A Commentary on the Case of People vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et.al.

G.R. No. 176864 | December 14, 2010

(by: Eunice Lao Saavedra | 14 – 35108)

The RTC and CA found Webb, et.al. guilty of raping and killing Carmela Vizconde and
executing Carmela’s mother and younger sister, based on the testimonies of the
prosecution’s star-witness, Jessica Alfaro, and the other witnesses. Both courts found
credible witnesses in them especially in the alleged positive identification of Webb, et.al.
for committing the crimes, by Alfaro, over the evidences presented by the defense. Upon
appeal with the Supreme Court, Webb filed a motion requesting to submit for DNA
analysis of the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver. The Court granted the
request. Unfortunately, the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court.The trial record shows,
however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution
offered in evidence in the case. Such outcome prompted Webb to file an urgent motion to
acquit on the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has
resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

The SC did not grant Webb’s motion for outright acquittal on the ground of loss of DNA
evidence. Nontheless, 15yrs after conviction by the lower court, the High Court still
reversed the decisions of the RTC and CA and acquitted Webb and the other accused,
finding that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The High Court put to question the credibility of the testamentary
evidence furnished by the witnesses especially that of the prosecution’s star witness,
Jessica Alfaro. The High Court also gave greater weight on Webb’s alibi that he was in
the US during the perpetration of the crime because of the evidences presented by him
which the high court found to be positive, clear and satisfactory.

However, the Supreme Court, as a trier of law not of facts, pointed out many
considerations on the facts rather than on the laws. However further, its decisions are
actually in line with laws, jurisprudence and justice, as will be expounded herein.
Loss of DNA Evidence is not ground for outright acquittal

The Supreme Court correctly held in not granting the outright acquittal of the accused
due to loss of DNA evidence. But apart from the court’s justification that (1) Brady v.
Maryland, the case cited by Webb as ground for his motion, was superseded by Arizona v
Youngblood, (2) that when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the
test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence, and
(3) that Webb, et al. expressed lack of interest in having a DNA test done, it is also
noteworthy to consider the nature of the crime charged, which is rape with homicide, and
the penalty attached thereto.

Considering that rape with homicide is a heinous crime, the conviction or acquittal of an
accused should be scrutinized with great caution, as not to tamper the justice ought for
the victim/s, at the same time the protection ought to innocent/s against wrongful
conviction. While every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be
taken account, courts should not unjustly, unreasonably or outright favor the accused at
the expense of due process just to the victim/s. Due process must be served not only to
the accused but also to the victims. Therefore, while the loss of DNA evidence must
favor the accused, the loss should not justify outright that the accused is innocent per se,
even if there is proof of bad faith on the part of the officer or agency liable for the loss
(as opposed to Arizona v Youngblood), and therefore be acquitted, because the DNA
evidence is still subject to analysis and result that would yet justify either the innocence
or guilt of the accused. Thus, when the evidence is loss, it means that there can be no
result at all, then, there is no justification that the accused is really innocent or not. The
claim of innocence or guilt is therefore inchoate and not yet real. Judgments for acquittal
and conviction should not be based on speculations and inchoate grounds. Again, it must
be scrutinized with great caution. Same rule should also apply if the prosecution took
recourse in the DNA evidence to prove the guilt of the accused – still, outright acquittal
or outright conviction of the accused should not be granted, even if there is evident bad
faith accompanied by the loss. It is true that the DNA evidence is one way to best prove
the guilt or innocence of the accused, but it is also true that it is not the only way. The
officer in charge should however be liable for the loss. Wherefore, the motion for the
outright acquittal of the accused based on loss of DNA evidence should be denied.

