Case Title: PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs.

JULIE CHANDUMAL, respondent.

G.R. No. 195619, September 5, 2012
PONENTE: REYES, J.
Topic: Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem
Doctrine: The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a defendant
in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or
through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its
authority. If a defendant has not been properly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over its person, and a judgment rendered
against it is null and void.
FACTS:
A Contract to sell of a property located at Talon Dos, Las Pinas City, was
entered between BF Homes Inc. and the Jullie Chandumal. On February
1993 BF Homes sold in favor of PDB all of its rights and participation in the
said contract. Chandumal paid the amortizations faithfully until 1994 when
she defaulted. A notice of delinquency, rescission and to vacate was sent to
her, giving her 30 days to vacate the property, despite the demand she fails
to pay. Thus, in 1999, PDB filed a judicial confirmation of rescission. As
alleged by PDB it tried to deliver its surrender value of P10,000.00, but
defendant refused.
Summons was issued but despite few attempts it’s unavailing for she is out
of house always, this prompt the PDB to file a motion ex parte to declare her
in default, which was granted by the court accordingly. Subsequently,
Chandumal file a motion to set aside the order with admission of attached
Answer. RTC denied the same together with the Motion for Reconsideration
and instead allow PDB to present ex parte evidence. Thus an appeal was
filed before the CA which rendered to annulled the RTC’s decision. Motion
for reconsideration was filed by PDB but to no avail. Hence, this Petition for
Review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in annulling RTC’s decision.
RULING:
It is fundamental rule in Civil case that jurisdiction over the defendant was
acquired through valid service of summons. If the defendant was not
summoned properly the court acquires no jurisdiction.
Where the action is in personam, may be made through personal service,
where summons may be served by handling the copy thereof to the
defendant, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Personal service of summons is always be the first option, if he cannot be
served with it within reasonable time that’s the time that substituted service
may be resorted to.
In this case however, sheriff resorted to substituted service due to his
failure to serve it personally. To be valid the Substituted service of
summons requisites are as follows:
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service;
2. Specific details in the return;
3. A person suitable age and discretion;
4. Competent person in charge;
The sheriffs return fails to alleged the present of the above requisites, the
return of summons failed to assert in detail the actual exertion of efforts to
locate her, it merely states that the whereabouts of the defendant is
unknown and does not verified said fact, it does not even have asked
Chandumal’s mother of as to her specific whereabout. Thus the CA decision
is affirmed, and declared that there is no valid rescission of contract made.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals, as well as its Resolution dated February 16, 2011,
denying the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 82861 are
AFFIRMED in so far as there was no valid service of summons. Further, the
Court DECLARES that there was no valid rescission of contract pursuant to
R.A. No. 6552. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 255 in Civil Case No. LP-99-0
137 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and is therefore, DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC.,

PETITIONER, VS.
FELIX PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC., AND HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012.
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.
Topic: Third (fourth, etc.) party complaints
Doctrine: Section 12. Third-party complaint. — A third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court,
file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party
defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
FACTS:
Felix Paras a fish buyer and seller, rode a bus on his way home to Manila
from Bicol, owned and operated by Inand Trailways and driven by Calvin
Coner. On their way, somewhere in Maharlika Hiway, Tiaong Quezon it
bumped with a Philtranco Bus, as a result of the impact Inland Bus Bumped
into a Cargo Truck which causes considerable damages to vehicles and
injuries to the Passengers and the death of Coner. Paras incurred severe
damages especially fractures on left and right leg. Unable to obtain
sufficient financial assistance from inland he filed breach of contract of
carriage against the same.
As defense, inland alleged that utmost diligence was observed by their
driver Coner, and it was the same observation of the investigators who
responded saying that its the Philtranco Bus which bumped into their bus.
Inland after leave of court filed a third party complaint against Philtranco.
After Trial the RTC Branch 71 of Antipolo, Rizal rendered the decision
against Philtranco ordering it jointly and severally with Apolinar Miralles
(Driver) to pay all the damages. All parties appealed to CA on different
grounds. The CA agreed to the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling. A
motion for reconsideration was filed but was also denied, thus this petition
anchored on grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in deciding the case against Philtranco.
