DOCTRINES ONLY  8. Carbonilla
Board of Airlines
1. Hyun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R.
No. 220826, March 27, 2019
2. Metrobank. v. Justice Sandoval, et al., G.R.
No. 169677, February 18, 2013
3. Neri v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 202243,
August 7, 2013
4. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
149495, August 21, 2003
5. Spouses Coronel v. Solis- Quesada, G.R.
No. 237465, October 07, 2019
Topic: Demurrer to evidence
"A demurrer to evidence is defined as 'an objection
or exception by one of the parties in an action at
law, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law
(whether true or not) to make out his case or
sustain the issue.' The demurrer challenges the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a
verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt."
6. Navy Officer’s Vill. Ass’n. v. Republic, G.R.
No. 177168, August 3, 2015.
7. Metrobank v. International Exchange Bank,
G.R. No. 176008, August 10, 2011
The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger
to an action to become a party in order for him to
protect his interest and for the court to settle all
conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid
multiplicity of suits more than on due process
considerations. To warrant intervention under Rule
19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must
concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest on the
matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the
intervenor be capable of being properly decided in
a separate proceeding.
A person seeking to intervene in a suit must show
that he has legal interest which must be actual and
material, direct and immediate. He must show that
he will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of a judgment.  12. Solid Homes, Inc. v. Spouses Jurado, G.R.
v.
Representatives, G.R. No. 193247, Sept 14,
2011
TOPIC: INTERVENTION; APPEAL FROM
JUDGMENT
Intervention is not a matter of right but it
may be permitted by the courts when the applicant
shows facts which satisfy the requirements
authorizing intervention.20 In G.R. No. 193247, the
Court of Appeals denied Carbonilla, et al.’s motion
for intervention in its 26 February 2009 Resolution
on the ground that the case was for collection of
unpaid overtime services and thus should be
pursued in a separate proceeding against the
proper respondents. A reading of the Carbonilla, et
al.’s Omnibus Motion supports the ground invoked
by the Court of Appeals in denying the motion. 
It should be stressed that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion for intervention is
addressed to the sound discretion of the courts.
The permissive tenor of the Rules of Court shows
the intention to give the courts the full measure of
discretion in allowing or disallowing the
intervention. Once the courts have exercised this
discretion, it could not be reviewed by certiorari or
controlled by mandamus unless it could be shown
that the discretion was exercised in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. Carbonilla, et al. failed to show
that the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution in
an arbitrary or capricious manner.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
BAR’s petition stems from Section 1 in relation to
Section 3, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which states that appeals from "awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi judicial functions[,]" which
includes the Office of the President, may be taken
to the Court of Appeals. BAR’s petition for review to
the Court of Appeals from the 12 March 2007
Decision and 14 March 2008 Resolution of the
Office of the President falls within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals.
9. Ongco v. Dalisay, 691 Phil. 462 (2012)
10. Yu, et al. v. Miranda, et al., G.R. No.
225752, March 27, 2019
11. Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141273, May 17, 2005
No. 219673, September 02, 2019
 13. UP v. Abueva, et al., G.R. No. 171182,
August 23, 2012
Doctrine: Exception to the doctrine of immutability
of a final judgment
It is true that a decision that has
attained finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and cannot be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether the modification is made
by the court that rendered it or by this Court
as the highest court of the land. Public
policy dictates that once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable,
the prevailing party should not be deprived
of the fruits of victory by some subterfuge
devised by the losing party. Unjustified
delay in the enforcement of such judgment
sets at naught the role and purpose of the
courts to resolve justiciable controversies
with finality. Indeed, all litigations must at
some time end, even at the risk of
occasional errors.
But the doctrine of immutability of a
final judgment has not been absolute, and
has admitted several exceptions, among
them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that
cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision that
render its execution unjust and inequitable.
Moreover, in Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca,
we stated that despite the absence of the
preceding circumstances, the Court is not
precluded from brushing aside procedural
norms if only to serve the higher interests of
justice and equity. Also, in Gumaru v.
Quirino State College, the Court nullified the
proceedings and the writ of execution
issued by the RTC for the reason that
respondent state college had not been
represented in the litigation by the Office of
the Solicitor General.
14. Sioson v. Avanceña, G.R. No. 161387,
March 13, 2009
15. Prescilla, et al. v. Lasquite and Andrade,
G.R. No. 205805, September 25, 2019
It is elementary that a judgment of a court is
conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and their successors-in-interest after
the commencement of the action in court. A
decision rendered on a complaint in a civil
action or proceeding does not bind or
prejudice a person not impleaded therein,
for no person shall be adversely affected by
the outcome of a civil action or proceeding
in which he is not a party. The principle that
a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling
rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he has not been made a party
conforms to the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law.
