LETICIA A. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs.

FELOMINO ELOMINA, represented by his

attorney-in-fact, FEDERICO ELOMINA, respondent.

G.R. No. 202661. March 17, 2021 THIRD DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of
the Rules. Failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.

Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an
appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances
warranting such deviation.

FACTS

On May 11, 1994, Ramirez was issued an Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a Free
Patent granted over Lot No. 922, Cad-455-D located at Butong, Cabuyao, Laguna, with an
area of 1,087 square meters.

On July 11, 2000, Felomino filed a letter-protest with the Bureau of Lands of Los Bañ os,
Laguna against the approval of the application and issuance of the free patent to Ramirez.
Felomino claimed that the patent application was allegedly transferred to Ramirez by one
Delfin Torinos (Torinos). Both Ramirez and Torinos were never in possession of the subject
land. Felomino asserted that he was in possession of the subject land in the concept
of an owner since birth.

Consequently, the CENRO Regional Executive Director of the DENR issued an order
directing the CENRO to conduct an investigation. On December 29, 2003, the Regional
Executive Director issued an order cancelling and revoking the free patent of Ramirez. The
DENR Legal Division was also directed to initiate proceedings leading to the cancellation of
Ramirez's OCT and the reversion of the subject land to the public domain.

The DENR pointed out that, upon ocular inspection, it was found that the members of the
Elomina family were in possession of the property, and that there was nothing to show that
the Ramirezes or their predecessor-in-interest, Torinos, had ever occupied the subject
property. Thus, Ramirez's application for free patent was found as having been tainted with
misrepresentations constituting fraud and rendered void the application and free patent
itself.
On December 12, 2005, Felomino, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Federico Elomina
(Federico), sued for reconveyance of title and damages before the RTC Biñ an, Laguna,
against Ramirez and the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City, Laguna. In an amended
complaint, Felomino alleged that: (i) he is the actual possessor and occupant of the subject
land; (ii) the property was first occupied and possessed by his father, Felix Elomina, since
time immemorial; (iii) they were surprised when they were informed that on May 11,
1994, Ramirez was able to secure an OCT over the land pursuant to a free patent which the
DENR subsequently cancelled and revoked; (iv) he was unlawfully deprived of a legitimate
right and peaceful possession over the land when Ramirez was issued an OCT; and (v) he is
entitled under the law to recover the subject property which was erroneously registered in
the name of Ramirez.

Felomino prayed that he be declared the lawful owner of the subject property. He also
asked for compensation of damages and that Ramirez be ordered to reconvey the subject
land to him and for the Register of Deeds to cancel Ramirez's OCT and issue a new Transfer
Certificate of Title under his name.

In her Answer, Ramirez interposed the following affirmative defenses — that the action is
barred by prescription, the complaint states no cause of action and Felomino is not the real
party-in-interest.

RTC: Dismissed Felomino's complaint for lack of merit. The trial court pointed out that
Felomino had no cause of action since he failed to sufficiently prove his title to support his
claim of ownership over the disputed property. At the time that OCT was issued to Ramirez
in 1994, Felomino had not filed any application for patent on the land in question.

Assuming arguendo that Ramirez committed misrepresentation in her patent application,

Felomino was not the real party-in-interest to file the case. The trial court pointed out that
the DENR recommended the State to file reversion proceedings. Thus, since the subject
property originated from a grant by the State, the cancellation of the issued patent was
between the grantor and the grantee.

Lastly, the RTC ruled that the cause of action had already prescribed. Ramirez's OCT was
issued in May 1994 while Felomino filed the action more than 10 years later or in
December 2005. The trial court held that an action for reconveyance resulting from fraud
prescribes in four years from discovery, which was deemed to have taken place when the
property was registered in 1994.

CA: The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. The land occupied by the
plaintiff-appellant [Felomino] and his family is within the alienable portion of the public
domain, or the DENR would not have agreed to issue a patent to the defendant- appellee
[Ramirez]. It is also uncontested that they have been in possession for more than 70 years,
practically since time immemorial, since the possession dates back to the time of his father.
And it is as plain as day that the plaintiff-appellant is in present possession as confirmed by
the DENR officials who made a personal inspection of the land. The defendant- appellee
had never possessed the land, and she was able to obtain a patent only through the
misrepresentation that she was the occupant. She was able to obtain registration through
fraud on the rights of the rightful occupants who are the plaintiff-appellant and his family.
The appellate court further pointed out that the four-year prescriptive period as to an
action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud does not apply where the
party applying for reconveyance is in possession of the property.

Ramirez received a copy of the foregoing Decision on October 17, 2011. After 17 days from
receipt thereof, or on November 3, 2011, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a
December 21, 2011 Resolution, the appellate court denied said Motion for late filing and
therefore the appellate court's jurisdiction to act on it had been lost. Thus, in its May 25,
2012 Resolution, the appellate court ordered the issuance of an Entry of Judgment. The
court noted that on January 19, 2012, its October 12, 2011 Decision had become final and
executory.

Undaunted, Ramirez filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

Argument of Ramirez

Ramirez admits having committed the procedural infraction but asks for the relaxation of
the rules. She explains that the inadvertent late filing of the November 3, 2011 Motion for
Reconsideration with the appellate court was due to forgetfulness in view of her old age
and frail condition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying Ramirez's Motion for Reconsideration for having been
filed belatedly and thereafter issuing an order for the issuance of an entry of judgment to
the alleged undue prejudice of petitioner.

RULING

NO. Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides for the period to file a Motion for
Reconsideration:

Section 1. Period of filing. — A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the
adverse party.

Rule 36, Section 2 of the same Rules also provides that a judgment or final order shall
become final unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed:

Section 2. Entry of Judgments and Final Orders. — If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or
final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be
the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order
has become final and executory.

In the instant case, the following are the relevant dates: (i) On October 12, 2011 the
appellate court issued its Decision; (ii) Ramirez received a copy of the appellate court's
Decision on October 17, 2011; (iii) After 17 days from receipt thereof, or on November 3,
2011, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (iv) On December 21, 2011, the appellate
court issued its Resolution denying the Motion since it was belatedly filed; and (v) On May
25, 2012, the appellate court issued a Resolution directing the issuance of an entry of
judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 92374.

The 15th day of the allowable period for Ramirez to file her Motion for Reconsideration fell
on a holiday, November 1, 2011. Thus, Ramirez had until November 2, 2011 to file the
same, reckoned from the date of her receipt of the appellate court's Decision. However, she
filed the Motion the following day, or November 3, 2011.

Time and again, the Court has declared that "the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so . . . leads to
the loss of the right to appeal," such as the instant case.

This Court finds no compelling reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Settled is the
rule that "[a]nyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for
filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious
instances warranting such deviation." However, this Court finds that Ramirez failed to
discharge the same, thus warranting the appellate court's denial of her Motion for
Reconsideration. The instant case is no exception to the foregoing rule. Thus, due to
Ramirez's disregard of the Rules, the appellate court was justified in denying her motion.

This Court further notes that the instant Petition challenges the appellate court's May 25,
2012 Resolution which ordered the issuance of an Entry of Judgment. However, said
Resolution was a necessary consequence of the appellate court's December 21, 2011
Resolution which denied the November 3, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration due to late
filing.

Thus, the appropriate recourse would have been for Ramirez to timely file an appeal of the
December 21, 2011 Resolution, which she received on January 5, 2012. She had until
January 20, 2012 to file an appeal, reckoned from the date of her receipt. However, the
instant Petition was only filed on August 10, 2012, and thus likewise filed beyond the
reglementary period to file an appeal.
In view of the foregoing, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court. A special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is designed to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. Thus, We have repeatedly held
that when "the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any
mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court
may be corrected only by appeal."

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the CA had jurisdiction over the case. What
Ramirez actually seeks is the reversal of the appellate courts' ruling declaring Felomino as
the lawful owner of the subject land. Therefore, assuming there was any error in the
appellate court's interpretation of the law and appreciation of evidence, it may only be
corrected through an appeal and not through certiorari, since it is considered as an error
of judgment and not of jurisdiction.

Moreover, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court can only
strike down an act that was done with grave abuse of discretion. Settled is the rule that
"[f]or certiorari to prosper, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility."

This Court emphasized that "[n]ot every error in a proceeding, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, is an act in excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion. The
prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie except to correct, not every misstep, but a grave
abuse of discretion."

In view of the belated filing of Ramirez's Motion, the appellate court's Decision had become
final and executory. Basic is the rule that once a judgment had attained finality, it can no
longer be disturbed, altered or modified, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to
rest.
ARTURO O. RADAZA, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 201380. August 4, 2021, SECOND DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE 1

Lack of authority of an officer to file an Information, while a ground for quashal, is not a
jurisdictional defect. A handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority from the head
prosecutor in the filing of an Information does not affect a trial court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the accused. Such handling prosecutor
who filed an unauthorized Information but without bad faith or criminal intent is considered
as a de facto officer coated with a color of authority to exercise acts that remain valid and
official.

If the unauthorized filing was done with malice, the erring officer may be held criminally or
administratively liable for usurpation of official functions at most. Intentional or not, this
deficiency remains formal, non-jurisdictional, and curable at any stage of the criminal
proceedings.

DOCTRINE 2

An accused who travels abroad with the provisional conformity of the Sandiganbayan is
considered to have positively invoked and already validated the same judicial power that
permitted his travel outside the Philippines during the pendency of the criminal proceedings.
By the principle of estoppel, the accused's own actuations countered and nullified any dispute
on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the person of such accused.

FACTS

In 2006, the Province of Cebu was designated as the venue for the 12th ASEAN Summit that
was to be held on January 9-15, 2007.

Beautification projects then commenced in preparation for the event. Among such projects
were the acquisition and installation of street lighting facilities and decorative lampposts in
the focal thoroughfares of Cebu, Mandaue, and Lapu-Lapu cities. The DPWH was the main
government agency tapped to facilitate the street lighting project.

On January 9, 2007, BAYAN, et. al., wrote the Ombudsman-Visayas. Their letter alleged
anomalies in pricing and called for the investigation of the transactions entered into by the
DPWH in connection to the street lighting project.

On March 23, 2007, the Ombudsman-Visayas acted upon the January 9, 2007 letter and
released a Final Evaluation Report on the matters raised by the above organizations. In the
Report, the Ombudsman-Visayas found prima facie evidence of overpricing resulting from
the purported collusion between the winning bidders, the private contractors, and the City
Governments of Mandaue and Lapu-Lapu.

Prompted by its discoveries, the Ombudsman-Visayas recommended the institution of

criminal charges and administrative cases against the persons and government officials
allegedly involved in the street lighting project irregularities. Among the respondents was
herein petitioner Arturo O. Radaza, then the City Mayor of Lapu-Lapu City.

He was initially recommended to be indicted for violation of Paragraph (e), Section 3 of

Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as well as for
administrative liability for Dishonesty/Grave Misconduct. Upon the April 2, 2007 Order of
the Ombudsman-Visayas, Radaza filed his Counter-Affidavit on the said recommendation
for criminal and administrative charges against him.

In its January 24, 2008 Resolution, the Ombudsman-Visayas amended the criminal charges
against Radaza and his other co-respondents (Radaza, et al.) from violation of Section 3 (e)
to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. The full criminal charges were enfleshed in an Information and
approved by then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez.

Radaza filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the January 24, 2008 Ombudsman- Visayas
Resolution before the Office of the Ombudsman. He raised the main issue of whether his
mere signature on the Program of Works and Detailed Estimates (POWE) sufficiently
established probable cause against him for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.

Pending resolution of the MR, Radaza filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to
Defer/Recall/Hold Warrant of Arrest. Radaza likewise put up his bail bond.

Still pending resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to
Defer/Recall/Hold Warrant of Arrest, the Sandiganbayan scheduled Radaza's arraignment
on June 6, 2008. Anticipating an imminent waiver of his objections to the validity of the
Information against him, Radaza filed on June 3, 2008 an Omnibus Motion for Judicial
Redetermination of Probable Cause, and for Quashal of Information before the
Sandiganbayan.

In his Omnibus Motion for Redetermination of Probable Cause, Radaza assailed anew the
validity of the January 24, 2008 Information. While admitting the initial finding of probable
cause by the Sandiganbayan when it issued the warrants of arrest pertinent to the case,
Radaza sought a judicial redetermination due to an allegedly incomplete finding of
probable cause effected by the pendency of his Motion for Reconsideration of the January
24, 2008 Resolution before the Ombudsman-Central.

The Sandiganbayan denied Radaza's Omnibus Motion for Redetermination of Probable

Cause. It declared in its August 14, 2008 Resolution that to judicially pass upon the issue of
probable cause would be redundant and superfluous as it had already issued the warrant
for Radaza's arrest.
On September 23, 2008, Radaza was conditionally arraigned as one of the pre- requisites to
his Urgent Motion to Travel Abroad.

Upon motion by the Ombudsman-Visayas, however, the January 24, 2008 Information was
ordered withdrawn by the Sandiganbayan. In the same vein, the Sandiganbayan
reconsidered its August 14, 2008 Resolution. In its November 3, 2008 Order, the
Sandiganbayan granted Radaza's Motion for Reconsideration of its August 14, 2008
Resolution and ordered the prosecution to reinvestigate the case.

The Ombudsman-Visayas thus continued with the investigation of the case and issued a
Supplemental Resolution thereon dated May 4, 2009. In the Supplemental Resolution, the
Ombudsman-Visayas mainly reiterated its earlier findings contained in its January 24, 2008
Resolution, but reverted to its original criminal accusations of violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 against Radaza, et al.

Consequently, also on May 4, 2009, the prosecution filed its Manifestation and Motion to
Admit Attached Amended Information charging Radaza, et al., accordingly under Section 3
(e) of RA 3019.

On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting the Amended
Information.

Radaza filed an Omnibus Motion for Clarification and Reiteration of Reinvestigation. He

claimed that, while not disputing the fact that a reinvestigation was conducted, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor should have been the one conducting the reinvestigation, but the
task was delegated to the Ombudsman-Visayas. Thus, Radaza opined that he was deprived
of his right to participate in the reinvestigation. He believed that he was not accorded due
process and that the findings in the Supplemental Resolution and the accusations in the
Amended Information shall not bind him. He also reiterated his request for reinvestigation.

On October 22, 2010, the Sandiganbayan granted Radaza's Omnibus Motion for
Clarification and Reiteration of Reinvestigation.

Despite the grant, Radaza filed a Manifestation with Motion to Stop the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas from Conducting the Preliminary Investigation.He questioned the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, who, instead of conducting the reinvestigation itself,
turned over the duty to the Ombudsman-Visayas. He ascribed bias upon the Ombudsman-
Visayas as it issued consistently-adverse findings against him, and that its conduct of
reinvestigation shall simply be moro-moro.

Nonetheless, the Ombudsman-Visayas proceeded to issue its Joint Resolution dated April
14, 2011 directing the filing of an information against Radaza, among other respondents
and other additional persons, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The Joint Resolution
was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro.
In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan denied Radaza's Manifestation with Motion to Stop
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas from Conducting the Preliminary
Investigation.

For its part, the Ombudsman-Visayas filed Motion for Summary Amendment. The
Ombudsman-Visayas moved to summarily re-amend the Amended Information to modify
the accused persons therein and to set their arraignment.
Radaza, however, filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information. He pointed out that, as the
prosecution itself had declared, the final approving authority of the Joint Resolution was
not Acting Ombudsman Casimiro, but the then newly-appointed Ombudsman Hon.
Conchita Carpio-Morales.

He moved to quash the Amended Information, which allegedly was the result of the
reinvestigation concluded by the Ombudsman-Visayas in its May 4, 2009 Supplemental
Resolution of the original charge for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. Radaza theorizes
that the Amended Information cannot be issued ahead of the Joint Resolution, which
contained the preliminary investigation conducted on the charge of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 against him.

The Assailed Sandiganbayan Rulings: The Sandiganbayan resolved Radaza's Motion to

Quash Amended Information in the negative. It held that the absence or lack of preliminary
investigation is not a ground to quash the Amended Information charging Radaza with
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, nor does it render the Amended Information defective
as to affect jurisdiction over the same which the Sandiganbayan has already assumed.

ISSUES

1. Whether denials of a motion to quash are proper subjects of a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information.
3. Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the offenses charged and
over the person of Radaza as an accused.

RULING
1. NO. Denials of a motion to quash are improper subjects of a petition

for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

In the present Petition forCertiorari, Radaza assails the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
denying his Opposition and Motion to Quash Amended Information. On technical grounds
alone, the Court finds no reason to sustain Radaza.

Foremost in our rules of criminal procedure is that motions to quash are interlocutory
orders that are generally unreviewable by appeal or by certiorari. If the motion to quash is
denied, it means that the criminal Information remains pending with the court, which then
must proceed with the trial to determine whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the
crime charged against him. Only when the court promulgates a final judgment of conviction
can the accused question the deficiencies of the Information by raising them as errors by
the trial court and as an additional ground for his exoneration in his appeal.

More importantly,certiorariis a remedy of last resort. The special civil action of certiorari
will not lie unless its petitioner has no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The fact that another remedy — to proceed to trial — is ready,
available, and at the full disposal of the accused herein post-denial of his motion to quash
already bars his remedial refuge in certiorari.

As with any general rule, Radaza's erroneous understanding of criminal procedure may be
overlooked and his Petition can be treated as an exception if his circumstances should fall
under any of the following: (1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (3)
in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; (4) to promote public welfare
and public policy; and (5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it
essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. Under these instances,
appeal is considered an inadequate remedy for a denied motion to quash and certiorari
may be allowed instead. Radaza's case, however, certainly does not fit in any of the
aforecited jurisprudential exceptions, thus deserving the least application of liberality.
Even if the Petition for Certiorari would be so allowed, it appears to have transgressed
upon another vital rule of procedure.

2. NO.

Radaza ascribes grave abuse of discretion against the Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed
Resolutions and seeks their reversal. His grounds therefor, however, are thoroughly
misplaced.

The Court shall not tire in calling out the usual propensity of some litigants in confounding
errors of judgment for errors of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is an error committed
by a court within its jurisdiction that is reviewable by appeal. Mere allegations of wrongful
conclusions based on the facts and the law or supposed misappreciation of evidence do not,
by themselves, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion against the trial court.

On the other hand, errors of jurisdiction are those done outside and in excess of a trial
court's jurisdiction and committed in grave abuse of discretion that are properly reversible
by certiorari. The abuse of discretion should clearly be grave.

Radaza may have introduced his arguments with a generic accusation of grave abuse of
discretion. However, a plain reading of the issues raised and discussions he propounded in
his present Petition reveals that his objections pertained to the Sandiganbayan
appreciation of the evidence and application of the law in disposing his Opposition
and Motion to Quash Amended Information. An attack against the correctness of a
court's judgment, without any real demonstration of its utter randomness and
whimsicality, if any, is not the grave abuse of discretion contemplated by certiorari
proceedings. Radaza even seeks a review of the facts and the case records in his
attempt to justify the quashal of the Amended Information against him. Such is a
prayer that is easily beyond the bounds of certiorari that is limited to an evaluation of
whether a tribunal's exercise of judicial discretion sufficiently amounted to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Lack of authority of an officer to file an Information, while a ground for quashal, is

not a jurisdictional defect.

Radaza's Petition for Certiorari first assails the Amended Information for lack of the written
authority or approval of the incumbent Ombudsman at the time the Amended Information
was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Radaza claims that while the Amended Information
was approved to be filed by then Ombudsman Gutierrez in the Supplemental Resolution,
there was no such approval on the Joint Resolution by former Supreme Court Associate
Justice Carpio-Morales, who was the incumbent Ombudsman at the time the Joint
Resolution was issued. Radaza posits that this fact prevented the Sandiganbayan from
acquiring jurisdiction over the offense charged under the Amended Information and over
his person as the accused thereunder. Hence, his motion to quash should have been
granted. The Court finds no reason in law or in fact to agree with Radaza.

Rule 117 of the Rules of Court spells out the grounds to quash a criminal complaint or
information, Section 3 (d) of which is the crux of this case:

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

This is read in conjunction with the principle laid down in the third paragraph of Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. —

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating

prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Specifically, Section 4 (g), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
echoes such:

g) Noinformation may be filed andnocomplaint may be dismissed without the

written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Earlier jurisprudence had viewed the lack of authority by the officer filing the
Information under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court as a
non- waivable ground additional to paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of the same provision.
It was the prevailing principle that an Information filed by an officer who had no authority
to do so shall be considered jurisdictionally infirm for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused and over the subject matter or the offense. The ratio underlying this principle
was that an Information filed without such proper authorization was a defective
Information, and a defective Information can never be the basis of a valid conviction.

However, this legal maxim set by jurisprudence has already been rendered old and
obsolete with the advent ofGomez v. People. It was therein held that a handling
prosecutor's lack of prior written authority from the head prosecutor in the filing of
an Information does not affect a trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the person of the accused. Such handling prosecutor who filed an
unauthorized Information but without bad faith or criminal intent is considered as a de
facto officer coated with a color of authority to exercise acts that remain valid and
official.

If the unauthorized filing was done with malice, the erring officer may be held criminally
or administratively liable for usurpation of official functions at most.Intentional or
not, this deficiency remains formal, non-jurisdictional, and curable at any stage of
the criminal proceedings. As it always is, jurisdiction springs from substantive law,
whereas a government officer's authority to sue is a matter of mere form and
procedure. Purely technical infirmities are never determinative of a court's jurisdiction. In
no case shall it prevent the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the offense or the person
of the accused.

The same goes with a criminal prosecution that nonetheless proceeds in the absence of a
preliminary investigation — the accused's right thereto is not a constitutionally-
guaranteed right but one of mere statutory privilege. Even if there was no preliminary
investigation, such fact neither affects the court's jurisdiction over the case nor does it
impair the validity or completeness of an Information. As the lack of a preliminary
investigation is not even one of the listed grounds for quashal of an Information, it is more
so that the lack or prior written authority or approval on the part of the handling
prosecutor is inconsequential in terms of jurisdiction and efficacy of the Information
filed against the accused.

3. YES. The Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the offenses charged and over
the person of Radaza as an accused.

First, the factual issues raised by Radaza require analysis of evidence that is already
beyond the limited coverage of a preliminary investigation inquiry.

In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is

evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. They merely
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.
The gist of Radaza's continuing objections to the Informations and the preliminary
investigations was that his mere signature on the POWE should not make him criminally
liable as a conspirator in the alleged violation of RA 3019. Such arguments already
constitute as his full defenses against the criminal accusations against him that
cannot be entirely and fairly weighed in a preliminary investigation proceeding. It
cannot be expected that upon the filing of an Information in court, the prosecutor would
have already considered all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused.
This is a matter of evidence that is within the province of a full-blown trial and
indeterminable in a preliminary investigation.

Next, the changes in the words and phrasings of the Sandiganbayan issuances and of the
reinvestigation findings pertained only to the participation of the other accused. The
allegations against Radaza and the acts imputed upon him remained unmodified for him to
decry that he had been deprived of due process or of his right to preliminary investigation.

Moreover, the Court finds Radaza to have already submitted his person as an accused
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Multiple pleadings, motions, and remedies
had been signed, filed, and prayed for under his name throughout the proceedings of
this case. Radaza invoked the processes of the Sandiganbayan in moving for a judicial re-
determination of probable cause. He had even applied for bail before the anti-graft
court and was granted provisional liberty thereon. Settled is the rule that an accused is
deemed to have yielded himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking before it the
grant of affirmative reliefs.

Likewise, the legal repercussions of the conditional arraignment bargained for by Radaza
cannot be discounted.

Unlike regular trial courts, the Sandiganbayan sanctions conditional arraignment of

the accused. Section 2, Rule VIII of the2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
so states:

Sec. 2. Conditional Arraignment. — Where an accused seeks to travel outside the

Philippines prior to arraignment, the Sandiganbayan, in its discretion, may arraign the
accused under the following conditions:

(c) That the accused will not lose the right under the rules to question in a motion to
quash the amended or new information filed subsequent to the conditional
arraignment; and

A person criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan may be permitted to travel outside
the Philippines, subject to certain conditions. An accused conditionally arraigned under
the first Information will not lose the right to question in a motion to quash the
amended or new Information filed after the conditional arraignment.
A clarification of the grounds to quash an information that is amended after the conditional
arraignment under Section 2, Rule VIII of the2018 Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan is now imperative.

Paragraph (c) thereof indeed secures the right to question in a motion to quash the
amended or new information filed subsequent to the conditional arraignment, which may
rest upon the grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
However, the accused shall now be proscribed from assailing the amended or new
information against him for lack of jurisdiction over his person, as originally available
to him under Paragraph (c), Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. An accused who
travels abroad with the provisional conformity of the Sandiganbayan is considered to have
positively invoked and already validated the same judicial power that permitted his travel
outside the Philippines during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. By the principle of
estoppel, the accused's own actuations countered and nullified any dispute on the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the person of such accused.

Radaza prayed that he be allowed to travel to USA to visit his brother, then terminally ill
and confined in a hospital in California. On September 23, 2008, the Sandiganbayan granted
his Urgent Motion for Permit to Travel and he was arraigned under the original
Information charging him with violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. As such, Radaza is
deemed to have acquiesced to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over his person in
the case before the anti-graft court. He should not be permitted to assail the very
authority that indulged in his personal privileges that ordinarily are unavailable to an
accused such as himself.

At this point, Radaza is now deemed a proper subject under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as an accused. He had benefitted far too much from the positive reliefs that
he had sought from and granted by the Sandiganbayan. Whether in civil or criminal
actions, prayers for affirmative reliefs constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party, as by doing so the latter is then
deemed to have voluntarily appeared and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court.

More importantly, the accusations against Radaza, whether in the original Information or in
the Amended Information, both yield a prima facie case of violation of RA 3019, effectively
placing the subject offenses under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and rendering
Radaza indictable under Section 3 (e) or 3 (g).

Jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. Correlatively, the law vests upon the Sandiganbayan the power
to hear and decide violations of RA 3019, among other offenses, committed by a city mayor,
among other public officials specifically enumerated therein.

By the wordings of the assailed Informations, the Court finds all elements for both offenses
properly alleged by the prosecution against Radaza.
Radaza, being then the City Mayor of Lapu-Lapu City, had likewise never disputed the fact
that he affixed his signature on the POWE relative to the street lighting project. He denied,
though, that his signature had implicated him for any criminal offense, or that he colluded
with the other participants in the irregularities discovered. The prosecution, of course,
states otherwise. The issues having been joined, the imperative now is for the prosecution
to present proof beyond reasonable doubt against Radaza, and the latter as the accused is
given the opportunity, although not an obligation, to debunk the evidence against him. Such
elaborate presentation of evidence has no place in a preliminary investigation.

Again, jurisprudence has declared that matters that are evidentiary in nature are better
threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits. In the same vein, there is no contest that the
Informations that Radaza have labored for so much to quash have adequately charged the
offenses charged thereunder. Jurisdiction over the offenses of violation of RA 3019,
whether under Section 3 (e) or 3 (g), has already attached to the Sandiganbayan.

All said, Radaza may be indicted therefor. His arguments are too trivial to merit the quashal
of the Information, and too vacuous to justify the delay in the prosecution of this criminal
case. This has fermented in the preliminary investigation stage for thirteen long years.
While unnecessary, this Court indulged in a wordy discourse on the baselessness of
Radaza's prolonged saga against the Informations and Resolutions filed by the
Ombudsman, all for the purpose of finally ending the same. The Sandiganbayan is hereafter
enjoined to fully dispose of the case with dispatch and without tolerance for further
needless delays.
PNTC COLLEGES, INC., petitioner, vs. TIME REALTY, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 219698,
September 27, 2021, SECOND DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Contrary to the claim of PNTC and the finding of the RTC, there would be no unjust
enrichment to speak of, as Time Realty withheld the properties pursuant to Paragraph 23 of
the Contract of Lease, a provision which PNTC knowingly agreed to. In other words, Time
Realty retained the said properties as security to compel PNTC to pay and not to unduly
enrich itself.

The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 33 requires two conditions: (1) that a person
is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at
another's expense or damage. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit
has a valid claim to such benefit.

FACTS

PNTC and Time Realty entered into a Contract of Lease wherein Time Realty leased to
PNTC the Extremadura Streets, Sampaloc, Manila, from 2005 to 2007. While the term of the
lease ended on December 31, 2005, the contract was impliedly renewed on a monthly basis
after said date. With the acquiescence of Time Realty, PNTC continued to occupy the
premises for an increased rental rate.

Eventually, Time Realty notified PNTC of its (Time Realty's) intent not to extend the lease
on the fourth floor anymore. For this reason, Time Realty provided PNTC two options: (1)
to extend the lease on the fourth floor but only until April 2007; or (2) to transfer to the
second floor of the same building. In a letter dated April 4, 2007, PNTC informed Time
Realty of its decision to terminate its lease in the fourth floor which would take effect at the
end of April 2007.

Sometime in April 2007, PNTC commenced the transfer of its operations to its new site in
Intramuros, Manila. However, Time Realty alleged that PNTC did so without settling its
(PNTC's) outstanding rentals and service (electricity and water) charges, plus
interest/surcharges. Hence, Time Realty ordered PNTC to cease its moving out operations,
then retained the remaining properties of PNTC in the premises.

Time Realty averred that its retention of PNTC's properties as security was in accordance
with Paragraph 23 of the Contract of Lease.

PNTC sent a Letter (Re: Unjustified Withholding of Numerous [Equipment], Machineries,

and Other Related Materials Which Greatly Damage our Operations) to Time Realty stating
its intention to seek legal action to protect its interests.
Thus, PNTC filed a Complaint for Delivery of Personal Properties with Damages before the
RTC. It alleged that it suffered serious losses due to Time Realty's unjustified withholding of
its properties after employees of PNTC made an inventory.

Time Realty filed an Answer with Counterclaim arguing that PNTC started vacating the
leased premises absent a formal notice and without paying its remaining obligations. It
asserted that since discovery of PNTC's moving out operations sometime in April 2007,
Time Realty retained and inventoried the remaining items, most of which could not be
removed without damaging the property. Time Realty contended that pursuant to the lease
contract, it had the right to withhold the properties to cover PNTC's payables and damages
caused to the property. By way of counterclaim, Time Realty prayed for the payment of the
unpaid rentals and service charges with interest from May 2007.

Also, Time Realty averred that PNTC left without restoring the premises in the same
condition it was found at the beginning of the lease. Hence, Time Realty engaged the
services of a general contractor in order to restore the premises to a tenantable condition.
It thus sought the reimbursement of the expense of restoration of the premises and also
attorney's fees. Significantly, it admitted that PNTC had rental deposits totaling
P743,640.00.

PNTC, in its Reply, denied that the lease contract was still in effect when the properties
were confiscated. It argued that the parties' relationship should be based on a monthly
rental basis. Moreover, PNTC submitted copies of check vouchers payable to Time Realty to
answer for its liabilities but these were not actually tendered to the latter.