Non-credibility of Prosecution’s Witnesses

The Supreme Court found Alfaro’s testimony doubtful and unreliable. Therefore, making
her not credible as witness. The court based its decision on the following grounds:

(1) Tainted quality of Alfaro as a witness, who had prior knowledge on the facts of
the case having been an asset of the NBI and hence, the high court found it
possible for Alfaro to lie on the details of the case. Especially that Alfaro, who
had practically lived at the NBI's offices, would have been able to hear about the
details, and gain access to the documents, without difficulty.

More importantly, the Supreme Court took notice of the testimony of Atty.
Sacaguing, which Alfraro never refuted. He testified that Alfaro was an asset of
the NBI since 1994 and when the officers one day teased her about being
dormant, she became piqued and suddenly claimed that she know someone who
knows about the vizconde massacre. But when the said “someone” was not
presented, she told Sacaguing that she might as well assume the role of her
informant.

The Supreme Court correctly held the unreliability of Alfaro as a witness with the
above given grounds. In fact, Alfaro was not only unreliable or not credible, but
she was also an incompetent witness when she did not refute the testimony of
Atty. Sacaquing with regards to her words that she might as well assume the role
of her informant. According to the rules, a witness is one who can perceive, and in
perceiving, can make known his/her perception to others.1 Corollary to the

1
Sec 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
 capacity to perceive is the requirement that a witness must have personal
knowledge of the facts surrounding the subject matter of his/her testimony; that is,
which derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the rules
2
of court (such as exemptions to the hearsay rule). In this case, Alfaro has not
personally perceive what she testified in court for it was un-refuted that there exist
an informant, who was not presented, from whom her testimonies came from and
upon whom she impersonates. Worse, she didn’t just give hearsay testimonies but
she testified on behalf of the informant, acting or pretending as if she was the
informant. Such acts tantamount to deceiving, defrauding and shamming the court
of her identity. Clearly, Alfaro is unreliable as a witness, because she did not pass
the competency and credibility test of being a witness. This matter that was not
noticed by the lower court, is crucial misapprehension of the facts. Have the court
noticed this, the real witness might have been called for subpoena, and Alfaro be
disqualified or Alfaro be allowed to help strengthen the testimony of the real
witness. Have the court noticed this, the truth might speedily be revealed. And,
have the court noticed this, justice might have been served both to the prosecution
and the defense. Thus, unless Alfaro was proven to be a competent and credible
witness, the lower court should not believe her testimonies.

(2) Presence of suspicious detials that lack sense or would not sunstantiate the sense
of the acts. For instance, Alfaro was not able to explain why the house was
ransacked if robbery was not the motive of Webb and his group; or why did Webb
being Carmela's alleged boyfriend, who had no reason in breaking the glass panel
of the house's front door to enter the house, broke the glass. Alfaro said that
Webb "picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled
front door". The court rightfully observed that, hurling a stone at that glass door
and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
Same thing also with the garage light that was found by the police investigators as
having been loosened to turn off the light. It did not make sense for one of the

2
Sec 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
 accused to risk to turn off the bulb when the victim (Carmela), according to
Alfaro’s testimony, left the doors to the kitchen open for them.

Indeed, Alfaro’s testimonies could not stand on its own merit to tally and
substantiate with the physical evidence of the crime scene. These suspicious
details erected doubt (on the part of the Supreme Court) to the truthfulness or
reliability of Alfaro’s testimony, therefore strengthening her unreliability as a
witness. However, the lower court, which has the sound discretion and which is in
the best position to observe the witness’ demeanor and manner of testifying 3,
heeded none of these. In fact, it was impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the
crime and the events surrounding it, and found credible witness in her. It noted
her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank testimony, which the court
found undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The court even remained
unfazed by the significant discrepancies among her two affidavits and in-court-
testimony. Because of Alfaro’s testimony in consideration of her manner in
testifying, the lower court had a single story of the massacre, that it was Webb
and his group who perpetrated the crime.

