was reassigned to Fiscal Sia and appearance of new private prosec.
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Lucena City RTC.
Contending the 9 postponements of the pre trial were capricious, vexatious
and oppressive, further petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated.
- RTC denied. CA Affirmed.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates
commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial and
the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section
3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 9 postponements of the pre trial conference In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are
amounted to a violation of Francisco’s right to a speedy trial. – NO "required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to give particular
RULING: The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Viewed in the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well as the further
reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of
RATIO: Francisco claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated when Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent transfer to another government office, we find
the Public Prosecutors assigned to the case failed to attend the nine hearings that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the
scheduled by the Sariaya MTC on 10 and 17 October 2001, 7 November 2001, postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya
23 January 2002, 13 March 2002, 4 September 2002, 6 November 2002, 15 MTC were violative of his right to a speedy trial.
January 2003 and 5 March 2003. Far from being vexatious, capricious and
oppressive, however, the delays entailed by the postponements of the FALLO: Petition Denied and conduct mandatory pre trial conference
aforesaid hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner without further delay.
Francisco’s own pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory
orders issued by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at least three public
prosecutors to the case, namely, Prosecutors Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., Francis Sia
and Joel Baligod. Indeed, the record shows that, on 30 August 2001,
petitioner filed a motion styled as one to compel Prosecutor Zabella to agree
to his proposed stipulations and/or to disqualify him from the case as well
as to correct the pre-trial order issued on 14 August 2001. Considering that
said motion was denied by the Sariaya MTC only on 18 October 2001, we
find that Prosecutor Zabella's absence at the 10 and 17 October 2001 pre-trial
conference in the case can hardly be considered capricious, vexatious and
oppressive.