Notably, however, PNTC alleged that it had an agreement with Time Realty (through Time
Realty's representative, Natividad Ocampo) that it (PNTC) would settle its obligations after
the transfer of all its properties has been finalized. In addition, PNTC stated that it was
prepared to make payments as far as unpaid rentals and service charges were concerned,
less its security deposits with Time Realty.

RTC: Dismissed the Complaint and found that PNTC has no cause of action against Time
Realty. It noted that the lease contract's effectivity ceased a year after its execution without
need of demand. However, even without a subsequent lease contract, Time Realty allowed
PNTC to continue occupying the premises and collected monthly rentals therefrom,
creating an implied new lease (tacita reconduccion) in accordance with Article 1670 of the
Civil Code.

The trial court found that PNTC violated Paragraph 23 of the Contract of Lease when it
vacated the premises without settling all of its obligations, notwithstanding receipt of the
Statement of Account Time Realty. Because PNTC did not tender rental and service charge
payments since the lease was terminated in April 2007, the trial court held that it did not
comply with the contract in good faith. Thus, Time Realty was justified to seize PNTC's
properties pursuant to the lease contract. Notably, however, the RTC denied Time Realty's
counterclaims for lack of basis.
Both PNTC and Time Realty filed their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration
which the RTC both denied. The RTC reiterated that PNTC's continuous refusal to settle its
obligations justifies Time Realty's retention of the properties. Relevantly, the trial court
ruled that since Time Realty already has complete physical possession and control of
PNTC's properties, unjust enrichment would arise if the former's counterclaims would still
be granted even without the accounting and valuation of the said properties.
CA: The CA granted Time Realty's appeal. It noted that PNTC made the judicial admissions
of its liability to Time Realty. The appellate court held that Time Realty presented sufficient
evidence to prove its counterclaims, "i.e., [PNTC's] violation of the contract of lease such as
non-payment of rentals, utilities, surcharges and cost of repairs, which [PNTC] failed to
dispute." Thus, it ruled that it was grave error for the trial court to dismiss Time Realty's
counterclaims for lack of basis.

Moreover, the appellate court did not agree with the RTC's ruling on unjust enrichment. It
pointed out that a claim for unjust enrichment fails when the entity who will benefit, like
Time Realty, has a valid right therein. It noted that Time Realty retained PNTC's personal
properties because of the latter's unpaid obligations and that such withholding was made
pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the lease contract. Also, the appellate court noted that PNTC
failed to prove the true value of the properties which were retained by Time Realty, and
failed to justify that such would be sufficient to cover or set-off its unsettled
accountabilities. Similarly, the CA did not find merit in PNTC's argument that unjust
enrichment would ensue without Time Realty's accounting and valuation of the personal
properties. Hence, PNTC then filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Time Realty's counterclaims should be granted.

RULING

YES. To start, PNTC is liable to Time Realty for rental arrears and service charges. PNTC
even acknowledged this, yet it justified its non-payment by arguing that it had a previous
agreement with Time Realty that full payment will be made after a complete transfer of its
properties. Since PNTC failed to prove this allegation with sufficient evidence, its
obligations must be fulfilled in accordance with law and the lease contract. Particularly,
PNTC incurred liabilities because it violated the provisions of the Contract of Lease which it
willingly signed. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Relevantly, the lease contract provides that Time Realty has the prerogative to take control
or possession of PNTC's properties in the event the latter violates a provision of the
contract, including non-payment of rent and other charges. Through its judicial admissions
which the CA already took note, there is no doubt that PNTC should settle the said
obligations in accordance with the Contract of Lease and applicable laws.
To expound, PNTC incurred the obligations mainly because of Paragraph 23 of the Contract
of Lease which states that Time Realty can retain PNTC's properties as security for unpaid
rentals and other charges. Even while Time Realty exercised its right under the contract,
PNTC still filed a Complaint to recover its properties. By doing so and yet still refusing to
pay, PNTC somehow preempted Time Realty's option to file its own case in order to collect
from the former. Hence, Time Realty filed an Answer with Counterclaim instead.
Nonetheless, as Time Realty was forced to resort to the measures specified in the contract
to protect its interests, its counterclaims should be granted. This is because these
counterclaims are intimately related to the subject matter of the Complaint,
particularly the personal properties of PNTC, which have been withheld and stored
by Time Realty. A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant's claim for money or other
relief which arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the
complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in the future if not
set up.

Contrary to the claim of PNTC and the finding of the RTC, there would be no unjust
enrichment to speak of, as Time Realty withheld the properties pursuant to Paragraph 23
of the Contract of Lease, a provision which PNTC knowingly agreed to. In other words,
Time Realty retained the said properties as security to compel PNTC to pay and not to
unduly enrich itself.

The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 33 requires two conditions: (1) that a
person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived
at another's expense or damage. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will
benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.

The circumstances in the instant case do not show that Time Realty unjustly benefitted
from the retention of the properties without valid basis, as it merely acted in accordance
with the lease contract to ensure recovery of what is due to it. If anything, the so- called
"benefit" which Time Realty is "enjoying" by withholding the properties is the assurance
that it would be able to collect from PNTC. Additionally, it cannot be said that Time Realty
is using the said properties as these were being kept in storage pursuant to the lease
contract.

In relation to this, PNTC argues that the properties' actual values should be determined, as
it may already be adequate to compensate for its accountabilities. While this may be so, a
perusal of the inventories submitted by both PNTC and Time Realty shows that the
projected values of the personal properties would not be enough to cover all of PNTC's
liabilities. In any case, whether the properties' values are sufficient or not, it would not
change the fact that PNTC owes Time Realty. Besides, the issue of valuation and
depreciation of the personal properties are matters which should be addressed during the
execution stage after the finality of the judgment in this case.
It should be noted, though, that as admitted by Time Realty, PNTC still has a deposit
amounting to P743,640.00. Notably, the Contract of Lease expressly provides that "[t]he
deposit shall be forfeited in favor of [Time Realty], should [PNTC] fail to consummate the
full term of this contract, or upon violation of any of the terms of this contract." Although
the contract indicated that the deposit would be forfeited in favor of Time Realty, it did not
specifically prohibit the application of the same deposit to rental arrears or to any other
monetary liability of PNTC. The deposit, therefore, should be deducted from the total figure
which PNTC has to pay Time Realty during the execution stage.

In connection with this, the lease contract states that PNTC's deposit should be
P739,200.00 or equivalent to two (2) months' rental of the leased premises to answer for
any of its obligations under the contract. Curiously, there is an amount of P4,440,00
unaccounted for in the deposit, since Time Realty did not clarify why there is a difference
between P743,640.00 (PNTC's deposit as indicated in Time Realty's Answer with
Counterclaim) and P739,200.00 (the amount indicated in the Contract of Lease regarding
the deposit). Additionally, Time Realty did not explain the discrepancy, whether it was due
to the increase in rentals or not. Ergo, the entire deposit of P743,640.00, which Time Realty
admitted, should be the figure considered.

On a different but related matter, Time Realty claims that PNTC should reimburse it for
the repairs of the fourth floor, as the latter vacated, the premises without returning the
same in good condition considering ordinary wear and tear, and in violation of the lease
contract

A scrutiny of the records reveals that PNTC failed to demonstrate that the dire condition of
the fourth floor was not due to its own actions. It should be noted that PNTC occupied the
premises for more than two years, and it did not show any proof that during the said
period, it reported issues with the doors, floors, lighting, rest rooms and water sources to
the administrator of the building. Thus, there is an assumption that PNTC's personnel
initially occupied the premises in tenantable condition and that, over time, their employees
or their agents caused the state of disrepair due to poor maintenance.

In line with this, it is important to mention that Time Realty did not dispute or move for the
modification of the awards given by the CA in its favor. The figures were based on the
Statement of Account which Time Realty itself submitted, pertaining to PNTC's rental
arrears and utility charges for the months of March and April 2007. Thus, the said amounts,
P870,038.40 for rental arrears and P340,090.48 for utilities, should be maintained as the
principal figures for the purpose of the imposition of the interests. Additionally, the
reimbursement amounting to P5,095,822.34 for the restoration of the leased premises
should be taken into account. Also, as previously mentioned, PNTC's deposit of
P743,640.00 should be deducted in the total amount of its accountabilities.

As regards the interest on unpaid rentals, Time Realty prays that an interest of three
percent (3%) per month (on any amount due and not paid on time) should be imposed
from May 2007 until full payment pursuant to the lease contract. We disagree. It is true that
according to Paragraph 1 (Amount of Rent) of the Contract of Lease, "[w]ithout prejudice to
the exercise by [Time Realty] of its rights under Paragraph 24 herein, [PNTC] shall pay to
[Time Realty] an interest at the rate of three (3) per cent a month on any amount due and
not paid on time, to be computed per number of days delayed over thirty (30) days from
the dateofdelinquency,whichisfromthe5thofeachandeverymonth." However,itisalsotrue
that the imposition of an interest on unpaid rentals contained in the said provision
takes the nature of a penalty clause, in case PNTC breaches any of the stipulations in
the lease contract. Withal, even if such was specified in the contract, public morals and
policy dictate that the interest rate should still be reasonable and equitable. A penalty
clause, expressly recognized by law, is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability
on the part of an obligor in case of breach of an obligation. It functions to strengthen the
coercive force of the obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated
damages resulting from such a breach. The obligor would then be bound to pay the
stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of
damages caused by the breach. Although a court is not at liberty to ignore the freedom of
the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as they see fit that contravene neither
law nor morals, good customs, public order or public policy, a stipulated penalty,
nevertheless, may be equitably reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable
or if the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with.

In light of this, the Court deems the penalty charge of 3% per month for unpaid rentals
unconscionable, especially considering that PNTC only failed to pay when it was already
clearing out of the premises. Thence, We find it equitable to reduce the interest rate from
3% to 1% per month or a total of 12% per annum in accordance with Article 1229 of the
Civil Code. As such, the amount of P870,038.40 should be subject to the interest rate of 1%
per month or 12% per annum counting from May 2007 until full payment.

With regard to the service charges, Time Realty prays for the imposition of the legal
interest from May 2007 until full payment. Given that these charges do not constitute as a
loan or forbearance of money, the applicable legal interest should be six percent (6%) per
annum from the time of judicial demand, or the date when Time Realty filed its Answer
with Counterclaim on January 7, 2008.

Regarding attorney's fees, Paragraph 24 (Judicial Relief and Penalty) of the Contract of
Lease provides that in calculating for the attorney's fees, twenty percent (20%) of the
amounts claimed in Time Realty's counterclaims should be computed, which in all cases
should not be less than P10,000.00. In its counterclaim, Time Realty asked for the payment
of P977,314.46 (or the remainder thereof after application of PNTC's deposit) for unpaid
rentals including E-VAT and surcharges for late payment of previous rentals. However, it
only presented sufficient proof for the amount of P870,038.40 as reflected in the Statement
of Account, which the CA actually awarded and which Time Realty no longer questioned.
For purposes of illustration, let Us assume that the deposit of PNTC amounting to
P743,640.00, when subtracted from the amount of P870,038.40, yields the remainder of
P126,398.40. This should be added to the claimed amount of P340,090.48 for service
charges as well as P5,095,822.34 for the cost of restoration of the premises. The total
would be P5,562,311.22, 20% of which yields P1,112,462.24, represents attorney's fees
pursuant to Paragraph 24 of the Contract of Lease.
Notwithstanding this, We should consider that Time Realty, in its Answer with
Counterclaim, only prayed for P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. Likewise, Time Realty did not
expressly appeal the award of the CA of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees in its favor. To
stress, Time Realty did not file its own motion for reconsideration before the CA or its own
petition before this Court in order to question the specific amount of the award for
attorney's fees. It merely filed a Comment on PNTC's motion for reconsideration before the
CA, followed by another Comment on PNTC's instant petition, wherein it (Time Realty)
suddenly mentioned Paragraph 24 of the Contract of Lease as the basis for its entitlement
to attorney's fees without further explanation or computation. Simply put, Time Realty's
Comments were only "responses" to PNTC's motion and petition, both of which cannot be
considered as a definite or direct request to modify the award for attorney's fees in
accordance with Paragraph 24 of the Contract of Lease.

Indeed, "[s]ettled is the rule that an issue not properly raised on appeal constitutes a
waiver of that issue on appeal, which precludes the Court from acquiring jurisdiction to
review and alter judgment. An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
court below." Considering that Time Realty did not itself contest the amount of
P100,000.00, the said figure is already final and binding upon it. In any case, this amount is
still higher than the minimum of P10,000.00 as provided by Paragraph 24 of the Contract of
Lease.

Given that the Court has discussed the computation of the sums due to Time Realty which
PNTC with respect to the amounts and interests applicable for each category of liability.
Moreover, once the judgment in this case becomes final and executory, all the monetary
awards in favor of Time Realty shall be subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from such finality until its full satisfaction.
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK (MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED), petitioner, vs.
REMEDIOS SIAN-LIMSIACO, respondent.

G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021, THIRD DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The action to cancel the mortgage is a personal action, as compared to an action to

foreclose such mortgage, which is a real action that involves real property. With respect
to mortgage, the rule on real actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage. Using
the legal maxim of exclusio unios est inclusio alterius, it was concluded that the latter thus
falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions.

Whether or not the petition to cancel the mortgage liens was granted, no transfer or
disposition of real property rights would have occurred either way. This is in contrast to a
case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage, wherein property rights will clearly be
transferred or at least be affected depending on the ruling of the court hearing such a
case.

Therefore, since neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant case involved the
mortgagors-principals' real property rights, there was no need to join them and hence,
respondent validly instituted the action in her own name but still in her capacity as an agent
of the mortgagors-principals.

FACTS

Sometime in 1979, respondent Remedios Sian-Limsiaco obtained a sugar crop loan from
Maybank which was payable within one year. Through an SPA, Remedios executed a REM
on the following parcels of land: (a) Lot 8, which is owned by Sian Agricultural Corporation;
and (b) Lot 1, covered by TCT No. 55619, which is owned by spouses Sebastian and Marina
de la Pena.

Subsequently in 1982, Remedios and her son Roy Sian-Limsiaco obtained another sugar
crop loan which was likewise due after one year. Through another SPA, Roy executed a
REM on four parcels of land owned by Spouses Jerome Gonzales and Perla Sian-Gonzales.

Likewise, in 1984, Remedios obtained another sugar crop loan also secured by a REM on
Lot 8 owned by Sian Agricultural Corporation.

Maybank never demanded payment of the above sugar crop loans nor filed a case to collect
or foreclose the mortgage. Thus, on June 29, 2001 or after a lapse of 17 years, Remedios
and Roy filed a Petition before the RTC, Branch 56 of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, to
cancel the liens annotated on the titles of the mortgaged properties on grounds of
prescription and extinction of their loan obligation.

Maybank referred the case to the PNB to which it had assigned its assets and liabilities
including its receivables. Hence, by virtue of the Deed of Assignment, Maybank argued that
PNB should be treated as substitute respondent. Unconvinced and not satisfied with the
aforementioned Deed of Assignment, the RTC required additional documents to justify the
substitution, which PNB failed to provide. Consequently, the RTC denied the Motion for
Substitution.

Thereafter, Atty. Alovera, for and on behalf of the PNB, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Demurrer to Evidence which the trial court denied, in view of Atty. Alovera's failure to
submit proof that he was authorized to appear on Maybank's behalf. Subsequently, the
receivables were transferred to the BSP.

RTC: The mortgage contracts as annotated in the respective Certificates of Title of the
properties mortgaged, are declared unenforceable and of no force and effect due to
prescription.

Aggrieved, Maybank raised the following issues in its appeal with the CA: 1) Did the trial
court err in taking cognizance of the case and in granting the petition even if the same was
not filed in the name of the real parties in interest, e.g., the registered owners of the
properties mortgaged and BSP as the assignee of the receivable assets — in violation of
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court?; 2) Did the trial court err in granting the petition
even if Remedios had no cause of action against Maybank; and 3) Are the owners of the
properties mortgaged bound by the trial court's judgment despite the failure to make them
parties to the case?

CA: Denied Maybank's appeal. ISSUES

1. Whether the questions raised by petitioner as to "who are the real parties in interest
and who are the indispensable parties" are questions of fact.
2. Whether the issue on whether or not BSP is an indispensable party is a question of
fact.
3. Whether the real parties-in-interest in the present action are the registered owners
of the lands mortgaged and thus, since they were not impleaded in the case, any
judgment resulting therefrom should be considered as null and void.

4. Whether the main loan contracts have already been rendered unenforceable by
virtue of prescription.
5. Whether the authority to encumber one's land title includes the authority to
perform acts to disencumber such title.
6. Whether the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of the mortgage liens,
regardless of whether it acted as a cadastral court or a court of general jurisdiction.
7. Whether the parties' right to due process was violated during the proceedings.
RULING
1. NO. Petitioner raised questions of law which may be reviewed by this Court.

Respondent posits that the questions raised by petitioner as to "who are the real parties in
interest and who are the indispensable parties" are questions of fact outside of the scope of
a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.

Indeed, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth, shall be raised.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact has been clear-cut. A
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of
fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of
fact.

Here, the petition raised questions of law. The said question begs us to discuss the legal
definitions of "real[-]parties[-]in[-]interest" as applied to the undisputed facts.

To put it simply, some of the questions raised by petitioner are more geared towards the
application of the law on civil procedure and civil law rather than simply identifying
specific persons, which respondent seems to imply. Such legal questions obviously do
not require an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented in order
to come up with an answer to them.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised by petitioner are questions of
facts, we are not totally precluded from reviewing the same. In Salcedo v. People, we
enumerated some exceptions to the general rule that only questions of law are reviewable
in a Rule 45 petition, namely:

(1)When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Thus, if any of the situations above are found to be present, this Court may validly review
the factual findings of the lower courts notwithstanding the general rule that questions of
facts are not allowed in a petition filed under Rule 45 as this Court is not a trier of facts. In
this case however, there is no need to review the facts as the questions interposed by
petitioner can be answered without disturbing the factual findings of the lower courts.

2. A reexamination of factual findings is outside the province of a petition for review on

certiorari. The SC is not a trier of facts. It is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province of the
instant Petition for Certiorari.

While the question of "who is an indispensable party?" is not necessarily a question of fact
per se, the instant petition hinges its assertions that the BSP is an indispensable party on
the Deed of Assignment which it presented to the RTC. Both the appellate court and the
trial court found nothing of probative value in the said Deed of Assignment, which
was the sole piece of evidence presented as proof that BSP is an indispensable party.

Weighing the probative value of a piece of evidence is clearly a question of fact that
calls for an appreciation of the evidence on record, and is something that cannot be
reviewed in a Rule 45 Petition.

Therefore, there being no compelling reason for us to depart from the factual findings of
the lower courts that the Deed of Assignment was irrelevant, we do not see the necessity of
discussing the issue of "whether or not BSP is an indispensable party" any further.

In any event, upon perusal of the Deed of Assignment it was not even clear if the sugar crop
loans in question were indeed assigned to BSP as no further evidence was presented.
Moreover, at the time of assignment, the sugar crop loans (the latest of which was due and
demandable after one year) were already unenforceable since nowhere in the petition did
the petitioner deny ever demanding the respondent to pay her loans.

3. NO. Respondent acted on behalf of the mortgagors-principals when she initiated

the action to cancel the mortgages. There was no need to join such principals as the
subject mortgage contracts were merely accessory contracts that were entered into
for the purpose of securing respondent's loans and merely involved the right to
foreclose upon the lands specified therein upon the fulfillment of certain
contingencies, such as when there is default.

Respondent has been acting on behalf of the mortgagors-principals throughout the whole
course of the proceedings. Petitioner, despite having knowledge that respondent was not
the registered owner of the mortgaged properties and was merely acting in her capacity as
an agent of the mortgagors-principals, failed to raise the issue of joining these mortgagors-
principals at the earliest opportunity, which is during the proceedings before the trial
court.

Thus, the appellate court should not have even entertained the issue in the first place as "it
is axiomatic that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained because to
do so would be anathema to the rudiments of fairness and due process."

Despite this, the CA, in its discretion, applied liberality and still ruled on the said issue,
albeit against the petitioner who brought it up. But, even assuming that it was proper to
raise such issue at that stage, and for the CA to entertain the same, we must maintain that
petitioner's argument itself holds no water.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.

Pertinently, Section 3 of the same Rule provides that an agent acting in his own name and
for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal
except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

Clearly, the Rules allow agents to bring actions for the principals in their own name without
joining their principals, provided that the contract does not involve things belonging to the
principal. As applied in this case, while it may seem that the mortgage contracts "involve"
real property of the principals, such contracts are actually not of that nature.

To clarify, the mortgage contract itself does not involve real property, but merely the
right to foreclose upon such real property should the necessary legal pre-conditions are
met, such as a breach in the principal contract to which the mortgage is merely an
accessory of.

Jurisprudence has held that the action to cancel the mortgage is a personal action, as
compared to an action to foreclose such mortgage, which is a real action that involves
real property. With respect to mortgage, the rule on real actions only mentions an action
for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of
a real estate mortgage. Using the legal maxim of exclusio unios est inclusio alterius, it was
concluded that the latter thus falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions.

Whether or not the petition to cancel the mortgage liens was granted, no transfer or
disposition of real property rights would have occurred either way. This is in contrast to
a case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage, wherein property rights will clearly be
transferred or at least be affected depending on the ruling of the court hearing such a
case.

Therefore, since neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant case involved the
mortgagors-principals' real property rights, there was no need to join them and hence,
respondent validly instituted the action in her own name but still in her capacity as an
agent of the mortgagors-principals.

4. YES. In any event, we agree with the appellate court in its ruling that the joining of the
mortgagors-principals would be unnecessary and moot as the evidence on record patently
reveals that the main loan contracts have already been rendered unenforceable by virtue of
prescription. Given that the subject mortgage contracts are mere accessory contracts
to the said loan contracts, then it follows that the action to foreclose on these
mortgage contracts had also already prescribed. Therefore, there is no necessity in
including the mortgagors-principals in the petition as the cancellation of the mortgages
annotated on the titles was a result of the unenforceability of the principal loan.

5. YES. When the mortgagors authorized petitioner-appellee and her son Roy Sian
Liamsiaco to mortgage their properties, they allowed a burden to be placed therein bearing
the risk of losing it if the loans were not paid. It is because of this risk that mortgagors
should be absolute owners, or, that special authority from the owners of the properties
must be given before their properties can be encumbered through mortgage. Since the
lifting of this encumbrance is a benefit that would free the owners of the risk of losing their
properties, it is only a matter of course that the special power to mortgage includes the
authority to discharge it from the burden.

Article 1882 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the limits of the agent's authority
shall not be considered exceeded should it have been performed in a manner more
advantageous to the principal than that specified by him.

Given this and considering that respondent was already given special authority to
encumber the mortgagors-principals' titles with the subject mortgage contracts, then it is
indeed implicit that respondent is also authorized to do all the necessary acts to release the
mortgagors-principals from such encumbrance. Thus, the filing of the instant case to cancel
the mortgage liens, which were annotated in the mortgagor-principals' respective titles
through the special authority granted by them to respondent, should be considered within
the limits of respondent's authority since disencumbering the mortgagors-principals' titles
of the same mortgage liens are obviously advantageous to the latter.

Moreover, records show that the registered owners of the mortgaged lands (alleged to be
the real parties-in-interest) never questioned the authority of respondent all throughout
the proceedings nor did they file any pleading or motion to that effect. In short, the real
parties-in-interest effectively ratified the act of respondent of filing an action to cancel the
mortgage.

To reiterate, unlike a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, which involves real property
rights, the cancellation of a real estate mortgage is merely personal in nature. In fact, the
mortgaged properties do not even come into the picture until there is a default on
the loan as the mortgage's purpose is merely to secure such loan.

6. YES. Throughout the proceedings, petitioner never refuted the fact that it never
exercised its right to collect on the subject sugar crop loans for almost 16 years after the
latest sugar crop loan's due date, nor did petitioner provide any proof that demand was
made to respondent within the prescriptive period.

In Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc, the SC ruled that
the RTC, in its special and limited jurisdiction as a land registration court, does not have the
power to adjudicate issues properly pertaining to ordinary civil actions such as questions
relating to the validity or cancellation or discharge of a mortgage. Said issue should be
ventilated in an ordinary civil action. However, such a rule does admit of some exceptions.

There are situations wherein the relief under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act may
be allowed if "there is a unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in interest"; otherwise, the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case. In another case, this Court
has held that "Section 112 authorizes, in our opinion, only alterations which do not impair
rights recorded in the decree, or alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are
consented to by all parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes."

Clearly, the situations above would not require a separate, ordinary action in order for the
RTC, while acting as a cadastral court, to have jurisdiction to rule on the petition for the
cancellation of the annotation of mortgages on the land titles covering the mortgaged lots.
As applied in this case, there was no adverse claim or serious objection interposed by
petitioner on the issue of prescription.

Respondent clearly alleged that the petitioner failed to exercise its right to collect on the
subject sugar crop loans and that such failure rendered the mortgage contracts functus
officio, unenforceable, and of no force and effect due to prescription and laches, but
nowhere in the records did petitioner deny such allegations nor did it present proof
rebutting the same.
Moreover, the deletion of the mortgage liens would not even result in any prejudice to the
petitioner, since its right to collect on the subject loans (of which the mortgages were
merely accessory contracts thereof) had already prescribed.

Therefore, the RTC had acted well within its jurisdiction when it issued the order directing
the cancellation of the subject mortgage liens, and consequently, the CA committed no
error in affirming the RTC's decision containing such order in toto.

7. NO. The parties' right to due process was not violated during the proceedings as
they were given the same opportunities to present their own side as in an ordinary
action. Technicalities may be set aside if strict application of the same would defeat
the disposition of substantial justice.

The rules of procedure was intended to facilitate the disposition of justice and not to hinder
it. Truly, the circumstances of the instant case do not call for a strict application of the Rules
of Court, especially considering that the basic tenets of due process were observed during
the proceedings. While cadastral proceedings are normally summary in nature and would
only require notice to other interested parties, the RTC actually issued a summons to
petitioner, and the latter was given ample opportunity to present its side and adduce
evidence supporting such. Moreover, the records would reveal that trial ensued like in an
ordinary civil action, and in fact, respondent was able to present two (2) witnesses.

Despite being served summons and given more than enough opportunities to defend itself,
petitioner still failed to refute respondent's allegations that the former failed to exercise its
right to collect on the subject sugar crop loans for almost 16 years and that such failure
rendered the mortgage contracts functus officio, unenforceable, and of no force and effect
due to prescription and laches. Clearly, the parties' right to due process had been
substantially complied with, given that both parties were given the opportunity to present
their side and adduce their own evidence to bolster their positions.

While the proceedings of this case may have been riddled with procedural infirmities, none
have been so severe as to deprive the parties to their right to due process and fair hearing.
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice for us to remand a roughly two-decades- old
dispute to the trial court just to unnecessarily thresh out matters that were not even issues
in the first place, based on a mere technicality.
EDILBERTO PINEDA, et al. v. ABELARDO C. MIRANDA, et al. G.R. No. 204997, August 4,
2021, Second Division, (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

An action for revival of judgment is an action with the exclusive purpose of enforcing a
judgment which could no longer be enforced by a motion. The revival action is a new action
altogether; it is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced. It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself
and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered.
The SC agreed with the CA in citing Saligumba v. Palanog , especially when it ruled that
revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by
motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.

FACTS

Herein respondents Abelardo C. Miranda, Elias C. Miranda and Carmencita D. Miranda filed
a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners who are residents of Barangay
Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, before the MTC of San Fernando City, Pampanga. The
MTC, Branch 3 rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, holding the latter to be the
registered owners of 24 parcels of land located in Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando,
Pampanga which petitioners surreptitiously and arbitrarily occupied without respondents'
consent and knowledge. Aggrieved, petitioners filed an Appeal before the RTC of San
Fernando City, Pampanga which was raffled to Branch 42. On May 17, 1999, the RTC,
Branch 42 of San Fernando, Pampanga, affirmed with modification the MTC Decision.
On January 6, 2000, herein respondents, through their counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution, which was granted by the MTC on February 14, 2000.

On May 9, 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment, holding that the
Writ of Execution was not implemented within five years from the finalization of the
decision. Respondents held that the judgment was not yet barred by the statute of
limitations. In turn, petitioners filed an Answer, alleging that the Complaint for Revival of
Judgment should be dismissed on the ground that the case does not fall within the ambit of

unlawful detainer, thus, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, they
averred that the Complaint must have been filed with the MTC, the court that rendered the
decision sought to be revived, not with the RTC.

Petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with the MTC for
failure of respondents to implement the Writ of Execution within five years from the time
of its issuance. Thus, the MTC issued an Order quashing the Writ of Execution. Pending the
RTC Branch 43's resolution on respondents' Complaint for Revival of Judgment, petitioners
filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA, assailing the Decisions
respectively rendered by the MTC and the RTC Branch 42 in an action for unlawful
detainer.
On March 20, 2009, the RTC Branch 43 rendered its Decision in the Complaint for Revival
of Judgment in favor of herein respondents, holding that the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated
May 17, 1999 can still be revived because the filing of the Complaint for Revival of
Judgment was still within the 10-year period. the RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. On September 24, 2009, the RTC Branch 43
issued an Order dismissing petitioners' Notice of Appeal and granting herein respondents'
Motion to Dismiss. On December 28, 2009, the RTC Branch 43 issued another Order
granting herein respondents' Motion to Remand Record of Case to the Municipal Trial
Court of Origin. Finally, the petitioners elevated the matter to the CA through a Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to compel the RTC to
give due course to their Notice of Appeal.

The CA Special Seventeenth Division issued a Resolution dismissing petitioners' Petition

for Annulment of Judgment. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction to annul judgments or final
orders and resolutions issued by the MTC. Furthermore, the CA held that petitioners failed
to show why no appeal was first taken from the RTC Branch 42 Decision which affirmed
with modification the MTC Decision. The CA Fifteenth Division promulgated a Decision and
acted on the respondents' ordinary appeal from the RTC Branch 43 Decision and held that
it cannot rule on the merits of the case filed before the lower courts for it runs counter to
the nature of an action for revival of judgment and would be tantamount to trying the cases
anew. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999
had indeed become final and executory.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in denying the appeal pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court and in citing Saligumba v. Palanog

RULING

NO. The SC denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari. Despite the several petitions and
motions filed by the petitioners in different courts throughout the course of the
proceedings, the SC emphasized that the case at bar is simply a review of the CA and RTC
Decisions granting respondents' Complaint for Revival of Judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is an action with the exclusive purpose of enforcing a
judgment which could no longer be enforced by a motion. The revival action is a new action
altogether; it is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced. It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the decision
itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. The SC agreed with the CA in citing Saligumba v. Palanog , especially when it
ruled that revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be
revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.
In this case, the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999 became final and
executory when no further legal action was undertaken by herein petitioners
concerning the RTC Branch 42 Decision. Thus, on January 6, 2000 or less than a year
after the RTC Branch 42 Decision became final, respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Execution. The Motion was granted on February 14, 2000. However, seven
years later, the RTC Branch 42 Decision had not yet been executed, thus, on May 9, 2006,
the respondents filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment in accordance with the above
legal provisions. The revival suit filed by respondents did not intend to re-open any issue
affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.