There exist though a danger of having a single story. As Nigerian writer

Chimamanda Adichie once said in TED talk, most people become impressionable
and vulnerable when faced with stories and when one has shown the people one
thing as the only one thing over and over again, then that is what they become; a
single story. A single story makes it the definite and the only story. It is like
power being played on people by persons with authority dictating what people
should only know. The single story creates stereotypes and the problem with
stereotypes is not that they aren't true but that they are incomplete. It then robs
people of their dignity and makes recognition of equal humanity difficult.

That is why it is not absolute that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the
witness, the findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect and appellate

3
People v Bustamante, GR No 177769, 12 September 2007.
 courts cannot overturn the said findings. It is when there exist a clear showing that
the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, wherein the appellate courts can reverse a
judgment of conviction4. Also, the Supreme Court, although it is not the proper
forum from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, can overturn the
rulings of the lower court even if sustained by the CA (emphasis supplied), when
the factual findings of the trial court do not find support in the evidence in record
or where the judgment appealed from was based on a misapprehension of facts 5.
Therefore, the SC in this case correctly reversed the conviction because there
existed a clear misapprehension of the facts by the lower court when it overlooked
the existence of suspicious details and the tainted quality of Alfaro as a witness. It
is therefore just for the high court to intervene when the lower courts have
conditioned its perspective to believe a single story, that no matter how doubtful,
everything else might put aside due to bias that was developed. To resist having a
single story, bias or having overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts,
the Supreme Court is there to rectify the lower courts.

(3) Tainted quality of Alfaro’s testimony, which again lacks sense and suffers from
inherent inconsistencies. The Supreme Court in this case presented instances of
Alfaro’s inconsistencies in her testimonies. Yet what is most striking is that, it
was the first time for Alfaro to meet Webb and his friends (except for Ventura,
Alfaro’s dope supplier) on the night when the crime was about to be perpetrated.
With that and in addition to the high court’s suspicions, what made him
comfortable in having Alfaro around during the alleged conspiracy of raping
Carmela? It can be said that the first time might be a joke but for the second time,
if Webb is really serious about raping Carmela, then what made him said so in the
presence of Alfaro, who might be a future witness against them? Maybe he just
didn’t think about it or didn’t notice Alfaro because he was under drugs? We
don’t know. It’s hanging. The testimony faints. Another thing is that, what made

4
Lascano v People, GR No. 166241, 7 September 2007.
5
Id.
 Webb do nothing when he saw Alfaro saw him raping Carmela in the floor with
two bloodied bodies in the bed? Was he that sure that Alfaro will not speak
against him? If yes, what made him believed so? We don’t know. It’s vague. It’s
lacking. Above all, what made Webb and others say nothing about Alfaro during
the blaming session? What even made them (the accused) comfortable having
Alfaro around? Again, we don’t know. The testimony’s legs are broken. But one
thing is for sure, that the trust of Webb and his friends on Alfaro’s presence
during the preparation, commission and blaming session of the crime was not
established in Alfaro’s testimony that could supposedly support and strengthen
her words. Truly, as the high court said, “An understanding of the nature of things
and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie.”

As the Supreme Court said, in “intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony,

the prosecution presented six additional witnesses”; the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the
former laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police officer Biongs former girlfriend,
and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.

However, the high court did not find the testimonies of most of the witnesses reliable, as
there are inconsistencies and un-corroborations with Alfaro’s testimony that are worthy
to consider.

While it is true that positive identification of the accused constitutes direct evidence, not
merely circumstantial 6, and that trivial inconsistencies do not impair the veracity of the
witness’ identification of the accused 7, it is also true that positive identification must first
be established before applying the precedents. As the Supreme Court held in this case,
for positive identification of the accused be accepted, it must come from a credible
witness and that the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherently contrived. Its decision is in line with the rule that the witness must have first

6
People v Bas, GR No. 195196, 13 July 2015.
7
People v Cuesta, GR No. 217380, 23 November 2015.
passed the test of competency and credibility before relying on her words which, as
shown earlier, was not complied by Alfaro.