The record further shows that, upon the Sariaya MTC’s issuance of the 9
January 2002 order denying his motion for reconsideration of said 18
October 2001 order and setting anew the pre-trial conference in the case,
petitioner Francisco proceeded to file on 1 April 2002 the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Francisco cannot,
consequently, complain of violation of his right to speedy trial in view of his
pending petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which raised,
among other matters, issues pertinent to the conduct of the pre-trial
conference by the Sariaya MTC.
 RULE 116
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
TOPIC: Effect of Denial
84. People vs. Alicando 251 SCRA 293
G.R. No. 117487 | 12 December 1995| Puno, J.
Doctrine:
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language
or dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant
". . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
The new rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country
divided by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process
of evolution. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have
limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official
languages for purposes of communication and instruction. The importance
of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or
dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in
the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment of
conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and in justice to the
victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without
any semblance of fairness and justice.
Emergency Recit:
Appellant Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide to
which he pleaded guilty thereto. The trial court found appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death hence the case is brought before the Supreme Court
on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed. The Supreme
Court held that the decision convicting accused Alicando of the crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death
should be annulled and set aside (the case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings), for the following reasons:
1. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. Records do not
reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to him. The information against the
appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown
whether the appellant knows the English language.
2. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this
duty of conducting a “searching inquiry”
3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of
guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible yet, were considered by
the trial court convicting the appellant. These are inadmissible
evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo
City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant
verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.
Facts:
● Appellant Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide.
○ Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty.
Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, DOJ.
○ Alicando pleaded guilty.
● After his plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for
the appellant, if he so desired.
● Prosecution’s evidence:
○ Afternoon of June 12, 1994, the father of the 4 year old
victim Khazie Mae was drinking with two other men
when Alicando joined them but every now and then
would take leave and return.
○ Rebada (who also lives in the same neighborhood) saw the
victim at the window of Alicando’s house and heard her
crying. She approached Alicando’s house and saw
Alicando naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking
her neck.
○ Around 8pm, the father of the victim could not locate her
and so they searched for her until 1 am.
○ The next day, another neighbor discovered the lifeless
body of Khazie Mae under his house and thereafter
informed the victim’s parents and the police.
○ Rebada informed the victim’s parents that Alicando
committed the crime.
○ Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo
Tan.
■ Alicando verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel.
■ On the basis of his uncounseled verbal confession
and follow up interrogations, the police came to
 know and recovered from appellant’s house,
Khazie Mae’s green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as
evidence for the prosecution.
○ The body of Khazi Mae was autopsied and it was found
that the proximate cause of her death was asphyxia by
strangulation.
● TRIAL COURT: found appellant guilty and sentenced him to
DEATH.
● The case is before the Supreme Court on automatic review
considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
Issue:
W/N the Decision of the Trial Court sentencing the appellant to death was
proper.
Held:
No.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death
is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge
failed to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 on arraignment. The reading of
the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect
known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The new
rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by
dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of
evolution. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have
limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official
languages for purposes of communication and instruction. The importance
of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or
dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The
Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is
unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it
known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any
showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the
appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt.
Transcript during arraignment in case Sir asks:
Prosecutor Edwin Fama — Appearing as public prosecutor
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera — For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for
arraignment and pre-trial.)
Interpreter — (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and
pre-trial.)
Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)"
One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is
a nullity. It violated section 1 (a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional
right to due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the
arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted.
Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void.
The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry." The bottom line of the rule is that the plea
of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching
inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the
plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of
guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal
any information about the personality profile of the appellant which can
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea
of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in
English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of
English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to
the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the
voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency.
The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of
maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who
arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its
efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even
turned a blind eye on the following damning entry on the June 13, 1994
Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP showing that after his arrest, the
appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma,
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned
the appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining
the meaning of "mandatory". It did not inform the appellant of the
indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned appellant
there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without telling the
appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to
sentence him to death.
Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt
of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court
convicting the appellant. These are inadmissible evidence for they were
gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial
interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the
benefit of counsel. In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple
sense to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing.
Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived his right
to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. Despite the
blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed
his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in
sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible,
but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the
alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession
illegally extracted by the police from the appellant.
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the
basis of the procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible
evidence considered by the trial court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., this
Court held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is
void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant,
and in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the
State to kill without any semblance of fairness and justice.
Topic: Arraignment in absentia
85. Nolasco vs Enrile
G.R. No. L-68347 November 7, 1985
Melencio- Herrera
Doctrine: Even military tribunals are bound to observe fundamental rules
of law and arraignment in absentia would be violative of due process. chanr
Emergency Recit: Aguilar is one of the 10 co- defendants in the case of
“People vs. Jose Ma. Sison” charged for Rebellion by a Special Military
Commission ( March 18, 1977). On October 3. 1978, Aguilar was charged
again before Military Commission No. 25 with Subversion. Both of these
cases proceeded with their arraignment even though Aguilar was still at
large and cannot be found by the authorities. The plea of not guilty was
entered by the Military Courts on her behalf even though Aguilar was not
present during said arraignments. Aguilar was later captured by
authorities on August 6, 1984. Aguilar contends that the Military courts
did not acquire jurisdiction over her because she was not present during
said arraignments. The Supreme Court ruled that the Military Courts did
not gain jurisdiction over Aguilar because Arraignment in absentia is
Unconstitutional and violative of due process. Since Martial Law was
already lifted, Military Courts are deemed dissolved and the only other
recourse of the government is to file before the civilian courts.
FACTS: On March 18, 1977, Aguilar was charged by the Special Military
Commission No. 1 for Rebellion and being a ranking member of the NPA.
Subsequently. Aguilar was also charged on October 3, 1978 by the
Military Commission no. 25 for Subversion. These cases proceeded with
their arraignments even though Aguilar remained at large and was not
able to enter her plea in person. The Military Courts entered the plea of
not guilty in behalf of Aguilar even though she was absent from the said
arraignment.
She was later arrested on August 6, 1984 by the authorities for
having Subversive Documents in their household. Aguilar was able to
post bail but was not released by the authorities because of her pending
two other cases before the Military Courts.
 On September 14, 1984, in the Subversion Case, AGUILAR was
brought before MC 25 to appear and be involved in the ongoing trial of
the case. AGUILAR's counsel questioned the jurisdiction of the
Commission over her, but the Commission upheld its jurisdiction.
Challenging that ruling, on January 7, 1985, AGUILAR filed her Petition
in G.R. No. 69482 for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction. A Temporary Restraining Order en-joining MC-
25 from proceeding further with the Subversion Case, insofar as it
involves AGUILAR, was issued by this Court January 10, 1985.
Issue: Whether or not the Military Court No. 25 has jurisdiction over
Aguilar even though they entered the plea of not guilty on her behalf- NO
Ratio: We hold that AGUILAR had not been legally arraigned when a plea
of "not guilty" had been entered for her together with the other
defendants who had refused to plead. There can be no arraignment or plea
in absentia. Under both the 1964 Rules of Court 6 and the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, a defendant must be present at the arraignment and
must personally enter his plea. Even under Section 62 of the Manual of
Courts Martial, it is provided that "during arraignment, the accused and
personnel will stand.
SEC. 5. After the arraignment of an accused who is charged
with subversion, the trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused, provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. Judgment
may be promulgated in absentia and the penalty of
confiscation of his properties in the Philippines may be
immediately executed.
The codal section replaces Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 39, And
it should be borne in mind that actual arraignment is an element of due
process. Even military tribunals are bound to observe fundamental rules
of law and arraignment in absentia would be violative of due process. chanr
Since Aguilar was never arraigned by the Military Courts, they
never acquired jurisdiction over her. Even though the trials were already
underway, Aguilar could not be a part of the trial because she was not
arraigned.
The Subversion Case, therefore, should be transferred to the civil
Court. for further proceedings. No "irreparable prejudice" will be caused
the State inasmuch as, due to the absence of ar-raignment, no double
jeopardy can attach. Nor has any evidence been presented against
AGUILAR thus far, The in-convenience and "difficult(ies)" attendant to
the transfer, and the quantity of evidence that the State may have to re-
introduce in a separate trial must yield to the Constitutional rights of a
defendant, and to the desired objective for normally and civilian
supremacy to prevail, with judicial power vested exclusively in civil
Courts.c
WHEREFORE, judgment in these two consolidated cases is rendered as
follows:
(1) Respondent Military Commission No. 25 shall not take jurisdiction
over petitioner, Mila Aguilar, in its Case No. MC-25-113, entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." The Temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. Within 30 days after
receipt of notice hereof, the said respondent shall refer the case against
petitioner Mila Aguilar to the proper provincial or city Fiscal, or civilian
government prosecutor, so that the corresponding Information may be
filed against her before a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The date of
the referral shall be immediately advised to this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibra
(2) If, within forty-five (45) days after the date of referral, no Information
is filed against petitioner, Mila Aguilar, before a civil Court, she shall be
immediately released in relation to the MC-25-113 case, as well as in
relation to Criminal Case No. 223466 of the Quezon City Metropolitan
Trial Court where she has already filed bail without prejudice to her
detention during the continued pendency of the Rebellion Case in her
regard.chanroblesvirtualawlibr
(3) If, within forty-five (45) days after the mentioned referral, an
Information is filed before a civil court against petitioner Mila Aguilar,
charging her with a capital offense, her petitions in these consolidated
G.R. No. 68347 and No. 69482 cases shall be deemed dismissed in view of
the pendency of the Rebellion Case and of the capital offense
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibr
(4) If the Information filed before a civil Court does not charge petitioner,
Mila Aguilar, with a capital offense, and the civil Court shall order her
release cm ball, she shag ako be released in relation to Criminal Case No.
223466 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, on the strength of
the bail she has already filed, but also without prejudice to her detention
during the continued pendency of the Rebellion Casein her
regard.chanroblesvirtualawli
SO ORDERED.
R. 115. Arraignment and Plea : Plea to A Lesser Offense
86. GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (679 SCRA 614)
2012
G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 September 4, 2012
EN BANC, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
DOCTRINE: Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval. The essence of a plea bargaining
agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense
than that charged against him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides the procedure therefor, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused,
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.
However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the
evidence on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution
promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the
testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the
conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the
Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail."
EMERGENCY RECIT: Major General Garcia’s 2 children went to the U.S.
with 100, 000 dollars in Cash. Tis led to a plunder + money laundering
investigation against him (300 M php). Their accounts freezed, and
properties sequestered. The evidence of guilt against him is strong but the
Special Prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining agreement to lower the
offenses to direct bribery and even allowed bail. SC said entering into an
agreement which the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could
result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea
bargaining agreement entered into. (SEE DOCTRINE).
FACTS:
These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the
same factual milieu but because they raise a common thread of issues
relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the
Ombudsman.
SECOND CASE: (related)
1. Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the OMB charged Maj. Gen. Carlos
F. Garcia, his family and several unknown persons with Plunder (Crim. Case
No. 28107) and Money Laundering (Crim. Case No. SB09CRM0194) before
the SB.
2. Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her
prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea
Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused.
3. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea
warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
4. Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to
get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the
prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public
offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted
public hearings on the PLEBARA.
5. The Committee on Justice recommends to the President the dismissal of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants for having committed acts
and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman
Act.
6. The OP initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-
Sulit. In her written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity
and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative
disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with
the case, setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011.
7. With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent,
petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking and
continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her
must depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the
PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the
PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against
her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her
failings.
ISSUE: WON the plea bargaining agreement was correct despite strong
evidence of guilt of the accused (NO!)
WON Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor
who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence
of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP,
unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the accused Maj. General
Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a
conviction.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of
strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused
is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which
is sufficient to initiate a criminal case." Hence, in light of the apparently
strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining
authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and
wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.
The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of
the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and
that the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to
promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major
General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses.
Immediately after the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010
Resolution had been substantially complied with, Major General Garcia
manifested to the Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness for
sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife
and two sons.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no
consequence to an administrative finding of liability against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea
bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the
disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative
liability is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the
conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the
diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to
prosecute crimes against the State.
Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or
willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special
Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the
government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the
government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative
liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement
entered into.
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP,
unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the accused Major General Garcia
as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of
strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused
is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which
is sufficient to initiate a criminal case." Hence, in light of the apparently
strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority
would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the
prosecution's turnabout in the case.
The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the
subject of the pending administrative proceeding against petitioner Barreras-
Sulit and are, thus, better left to the complete and effective resolution of the
administrative case before the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the
President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately,
even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R.
No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003
against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and
omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal
of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989.
EXTRA:
FIRST CASE (not related topic but worth discussing)
1. Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales lll, ordered the dismissal of P/S
Insp. ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO MENDOZA. The Motion for
Reconsideration languishuised for more than nine (9) months without any
justification (the law states that it must be resolved within 5 days from
submission.) Mendoza hostaged 21 HK tourists + 4 Filipino Assistants in
Manila asking for reinstatement. He killed 8, injured 7. He himself was killed.
This led to the admin. charges against Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty
and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. Office of the
President ordered his suspension, and later his dismissal from Office.
Gonzales is questioning the legality of the law granting the President the
power to remove the OMB.
HELD: YES, According to R.A. 6670, Section 8(2), grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. Thus: Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-
xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman, and after due process.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an
obvious gap in the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the
power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for
in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same
Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with
the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor,
for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled
a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or
existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public
officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are
not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
HERE, it was held by S.C. that the hostage taking was because of different
factors and not by Gonzales alone, whose decision actually was pending
before the Ombudsman Gutierrez.
88 TOPIC: Rule 116: What is searching inquiry
People vs Dayot
GR NUMBER | DATE
PONENTE: G.R. No. 88281 | July 20, 1990
SARMIENTO, J
---------------
DOCTRINE:
● A “searching inquiry” likewise compels the judge to content
himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed
under a state of duress—and that his guilty plea has not therefore
been given improvidently—either by actual threats of physical
harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the
judge’s, intimidating robes.
● The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused in pleading guilty is
truly guilty.—Above all, the trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused, in pleading guilty, is truly, guilty. This is possible say, by
requiring him to narrate the tragedy or say, by making him reenact
it, or by causing him to furnish missing details.
● There can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a
searching inquiry.—While there can be no hard and fast rule as to
how a judge may conduct a “searching inquiry,” as to the number
and character of questions he may put to the accused, or as to the
earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be
measured according to its individual merit, taking into
consideration the age, educational attainment, and social status of
the accused confessing guilt, among other things, the singular
barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully convince himself
that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and
(2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational
basis for a finding of guilt, based on his testimony.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Accused Dayot has been charged with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide punished with reclusion perpetua
to death. During arraignment he pleaded “not guilty” but during the trial he
had a “change of heart” and pleaded guilty as manifested by his counsel.
The trial judge then propounded 5 questions(“searching inquiry”) just
asking the accused if he was aware of the consequences of his guilty plea.
(the case mentioned he probably just wanted “to get the job done”)
The Court held that the “searching inquiry” was not done properly by the
trial judge, hence the judgement has been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, or otherwise, has been vitiated by substantial legal errors. The
case has been REMANDED for rearraignment
FACTS:
The Court reverses the judgment subject of this appeal, rendered upon a
plea of "guilty" entered by the accused-appellant, on the ground of serious
errors of law committed by the trial judge, and remands the case for
rearraignment and trial on the merits.
The accused had been charged with the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide punished with reclusion perpetua to death under Article 294,
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
On March 21, 1989, the accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded "not
guilty".[2] Trial was set to April 26, 1989.On that date, however, the
accused's counsel, Atty. Fernando Fernandez, manifested that the accused
was willing "to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the offense
charged. Thereupon, Atty. Fernandez put him on the stand, and
propounded questions.
For his part, the trial judge, the Honorable Martin Villarama, Jr.,[5]
propounded the following questions to him:
COURT
Are you aware of the consequences of your change of heart?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:What will happen?
A:I will be detained, your Honor.
Q:For how long, more or less?
A:I do not know, your Honor.
Q:More or less, less than ten years or more than ten years?
A:Perhaps less than ten years, your Honor.
Q:And it could also be more than ten years?
A:Yes, your Honor.
On account thereof, His Honor rendered judgment, sentenced the accused
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment under appeal has been tainted with a
grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise, has been vitiated by substantial legal
errors.
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: We have held that where the accused enters a plea of guilty to the
capital offense, the trial court is called upon to observe the following
procedure:
While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a
"searching inquiry," as to the number and character of questions he may put
to the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since
each case must be measured according to its individual merit, taking into
consideration the age, educational attainment, and social status of the
accused confessing guilt, among other things, the singular barometer is that
the judge must in all cases, fully convince himself that:(1) the accused, in
pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2) he, in so doing, is truly
guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt, based on
his testimony.
The five questions posed by Judge Villarama to the accused-appellant,
needless to say, hardly amount to a "searching inquiry".He should have
known better, because he actually condemned a twenty-year old to spend a
great deal of his mortal life in prison.