As for petitioners, the ordinary remedy of appeal was still readily available as a
proper legal remedy after the RTC Branch 42 promulgated its Decision. However,
instead of filing an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed the following motion and
petitions throughout the course of the proceedings: (1) Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution; (2) Petition for Annulment of Judgment; and (3) Petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition.

Petitioners' Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was groundless. The Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution was filed on the ground that the Writ of Execution cannot be
enforced anymore because more than five years had elapsed since its issuance. However,
the SC noted that respondents' Complaint for Revival of Judgment was filed on May 9, 2006,
two months before petitioners filed their Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution on July 20,
2006.

Petitioners' Petition for Annulment of Judgment of both the MTC and RTC Decisions
was correctly dismissed by the CA not only because it did not have jurisdiction over the
Petition but also because it was not the proper legal remedy. Rule 47, Sections 1 and 2 of
the Rules of Court are clear that the remedy of annulment of judgment can only be availed
of when the ordinary remedy of appeal, among others, is no longer available through no
fault of the petitioners. Furthermore, the annulment may be based only on grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction which were clearly not present in this case.

Lastly, petitioners' Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed with the CA was to compel
the RTC to give due course to petitioners' Notice of Appeal filed after the RTC granted
respondents' Complaint for Revival of Judgment. A Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition
is only available when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Again, the Court reiterates that the ordinary remedy of
appeal was easily available to petitioners when the RTC Branch 42 promulgated its May 17,
1999 Decision.

In the end, the Court finds that the CA correctly ruled that the RTC Branch 42 Decision can
still be revived as the respondents properly filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment in
accordance with existing law and jurisprudence.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, MARCELO SAGUN, and EDNER SAGUN

G.R. No. 217492, October 4, 2021, (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

It is settled that the requirement of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit with
any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by the LBP or the DAR, and
its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set
forth by RA 6657. What is material is the fact that the landowner remains unpaid
notwithstanding the taking of the property.

In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is "taking" where the
owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; where there is a practical
destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property; or when he is deprived of
the ordinary use thereof. On the other hand, just compensation refers to the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation and is ordinarily determined by referring to the value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the expropriating authority.

FACTS

In 2003, respondent BCDA instituted several expropriation proceedings for acquisition of

lands needed for the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) Project. Two of the properties
subject of the expropriation proceedings are the 1) 2,511 square meter parcel of land
covered by Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00604434 and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15767 in the name of Marcelo; and 2) 1,504 sq. m. parcel of
land covered by CLOA No. 00604433 and TCT No. 15762 in the name of Edner (Subject
Properties).

The Subject Properties were originally owned by BAIDECO. In 1976, BAIDECO mortgaged
the properties to PVB. The latter had since foreclosed on the mortgages and bought the
same at a public auction in 1982. BAIDECO failed to redeem the foreclosed properties.

Meanwhile, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(CARL), was enacted. The Subject Properties were placed under the coverage of the CARP
and consequently distributed to the Saguns who are farmer-beneficiaries. The Landbank of
the Philippines (LBP) deposited advance payments for the registered landowner on the
basis of its own valuation. Based on the Certificates of Deposit, the DAR issued CLOA No.
00604434 to Marcelo and CLOA No. 00604433 to Edner on September 25, 2001 .

Pursuant to the issuance of the CLOAs, the Register of Deeds of Pampanga issued TCT No.
15767 in favor of Marcelo and TCT No. 15762 in favor of Edner on November 21, 2001. LBP
did not inform PVB regarding the expropriation of the Subject Properties prior to the
issuance of the CLOA and TCTs in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries.

When PVB attempted to consolidate its ownership over the Subject Properties, it
discovered that the same were already distributed to the farmer- beneficiaries, who
already had CLOAs and TCTs issued in their favor. Thus, PVB filed a case for declaration of
nullity of the Emancipation Patents (EPs) and TCTs with the RTC against BAIDECO, among
others on the ground that it was not informed of the action made by the DAR on the Subject
Properties. However, the case was withdrawn by PVB pursuant to this Court's ruling in
Department of Agriculture v. Cuencathat controversies on the implementation of the CARP
fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR.

In 2002, PVB filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the Office of the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of San Fernando, Pampanga. After a few years, in
2005, PVB and BAIDECO entered into a written agreement wherein BAIDECO ceded all of
its rights and interests over the Subject Properties to PVB. After which, in 2006, PVB filed a
petition before the RTC of Angeles City assailing the DARAB's determination of just
compensation over the Subject Properties, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 13237.
PVB likewise asserted that full payment for the just compensation pursuant to the CARP
coverage has not been made.

On December 4, 2003, BCDA instituted two expropriation proceedings seeking to

expropriate the Subject Properties. After learning of the expropriation cases filed by the
BCDA, PVB filed motions to intervene in the cases. On July 11, 2005, the trial court issued
an order of expropriation declaring that BCDA has the lawful right to take the Subject
Properties for expropriation.

On August 5, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision in both Civil Case Nos. 11267 and
11273 finding that BCDA had the lawful right to the Subject Properties and ordered BCDA
to deposit the remainder of the just compensation to the trial court, which shall answer for
the satisfaction of LBP's mortgage lien and the balance, if any is to be paid to Marcelo and
Edner. The trial court observed that the Saguns had a better right to the just
compensation. While it noted that the Saguns' TCTs were improvidently issued in view of
lapses in procedure provided under the CARL, the trial court likewise noted that PVB no
longer contests such improvident issuance or the rightfulness of the expropriation under
the CARP as the only issue remaining to be resolved is how much compensation PVB
should receive.

Aggrieved, PVB appealed the trial court's Decision and argued that it is the owner of the
Subject Properties and not the Saguns; thus, it is entitled to receive the just compensation
which the RTC awarded to the latter.

In its June l6, 2014 Decision, the appellate court ruled that PVB is not entitled to just
compensation. In so ruling, the appellate court similarly observed that PVB instituted the
petition for determination of judicial compensation as the owner of the Subject Properties.
The propriety of the CARP coverage over the Subject Properties, as well as the distribution
of the same to the fanner-beneficiaries, was no longer an issue on the part of PVB, since
PVB was contesting only the amount of the just compensation that it will receive. The CA
opined that upon the initiation of the SCTEX expropriation case, the lawful owners of the
properties were the farmer-beneficiaries, who were already in possession of valid CLOAs;
and grave injustice and unjust enrichment would result if the CA sustained the contention
that PVB was entitled to the just compensation of the SCTEX project as it would be doubly
compensated by the State.

ISSUE

Whether the just compensation in the expropriation proceedings instituted by BCDA on the
Subject Properties should be awarded to PVB instead of the Saguns.

RULING

NO. The proceedings from the SCTEX appropriation should be paid to the Saguns. PVB, as
the landowner entitled to just compensation in the CARP expropriation, is not entitled to
receive just compensation in the SCTEX expropriation for the same property.

It is settled that the requirement of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit
with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by the LBP or the
DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal
requirements set forth by RA 6657. What is material is the fact that the landowner remains
unpaid notwithstanding the taking of the property.

Moreover, there were lapses on the part of the State in complying with the procedure
provided for acquisition of lands under RA 6657,as CLOAs and TCTs were issued in favor of
the Saguns without DAR or LBP notifying PVB, the owner of the property, of the
proceedings.

PVB had already withdrawn its action for the declaration of nullity of the EPs and TCTs
issued in favor of the Saguns. In filing the petition for judicial determination of just
compensation, PVB was contesting only the amount of the just compensation that it will
receive from the CARP expropriation, in addition to its claim for just compensation in the
SCTEX expropriation.

However, PVB's contention that it is entitled to the proceeds in either the CARP and SCTEX
expropriations runs contrary to the concepts of "taking'' and "just compensation” in our
jurisdiction. In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is
"taking" where the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; where there
is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property; or when he
is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the
time EPs are issued by the government. Here, it is undisputed that prior to the SCTEX
expropriation initiated in 2003, PVB was already deprived of use and possession of the
Subject Properties when CLOAs were awarded and TCTs were issued in favor of the Saguns
in 2001. Thus, the taking of PVB's property was by virtue of the CARP expropriation, and
not the SCTEX expropriation.

On the other hand, just compensation refers to the just and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation and
is ordinarily determined by referring to the value of the land and its character at the time it
was taken by the expropriating authority. In fine, just compensation is the "equivalent for
the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and
anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue
to the expropriating authority." In other words, the measure of just compensation "is not
the taker's gain but the owner's loss."

Accordingly, the State's obligation to compensate the landowner arises only if the owner
suffered a loss in the hands of the State. Just compensation must not extend beyond the
property owner's loss or injury. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his
property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the
prejudice of the public. In this manner, the compensation to be paid is truly just, not only
for the owner whose property was taken, but also to the public who bears the cost of
expropriation.

As previously mentioned, the "taking" suffered by PVB occurred by virtue of the

implementation of the CARP. Thus, just compensation must be paid by the LBP by virtue of
the CARP expropriation. To rule otherwise, i.e., to find that PVB is entitled to compensation
from either proceeding at its choosing, or worse, to find that PVB can claim compensation
from both proceedings, would result in unjust enrichment on the part of PVB.

In sum, considering that the Subject Properties were already distributed to the
Saguns when the SCTEX expropriation was initiated, PVB just has to receive just
compensation pursuant to CARP. It no longer has an interest or right over the Subject
Properties when BCDA filed the case for the SCTEX expropriation.

The Saguns, as farmer-beneficiaries with CLOAS and Torrens Titles issued in their
favor over the Subject Properties, are entitled to receive just compensation in the
SCTEX expropriation. As registered property owners, the Saguns are entitled to the
protection given to every Torrens title holder. Their rights may only be forfeited in case of
violations of agrarian laws, as well as noncompliance with the restrictions and conditions
under the CARL. Thus, the Saguns, who were already in possession of valid CLOAs and TCTs
covering the Subject Properties when the SCTEX expropriation began and whose CLOAs
and TCTs are no longer an issue, should be considered the lawful owners of the Subject
Properties who are entitled to receive just compensation by virtue of the SCTEX
expropriation.

Indeed, it would be unjust to deprive the Saguns, through no fault of their own, of the land
they till or just compensation in lieu thereof, more so because PVB does not even contest
the transfer of title to them and has even withdrawn its action to nullify its EPs and TCTs.
All told, the courts' a quo were justified in awarding just compensation to the Saguns by
virtue of the SCTEX expropriation.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. ALMA T. PLACENCIA FONTANOZA G.R. No. 213673,
March 2, 2022, Second Division, (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Generally, "once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer's name upon failure
of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can
demand possession of the property at any time. Its right of possession has then ripened into
the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial
function that does not admit of the exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an
application for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any
delay."

However, there are exceptions to the rule that the trial court's duty to issue the writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser is ministerial. "In Nagtalon v. United Coconut Planters
Bank, the Court enumerated the following jurisprudential exceptions: (a) gross inadequacy of
the purchase price; (b) third party claiming right adverse to the mortgagor/debtor, and; (c)
failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor."

FACTS

Spouses Salvador and Alma Fontanoza obtained a loan from the Ozamiz Branch of PNB. To
secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land located at Barangay Dao, Mahayag,
Zamboanga del Sur. Since the Fontanozas failed to pay, PNB foreclosed the property. On
January 8, 2002, as the sole bidder in the public auction, PNB acquired the lot for
P236,000.00. PNB registered the sale on January 28, 2002. However, the Fontanozas failed
to redeem the property. More than nine years later, specifically on July 18, 2011, PNB
filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of possession before the RTC.

The RTC granted PNB's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. The RTC
Resolution became final and executory based on a certificate of finality. More than two
months after the RTC's Resolution became final and executory, Alma filed an opposition
with urgent motion to recall writ of possession. She averred that she also instituted a suit
against PNB before the trial court. Likewise, she had a contract with PNB for the
repurchase of the property, and that she had already paid the agreed down payment, which
she claimed as earnest money. In addition, she was not notified of PNB's petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession.

PNB denied the perfection of the contract of repurchase. It argued that Alma's deposits
were mere unaccepted offers. Additionally, it returned Alma's deposits. Furthermore, the
title to the subject property need not be consolidated in its name as it is the trial court's
ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession in its favor as the purchaser during the
foreclosure sale. Besides, Alma failed to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period. There is no need to give Alma any notice of its petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession given that it was an ex parte proceeding. Apart from this, the
pendency of a separate case for annulment of mortgage and/or foreclosure sale does not
bar the grant of a writ of possession to it. Alma contended that she remains in possession of
the property not as a mortgagor but as a purchaser. She presented receipts and deposit
slips to show that she had fully paid the repurchase price. In addition, she submitted a copy
of a Notice of Lis Pendens.

The RTC ruled that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be used as a legal ground to refuse the issuance of a writ of possession. Even if there
is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or foreclosure, the purchaser is entitled to
a writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of the annulment case.

The CA, in its assailed January 23, 2014 Decision, stated that in case the mortgagor fails to
redeem the property, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a matter of right. The writ should be issued upon the
filing of a proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. Thus, the trial court
cannot allow an injunction to prohibit the issuance of the writ despite a pending action for
the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself. The CA held that the instant case is
similar to Barican. Aside from PNB's delay in applying for a writ, Alma remained in
possession of the property. Although she is not a third person to the mortgage, Alma is
claiming the property as a purchaser and no longer as a mortgagor. Hence, the issuance of
the writ of possession in favor of PNB is unjust, as the issue of repurchase has not yet been
settled.

PNB insists that Alma's claim of violation of due process is baseless as the trial court's duty
to issue the writ of possession is ministerial and raised in an ex parte proceeding.

ISSUE

Whether or not PNB is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Possession

RULING

YES. The SC held that the petition has merit. Generally, "once title to the property has been
consolidated in the buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property
within the one-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right
belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at
any time. Its right of possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute
owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of
the exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an application for its issuance,
should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay."

In this case, the records showed no proof that PNB has formally consolidated the title of the
property in its name. Additionally, it took the bank more than nine years before it
petitioned for the issuance of a writ of possession. Nevertheless, the bank registered itself
as the purchaser following the foreclosure sale, through a Certificate of Sale recorded in the
Registry of Deeds on January 28, 2002. Moreover, Alma failed to redeem the property
during the one-year redemption period. Thus, she ceased to have rights over the subject lot
either as a mortgagor or redemptioner. These circumstances suggest that PNB, although
it did not consolidate the title in its name yet, is entitled to possess the property as
the registered purchaser after the foreclosure sale, and because of Alma's failure to
redeem it even if she is in actual possession of the lot.

However, there are exceptions to the rule that the trial court's duty to issue the writ
of possession in favor of the purchaser is ministerial. "In Nagtalon v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, the Court enumerated the following jurisprudential exceptions: (a) gross
inadequacy of the purchase price; (b) third party claiming right adverse to the
mortgagor/debtor, and; (c) failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the
mortgagor."

Jurisprudence teaches that when there are third-party possessors of the property, the RTC
should instead conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession.
However, for this exception to apply, it is not enough that the property is in the possession
of a third party, it must also be held by the third party adversely to the judgment debtor or
mortgagor. Here, Alma cannot be considered as a third party since she herself was the
mortgagor who failed to redeem the property during the foreclosure proceeding and
the redemption period. At least with respect to the foreclosure itself, she already
surrendered any right (as a mortgagor or redemptioner) she had over the property after
she failed to redeem it. This is notwithstanding PNB's delay, for reasons only known to it, in
filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

Alma cannot insist on the recall of the writ of possession solely because she filed a separate
case which questioned the foreclosure and advanced her claim of repurchase. To reiterate,
"[t]he duty of the court to issue a writ of possession is ministerial and may not be stayed by
a pending action for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself. The only
exception is when a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. To
be considered in adverse possession, the third party possessor must have done so in his
own right and not as a mere successor or transferee of the debtor or mortgagor."

More importantly, PNB's right to the writ of possession is solidified by the fact that the
RTC's order issuing the said writ has already become final and executory. As a rule, a
final judgment is immutable and unalterable. It cannot be disturbed or modified by any
court even if the purpose of the alteration is to rectify perceived errors of fact or law. The
doctrine of immutability of judgment is for the purpose of avoiding delay in the
administration of justice and of putting an end to judicial controversies which cannot drag
perpetually. Pursuant to this doctrine, courts have the ministerial duty to enforce judgment
that already attained finality. Notably, there are established exceptions to the
foregoing rule, namely: (i) the correction of clerical errors; (ii) presence of nunc pro
tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party; (iii) void judgment; and, (iv)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgment which renders
the execution unjust and inequitable.
In the case at bench, the aforementioned exceptions are not present. Alma filed an
opposition more than two months after the issuance of the writ became final and
executory. "To be sure, no hearing is necessary prior to the issuance of a writ of possession,
as it is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the
relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex-parte petition for
issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for
the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale.

To conclude, while Alma can no longer question the issuance of a writ of possession in
PNB's favor, she is not without recourse. She can still assert her claims in the separate suit
which she filed before the trial court. Thus, it is within the trial court's discretion in the
separate case to make a final determination regarding Alma's allegation of ownership over
the property. Hence, the petition is granted.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. ROMEO B. DARADAR

G.R. No. 180203, June 28, 2021, Third Division, (Hernando, J.) DOCTRINE

Under the principle of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause
of action. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4)
there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

FACTS

Petitioner PNB and respondent Daradar entered into a Deed of Promise to Sell covering
two parcels of land and improvements therein that were owned by PNB. Due to Daradar's
failure to pay the yearly amortizations and interest due under the Deed, PNB rescinded
the Deed through a Notarial Notice of Rescission. Thus, Daradar filed an action for
Annulment of Rescission, Accounting and Damages against PNB in the RTC of Iloilo City to
annul the notarial rescission of the Deed. Due to respondent's failure to appear at the
scheduled hearing, the RTC, in an April 5, 1995 Order (First Order) provisionally dismissed
Civil Case No. 21375 without prejudice. No motion for reconsideration was filed against the
said Order. After the lapse of four years, the RTC motu proprio issued its June 17, 1999
Order (Second Order) finally dismissing Civil Case No. 21375 on the ground of
respondent's failure to prosecute the case under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, in
view of respondent's failure to reinstate or revive the case despite the lapse of more than
four years from the first dismissal.

On October 18, 1999, Daradar filed another complaint for declaration of nullity of notarial
rescission of the Deed with the RTC. PNB moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the second order of dismissal which dismissed Civil No. 21375 was an adjudication on
the merits, thereby barring the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 25981 on the ground of
res judicata.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and opined that
the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 21375 involving the same parties, the same cause of
action and the same subject matter had the effect of adjudication upon the merits pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, without prejudice to PNB's
counterclaim in the same action. Respondent moved for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the same. Thus, respondent appealed the same before the CA on the ground that
Civil Case No. 21375 was dismissed without prejudice and is thus not a bar to the filing of
Civil Case No. 25981, and in the alternative, that petitioner's failure to prosecute its
compulsory counterclaim for ejectment should also be barred.
The appellate court granted Daradar's Petition and opined that the First Order
dismissing Civil Case No. 21375 operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the
case; thus, the Second Order issued by the trial court four years later, which purportedly
dismissed Civil Case No. 21375 with prejudice, is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, the CA ruled that the Second Order did not bind respondent or produce the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits of the case that would bar Daradar from reviving the same
action by filing another complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in reinstating the complaint in Civil Case No. 21375 on the ground
that the same is not barred by res judicata.

RULING

YES. The SC granted the petition. The concept of a provisional dismissal in our jurisdiction
contemplates the temporary dismissal of a criminal action that may be revived within the
period set by the Rules of Court upon compliance with certain requisites. There is nothing
in the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for a provisional
dismissal of a civil case. Moreover, a judgment must be definitive; the decision itself must
purport to decide finally the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted by specifically
denying or granting the remedy sought by the action. It is significant to note that in Cu
Unjieng E. Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Company the SC held that when a definitive judgment
cannot be rendered since the judgment is subject to a contingency, the judgment contains
no disposition at all and is null and void. Similarly, the SC found that the provisional
dismissal fails to meet this standard of definitiveness discussed in Cu Unjieng and hence
should not be sanctioned.

The SC is convinced that the First Order which provisionally dismissed Civil Case No. 21375
is void and without legal effect for lack of basis. A void judgment or order has no legal and
binding effect for any purpose. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. In this sense, a void order can never attain finality. Being void,
the issuance of the First Order never became final nor operated to divest the trial
court of jurisdiction over the complaint.

Nevertheless, while the present Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for provisional
dismissals, this Court in a 1940 case equated a provisional order with an interlocutory
order that was subject to vacation or amendment at any time before final judgment is
rendered or has become executory. Here, the First Order which provisionally dismissed the
case is interlocutory because it did not completely dispose of the case and did not decide
with finality the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, even assuming arguendo
that provisional dismissals of civil cases such as the First Order could be sanctioned,
the First Order should be considered interlocutory and could not have operated to
divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court accordingly acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing its Second Order and in motu proprio dismissing the case for
respondent's failure to prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The dismissal of an action due to a plaintiff's failure to prosecute is governed by Rule 17,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The courts can no longer delve into the legality of the
Second Order absent any indication that the same is void. No other procedural law
principle is more settled than that once a judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject to
change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or
the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the
judgment itself is void. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by
law. After all, the very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies.

Here, respondent did not move for the reconsideration of the Second Order nor
appeal the same, thus allowing it to become final and executory. On this score, the
Second Order is already beyond the power of the courts to amend or revoke.

In any event, the question of whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute is
mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The true test for the exercise of
such power is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is culpable for
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be
unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. As to what constitutes an
"unreasonable length of time," the SC has ruled that it depends on the circumstances of
each particular case and that the sound discretion of the court in the determination of the
said question will not be disturbed, in the absence of patent abuse. Herein respondent's
actions clearly demonstrate his lack of interest and due diligence to prosecute the case. He
failed to act on the First Order and allowed the trial court to issue its Second Order four
years later. Respondent's lack of interest and due diligence to prosecute his case is further
highlighted by his failure to assail the Second Order and the lapse of another four years
before he filed another complaint based on the same cause of action.

Under the principle of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on
the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.

All elements of res judicata are present in the instant case. Anent the first and second
elements, the Second Order is a final judgment which has already attained finality and was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is likewise undisputed that there is an
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Finally, the third element of res
judicata is present as the Second Order dismissing Civil Case No. 21375 operated as a
judgment on the merits. Here, the Second Order did not state that the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice. A dismissal based on any of the grounds in Section 3, Rule
17 operates as an adjudication on the merits. Unless otherwise qualified by the court, a
dismissal under said rule is considered with prejudice, which bars the refiling of the case.

Respondent was barred from reviving his action by filing a new complaint, which he did in
Civil Case No. 25981. In fine, the trial court in Civil Case No. 25981 correctly granted
petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Hence, the petition is granted
and the decision and resolution of the CA are reversed and set aside and the order of the
RTC is reinstated.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESPEDITO Q. ESCARO, REPRESENTED BY
MARCELO Q. ESCARO, SR. THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 204526, February 10, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.) DOCTRINE

Considering that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, this Court, in
Dalauta, struck down as void the 15-day prescriptive period under the DARAB Rules on the
finding that it unduly undermined and impeded the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTCs to determine just compensation in accordance with Section 57 of RA 6657. The
jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC in actions for determination of just compensation is original and
exclusive, and not merely appellate. Thus, the Court cannot recognize a procedural rule of the
DARAB that requires the court to adjudge as dismissible an action (which is otherwise by law
properly brought within its judicial cognizance) for having been filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in the DARAB Rules.

FACTS

Expedite Q. Escaro, as represented herein by respondent Marcelo Q. Escaro, Sr., is one of

the heirs of the registered owner of 24.3990 hectares parcel of land in Sibao, Calabanga,
Camarines Sur. On August 30, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed
24.0467 of the said parcel of land under the Compulsory Acquisition scheme pursuant to
Republic Act. No. 6657 (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

By virtue of its mandate under RA 6657, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
made an initial valuation of the property at P272,347.63 Respondent rejected petitioner's
valuation. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur who,
after conducting summary administrative proceedings, fixed the just compensation at
P1,555.084.00.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), which reinstated petitioner's valuation of P272,347.70. Respondent received the
DARAB Decision on May 7, 2008. Thereafter, on May 20, 2008, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the DARAB Decision, but the same was denied by the DARAB in its
October 18, 2008 Order, which was received by respondent on December 16, 2008.

Thereafter, on January 5, 2009, respondent filed with the RTC-SAC a complaint praying that
the trial court fix the valuation of the land at P1,681,199.00 or approximately P70,000.00
per hectare. In its Answer, petitioner argued that respondent had no cause of action to file
an action for determination of just compensation with the RTC-SAC considering that the
case is already barred by prior judgment.

Respondent thus filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The CA set aside the ruling of the RTC-SAC, and ruled that that Sec. 57 of RA 6657 expressly
vests the RTC with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners. Petitioner sought reconsideration of
the Decision of the CA, which was, however, denied.

Thus, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner argued that pursuant to
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, failure to file the complaint within the
prescribed 15-day period from receipt of the DARAB Decision on May 7, 2008 rendered the
DARAB's valuation order final, and thus, warrants the complaint's dismissal for having
been filed out of time.

ISSUE

Whether respondent’s complaint shall be dismissed for being filed out of time?

RULING

NO. The Court upheld its ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta, which
abandoned the ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA and Limkaichong that requires a
party who does not agree with the initial valuation of the adjudicator in land compensation
cases to bring the matter to the RTCSAC within 15 days from receipt of notice thereof.

The Court first ruled that the "valuation of property or determination of just compensation
in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
courts and not with administrative agencies." Accordingly, RA 6657 vests the RTCs, acting
as SACs, original and exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of just compensation. The
Court, in Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines expounded on this by ruling that the right
of a landowner to just compensation for the taking of his or her private property is a legally
demandable and enforceable right guaranteed by the Constitution, and that the
determination of just compensation in cases of eminent domain is thus an actual
controversy that calls for the exercise of judicial power by the courts.

In this case, RA 6657 only provided for the preliminary determination by the DAR of just
compensation. In amending Section 17 of RA 6657, Congress provided that the factors and
the resulting basic formula, shall be 'subject to the final decision of the proper court.'

The RTC-SAC dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata, ruling that respondent
erred in filed before the DARAB a motion for reconsideration to question the DARAB
Decision rather than filing an original action for determination of just compensation with
the RTC-SAC within 15 days from his receipt of the said decision on May 7, 2008 as
prescribed under Section 7, Rule XIX of the DARAB Rules. Thus, the DARAB Decision had
attained finality on May 22, 2007, and thus, already beyond the court's judicial review.

Congress thus clearly conceded that the courts have the power to look into the 'justness' of
the use of a formula to determine just compensation, and the 'justness' of the factors and
their weights chosen to flow into it.
In fact, the regulatory scheme provided by Congress in fact sets the stage for a heightened
judicial review of the DAR's preliminary determination of just compensation pursuant to
Section 17 of RA 6657. In case of a proper challenge, SACs are actually empowered to
conduct a de novo review of the DAR's decision. Under RA 6657, a full trial is held where
SACs are authorized to (1) appoint one or more commissioners, (2) receive, hear, and
retake the testimony and evidence of the parties, and (3) make findings of fact anew. In
other words, in exercising its exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine the just
compensation under RA 6657, the SAC is possessed with exactly the same powers and
prerogatives of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Considering that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, this Court, in
Dalauta, struck down as void the 15-day prescriptive period under the DARAB Rules on the
finding that it unduly undermined and impeded the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts to determine just compensation in accordance with Section 57 of
RA 6657. It was emphasized in Dalauta that the jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC in actions for
determination of just compensation is original and exclusive, and not merely appellate.
Thus, the Court cannot recognize a procedural rule of the DARAB that requires the court to
adjudge as dismissible an action (which is otherwise by law properly brought within its
judicial cognizance) for having been filed beyond the 15-day period provided in the DARAB
Rules. To sanction such rule will effectively reduce the RTC-SAC to act merely as an
appellate review of the administrative decisions of the DAR through its adjudicators. This
clearly runs counter to Section 57 of RA 6657 and, therefore, should be considered as void
and ineffectual.

Since the payment of just compensation is an obligation created by law, the proper
prescriptive period to file a complaint for judicial determination of just compensation
under RA 6657 is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code. In this regard, the
period to file an original action for just compensation with the RTC-SAC should be reckoned
"from the time the landowner received the notice of coverage."

In this case, the 10-year prescriptive period was tolled by the commencement of
administrative proceedings before the DAR sometime in 1996 when respondent
questioned the initial valuation of the property before the PARAD, which was terminated
12 years later on May 7, 2008, or the date when respondent received the DARAB Decision
reinstating petitioner's valuation of P272,347.70. The 10-year prescriptive period started
to run again on May 7, 2008 for the reason that it was at this point that respondent may
already bring the matter to the RTC-SAC for final determination of just compensation
pursuant to Sec. 16(f) of RA 6657,65 and Sec. 7 of the DARAB Rules.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court is
directed to REINSTATE the Complaint for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation of
Expedito Q. Escaro, as represented by Marcelo Q. Escaro, Sr.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA F. TUYAY
G.R. No. 206579, December 1, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

A special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in the
absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Thus, if the remedy of an appeal is available, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will not
prosper as it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

FACTS

On June 25, 2003, Assistant Commissioner Percival T. Salazar of the BIR issued a Letter of
Authority (LOA) authorizing the BIR revenue officers to examine the books of accounts for
taxable years 2000 to 2002 of Glo Herbal Trading and Manufacturing, which manufactures
Glo-Herbal concoction and is owned by respondent Gloria F. Tuyay, as it allegedly sold
millions of its product during the said years. However, despite receipt of the LOA, Tuyay
failed to submit the books of account. On June 10, 2004, the BIR issued assessment notices
against Tuyay for deficiency income tax and value-added tax (VAT) for the taxable years
2001 and 2002 in the amounts of P110,305,049.69 and P4,501,011.03, respectively.