When positive identification fails, conviction may still be sustained based on

circumstantial evidences presented by the prosecution’s witnesses. “It is essential though
that the circumstantial evidences presented constitute an unbroken chain which leads one
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others,
as the guilty person.”8 Therefore it is incumbent for the courts to examine with perusal all
the testimonies of the witnesses making sure that they corroborate with each other,
constituting an unbroken chain leading to a conclusion that the accused is the guilty
person, and that it was impossible for some other person to have committed the crime.
Align with it, conviction based on circumstatial evidence will not apply in this case as
there are a number of inconsistencies and un-corroborations of testimonies discovered by
the SC.

Yet, looking at the case in its basic picture, it may seem that there was no break in the
chain of the testimonies of these witnesses specially when the details are so specific as to
the date time and place. Unfortunately, the seemingly specific, guardedness and
rehearsed corroboration of testimonies weaken their authenticity and gave rise to the
inconsistencies, questions and considerations pointed out by the high court. These
testimonies even gave rise to the missing corroboration that Webb and Carmela are
theoretically sweethearts that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this
reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her.

Webb’s Alibi

The Supreme Court reverses the trial court and CA in rejecting Webb’s alibi. The SC
gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb
including his passport and certifications issued by U.S. immigration officials.

8
Zabala v People, GR No. 210760, 26 January 2015.
The trial court and CA, however, reasoned that, "Webb's alibi cannot stand against
Alfaro's positive identification of him." It is true that Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime. It has been held by
jurisprudence that in the face of a positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witness, such alibi crumbles like a sand fortress.9

But, it should not be absolute that positive identification prevails alibi where such
identification is not credible and not categorical or there exist no positive identification at
all.  Indeed, as the court in this case expressed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can
have no other defense but denial and alibi. So the court in this case pronounced,

“A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into
hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of
deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the
accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive
an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say
as forthrightly and unequivocally, He did it! without blinking an eye.
 
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two
criteria:
 
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based
on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its
weight in gold.
 
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about

9
People v Vargas, GR No. 122765; People v Adam, 413 scra 293; People v Enriquez, 465 scra 407.
 something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering
claims.”

While it is true that positive identification prevails alibi, courts must first subject the
identification to the test pronounced by the Supreme Court in this case. It is not really an
exception to the rule but a precedent that must be taken up. Because when the test fails,
then there can be no positive identification at all and therefore, the rule that positive
identification prevails alibi will not be applicable. As explained before hand, its decision
is in line with the rule that the witness must have first passed the test of competency and
credibility before relying on her words which, as shown earlier, was not complied by
Alfaro.

Nonetheless, in criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required is proof of the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt10 wherein the burden of proof lies with the
prosection because of the presumption that the accused is innocent until proven guilty.11

The rule entails that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit
and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 12
Clearly, it is not for the accused to prove his innocence but for the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.13 Unless the prosecution discharges that
burden, the accused need not even offer evidence on his behalf, and he would be entitled
to an acquittal.14

