REVOCATION
Held: NO. The physical act of destruction of
Testate Estate of Maloto vs Court of
Appeals G.R. No. 76464
February 29, 1988
Facts: Adriano dies leaving as heirs her neice
and nephews, Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo
and Felino. Believing that the decease did not
leave behind a last will and testament, the
aforementioned heirs commenced an instate
proceeding for the settlement of their Aunt’s
estate. While the case was still in progress the
heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial
settlement, dividing the estate into 4 equal
parts among them. It was latter approved by
the trial court upon presentment. 3 years later,
Atty. Palma, a former associate of Adriana’s
counsel, discovered a document entitled
“Katapusan nga Pagbubulat-an (Testamento)”
purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana. It was claimed to be found in the
cabinet drawer formerly used by Adriana’s
counsel. Under the will, while Panfilo and
Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much
bigger and more valuable shares in the estate
of Adriana that what they received by virtue
of the extra judicial settlement. While the trial
court allowed the probate, it was however,
reversed by the CA finding that the will was
allegedly burned by the house help of Adriana
upon the orders of the latter. The appellate
court based its finding on the facts that the
document was not in the two safes in
Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to
the residence of his counsel to retrieve a copy
of the will left in the latter's possession, and,
her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in
order to have a new will drawn up.
Issue: Whether or not the purported will was
revoked
a will, like burning in this case, does not per
se constitute an effective revocation, unless
the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the
testator. Of course, it goes without saying that
the document destroyed must be the will
itself. In this case, while animus revocandi or
the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for
that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone
would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only
one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling
the will carried out by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his
express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these
requirements. For one, the document or
papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe,
was not satisfactorily established to be a will
at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto.
For another, the burning was not proven to
have been done under the express direction of
Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her
presence.
Other doctrinal pronouncements:
It is an important matter of public interest that
a purported win is not denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be
shaken to its very foundations.
 PROBATE
Caniza vs CA G.R. No. 110427 February 24,
1997
Facts: Caniza, a spinster of advanced age,
was the owner of a house and lot in QC.
Caniza’s niece who was also her legal
guardian commenced a suit in the MeTC to
eject the Sps. Estrada from the said premises
since Caniza has already had a dire need of
funds to defray her medical expenses . It was
alleged in the complain that the possession of
the Sps Estra was only out of kindness and
tolerance from Caniza. On their part, the Sps
contend that they had been living in the
premises since the 1960’s and there were
considered by Caniza as her own family and
the latter in fact executed a holographic will
bequeathing to them the house and lot in
question. The MeTC ruled in favor of Caniza
but the RTC reversed said decision which was
latter affirmed by the CA. The CA opines that
while the said will, unless and until it has
passed probate by the proper court, could not
be the basis of the Estrada’ claim to the
property, it is indicative of intent and desire
on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants
are to remain and are to continue in their
occupancy and possession, so much so that
Cañiza's supervening incompetency can not
be said to have vested in her guardian the
right or authority to drive the defendants out.
Issue: Whether the will could be the basis of
the claim of the Sps Estrada
Held: A will is essentially ambulatory; at any
time prior to the testator's death, it may be
changed or revoked; and until admitted to
probate, it has no effect whatever and no right
can be claimed thereunder, the law being
quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's intention
to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. And that in this case there
was sufficient cause for the owner's
resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on
account of the physical infirmities afflicting
her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a
competent court the general guardian of both
the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen
Cañiza. By that appointment, it became
Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's
person, to attend to her physical and spiritual
needs, to assure her well-being, with right to
custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right
and duty to get possession of, and exercise
control over, Cañiza's property, both real and
personal, it being recognized principle that
the ward has no right to possession or control
of his property during her incompetency. That
right to manage the ward's estate carries with
it the right to take possession thereof and
recover it from anyone who retains it, and
bring and defend such actions as may be
needful for this purpose.
Tolentino vs Francisco G.R. No. 35993
December 19, 1932
Facts: Gregorio Tolentino had no children
and was predecease by his wife at the time of
his death. As such, he contemplated leaving
his properties to the kin his wife which was
stated in his will. However, due to strained
relations, resulting from grave disagreements
between the Franciso he decided to make a
new will this time bequeathing the bulk of
the Estate to Adelaida Tolentino, as his
universal heir.