On June 3, 2005, the BIR, through its revenue officers filed with the DOJa criminal
complaint for violations of Section 254 and 255 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) against Tuyay. On August 20, 2009, the DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable
cause and recommending the filing of criminal cases against Tuyay for violations of
Sections 254 and 255 of the NIRC. On October 23, 2009, Informations against Tuyay were
filed with the CTA. The criminal case for violation of Section 254 of the NIRC, docketed as
CTA Crim. Case No. 0-155, was raffled to the First Division while the criminal case for
violation of Section 255 of the NIRC, docketed as CTA Crim. Case No. 0-154, was raffled to
the Third Division. During the arraignment in Crim. Case No. 0-154, Tuyay pleaded "not
guilty."

On June 21, 2011, Tuyay moved to dismiss CTA Crim. Case No. 0-154 against her on the
ground that she was immune from criminal liability in view of her availment of the tax
amnesty under R.A. No. 9480. Tuyay alleged that on February 21, 2008, she filed with the
BIR a Notice of Availment of Tax Amnesty, together with her Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Networth (SALN) as of December 31, 2005; and that on February 26, 2008,
she filed with the BIR her Tax Amnesty Return and Tax Amnesty Payment Form evidencing
her payment of the amounts of P79,913.90 and P35,177.50.

Petitioner opposed the motion contending that Tuyay was disqualified to avail of the tax
amnesty because under the IRR of RA 9480, the tax amnesty does not extend to those with
pending criminal cases filed in court or in the DOJ for tax evasion and other criminal
offenses under the NIRC. In Tuyay's case, petitioner averred that when she availed of the
tax amnesty, there was already a pending case against her with the DOJ. Thus, under the
IRR of RA 9480, she was not entitled to the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty
law.

The CTA Third Division denied the Motion to dismiss filed by respondent Tuyay. On
reconsideration, the CTA Third Division dismissed Crim. Case No. 0-154 in view of
respondent’s availment of the tax amnesty. Petitioner appealed the dismissal to the CTA En
Banc via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but it was dismissed by
the CTA En Banc as the petitioner was represented by the BIR Special Prosecutors instead
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the
same, but it failed to submit copies of the RMC No. 25-2010, and the deputization orders it
invoked in its Motion for Reconsideration, so the CTA En Banc denied the said motion.
Petitioner filed its second Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CTA En
Banc for being a prohibited pleading. Thus, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner correctly availed of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65?

RULING

NO. A special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only
in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Thus, if the remedy of an appeal is available, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 will not prosper as it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
In this case, the remedy of an appeal was available. Section 1, Rule 16 of the 2005 Revised
Rules of the CTA provides:

SECTION 1. Appeal to Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari. - A party adversely
affected by a decision or ruling of the Court en banc may appeal therefrom by filing with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari within fifteen days from receipt
of a copy of the decision or resolution, as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court If such
party has filed a motion for reconsideration or for new trial, the period herein fixed shall
run from party's receipt of a copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
or for new trial.

Thus, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy because instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.

While the Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 petition as a Rule 45 petition under the
following circumstances: (1) if the petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing
a petition under Rule 45; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is
justifiable reason for the relaxation of the rule, this cannot be done in the instant case
because none of the circumstances are present. Thus, for being a wrong remedy, the instant
petition merits an outright dismissal.
And besides, even if the Court exercises liberality and gives due course to the instant
petition, it would still be dismissed for failure of petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CTA.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, there must be grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as when an act of a court or tribunal is
performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law -- mere abuse of discretion is not enough. In the instant case, there is
none.

First, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA En Banc in denying
due course to the petition for review, and accordingly dismissing the same.
Jurisprudence consistently holds that is it the Solicitor General who has the primary
responsibility to appear for the government in appellate proceedings. The only exceptions
are: (1) when the government is adversely affected by the contrary position taken by the
OSG; (2) when there is an express authorization by the OSG deputizing legal officers to
assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the government in cases involving their
respective offices; and (3) when the dismissal of the petition could have lasting effect on
government tax revenues as in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) v. La
Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, where the issue raised was whether the revenue
regulation issued by the CIR has exceeded, on constitutional grounds, the allowable limits
of legislative delegation. In this case, none of the exceptions apply.

Second, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA Second Division
in dismissing the complaint against Tuyay because of her availnent of the tax
amnesty. Under Section 8(e) of RA 9480, only those with pending criminal cases in court
for tax evasion and other criminal offenses under the NIRC, and the felonies of frauds,
illegal exactions and transactions, and malversation of public funds and property, under
Chapters III and IV of Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, are excluded. Here, there is no
dispute that Tuyay availed of the tax amnesty under RA 9480 and complied with all the
requirements thereof. In fact, during the pre-trial hearing, petitioner admitted that Tuyay' s
application for tax amnesty was approved and that her payment of taxes was accepted by
the BIR. Thus, the only question is whether Tuyay was excluded from availing the tax
amnesty. The Court finds that she was not disqualified to avail of the tax amnesty because
at the time she availed of it on February 21, 2008, there was no pending criminal case
against her before any court as it was only in October 2009 that the criminal cases were
filed against her with the CTA. And even though there was already a pending criminal
complaint against her before the DOJ on June 3, 2005, such fact cannot disqualify her from
availing of the tax amnesty because this is not included in the list of exceptions under
Section 8 of RA 9480.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS LACANILAO
G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINES

1. Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable to a prosecution witness, like
Mary Jane Veloso, who was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the
Indonesian Government and who is presently confined in a prison in Indonesia.
2. Extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant the
resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
3. Deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process.
4. The deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to

confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.

5. A "dying declaration" is one of the recognized exceptions to the right to confrontation.

FACTS

Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio, and Julius L. Lacanilao were friends and neighbors in
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina
and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Mary Jane scraped
whatever meager money she had, borrowed money from relatives, and sold their motorcycle to
pay Cristina and Julius the placement fee she needs to work in Malaysia. To Mary Jane's dismay,
she was informed by Cristina upon their arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her was no
longer available. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for
a seven-day holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Cristina
gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip.

Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin
inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged with drug trafficking before the District
Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

In October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, convicted Mary Jane
of drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by firing squad, which conviction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Indonesia. Mary Jane and eight other felons who were
similarly convicted of drug-related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the island of
Nusakambangan, off Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by firing squad, which
was originally scheduled on April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28, 2015.
Eventually, the eight companions of Mary Jane were executed by firing squad. Presently,
Mary Jane is detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives of the
Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the NBI, and were charged with qualified trafficking in
person in violation of Sec. 4(a) in relation to Sec. 3 (a) and 6 of R.A. No. 9208, otherwise
known as "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" docketed as Criminal Case No. SD (15)-
3723. The two were likewise charged in two separate Informations with the crime of illegal
recruitment as penalized under Sec. 6, par. (k) and (1) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known
as "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995," and estafa in violation of
Sec. 2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SD (15)-3724, [5]
and SD (15)3753,[6] respectively, filed before the trial court. Upon arraignment, Cristina and
Julius entered a plea of "not guilty" on all charges.

On March 31, 2015, representatives from the PDEA, PNP Crime Laboratory, and the DFA
went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She executed a document known as
"Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso," where she maintained her innocence
and narrated how she was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She alleged that while in
Malaysia, or on April 24, 2010, Mary Jane and Cristina went to the hotel parking lot and met
with "Ike," a brother of the alleged boyfriend of Cristina, who was on board a white car.
They then went inside the car wherein "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina. When they
returned to the hotel room, Cristina gave Mary Jane the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it
was unusually heavy but, upon checking, found nothing inside. She then asked Cristina why
the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage
was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended
at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian
Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian
Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody,
and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

Thus, on April 28, 2015, or a few hours before the scheduled execution of Mary Jane, the
President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an indefinite reprieve.
Pursuant to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into by
Southeast Asian Nations, the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and "Ike"
who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting her to engage in drug
trafficking. The Indonesian authorities however imposed some conditions relative to the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony.

Thereafter, the State, through the OSG, filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the
Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. "
It averred that (1) the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon
written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she
is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to her
imprisonment; (2) Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily in criminal
proceedings and the use of deposition upon written interrogatories in criminal cases is not
expressly prohibited under the Rules of Court; and (3) Cristina and Julius will still have an
opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of written interrogatories
through the designated consular officer who will be taking the deposition; moreover, they
were not precluded from objecting to the questions and answers.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that: (1) the deposition should be made
before and not during the trial, (2) the depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of
Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and the
use thereof is confined only in civil cases; and (3) such method of taking testimony will
violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided
under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, and to subject her to cross-examination.

The RTC granted the prosecution's motion subject to the some conditions, and denied
Cristina and Julius’ subsequent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Undeterred, Cristina
and Julius filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for TRO and/or
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals averring that the trial court judge
gravely abused her discretion in the issuance of the assailed Resolutions.

Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the CA granted the Petition
for Certiorari and reversed the Decision of the RTC. It held that, the conditional
examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily governed by Rule 119 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which requires that the taking of deposition of Mary Jane
or her conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where
the case is pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88,
and that Cristina and Julius, being the accused in the criminal proceedings, should be
notified thereof so they can attend the examination.

The OSG sought for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA; hence, this. Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Veloso, who was convicted of drug
trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian Government and who is presently
confined in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by way of deposition without violating the
constitutional right to confrontation of a witness by the accused?

RULING: YES.

Firstly, the Court ruled that Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable in the
instant case.

Sec. 15 of Rule 119 only covers examination of a prosecution witness who is either: (a) too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, the case of Mary Jane does not fall
under either category. She is neither too sick nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to
leave the Philippines indefinitely. To recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia
for having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of drug trafficking, a grave offense
in the said state. In fact, she was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting her
execution by firing squad. Her situation is not akin to a person whose limitation of mobility
is by reason of ill-health or feeble age, the grounds cited in Section 15 of Rule 119.

In fact, Mary Jane's predicament does not in way pertain to a restriction in movement from
one place to another but a deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign country with
little or no hope of being saved from the extreme penalty of death by firing squad. Her
imprisonment in Indonesia and the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her of any
opportunity to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the trial court in
Nueva Ecija where the cases of the respondents were pending. Considering the
circumstances of Mary Jane, the Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to happen
when it required Mary Jane to appear before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija; and
thus, impaired the substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was akin to a denial of
due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to establish its case against the
respondents. The Court of Appeals did not take into account the fact that the case of the
prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be erected through the testimony of Mary
Jane herself. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court
of Appeals deprived her of the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian
authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set
for the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.

Second, the Court ruled that the extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding the
case of Mary Jane warrant the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. They should not be strictly applied causing
injury to a substantive right of a party to case. There are several instances wherein the
Court has relaxed procedural rules to serve substantial justice because of any of the
following reasons: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Art. 1, par. 2(a) of the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, to which both Indonesia and
the Philippines are parties, states that mutual legal assistance can be rendered by the state
parties in case of taking evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons, among
others. The legal assistance sought by the Requesting Party from the Requested Party is not
without limitations. In fact, Art. 3 of the ASEAN ML AT has laid down guidelines on
limitations on assistance. In particular, par. 7 of the said Article states that the Requested
Party can render legal assistance subject to certain conditions which the Requested Party
must observe.

The Indonesia Government imposed the following conditions in taking the testimony of
Mary Jane:
a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

b) No cameras shall be allowed;

c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;
d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by
final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness. The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of
Mary Jane that were laid down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of
written interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under Rule 23 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal
proceedings so long as there is compelling reason. A strict application of the procedural
rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to
Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the
pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius.

Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with the aim
of ASEAN MLAT, which is enforced precisely to be applied in circumstances like in the case
of Mary Jane, and which recognizes the significance of cooperation and coordination among
the states to prevent, investigate and prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated
not only in a single state just like in the case of drug and human trafficking, and illegal
recruitment, the very charges that were filed against respondents.

Third, the deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to

due process.

To disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process. Just as
an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process
in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its evidence
in support of a charge.

Fourth, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also
in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers.It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily,
to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.

It is true that Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in
light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by the
trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by
way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional
right. In this case, the trial court required Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file
their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written
interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on
the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by the Consul of the
Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the
propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would
be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raised any objection
thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same, and the final cross
interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's
answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed
copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld.
As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge
will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give
her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely.
Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the
reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each question propounded to her
both by the prosecution and the defense.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The
parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will
give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still
subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in her
testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a
witness and assess her credibility.

Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized

exceptions to the right to confrontation.

In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state that Mary Jane's deposition through written
interrogatories is akin to her dying declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will be
answering the written interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death - or
execution by a firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by final
judgment and sentenced to death by firing squad.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION), ALFONZO SERVANA CASURRA, LEONARDO LUIB EDERA, JR., JOCELYN
ELEAZAR MONTEROS, MARIA SEPARA GEOTINA, ARMANDO MAPA ELUMBA, CARLO
REYNALDO FAROLAN LOZADA, JR., and ROSEMARIE V. PALACIO

G.R. No. 239878, February 28, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINES

1. Pursuant to the ruling in Cagang, the period taken for fact-finding investigations shall
not be included in the determination of whether there is inordinate delay; the period
shall be reckoned from the filing of a formal complaint.
2. The burden of proof to justify the delay shifts depending on when the right was
invoked. The defense bears the burden if the right was invoked within the periods
prescribed by this Court, the Rules of Court, or the OMB for the conduct of preliminary
investigation; the prosecution bears the burden if the right was invoked beyond the set
periods, and it must show that the delay was justifiable under the factors provided in
Cagang.

FACTS

The Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
alleged that in early 2004, the DBM issued a special allotment order amounting to
P723,000,000.00 for the implementation of the Farm Inputs and Farm Implements
Program of the Department of Agriculture. Out of the amount, the City Government of
Surigao, Surigao del Norte received P5,000,000.00.

Thus, the city, through respondent city mayor Casurra and other respondent LGU officials,
entered into a contract with respondent Palacio and Rosa "Mia" Trading, for the purchase
of 3,332 kilograms of Elements 15-15-30+T.E. Foliar Fertilizer for P1,500 per kilogram, or a
total amount of 4,998,000.00, without the requisite public bidding under the procurement
law. The city paid Rosa "Mia" Trading in two tranches.

Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) post-audited the transaction, and found an
overpricing on the price of the fertilizers. Thus, the COA issued on June 14, 2006 a Notice of
Disallowance (NOD), which was subsequently amended on March 19, 2007.

Thereafter, on July 4, 2011, Task Force Abono filed the Complaint against respondents for
violation of Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, Sec. 10, 18, and 21 of RA 9184, or the
"Government Procurement Reform Act," and its IRR, as well as administrative charges. The
OMB issued a resolution dated October 5, 2016 finding probable cause for the filing of an
Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. This was approved by the
Ombudsman on March 22, 2017. On September 11, 2017, an Information dated May 2,
2017 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents with violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019.

Then on September 22, 2017, respondent Monteros filed a motion to quash

information/dismiss the case and to defer the arraignment on the ground that her right to
speedy disposition of cases was violated because inordinate delay on the part of the OMB
(11 years and 3 months) from the COA investigation in 2006 to the filing of the Information
before the Sandiganbayan in 2017. Respondents Casurra, Edera, Geotina, Elumba, and
Lozada filed their motions to quash information and to defer arraignment similarly
claiming that there was inordinate delay from the fact-finding phase up to the filing of the
Information. Meanwhile, respondent Palacio did not file a similar motion.

The prosecution opposed the said motions arguing that the delay in this case is reasonable
because delay only becomes inordinate if there are arbitrary, vexatious and oppressive
actions or inactions that are attendant to the proceedings within the context of the
particular circumstances attendant thereto. The prosecution stressed that the instant case
is part of the controversial “Fertilizer Fund Scam” that involved high ranking officials of the
government and various NGOs; investigating the case thus requires diligence,
thoroughness, and necessarily, time.

The Sandiganbayan granted the motions of the respondents and dismissed the criminal
case against them on the ground that the delay of more than 11 years is not reasonable, and
that the delay cannot be attributed to the accused as they have timely filed their affidavits
and supporting documents with the OMB. Thus, the respondents were acquitted from their
charges. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the criminal case against Palacio as well, despite his non-
invocation of inordinate delay through a Motion to Dismiss.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, where the prosecution invoked the doctrine of Balancing
Test, and argued that: 1) the period of fact-finding investigation should not be added to the
period for preliminary investigation for purposes of computing length of delay; 2)
respondents did not assert their right to speedy disposition of cases at any time before the
filing of the Information; and 3) the prejudice claimed to have been suffered by
respondents has no factual support.

ISSUE

Whether there has been a violation of the respondents’ right to speedy disposition of cases
caused by the delay in the filing of Information against them?

RULING
YES. Applying the guidelines in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, the Court finds that there is a
violation of respondents' right to speedy disposition of cases.

Firstly, the Court ruled that pursuant to the ruling in Cagang, the period taken for
fact-finding investigations shall not be included in the determination of whether
there is inordinate delay; the period shall be reckoned from the filing of a formal
complaint.

In other words, inordinate delay on cases filed with the OMB primarily pertains to the
period taken for preliminary investigation. As such, the Sandiganbayan erred in including
the period for fact-finding in its determination of the period relevant to inordinate delay.
Since the OMB's preliminary investigation of the case started from the filing of the
complaint on July 4, 2011 and ended on the filing of the Information before the
Sandiganbayan on September 11, 2017, it took 6 years, 2 months and 7 days for the OMB to
conduct its preliminary investigation.

Second, the Court ruled that the prosecution bears the burden of proof to justify the
delay.

Cagang states that the burden of proof to justify the delay shifts depending on when the
right was invoked. The defense bears the burden if the right was invoked within the
periods prescribed by this Court, the Rules of Court, or the OMB for the conduct of
preliminary investigation; the prosecution bears the burden if the right was invoked
beyond the set periods, and it must show that the delay was justifiable under the factors
provided in Cagang.

As the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman then in effect do not provide for
the period within which the preliminary investigation shall be concluded, the periods
provided for in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court shall have suppletory application. Applying
Sections 3 (f) and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the graft investigation officer shall have
10 days after the investigation to determine probable cause; then, he has five days from
resolution to forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman, who shall act upon the
resolution within 10 days from receipt.

In this case, the prescribed periods were not observed. As there were no further
submissions or orders for parties to submit further pleadings as well as hearings, the case
should have been submitted for resolution as early as June 14, 2012. However, it was only
on October 5, 2016 when the OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause, which is
almost 3 years after the case was submitted for resolution, or more than 4 years from the
date the last pleadings were submitted — clearly way beyond the 10-day period. Further,
the Ombudsman herself approved the resolution only on March 22, 2017, which is almost 6
months after the issuance of the resolution — again way beyond the five-day and 10-day
period respectively prescribed for the transmittal of the records to her office and for her to
act upon the resolution.

The next step is the determination of when respondents invoked their right to speedy
disposition of cases. In this case, the earliest time respondents invoked the right was when
respondent Monteros filed a motion for reconsideration of the OMB October 5, 2016
Resolution. The right was invoked after the lapse of the periods prescribed, resulting to the
burden shifting to the prosecution.
Third, the Court ruled that the prosecution failed to justify the delay.

As the prosecution bears the burden, it shall prove that the delay was reasonable. However,
the prosecution failed to do so, as it merely made allegations that the OMB is deluged with
cases and that the instant case is complex. While the Court recognizes the reality of
institutional delay in government agencies, including the OMB, this solely does not justify
the office's failure to promptly resolve cases before it. After all, the Constitution itself, as
enforced and bolstered by The Ombudsman Act of 1989, requires the OMB to promptly act
on complaints filed before it against public officials and government employees. The OMB
should clearly show that delay is inevitable because of the peculiar circumstances of each
specific case, which it failed to do so in this case. The OMB here failed to show that this
specific procurement of fertilizer had peculiar circumstances to make delay inevitable.

The Court understands that the instant case is part of the so called "Fertilizer Fund Scam"
cases. However, this does not mean that the case is highly complex that requires a serious
amount of time. The delay of 6 years, 2 months and 7 days for the preliminary investigation
of a case involving a single transaction (i.e. the procurement of fertilizer that was paid in
two tranches) and 7 respondents is too long a period for this Court to accommodate. There
is also no allegation that respondents here conspired with other government officials
involved in the other Fertilizer Fund Scam cases elsewhere in the country. To add, the OMB
was in effect assisted by the COA in the latter's issuance of the NOD.

Fourth, the Court ruled that the respondents suffered prejudice.

In addition to the discussion, the prosecution must show that respondents did not suffer
prejudice as a result of the delay. In this case, respondents suffered anxiety due to the long
period of uncertainty while waiting for the resolution of the case. The delay affected their
ability to prepare for their defense. As found by the Sandiganbayan, respondents suffered
public humiliation and embarrassment as a result of the case dragging on for so long.

Lastly, the right to speedy disposition of cases was timely invoked by the
respondents, as required by the case of Cagang.

In Catamco and Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, the Court, applying Cagang, considered the filing
of a motion for reconsideration of the OMB resolution finding probable cause as a timely
invocation of the right. In this case, the Court considers the motion for reconsideration filed
by Monteros before the OMB sufficient for purposes of determining whether the
respondents' right to speedy disposition had been violated. Her invocation of the right in
the motion is deemed to cover the other respondents as they are co- respondents in a
single case and it assails a single resolution that applies to all of them. In any event, worthy
of great consideration is respondents' immediate filing of the motions to quash before the
Sandiganbayan after the filing of the Information. As for respondent Palacio, the Court
notes that the petition did not assail the dismissal of the criminal case as against her; hence,
her acquittal still stands.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS. BENEDICTA MALLARI AND CHI WEI-NENG
G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Settled is the rule that when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and
notices must be made upon his/her counsels or one of them. Otherwise, notice to the client
and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. Assuming ACP
Mendoza failed to duly file on time the motion for reconsideration, the negligence and
mistakes of a counsel, ACP Mendoza, are still binding on the petitioner. This is so because a
counsel, once retained, has the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least,
incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his/her client,
petitioner in this case. As such, any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the
authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client
himself/herself.

In its Resolution dated October 7, 2009, the CTA First Division issued three resolutions
ordering ACP Mendoza to attach the CIR's recommendation for criminal prosecution of
Mallari and Wei-Neng or the filing of information, among others, along with a warning that
non-compliance with its orders will result in the dismissal of the case for failure to obey
lawful order of the court. However, ACP Mendoza, in his Compliance with Manifestation,
maintained that the authority of Regional Director Misajon is already sufficient pursuant to
RDAO No. 2-2007, which authorizes Regional Directors to approve and sign approval and
referral letters to authorize the institution of criminal actions for the National Office of the
BIR as required by Sec. 220 of the NIRC including the filing of information before the

FACTS

On October 23, 2007, pursuant to Revenue Delegation Authority Order (RDAO) No. 2-
2007,Regional Director Alfredo V. Misajon of the BIR Revenue Region No. 6 of Manila (BIR
Manila), filed a criminal complaint against respondents Benedicta Mallari and Chi Wei-
Neng, President and General Manager, respectively, of Topsun Int'l., Inc. for violation of Sec.
255 in relation to Sec. 253 and 256 of the 1997 NIRC before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila docketed as I.S. No. O8A-00131. The complaint stemmed from
Topsun's outstanding Value Added-Tax (VAT) deficiency for the months of January to June
2000 in the amount of P3,827,564.64, and a compromise penalty of P25,000.00 for the
same period. Topsun failed and refused to pay its outstanding obligations despite several
demands and the service of the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy. Mallari denied that
Topsun had any outstanding internal revenue tax liability. Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP)
of Manila Gideon C. Mendoza filed an Information against Mallari and Wei-Neng for
violation of Sec. 255 in relation to Sec. 253 and 256 of the NIRC before the CTA First
Division.
The CTA First Division dismissed the criminal complaint for failure of ACP Mendoza to obey
a lawful order of the court, i.e., to submit a certified true copy of the Memorandum of the
CIR authorizing Regional Director Misajon to prosecute and conduct proceedings. ACP
Mendoza received the said CTA First Division Resolution on January 13, 2010. On January
18, 2010, the special counsels/prosecutors of the BIR Manila filed their Entry of
Appearance with Leave to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, where it maintained
its position that the Memorandum of the CIR is no longer needed. The CTA Special First
Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration due to late filing. It observed that based on
the records, the BIR received its December 14, 2009 Resolution on December 17, 2009,
while the Office of the City Prosecutor received the same on December 21, 2009; hence, the
prosecution had until January 4, 2010 and January 5, 2010, respectively, to file the Motion
for Reconsideration. Regrettably, the prosecution filed its Motion for Reconsideration only
on January 18, 2010 or 14 days late beyond the prescribed 15-day period for filing the
same.

Undaunted, the prosecution filed a Petition for Review before the CTA En Banc, which
dismissed the Petition for Review for lack of merit affirming the findings of the CTA Special
First Division, and ruling that the Motion for Reconsideration was belatedly filed.

Hence, this Petition for Review, where petitioner argues that the period for the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration has not yet run since it did not receive a proper notice of the
December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division. Besides, assuming that ACP
Mendoza, the deputized special counsel, failed to timely file the said motion, his
inadvertence cannot be imputed against the State especially on matters relating to the
exercise of its inherent power to tax .

ISSUE

Whether the Motion for Reconsideration was beyond the 15-day prescribed period?

RULING

YES. Section 1, Rule 15 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, otherwise known as the Revised Rules of
the CTA, states that an aggrieved party shall file a motion for reconsideration within 15
days from the date he/she received notice of the assailed decision, resolution or order of
the court in question.

The records show that the BIR Main Office and the Office of the City Prosecutor received
the Notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division on December 17,
2009 and December 21, 2009, respectively. From the date of receipt, petitioner only had
until January 4, 2010 and January 5, 2010, respectively, to file its Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner, however, filed its motion only on January 18, 2010 or 14 days
beyond the prescribed period. Thus, the Court found no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the CTA Special First Division, which was affirmed by the CTA En Banc, that
petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Consequently, petitioner's failure to duly file on time a Motion for Reconsideration of the
CTA First Division's December 14, 2009 Resolution resulted in losing its right to assail the
CTA First Division's judgment before this Court, which is in accordance with the basic rule
that a party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy
within the period prescribed by law for the purpose loses the right to do so.

Settled is the rule that when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders
and notices must be made upon his/her counsels or one of them. Otherwise, notice to the
client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. Petitioner,
through ACP Mendoza, was properly served notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of
the CTA First Division. A review of the records shows that the notices of the Resolutions
dated October 7, November 10 and 26, 2009, respectively, were duly served on the Office of
the City Prosecutor, through ACP Mendoza and now Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Jhosep Y. Lopez, and the BIR Main Office, respectively. To note, ACP Mendoza was the same
prosecutor who initiated the filing of the Information against Mallari and Wei-Neng for
violation of the NIRC before the CTA. Interestingly, there is dearth of records showing that
petitioner questioned the services of the notices that were made upon the BIR Main Office
and the named city prosecutors in the OCP with respect to the said Resolutions. Hence, the
services of notice made to the OCP through ACP Mendoza and the BIR Main Office,
respectively, are deemed proper and are thus service of notice to petitioner itself.

Assuming ACP Mendoza failed to duly file on time the motion for reconsideration, the
negligence and mistakes of a counsel, ACP Mendoza, are still binding on the petitioner. This
is so because a counsel, once retained, has the implied authority to do all acts necessary or,
at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his/her
client, petitioner in this case. As such, any act or omission by counsel within the scope of
the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client
himself/herself.

There is also evidence on record indicating that petitioner has been remiss in its duty to
maintain communication with its counsel from time to time so as to be aware of the
progress of its case. Had petitioner exercised that standard of care "which an ordinarily
prudent man bestows upon his business," then it would have become aware of the previous
resolutions issued by the CTA First Division ordering ACP Mendoza to submit the required
documents. It did not do so. This only shows that petitioner likewise failed in its duty to
keep itself updated as to the status of its case. It should therefore suffer the consequences
of the adverse judgment rendered against it.

Consequently, the CTA First Division December 14, 2009 Resolution had already attained
finality because of petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration within the 15-
day reglementary period allowed under the CTA's revised internal rules.

Judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial
declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or no motion for reconsideration or new trial is
filed. Thus, the assailed Resolution of the CTA First Division now "becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.”
ILDEFONSO TV PATDU, JR., REBECCA S. CACATIAN, AND GERONIMO V. QUINTOS v.
HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, AND FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE-OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 2301711, September 27, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

It remains that OMB resolutions on probable cause in criminal cases are assailable by filing a
petition for certiorari with this Court. This has always been and is still the prevailing rale. To
repeat, Carpio-Morales did not invalidate this remedy as it covers administrative cases only.
The CA has no jurisdiction over findings of probable cause in criminal cases. Indeed, in Carpio-
Morales, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA
6770. However, it is settled that the doctrine laid down in Carpio-Morales has no application
in criminal cases before the OMB.

FACTS

The OMB Field Investigation Office filed a complaint for Estafa, Falsification of Public
Documents, and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 against Iloilo Second District
Representative Judy J. Syjuco, TESDA Director-General Augusto Syjuco, Jr., DOTC
Management Division Inspector Marcelo P. Desiderio, Jr., DOTC Management Technical
Inspector Danilo M. Dela Rosa, and Domingo Samuel Jonathan L. Ng, proprietor of West
Island Beverages Distributor. A supplemental complaint was also field to include DOTC
Storekeeper III Antonio D. Cruz. Likewise, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, DOTC Bids
and Awards Committee Chairman Domingo A. Reyes, Jr., BAC Vice Chairman Elmer A.
Soneja, BAC members Director III Cacatian, Director III Patdu, Legal Officer V Quintos, and
Venancio G. Santidad were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

The OMB found probable cause to charge petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 and Malversation through Falsification. The OMB found that these individuals,
conspired with each other through seemingly separate but collaborative acts to defraud the
government. The charges against Secretary Mendoza are dismissed by reason of his death,
the charges against Syjuco, Jr. are likewise dismissed for insufficiency of evidence against
him. In a separate Resolution, the OMB also ruled that petitioners and the other public
officials charged in the criminal cases are guilty of grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty, warranting the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioners,
moved for the reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the OMB Resolution. However, it
was denied. In a Joint Order, the OMB included storekeeper Cruz among the individuals to
be charged.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the criminal
aspect of the OMB Resolution and the Joint Order. Meanwhile, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan two separate Informations charging petitioners
and the other respondents in the OMB proceedings with violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents.

The CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed with the wrong court. It
reasoned that the remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal cases is
by filing an original action for certiorari with this Court. It ruled that it has no jurisdiction
over the criminal aspect of a case elevated from the OMB. The CA explained that it has
jurisdiction over decisions in administrative disciplinary cases only, which can be assailed
via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA reiterated that the second
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, which states that "No court shall hear any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law," has been declared unconstitutional in Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals for increasing this Court's appellate jurisdiction without its
advice and concurrence. The CA explained that this invalidation does not mean that all
kinds of remedies from the decisions or findings of the OMB may now be brought to the CA;
with respect to probable cause findings in criminal cases, the remedy is still with this Court.
It held that Carpio-Morales affirmed and retained the applicability of Fabian v. Desierto,
which served as basis for the current rule that the OMR's findings of probable cause in
criminal cases may be assailed via a petition for certiorari filed with this Court. This rule
has not been abandoned in Carpio-Morales. Thus, petitioners in the instant case should
have gone to this Court instead of the CA.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend
that the invalidation of the second paragraph of Section 14 in Carpio-Morales is all
encompassing as the Court did not make a distinction on whether the ruling is exclusively
applicable to administrative cases. Hence, the ruling in Carpio-Morales likewise applies to
findings of probable cause in criminal cases.