RULING:
NO. The Court did not erred, the court does not disturb with the unanimous
findings of negligence on the part of Philtranco’s driver which is the direct
proximate cause of the damages suffered by Paras and Inland.
The parties implead of new parties under this rule is proper only when a
right to relief exist under the applicable substantive law. The rule is merely
a procedural mechanism, and cannot be utilized unless there is some
substantive basis under the applicable law.
Apart from the requirement that the third party complainant should assert a
derivative or secondary claim for relief from the third party defendant there
are other limitations on said party’s ability to implead. The crucial
characteristics of a claim under section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original
defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party the liability asserted
against him by the original plaintiff.
The requisites for a third party action are:
a. that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action;
b. That the claim of the third party defendant must belong to the original
defendant;
c. the claim of the original defendant must be based upon the plaintiffs
claim against the original defendant;
d. The defendant is attempting to transfer to the third – party defendant the
liability asserted to him by the original plaintiff.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 25, 2002. by ordering
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. and APOLINAR MIRALLES to
pay, jointly and severally, as follows:
1. To Felix Paras:
(a) P1,397.95, as reimbursement for the costs of medicines purchased
between February 1987 and July 1989;
(b) P50,000.00 as temperate damages;
(c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P36.000.00 for lost earnings;
(e) 10% of the total of items (a) to (d) hereof as attorney's fees; and
(f) Interest of 6% per annum from July 18, 1997 on the total o[ items (a) to
(d) hereof until finality of this decision, and 12% per annum thereafter until
full payment.
2. To Inland Trail ways, Inc.:
(a) P250,000.00 as temperate damages;
(b) 10% of item (a) hereof; and
(c) Interest of 6% per annum on item (a) hereof from July 18, 1997 until
finality of this decision, and 12% per annum thereafter until full payment.
3. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139539, February 5, 2002.
PONENTE:
Topic: Manner of making allegations
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made
to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed
by the defendant.
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed with the RTC of Quezon City Br. 93 a complaint against
Ernesto Santiago for damages and injunction, with Preliminary Injunction.
Cerrofer prayed that Ernesto and his agents be enjoined from claiming
possession and ownership over Lot No. 68 of Tala Estate Subd. In Quezon
City and from making use the same as a Jeepney terminal.
Due to the competing claims of the parties, the case become clear to be not
merely a case of collection but a case involving the review of the Titles at
this point the defendant filed a motion to dismiss due to the fact that the
court cannot discuss the matter without passing over the question of
ownership. The Court decided to dismiss the case due to lack of
jurisdiction.The plaintiff appealed, the CA dismissed the appeal as well as
the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this appeal via Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred.
RULING:
The Rules of Procedure requires that the complaint must state a concise
statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action.
A complaint states cause of action only when it has its three indispensable
elements, namely:
1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or its created;
2) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right;
3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the decision of
the Court of Appeals and the order of the trial court dismissing the case. We
remand the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, for
further proceedings.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

Case Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE, REPRESENTED BY THE

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REGIONAL OFFICE
NO. 3, PETITIONER, VS.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 192975, November 12, 2012.
SAMAHANG KABUHAYAN NG SAN LORENZO KKK, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE PRESIDENT ZENAIDA TURLA,
PETITIONER, VS.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 192994, November 12, 2012.
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: Remedies of defendant when the motion is denied
Doctrine: An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory
order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of
the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the
grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan for
cancellations of Titles and reversion against the RCAM who appears to be
the owner of 8 parcels of land covering 39, 790 Square Meters. Said titles
allegedly emanated from Decree 57486 issued by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office pursuant to the decision of LRC Case No. 5 of G.L.R.O ,
however it appears on record that it should be Lot 495, 496, 497, 498 and
638 and should not include Lot 43 to 50. RCAM sold the same to the other
named defendants and titles were issued in their favor, this parcels of land
are certified to be unclassified lands by the Bureau of Forestry.