As we have said, the procedure laid down by the Rules is mandatory. The
SEC. 3.Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -- When the
judge having satisfied himself that the accused fully understood the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
significance, effects, and consequences of his guilty plea, the next step would
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
be to make the prosecution adduce evidence to determine the guilt and exact
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
culpability of the accused taking into account the presence of other possible
degree of culpability.The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.[8]
aggravating or mitigating circumstances--and thereafter, to make the
accused present his own evidence, if he is so minded, for the same purpose.
As we held, the judge is required to accomplish three things:(1) to conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is SET ASIDE.The case
consequences of the accused's plea; (2) to require the prosecution to prove
is REMANDED for rearraignment and thereafter, should the accused-
the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) to
appellant enter a plea of "guilty", for reception of evidence for the
inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf
prosecution, and should the accused-appellant so desire, for reception
and allow him to do so if he so desires.This procedure is mandatory,[9] and
likewise of evidence on his part.
a judge who fails to observe it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

A "searching inquiry," under the Rules, means more than informing

cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term (because the accused is aware
Topic: What is searching inquiry?
of that) but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the
89. People vs. Alicando, supra
certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal
G.R. Number 117487 | December 12, 1995 | J. Puno
colony.

Doctrine: PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; NULL AND VOID

A "searching inquiry" likewise compels the judge to content himself
WHERE THE SEARCHING INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY THE COURT IS
reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of
PROCEDURALLY INADEQUATE. — The plea of guilt made by the
duress--and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently--
appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated Section 3 of Rule
either by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply
116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section provides:
because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free
and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must
be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial
court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant
nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea.
Emergency Recit: Arnel Alicando was convicted by the trial court with the
crime of rape with homicide. By way of automatic review considering the
death penalty imposed by the trial court, the case has reached the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court sentencing Alicando to
death is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. One basis is
that the plea of guilt made by Alicando was null and void as the trial court
violated Sec. 3 of Rule 116. The records reveal how the trial judge
inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching inquiry."
The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of
the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a
free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and
educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial
court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that
appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the
trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of
the crime of rape with homicide.
Facts: Arnel Alicando was convicted by the trial court with the crime of rape
with homicide. By way of automatic review considering the death penalty
imposed by the trial court, the case has reached the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings below. Alicando was confirmed to
have plead guilty to the crime of rape. The trial court held the following Q &
A to secure the plea of guilt.
Q: Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous
crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the
discretion of the court, the court will give you a mandatory death penalty
because of the crime charged, do you understand?
Accused: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any
force or intimidation from any one or whatever?
Accused: None, Your Honor.
Q: Are you sure?
Accused: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Or maybe because you were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and
that will just be the consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused: No, Your Honor.
Court: Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body? Note
(Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his
body from waist up.)
Accused: No, Your Honor.
Court: You were not maltreated in the jail?
Accused: No, Your Honor.
Court: Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be
examined by a physician to the order of the court?
Accused: No, Your Honor.
Court: If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no use because there
will be a mandatory death penalty, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
Accused: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on
your civil rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Accused: Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera: Before the court will proceed with the reception of
evidence by the prosecution Arnel Alicando, please come here. (at this
juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near to the court) The court is warning you
again that this is reception of evidence by the prosecution after you plead
guilty to the crime charged at, do you understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of rape with
homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary without force,
intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable
penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court: Okey, proceed.
Issue: Whether or not the plea of guilt was properly made. - No, the plea of
guilt was null and void.
Ruling: The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the
plea of guilt of the appellant.
Said section provides:
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry."
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it
merely incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr.,
and reiterated in an unbroken line of cases. The bottom line of the rule is
that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus,
the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions
demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.
The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of
the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and
educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial
court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that
appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that
the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential
elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the
voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency.
The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of
maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who
arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its
efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned
the appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining
the meaning of "mandatory". It did not inform the appellant of the
indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned appellant
there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without telling the
appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to
sentence him to death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of
guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of
guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital
offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information
without need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of
the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction.
We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination of our
system that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man
go free."
Fallo: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663,
convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and
the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
TOPIC: Effect of Improvident Plea of Guilty
90 People v. Baharan
G.R. No. | February
PONENTE: J. Sereno
---------------
DOCTRINES:
● The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as
they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the
accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and
mandatory.
● But even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was
not complied with, such fact becomes immaterial where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were part of a plot to plant bombs
within Metro Manila. They succeeded in exploding a bus in Makati. Baharan
and Trinidad planted the bomb in the bus. Asali made the bomb and gave it
to Baharan and Trinidad. While Rohmat was the one who trained Asali in
making bombs and was one of the persons who planned the bombing.
Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali made extrajudicial confessions of their acts
thru television interviews with ABS-CBN. Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali then
made the same confessions in their pretrial stipulations. Asali turned state
witness and testified that he made the bomb which he then gave to Baharan
and Trinidad, and that Rohmat was the one who instructed him in making
and giving the bomb. While Baharan and Trinidad pleaded guilty to the
charge of multiple murder, they pleaded not guilty to multiple frustrated
murder. They changed their plea to guilty after the defense counsel
explained to them the consequences in doing so. RTC thus held them guilty
but the accused are now questioning the RTC’s decision on the ground that
the RTC erred when it accepted the accused’s plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the said plea. The SC affirms the RTC
ruling. The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges and is
a stringent and mandatory requirement. But even if the requirement of
conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, such fact becomes
immaterial where the conviction can be based on independent evidence. In
this case, the finding of Baharan and Trinidad’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt was supported by numerous independent evidence: (a) Their
extrajudicial confessions thru their television interviews; (b) Their judicial
confessions thru their pre-trial stipulations; (c) Asali’s testimony as state
witness; (d) Testimony of Elmer Andales, the bus conductor who identified
Baharan and Trinidad as the men responsible for the bombing of the bus.
FACTS:
● An RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route when two
men entered the bus and sat at the opposing ends of the bus.
● The bus conductor, Elmer Andales, instantly became wary of the
two men because of their demeanor and insistence on getting off
the bus at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA despite Makati
regulations prohibiting unloading passengers in the area.
● When the bus stopped at the said corner, the two men ran off the
bus followed by an explosion from inside the bus.
● Shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (Abu Solaiman) announced over radio station DZBB that the
group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
● After the bus explosion, Abu announced over the radio that more
bombings would be coming.
● Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested and
charged with the crimes of multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder. The other accused remained at-large.
● Accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation
in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. Trinidad also stipulated
the same fact during pre-trial.
● In another exclusive interview with ABS-CBN, accused Baharan
likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Baharan
likewise stipulated the same fact during pre-trial.
 ● Accused Asali also gave a television interview, confessing that he
had supplied the explosive device. Asali likewise stipulated the
same fact during pre-trial.
● On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty.
● On their arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge,
accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not
guilty.
● Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali also admitted that they are members
of the Abu Sayyaf.
● In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether
accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their
"not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murdeR
considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple
murder.
● Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. Baharan and
Trinidad then pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder.
● Asali then became state witness. Asali confessed that he was the
one who made the bomb and that Trinidad and Baharan were
successful in their attempt to plant the bomb on the bus that
exploded.
● The accused now questions (a) the RTC’s decision of accepting the
accused’s plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of the said plea; and (b) the RTC’s finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
1.) WON the RTC erred when it accepted the accused’s plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
2.) WON the RTC erred when it ruled the accused were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
1.) NO. The RTC did not err when it accepted the accused’s plea of guilt.
There was sufficient searching inquiry.
2.) NO. The RTC also did not err when it ruled that the accused were guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIO:
AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE:
● All trial judges must refrain from accepting with speed an accused's
plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration,
judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that
when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning
of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
● The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt,
especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon
the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility
that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.
● The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be
deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who
explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused.
● There is still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had
already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation
of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of
death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been
intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
● The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as
they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the
accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects,
and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is
stringent and mandatory.
● IN THIS CASE, despite the defense counsel being the one who
explained the consequences of pleading guilty to the accused, there
is sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this case because the
accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration.
● Accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to multiple
murder based on the same acts relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge. Prior to the change of plea to one of
 guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of
guilt: (a) One through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during
pretrial); and (b) the other via judicial admission (pre-trial
stipulation).
● Even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was
not complied with, such fact becomes immaterial where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission by the person accused of the offense charged.
● Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained.
● IN THIS CASE, the following are the evidence establishing the
guilt of the accused independent from their plea of guilty:
(a) Testimony of the bus conductor Elmer Andales who positively
identified Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who caused the
explosion in the bus.
(b) Testimony of accused-turned-state witness Asali who testified
both in and out of court that he gave accused Baharan and Trinidad
the TNT used in the bombing incident in the bus.
(c) Baharan and Trinidad’s respective judicial admissions in the
pre-trial stipulations.
(d) Baharan and Trinidad’s respective extrajudicial confessions
during their interviews with ABS-CBN.
AS TO THE SECOND ISSUE:
● As to the guilt of accused Baharan and Trinidad, same ratio as
above.
● As to the guilt of accused Rohmat, he is guilty as a principal by
direct inducement because:
(a) Rohmat was the one who gave instructions and training to Asali
on how to make bombs
(b) Rohmat was involved in the careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila
(c) Rohmat’s confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT
from Asali as part of their mission
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
91 TOPIC: Rule 116 Plea Must Be Unconditional
CASE NUMBER & CASE TITLE: People vs. Patrick De Luna
GR NUMBER | DATE G.R. No. 77969 | June 22, 1989
PONENTE: Gancayo, J.
---------------
DOCTRINE: There is no such thing as a conditional guilty plea in the sense
that the accused admits his guilt, provided a certain penalty is imposed
upon him.
EMERGENCY RECIT: De Luna attacked a woman who died the following
day. He entered a guilty plea but repeatedly said na “hindi ko sinasadya and
nangyari.” He declined presenting witnesses and waived the prosecution
from presenting theirs. However, the COURT RULED THAT this was not a
valid guilty plea but a conditional plea of guilty. In such cases, (1) the
information should be amended with the fiscal’s consent; or (2) the accused
must be considered to have entered a plea of not guilty
FACTS: Patrick de Luna, with intent to kill, treachery, and evident
premediation, attacked a woman by punching and kicking her. The woman
died the next day. He entered a guilty plea with the qualification that “hindi
ko sinasadya and nangyari.” He told the court that he will not present
evidence and waived his right for the prosecution to present its own
evidence to determine the degree of his culpability. RTC convicted him of
Murder. On appeal to the SC, he argues that he was admitting only to
Homicide and denied the allegations of treachery and evident premediation.
He argues that what he was trying to convey to the RTC was that there is a
mitigating circumstance (i.e. no intention to commit so grave a wrong).