ISSUE

Did the CA err in dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction?

RULING

NO. The CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright. The proper mode
to assail the OMB's finding of probable cause in criminal cases is by filing a petition for
certiorari before this Court - which petitioners failed to do. Indeed, in Carpio-Morales, the
Court struck down as unconstitutional the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770.
However, it is settled that the doctrine laid down in Carpio-Morales has no application in
criminal cases before the OMB.

In Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court examined previous case law and
clarified that Carpio-Morales has limited application to administrative cases before the
OMB. The antecedents of Gatchalian are similar with the instant case. The OMB found
probable cause to indict petitioner Gatchalian and other individuals for violation of RA
3019, Malversation, and violation of the Manual of Regulations for Banks in relation to the
New Central Bank Act. Petitioner therein also filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to
assail the OMB ruling and reasoned that he elevated the case to the CA by virtue of the
ruling in Carpio-Morales. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction
and opined that Carpio- Morales "should be understood in its proper context, i.e., that what
was assailed therein was the preventive suspension order arising from an administrative
case filed against a public official." On further appeal, this Court agreed with the CA's
disposition—the relevant portions of the Decision state:

A thorough reading of the Carpio-Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was
limited in its application—that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less categorically
stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Ruizon and Estrada and the distinction made
therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an
interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or
orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative or criminal cases.

It is thus clear that the Carpio-Morales decision never intended to disturb the well-
established distinction between the appellate remedies for orders, directives, and decisions
arising from administrative cases and those arising from non-administrative or criminal
cases.

Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was declared unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-
making powers of the Court by: 1) prescribing the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, for all cases whether final or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the
certiorari jurisdiction of the CA over incidents arising from administrative cases. Therefore,
the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 did not necessarily have an effect over the
appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because
the said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section. To recall, the rule
that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause (or the
lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed
with the Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr.,
Mendcza- Arce v. Ombudsman, Estrada, and subsequent cases affirming the said rule. The
rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule
prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of
unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore immaterial insofar as the
appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is
concerned.

The argument therefore that the promulgation of the Carpio-Morales decision—a case
which involved an interlocutory order arising from an administrative case, and which did
not categorically abandon the cases of Kuizon, Tirol, Jr., Mendoza-Arce, and Estrada— gave
the CA certiorari jurisdiction over final orders and decisions arising from non-
administrative or criminal cases is clearly untenable.
Therefore, the remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-
administrative cases is still by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court, and not with
the CA. This doctrine has never been struck down or abandoned by Carpio-Morales. This is
supported by a more recent case, Yatco v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
(Yatco). Yatco also assailed the OMB's ruling in a criminal case for lack of probable cause
before the CA, which the latter likewise dismissed.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it remains that OMB resolutions on probable cause
in criminal cases are assailable by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court. This has
always been and is still the prevailing rale. To repeat, Carpio-Morales did not invalidate
this remedy as it covers administrative cases only. The CA has no jurisdiction over
findings of probable cause in criminal cases.

In the instant case, the CA, therefore, did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners have erroneously filed their petition for certiorari with the
appellate court, when it should have been filed before this Court. It follows then that
petitioners have lost their right to assail the OMB's finding of probable cause against them
when they elevated the case before the wrong forum.

Now that Informations were already filed in the Sandiggnbayan, petitioners have all the
opportunity there during the trial proper to dispute the findings of probable cause, and,
possibly, to eventually clear their names from the alleged crimes.
GORGONIO P. PALAJOS v. JOSE MANOLO E. ABAD

G.R. No. 226272, March 7, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to prior physical possession or possession
de facto, not possession de Jure or that arising from ownership. Title is not an issue. As an
exception, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall
be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with
the issue of ownership. Thus, based on the foregoing, the issue of ownership of the property in
forcible entry cases may be provisionally determined - to determine the issue of possession
and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership. In addition, We have likewise consistently held that "possession can be acquired
not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right."

FACTS

Manolo and his siblings Ma. Jasmin and Jose Roman (collectively, plaintiffs), filed a
complaint for forcible entry against Palajos along with other individuals with the METC.
While such case was pending before the METC, plaintiffs filed a motion to render judgment
claiming that defendants filed their answer beyond the reglementary period or ndid not file
any answer at all. The METC granted the motion except against Palajos whose answer was
admitted.

Plaintiffs claimed that they are the registered owners of three adjacent and contiguous
parcels of land in Quezon City which they acquired from their parents in 1999. Sometime in
September or October 2001, they took actual possession of the subject property and
constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it. They claimed that on the third week of
January 2006, they discovered that defendants destroyed portions of the perimeter fence,
entered the subject property, and constructed their houses thereon, depriving plaintiffs of
their possession. Upon discovery, plaintiffs made demands for defendants to vacate but the
latter failed and refused to remove their houses and structures. As a result, plaintiffs filed a
complaint before the proper barangay authorities, but defendants still failed to comply
with their demand.

On the other hand, Palajos claimed that he entered Lot No. 5 of the subject property by
virtue of a May 4, 1988 deed of absolute sale which B.C. Regalado & Co. executed in his
favor. To further substantiate his claim of prior physical possession he averred that he paid
real property taxes as evidenced by receipt of payment, proofs of billing of his Bayantel
telephone which he had installed in his residence in the year 2004, and that he was able to
procure a COMELEC registration application of his son, Ronald C. Palajos, dated October 24,
2003.
The METC ruled in favor of plaintiffs finding that they had prior physical possession of the
subject property since they constructed a concrete perimeter fence thereon in 2001.
Aggrieved, Palajos filed an appeal which was given due course. The RTC reversed the METC
finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove prior actual physical possession. Manolo filed a
petition with the CA which was granted. The CA reversed the RTC fidning that Manolo
sufficiently proved that he had prior physical possession over the property. Palajos moved
for a reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Did Manolo prove his prior physical possession of the subject property, which includes Lot
No. 5, Block 73, to entitle him to recover in an ejectment suit of forcible entry?

RULING

YES. The three elements that must be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to

prosper are the following:

(a) plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property before the
defendant encroached on the property;
(b) plaintiff was deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth by defendant; and
(c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the plaintiff learned of his
deprivation of the physical possession of the property, except that when the entry is
through stealth, the one (1 )-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff- owner or
legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

In this case, Palajos contends that two elements of forcible entry are absent: first, Manolo
had no prior physical possession of the property; and second, the action was filed beyond
the one-year prescriptive period. We disagree.

As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to prior physical possession or

possession de facto, not possession de Jure or that arising from ownership. Title is not an
issue. As an exception, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of
ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. Thus, based on the foregoing, the
issue of ownership of the property in forcible entry cases may be provisionally determined
- to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. In addition, We have likewise
consistently held that "possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also
by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right."
This Court finds that it is necessary to provisionally determine ownership of the subject
property for purposes of determining prior possession. In the instant case, both the METC
and the CA correctly found that Manolo and his siblings were able to establish that they are
the registered owners of the subject property which they acquired from their parents in
1999. Although they did not immediately put the same to active use but viewed in the light
of the foregoing juridical acts, Manolo had been occupying the land since 1999. On the
other hand, Palajos claims that his right to enter Lot No. 5 of the subject property was by
virtue of a May 4, 1988 Deed of Absolute Sale which B.C. Regalado & Co. executed in his
favor. However, We find that Palajos failed to substantially prove the same.

With regard to the issue of prior physical possession, sometime in September or October
2001, Manolo and his siblings took actual possession of the subject property and
constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it. On the other hand, Palajos' evidence of
alleged prior possession of Lot No. 5 of the subject property - such as payment of real
property taxes on February 17, 2005 and January 21, 2006, or proofs of billing of his
Bayantel telephone which he had installed in his residence in the year 2004, or that he was
able to procure a COMELEC registration application of his son on October 24, 2003 – are
incidents that occurred after Manolo took possession of the subject property. Thus, this
Court finds that Manolo had prior physical possession of the subject property.

Anent the claim of prescriptive period, We find that the same was filed within one year
from the time Manolo and his sibling discovered the clandestine entry of the defendants on
the third week of January while the complaint was filed on February 23, 2006. Entry in the
premises of the subject property without the consent and knowledge of the registered
owner, clearly falls under stealth, which is defined as "any secret, sly or clandestine act to
avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within the residence of another
without permission."
FELINO A. PALAFOX, JR. VS. HON. FRANCISCO G. MENDIOLA AND SENATOR EDGARDO
J. ANGARA

G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy. Further, We have held that such serious and important
reasons must be "clearly stated in the petition."

FACTS

A Complaint for Damages filed by Sen. Angara against Palafox, Jr., alleging that Palafox, Jr.
authored an unsigned letter containing defamatory statements against him. In the
Complaint, Sen. Angara indicated that he was holding office in Pasay City.

In his Answer, Palafox, Jr. argued that venue was improperly laid since the Complaint was
filed in the RTC of Pasay City instead of Makati City where both parties reside. He moved to
set the preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses, raising such issue of improper
venue, among others. Sen. Angara opposed the motion and pointed out that Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code allows the filing of the civil action where the public officer holds
office. Palafox, Jr. argued that Article 360 is inapplicable because the action involved is a
civil action for damages and not a criminal action for libel. Meanwhile, Sen. Angara served
Palafox, Jr. with a notice to take deposition upon oral examination. Palafox, Jr. opposed such
notice on the ground that deposition was premature as pre-trial had not yet been
terminated.

The trial court held that the venue was proper since the filing of a separate civil action for
damages where the public officer holds office is allowed under Article 360. The RTC denied
Palafox, Jr.'s motion to dismiss for improper venue. It likewise granted Sen. Angara's
motion to take oral deposition pursuant to Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, which does not expressly require the termination of pre-trial before the taking
of deposition. Palafox, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
Petition for Certiorari.

In his Comment, Sen. Angara countered that Palafox, Jr. violated the rule on hierarchy of
courts when he filed the Petition directly to the Supreme Court. While Palafox, Jr. was
required to file a Reply to Sen. Angara's Comment, he manifested that he was adopting his
arguments raised in the Petition.

ISSUE

Was Palafox, Jr. correct in filing his Petition directly to the Supreme Court?
RULING
NO. We dismiss the Petition for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. In

Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, We summarized such rule and the exceptions thereto:

Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper
because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it
to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time
and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding
of its docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (I) when dictated by the public welfare and
the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional
and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of
the case.

We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of strictly respecting this rule. In

Pemberton v. De Lima, We said that the Court may only act when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now
affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of
the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well
within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The
Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy. Further, We have held that such serious and important
reasons must be "clearly stated in the petition."

Here, Palafox, Jr. filed his Petition directly to this Court despite the concurrent jurisdiction
of the appellate court. Significantly, he did not bother to provide any reason or explanation
to justify his noncompliance to the rule on hierarchy of courts. Further, when he was
required to reply to Sen. Angara's Comment containing the latter's argument on the
violation of hierarchy of courts, he simply manifested his adoption of his previous
arguments in the Petition. This constitutes a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts and
merits the dismissal of the Petition.
PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. VS. VILETA NOCHE, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 202392, October 4, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules provides that an appeal may be perfected by the
appellant-employer only by the posting of a bond in the equivalent amount of the full
monetary award granted to the appellee-employee. The perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
Consequently, there should be no implied approval of a jurisdictional requirement that has
not been complied with. Whether the NLRC accepts or rejects the appellant's motion to reduce
bond, the ruling must be unequivocal, and such ruling must be issued before or at the time the
NLRC resolves the appeal by final judgment. Failure to do so shall render the NLRC liable for
grave abuse of discretion for having ruled on an appeal without acquiring jurisdiction over
the same, and the judgment that issued shall be vacated as null and void.

FACTS

Petitioner Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. (PRBFI) is a business entity engaged in the
manufacturing, processing, and distribution of coconut products for export. PRBFI
employed respondents as coconut parers. Respondents filed a complaint for non-
regularization with the DOLE. On March 20, 2009, PRBFI sent letters to respondents
allegedly acting on product quality complaints and claims for reimbursement and damages
from some of its clients. Thereafter, PRBFI dismissed respondents from work.

Respondents filed a complaint against PRBFI for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
regularization, damages, and reinstatement before the NLRC averring that they were
dismissed from work without a prior investigation or an opportunity to air their side.
Respondents claimed that their suspension and eventual dismissal from work was PRBFI's
retaliatory measure against respondents' complaint for non-regularization and was
violative of Article 118 of the Labor Code. PRBFI claimed that respondents were
subsequently dismissed for just causes.

The LA ruled for the respondents finding that PRBFI had no just cause for their dismissal.
PRBFI showed no factual bases for or specific circumstances of the infractions allegedly
committed by respondents. PRBFI appealed to the NLRC. It also filed an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion to Reduce Bond and tendered a cash bond of Pl00,000.00. The NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter. It held that respondents left the fact of product contamination undisputed
and failed to show any ill motive on PRBFI's part in accusing them of having caused such
contamination.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA granted respondents'
Petition for Certiorari. It found that PRBFI did not present any proof of compliance as to the
required posting of an appeal bond. Thus, PRBFI's appeal before the NLRC should have
been deemed not perfected, and the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over PRBFI's appeal.
While the NLRC did not resolve the procedural issue and gave due course to PRBFI's
appeal, the CA held that PRBFI cannot rely on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. On the merits, the CA found no satisfactory basis in fact or in
law to affirm the factual findings of the NLRC.

ISSUE

Did the CA err in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and finding grave abuse of
discretion against the NLRC?

RULING

NO. The CA was correct. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed before the Supreme Court covers pure questions of law - questions on the
application of the law on a certain set and state of established facts. Questions of fact, or
those seeking to verify the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, will not be entertained.
Essentially, a petition for review on certiorari excludes a reassessment of the disputed facts
of the case.

In assailing the CA's actions on the respective procedural obedience of herein parties and
its favorable appreciation of the arguments raised by respondents, PRBFI necessarily prays
the reopening of the factual records of the case. PRBFI cannot do so in a Rule 45
proceeding. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Such a noble task is better left to the
competence of the trial courts and appellate courts. Note, however, that this is not an
inflexible rule. A factual probe into the case may be conducted in a Rule 45 petition if it falls
under the exceptional circumstances. The case at hand does not fall under any of these
exceptions.

Even if the Court lends procedural lenience to PRBFI and reviews the factual circumstances
of this case, the CA's judgment must still be upheld.

1. PRBFI first argues against the CA's act of allowing respondents' Petition for Certiorari
despite the latter's alleged failure to fully comply with the CA's directive to submit
additional supporting documents. Petitioner believes that the petition should have been
dismissed, but the CA instead, unfairly gave due course to the same. The Court disagrees
with petitioner.

Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court instructs that the failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the formal requirements of a petition for certiorari shall be sufficient ground
for its dismissal. The CA, however, is not compelled to automatically order the dismissal of
a formally-infirm pleading. Section 5, Rule 46 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 5. Action by the court. - The court may dismiss the petition outright with specific
reasons for such dismissal or require the respondent to file a comment on the same within
ten (10) days from notice.
Two basic options are given to the CA under the foregoing provision: (1) to dismiss the
petition outright, wit.h. specific reasons, or (2) to require the respondent to file a comment
on the same within ten (10) days from notice. The CA, however, holds a wide discretionary
latitude in the disposition of the cases filed before it and is not restricted to those provided
under Section 5, Rule 46. It may make an initial determination of the necessity for the
submission of copies of pleading and other documents.

In resolving respondents' Petition for Certiorari, the appellate court exercised such judicial
discretion by first instructing respondents to complete the documentary attachments.
Respondents did so, albeit inaccurately. While petitioner pointed out that respondents
attached the allegedly wrong pleadings to their Compliance, the CA noted the same,
directed PRBFI to file a Comment, and proceeded to decide respondents' Petition for
Certiorari on the merits. Contrary to PRBFI's insinuations, the CA did not act arbitrarily.
The CA correctly relied on the available documents already submitted by the parties; after
all, litigants in a labor case must allege all their arguments and evidence in their position
papers and pleadings before the labor arbiter, and no other argument or evidence will be
considered oilier than those raised during the proceedings before the labor arbiter.

The Court affirms the CA's decision to gloss over the other technical issues raised by PRBFI
which were unfounded. Per the CA records, the Verification and Certification was
notarized, and the Affidavit of Service required by the CA was attached to respondents'
Compliance. Even if PRBFI was correct, such lapses are mere formal not jurisdictional,
errors. Labor cases have never been strictly bound by technicalities of form and procedure.
Also, a grant of liberality to one does not automatically connote bias against the other
party. An allegation of bias is a grave accusation that requires proof, and there can be no
bias ascribable upon a tribunal if its actions were clearly done in accordance with the law.

2. PRBFI further insists that the CA erred in considering its appeal of the Labor Arbiter's
Decision before the NLRC as not perfected for its failure to file a bond. Petitioner asserts
the sufficiency of its payment of a cash bond in the amount of P l00,000.00 and its filing of a
Motion to Reduce Bond. The Court still finds no reason to agree with PRBFI on this
procedural point.

The general rule is that appeals by an employer before the NLRC of decisions by a labor
arbiter that involve monetary awards to an employee must be secured by a cash or surety
bond in the full amount of the monetary award. By way of exception, the payment of this
full amount may be excused if the appealing employer files a motion to reduce bond
showing meritorious grounds, and upon posting of a bond in a reasonable amount.

Records, however, show that PRBFI's Motion to Reduce Bond was never acted upon
by the NLRC. Still, the NLRC resolved petitioner's appeal of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on
the merits and issued its own resolutions thereon. Such final resolutions had been the
subject of certiorari proceedings before the CA, during which petitioner argued for the first
time that the NLRC's inaction on its Motion to Reduce Bond, coupled with its resolution of
the case on all its substantial points, is tantamount to an implied affirmance of the
perfection of PRBFI's appeal.
Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules provides that an appeal may be perfected by the
appellant-employer only by the posting of a bond in the equivalent amount of the full
monetary award granted to the appellee-employee. The perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
Consequently, there should be no implied approval of a jurisdictional requirement that has
not been complied with. Otherwise, the ground of lack of jurisdiction becomes a waivable
defect in procedure. Whether the NLRC accepts or rejects the appellant's motion to reduce
bond, the ruling must be unequivocal, and such ruling must be issued before or at the time
the NLRC resolves the appeal by final judgment. Failure to do so shall render the NLRC
liable for grave abuse of discretion for having ruled on an appeal without acquiring
jurisdiction over the same, and the judgment that issued shall be vacated as null and void.

The CA was correct in granting respondents' Petition for Certiorari and finding grave abuse
of discretion against the NLRC. PRBFI cannot rely on the mere presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties in favor of the NLRC when the latter gave due course to
its appeal; not when it is faced with a serious imputation of non-compliance from
respondents. Considering that the requirements provided under the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules are mandatory for purposes of perfecting an appeal, the rule on
presumption of regularity cannot apply.
ANTONIO NGO v. VISITACION GABELO, et al.

G.R. No. 207707, August 24, 2020, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Subject to exemptions provided in Administrative Circular No. 14-93, a party's failure to

comply with the requirement of prior barangay conciliation before filing a case in court
would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a condition
precedent.

FACTS

On Sept. 24, 2008, petitioner Antonio Ngo (Ngo) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
250439 (subject property) against respondents Visitacion Gabelo, et al. (Gabelo, et al.).

In the complaint, Ngo alleged he is the lawful and absolute owner of the subject property by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Philippine Realty Corp. (PRC), as
allegedly confirmed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 111743. He averred further
that despite several demands, Gabelo, et al. refused to vacate the property.

Answering, respondents Gabelo et al. argued that Ngo has no legal personality to sue, and
that the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 111743 merely identified Ngo as one of those who could
buy the lot from PRC and did not declare him as absolute owner of the same. Further, they
insisted that Ngo failed to comply with the condition precedent for filing the action since he
failed to bring the matter to barangay conciliation.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that the case did
not undergo barangay conciliation proceedings. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Ngo, the RTC reinstated the complaint but referred the same to barangay
conciliation. Gabelo, et al. filed their own motion for reconsideration of the reinstatement,
but the RTC denied the same.

The Court of Appeals (CA) later granted Gabelo et al.’s petition for certiorari, holding that
the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly mandates resort to barangay conciliation
proceedings as a precondition to the filing of complaints for disputes between parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality and non-compliance therewith could
affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action.

In the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, Ngo asserts that
the respondents’ failure to file a motion to dismiss on account of failure to comply with a
condition precedent constitutes waiver on the part of the defendant. He further asserts that
his subsequent compliance with the requirement of barangay conciliation has rendered the
case moot and academic.

ISSUE

Whether the complaint filed by Ngo should have been dismissed for failure to undergo
barangay conciliation proceedings.

RULING

YES. Subject to [xxx] exemptions [provided in Administrative Circular No. 14-93], a party's
failure to comply with the requirement of prior barangay conciliation before filing a case in
court would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a
condition precedent. Moreover, as a general rule, grounds for dismissal must be invoked by
the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer;
otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived.

Notably however, such non-compliance of the condition precedent is not jurisdictional. In

Uy v. Judge Contreras, We held: The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of
pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.

Moreover, the case is not among those exempted from the requirement of prior
conciliation. Gabelo, et al., timely and consistently raised such omission and vigorously
invoked the dismissal of the complaint. All these circumstances justified the dismissal of
Ngo's complaint.

The case is not moot and academic

[P]etitioner, at this juncture, argues that the issue was rendered moot due to the referral of
the case to barangay conciliation proceedings and issuance of Certificate to File Action.
However, a careful review of the said undated Certificate to File Action reveals that the
same was irregularly issued.

Ngo's admission that none of the respondents appeared is materially inconsistent with the
statement in the Certification that there has been personal confrontation between the
parties. Moreover, based on the copy of the summons attached, only respondents Spouses
Gabelo and Erlinda Abella were able to receive the same. The foregoing clearly does not
satisfy the requirement of the law. Moreover, the Certification mentioned that a settlement
has been reached by the parties. If this is so, then there would have been no need for
referral of the matter to the court/government office, contrary to the statement in the
Certification.
Suspension is not proper since there was a complete failure to refer the case to the
barangay

In the instant case, there is a complete failure on the part of Ngo to refer the case to the
barangay for prior conciliation. [Bonifacio Law Office v. Bellosillo] is not on all fours with the
case at bar because there was a prior barangay conciliation therein but the trial court
merely referred it back for completion.
FROILAN NAGAÑO, et al. v. LUIS TANJANGCO, et al.

G.R. No. 204218, May 12, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The purpose of a reply is to deny or allege facts in denial of new matters alleged by way of
defense in the answer, or respondents' comment in this case. It is not the function of a reply to
introduce new arguments which would offend the basic principles of fair play and due
process.

FACTS

The property which is the subject of this case is a 238.7949-hectare piece of land in Nueva
Ecija. On Oct. 21, 1972, the subject property was placed under the land transfer program of
the government pursuant to Presidential Decree 27 (PD 27), or the Tenants Emancipation
Decree.

At the time, the property was registered under the names of the spouses Jose Tanjangco
and Anita Suntay (Spouses Tanjangco) with respect to 144 hectares, and under the names
of respondents and their two other siblings, Federico Tanjangco (Federico) and Antonio
Tanjangco (Antonio) with respect to 95.5845 hectares. Pursuant to PD 27, emancipation
patents were issued in favor of the tenant-beneficiaries.

On April 7, 1983, the 144-hectare portion allocated to the Spouses Tanjangco was
transferred to respondents Luis Tanjangco et al. and their siblings.

On Oct. 5, 1999, the respondents filed an application for retention of five hectares for each
of them on the subject property pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office.

Petitioners Froilan Nagañ o, et al., who claim to be transferees of the areas sought to be
retained by respondents, alleged that respondents were disqualified to retain, considering
that they each already owned more than 24 hectares of land on the subject property.

During the pendency of the petition for retention, respondents and their siblings executed a
deed of partition dated July 4, 200, allocating 20 hectares to each respondent, 138.7949
hectares to Federico and 20 hectares to Antonio. As such, on said date, the respondents
each owned less than 24 hectares.

Meanwhile, the DAR Regional Director on 2004 ruled that respondents were not entitled to
retention because they each owned more than 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn lands, in
violation of the first ground provided in DAO 04-91. Upon denial of their motion for
reconsideration, respondents appealed to the DAR Secretary.
The DAR Secretary affirmed the Regional Director’s ruling but on another ground –
respondents each owned more than seven hectares of other agricultural lands. Upon
motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary reversed its earlier order and held that
respondents complied with the "compact and contiguous" requirement and are entitled to
retention.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the DAR Secretary’s resolution granting
respondents’ motion for reconsideration. This, however, was denied by the DAR Secretary
for being a prohibited pleading. Petitioners thus appealed to the Office of the President
(OP).

The OP reinstated the DAR Regional Director’s decision and held that respondents were not
entitled to retention. The OP further denied the respondents’ ensuing motion for
reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals (CA), however, reinstated the resolutions of the DAR secretary
granting the respondents’ application for retention on the following grounds: (1)
petitioners’ appeal before the OP was belatedly filed; (2) petitioners were without
personality to oppose the application for retention because they were illegal transferees of
the lots; and (3) respondents each owned less than 24 hectares of land on the property as a
result of the partition.

ISSUES

(1) Whether petitioners are real parties in interest to oppose the application for retention.
(NO.)

(2) Whether the appeal before the Office of the President was timely filed. (NO.)

RULING

(1) NO. The transfer of lands covered by PD 27 is null and void, except when made to the
heirs of the beneficiaries by hereditary succession or to the government. The transfers of
Lot Nos. 77, 133 and 134 being null and void, title to these lots never left the hands of the
original beneficiaries or their heirs.

Accordingly, the DAR Regional Director and DAR Secretary correctly based their decisions
only on the merits of the application for retention, and without any reference to
petitioners' opposition or pleadings. Petitioners, who are strangers to this case, have no
right to oppose respondents' application for retention.

The arguments were raised only in the reply and could not be considered

Petitioner Froilan adds in his Reply to respondents' Comment that his interest in Lot Nos.
77, 133 and 134 stems from his purchase of said lotsfrom the transferees of the original
tenant-beneficiaries. According to him, the transfers were valid by virtue of Executive
Order No. 228 (EO 228) and this Court's ruling in Heirs of Paulino Atienza v. Espidol, which
supposedly rendered ineffective the prohibition on transfer under PD 27.

However, this argument was raised only in the Reply to respondents' Comment, which
petitioner Froilan is not allowed to do. "The purpose of a reply is to deny or allege facts in
denial of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer," or respondents' comment
in this case. It is not the function of a reply to introduce new arguments which would
offend the basic principles of fair play and due process.

(2) NO. The October 1, 2009 Resolution of the DAR Secretary which granted respondents'
application for retention has become final and executory, and therefore immutable.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the October 1, 2009 Resolution [of the DAR
Secretary], instead of appealing directly to the Office of the President within 15 days, as
provided under Section 32, Rule V of DAO 03-03.

Thus, in its assailed Decision, the appellate court held that petitioners' motion for
reconsideration did not toll the running of the period for filing the appeal before the Office
of the President. Consequently, when the 15-day period lapsed without petitioners filing an
appeal thereto, the October 1, 2009 Resolution became final and executory. We agree with
the pronouncement of the CA.

Petitioner Froilan insists, however, that Sec. 32 allows one motion for reconsideration for
each party, notwithstanding the DAR Secretary's resolution of the motion for
reconsideration filed by the opposing party. Thus, when petitioners exercised their right to
file a motion for reconsideration, the reglementary period for their appeal before the Office
of the President supposedly did not yet commence until they received the June 16, 2010
Resolution of the DAR Secretary resolving their motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Froilan is mistaken. While Sec. 32 allows each party to file a motion for
reconsideration with respect to the decision of the DAR Secretary, once the latter resolves
any or both motions filed, the remedy left to the losing party is that provided under
Sec. 32, i.e., "[u]pon receipt of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, x x x [to]
elevate the matter to the Office of the President (OP)."

Thus, when the DAR Secretary issued the March 26, 2009 Order, both parties could have
simultaneously filed a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from receipt thereof. Yet
it was only respondent Luis who moved for a reconsideration. Consequently, when the 15-
day period for filing a motion for reconsideration lapsed without petitioners filing such
motion, they were no longer allowed to do so. Their recourse was to appeal to the Office of
the President.

Because of the belated appeal before the Office of the President, the October 1, 2009
Resolution has become final and executory, and therefore, immutable.
FE MORADA v. RANDY RIAS, et al.

G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The liberality accorded to amparo does not mean that a claimant is excused from the onus of
proving his case. Even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate
evidence.

FACTS

At about 8 a.m. on Oct. 14, 2015, petitioner Fe Morada (Morada) received a text message
from her daughter that her (Morada’s) son Johnson was arrested and detained by barangay
tanods of Brgy. 176 in Caloocan City for alleged theft of a mobile phone.

At about 7 p.m. of the same day, Morada went to the barangay hall, where she was
informed that Johnson was already released from the custody of the barangay as evidenced
by the entry in the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself.

In December of the same year, Morada went to the Northern Police District to report that
her son is missing. An investigation was conducted but was later terminated due to the lack
of a witness to shed light on Johnson’s disappearance well as the insistence of the barangay
officers that Johnson was already released.

In the meantime, rumors circulated within the barangay that Johnson was extrajudicially
killed and his body was mixed in cement to conceal the incident. This prompted Morada to
institute a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
impleading respondent barangay desk officials, to determine whether the latter had
violated or threatened to violate Johnson's right to life, liberty and security, and to compel
respondents to determine the whereabouts of Johnson, and the person/s responsible for
his disappearance or possible death, among others.

The RTC denied the petition, ruling that there was no showing of any refusal on the part of
the respondents to acknowledge or to give information on Johnson's whereabouts such
that there was no intention to remove him from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC should have given due course to the petition for issuance of the writ of
amparo.

RULING
NO. A careful review of the records of the case reveals that the RTC committed no
reversible error in finding that no substantial evidence exists to compel the grant of the
writ prayed for by Morada.

The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under Republic Act No. 9851
are as follows:

1. that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

2. that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
3. that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and
4. that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.

There is no question that the first and second elements are attendant in this case.

However, We agree with the RTC that the third and fourth elements are sorely lacking.
While it is admitted that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft that he committed in
the house of Randy, it was sufficiently established by the respondents that he was already
released from their custody on October 14, 2015, as evidenced by the barangay blotter,
signed by Johnson himself. In fact, Morada neither denied nor refuted the said document of
release.