KKK the other petitioner and the occupants of the said lot, filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene, which was subsequently granted by the RTC.
During the Pre-trial RCAM filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint. RTC denied the Motion filed by
RCAM for being premature. Motion for reconsideration was filed but
denied, Hence elevated to CA on Certiorari. The CA Ruled in favor of the
RCAM, ruling that reversion suits should be instituted before the CA, the
RTC being a co-equal of the land registration courts which decisions is
prayed to be annulled. Both Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was
denied thus the Petition under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in deciding the case against Petitioners.

RULING:
The Petitions are meritorious. The Petitioners did not wish to annul a
decision of the then CFI sitting as a Land Registration Court but wishes to
annul the titles issued in favor of the RCAM.
An order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates nor finally disposed of a case as it leaves something to be
done by the Court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The
denial of said Motion cannot be questioned in a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of Judgment. But if the denial of the Motion was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion the remedy of certiorari may be justified.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed April 22, 2010
Decision and July 19, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
84 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: SPOUSES RAMON VILLUGA and MERCEDITA VILLUGA,

PETTIONERS, VS.
KELLY HARDWARE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY INC.,
represented by ERNESTO V. YU, Executive Vice-President and
General Manager, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012.
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
Topic: Meaning of “genuine issue”
Doctrine: Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleading. – An amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in
superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the
pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in
the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money in RTC
Bacoor, Cavite for an amount equivalent to P259,809.50 as principal
obligation reimbursements of attorney's fees plus litigation and other
related expenses. Petitioners in their answer admitted the purchases but
denied the amount claim since according to them payments were already
been made with it they are willing to pay after verification of the amount in
order to buy peace. Respondent signified willingness to settle provided that
Sps. will pay interest and litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all
incidental expenses.
Motion for Partial Judgment was filed base on the premise but was opposed.
RTC issued an Order deferring resolution of respondent's Motion for Partial
Judgment on the ground that there is no clear and specific admission on the
part of petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent. With
Leave of Court complaint was amended alleging the owing came from
various construction materials and supplies, in which only P20,000.00 had
been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50. Later, second amended
complaint was filed.
A Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that
petitioners' Comments on respondent's Request for Admission is a mere
scrap of paper as it was signed by petitioners' counsel and not by
petitioners themselves and that it was filed beyond the period allowed by
the Rules of Court. Respondent goes on to assert that petitioners, in effect,
were deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters subject of the said
request. Respondent also contended that it is already entitled to the
issuance of a summary judgment in its favor as petitioners not only failed to
tender a genuine issue as to any material fact but also did not raise any
special defenses, which could possibly relate to any factual issue. However,
the motion was favored by RTC. Petitioners filed an appeal with the CA who
rendered its presently assailed Decision, affirming the orders of the RTC.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence,
the petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside said
Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Summary Judgment is proper in consideration of the
alleged lack of genuine issue.
RULING:
The summary judgment issued by the RTC is improper and without legal
bases, considering that genuine issues were raised in the pleadings filed by
petitioners.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long
drawn out litigations and useless delays. Such judgment is generally based
on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or
admissions of the parties.
Respondent did not allege as to how petitioners' partial payments of
P110,301.80 and P20,000.00 were applied to the latter's obligations. In fact,
there is no allegation or admission whatsoever in the said Complaint and
Amended Complaint that such partial payments were made. Petitioners, on
the other hand, were consistent in raising their affirmative defense of
partial payment in their Answer to the Complaint and Answer to Amended
Complaint. Having pleaded a valid defense, petitioners, at this point, were
deemed to have raised genuine issues of fact. But when the second
amended complaint was filed this defense did not raise anymore a genuine
issue of fact.
On the basis of the foregoing, petitioners' defense of partial payment in
their Answer to Second Amended Complaint, in effect, no longer raised
genuine issues of fact that require presentation of evidence in a full-blown
trial. Hence, the summary judgment of the RTC in favor of respondent is
proper.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ,
RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS,
CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD GARY RENACIDO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000.