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid guilty plea (for Murder).
RULING: No. His repeated and emphatic qualification should have draw
attention from the RTC that the plea was made without full knowledge of its
consequences.
RATIO: When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense: the Court shall
(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the (1) voluntariness and (2) full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea; (2) require the prosecution
to provide his guilt and precise degree of culpability; (3) ask the accused if
he wishes to present evidence on his behalf.
FALLO: RTC Decision is SET ASIDE and REMANDED for new
arraignment.
92. Topic: Illegal arrest waived if not raised in arraignment
PEOPLE vs. ABDUL AMINOLA | G.R. No. 178062 | September 8, 2010
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
Doctrine
The CA correctly ruled on the question of legality of the warrantless arrests
of accused-appellants. A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and
any objection to it is waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection, as in this case. Accused-appellants are
questioning their arrest for the first time on appeal and are, therefore,
deemed to have waived their right to the constitutional protection against
illegal arrests and searches.
Emergency Recit
An Information was charged against the accused-appellants, one of which
was Aminola, with Robbery with homicide. They planned to steal the bag
Nestor Gabuya however due to some complications to their plan; it led the
victim’s death. After the killing of the victim, one of the accused then
approached and took something from the fallen Gabuya. The RTC and Ca
convicted AMINOLA of robbery with homicide. Accused-appellants
question the legality of their warrantless arrest, arguing that there was no
hot pursuit to speak of, since there was no indication that they were
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers or that they had just committed an offense. As claimed, a
considerable period of time had elapsed between their arrest and the
commission of the crime, thus necessitating a warrant of arrest. The SC held
that the question of legality of the warrantless arrests of accused-appellants.
A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to it is
waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any
objection, as in this case. Accused-appellants are questioning their arrest for
the first time on appeal and are, therefore, deemed to have waived their
right to the constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches.
The Facts
2 Information were charged against the accused-appellants with Robbery
with homicide and with illegal possession of firearms.
In the afternoon of August 31, 1999, at around five, Nestor Gabuya closed
shop at his motorcycle and bicycle spare parts store located in Upper
Bicutan, Taguig. He then headed home on his bike. Unbeknownst to him,
accused-appellant Abdul Aminola and accused Alimudin Laminda were
observing him from a nearby basketball court. Aminola proceeded to follow
Gabuya. Upon catching up with Gabuya, Aminola put his arms around
Gabuya and wrestled for the bag Gabuya was carrying. Gabuya refused to
let go of his bag, whereupon Aminola pulled out a gun and shot him.
Gabuya fell to the ground but still resisted, prompting Aminola to take
another shot.
Accused-appellant Mike Maitimbang then approached and took something
from the fallen Gabuya. Maitimbang shot Gabuya behind and fled towards
the direction of eyewitness Oliva. Joel, Gabuya’s caretaker, gave chase but
was fired upon by Maitimbang. Oliva testified seeing the incident while he
was on Genera Valdez St. in Purok V, Upper Bicutan.5
Regina, Gabuya’s wife, reported the incident that same afternoon. Based on
her information, Major Migano formed a team to investigate the crime.
Later that evening, an informant known as "Abdul" told the police that he
witnessed what had happened to Gabuya and could tell them where the
suspects could be found. True enough, Abdul led Major Migano and his
men. A blocking force was organized while Col. Bernido formed a team to
make the arrests on the suspects.
In the evening of September 1, 1999, Major Migano’s team once again went
to the hideout, where Abdul identified four of Gabuya’s assailants. One of
them, Aminola, was found in possession of an unlicensed .45 caliber gun
with one (1) magazine and two (2) ammunitions.
The four men arrested, identified as Aminola, Laminda, Datu Ban
Ampatuan, and Abdulan Sandaton, were then brought to the Criminal
Investigation Division at Camp Crame, Quezon City for further
investigation. On September 2, 1999, Maitimbang was also arrested.
The result of the post-mortem examination of Gabuya, conducted by Dr.
David, showed that he had four (4) gunshot wounds with three (3) entry
wounds and one (1) exit wound. Two (2) slugs were recovered from the
Gabuya’s body, one from the brain and the other from his lungs.
The RTC found accused-appellants Aminola and Maitimbang guilty of
robbery with homicide
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but reduced the penalty imposed
to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty.
We affirm accused-appellants’ conviction.
Legality of Warrantless Arrests
The CA correctly ruled on the question of legality of the warrantless arrests
of accused-appellants. A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and
any objection to it is waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection, as in this case. Accused-appellants are
questioning their arrest for the first time on appeal and are, therefore,
deemed to have waived their right to the constitutional protection against
illegal arrests and searches.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01300 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATIONS
that accused-appellants are to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, and each of them is ordered to pay the increased
amount of PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 75,000 as moral damages,
in addition to PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.

Accused-appellants question the legality of their warrantless arrest, arguing

that there was no hot pursuit to speak of, since there was no indication that
they were committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of
the arresting officers or that they had just committed an offense. As claimed,
a considerable period of time had elapsed between their arrest and the
commission of the crime, thus necessitating a warrant of arrest.

The OSG counters that what transpired were hot pursuit arrests, for the
arresting team’s investigation and the data gathered from informant Abdul
were sufficient reasonable grounds to believe that accused-appellants indeed
robbed and killed Gabuya. The fact that Aminola was arrested a day after
the incident while Maitimbang was arrested two days later would bring the
arrests within the purview of hot pursuit arrests, made as they were within a
brief interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrests
effected.