As opposed to the unsubstantiated allegations of Morada that it is respondents who are

responsible for Johnson's disappearance, We accord greater weight to the documentary
evidence presented by the respondents exhibiting that Johnson was no longer in the
custody of the respondents when he disappeared. Such evidence strongly militate against
Morada's claim of enforced disappearance.

There was no lack of cooperation on the part of respondents

By her own admission, Morada disclosed that when she inquired about her son Johnson at
the barangay hall, she was immediately informed by respondent Rolly that Johnson was
captured but was also released from detention the same day. In support thereof, Rolly
showed the barangay blotter which bore Johnson's signature showing his release. Thus, it
is clear that there was no refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Johnson.

Morada further admitted that the NPD conducted an investigation on Johnson's

disappearance but the same was terminated due to the lack of a witness to give light to the
investigation and on account of the information from the barangay that he was already
released from custody. The foregoing belie Morada's claim of lack of cooperation on the
part of the authorities.

Government authorization, support or acquiescence was not shown

“For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even
not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the
required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and
that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the missing persons."

Morada's petition is mainly anchored on the alleged rumor which circulated in their
community that Johnson was killed and his dead body was mixed in cement. However, said
allegation lacked corroborations. The presentation of testimonial, documentary or at least
circumstantial evidence could have made a difference in light of the denials made by the
respondents as regards Morada's claims, as well as the documentary evidence, showing
that Johnson is no longer in the charge of the barangay. Morada's continued reliance on
mere rumors and speculations, without presenting any clear and independent evidence
showing that there was a threat to Johnson's life, liberty, and security, even prior to his
arrest or that he was physically harmed by the respondents while in detention, does not
amount to substantial evidence.

Not only did Morada fail to substantiate any extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance
in this case, she also miserably failed to show any government participation or
acquiescence in any killing or disappearance. To reiterate, records show that Johnson was
properly accounted for by the authorities who initially detained him.

The liberality accorded to amparo does not mean that a claimant is excused from the onus
of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands
some adequate evidence."
JONATHAN MONTERDE and ROY CONAG v. BAYANI JACINTO, in his capacity as Graft
Investigation Officer III, et al.

G.R. No. 214102, February 14, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are required to be executed

as a matter of course. Not even the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for
review can stay the immediate implementation of Ombudsman decisions, resolutions, or
orders in administrative disciplinary cases.

Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

FACTS

In 2011, Evelyn Conag (Conag) filed an administrative complaint against the vice mayor
and members of the sangguniang bayan of Esperanza, Masbate grounded on the local
government officials’ failure to respond to the request of a certain organization for an
ordinance establishing a marine reserve and fish sanctuary in Masbate. Petitioners
Jonathan Monterde and Roy Conag were among the sanggunian members impleaded.

In its Feb. 22, 2013 decision, the Ombudsman found merit in the complaint and imposed
upon the local government officials the penalty of suspension for six months. The
Ombudsman later partially granted the motions for reconsideration of the local
government officials in a May 1, 2013 order and reduced the penalty to a fine equivalent to
three-months’ salary. In the meantime, petitioners Monterde and Roy Conag were re-
elected during the May 13, 2013.

Unsatisfied with the reduction of the penalty, Conag moved for reconsideration, but the
same was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, the local government officials filed a motion
to stay execution of the Ombudsman’s decision grounded on the application of the
condonation doctrine.

The Ombudsman denied the motion to stay execution on the ground that the condonation
doctrine does not apply in petitioners’ case because the decision finding them guilty had
already become executory even before their re-election.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Supreme Court, arguing that they can no longer be administratively disciplined following
their re-election.

ISSUES
1. Whether petitioners availed of the correct remedy from the orders of the Ombudsman.
(NO.)

2. Whether the execution of the decision of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty on

petitioners should have been stayed. (NO.)

RULING

(1) NO. It is well-settled that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.

Such ruling has been reiterated in many subsequent cases, and has been later on
incorporated in the first paragraph of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of
Procedure. Accordingly, A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC instructs that any appeal by way of petition
for review from a decision, final resolution, or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases, or by way of special civil action relative to such decision, resolution, or order, must
be denied or dismissed, respectively.

As to the second assailed Order, which is an interlocutory order, even though the special
civil action of certiorari may be the proper remedy, petitioners still violated the hierarchy
of courts when they filed the petition directly to this Court without citing any exception to
the rule. Thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground.

(2) NO. Decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are required to be
executed as a matter of course, viz.:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. — x x x

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a

matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be
strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without
just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

In fact, not even the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review can stay
the immediate implementation of Ombudsman decisions, resolutions, or orders in
administrative disciplinary cases. Only a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction, duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, can produce such
effect as stated in Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006.

Hence, the Ombudsman cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners' motion to stay execution. It was merely doing its duty as required
by law.
GIL MIGUEL v. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS UDK-15368, September
15, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Murder is considered a heinous crime in so far as the GCTA Law is concerned, and persons
charged with and/or convicted of such are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the
law.

FACTS

On Feb. 26, 1991, petitioner Gil Miguel (Miguel) was charged with the crime of Murder
before the Regional Trial Court and was later found guilty as charged and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was later delivered to the National Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City on Jan. 15, 1994. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court on 1996.

Alleging that his continued detention no longer holds legal basis in view of R.A. No. 10592
or the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law (GCTA Law), Miguel filed the present petition for
the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus on Aug. 19, 2015.

Miguel’s argument is two-fold. First he argues that pursuant to the GCTA Law, he has
already served a total of 38 years, 10 months and 1 day. Further, he posits that pursuant to
Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of reclusion perpetua is capped at 30 years.
Thus, he concludes that he has fully served his sentence.

ISSUES

(1) Whether Miguel’s direct resort to the Supreme Court is proper. (NO.)

(2) Whether Miguel is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. (NO.)

RULING

(1) NO. The trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. However, this does not mean
that parties are absolutely free to choose before which court to file their petitions.

[M]ere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the
court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy
of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary writs.' Miguel should have filed the
present petition before the RTC, absent any showing of special and important reasons
warranting a direct resort to this Court.
(2) NO. On the first point, Miguel assumes that he is entitled to the benefits of the GCTA
Law. However, a plain reading of the law would reveal otherwise.

The GCTA Law and the 2019 Revised IRR have made it abundantly clear that persons
charged with and/or convicted of heinous crimes are not entitled to the benefits under
the law.

The 2019 Revised IRR defines "heinous crimes" as follows: "Heinous Crimes" — crimes
which are grievous, odious and hateful to the senses and which, by reason of their inherent
and/or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society, including crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under
the provisions of RA No. 7659, as amended, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
and those crimes specifically declared as such by the Supreme Court[.]

While the definition did not expressly enumerate crimes which are considered heinous, it
made reference to "crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under the
provisions of RA 7659, as amended xxx.”

[As provided by RA 7659,] the crime of Murder is one that is mandatorily punishable by
death, in accordance with the Death Penalty Law. In sum, Murder is considered a heinous
crime in so far as the GCTA Law is concerned, and persons charged with and/or convicted
of sucharedisqualifiedfromavailingofthebenefitsofthelaw. Onthispointalone,thepetition
should already fail.

Reclusion perpetua is not capped at 30 years

Nowhere in the [last paragraph of Art. 70 of the RPC] does it state that perpetual penalties,
such as reclusion perpetua, are capped at thirty (30) years. Instead, what it only provides is
that in applying the rules laid out in Article 70, such as the three-fold rule, the duration of
perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty (30) years.

Miguel'spositionisfurthernegatedbythepronouncementinPeoplev.Baguio, where the Court

similarly held that "[r]eclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years,
after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon xxx.”

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, it is evident that the penalty of reclusion perpetua
requires imprisonment of at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes only
eligible for pardon, and not for release. This is in stark contrast to Miguel's claim that a
convict meted with the penalty of reclusion perpetua must serve only thirty (30) years.

To recap, Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on January 15, 1994.
Therefore, as of August 15, 2021, he has only served a total of twenty-seven (27) years and
seven (7) months of his sentence. Hence, having been punished to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, Miguel's continued detention is valid and justified. He has utterly failed
to show that he is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty.
CRISTINA SEMING v. EMELITA ALAMAG, et al.

G.R. No. 202284, March 17, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

A private document must be authenticated in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court
before its acceptance as evidence in court.

FACTS

In 2006, petitioner Cristina Seming (Cristina) and her spouse Eutiquio (collectively,
spouses Seming) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for specific
performance and damages against the spouses Angel and Natividad Pamat (collectively,
spouses Pamat). The case involved the one-half portion of a parcel of land Lot 512-C
located at Ligao City in Albay, covered by TCT No. T-134781 issued under the names of
Jesusa Seming Vda. De Lopez (Jesusa) and the spouses Pamat.

The spouses Seming alleged that in 1977, they purchased Jesusa’s share in Lot 512-C
consisting of 771 sq. m. or one-half of the property. Cristina further alleged that in the same
year, she and her husband entered a verbal agreement with the spouses Pamat for the
purchase of the other half portion of the lot, but the spouses Seming admitted that the
parties did not execute any written agreement reflecting the alleged sale.

In the meantime, a complaint for quieting of title concerning Lot 512-C was filed by a
certain Maria Aguilar Avecilla against Jesusa and the spouses Pamat. Petitioner Cristina
averred that she agreed to shoulder all the expenses of the litigation, with the alleged
agreement that such expenses would be deemed part of the purchase price of the half
owned by the spouses Pamat.

Cristina further alleged that sometime in 1990, she and Natividad Pamat agreed that
certain payments in cash and in kind shall serve as partial payment for a 200 sq. m. portion
of the subject property. Cristina supposedly executed a receipt whereby Natividad
acknowledged receipt from petitioner of the amount of P6,000. The receipt read as follows:

[RECEIVED] THE AMOUNT OF SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) FROM MRS. CHRISTINA
SEMING, AS PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THE SAID LAND LOT NO. 512-C CONTAINING AREA
1542 TAX DECLARATION NO. 39. THIS AMOUNT IS PAYMENT ONLY FOR TWO LOTS.

An identical receipt was allegedly executed in 1991 covering another 200 sq. m. portion of
the property, again signed by Natividad with Jesusa as witness.

In 1983, after the aforementioned quieting of title case was resolved, Natividad allegedly
agreed to pay Cristina for the litigation expenses with another 200 sq. m. portion of the
property. At this point, according to Cristina, she and her husband were already able to
acquire 600 sq. m. out of the 771 sq. m. half owned by the spouses Pamat.

Sometime in 2002, Cristina offered to buy from the spouses Pamat the remaining 171 sq. m.
portion of the property, but the spouses Pamat refused to sell nor execute a deed of sale,
claiming that they never sold any portion of their share in the lot.

In support of the alleged sale, petitioner Cristina Seming claimed that the spouses Pamat
never possessed any part of the property; never questioned the spouses Seming’s right to
possess the property; and that a compromise agreement dated 2006 states that the spouses
Seming were actually in possession over the alleged one-half portion sold to them.

Following trial, the RTC ordered respondents, heirs of the spouses Pamat, to execute a deed
of sale in favor of Cristina covering 600 sq. m., finding that there was a perfected contract of
sale between Cristina and Natividad. The RTC heavily relied on the two receipts allegedly
signed by Natividad in ruling that the element of consent was present.

As to the sale of the 200 sq. m. portion of the property, the RTC found that the same was
sold orally to Cristina by the spouses Pamat as payment for the aforementioned litigation
expenses. The RTC further gave credence to Cristina’s argument that the fact that the
respondents allowed her to construct a concrete pavement on the property and plant trees
thereon, as well as the payment of real property taxes, was sufficient proof that there was
indeed a sale.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the RTC and held that no contract of sale
existed covering the subject property due to the absence of meeting of the minds. The CA
noted petitioner's own admission that she rejected the offer of sale of Natividad when she
undertook to pay the litigation expenses.

The appellate court disregarded the two receipts due to Cristina’s failure to prove the due
execution and authenticity thereof. Even assuming the receipts are admitted in evidence,
the CA ruled that the documents do not prove the existence of a contract of sale as they do
not specifically state what the payments were for and they do not describe the exact
portion of the lot sold to the spouses Seming.

ISSUE

Whether the two receipts were correctly disregarded by the CA.

RULING

YES. The signatures of Natividad on the October 22, 1990 and January 23, 1991 receipts are
forgeries. A private document must be authenticated in the manner allowed by law or the
Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The October 22, 1990 and January
23, 1991 receipts are private documents executed by petitioner herself. Before they can be
admitted in evidence, they must be authenticated in accordance with Section 20 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. The more important issue to be resolved is whether the
signatures of Natividad on the subject receipts are genuine.

"Settled is the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence, thus, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One
who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his/her case by a preponderance of
evidence."

Natividad herself, including her daughter, Emelita, denied the genuineness of the former's
signatures in one of the receipts. [The] testimonial evidence adduced by respondents
served to debunk the genuineness of a handwriting as set forth by Section 22, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner made no comparison at all of
Natividad's signatures before the RTC. She also did not present any witness, other than
herself, to testify on the same. Notably, no other evidence was presented to validate the
genuineness of Natividad's signatures on the receipts.

Petitioner, however, contends that Natividad's signatures on one of the receipts were duly
identified and confirmed by her other daughter, Violeta. [W]hile it would appear that
Violeta had identified the signatures appearing on the receipt as her mother's, she
nonetheless likewise admitted that she had never seen her mother affix her signature
before. Thus, her testimony did not satisfy the requirements under Section 22, Rule 132[.]

Petitioner's comparison of Natividad's signature on the questioned receipts with her

genuine signatures on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of her
Answer filed before the RTC serves no purpose. The verification and certification bearing
Natividad's signature was executed on May 22, 2006 while the receipts were executed on
October 22, 1990 and January 23, 1991, respectively. Considering the 15-year difference
between the dates of execution, no accurate analysis can be given that would establish the
genuineness or authenticity of Natividad's signatures on the questioned receipts.

No accurate analysis may be given considering the long period between the time each of
them were accomplished. To reiterate, the closeness or proximity of the time in which the
standards used to that of the inspected signature is essential to arrive at an accurate
analysis and conclusion. Moreover, the passing of time and the increase in age may have a
decisive influence in [...] writing characteristics[.] [I]n order to bring about an accurate
comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point
of time to the suspected signature.

Notably, being a witness to the execution of the receipts, Jesusa could have been presented
by petitioner to establish the genuineness of Natividad's signature. Petitioner, however,
failed to do so. Interestingly, both petitioner and Jesusa claim that the sale of Lot 512-C was
perfected in 1977. Despite this claim, petitioner executed the receipts only sometime in
1990 and 1991, or approximately 13 years after the parties allegedly agreed to the sale of
Lot 512-C in 1977. To execute receipts for the amounts paid by Natividad several years
after the parties agreed upon the sale of Lot 512-C is simply contrary to logic and sound
reasoning.
On the other hand, Natividad and Emelita's denial that the signature was that of the
former's, as opposed to petitioner's lone testimony, gains greater weight for evidentiary
purposes. Although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of evidence
indubitably favors respondents.
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. TRACKWORKS RAIL
TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC.

G.R. No. 204452, June 28, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief through a
special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies. The
exception to this rule is conceded only where public welfare and the advancement of public
policy so dictate, and the broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders
complained of were found to be completely null and void, or that appeal was not considered
the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals from orders of preliminary attachment or
appointments of receiver.

FACTS

The DOTC entered into a Build-Lease-and-Transfer (BLT) Agreement with MRT regarding
the Phase 1 of MRT-3 Light Rail System along EDSA. In line with the said BLT Agreement,
the DOTC, MRT, and MRTDC executed another contract which granted MRTDC the right to:
(a) develop commercial premises in the depot and airspace above the EDSA MRT-3
stations; (b) lease, sublease, or assign interests in the said depot and airspace; and (c)
obtain income therefrom and exercise advertising rights.

Thereafter, MRTDC engaged the services of Trackworks and executed a Contract for
Advertising Services. In addition, Trackworks obligated itself to pay MRTDC a percentage
share of its gross revenues or a minimum guaranty, whichever is higher.

On March 11, 2005, MRTDC and Trackworks executed an Agreement to Renew Contract for
Advertising Services to extend the effectivity of the original contract to 10 years. However,
Trackworks defaulted in the payment of its obligation. MRTDC sent a Notice of Termination
to Trackworks.

Trackworks filed a Complaint with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against MRTDC with the RTC of Pasig City which was docketed as Civil Case No.
77291-PSG. The RTC of Pasig City denied Trackworks' application for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and ordered the parties to submit to arbitration. It also ruled that
pending the rendition of the arbitration award, the proceedings before it are "stayed."

However, on January 20, 2010, MRTDC sent a letter to Trackworks demanding the latter to
comply with its post-termination obligations. Hence, Trackworks filed the following: (a)
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Show Cause Order dated January 25, 2010;16 (b) Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Status Quo and/or Cease and Desist Order dated March 4, 2010; and
(c) Addendum Re: Plaintiffs Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo and/or Cease and
Desist Order dated March 8, 2010. Thereafter, on March 8, 2010, Trackworks filed a Notice
of Arbitration against MRTCDC with the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI).

The RTC of Pasig City resolved the above three motions filed by Trackworks. It denied the
injunctive relief and/or status quo order prayed for by Trackworks. However, it clarified
that the proceedings before it are stayed or suspended until such time that the parties
conclude their arbitration and an arbitral award is rendered. Trackworks filed a Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the said March 15, 2010 Omnibus Order issued by RTC of
Pasig City.

Thereafter, Trackworks filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under
Rule 65 before the RTC of Makati City which was docketed as Civil Case No. 10-414. The
RTC of Makati City, Branch 138 granted Trackworks' application for the issuance of a TRO
and thereafter, heard its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On May 24, 2010, MRTDC filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 10-414 pending before
the Makati RTC. Meanwhile, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dated May 28, 201025
denying Trackworks' Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of its March 15, 2010
Omnibus Order. Subsequently, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, issued its June 29, 2010
Order which denied Trackworks' Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. A Motion for Reconsideration of the June 29, 2010 Order was filed by
Trackworks. However, the Presiding Judge of RTC of Makati City, Branch 138 inhibited
himself from hearing Civil Case No. 10-414. Hence, the case was transferred to RTC of
Makati City, Branch 65.

ISSUE

Whether the Petition for Certiorari filed by MRTDC before the CA has been rendered moot
by reason of the June 14, 2012 Decision of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 65

RULING

NO. A review of the records show that the appellate court rendered its assailed July 30,
2012 Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by MRTDC. However, on motion for
reconsideration filed by Trackworks, the CA reversed its July 30, 2012 Decision and issued
its assailed November 9, 2012 Resolution dismissing MRTDC's Petition for Certiorari on
account of the earlier Decision rendered by the RTC of Makati City on June 14, 2012. The
appellate court reasoned that when the RTC of Makati City rendered its June 14, 2012
Decision, MRTDC had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law which is appeal.
Hence, its subsequent July 30, 2012 Decision is rendered moot.

Indeed, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. Thus, the subsequent promulgation of the RTC's June 14, 2012 Decision renders
the Petition for Certiorari superfluous and warrants its dismissal. However, this rule
admits of certain exceptions.
The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief through
a special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies. The
exception to this rule is conceded only where public welfare and the advancement of public
policy so dictate, and the broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders
complained of were found to be completely null and void, or that appeal was not
considered the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals from orders of preliminary
attachment or appointments of receiver.

It is true that the promulgation of the Makati RTC's June 14, 2012 Decision rendered the
certiorari case filed by MRTDC before the CA moot as no practical relief could be granted
when a decision on the main case had already been rendered. However, the rule admits of
certain exceptions as when the orders complained of were completely null and void as in
the case at bar.

The assailed October 22, 2010 Omnibus Order and December 20, 2010 Order issued by the
RTC of Makati City as well as its June 14, 2012 Decision, completely reversed and set aside
the January 4, 2010 Order issued by the RTC of Pasig City which ultimately denied the
injunctive relief sought by Trackworks. The RTC of Makati City obviously violated the
doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of Trackworks' Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus despite the fact that the said case involved the same parties and
the subject matter fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City from which the case
originally emanated. Verily, Trackworks' Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction as the RTC of Makati City
is bereft of any authority to nullify the orders of the RTC of Pasig City, a coordinate and co-
equal court.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a

co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for
the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the
case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all
other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.

Thus, Trackworks' Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed before the RTC
of Makati City was improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. The
RTC of Pasig City's denial of the injunctive relief sought by Trackworks in its Orders dated
January 4, 2010, March 15, 2010 and May 28, 2010 and all other incidents arising
therefrom, may not be interfered with by the RTC of Makati City, a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, for the power to open, modify, or vacate the said orders is not only possessed
but is restricted to the court in which the order is issued. Consequently, the RTC of Makati
City has no jurisdiction over Trackworks' petition, rendering all the proceedings therein, as
well as the June 14, 2012 Decision and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Settled is the rule that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void
and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic
fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect.
MEGA FISHING CORPORATION v. ESTATE OF FRANCISCO FELIPE N. GONZALES

G.R. No. 214781, March 9, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

We have previously allowed the relaxation of these rigid rules of procedure in order to serve
substantial justice in considering (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (6)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

FACTS

Deceased Francisco owned the subject property located in Navotas, Metro Manila covered
by TCT 280406 issued on April 20, 1994. By virtue of a deed of sale in favor of Francisco
Gabriel Gonzales III, TCT 280406 was cancelled and TCT 21297 was issued on April 30,
1999. TCT 21297 was also cancelled on the same day and at the exact time and a new TCT
21299 was issued in the name of Esperanza.

On May 18, 1999, a certain Mercedita, acting in a representative capacity for and in behalf
of Esperanza, executed an affidavit of loss of TCTs 280406, 280407, and 280409. Claiming
to be the beneficial owner of the properties covered by the said titles, Esperanza, through
Mercedita, filed a petition for the reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copies of the three
titles.

On September 19, 1999, the original copy of TCT 280406 was annotated reflecting the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy pursuant to the Order dated June 7, I 999. On
November 5, 1999, petitioner Mega Fishing Corporation (MFC) purchased the subject
property from Esperanza for P9,601,920.00 by virtue of a Kasulatan ng Ganap at lubos na
Bilihan. Accordingly, TCT 21299 was cancelled and TCT 21926 was issued in the name of
MFC.

Records also reveal that as early as 1989, during the lifetime of Francisco, his last will and
testament was submitted to probate before the RTC of Manila and letters testamentary
were issued in favor of Teresita as the executrix.

In May 2000, the estate of Francisco Felipe N. Gonzales (respondent), through Teresita,
filed a case against Esperanza, Mercedita, MFC, Vicente Garcia (Garcia), and Sarah Principe,
seeking to annul and cancel TCT 21297, 21299, and 21 926, and the reinstatement of TCT
No. 280406.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. It found that the new owner's duplicate copy of
TCT 280406 in the name of Francisco Felipe Gonzales was null and void for being
fraudulently obtained.

In a notice dated August 15, 2013, the CA required MFC to file its appellant's brief. On
December 20, 2013, MFC filed a motion to be given the opportunity to file its file appeal
brief. It alleged that it received the notice dated August 15, 2013 sometime in September
and had until October 15, 2013 within which to file its brief However, MFC only discovered
the said notice which was apparently filed in another case folder during their year-end
inventory in December 2013. Thus, MFC asked for an additional period of 30 days from
December 19, 2013, or until January 19, 2014, within which to file its brief, which the CA
later granted.

On February 6, 2014, MFC filed its motion to admit appellant's brief. The CA denied MFC's
motion. It held that MFC failed to file its brief within the reglementary period. On July 22,
2014, the CA issued a Resolution closing and terminating the case in view of the fact that no
motion for reconsideration and/or petition to the Court was filed by MFC.

On August 22, 2014, MFC filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration which the CA later denied in its October 14, 2014 Resolution. The CA noted
that MFC received the March 28, 2014 Resolution on ApriI 14, 201436 but only filed its
motion for reconsideration on August 22, 2014 or more than three months after the lapse
of the 15-day period within which to submit a motion for reconsideration.

On November 3, 2014, MFC filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review
on certiorari which was granted by this Court in its February 4, 2015 Resolution. In its
petition for review on certiorari, MFC argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion
when it did not allow MFC's appeal brief and ordered the case closed and terminated.

ISSUE

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it did not allow MFC's appeal brief and
ordered the case closed and terminated

RULING

YES. Generally, the rules of procedure must be strictly followed because “the right to
appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party
who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.” Acting on such appeals, the CA has the
authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief in the exercise of its
judicial discretion. However, the CA must still adhere to the fundamentals of justice and
fairness, bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances and deciding
matters on a case by case basis.
The present case is similar to CMTC International Marketing Corp. v. Bhagis International
Trading Corp., where this Court has allowed the late filing of the appellant's brief due to its
counsel's negligence, to wit:

In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant's
brief on petitioner's part.

When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellant's brief, there was a
clear intention on the part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact,
were it not for its counsel's act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice to File Brief in
another file, petitioner could have seasonably filed its appellant's brief as its counsel
had already prepared the same even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.

It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that the mistakes of
counsel binds the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would
result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of
justice so requires. In rendering justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat against
substantive rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice. this Court is not without power to exercise its judicial
discretion in relaxing the rules of procedure.

In the same vein, MFC should be afforded the amplest opportunity for its case to be decided
on the merits and not on mere technicalities. When MFC filed its motion with the attached
appellant's brief, it was a clear indication that it did not abandon its appeal. We have
previously allowed the relaxation of these rigid rules of procedure in order to serve
substantial justice in considering (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or
(6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

This Court notes that MFC stands to lose its property rights due to a technicality for the
belated filing of its appellant's brief attributed to its former counsel's negligence. We are of
the view that the belated filing of its brief was an honest mistake and not an attempt to
delay the proceedings of the case.
SPOUSES LIU v. ESPINOSA
G.R. No. 238513, July 31, 2019, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

While a conflict in their findings may prima facie provide basis for a recourse to this Court,
only a showing, on the face of the record, of gross or extraordinary misperception or manifest
bias in the Appellate Court's reading of the evidence will justify this Court's intervention by
way of assuming a function usually within the former's exclusive province.

FACTS

Petitioner Belinda Y. Liu owns a parcel of land covered by a TCT in Davao City. Petitioner
Hsi Pin Liu is her husband. They acquired said land from their predecessor-in- interest
who, in turn, merely tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The latter
are the present occupants of the land.

After title was transferred to the petitioners, they likewise tolerated the presence of the
respondents upon the understanding that they will peacefully vacate the land once the
petitioners' need to use the same arises. When petitioners' demands to vacate the property
were made, however, the latest of which was on February 12, 2013, the respondents
refused to comply.

Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against them in the MTCC which
ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal to the RTC, the RTC affirmed in all respects the
MTCC's Decision. The CA however reversed the findings of the RTC. It held that petitioners
were unable to sufficiently prove the presence of tolerance of respondents' occupation
from the start of their possession of the subject property. Also, plaintiffs failed to adduce
evidence that would have shown when the respondents entered the property or who gave
them the permission to do the same. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioners'
bare claim of tolerance could not sustain their action for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE

Whether the SC can resolve questions of fact

RULING

YES. It must first be stated that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The case at bar,
however, calls for a re-examination of facts for the findings of the MTCC and the RTC are in
conflict with that of the Court of Appeals. In Pascual v. Burgos, it was held that while the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, this alone
does not automatically warrant a review of factual findings by this court.

Pascual further held that:

While a conflict in their findings may prima facie provide basis for a recourse to this Court,
only a showing, on the face of the record, of gross or extraordinary misperception or manifest
bias in the Appellate Court's reading of the evidence will justify this Court's intervention by
way of assuming a function usually within the former's exclusive province.

Such is the case here.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, this Court finds that the petitioners' action for
unlawful detainer must be sustained.

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his
possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract
between them. However, defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

Thus, an action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present: (a)
Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff; (b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (c) Thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and (d) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

It is clear upon perusal of the records that petitioners are the registered owners of the
subject property, as evidenced by the TCT and that the respondents' occupation of the
subject property was merely tolerated by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest and the
petitioners themselves based on the understanding that the said respondents will
peacefully vacate the same once the need to use the land by the petitioners arises.

Subsequently, this occupation became illegal when respondents refused to heed

petitioners' express and clear demands to vacate the subject property, the last of which
was dated February 12, 2013. It is evidently clear that the complaint for unlawful detainer,
filed on August 6, 2013, was made within one year from the time the last formal demand to
vacate was made.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. AAA CRYOGENICS PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 207429, November 18, 2020, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of questions of law
because the Court is not a trier of facts. The rule however admits of exceptions: (1) When the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion(4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.

FACTS

AAA was engaged in the production of liquid forms of gases. In the production of these
products, the plant facilities of AAA relied on computers and electronic processors that
required a very stable source of power, otherwise the whole plant would shut down and
freeze up. A stable source of power was, thus, crucial to AAA's operations.

Between October 1997 and April 1998, AAA's Plant Supervisor reported fluctuations and
interruptions in the electrical power supplied by Meralco. As a result of these power
fluctuations and interruptions, AAA suffered losses.

AAA sent several letters informing Meralco of its problems with respect to the supply of
power, but Meralco could not remedy the situation, except to advise AAA to install power
conditioning equipment in the form of a motor generator set in order to level out the
supply of power. In the meantime, AAA stopped paying its electrical bills until its total
accountabilities reached P13,657,141.56. Meralco, thus, disconnected and terminated its
service contract with AAA. After deducting AAA's service and meter deposit and applying
interest charges, Meralco computed AAA's unpaid bills to amount to P10,453,477.55.

AAA then filed an action for Injunction and Damages against Meralco. On the other hand,
Meralco filed an action against AAA for Collection of Sum of Money to collect the sum
representing the latter's unpaid electric bill. The two cases were consolidated.

During trial, AAA presented the Log Sheet Readings of its computers, which contained the
exact time and date when the purity of gases fell below the required purity. According to
AAA's plant supervisor, the fall in the purity of gases indicated the presence of power
fluctuations and interruptions.

To rebut AAA's claim of power fluctuations and interruptions, Meralco presented two Daily
Interruption Reports prepared by its personnel, which showed that there were only two
power interruptions which occurred during the period in question, as recorded by its
computers. Meralco likewise presented expert witnesses who stressed that power
interruptions and fluctuations are normal due to the inherent nature of electricity, and thus
unavoidable.

In its July 6, 2005 Joint Decision, the RTC found Meralco liable for actual damages arising
from its failure to deliver constant energy supply to AAA, in breach of its contractual
obligation to deliver energy "at reasonably constant potential and frequency" under the
Agreement for the Sale of Electric Energy. The CA affirmed the RTC's Joint Decision with
modification in that the award of attorney's fees to both parties was deleted for having no
factual or legal basis.

ISSUE

Whether the power fluctuations and interruptions occurred and were caused by Meralco.