When the trial court or appellate court
issues a judgment or final resolution in a
case involving several parties, the right of
one party to file a motion for reconsideration
or appeal is not hinged on the motion for
reconsideration or appeal of the other party.
16. Gadrinab v. Salamanca, et al., G.R. No.
194560, June 11, 2014
A judgment on compromise agreement is a
judgment on the merits. It has the effect of
res judicata, and is immediately final and
executory unless set aside because of
falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of
immutability of judgments bars courts from
modifying decisions that have already
attained finality, even if the purpose of the
modification is to correct errors of fact or
law.
17. Spouses Bernardo v. Union Bank, G.R. No.
208892, September 18, 2019
18. Magbanua v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511 (2005).
19. Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 214593, July 17,
2019
Topic: Judgment upon compromise
On one hand, the immutability and
immediate effect of judgments upon
compromise is well-settled. In Magbanua
v. Uy, it was held that: When a compromise
agreement is given judicial approval, it
becomes more than a contract binding upon
the parties. Having been sanctioned by the
court, it is entered as a determination of a
controversy and has the force and effect of
a judgment. It is immediately executory and
not appealable, except for vices of consent
or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms
and conditions justifies the issuance of a
writ of execution; in such an instance,
 execution becomes a ministerial duty of the
court.
However, like any other judgment, a
judgment upon compromise which is
contrary to law is a void judgment; and
"[a] void judgment or order has no legal
and binding effect. It does not divest
rights, and no rights can be obtained
under it; all proceedings founded upon a
void judgment are equally worthless."
20. Unirock Corporation v. Carpio, G.R. No.
213421, August 24, 2020
21. Briones-Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 144882, Feb. 4, 2005
Nunc pro tunc judgments have been
defined and characterized by this Court in
the following manner: The office of a
judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some
act of the court done at a former time which
was not then carried into the record, and the
power of a court to make such entries is
restricted to placing upon the record
evidence of judicial action which has been
actually taken. It may be used to make the
record speak the truth, but not to make it
speak what it did not speak but ought to
have spoken. If the court has not
rendered a judgment that it might or
should have rendered, or if it has
rendered an imperfect or improper
judgment, it has no power to remedy
these errors or omissions by ordering
the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper
judgment. Hence a court in entering a
judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to
construe what the judgment means, but
only to enter of record such judgment as
had been formerly rendered, but which
had not been entered of record as
rendered. In all cases the exercise of the
power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc
presupposes the actual rendition of a
judgment, and a mere right to a judgment
will not furnish the basis for such an entry.
(15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)
The object of a judgment nunc
pro tunc is not the rendering of a new
judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one
placing in proper form on the record, the
judgment that had been previously
rendered, to make it speak the truth, so
as to make it show what the judicial
action really was, not to correct judicial
errors, such as to render a judgment
which the court ought to have rendered,
in place of the one it did erroneously
render, nor to supply nonaction by the
court, however erroneous the judgment
may have been. (Wilmerding vs. Corbin
Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala.,
268.)
A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is
an entry made now of something which was
actually previously done, to have effect as
of the former date. Its office is not to
supply omitted action by the court, but
to supply an omission in the record of
action really had, but omitted through
inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs.
Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672.)
It is competent for the court to make
an entry nunc pro tunc after the term at
which the transaction occurred, even though
the rights of third persons may be affected.
But entries nunc pro tunc will not be ordered
except where this can be done without
injustice to either party, and as a nunc pro
tunc order is to supply on the record
something which has actually occurred,
it cannot supply omitted action by the
court 
22. Spouses Mahusay v. B.E. San Diego, Inc.,
G.R. No. 179675, June 8, 2011
23. Dizon v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-96-
1338, September 5, 1997
Merely reading the dispositive portion of the
decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the
judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts
and the law on which such judgment is based.
A "sin perjuicio" judgment is a judgment without a
statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to
be later supplemented by the final judgment.
The Court has expressed approval of the practice
of some judges of withholding the dispositive
portion from their opinions until the very last
moment of promulgation of their judgment in order
to prevent leakage, but that refers to the
preparation of their decision, not its promulgation.
What must be promulgated must be the complete
decision. There would be no more reason to keep
the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of
promulgation of judgment.