ISSUE: W/N the accused waived his right to question the validity of his
warrantless arrest? YES

HELD
TOPIC: Rule 116 Arraignment and Plea
93. PEOPLE v TAN
GR No. 191069 | November 15, 2010
Velasco, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE: It has been ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing
any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
his arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
EMERGENCY RECIT: In this case, PNP conducted a manhunt operation
against a suspect in a robbery case when they chanced upon a male
individual selling certain items to two foreigners. They arrested the accused.
The said arresting officers had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest in
view of the fact that they themselves heard accused-appellant say, “Hey Joe,
want to buy Valium 10, Cialis, Viagra?” which, in turn, prompted them to
ask accused-appellant what he was selling. When accused-appellant showed
them the items, they identified 120 tablets of Valium 10, a regulated drug.
The police officers then became obligated to arrest accused-appellant, as he
was actually committing a crime in their presence––possession of a
dangerous drug, a violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.
Therefore, it is without question that the warrantless search and arrest of
accused-appellant are legal and valid.
RTC found him guilty. CA affirms. On appeal to the CA, accused-appellant
disputed the lower court’s finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. He argued that the prosecution failed to establish every
link in its chain of custody and that the warrantless search and arrest done
by the police officers were illegal. However, petitioner never raised this
issue before his arraignment. He never questioned the legality of his arrest
until his appeal. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
about his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged under Section 11 of RA No. 9165 or illegal
possession of drugs. On March 21, 2006, accused-appellant was initially
arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. However, on
March 22, 2006, petitioner filed a motion to allow accused-appellant to
withdraw his earlier plea and for reinvestigation of the case, which was
granted. However, after finding the existence of a probable cause,
petitioner’s counsel re-entered his plea of not guilty.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on February 20, 2006,
at around 1:15AM, the PNP conducted a manhunt operation against a
suspect in a robbery case when they chanced upon a male individual selling
certain items to two foreigners. They heard him say, “Hey Joe, want to buy
Valium 10, Cialis, Viagra?” Curious, they inquired and the male individual
told them that he was selling Viagra and Cialis, while, at the same time,
showing them the contents of his bag which yielded 120 tablets of Valium
10.
The male individual, who later turned out to be Sonny Boy, was
immediately searched and placed under arrest, after which they informed
him of the nature of his apprehension and of his constitutional rights. Sonny
Boy was then brought to the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF), where the items recovered from him
were marked and inventoried by PO1 Cruz. The items were turned over to
the duty investigator.
RTC found him guilty. CA affirms. On appeal to the CA, accused-appellant
disputed the lower court’s finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. He argued that the prosecution failed to establish every
link in its chain of custody and that the warrantless search and arrest done
by the police officers were illegal.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is estopped from assailing the irregularity of his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before his arraignment. – YES
RULING + RATIO: Petitioner never raised this issue before his
arraignment. He never questioned the legality of his arrest until his appeal.
On this alone, the contention must fail. It has been ruled time and again that
an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity about his arrest if he
fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against
him on this ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
In this case, accused-appellant even requested a reinvestigation during his
initial arraignment, and, as a result, his arraignment was postponed. He
could have questioned the validity of his warrantless arrest at this time but
he did not. His arraignment was then rescheduled where he entered a plea
of not guilty and participated in the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived
any question as to any defect in his arrest and is likewise deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
Undoubtedly, the case at bar falls under Section 5(a) of Rule 113, that is,
when the person to be arrested is actually committing an offense, the peace
officer may arrest him even without a warrant. However, a warrantless
arrest must still be preceded by the existence of probable cause. Probable
cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged.
94. ANTONE VS BERONILLA
G.R. No. 1831824 | December 8, 2010
J. Perez
DOCTRINE:
1. Matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash
2. There is grave abuse of discretion since court considered an
evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat
disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and
that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under
exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant
petition.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint
for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla. She alleged that her marriage with
respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter
contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Pending the
setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was
declared null and void by the RTC on 26 April 2007; that the decision
became final and executory on 15 May 2007. He argued that since the
marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was
actually no first marriage to speak of. While the prosecution, through herein
petitioner, maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all
the essential requisites of bigamy. After a hearing on the motion, the court
quashed the Information. SC: The trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, in so quashing the Information, it considered an evidence
introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the
information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only
under exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant
petition.
FACTS: On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an
Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla. She alleged that
her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved
when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in
1991.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to
quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense. He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was
declared null and void by the RTC on 26 April 2007; that the decision
became final and executory on 15 May 2007; and that such decree has
already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007.
He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first
valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the
crime of bigamy.
In its comment/opposition to the motion, the prosecution, through herein
petitioner, maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all
the essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the
marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has not yet
been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16 February 1991, for
which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared
the first marriage null and void on 27 April 2007.
After a hearing on the motion, the court quashed the Information. Applying
Morigo v. People, it ruled: o Hence, contrary to what was stated in the
Information, accused Beronilla was actually never legally married to Myrna
Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to be missing.
Furthermore, the statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved clearly contemplates that the
first marriage must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void,
as in this case.
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the
said Order. The MR was denied.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment, petitioner questioned
the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290. On 24 March 2008, the court set aside its
Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of petitioner with
respondent null and void. On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the
petition for nullity of marriage for failure of herein respondent to submit his
pre-trial brief. Respondent, however, challenged the orders issued by the
court before the Court of Appeals. The matter is still pending resolution
thereat.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26
March 2008 before the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner alleged that the
RTC in the bigamy case acted with GADALEJ when it dismissed the case of
bigamy and denied her MR.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondent's motion to quash
RULING: YES
RATIO:
We see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at
bar.
Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion sufficiently constitute an
offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
A. that the offender has been legally married;
B. that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
C. that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
D. that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
First, the documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the
marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning;
and o (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly
registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of
evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the
Information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the
respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been
considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to
quash.
Second, with the submission of the documents showing that the court has
declared the first marriage void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the
rulings in People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for
bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is
no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is
invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect
such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which
renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family
Code, which was promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in
1987, a few years before respondents subsequent marriage was celebrated in
1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void.
This was exhaustively discussed in Mercado, where this Court settled the
conflicting jurisprudence on the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage. o After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision
expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and
examining a long line of cases, this Court, concluded, in essence, that under
the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had
already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a
person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy.

The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo reinforces the

position of this Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code.
Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground

of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. xxx.

Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel

and Amelia Serafico, this Court pronounced: o In a catena of cases, the Court
has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between

petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent
marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the
facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.

The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the
Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence
introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the
information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only
under exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant
petition.
95. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NELSON PALMA y
HANGAD, appellant., G.R. No. 189279 | March 9, 2010 |Nachura, J.
Topic: Motion to Quash (rule 117)
Doctrine: An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if
he fails to raise this issue, or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground, before arraignment.
Emergency Recit: AAA was raped and robbed by Palma in a dark place
under the C-5 bridge. When AAA reported the crime, members of the
barangay security force chanced upon Palma, sleeping under the same
bridge, using several ladies’ wallets as pillows. It appearing that appellant
was drunk and recalling the rape incident that occurred a few days earlier,
the barangay security force brought appellant to the Barangay Hall for
verification. He was then identified by AAA. The RTC convicted him of
Robbery with rape. CA Affirmed RTC decision. ISSUE: W/N appellant’s
warrantless arrest was unlawful. HELD: No. the SC have consistently ruled
that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
fails to raise this issue, or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground, before arraignment. Here, appellant was
arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty and actively participated in his trial.
He raised the issue of the irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to
the CA. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect.
Facts: On December 7, 2004, , AAA, while walking along the C-5 Bridge in
Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, noticed that a man had followed her after she
passed the talipapa. Suddenly, the man placed his arm over her shoulder,
poked a sharp object on the left side of her body, then instructed her to go
with him. When she turned her head towards the man, she recognized the
assailant (although then, she did not know his name) as she regularly saw
him at the bridge every time she and her co- workers would pass by.
Appellant forcibly brought AAA to a dark place under the bridge, covered
by big stones that blocked the view of passersby. There, he asked if she
had a cellular phone and some money. She replied in the affirmative. Then,
appellant hit her on the stomach and told her to undress. But she refused.
He thus pushed her towards the sofa (found under the bridge), slashed her
clothes and underwear and threatened her with the knife. When AAA was
already naked, appellant lowered his own short pants and briefs, and
forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina and continued pushing it in for
about two (2) to three (3) minutes. After satisfying his lust, he withdrew his
penis and fixed himself. AAA wanted to run away, but she could not do so
as she was totally naked.
Appellant thereafter grabbed AAA’s bag and took her cellular phone and
transportation money amounting to ₱40.00. AAA was able to locate only
her blouse that she used to cover herself. She came out from under the
bridge to seek help. A male passerby helped her by giving her a pair of
short pants, and escorted her to Bagong Ilog Barangay Hall, where the
incident was entered in the police blotter. The following day, AAA
underwent medical examination.
On December 16, 2004, while conducting their routine patrol, members of
the barangay security force chanced upon appellant, whom they found
sleeping, using several ladies’ wallets as pillows, under the C-5 bridge, near
the place where AAA was raped. It appearing that appellant was drunk and
recalling the rape incident that occurred a few days earlier, the barangay
security force brought appellant to the Barangay Hall for verification. That
same day, AAA positively identified appellant as her assailant. Appellant
immediately bowed his head and asked AAA for forgiveness.
Appellant was charged in an Information for Robbery with Rape. When
arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty." Appellant denied liability and
insisted that he only saw AAA in the precinct. He claimed that, on
December 7, 2004, he was vending cigarettes at the corner of Crossing and
Mandaluyong, and that he slept in Mandaluyong afterwards. When
questioned by the court, he, however, admitted that he indeed slept under
the C-5 bridge on the date AAA was raped. He later on changed his
statement by saying that he only slept under the bridge on the night he
was apprehended.
RTC: Found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
CA: Affirmed RTC decision in its entirety.
Issue: W/N appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful.
Ruling: No. we have consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground, before
arraignment. Here, appellant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty
and actively participated in his trial. He raised the issue of the irregularity
of his arrest only during his appeal to the CA. He is, therefore, deemed to
have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of
the court through his counsel-assisted plea during the arraignment, by
actively participating in the trial, and by not raising the objection before his
arraignment.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals
Decision dated June 25, 2009 is AFFIRMED, with the following
MODIFICATIONS: 1) appellant Nelson Palma y Hangad is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; 2) the
award of civil indemnity is INCREASED from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; 3)
the award of moral damages is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00;
and 4) the award of exemplary damages is REDUCED from ₱50,000.00 to
₱30,000.00.
No jurisdiction over person
96. Salvador Revellion v. People
GR NO. 175700 | 5 July 2010
Del Castillo
---------------
DOCTRINE: An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Rebellion was charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, having caught in the act of exchanging strips of aluminum
foil and a plastic sachet containing shabu with another individual. He,
however, insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful because he was
not committing any crime when he was arrested or he was not caught in
flagrante delicto. The RTC and the CA both convicted Rebellion. The SC
affirmed Rebellion’s conviction. SEE DOCTRINE.
FACTS:
Around 4:40pm of 27 July 2000, PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor were on
routine patrol when they chanced upon two individuals chanting and in the
act of exchanging something. They approached these two individuals,
introduced themselves, and then inquired from Rebellion (one of the
individuals) what he was holding. Rebellion took out from his possession
three strips of aluminum foil and a plastic sachet with white crystalline
substance. Then and there, they were brought to the Mandaluyong City
station at the Criminal Investigation Division. Upon examination of the
substance, it turned out positive for shabu.
Rebellion was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. He
denied the charge, and instead claimed that he was merely standing in front
of a store waiting for the change of his P500 bill when he was suddenly
accosted by the police team. Hence, he was insisting that his warrantless
arrest was unlawful because he was not committing any crime when he was
arrested, or he was not caught in flagrante delicto.
RTC and CA both convicted Rebellion. Hence, this petition for review.
Rebellion challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the arrest and the subsequent search on the person of
Rebellion were both illegal and unlawful? NO
2. Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Rebellion? YES
RULING:
1. No, the arrest and search was not illegal or unlawful. Rebellion was
caught in flagrante delicto, one of the instances for valid warrantless
arrest.
2. Yes. Rebellion failed to raise an issue or timely invoke the motion to
quash the information against him before arraignment. For actively
participating in the trial, the objection on the jurisdiction over his
person was deemed waived.
RATIO:
Rebellion’s conviction affirmed. SEE DOCTRINE.
Nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner
to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. In this case,
petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively
participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any
perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even
negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
arrest has the authority to search on the belongings of the offender and
confiscate those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense.
FALLO: The decision of the CA affirming the conviction of petitioner
Salvador Rebellion for the unlawful possession of 0.03 gram of shabu and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to two years, four months and one day of prision correcional as
maximum is affirmed.