RULING

YES. A cursory reading of the Petition reveals that it primarily raises a question of fact,
which is inappropriate in a Rule 45 petition. The Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is
limited to the review of questions of law because the Court is not a trier of facts. The rule
however admits of exceptions: (1) When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion(4) when the judgment
is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The circumstances in the instant case warrant the application of the exception rather than
the general rule. The occurrence of the power fluctuations and interruptions is well-
supported by evidence.

First, in its November 19, 1997 letter to AAA's complaint of power fluctuations and
interruptions, Meralco responded by enumerating the measures that AAA should
undertake to "minimize the transient interruptions," including making "recommendations
to minimize interruption." It even assured AAA of a "better power supply" once a new
substation is installed near AAA's plant. Second, in its January 28, 1998 letter, Meralco
reiterated its "steps to minimize if not eliminate power trippings of circuit," including
conducting a "continuous line rehabilitation program," among others. Third, in the
testimonies of Meralco's expert witnesses, they consistently emphasized that power
fluctuations and interruptions are normal due to the inherent nature of energy. Taken
altogether, these pieces of evidence persuade Us to believe that indeed, the power
fluctuations and interruptions occurred, and that the same were caused by the energy
provider, Meralco.

At this point, it is to be stressed that the Court has always accorded great weight and
respect to the factual findings of trial courts, especially in their assessment of the credibility
of witnesses. Their findings are even binding when affirmed by the CA. We do not find any
reason to deviate from this doctrine specifically on the issue of the occurrence of the power
fluctuations and interruptions.

AAA was unable to prove with reasonable degree of certainty the amount of actual
damages it suffered. Nevertheless, Meralco cannot escape liability for this sole reason.
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case,
be provided with certainty.

The calculation of temperate damages is usually left to the sound discretion of the courts.
We observe the limit that in giving recompense, the amount must be reasonable, bearing in
mind that the same should be more than nominal, but less than compensatory. In
jurisprudence, this Court has pegged temperate damages to an amount equivalent to a
certain percentage of the actual damages claimed by the injured party. Given the foregoing
circumstances, We find three-fourths of AAA's claim, or P15,819,570.00, to be in order.

Additionally, it should be pointed out that Meralco's argument that it should not be held
liable for the power interruptions on November 13, 1997 and November 28, 1997, as well
as the power fluctuation on November 18, 1997, lacks merit. This is because Meralco failed
to provide any concrete proof of the cause of the power interruptions and fluctuation.

As to the grant of exemplary damages, We find that the same was properly awarded by the
CA. The records show that despite Meralco's repeated assurance of better electric supply,
and despite knowledge of the serious production losses experienced by AAA due to the
power fluctuations and interruptions, it still failed to provide any remedy, in wanton
disregard of its contractual obligation to deliver energy "at reasonably constant potential
and frequency

Finally, as to the CA's deletion of attorney's fees, jurisprudence instructs that "the award of
attorney's fees is an exception rather than the general rule; thus, there must be compelling
legal reason to bring the case within the exceptions provided under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code to justify the award."
LINDEN SUITES, INC. v. MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES, INC. G.R. No. 211969,
October 4, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has supervisory control over the
execution of its judgment. It does not, however, give the court the power to alter or amend a
final and executory decision in the absence of the recognized exceptions, namely: (a) if there is
a need to correct clerical errors which cause no prejudice to any party, (b) void judgments,
and (c) if circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution
unjust and inequitable. The court's supervisory control does not, however, extend as to
authorize the alteration or amendment of a final and executory decision, save for certain
recognized exceptions, among which is the correction of clerical errors. Else, the court
violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability. An order of execution which
varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.

FACTS

The Linden Suites Inc (petitioner) filed a complaint for damages against respondent
Meridien Far East Properties, Inc. (respondent) before the RTC of Pasig City, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 69023. Petitioner averred that while doing excavation works for
the construction of the Linden Suites in Ortigas, Pasig City, it discovered that the concrete
retaining wall of the adjacent building, One Magnificent Mile (OMM), owned by respondent,
had encroached on its property line.

Petitioner then informed respondent about the encroachment which, in turn, immediately
instructed its workers to remove the same. However, respondent's workers were unable to
finish it and a substantial part still needed to be removed. Petitioner was consequently
compelled to hire a contractor to complete the demolition. It then demanded payment of
the cost of the additional works it conducted in the amount of P3,980,468.50, but
respondent refused, which led to the filing of the complaint.

The RTC adjudged respondent liable for the cost of the demolition, actual and
compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. The CA affirmed the same.

Considering that the RTC Decision had already attained finality, petitioner filed a motion
for issuance of a writ of execution before the RTC, which it granted. Thereafter, Sheriff
Marco A. Boco attempted to serve the writ on respondent in its office address in Makati City
but failed. Petitioner then advised the sheriff to serve the writ to respondent in its
registered address in its 2006 General Information Sheet (GIS) that was tiled before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Sheriff Boco proceeded to the said
condominium to serve the writ. However, Atty. Baculi, the Legal and Administrative Officer
of Meridien East Realty and Development Corporation (MERDC), informed him that it was
Meridien Development Group, Inc. (MDGI), not respondent, which owned the office in the
said address. Atty. Baculi showed a GIS issued by the SEC as proof that the occupant of the
said address was indeed MDGI. As a result, Sheriff Boco returned the writ unserved as per
Sheriffs Return dated June 18, 2010.

Petitioner observed that the 2006 GIS of respondent and 2009 GIS of MERDC stated the
same officers. The officers were likewise shareholders of both corporations and had similar
residential addresses.

Thus, on November 8, 2010, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Examine Judgment

Obligor before RTC of Pasig City, the same trial court which rendered the final judgment. It
prayed that respondent's officers be directed to appear before the court for an examination
of the income and properties owned by respondent for the satisfaction of the RTC Decision.
Petitioner also sought the grant by the trial court of other reliefs as are just and equitable.

Respondent, on the other hand, argued for the dismissal of the motion alleging that the
persons sought to be examined are not the judgment obligors in the RTC Decision. It also
claimed that their examination is a violation of the doctrine of separate corporate
personality. Respondent further asserted that the officers cannot be required to appear
before RTC Pasig City as they reside in Makati City, where respondent's office sits.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC, as the court that rendered judgment on petitioner's complaint, examine
respondent's officers.

RULING

YES. It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has supervisory control over
the execution of its judgment. It does not, however, give the court the power to alter or
amend a final and executory decision in the absence of the recognized exceptions, namely:
(a) if there is a need to correct clerical errors which cause no prejudice to any party, (b)
void judgments, and (c) if circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which
render its execution unjust and inequitable.

A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the
court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of
execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and
law which may be involved in the execution.

The court's supervisory control does not, however, extend as to authorize the alteration or
amendment of a final and executory decision, save for certain recognized exceptions,
among which is the correction of clerical errors. Else, the court violates the principle of
finality of judgment and its immutability. An order of execution which varies the tenor of
the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.
The judgment court's supervisory control over the case ensures the enforcement of a
party's rights or claims that it has duly recognized. Indeed, a court's mandate to resolve
disputes ends upon its adjudication of the litigation. It is only when the party that has
secured favorable judgment finally relishes the fruits of its legal calvary that justice may be
said to have been duly served. This tenet fortifies a judgment court's so-called supervisory
control over decided suits.

Corollarily, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down available remedies and guidelines for
the satisfaction of a judgment, including enforcement of a writ of execution, which the
winning party may avail of before the judgment court. Among the remedies available to
such party to fully enforce the writ of execution is the examination of a judgment obligor.

Lastly, Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every court has the
inherent power to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice". The court, in carrying out its jurisdiction, can thus issue
"auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect" and to adopt
any suitable process or mode of proceeding "which appears conformable to the spirit of the
said law or rules".

The trial court has the inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
its ministerial offices, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before
it, in every manner appertaining thereto. The inherent power of the court carries with it the
right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.
The court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher
interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based
on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial
court apparent on the record.

In the case at bench, the writ of execution was returned unserved, as shown in the Sheriff's
Return dated June 18, 2010. It was therefore imperative for the judgment court to issue an
order for examination of respondent after the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied.
Such order would have ensured the satisfaction of its judgment, all the more so if it has
already attained finality. In other words, the RTC, pursuant to its residual authority, should
have issued auxiliary writs and employed processes and other means necessary to execute
its final judgment.

Moreover, the RTC disregarded the general prayer for "other reliefs just and equitable" by
the petitioner in its motion. The general prayer appearing on the motion enables the court
to award reliefs supported by the same or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial,
and by the evidence adduced by the parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed
for in the same.

The trial court should have proceeded to conduct a permissible examination of respondent,
through its officers, so as to disclose the properties which can be subjected to execution.
The RTC should have employed other allowable means such as, but not limited to, the
submission of documents consisting of a list of properties and income of respondent and
the affidavits of concerned officers in relation thereto.
OLIVIA D. LEONES v. HON. CARLITO CORPUZ lN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF BRANCH 27, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, AND
HON. MINDA FONTANILLA, IN HER CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR Of BACNOTAN,
LA. UNION
G.R. No. 204106, November 17, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

From the regional trial court, Leones skipped the appellate tribunal and proceeded straight
to this Court for recourse. This is an open disregard of the hierarchy of courts. Although this
Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in petitions for certiorari, a direct resort is
allowed only when there are special or compelling reasons that justify the same. Leones'
cause against the jurisdiction of the RTC is far too generic, personal, and non-transcendental
to fall under any of these four exceptions. Thus, there is no valid reason for her to take this
remedial shortcut.

Further, for res judicata to bar a subsequent action, the following elements must be present:
(1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) The decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) The
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) There must be as between
the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

FACTS

Petitioner Olivia D. Leones (Leones) was appointed municipal treasurer of the Municipality
of Bacnotan, La Union (Municipality of Bacnotan). In December 1996, she "was temporarily
detailed to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of La Union. During Leones' stint in the
Provincial Treasurer's Office, she was not paid her RATA. Leones sued for mandamus
before the regional trial courts of San Fernando, La Union against the officers of the
municipality of Bacnotan. The suit, however, was dismissed for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The CA affirmed the dismissal, and such dismissal became final
and executory in 2003. Leones thereafter wrote the Department of Budget and
management (DBM) requesting an opinion on her entitlement to the RATA sought. Emilia
T. Boncodin (Boncodin), then DBM Secretary, responded that Leones was entitled to RATA,
but only for the fiscal year of 1999. Unsatisfied, Leones filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA. She sought to compel Boncodin and respondent herein, Ma. Minda Fontanilla
(Minda Fontanilla), then municipal Mayor of Bacnotan, La Union, to pay her RATA. In its
May 24, 2005 Decision, the CA ordered Boncodin and Minda Fontanilla to pay Leones'
RATA” from December 1996 up to the present or during the entire period of her
reassignment" in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of La Union. This Court affirmed the
CA's Decision in G.R. No. 169726. This Court's Decision became final and executory on
August 6, 2010, Leones’ RATA, however, remained unpaid.

She again filed a petition for mandamus against Rufino Fontanilla, incumbent mayor of the
municipality of Bacnotan at the time, before the RTC, Branch 27, City of San Fernando, La
Union. Proposals for amicable settlement ensued. The case ended in a compromise
between Leones and Mayor Rufino Fontanilla (Compromise Agreement). The RTC issued a
judgment on compromise. Thereafter, the Municipality of Bacnotan completed its payment
to Leones. On June 15, 2012, Leones learned that she was dropped from the payrolls of the
Municipality of Bacnotan effective May 31, 2012. She was also told to stop reporting for
work. She wrote the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Bacnotan and the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer. Leones sought to verify if she had indeed been unilaterally dropped
from the payrolls, which she asserted was tantamount to illegal dismissal from
employment.

Mayor Rufino Fontanilla, as respondent in Leones' petition for mandamus before the RTC,
filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution of the compromise agreement. The RTC
granted and issued the writ prayed for. The sheriff proceeded to enforce the writ to execute
the compromise agreement. The sheriff however, returned the writ, stating that the same
had been served but Leones refused to comply. Leones thus moved to quash the writ of
execution of the compromise agreement (motion to quash). The RTC upheld the June 23,
2011 compromise judgment. It declared that the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 169726 did
not constitute res judicata in the mandamus case that Leones filed against Mayor Rufino
Fontanilla as the two cases comprehended different parties and prayed for different reliefs.
The RTC also held that no public policy was violated when Leones agreed to retire on May
31, 2012 per the compromise agreement, and that public office is not property covered by
the constitutional proscription against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Aggrieved by the RTC's ruling, Leones sought recourse directly to this Court via the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Leones ascribes grave abuse of discretion upon the
RTC in denying her motion to quash the writ of execution of the compromise agreement.

ISSUE

W/N there was grave abuse of discretion upon the RTC in denying her motion to quash the
writ of execution of the compromise agreement.

RULING

NO. From the regional trial court, Leones skipped the appellate tribunal and proceeded
straight to this Court for recourse. This is an open disregard of the hierarchy of courts.
Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in petitions for certiorari, a
direct resort is allowed only when there are special or compelling reasons that justify the
same. Leones' cause against the jurisdiction of the RTC is far too generic, personal, and non-
transcendental to fall under any of these four exceptions. Thus, there is no valid reason for
her to take this remedial shortcut.

Further, for res judicata to bar a subsequent action, the following elements must be
present: (1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) The decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) There
must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. 54 The first three requisites are established with the finality of the Court's
Decision that disposed G.R. No. 169726 on the merits in 2010. The fourth and the most
important element, however, is lacking. Contrary to the conclusions of the trial court, the
parties in G.R. No. 169726 and SCA No. 007-11 are identical. While the respondents in both
cases, Minda Fontanilla and Rufino Fontanilla, are not the same persons, both however
were sued in their official capacity as mayor of the Municipality of Bacnotan. Both suits also
sprouted from one and same event - the non-payment of the RATA pertaining to Leones'
employment in the municipality of Bacnotan. But the similarities of the two cases end
there. G.R. No. 169726 determined the factual and legal bases of Leones' entitlement to
payment of her RATA, whereas SCA No. 007-11 is concerned with the manner of execution
of the actual payment of the RATA judicially awarded to Leones. With these marked
differences in subject matters, the bone of contention in SCA No. 007-11 cannot be deemed
to have been already resolved by the final dispositions of the Court in G.R. No. 169726. To
consider SCA No. 007-11 as barred by the prior judgment in G.R. No. 169726 will run
counter to the very meaning of res judicata: "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Since all the requisites of res
judicata are not obtaining, the same will not deter the proceedings and resolution of SCA
No. 007-11 as claimed by Leones.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES MILU AND ROSALINA DE JESUS G.R. No.
221133, June 28, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Grave abuse of discretion exists when "an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law
or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will
or personal bias." It has been described as follows: "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Here,
the RTC did not act with such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment when it issued
its August 22, 2012 Order denying the spouses De Jesus' motion for a status quo order, and its
November 29, 2012 Order denying their motion for reconsideration. On the contrary, it acted
within its jurisdiction and in accordance with the law.

FACTS

On September 17, 2009, respondents Spouses Milu and Rosalina De Jesus (spouses De
Jesus) filed a Complaint4 for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Promissory Note and
Foreclosure Sale and Damages with an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, against petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank). In their Complaint,
the spouses De Jesus prayed for the declaration of nullity of the subject real estate
mortgages and promissory notes they executed in favor of Land Bank, as well as the
foreclosure proceedings initiated by the latter.6 They likewise sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction against the
bank to prevent it from consolidating its ownership over the properties. According to them,
consolidation was impending since a Certificate of Sale was already issued in Land Bank's
favor and the same was already registered with the Registry of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan.

On September 23, 2009, the spouses De Jesus presented their first witness in support of
their application for TRO. After their presentation, they withdrew their motion for TRO in
view of the commitment by Land Bank's counsel, Atty. Napoleon Latosa (Atty. Latosa), that
the bank will not consolidate for the duration of the hearing on the preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the continuation of the hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction, as well as the main case, to be held on October 28, 2009. On
November 25, 2009, days before the scheduled hearing on the spouses De Jesus'
application for preliminary injunction, they moved to set the main case for pre-trial.15
Thus, the RTC ordered the setting of the pre-trial conference to be held on December 9,
2009, in lieu of the originally scheduled hearing for the preliminary injunction. The RTC
further ordered the resetting of the hearing due to Atty. Latosa's demise. It conducted the
preliminary conference on July 19, 2011 and set the presentation of the couple's evidence
on June 26, 2012 and August 7, 2012. On May 22, 2012, the bank, through its new counsel,
filed an Entry of Appearance and Manifestation stating that it will proceed to consolidate its
ownership considering that the one-year redemption period already lapsed without the
spouses redeeming the properties, and because the period for issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction, which was the duration of Atty. Latosa's commitment not to
consolidate, lapsed without the RTC issuing the same. On June 5, 2012, the spouses De
Jesus filed a Counter- Manifestation and Motion, arguing that Land Bank may not
consolidate its ownership in view of Atty. Latosa's commitment not to consolidate for the
duration of the main case, and not for the period for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, as claimed by the bank.

The RTC denied the spouses De Jesus' motion for a status quo order after finding that
consolidation became a matter of right on the part of the bank when the one-year
redemption period lapsed without them redeeming the properties. Further, the trial court
held that a status quo order cannot be granted as the same would be tantamount to an
injunction order which it cannot grant without a hearing. The CA thereafter held that the
RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for the issuance of a
status quo order, considering that no hearing was ever conducted on the spouses De Jesus'
application for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE

Did the CA err in reversing the RTC's August 22, 2012 and November 29, 2012 Orders for
supposedly being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack, or excess of
jurisdiction?

RULING

YES. After a judicious review of the records, We find that the CA erred in reversing the
RTC's August 22, 2012 and November 29, 2012 Orders. The trial court did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion when it denied the spouses De Jesus' motion for issuance of a
status quo order and when it no longer conducted the hearing on their application for
preliminary injunction. Grave abuse of discretion exists when "an act is (1) done contrary
to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias." It has been described as follows: "Grave
abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and
such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Here, the RTC did not act with such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment when it issued its August 22, 2012 Order denying the
spouses De Jesus' motion for a status quo order, and its November 29, 2012 Order denying
their motion for reconsideration. On the contrary, it acted within its jurisdiction and in
accordance with the law.
A status quo order is "in the nature of a cease and desist order," and is "intended to
maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the
controversy." If the RTC granted the spouses De Jesus' prayer for such order, Land Bank
will be prevented from consolidating its ownership over the properties for the duration of
such order. However, We find no legal impediment to prevent Land Bank from
consolidating its ownership. The RTC is correct that upon the expiration of the period for
redemption, without the mortgagor or his or her successor-in-interest redeeming the
property, consolidation becomes a matter of right.

Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights
or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to
a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The
controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is
that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some
of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.
The application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special
reason for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential
conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts
that appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the
entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the
litigation.

By moving for the pre-trial of the main case, instead of proceeding with the hearing on
preliminary injunction as originally scheduled, the spouses De Jesus revealed the lack of
urgency in obtaining injunctive relief, which is precisely the basis of their prayer therefor.
Without any pressing necessity or emergency, the trial court is duty-bound to proceed with
trial on the merits, consistent with the policy of courts to "avoid issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial."
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAGDALENA QUILIT AND MAURICIO LAOYAN
G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

DARAB's exercise of the innately judicial certiorari power is an executive encroachment into
the judiciary. It violates the separation of powers; it is unconstitutional. With or without a law
enabling it, DARAB has no power to rule on jurisdictional controversies via petitions for
certiorari. DARAB's self-serving grant to itself of the power to issue writs of certiorari in the
1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure is itself a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It must be annulled for running afoul of the Constitution. A rule
granting the DARAB judicial certiorari powers is an "executive encroachment into the
judiciary," and therefore, constitutionally infirm. Petitioner cannot seek protection behind the
protective veil of equity and fair play when the very rule invoked by it has been annulled by
this Court for running afoul with the Constitution. Accordingly, it confers no right to
petitioners, affords no protection to them, and in legal contemplation, inoperative and cannot
be cured by mere judicial accommodation.

FACTS

On August 13, 1999, herein respondents Mauricio Laoyan (Laoyan; now deceased) and
Magdalena Quilit (Quilit) filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) a
petition for annulment of sale of an agricultural land and redemption thereof docketed as
DARAB Case No. 0347-99-B-CAR. The case involves two parcels of land located at La
Trinidad, Benguet containing areas of 219 square meters and 3,042 square meters,
including improvements thereon, which were formerly owned by the Spouses Pedro and
Erenita Tolding (Spouses Tolding). These lots were mortgaged by the Spouses Tolding and
were later acquired by petitioner through foreclosure, by virtue of which petitioner was
issued Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-43270 and T-43271. The RARAD rendered
a Decision holding, among others, that respondents may exercise their right of redemption
for both parcels of land. Subsequently, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution commanding
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) sheriff to enforce and execute the December 17,
1999 Decision. Thereafter, on April 28, 2000, the RARAD issued a Certificate of Finality and
Entry of Judgment. On May 4, 2000, petitioner filed with the DARAB a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the December 17, 1999 Decision, April 10, 2000 Order, issuance of the writ of
execution and certificate of finality by the RARAD, in accordance with Section 3, Rule VIII of
the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure. On August 7, 2006, the DARAB issued a
Resolution dismissing the May 2, 2000 Petition for Certiorari of petitioner on the ground
that the DARAB, being only a quasi-judical body with limited jurisdiction, cannot acquire
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, citing Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board v. Lubrica (Lubrica). Petitioner, in its Petition for Review filed with the
CA, averred, among others, that the RARAD acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
when it denied its Notice of Appeal. LBP likewise claimed that the DARAB committed an
error in judgment when it dismissed its May 2, 2000 Petition for Certiorari for lack of
jurisdiction. The CA rendered its assailed Decision denying LBP's petition for review.
Hence, the case at bar where petitioner argues that the Lubrica ruling cannot be applied
retroactively in determining whether petitioner's May 2, 2000 Petition for Certiorari was
properly filed with the DARAB.

ISSUE

W/N the DARAB erred in dismissing the May 2, 2000 petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction.

RULING

NO. Atanyrate,wefindthatpetitionermaynotrepeatedlyseekprotectionunderthe provisions

of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Proceeding from our pronouncements in
Lubrica and Zoleta, they cannot conveniently invoke rules of procedure in asserting their
supposed right to file a petition for certiorari with the DARAB. As extensively explained by
the Court in Lubrica, Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which is the very law creating the DARAB, does not confer it authority
to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari. Thus, to otherwise allow petitioner to avail
the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari with the DARAB would necessarily sanction
an act outside the statutory authority granted by law. Worse still, following the logic of
petitioner's position would lead to an absurd situation where this Court itself will unduly
confer a quasi-judicial agency the authority to correct errors of jurisdiction, which, as
discussed in Zoleta, is lodged only with the regular courts by virtue of express
constitutional grant.

DARAB's exercise of the innately judicial certiorari power is an executive encroachment

into the judiciary. It violates the separation of powers; it is unconstitutional. With or
without a law enabling it, DARAB has no power to rule on jurisdictional controversies via
petitions for certiorari. DARAB's self-serving grant to itself of the power to issue writs of
certiorari in the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure is itself a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It must be annulled for running afoul of the
Constitution. A rule granting the DARAB judicial certiorari powers is an "executive
encroachment into the judiciary," and therefore, constitutionally infirm. Petitioner cannot
seek protection behind the protective veil of equity and fair play when the very rule
invoked by it has been annulled by this Court for running afoul with the Constitution.
Accordingly, it confers no right to petitioners, affords no protection to them, and in legal
contemplation, inoperative and cannot be cured by mere judicial accommodation.
PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and MARCIA CAGUIAT v. SYLVIA DE
LUNA and NENITA BUNDOC
G.R. No. 209437, March 17, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

We recognize the expertise and authority of quasi-judicial bodies such as the NLRC in
ascertaining matters specifically delegated to their jurisdiction. Similar to this Court's
appreciation of a trial court's factual findings, the latter being in the best position to observe
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses, We regard and value the competence of the
Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in resolving labor disputes. The NLRC's conclusions relating to
questions of fact set forth in the case are accorded great weight and respect, and even clothed
with finality and binding on this Court especially if they are supported by sufficient and
substantial evidence. The CA, in its judicial review pursuant to Rules 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, is nonetheless empowered to examine the records and evaluate the pieces of evidence
in order to confirm their materiality and significance, and to disregard the labor tribunal's
factual findings whenever its conclusions were not substantiated by the evidence on record.
The appellate court, in order to arrive at a just decision of the case, modified the NLRC's
award of nominal damages in favor of Bundoc whose termination was tainted with
procedural lapses on the part of PHAl, and ordered the payment of De Luna's 10-day salary,
which corresponded to the number of days her preventive suspension exceeded the mandated
30 days. Hence, the CA was justified and acted well within its appellate jurisdiction in
reviewing the facts, records and evidence of the case.

FACTS

PHAl is a non-stock, non-profit organization of the homeowners at Philam Homes, Quezon

City. Caguiat was its President and Chief Executive Officer at the time of the termination of
employment of respondents De Luna and Bundoc. De Luna's job as PHAl's Office Supervisor
consisted of managing the reservations for rental facilities and accepting payments from
clients, among others. Bundoc, as Cashier, performed the following duties and
responsibilities: (a) receiving membership dues and other incomes; (b) preparing daily
abstract of collections; (c) being in charge of petty cash fund; (d) making daily deposits of
collections; and (e) preparing checks and other disbursements. During an audit of PHAl's
books of accounts sometime in September 2008, several irregularities were discovered
such as issuance of unauthorized official and provisional receipts, unrecorded and
undeposited collections, and encashment of personal checks. The Investigating Committee
disclosed that De Luna and Bundoc were involved in said fraudulent activities particularly
in the disbursement of PHAl's funds. After submission of the final audit report by Baquiran,
the independent auditor, PHAI required De Luna and Bundoc to appear before the
investigating committee and to explain the irregularities and anomalies as well as to
account for the total amount misappropriated. PHAI asserted that despite said opportunity
given to De Luna and Bundoc, they still failed to participate and attend in the investigation.
Accordingly, on May 23, 2009, PHAI's Board of Directors issued a Memorandum addressed
to De Luna demanding payment for the amount of P75,315.00, and informing her of her
dismissal from service by reason of dishonesty, misappropriation and malversation of
funds. This prompted De Luna and Bundoc to initiate separate complaints for illegal
dismissal, underpayment and non- payment of wages, underpayment of retirement
benefits, illegal suspension, attorney's fees and damages. Both contended that they were
subjected to an investigation and were made to answer questions without the documents
supporting the alleged irregularities they committed.

The Arbiter, in an April 30, 2010 Decision, found that the termination of both De Luna and
Bundoc was legal since it was based on a just cause, and that due process was observed.
The NLRC affirmed in toto the findings of the Arbiter that De Luna and Bundoc held
positions of trust and confidence, hence, they are expected to exercise greater fidelity,
honesty and integrity in the performance of their duties. Further, the loss of trust and
confidence as just cause for dismissal should relate to the performance of their duties. The
NLRC relied on Baquiran's Affidavit and Exhibits "1" to "68" which clearly showcased the
fraudulent acts and misappropriation committed by the respondents resulting in PHAI's
loss of trust and confidence in them. The appellate court dismissed respondents' Petition in
the challenged Decision.

It affirmed the ruling of the NLRC with modification as to the monetary award. The
appellate court found that respondents' dismissal were anchored on loss of trust and
confidence hence, valid. The CA ruled that Philam Homeowners Association, Inc. (PHAI) is
ordered to pay petitioner Sylvia De Luna her corresponding salary, allowances and other
benefits from May 13, 2009 to May 23, 2009 or for a period of ten (10) days and to pay
petitioner Nenita Bundoc the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as and by
way of nominal damages.

Aggrieved by the appellate court's judgment, PHAl and Caguiat filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari. Petitioners, in their Petition and Reply, argue that the appellate court
can review the factual findings of the NLRC via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court only when
there is a variance between the findings of the LA and the NLRC. Here, since the LA and the
NLRC uniformly found that De Luna and Bundoc were afforded due process, the appellate
court could no longer review, much less reverse or modify, this finding.

ISSUE

W/N the appellate court acted well within its prerogatives in modifying the award of
nominal damages and ordering payment of De Luna's 10-day salary, allowances and other
benefits.

RULING

YES. We recognize the expertise and authority of quasi-judicial bodies such as the NLRC in
ascertaining matters specifically delegated to their jurisdiction. Similar to this Court's
appreciation of a trial court's factual findings, the latter being in the best position to
observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses, We regard and value the competence
of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in resolving labor disputes. The NLRC's conclusions
relating to questions of fact set forth in the case are accorded great weight and respect, and
even clothed with finality and binding on this Court especially if they are supported by
sufficient and substantial evidence. The CA, in its judicial review pursuant to Rules 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, is nonetheless empowered to examine the records and evaluate
the pieces of evidence in order to confirm their materiality and significance, and to
disregard the labor tribunal's factual findings whenever its conclusions were not
substantiated by the evidence on record. The appellate court, in order to arrive at a just
decision of the case, modified the NLRC's award of nominal damages in favor of Bundoc
whose termination was tainted with procedural lapses on the part of PHAl, and ordered the
payment of De Luna's 10-day salary, which corresponded to the number of days her
preventive suspension exceeded the mandated 30 days. Hence, the CA was justified and
acted well within its appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the facts, records and evidence of
the case.

For a dismissal to be valid, it must comply with the substantive and the procedural due
process. The appellate court found that PHAI failed to prove that Bundoc was notified and
given the chance to explain and to refute the accusations against her. Bundoc was not
notified of the charges leveled against her or of her termination. This clearly amounted to a
violation of Bundoc's right to procedural due process. For PHAI's failure to accord due
process in terminating her employment, Bundoc is entitled to nominal damages. The CA
correctly awarded P30,000.00 in favor of Bundoc in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
Further, as explicitly provided under Section 4, Rule XIV, the employer must pay the
corresponding wage of his employee if the preventive suspension had been extended
beyond the 30-day period. In this case, the appellate court found that De Luna's preventive
suspension lasted for 40 days. Even while the dismissal was valid, PHAI should have paid
De Luna her salary for 10 days corresponding to the number of days in excess of the 30-day
period of preventive suspension. In fine, we hold that the appellate court acted within its
jurisdiction in affirming the NLRC's judgment with modification as to the award of nominal
damages in Bundoc's favor, and payment of De Luna's 10-day salary in excess of the
mandated 30 days of preventive suspension.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEL MORAL, INC
G.R. No. 187307, October 14, 2020, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be
a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must
be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Applying
the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present case becomes dismissible.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enunciates the rule of res judicata or bar by prior
judgment.