To this end, he asked Repide to draft him a
new will. He then designated Syyap, Legard
and de Dios as the attesting witness. They
agreed to sign the will in a certain
“panceteria”. After the signing of the original
will, he then asked the witness to sign also the
duplicate copy but the witness objected on the
ground it was unnecessary. The will was then
kept in the Oriental Safe Deposit until his
ultimate demise. During the probate of the
will the two attesting witnesses repudiated
their participation in the execution of the will.
Issue: Whether the repudiations of the
attesting witnesses sufficient to deny probate
of the will.
Held: NO. When a will is contested it is the
duty of the proponent to call all of the
attesting witnesses, if available, but the
validity of the will in no wise depends upon
the united support of the will by all of those
witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate
notwithstanding the fact that one or more of
the subscribing witnesses do not unite with
the other, or others, in proving all the facts
upon which the validity of the will rests. It is
sufficient if the court is. satisfied from all the
proof that the will was executed and attested
in the manner required by law. In this case we
feel well assured that the contested will was
properly executed and the order admitting it
to probate was entirely proper.
Mercado vs Alfonso G.R. No. 45629
September 22, 1938
Facts: Mercado filed a petition for the
probate of the will of his deceased wife.
Without any opposition the probate court
admitted the will to probate. After 16 months
from the probate of the will, intervenor Basa
de Leon filed a complain against Mercado for
falsification or forgery of the will probated.
Issue: Whether the probate of the will of
Mercado’s wife is a bar to his criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said
will
Held: YES. The probate of a will by the
probate court having jurisdiction mereof is
usually considered as conclusive as to its due
execution and validity, and is also conclusive
that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time when he executed the will,
and was not acting under duress, menace,
fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery. Moreover, the
probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a
proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by
publication as a prerequisite to the allowance
of a will is constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon
everybody, even against the State.
Remedios Nuguid vs Felix Nuguid G.R.
No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
Facts: Rosario died single and without any
descendant, legitimate or illegitimate. He was
survived by her parents and 6 brothers and
sisters. Allegedly, Rosario executed a will 11
years prior her demise which bequeaths all
her property to one of her sisters Remedios
Nuguid. Thus, Remedios filed a petition to
probate the holographic will. Concededly,
Rosario’s parents entered their opposition to
the probate of her will upon the ground that
by the institution of Remedios as universal
heir, they were illegally preterited since they
are compulsory heirs of the decease.
Issue: Whether the probate court could touch
upon the issue of preterition in the allowance
or disallowance of the will.
Held: NO. The court's area of inquiry is
limited - to an examination of, and resolution
on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity, and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities by law prescribed,
are the questions solely to be presented, and
to be acted upon, by the court. Said court - at
this stage of the proceedings - is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy therein.
Other Doctrinal Pronouncement:
Really, as we analyze the word annul
employed in the statute, there is no escaping
the conclusion that the universal institution of
petitioner to the entire inheritance results in
totally abrogating the will. Because, the nul-
lification of such institution of universal heir -
without any other testamentary disposition in
the will - amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the
testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
for a cause authorized by law."In Manresa's
own words: "The express deprivation of
legitimacy constitutes disinheritance. The
tacit deprivation of it is called preterition.’
Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by
stating that disinheritance "es siempre
Yoluntarla": preterition, upon the other hand,
is presumed to be "involuntaria". Express as
disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the
will itself.
Iris Morales v. Olondriz G.R. No. 198994
February 3, 2016
Facts: Alfonso Olondriz died on June 9,
2003. He was survived by his widow and his
5 children. Believing that the decedent died
instestate, the heirs filed a petition for the
partition of the decedent’s estate. However,
Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the
RTC alleging that the decedent left a will and
prayed for its probate. Under the said will,
Morales was appointed as the executor and
that the estate shall be distributed equally
among her and the heirs with the exception of
Francisco, the illegitimate son of the
decedent. Morales then moved to suspend the
institute proceeding to give way to the
probate proceedings. The respondents
opposed moved to dismiss the probate
proceedings because Francisco was preterited
from the will. The RTC granted the
opposition and ordered the case to proceed in
intestacy after finding that Francisco, as an
heir of the decedent, was clearly preterited.
Issue: Whether the RTC can pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will during probate
proceedings
Held: YES. The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry
is limited to questions on the extrinsic
validity of the will; the probate court will
only determine the will's formal validity and
due execution. However, this rule is not
inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the
probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will when so
warranted by exceptional circumstances.
When practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon even before it is probated, the probate
court should meet the issue. The decedent's
will does not contain specific legacies or
devices and Francisco's preterition annulled
the institution of heirs. The annulment
effectively caused the total abrogation of the
will, resulting in total intestacy of the
inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter
how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null
and void. The conduct of separate
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity
of its testamentary provisions would be
superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error -
much less grave abuse of discretion - on the
RTC for ordering the case to proceed
intestate.
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
Pecson vs Coronel G.R. No. 20374 October
11, 1923
Facts: Dolores Coronel , before her death,
executed a will bequeathing all her properties
t o h e r n e p h e w, L o r e n z o P e c s o n i n
consideration of the good services which he
has rendered to the decedent. During the
probate proceeding instituted by Lorenzo, the
will was contested by the blood relatives of
the decedent contending that it is not natural
nor usual that she should completely exclude
her blood relatives from her vast estate. They
emphasise the fact that family ties in this
country are very strongly knit and that the
exclusion of relative from one’s estate is an
exceptional case.
Issue: Whether the designation of the nephew
as the sole heir of estate valid considering the
decendent has no forced heir.
Held: It is true that the ties of relationship in
the Philippines are very strong, but we
understand that cases of preterition of
relatives from the inheritance are not rare.
The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will
when there are no forced heirs is rendered
sacred by the Civil Code in force in the
Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in
the first paragraph of article 763 in the
following terms: "Any person who has no
forced heirs may dispose by will of all his
property or any part of it in favor of any
person qualified to acquire it." In the absence
of any statutory restriction every person
possesses absolute dominion over his
p r o p e r t y, a n d m a y b e s t o w i t u p o n
whomsoever he pleases without regard to
natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the
testator possesses the requisite capacity to
make a will, and the disposition of his
property is not affected by fraud or undue
influence, the will is not rendered invalid by
the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or
unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from
making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or
as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can
dictate. However, as has already been shown,
the unreasonableness or injustice of a will
may be considered on the question of
testamentary capacity.
Heirs of Jose Gepualla vs Andres G.R. No.
173636 January 13, 2016
Facts: Basilia had 5 children namely,
Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita and Isagani. In
her “Huling Habilin” she named Benita’s
children as Voluntary Heirs to 10% of the
free portion of her estate. When Basilia died,
she left behind considerable properties,
including a 36/72 pro indivisible share in a
property in San Juan co-owned by some of
Basilia’s children and grandchildren. Perfecto
and Luz then sold their share in the property
(26/72) Meanwhile, the 36/72 pro indivo
share was sold in a public auction to satisfy a
judgement in a civil case against the estate.
The judgement creditor emerged as the
highest bidder. Thereafter, Gepuela redeemed
the 36/72 share from the judgement creditor
and filed an action to consolidate the
ownership. However, Basilia’s grandchildren
filed a complaint for redemption and
cosignation with damages alleging among
others that, Gepuala’s redemption was null
and void as he not being an heir.
Issues: (1) whether Gepuela's redemption of
Basilia's 36/72 pro indiviso share in the
subject property was valid; and (2) whether
the grandchildren could still redeem the 36/72
pro indiviso share.
Held: NO. First. As instituted heirs only to a
part of the free portion of Basilia's estate, the
grandchildren are entitled to receive their
share of the same, if any, only after payment
of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow and
inheritance tax. Otherwise stated, their share
would be dependent on whether anything is
left of the estate after payment of all its
obligations.In this case, the disputed 36/72
pro indiviso share was sold at public auction
to satisfy the judgment claim of a creditor of
the estate. When it was redeemed by Gepuela,
no further redemption was made. Upon
expiration of the periods to redeem, Gepuela
became entitled, as a matter of right, to the
consolidation of the ownership of the share in
his name. The share no longer formed part of
the estate which can theoretically be
distributed to the grandchildren as Basilia's
voluntary heirs. Second, and more
importantly, as voluntary heirs to the free
portion, Hernita, et al. have no right to claim
any specific property of the estate, such as the
contested 36/72 pro indiviso share in the
property, until after the estate had been settled
and distributed in accordance with law.
PRETERITION
Acain vs. IAC G.R. No. 72706 October 27,
1987
Facts: Nemosio Acain executed a will written
in Bisaya instituting his brother Segundo
Acain as his heir with the condition that if
Segundo predeceased Nemosio, all the
properties shall be given to Segundo’s
children. As fate would have it, Segundo pre-
deceased Nemosio. Thus, Constantino, one of
Segundo’s children, filed a petition for the
probate of the will after the death of Nemesio.
Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of Nemesis, and Rosa Diongson,
Nemosio’s widow, opposed the probate of the
will and filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that they have been preterited.
Issue: Whether or not Virginia and Rosa have
been preterited.
Held: Yes, but only with respect to Virginia
as the legally adopted daughter. Preterition
consists in the omission in the testator's will
of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966];
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article
854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Stated
otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even
if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she
is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil
Code). However, the same thing cannot be
said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the
testator has not been questioned by petitioner
(Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9).
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
that she was totally omitted and preterited in
the will of the testator and that both adopted
child and the widow were deprived of at least
their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence,
this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child. The universal institution of
Constantino together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because
the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs - without any other
testamentary disposition in the will - amounts
to a declaration that nothing at all was
written. Carefully worded and in clear terms,
Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no
leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid
v. Nuguid).
Other Doctrinal Pronouncements:
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir
and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la
porción libre (que)no hubiese dispuesto en
virtual de legado, mejora o donación" . The
only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in
the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except in so far as the legitimes are
concerned.
The effect of annulling the institution of heirs
will be, necessarily, the opening of a total
intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943])
except that proper legacies and devises must,
as already stated above, be respected.
Neri vs. Akutin G.R. No. 47799 May 21,
1943
Facts: Agripino left all his property by
universal to the children by his second
marriage with preterition of the children by
his first marriage. It was alleged in the
proceedings in the lower court and appellate
court that the children by his first marriage
had already received their shares in his
property.
Issue: Whether the effect of the preterition
would be not be the annulment of the
institution of heirs but simply the reduction of
the bequest made to them.
Held: NO. The following example will make
the question clearer: The testator has two
legitimate sons, A and B, and in his will he
leaves all his property to A with total
preterition of B. Upon these facts, shall we
annul entirely the institution of heir in favor
of A and declare a total intestacy, or shall we
merely refuse the bequest left to A, giving
him two-thirds, that is, one third of free
disposal and one-third of betterments, plus
one-half of the other third as strict legitime,
and awarding B only the remaining one-half
of the strict legitime? If we do the first, we
apply article 814; if the second, we apply
articles 851 or 817. But article 851 applies
only in cases of unfounded disinheritance,
and all are agreed that the present case is not
one of disinheritance but of preterition.
Article 817 is merely a general rule
inapplicable to specific cases provided by
law, such as that of preterition or
disinheritance. Thus, in cases of preterition,
the property bequeathed by universal title to
the instituted heirs should not be merely
reduced according to article 817, but instead,
intestate succession should be opened in
connection therewith under article 814.
Other Doctrinal Pronouncements:
Moreover, There is certainly a difference
between a case of preterition in which the
whole property is left to a mere friend and a
case of preterition in which the whole
property is left to one or some forced heirs. If
the testamentary disposition be annulled
totally in the first case, the effect would be a
total deprivation of the friend of his share in
the inheritance. And this is contrary to the
manifest intention of the testator. It may fairly
be presumed that, under such circumstances, ART. 817. Testamentary dispositions which
the testator would at least give his friend the diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall
portion of free disposal. In the second case, be reduced on petition of the same in so far as
the total nullity of the testamentary they are inofficious or excessive.
disposition would have the effect, not of
depriving totally the instituted heir of his ART. 851. Disinheritance made without a
share in the inheritance, but of placing him statement of the cause, or for a cause the truth
and the other forced heir of his the basis of of which, if contested, is not shown, or which
equality. This is also in consonance with the is not one of those stated in the four following
presumptive intention of the testator. articles, shall annul the institution of heirs in
Preterition, generally speaking, is due merely so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited
to mistake or inadvertence without which the person; but the legacies, betterment, and other
testator may be presumed to treat alike all his testamentary dispositions shall be valid in so
children. far as they are not prejudicial to said legitime.
And specially is this true in the instant case
where the testator omitted the children by his
first marriage upon the erroneous beIief that
he had giyen them already more shares in his
property than those given to the children by
his second marriage. It was therefore, the
thought of the testator that the children by his
first marriage should not receive less than the
children by his second marriage.

For reference (old civil code):

ART. 814. The preterition of one or of all the

forced heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the execution of the will or born after death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heirs; but the legacies and betterments shall
be valid in so far as they are not inofficious.

The pretertion of the widower or widow does

not annul the institution; nut the person
omitted shall retain all the rights granted to
him by articles 834, 835, 836, and 837 of this
Code.
If the forced heirs omitted die before the
testator, the institution shall become
operative.