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SECOND DIVISION

CARMELITA V. DIZON, PETITIONER, v. JOSE LUIS K. MATTI, JR., RESPONDENT.


G.R. No. 215614, March 27, 2019
CAGUIOA, J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION:


Petition for Review on Certiorari Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision and
Resolution by the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the Decision and Order issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC).

FACTS:
This case stems from a Complaint for Specific Performance filed by respondent Matti, Jr. against
petitioner Dizon. Matti, Jr. alleged that sometime during February 2000, Acleto, a real estate agent,
together with Estaris, offered Matti, Jr. a townhouse for sale (subject property) that belonged to Dizon. In
Together they made a physical inspection of the said townhouse and was shown all the original
documents of said townhouse including the original Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
58674.

A Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) was executed by Dizon in favor of Matti, Jr. duly notarized and after
which Matti, Jr. paid Dizon in full. However Matti, discovered that documents in his possession were
falsified. In order to protect his rights and to avoid any fraudulent transfer of the said property to an
innocent third party, Matti, Jr. caused the annotation of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim on TCT No. T-
58674.

Despite oral and written demands from Matti, Dizon has not rectified her wrongdoings by delivering the
authentic OCT of TCT No. T-58674. Thus, Matti, Jr. asked that [petitioner Dizon] be ordered to: a)
Deliver the OCT or if Dizon refuses, that the RD be ordered to cancel TCT No. T-58674 and issue a new
TCT in Matti, Jr.'s favor; b) that physical possession of the property be surrendered to him;

Dizon alleged that Matti, Jr. has no cause of action because she did not encumber and/or transfer
ownership of her property to Matti, Jr.; she did not execute nor signed the DAS presented by Matti, Jr. nor
did she participate in the negotiation, preparation and execution of the same. Finally, Dizon stated that she
does not know Matti, Jr. nor a certain Acleto and Estaris.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. Dizon has sufficiently proven that she was not here in the Philippines
for the whole month of February 2000 by a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation; Dizon] has shown that she was working in London contrary to the mere allegation of Matti,
Jr. that she was here in the Philippines and executed the assailed DAS, dated February 24, 2000. Court is
Dizon could not have signed the said DAS which purportedly transferred or conveyed the subject
property Matti, Jr.

The CA granted respondent Matti, Jr.'s appeal. Since a notarized document enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and only clear, strong, and convincing evidence can rebut such presumption. The CA added
that allegations of forgery should not be presumed and that a claim of forgery cannot be accepted where
no examination of signatures was conducted by an expert witness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious and is therefore null and void? – (YES)

RULING:
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that despite the notarization of a deed of sale, the subject
sale was still deemed a fictitious conveyance which did not bind the parties, considering that "the
cumulative effect of the evidence on record x x x identified badges of simulation proving that the sale x x
x was not intended to have any legal effect between them." The Court further held that "though the
notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the
intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the
first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties
still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract."

There are indeed sufficient and convincing pieces of evidence establishing petitioner Dizon's claim that
she did not sell the subject property to respondent Matti, Jr. on February 24,2000.

Petitioner Dizon's testimony, by way of an Affidavit dated October 16, 2009, wherein she unequivocally
stated under oath that it was physically impossible for her to meet with respondent Matti, Jr. and execute
with him the Deed of Absolute Sale as she was in London working as a nurse during the purported
execution of the said instrument on February 24, 2000, and that she has never met respondent Matti, Jr. in
her life, was corroborated, not only by the testimony of her brother Wilfredo, but more importantly, by
the testimony of a public officer, i.e., Mr. Joeffrey G. Valix, an agent of the Bureau of Immigration.

A Certification dated March 21, 2011 with an attached Travel Record with Control No.
0322201105P1017G42 establishes that since her departure from the Philippines on October 20, 1999,
petitioner Dizon only went back to the Philippines on November 9, 2000, completely belying respondent
Matti, Jr.'s claim that he personally met up with petitioner Dizon in the Philippines in February 2000 and
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale together with her and other witnesses before a notary public.
According to Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules of Court, documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. This was further corroborated by the passport of petitioner Dizon, a public document, which bears
official stamps made by the Bureau of Immigration proving her absence from the Philippines during the
time alleged by respondent Matti, Jr. that she was in the Philippines.

The signature of petitioner Dizon inscribed in the Deed of Absolute Sale was necessarily a forgery on
account of physical impossibility, despite the lack of expert testimony scrutinizing the authenticity of the
signature in question.

In fact, as in Basilio, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court conducted its own analytical study of
the questioned document. After doing so, the Court is convinced that the purported signature of petitioner
Dizon in the Deed of Absolute Sale is highly dubious, to say the least. Comparing the purported signature
of petitioner Dizon contained in the Deed of Absolute Sale with her signatures inscribed in other
documents, such as her Demand Letters dated August 13, 2008 and the Special Power of Attorney dated
June 30, 2015, it is easy to detect the signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale is patently and demonstrably
dissimilar with petitioner Dizon's signature in the other documents, written in completely different
handwriting styles.

Thorough review of the records of the instant case, including the various evidentiary and documentary
evidence there is sufficient and convincing evidence establishing petitioner Dizon's claim that she did not
sell the subject property to respondent Matti, Jr. on February 24, 2000, and that the Deed of Absolute Sale
is a sham and fictitious document. An absolutely simulated and fictitious contract of sale is null and void.

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