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
Topic: Issuance of Writ
Doctrine: Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of
an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain
from performing a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary
remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status
quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. A
preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final
injunction.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a magazine allegedly Obscene, vulgar, indecent,
gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid of all moral
values published in Miriam Colleges school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine
(Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) on September-October 1994
issue (Vol. 41, No. 14).
In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled Foreplay, Jerome wrote: Alam
ko, nakakagulat ang aming pamagat. Jerome then proceeded to write about
previous reactions of readers to women-writers writing about matters erotic
and to gay literature. He justified the Magazines erotic theme on the ground
that many of the poems passed on to the editors were about sekswalidad at
ibat ibang karanasan nito. Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat
tungkol sa maselang usaping ito xxx at sa isang institusyon pang katulad ng
Miriam! Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not garapal and
sa mga tulang ito namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-
sensasyonal) ng pamagat na Libog at iba pang Tula. He finished Foreplay
with these words: Dahil para saan pa ang libog kung hindi ilalabas?
Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of
the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam
College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam
College Discipline Committee. Informing them of letters of complaint filed
against them for they allegedly violated regulations in the student
handbook. They were ask to submit their affidavits and to attend a hearing
at the DSA Conference Room. Students do not answer and instead ask to
transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS)
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte.
Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline
Committees report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students
consisting of Dismissal, Expulsion and Suspension.
The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam
College over them. The Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, issued an order
denying the plaintiffs prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. The
students thereafter filed a Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration and RTC grants the writ of preliminary injunction. Again
Motion for Reconsideration was filed, prompting the judge to dismiss the
case without prejudice of filing the same to another venue. Petition for
certiorari and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining order
questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995, but it
was decided to be referred to CA. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22
February 1995, as well as the student’s suspension and dismissal, void.
ISSUE:
When a Preliminary Injunction may be issued.
RULING:
It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary
restraining order, not a preliminary injunction. The records do not show
that the CA ever issued a preliminary injunction.
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to perform to refrain from performing a particular act or
acts. As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent
actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. A
preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination
of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the
status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction.
Under the former 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by 5, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a
limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the
20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
temporary order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no
action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction
within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would
automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no such
preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued
automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Miriam College is ordered to READMIT private
respondent Joel Tan whose suspension has long lapsed.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS

GARCIA, and LYDIA MARCIANO, PETITIONERS, VS.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 183367, March 14, 2012
PONENTE: SERENO, J.
Topic: Period of Effectivity of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
Doctrine: Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, a TRO may
be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be
inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction
could be heard.
FACTS:
In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent
Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government, through
its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, invited petitioner Australian
Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market and construct a
shopping center. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), APRI undertook
to construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-square-meter area. In return,
APRI acquired the exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces
for a period of 25 years.
In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent.
On 6 February 2003, respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with
Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 87. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-004.
The RTC issued summons to petitioners, requiring them to file their Answer
to the Complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved, as
petitioners were no longer holding office in the given address. As such,
Service by Publication was resorted to, the petitioners was declared in
default and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled to
declare null and void the MOA to pay the damages in favor of the
Municipality and the unfinished structure declared forfeited in favor of the
Municipality of Padre Garcia.
No timely appeal made, respondent filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment, which was granted by the RTC. A Writ of Execution was thus
issued.
Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
and Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was
denied. Petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not issuance of Writ of Temporary Restraining Order is proper.
RULING:
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests.
An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts
entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent
necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only
if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable
injury would arise unless it is issued immediately.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1)
there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the
right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions
dated 26 March 2008 and 16 June 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102540 are
AFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals is directed to proceed with dispatch to
dispose of the case before it.
SO ORDERED.
Case Title: SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, PETITIONER, VS.
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. and PEOPLES
BROADCASTING SERVICE, INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009.
PONENTE: TINGA, J.
Topic: Quo Warranto
Doctrine: Under Section 1 of Rule 66, an action for the usurpation of
a public office, position or franchise may be brought in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position
or franchise. Even while the action is maintained in the name of the
Republic, the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor is obliged to
commence such action upon complaint, and upon good reason to
believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be
established by proof.