The philosophy underlying this rule in establishing the absolute nature of acquittal is
‘part of the paramount importance [that] criminal justice system attaches to the protection
of the innocent against wrongful conviction.15
10
Sec 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
11
Sec. 14 (2), Art III, PHIL. CONS.
12
People v Grefaldia, 402 SCRA 153; People v Umbana, 402 SCRA 415; People v Pastorete, Jr., 393
SCRA 45; People v Baniguid, 340 SCRA 92; People v Barrientos, 285 SCRA 221,237-238; People v
Bidoc, GR 169430.
13
Boac v People, GR No. 180597, 7 November 2008.
14
People v Ganguso, 250 SCRA 268.
15
People v Velasco, 340 SCRA 207.
Therefore, the weight of Webb’s alibi is not really material when the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proof. But in this case, there was an alleged positive
identification, which seems to have established the guilt of Webb, et.al. The burden of
evidence was then shifted to Webb to refute or overthrow the positive identification
against him. So, Webb used the defense of alibi, and showed clear and convincing
evidences, as required by jurisprudence, which proved that he was in the States during the
commission of the crime and that it wass physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the commission of the crime. But regardless of the compliance of Webb with the
jursidictional requirement for alibi to prosper as a defense, the positive identification
should have prevail if it passed the test pronounced in this case. The Supreme Court in
this case did not give credence to the documentary evidences of Webb because it weighs
more than the alleged positive identification, since the high court knows that the quatum
of evidence in criminal cases is not about preponderance or clear and convincing
evidences but an established evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The SC gave
very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb because it
was proven that the positive identification fails the test pronounced in this case. Hence,
the accused can avail the defense of alibi and the court gave credence on it for having
complied with the jurisdictional requirement. Should Webb first attacked or refute the
credibility of the positive identification, and added his alibi; the lower courts should have
also acquitted him.

Effect of Webb’s Alibi to others

The Supreme Court in this case held that Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches
Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the other
accused (Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez), and Biong, as
accesory. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together. Webbs participation is the
anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
The court in this case might have applied the maxim of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus
meaning, “false in one thing, false in everything”.16 In People v Pacapac17, the court
pronounced the application of the aforsaid rule,

“ the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a positive rule of law
or of universal application. It should not be applied to portions of the
testimony corroborated by other evidence, particularly where the false
portion could be innocent mistakes. Moreover, the rule is not mandatory
but merely sanctions a disregard of the testimony of a witness if the
circumstances so warrant. To completely disregard all the testimony of
a witness, his testimony must have been false as to a material point,
and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to
falsify a material point.”

In the case at bar, the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime took place. It also holds that Alfaro was not a credible witness and has not
positively identify the accused. Therefore, Alfaros testimony has been false as to the
material point that she saw Webb do the crime. Although, the hight court has not
specifically pointed out Alfaro’s conscious and deliberate intention to falsify such
material point, the court has emphasized the unrefutted existence of an informant who
might be the real witness behind the case. Therefore, the court inherently established that
Alfaro consciously and deliberately falsify that she saw Webb do the crime. In effect, the
maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus meaning, “false in one thing, false in everything”,
is applicable in this case. Hence, when evidence against Webb was false, then evidence
against the other accused must have been false also.

However, what if Alfaro didn’t get it right from the informant that it was actually not
Huebert Webb who perpetrated the crime but his other sibling? And that all or some of
the other accused are really part of the commission of the crime? Well, the court have

16
Dawson v Bertolinin, 70 R.I. 325, 38 A.2d 765, 768.
17
People v Pacapac, 248 scra 77.
nothing to do about it. It’s a very sad fact which the prosecution fails to combat. The
court, cannot just convict the others when in fact their case are dependent on Webb’s
leadership in perpetrating the crime. The existence of “what ifs” simply concludes that
the guilt of the accused were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. And the court cannot
just convict based on its speculatons and “what ifs”.

It is also sad to realize that it was unfair for Webb to have adduced relevant evidences
and exhausted all efforts and resources to prove his innocence, while the the other
accused, whose alibis were not really strong, have not proven so much of their case and
just depend their case on the innocence or guilt of Webb. It might as if seem that for 15
years, the other accused were in the cell sleeping, then suddenly one day, without
exhausting so much effort to defend their case, woke up and was said to be released
because Webb has very strong case.

Drama might it be, but it is conclusive that in criminal cases, the quantum of evidence
required is proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt 18, and as the court
concluded in this case, “what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts
about the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering
doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail
where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat lodged
immovable between teeth.”

In this case, the prosecution failed in proving the guilt of all the accused beyond
reasonable doubt which concluded to the fact that, until now, justice has not been served
to the Vizconde family, and at the same time, for 15 years of conviction and waiting,
justice was also not served to Webb..

18
Supra.