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a

private individual under any of the following circumstances:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected under Section 5(a), or the
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. His case comes under the exception to
the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest.

The police team witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to

Clarito. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, they
approached them. There and then, the substance was confiscated; petitioner
and Clarito were apprehended and brought in for investigation. After
laboratory examination, it was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

Consequently, the results of the attendant search and seizure were

admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged.
Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless
TOPIC: Rule 117 Motion to Quash
97. Soriano v. People
GR NO. 162336 | February 1, 2010| J. Castillo
DOCTRINE: A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure
in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice
on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to
quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Two informations were filed against Soriano. One
for estafa and the other is for the prohibition against DOSRI loans. Soriano
moved to quash the informations on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged and the facts do not constitute an
offense. The RTC denied the motion to quash. Soriano then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA which was denied. The SC denied the motion to
quash and ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper
remedy against an order denying a motion to quash. The proper procedure
is to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on the accused to present
special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and after trial on the
merits, if an adverse decision is rendered, appeal in the manner authorized
by law.
FACTS:
● Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the
BSP, through its officers, transmitted a letter dated March 27, 2000
to Jovencito Zuno, Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ which was the
basis for the filing of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents in relation to PD No. 1689 against Soriano. It was
alleged that the Spouses Carlos appeared to have an outstanding
loan of P8 million with Rural Bank of San Miguel (RBSM) but they
never applied for the loan and it was never authorized by the
Board of Directors. It was Soriano, the president of RBSM who
facilitated and received the loan.
● State Prosecutor Fonacier then proceeded with the preliminary
investigation. In due course, the investigating officer found
probable cause and filed two separate informations against Soriano.
The first information was for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. The other information was for violation of
Sec. 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD 1975 which refers to the
prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans.
● Soriano moved to quash the informations on two grounds: that the
court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. Soriano theorized that the
characterization of possession is different in the two offenses. If he
acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and
therefore, cannot misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in
the offense of estafa. Conversely, if Soriano committed estafa, then
he merely held the money in trust for someone else and therefore,
did not acquire a loan in violation of DOSRI rules.
● The RTC denied Soriano’s motion to quash for lack of merit.
Soriano then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was
also denied.
ISSUE: WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
against an order denying a motion to quash?
RULING: No. Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy
against an order denying a motion to quash.
RATIO:
● A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail
the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper
procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.
● Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone
to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion
to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the
present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a
petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible
error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition.

Rule 117 (Rule on Double Jeopardy: Test of Identity of Offenses)
98. People vs. Pimentel
GR No. 100210 | April 1, 1998 | MARTINEZ, J
Doctrine: The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter which
he may raise in a motion to quash to defeat a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense.
ER: Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under Republic Act No.
1700 (the Anti- Subversion Law), as amended. When arrested, an unlicensed
revolver and 6 rounds of live ammunition were found in his possession,
hence, he was also charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under the Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended. Tujan filed a motion to quash the charge for Illegal
Possession of Firearm on the ground that he had been previously in
jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged. The petitioner opposed
the motion. The TC granted the motion. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied. The petitioner elevated the case to the CA
through a petition for certiorari. CA found that the TC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
quashing the questioned information. Court held that there is no identity of
offenses because the previous subversion charge against Antonio Tujan
before the RTC of Manila is based on a different law, that is, Republic Act
No. 1700, as amended. Thus, in the present case, private respondent Antonio
Tujan could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or R.A. No. 1700, or
both.
Facts:
● 1983: Private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with
Subversion (RA 1700) before the RTC of Manila. Thus, a warrant of
arrest was issued but it remained unserved as he could not be
found.
● 7 years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of
arrest in the subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed .38
caliber special revolver and 6 rounds of live ammunition were
found in his possession.
● June 1990: Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion (PD 1866)
before the RTC of Makati. The information read: “accused, being a
member of a communist party of the Philippines, and its front
organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, in
furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38 special
revolver with Serial No. 1026387 and with six (6) live ammunitions,
without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof from
competent government authority."
● Antonio Tujan filed a motion to quash the Information on the
ground that he "has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted
of the offense charged" (for subversion) of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. In support of this, Tujan contends that "common crimes
such as illegal possession of firearms and ammunition should
actually be deemed absorbed in subversion". Furthermore, he avers
that "the present case is the twin prosecution" of "the earlier
subversion case" and, therefore, he "is entitled to invoke the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy."
● The petitioner opposed the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio
Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second time
because (a) he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case,
and (b) the offense charged against him in Criminal Case No. 64079
is for Subversion, punishable under Republic Act No. 1700; while
the present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion, punishable under a
different law (Presidential Decree No. 1866).
● TC: GRANTED Motion to Quash. MR of Petitioner was denied. He
went to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the TC.
Issue: WON there is an identity of offenses in the filing of the Information
for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion?
Held: NO.
Ratio: While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700,
as amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the
subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on September 22, 1992,
totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended, has substantially changed the
complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being
favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual
delinquent, should be given retroactive effect.