FACTS:
Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and Peoples
Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965,
respectively. Both are involved in the operation of radio broadcasting
services in the Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative franchises
by virtue of two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582. R.A.
No. 7477, enacted on 5 May 1992, granted PBS a legislative franchise to
construct, install, maintain and operate radio and television stations within
the Philippines for a period of 25 years. R.A. No. 7582, enacted on 27 May
1992, extended CBSs previous legislative franchise to operate radio stations
for another 25 years. The CBS and PBS radio networks are two of the three
networks that comprise the well-known Bombo Radyo Philippines.
He thus prayed for the cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or
CPCs of PBS and CBS on account of the alleged violation of the conditions
set therein, as well as in its legislative franchises. The NTC ruled that it was
not competent to render a ruling on that issue, the same being more
properly the subject of an action for quo warranto to be commenced by the
Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review under Rule 43 was
resorted to in the Court of Appeals, in its decision it uphold the NTC’s
decision. The appellate court agreed with the earlier conclusion that the
complaints were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of
CBS and PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to thresh
out the issues raised in the complaints. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NTC has the power to cancel the CPCs it has issued to
legislative franchisees.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative this case is not a proper subject of quo
warranto. The Radio Control Act in 1931 requires broadcast stations to
obtain a legislative franchise and such requirement was not repealed by
E.O. 546 which established the NTC, the administrative agency which has
regulatory jurisdiction over broadcast stations. When the Congress grants a
legislative franchise, it is the legal obligation of the NTC to facilitate the
operation by the franchisee of its broadcast station and since public
administration of the airwaves is a highly technical function, the Congress
has delegated to the NTC the task of administration over the broadcast
spectrum. The licensing power of the NTC arises from the necessary
delegation by Congress of legislative power geared towards the orderly
exercise by franchisees of the rights granted them by Congress.
The life and authority of an administrative agency emanates solely from an
Act of Congress, and its faculties confined within the parameters set by the
legislative branch of government. Even as the NTC is vested with the power
to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the
power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise prevent broadcast stations with
duly issued franchises and CPCs from operating radio and television
stations. Although the Radio Control Act empowered the government
through the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications to
suspend or revoke issued licenses, the NTC did not retain such power when
it was established by E.O. 546 to replace the previous regulatory agencies.
Said E.O. 546 promulgated by then President F. Marcos in the exercise of
his legislative power withheld from it the authority to cancel licenses and
CPCs.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Case Title: NATIONAL POWER CORP., Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ, METROBANK,
Dasmariñas, Cavite Branch, REYNALDO FERRER, and S.K.
DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER CORP., Respondents.
G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007.
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.
Topic: Appointment of Commissioners; Commissioners’ Report;
Court Action upon Commissioners’ Report
Doctrine: Based on the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, it
is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the
two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required
to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation;
and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said
hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3)
the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes
during the said hearings.
FACTS:
NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created
under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, with the mandate of developing
hydroelectric power, producing transmission lines, and developing
hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. NAPOCOR decided to
acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the areas
of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the
proposed Dasmarias-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an
easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the
parcels of land sought to be expropriated, which were covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-313327, T-671864, and T-454278. The
affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square meters, respectively,
or a total of 84.425 square meters.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession, which the trial court granted. The trial court issued a Writ of
Possession over the lots owned by respondent’s spouses de la Cruz and
respondent Ferrer. Saulog intervene to the case and just compensation for
the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the
trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise
agreement. The trial court fixed the just compensation to be paid by
petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. Motion for Reconsideration
was filed but denied. Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA but same was
also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying the Petition.
RULING:
The Court finds the Petition meritorious especially in the way the case was
handled by the Commissioners. Based on these provisions, it is clear that in
addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) appointed
commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing or
hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the
following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend
them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the
said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their
respective causes during the said hearings.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the
property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation
cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is the
determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is
indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 28, 1999 and
March 23, 2000 Orders of the Imus, Cavite RTC and the November 18, 2002
Decision of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the said
trial court for the proper determination of just compensation in conformity
with this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.