 24. Sister Fernando v. Judge Sta. Maria, G.R.
No. 160730, December 10, 2004
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure provides –
SEC. 4. Several judgments.—In an action
against several defendants, the court may,
when a several judgment is proper, render
judgment against one or more of them,
leaving the action to proceed against the
others.
A several judgment is proper
when the liability of each party is clearly
separable and distinct from that of his
co-parties, such that the claims against
each of them could have been the
subject of separate suits, and judgment
for or against one of them will not
necessarily affect the other.
25. Associated Anglo-American Tobacco v. CA,
G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010
26. Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239,
January 25, 2012
27. Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595,
January 9, 2013
28. Napocor v. Delta P., Inc., G.R. No. 221709,
October 16, 2019
29. Webb v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 194469,
September 18, 2019
Civil contempt is one’s failure to fulfill a
court order in a civil action that would
benefit the opposing party. It is, therefore,
an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order was made. Good
faith is not a defense in civil contempt
proceedings.
In res judicata, primacy is given to the first case.  Thus, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
The underlying reason for this rule is the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments, which is essential
for the effective and efficient administration of
justice.91  In Siy v. National Labor Relations
Commission:92
[W]ell-settled is the principle that a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration
of justice that, once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the
verdict.  Courts must guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result and must
frown  upon  any  attempt  to  prolong  the
controversies.93
The doctrine rests upon the principle that “parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once[.]”94 It “exists as an obvious rule of
reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical
necessity, and public [tranquility].”95
Precluding re-litigation of the same dispute is made
in recognition that judicial resources are finite and
the number of cases that can be heard by the court
is limited.  Thus, the principle of res judicata seeks
to conserve scarce judicial resources and to
promote efficiency. Moreover, it precludes the risk
of inconsistent results and prevents the
embarrassing problem of two (2) conflicting judicial
decisions when there is re-litigation. 96  Hence, res
judicata “encourages reliance on judicial decision,
bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to
resolve other disputes.”97
Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (1) bar by
prior judgment; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment.
Res judicata by bar by prior judgment, enunciated
in Rule 39, Section 47(b)98  of the Rules of Court, is
in effect when, “between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.” 99
absolute bar to the second action.
The  second concept, pertaining to  conclusiveness
of  judgment, is found in Rule 39, Section 47(c)100 of
the Rules of Court.  There is conclusiveness of
judgment when “there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of
action[.]”  Moreover, “the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein.”101  Thus, when a
court of competent jurisdiction judicially tried and
settled a right or fact, or an opportunity for a trial
has been given, the court’s judgment should be
conclusive upon the parties.102  In Nabus v. Court of
Appeals:103 of judgment.106

To properly invoke res judicata, the following

The doctrine [of conclusiveness of judgment] states elements must concur:
that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit, and was there judicially passed on and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered
as concerns the parties to that action and persons by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
any future action between such parties or their case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
privies, in the same court or any other court of there must be as between the first and second
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
different cause of action, while the judgment causes of action.107
remains unreversed or unvacated by proper
authority. The only identities thus required for the
operation of the judgment as an estoppel, in In this case, this Court’s ruling
contrast to the judgment as a bar, are identity of in Lejano cannot preclude petitioner’s filing
parties and identity of issues. of the contempt action.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one The principle of res judicata, a civil law
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in principle, is not applicable in criminal cases,
another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issues be identical.  If
a particular point or question is in issue in the 30. FGU Insurance Corp. v. RTC of Makati City,
second action, and the judgment will depend on the Br. 66, 659 Phil. 117 (2011)
determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point
or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case
is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct
issue arising in the second.  In order that this rule
may be applied, it must clearly and positively
appear, either from the record itself or by the aid of
competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point
or question in issue in the second suit was involved
and decided in the first.  And in determining
whether a given question was an issue in the prior
action, it is proper to look behind the judgment to
ascertain whether the evidence necessary to
sustain a judgment in the second action would have
authorized a judgment for the same party in the first
action.104  (Citations omitted)

In essence, res judicata by bar by prior judgment

prohibits the filing of a second case when it has the
same parties, subject, and cause of action, or when
the litigant prays for the same relief as in the first
case.  Meanwhile, res judicata by conclusiveness of
judgment precludes the re-litigation of a fact or
issue that has already been judicially settled in the
first case between the same parties.105  If, between
the first and second case, the causes of action are
different and only the parties and issues are the
same, res judicata is still present by conclusiveness