Under the first paragraph Section 1 of PD 1866, the mere possession of an
unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the crime itself which carries the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
The third paragraph of the same Section makes the use of said firearm and
ammunition "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion" a circumstance to increase
the penalty to death. Thus, the allegation in the Information in Criminal
Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm found in the possession of
Antonio Tujan, "a member of the communist party of the Philippines and its
front organization," was used "in furtherance of or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion" does not charge him with the
separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same Information, but
simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 was committed 21 so as to qualify the penalty to death.
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned
information, that is, the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition,
qualified by its being used in furtherance of subversion. There is nothing
in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically
or by implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are
the very acts that are being penalized.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, including the orders
dated October 12, 1990 and December 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 148), National Capital Region, in Criminal Case No. 1789,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Motion to Quash: Test of Identity of Offenses
99. PEOPLE vs. DORIQUEZ
G.R. Nos. L-24444-45 | July 29, 1968
J. Castro
---------------
DOCTRINE: The protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offense. A single act may offend
against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and
if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Where two different
laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to
one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Doriquez, on August, 28, 1964, was charged with the
offense of grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Six days later, Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge of
firearm. Doriquez contends that the filing of the information for discharge of
firearm has placed him in peril of double jeopardy as he had previously
been charged with the offense of alarm and scandal in a complaint filed in
the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, upon the same facts which constitute the
basis of the indictment for discharge of firearm.
The SC held that for double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must
prove, among other things, that there is "identity of offenses so that the
dismissal of the case without his consent shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to, commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
The offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal,
nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be
asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of
alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less grave
felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of
alarm and scandal which is a light felony.
FACTS:
· Doriquez, on August, 28, 1964, was charged with the offense of
grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo.
· Six days later, Doriquez was indicted before the same court for
discharge of firearm.
· Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two
indictments.
· On December 3, 1964 he moved to dismiss both informations,
claiming that the institution of the criminal action for discharge
of firearm places him in double jeopardy or he had already
been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo
which dismissed, without his consent, the information
 charging him with the offense of alarm and scandal, allegedly
based on the same facts relied upon by Fiscal Simeon A.
Barranco in support of the aforesaid information for discharge
of firearm.
· The Court denied the motion to dismiss and he appealed the
case to the SC (wrong remedy).
ISSUE: WON the Constitutional proscription against double jeopardy
applies in this case.
RULING: NO. Double jeopardy does not apply in this case.
RATIO: For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove,
among other things, that there is "identity of offenses so that the dismissal of
the case without his consent shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense charged or for any attempt to, commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal,
nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be
asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of
alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less grave
felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of
alarm and scandal which is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of
the RPC and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under article
258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose
from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a
common element), they are definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two
indictments do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an
offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against
persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former crime is the
discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public,
while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a
certain person, without intent to kill.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the
two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely
they may appear to be connected in fact.
FALLO: ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed. This case is
hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin for immediate trial on the
merits. Costs against the appellant.
TOPIC: Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)- Remedy vs denial of motion to quash
100. Galzote v. Briones
G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011
PONENTE: J. Brion
---------------
DOCTRINE: As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory
order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not
allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a
proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the
absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed
to trial.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Jose Galzote was charged of robbery. He moved to
quash the information by alleging that it was flawed in form and in
substance. The MTC denied the quashal. Galzote then filed a certiorari.
Respondent moved to dismiss the certiorari. The SC denied the petition. As
a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not
appealable and it is not a proper subject of a certiorari. The plain and speedy
remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as
discussed above. Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is
an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be
firmly grounded on compelling reasons.
FACTS:
● On January 23, 1997, the prosecution filed an Information for
robbery in an uninhabited place against the petitioner before the
MeTC.
● The petitioner moved to quash the above information by alleging
that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form and in
substance.
 ● The MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion to quash and it also
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial.
● Via a petition for certiorari, the petitioner elevated the unfavorable
ruling of the MeTC to the RTC.
● The petitioner argued that the MeTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in not granting his motion to quash. Respondent
Jonathan Briones (respondent) moved to dismiss the petition for
certiorari, arguing that:
(a) the petitioner failed to prosecute the petition for an
unreasonably long period of time; (b) a petition for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to address the denial of a motion to quash; and
(c) the MeTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s
motion to quash.
● The RTC granted the respondent’s motion and dismissed the
petition for certiorari. The RTC also denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
● The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA where the
latter dismissed the petition in its resolution.
● The CA held that the petitioner lost his right to appeal when he
failed to appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA explained that the
petitioner should have filed an appeal, instead of a special civil
action for certiorari, upon receipt of the RTC’s denial of his motion
for reconsideration.
● The CA saw no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the lower
courts erred in denying his motion to quash. The fact that the
petitioner’s alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of the lesser
offense of malicious mischief in another case is not a bar to the
petitioner’s prosecution for the crime of robbery.
● The petitioner moved to reconsider this resolution, but the CA
denied his motion
ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of certiorari is correct
RULING: No, the SC denied the petition for lack of merit.
RATIO:
Remedy from the Denial of a Motion to Quash
A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the
chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to
question the denial of his motion to quash.
In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the
accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered
and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can
then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed
by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately
question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not
appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under
Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject
of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal
or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy
remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as
discussed above.
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception
rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded
on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more
enlightened and substantial justice"; the promotion of public welfare and
public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it
essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof"; or
judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling
reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.
At the RTC
We find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari
against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed to show that the
factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the above exceptional
circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was consistent with the
existing rules and applicable jurisprudence. The ground used by the
petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been
convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the
exclusive grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure that warrant the quashal of a criminal
information.
CA Resolution
We find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong legal
remedy to question the RTC order. Hence, the petitioner’s remedy was to
appeal the RTC order to the CA pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit,
and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. Treble costs
against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: Pre-Trial Order
101 People v. Guzman
G.R. No. 169246 | January 26, 2007
PONENTE: J. Chico-Nazario
---------------
DOCTRINES:
GENERAL RULE: Rule 118 Sec. 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial
conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts
stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the
trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during
the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
EXCEPTION: It can be relaxed in the greater interest of justice.
EMERGENCY RECIT: (issue discussed in this emergency recit is one
related to the syllabus, other issues are further below)
Accused Nicolas Guzman and his two companions suddenly surrounded
and took turns stabbing Michael who was just passing by. The stabbing
incident was witnessed by multiple persons, including prosecution
witnesses Ronald (jeepney driver), Edgardo (tricycle driver), Danilo
(Michael’s father), and Malaza (police inspector on his way home). All of
these witnesses positively identified Guzman and his two companions as the
ones who stabbed Michael to death. Additional prosecution witnesses are
SP03 Quinto (the investigator in charge of the case) and Dr. Supe (medico-
legal officer who concluded that the cause of death was due to the stabbing).
The RTC also issued a pre-trial order wherein the defense only named only
four witnesses. However, only two of said witnesses appeared and testified.
In the same order, the RTC stated that: “All parties are informed that witnesses
and documents which were not mentioned in this pre-trial order shall not be
entertained during the trial on the merits.” The defense counsel moved to
substitute the two absent witnesses but was denied by the RTC. The SC
upheld such denial: The pre-trial order of the RTC clearly shows that the
defense named only four witnesses. The parties were also informed therein
that witnesses who were not mentioned in the pre-trial order will not be
entertained during the trial on the merits. Thus, pursuant to Rule 118, Sec. 4
and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the disposition of criminal
cases and ensuring fair trial, the denial of the defense counsel’s motion for
substitution of witnesses is justified. While the exception is that it can be
relaxed in the greater interest of justice, nevertheless, the exception does not
apply in favor of the accused Guzman as the RTC had observed that his
motion for substitution of witnesses appears to be a "fishing expedition" of
evidence which is clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution.
FACTS:
● Accused Nicolas Guzman was having a drink with two
companions in front of a grocery store when the victim Michael
Balber passed by in front of them.
● Guzman and his two companions suddenly approached and
surrounded Michael. Guzman positioned himself at the back of
Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael.
● Guzman and his two companions suddenly grabbed the shoulders
of Michael and overpowered him. One of Guzman’s companions,
described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly
stabbed Michael at the stomach. Afterwards, the Guzman’s other
companion, described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife
from the companion with long hair, and also stabbed Michael at the
stomach. Later, Guzman went in front of Michael, took the knife
 from the companion with flat top hair, and likewise stabbed
Michael at the stomach.
● The said events were seen firsthand by multiple witnesses, namely:
(a) Ronald Santiago, a jeepney driver who was eating and resting at
a nearby carinderia when then stabbing occurred;
(b) Edgardo Bauto, a tricycle driver who was standing in the area
when he heard someone scream “sinasaksak!” before he looked at
the direction of the scream and saw the stabbing incident;
(c) Danilo Balber, Michael’s father, who was walking home when
he saw Michael lying still on the street. He approached Guzman
and his companions who immediately ran away and hid at
Guzman’s house after being chased by Danilo;
(d) Police Inspector Alberto Malaza, who was on his way home in
his owner-type jeep when he noticed a commotion wherein
Guzman and his two companions were taking turns stabbing
Michael. He then approached the Guzman trio and introduced
himself causing the trio to run away, although Malaza managed to
capture Guzman.
● Additional witnesses of the prosecution who did not see the
incident firsthand are:
(a) SP03 Samuel Quinto, who was the police investigator assigned
to investigate Michael’s stabbing incident. He was the one who
took the statements of the above witnesses.
(b) Dr. Francisco Supe, Jr., the medico-legal officer who conducted
the post-mortem examination on Michael’s body. In his medico-
legal report, he concluded that the cause of death was hemorrhage
and shock secondary to multiple stab wounds of the trunk.
● The RTC also issued a pre-trial order wherein the defense only
named only four witnesses, to wit: Antonio, Lizardo Dedase,
Eduardo Bidia, and accused Guzman himself. In the same order,
the RTC stated that: “All parties are informed that witnesses and
documents which were not mentioned in this pre-trial order shall not be
entertained during the trial on the merits.”
● During the trial, only accused Guzman and Antonio were able to
testify. The two other witnesses in the pre-trial order (Lizardo
Dedase and Eduardo Bidia) failed to appear and testify in court
several times.
● The defense counsel moved to substitute the two absent witnesses
explaining that they were hesitant to testify and that one of them
went home to his province.
● The RTC denied the defense counsel’s motion to substitute the two
absent witnesses of Guzman.
● Accused Guzman also used an alibi as his defense, stating that he
was attending to their sari sari store when the incident occurred.
● The RTC then rendered a decision convicting accused Guzman of
murder in view of the "clear, direct and positive" testimony of the
prosecution witnesses who all declared that they saw accused
Guzman stab Michael. RTC found no ill-motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses in testifying against accused Guzman. The
RTC also ruled that there was treachery and evident premeditation
in the killing of Michael. The CA affirmed the RTC.
● The accused now questions every aspect of the RTC’s decision.
ISSUES:
1.) WON the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should be given any
weight despite the fact that they were allegedly filled with discrepancies and
inconsistencies. YES
2.) WON accused Guzman’s defense of alibi be upheld. NO
3.) WON the RTC erred when it denied the defense counsel’s motion to
substitute the two absent witnesses of Guzman. NO
4.) WON there was treachery. YES
5.) WON there was evident premeditation. NO
RULING:
1.) YES. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should be given
weight. The alleged discrepancies and inconsistencies are only on minor
details that do not adversely affect the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
2.) NO. Guzman’s alibi should not be upheld. It is not enough for the
accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must likewise prove that it is physically impossible for him
to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
3.) NO. The RTC did not err when it denied the defense counsel’s motion to
substitute the two absent witnesses of Guzman. RTC was only acting in
accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 118 of the ROC.
4.) YES. There was treachery since the victim Michael was just a minor and
was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone when he was suddenly
surrounded and stabbed to death by Guzman and his two companions.
5.) NO. There was no evident premeditation because there is no showing
that Guzman and his two companions had previously planned and reflected
in killing Michael.
SECOND ISSUE:
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
● We have followed the rule in accord with human nature and
experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters
serve to strengthen, rather than destroy the credibility of a witness,
especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience and
numbing to senses.
● IN THIS CASE, The inconsistencies cited by accused Guzman refer
only to minor and unimportant details which do not adversely
affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses .
● Such inconsistency should not be considered as a "fatal error,"
since what is important and decisive is that the prosecution
witnesses had seen Guzman stab Michael and that they testified
on the fact during the trial:
(a.) Although the testimony of Ronald and Edgardo as to the
number of knives used in the stabbing incident differs with that of
Inspector Malaza, all of them declared under oath during the trial
that accused Guzman stabbed Michael.
(b.) As regards the alleged inconsistent testimony of Inspector
Malaza as to how he apprehended Guzman, it should be borne in
mind that the weight of the eyewitness account should be on the
fact that the witness saw the accused commit the crime and was
positive of the latter’s physical identification.Inspector Malaza had
seen appellant stab Michael and apprehended him right after the
incident. Hence, the details on the manner by which Inspector
Malaza apprehended Guzman would be immaterial and irrelevant.
(c.) As to the testimony of Danilo which allegedly runs counter to
the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, even if we were to
disregard as evidence for the prosecution the testimony of Danilo,
the categorical and credible testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses are sufficient to support the finding of guilt on the part of
appellant. It should be emphasized that the testimony of one
eyewitness would be enough to support a conviction provided it is
positive, credible, clear and straightforward.
● For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must
likewise prove that it is physically impossible for him to be present
at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
● Accused Guzman denied any liability and invoked alibi. He argued
that he was inside his store when the stabbing incident occurred,
and, that it was ‘Lemuel;; who stabbed Michael. He also presented
Antonio to corroborate his testimony.
● IN THIS CASE, if Guzman was, as he claimed, inside his store at
the time of the incident, then it was not physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene or in its immediate vicinity considering
that his store and the spot where the incident occurred where only
about five arms’ length away.
● Further, Antonio testified that he and Guzman, who was inside his
store, were having a conversation when the incident occurred. A
perusal of the records however shows that Guzman did not
mention anything about such conversation with Antonio. Guzman
did not even mention the name of Antonio in his entire testimony.
Given the foregoing, the testimony of Antonio cannot be
considered as credible.
THIRD ISSUE:
● The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide in Rule 118 the following:
“SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue
an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence
marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not
disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice .”
● IN THIS CASE, the pre-trial order of the RTC clearly shows that
the defense named only four witnesses. The parties were also
informed therein that witnesses who were not mentioned in the
pre-trial order will not be entertained during the trial on the merits.
Thus, pursuant to the afore-stated provision and its purpose of
preventing undue delay in the disposition of criminal cases and
ensuring fair trial, the denial of the defense counsel’s motion for
substitution of witnesses is justified.
● EXCEPTION: It can be relaxed in the greater interest of justice.
● Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of the accused
Guzman as the RTC had observed that his motion for substitution
of witnesses appears to be a "fishing expedition" of evidence which
is clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution.
● If the two absent witnesses of accused Guzman were indeed afraid
or hesitant to testify, he should have moved the RTC to subpoena
the said witnesses to testify in court pursuant to his constitutional
right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of his
witnesses.
FOURTH ISSUE:
● Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the
circumstances that renders the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack.
● IN THIS CASE, there was treachery in the killing of Michael
because of two primary reasons:
(1.) The victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their
tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when
an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.
(2.) The victim was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone
to a fight when he was surrounded and stabbed to death by
Guzman and his two companions. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
the slightest provocation on his part.
FIFTH ISSUE:
● The essence of evident premeditation as an aggravating
circumstance is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.
● IN THIS CASE, there was no evident premeditation because there
is no showing that Guzman and his two companions had
previously planned and reflected in killing Michael.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C.
No. 00095 dated 28 February 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, for which, he is accordingly sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Michael P25,670.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for Michael’s death; and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
102 Tiu vs. Middleton
GR No. 134998 July 19, 1999
J. Panganiban
Doctrine
A judge cannot exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony
were not included in the pre-trial brief.
Emergency Recit
 · Petitioner failed to name his witnesses Petitioner averred that named. Significantly, it also stated that “plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses,”
he would be presenting 6 witnesses, but he did not name them. without however naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as
After the pretrial conference, the court issued a pretrial order plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it necessarily follows
stating that the petitioner would present 6 witnesses and that it should grant the same right to petitioner.
specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose. When
Petitioner called his witness, the respondents objected, arguing The provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six
with the witness could not be allowed to testify because witnesses “shall control the subsequent course of action.” The court a quo
petitioner had failed to name her in his pre trial brief. The trial proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein,
court ordered that the witness of petitioner whose name was respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the
not disclosed in the pretrial brief is excluded. SC ordered to power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his
proceed with the heating and allow petitioner to present his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents
witnesses. acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner’s
Facts unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse,
· Respondent filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in
possession of real property, accounting, and damages against manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules.
Petitioner before RTC Oroquieta City
· RTC sent a Notice of Pre-trial Conference stating:
· The parties are warned that witnesses whose names and
addresses are not submitted at the pretrial may not be allowed
to testify at the trial, and documents not marked as exhibits at
the pretrial, except those then available or existing, maybe
board admission in evidence
· Petitioner averred that he would be presenting 6 witnesses, but
he did not name them.
· After the pretrial conference, the court issued a pretrial order
stating that the petitioner would present 6 witnesses and
specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose
· When Petitioner called his witness, the respondents objected,
arguing with the witness could not be allowed to testify
because petitioner had failed to name her in his pre trial brief.
· The trial court ordered that the witness of petitioner whose
name was not disclosed in the pretrial brief is excluded.

Issue: whether a judge can exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of
testimony were not included in the pre-trial brief.

Ruling: No

Ratio: In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his
discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply
provided that “[t]he defendant will present six witnesses.” It made no
mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were
 RULE 116 (ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA) 2. Husband of victim - found his wife dead in the house and observed
that their trunk with money inside was forcible opened;
TOPIC: Plea to a Capital Offense 3. Juan Languibo - identified the death certificate
87. People vs. Camay
GR No. L-51306 | July 29 1987

DOCTRINE: Rule where accused voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to a

capital offense, with the assistance of counsel is in Sec. 3, Rule 116 ROC.
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilty of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

EMERGENCY RECIT: The TC judge faithfully complied with the strit

procedure who asked the accused a series of questions, fully informing him
of the nature of the charge against him and the consequences thereof. Even
after the accused entered a plea of guilty and signed the Certificate of
Arraignment, TC still asked the 3 questions. He still presented the 3
witnesses to prove his guilt.

FACTS: (Background of case was discussed by the witnesses)

● In cases where the punishment is severe, the court should be sure
that the defendant fully understands the nature of the charges
preferred against him. Although TC should first receive evidence
and to ensure that the accused understands his plea of guilty, they
recognize the discretion of TC to convict the accused merely on his
plea of guilty if it is convinced that the taking of evidence is not
necessary and the accused understands the allegations of the
indictment.

ISSUE: WON Judge complied with the requisites under Sec. 3, Rule 116

Held: Yes, The judge complied faithfully with the strict procedure and
even after the extensive interviews conducted by the counsel de oficio, the
judge still asked a series of questions, fully informing him of the nature
of the charged against him and the grave consequences. TC ordered the
prosecution to present its witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused.
1. Daughter of victim - testified that accused barged into their house
and demanded money. When victim said she had none, he hacked
her.