FACTS

Respondent Del Moral, Inc. (Del Moral) is a domestic family corporation and the registered
owner of several parcels of land situated in different municipalities in Pangasinan with a
total area of 125.2717 hectares. These parcels of land were originally tobacco farmlands.
102.9766 hectares of Del Moral's property were later placed under the coverage of the
agrarian reform program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. On July 17, 1987,
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2284 was issued which (1) provided for the full land ownership
to qualified farmer-beneficiaries covered by P.D. No. 27; (2) determined the value of
remaining unvalued rice and com lands subject to P.D. No. 27; and (3) provided for the
manner of payment by the farmer beneficiary and mode of compensation to the landowner.
Pursuant to Section 2 of E.O. No. 228, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) computed
the just compensation to be paid to Del Moral in the total amount of P342,917.81. In 1992,
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) informed Del Moral of the approval of its
monetary claim pertaining to the 102.9766 hectares of farmlands which were placed under
the coverage of P.D. No. 27. The LBP assigned the original total valuation in the amount of
P342,917.81 or roughly P3,329.30 per hectare as just compensation to Del Moral. However,
Del Moral found the assigned valuation made by the DAR and the LBP to be grossly
inadequate and unreasonably low. Thus, Del Moral filed a petition on April 26, 2002 before
the RTC for the proper determination of just compensation.

The RTC rendered its Decision computing the just compensation based on the recent fair
market value of the property, instead of using the prevailing factors at the time of the
taking. The court a quo used the formula in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 5 (Series
of 1998) and fixed the amount of just compensation at P216,104,385.00. In addition, it
awarded Del Moral P90 million as temperate damages and PhP10 million as nominal
damages. The RTC also imposed legal interest on the monetary awards at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum to be computed from the finality of judgment until the amount is
actually and fully paid.

The CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 983739 affirmed the RTC's computation for just compensation but
reduced the award for temperate and nominal damages to P10 million and P1 million,
respectively. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, the DAR filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 181183, before this Court. However, on June 4,
2008, this Court denied the said petition for failure to (1) state the material date when it
filed its motion for reconsideration; and (2) submit a verification of the petition, a
certificate of non-forum shopping, and an affidavit of service that shows competent
evidence of the affiants' identities. On October 28, 2008, this Resolution became final and
executory and the corresponding entry of judgment was issued. Prior to the finality of the
denial of the DAR's Petition for Review before this Court, the CA issued the assailed
Decision denying the LBP's appeal regarding the proper computation of just compensation.
Aware of its earlier pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373, the CA similarly affirmed the
RTC's computation for just compensation and reduced the award for damages to conform
to its previous ruling. Hence, the LBP filed this present Petition. With the enactment of R.A.
No. 9700, amending R.A. No. 6657, the LBP argues that the issue as to which formula should
be followed in computing the just compensation is already mooted. On the other hand, Del
Moral contends that the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 181183 can no longer be disturbed under
the doctrine of law of the case because said judgment has attained finality.

ISSUE

W/N the the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 181183 can no longer be disturbed under the
doctrine of law of the case because said judgment has attained finality.

RULING

YES. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4)
there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.

All the elements of res judicata are present in the case at bar. First, there is a final judgment
or order, that is, the RTC Decision dated October 16, 2006 as affirmed by the CA in its
Decision dated October 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 had already become final and
executory by virtue of this Court's Resolution dated June 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 181183 which
denied the DAR's Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. Thereafter, on
October 28, 2008, the corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued. Second, both the CA
and the RTC have jurisdiction over (1) the subject matter, that is, the computation of just
compensation of the subject properties and the awards for temperate and nominal
damages as well as legal interest; and (2) the parties, namely, LBP, DAR and Del Moral.
Third, the RTC Decision dated October 16, 2006 and CA Decision dated October 30, 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 are judgments on the merits, the rights and obligations of the parties
with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case having been
unequivocally determined and resolved. Lastly, CA-G.R. SP No. 98033 and CA-G.R. SP No.
98373 refer to the same subject matter, raise the same issues and involve the same parties.
Although CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 was an appeal filed only by the DAR, for purposes of res
judicata, we have held that only a substantial identity of parties is required and not
absolute identity. The LBP may not be impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 which had
already attained finality, however, the LBP has community of interest with the DAR as both
parties represented the government's interest in the expropriation of Del Moral's 102
hectares of landholdings. Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment,
the present case becomes dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enunciates
the rule of res judicata or bar by prior judgment.
Villaroman v. Estate of Arciaga

G.R. Nos. 210822. June 28, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment
on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar
by prior judgment" would apply.

FACTS

Petitioners Florante Villaroman and Carlos Villaroman are heirs of Agrifina. Respondents
are the heirs of Jose, one of the registered owners of a parcel of land known as Lot 965. Jose
sold a 300-square meter portion of Lot 965 to Florentino for P6,000.00 evidenced by a
Kasunduan ng Bilihan. Florentino paid the remaining balance to Jose's wife, Felicidad.
Despite full payment, Jose failed to deliver and transfer the title of the 300-square meter
portion of Lot 965 in the name of Florentino. Florentino sold the said 300-square meter
portion of Lot 965 to Agrifina evidenced by a Kasulatang Tapos at Lubos na Bilihan ng
Piraso ng Lupa. Agrifina erected her house thereon and other improvements, such as a
three- door apartment and a store. The title to the property had not been transferred to
either Florentino or Agrifina even after Jose's demise. After the death of Jose, his wife,
Felicidad, together with Jose's brother, Alfredo, caused the execution of a Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Ganap, which involved the absolute sale of Lot 965 in favor of Agrifina, a certain
Emilia, and Artemio. Notably, the same agreement was executed and signed by Felicidad,
Alfredo, including Jose, among others four years after Jose's death in 1976. By virtue of the
said Kasulatan ng Bilihang Ganap, a certificate of title covering the 300-square meter
portion of Lot 965 was issued in the name of Agrifina. Meanwhile, titles over the remaining
550- square meter and 100-square meter portions of Lot 965 were transferred to Emilia
and Artemio.

Respondents thus lodged a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale,

Reconveyance of Real Property with Damages with the RTC docketed as Civil Case No.
11993, against Agrifina and her co-defendants Emilia and Artemio, on the ground that the
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Ganap is falsified and cannot serve as basis for the issuance of titles
in their names. By way of an Answer with Counterclaim for Damages, Agrifina and her co-
defendants insisted that respondents are bound to respect their title of ownership over the
property by virtue of the Deeds of Sale executed by Jose in their favor sometime in 1968
and 1969. The RTC dismissed respondents' complaint. The CA reversed the Decision of the
RTC.

It held that the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Ganap was falsified and therefore, void. The CA also
found that the agreement between Jose and Artemio and the Kasunduan na Bilihan
between Jose and Florentino did not transfer actual ownership of certain portions of Lot
965 in favor of Artemio and Florentino, as both contracts merely gave them the "right to
the transfer or acquisition of ownership." The appellate court also found that no contract of
sale existed between Jose and Emilia that would prove the latter's ownership over the 550-
square meter portion of Lot 965. The Decision of the CA became final and executory.

Afterwards, petitioners filed the instant complaint for specific performance against
respondents. Petitioners prayed that respondents "execute the appropriate documents,
particularly a Deed of Absolute Sale, to affirm and confirm the past transactions entered
into by the parties and to effect the formal transfer of the said property to petitioners."
Petitioners based their alleged ownership rights over the 300-square meter portion of Lot
965 on the following documents: (1) the Kasunduan ng Bilihan between Jose and
Florentino; and (2) the Kasulatang Tapos at Lubos Na Bilihan Ng Lupa between Florentino
and Agrifina. Respondents filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
judicata.

ISSUES

Whether or not the complaint for specific performance is barred by res judicata. RULING

1. YES. The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior
judgment" would apply.

The Court finds that the subject case satisfies all the requisites of res judicata under the
first concept of bar by prior judgment.

There is no question as to the presence of the first three elements in the present case. The
decision in Civil Case No. 11993 is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court that
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties.

Anent the fourth element, a careful examination of the allegations raised by the parties in
Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-113 shows that the cases involve the same
parties and relate to the same subject matter. In Civil Case No. 11993, the plaintiffs therein
are the heirs of the late Jose, while Agrifina, the mother of herein petitioners, is one of the
defendants in the said case insofar as her claim over the 300-square meter portion of Lot
965 is concerned. Notably, Agrifina was eventually substituted by petitioners upon her
demise on January 17, 1997. In the instant case, the plaintiffs are petitioners as heirs of
Agrifina, while defendants are the heirs of Jose. While the subject matter in Civil Case No.
11993 comprised the whole area of Lot 965, Agrifina's property interest therein
encompassed the 300-square meter portion of Lot 965, the very same subject matter
involved in this case.

There is identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-
113. When respondents filed their Complaint for Annulment of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Ganap with the RTC in Civil Case No. 11993, Agrifina and her co-defendants responded
thereto by filing an Answer with Counterclaim for Damages with prayer that they be
declared as the lawful owners of their respective portions of Lot 965. A counterclaim raised
by a defendant partakes of a nature of a complaint or a cause of action against a plaintiff. In
the Answer with Counterclaim for Damages in Civil Case No. 11993, Agrifina's cause of
action rested on respondents' failure to respect her ownership over the 300-square meter
portion of Lot 965 by virtue of the Kasunduan ng Bilihan between Jose and Florentino, and
the Kasulatang Tapos at Lubos na Bilihan ng Lupa between herself and Florentino. In Civil
Case No. 00-113, petitioners' cause of action hinges on respondents' refusal to execute a
deed of absolute sale despite the existence of the two foregoing documents supposedly
evidencing the sale of the property from Jose to Florentino, and from the latter to Agrifina.
In both Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-113, petitioners impute the same
wrongful act on respondents — their failure to recognize petitioners' title over the 300-
square meter portion of Lot 965 despite the existence of perfected contracts of sale in their
favor. Although differing in form, these two cases are ultimately anchored on conflicting
claims of ownership over the property in dispute. Under the same test evidence, if the
same evidence ultimately support and establish the causes of action in the first and second
cases, then there is likely an identity of causes of action. In this case, petitioners presented
the same documentary evidence to prove their claims in Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case
No. 00-133, as both actions ultimately seek to establish their title over a certain portion of
Lot 965. In this regard, petitioners presented three documents in both actions, namely: (1)
the Kasunduan ng Bilihan dated September 4, 1996 executed by Jose in favor of Florentino;
(2) the handwritten receipt executed by Felicidad, Jose's wife, of the remaining balance
amounting to P1,000.00; and (3) the Kasulatang Tapos at Lubos na Bilihan ng Piraso ng
Lupa between Florentino and Agrifina involving the said property in dispute.
TIÑA V. STA. CLARA ESTATE, INC.
G.R. No. 239979. February 17, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando J.,)

DOCTRINE

Where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the
issue on ownership is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue
of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property. In an ejectment case,
questions as to the validity of the title cannot be resolved definitively. A separate action to
directly attack the validity of the title must be filed to fully thresh out as to who possesses a
valid title over the subject property.

FACTS

Tina and her husband claims to have been occupying a 231-meter lot along Creek I,
denominated as Ogumod Creek in Bacolod City, for more than 55 years. They held the
property openly, publicly, adversely and continuously as owners. Evidenced by a an
Indorsement of Engr. Jose F. Falsis on January 10, 1990, stating that they have been
occupying the area for 45 years; and a Certification of Arturo V. Parreñ o of the Office of the
Barangay Council, Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City. Petitioner also filed a Miscellaneous
Sales Application on July 22, 1986 over the subject area. The application was not opposed
and onDecember10,1997,theMiscellaneousSalesApplicationwasapprovedbytheDENR.

Sta. Clara alleged that the contested property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-28629 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City registered under its name. Sta.
Clara traced its title as far back as TCT No. T-28629 which was entered in the Registry of
Deeds of Bacolod City on June 11, 1965. Respondent also presented a letter from the City
Assessor of Bacolod addressed to petitioner that the office could not change the appraisal
of the property under Patent Application No. (CENRO V-8)2 because the property is within
or is a portion of the property of Sta. Clara Estate, Inc., identified as Creek 1. Respondent
averred that petitioner is illegally occupying a portion of its property.

Sta. Clara filed a Complaint for ejectment before the MTCC. On the other hand, Tina filed a
Complaint for cancellation of title docketed as Civil Case No. 00- 11133 with damages and
other reliefs before the RTC over the contested property. The ejectment case filed by Sta.
Clara proceeded before the petition for cancellation of title by Tina. The MTCC ruled in
favor of Sta. Clara. The MTCC found that Sta. Clara is the registered owner of Creek I having
introduced the improvement into the property, which is the man-made creek, when the
said property was being developed into the Sta. Clara Subdivision. The MTCC also affirmed
the findings in the Commissioner's Report that the lot in question indeed belongs to
respondent. The findings of the MTCC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-11133 and while petitioner was about to present
her sur-rebuttable evidence, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the principal issue in the case, i.e., whether Creek I is a man-made or a public
creek, has been resolved in the ejectment case when the Supreme Court affirmed and
declared that Creek I is man-made and belongs to respondent. Petitioner opposed the
Motion and stated that the issue in the ejectment case is confined only to possession and
there is substantial evidence that Creek I is a natural creek.

The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 00-11133 in light of the pronouncement of this Supreme
Court that Ogumod Creek or Creek I belongs to respondent. Tina filed a direct appeal to this
Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that
the RTC erred in prematurely terminating the proceedings and dismissing the Complaint
for cancellation of title simply because of a ruling touching on ownership in a related
ejectment case.

ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case 00-11133 because a prior ruling
touching on ownership related on an ejectment case is merely ancillary to solve possession
and should not bind the title or ownership of the land.

RULING

YES. We note that the petitioner directly appealed to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, in
relation to Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on an alleged pure question of law. It is recognized
under Rule 45 that an appeal from the trial court's decision may be undertaken through a
petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law
are raised or involved.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely
solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the
issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test,
therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether the
appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.

An examination of the present petition shows petitioner essentially challenging the

dismissal of the case based solely on the premise that a ruling on ownership in an
ejectment case is merely ancillary to resolve the issue of possession and should not bind
the title or ownership of the land. This is clearly a question of law which calls for an
examination and interpretation of the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
"The sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject
property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties." Section 16, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court provides the exception to the rule in that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined
with the issue of ownership. In the related ejectment case, the parties were allowed to
prove how they came into possession of the property. In the ejectment case, the issue of
ownership over Creek I was resolved in favor of respondent.

This Court has consistently held that where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to
that of possession, adjudication of the issue on ownership is not final and binding, but
merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. In an ejectment case, questions as to the validity of the title
cannot be resolved definitively. A separate action to directly attack the validity of the title
must be filed, as was in fact filed by petitioner, to fully thresh out as to who possesses a
valid title over the subject property. Thus, any ruling on ownership that was passed upon
in the ejectment case is not and should not be binding on Civil Case No. 00-11133.

Tina’s application for a TRO had become moot and academic because subsequently on
March 3, 2019, the writ of demolition has been fully satisfied. However, this should not
deter us from remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine
who between the parties is the rightful owner of the disputed property as to put an end to
this protracted litigation.
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. ABRAGAR, G.R.
No. 201022, March 17, 2021, THIRD DIVISION (HERNANDO, J.)

DOCTRINE

The joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the
dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are
just, it remains essential — as it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded
in the proceedings before the court renders judgment. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

FACTS

Abragar filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in San
Fernando City, Pampanga for underpayment and non-payment of salaries/wages, service
incentive leave, and 13th month pay against a certain Marble Center (used interchangeably
with the "Marble Training Center" or "Marble Production Training Center"; hereinafter
referred to as the Center) with address at TESDA, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and his supervisor,
Bronio.

Abragar described the Center as a corporation organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine laws. He alleged that the Center's address is the TESDA Compound in Tabang,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. He further claimed that he was hired in September 1997 as a marble
operator for the Center and was tasked to cut and trim marbles in accordance with the
prescribed orders, until sometime in December 2002 when the Center suddenly cut down
his working days from six to twice or thrice a week, without giving him the usual salary he
received for the week. Also, his 13th month pay was reduced despite his pleas that he be
allowed to maintain his former work schedule. Respondent claimed that the reduction of
his work schedule and pay amounted to constructive dismissal.

The Center and Bronio failed to submit their position paper and thus were deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence. The Labor Arbiter (LA) found that Abragar was
constructively dismissed and granted his claim for unpaid salaries, service incentive leave,
and 13th month pay. There being no appeal filed within the reglementary period, Abragar
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to carry out the aforementioned decision.

Bronio filed a Motion for Reconsideration however, no action was taken on the said motion.
He later filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, where he reiterated that the Center is a
non-juridical entity but a mere training facility run by TESDA and created pursuant to a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by and among the DTI, the Provincial
Government of Bulacan, the Marble Association of the Philippines (MAP), the National
Manpower and Youth Council (now renamed TESDA; hereinafter referred to collectively as
the MOA Parties). Under the MOA, the said parties undertook to pool and share their
resources, facilities, and expertise for the establishment of a functional marble production
and training center. Moreover, Bronio alleged that he is merely an employee and trainor-
supervisor of MAP and thus cannot be held liable for any of the acts of the Center, and that
respondent is not an employee but a trainee of the Center. Abragar filed an Opposition
thereto, and the petition was referred to the NLRC. In a June 30, 2006 Resolution, the NLRC
dismissed the petition for relief from judgment.

The LA thereafter issued a Writ of Execution directing the sheriff to enforce the decision by
proceeding to the premises of Marble Center and Bronio located at TESDA, Guiguinto,
Bulacan and collect the total judgment amount.

Petitioner TESDA filed an Appeal Memorandum in Intervention with the NLRC praying for
the quashal of the writ of execution and break-open order issued by the LA and for the
remand of the case to the LA for further proceedings. Petitioner, in substance, alleged that
(a) the Center is a marble processing facility run by TESDA and a non-juridical entity
without capacity to sue or be sued; (b) the Center is a joint undertaking formed pursuant to
the aforementioned MOA agreed upon among the MOA Parties that pooled their resources
for the conduct of training and job induction programs for TESDA applicant-trainees; (c)
the writ of execution and break-open order, while directed at "respondents Marble Center
& Philip Bronio at TESDA, Guiguinto, Bulacan," was actually directed at TESDA as the
former's address is clearly the address of TESDA and occupied exclusively by the said
agency; (d) Bronio was the caretaker and supervisor assigned by MAP to oversee the
resources and facilities in the Center; and (e) despite the aforementioned facts; it was
never notified nor impleaded in the case.

NLRC in a June 30, 2008 Resolution gave due course to TESDA's appeal in intervention. The
NLRC cited Article 221 of the Labor Code which provides that technical rules are not
binding and that the LA shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure,
in the interest of due process, and Section 218(c) of the Labor Code which empowers the
NLRC to direct parties to be joined in or excluded from the proceedings, correct, amend, or
waive any error, defect or irregularity, whether in substance or in form, give all such
direction as it may deem necessary and expedient in the determination of the dispute. The
NLRC noted that TESDA's Appeal Memorandum in Intervention, while peculiar, is
impressed with substantial allegations that if proven true would result to a clear denial of
due process and miscarriage of justice.

Moreover, the NLRC stressed that nothing on record shows that the Center is a juridical
person authorized to be made a party to any case as it is not clothed with legal personality
to be sued, and the question remained on how it can be held liable for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims. Thus, the NLRC held that the real parties-in-interest appear to be
TESDA, DTI, the Provincial Government of Bulacan and the MAP, which should be joined as
parties even if only alternatively, conformably with Rule 3, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of
Court. The NLRC thereafter noted that the assailed order was void which can never attain
finality.
ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner's Appeal Memorandum in Intervention is proper.

RULING

YES. We rule for petitioner. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandate that only
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action
and every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real parties-in-
interest. In connection thereto, in Litonjua Group of Companies v. Vigan, this Court found
that the Litonjua Group of Companies, which therein respondent sought to hold solidarity
liable for illegal dismissal, was not a legal entity with juridical personality and hence could
not be held a party to the suit. Similarly, the Center which respondent seeks to hold liable
has no juridical personality nor is it an entity authorized by law to be a party to any action;
it has no legal capacity to sue or be sued and should not have been impleaded as defendant
in the instant case.

While the Center appears to be managed by TESDA in collaboration with MAP and involves
a pooling of resources by the DTI, TESDA, Provincial Government of Bulacan, and MAP, a
careful review of the records fails to show that the MOA Parties represented that the Center
had its own juridical personality in its dealings with respondent or third persons. In fact, as
pertinently alleged by petitioner, the employment contract submitted by respondent in
evidence was with MAP Multi-Purpose Cooperative Incorporated.

The Court is not inclined to rule that TESDA and the other parties to the MOA shall be held
liable as general partners to respondent's claims against the Center for non-payment of
wages, benefits, and illegal dismissal without giving them their day in court. It is a basic
tenet of due process of law that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an
action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. In the context of administrative
proceedings, due process refers to an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It would also be wholly unjust
to consider Bronio's appearance in the proceedings below as sufficient compliance with
this due process requirement insofar as the MOA parties are concerned. Relevantly, the
pleadings filed by Bronio in the proceedings below which purported to represent himself
and the Center was signed only by himself. The records are likewise devoid of any
indication that Bronio was authorized to attend the hearings on behalf of any of the MOA
Parties or if such authority was ascertained by the labor tribunals during the proceedings
below. As previously alleged by Bronio himself, he was a mere employee and tr ainor-
supervisor of MAP tasked to supervise the operations of the Center.

Given the foregoing, the proper remedy in this case is the joinder of the proper parties. In
connection thereto, the mandatory rule on joinder of indispensable parties is set forth in
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no

final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
"Indispensable parties are parties whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary
that 'the action cannot be finally determined' without them because their interests in the
matter and in the relief are so bound up with that of the other parties."

This Court has previously laid down the test to determine if a party is an indispensable
party, thus:

An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but
also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his
interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between
the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward. A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice
between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no
interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person
to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.

Applying the foregoing test, the Court finds that the MOA Parties are indispensable parties
as their interest in the controversy is such that a final adjudication cannot be made in their
absence, without injuring or affecting their interest. As alleged by respondent himself, his
claims are anchored in his employer-employee relationship with the Center. In view of the
lack of juridical personality of the Center, any judgment in favor of respondent against the
Center would have to be enforced against the properties contributed by the MOA Parties. A
perusal of the MOA shows that DTI contributed pre-operating expenses, machinery, and
consumables required for training and marble processing; the Provincial Government of
Bulacan allowed the use of its provincial lot where the Center operates to TESDA for
training purposes, and which TESDA in turn earmarked for the Center's operations; and
MAP provides supplies and materials for training and skills testing. While we wish to abide
by the mandate on speedy disposition of cases, more so considering that what is involved
here is the welfare of a worker, we cannot allow a judgment that would ultimately be
enforced against one or more of the MOA Parties without giving them their day in court. To
do so will result in a possible violation of due process. Their inclusion is necessary for the
effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties the benefit of
due process and fair play.

There are two consequences of a finding on appeal that indispensable parties have not
been joined. First, all subsequent actions of the lower courts are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction; second, the case should be remanded to the trial court for the inclusion of
indispensable parties. Considering the foregoing, the CA erred in setting aside the NLRC's
grant of petitioner's Appeal Memorandum in Intervention.

The failure to implead TESDA and the other parties to the MOA renders the proceedings
void, which may be questioned at any time. The joinder of all indispensable parties is a
condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. While the failure to implead an
indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that
said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential — as
it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before
the court renders judgment. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all, and all acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. The judgment is vulnerable to attack even when no appeal
has been taken, and does not become final in the sense of depriving a party of his right to
question its validity. Thus, the failure to implead petitioner and the other parties to the
MOA renders the July 30, 2004 Decision of the LA, writ of execution, and break- open order
null and void for want of authority, which may be attacked in any way at any time, even
when no appeal is taken. It is immaterial that petitioner filed the Appeal Memorandum in
Intervention after the LA judgment became allegedly final and executory, since a judgment
void ab initio is non-existent and thus cannot acquire finality.
TANINGCO V. FERNANDEZ

G.R. Nos. 215615. December 9, 2020, Third Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE

When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made
upon said attorney. Notice sent to counsel of record binds the client and the neglect or failure
of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is
not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face.

FACTS

A Complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and Ownership, was
resolved by the MTC in favor of the respondents and against petitioners. Petitioners' appeal
was denied by the RTC and subsequently by the appellate court whose Decision became
final and executory. Thus, respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution which the
MTC granted.

In a bid to stop the implementation of the writ, Jose Jr. filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment which was, however, dismissed by the RTC. His appeal before the CA was
likewise denied; the appellate court affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment. Jose Jr.'s Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme
Court was dismissed.

Meanwhile, the mother and brothers of Jose Jr., herein petitioners, filed a Motion to Quash
the Writ of Execution claiming that it was invalidly issued since they were not furnished a
copy of the order of substitution. They also argued that there was no valid substitution of
the defendant Jose Sr. who died during the pendency of the case.

The MTC, however, denied petitioners' Motion to Quash for being a collateral attack against
the already final and immutable decision of the appellate court. Considering the finality of
the said CA Decision, the MTC held that it was its ministerial duty to grant the writ.

The MTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration hence, they filed a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO before the RTC.

The RTC dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari and denied their prayer for
preliminary injunction and TRO.

In its February 28, 2013 Decision, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for being a
wrong remedy. In any case, it found that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when
it issued the assailed orders. The appellate court observed that the RTC's denial of
petitioners' prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and TRO was grounded on
insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners also did not attend the hearing for the reception of
their additional evidence.

On January 2, 2014, petitioners received a copy of the November 25, 2013 CA Resolution
declaring the February 28, 2013 Decision to have become final and executory on May 7,
2013, hence, to be recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Petitioners immediately filed before the CA a motion to set aside its November 25, 2013
Resolution and Entry of Judgment on the ground that they did not receive a copy of the
appellate court's February 28, 2013 Decision. Hence, their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration on the same before the appellate court.

However, the CA denied petitioners' motion finding that petitioners, through their counsel,
Atty. Taningco actually received a copy of the CA's February 28, 2013 Decision as
evidenced by Registry Return Card No. 1873.

ISSUES

Whether or not the CA did erred in denying petitioners' motion to set aside its November
25, 2013 Resolution and entry of judgment declaring the CA Decision dated February 8,
2013 to be final and executory.

RULING

NO. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must
be made upon said attorney. Notice sent to counsel of record binds the client and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of
his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face.

In the case at bench, Atty. Taningco, petitioners' counsel of record and also one of the
petitioners in the case, was served with a copy of the CA Decision on April 8, 2013 as
evidenced by Registry Return Card No. 1873, at his office address on record, which is also
his home address. Said copy was duly received by Mrs. Taningco.

Mrs.Taningcois presumed authorized to receive the CA Decision on behalf of Atty. Taningco

that was sent to the office address on record. It necessarily follows that petitioners,
through Atty. Taningco, duly received the said decision in the ordinary course of business.
In the absence of competent evidence to prove otherwise, the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty with respect to service of notice stands.

Moreover, petitioners failed to present even a scintilla of evidence other than the bare
assertion of non-receipt thereof and a mere photocopy of the identification cards with
signatures therein of Mrs. Taningco and Dennis Jr.
TALABIS V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 214647, March 4, 2020, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE:

Section 80 of PD 705 should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers
to conduct investigations and file criminal complaints regarding offenses prescribed in PD
705. Rather, said provisions should be construed as a recognition and reinforcement of their
special authority to conduct warrantless arrests, seize and confiscate property, and
proceeding therefrom, file the necessary complaints against forestry law offenders

FACTS:

One afternoon upon arriving at their house, Leonora Edoc and her husband noticed that the
pine trees planted at the edge of their garden were missing. They were then informed by
Eric Lanta-an and Raymundo Abuyog that they saw four men, among whom were the
petitioners, Edwin Talabis and Arsebino Talabis, who were cutting pine trees with the use
of a power chainsaw. Leonora went to the residence of Cesar Kitayan, a Forester and
Reforestation Unit Head of the CENRO-DENR. Thereafter, Leonora and Kitayan proceeded
to the cutting site where they saw several felled pine trees and four men standing beside it.
They then inquired from the petitioners if they have a permit to cut but the latter only
offered them a smile as response. When asked why they were cutting trees in the area,
Arsebino replied that he is the owner of the land where the pine trees were located, to
which Leonora countered that the land belongs to her daughter, Rhoda. Kitayan then took
pictures of the felled trees and made a report. The CENRO-DENR then conducted an
inventory whereby in their Inventory and Scaled Report, it was found that the total volume
of the cut pines trees were 3.1464 cubic meters valued at Twenty-two Thousand Four
Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Seventy-Six Centavos (P22,496.76). The CENRO-DENR also
issued a certification stating that no permit or authority to cut was issued to Arsebino and
the petitioner.

A Joint Affidavit-Complaint was then filed by Leonora and her daughter Rhoda Bay- An
against the petitioner and Arsebino before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. After
preliminary investigation, the petitioner and Arsebino were charged with the crime of
violation of Section 68 of PD 705. After the trial on its merits, the RTC found the petitioner
and Arsebino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the case was
dismissed only in so far as Arsebino is concerned on account on his death. On the part of
Edwin Talabis however, the CA affirmed his conviction. The matter was then brought to the
Supreme Court where the petitioner argued that the case should be dismissed on the
ground that the RTC has failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case since the complaint was
filed by a private individual when Section 80 of PD 705 requires that the complaint should
have been filed by a Forest officer.
ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case since the complaint was
filed by private individuals and not by forest officers.

RULING

NO. The Supreme Court failed to give credence to the argument of the petitioner that the
RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that the complaint was filed
by private individuals and not by forest officers. As elucidated by the Court, Section 80 of
PD 705 contemplates two situations: 1. Where forest officers arrests without warrant any
person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described
in PD 705, 2. Where an offense described in PD 705 is not committed in the presence of the
forest officer and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint.
Both situations, according to the Court recognizes the special authority of forest officers to
file necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a
preliminary investigation of criminal cases after the said forest officer has conducted
warrantless arrest, seizure or confiscation of property, or after his receipt of a complaint.

While it would appear that Section 80 of PD 705 does not apply to the facts of the instant
case since the complaint was filed by Leonora and her daughter, who were private
individuals, the Court nonetheless opined that Section 80 of PD 705 should not be
interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations and
file criminal complaints regarding offenses prescribed in PD 705. Rather, said provisions
should be construed as a recognition and reinforcement of their special authority to
conduct warrantless arrests, seize and confiscate property, and proceeding therefrom, file
the necessary complaints against forestry law offenders. Therefore, a complaint may thus
be filed with the Provincial Prosecutor not only by a forest officer but also by a private
individual. The RTC thus acquired jurisdiction over the case when Leonora and her
daughter filed the complaint.
SPS. TORRECAMPO v. WEALTH DEVELOPMENT BANK CORP.

G.R. No. 221845, March 21, 2022, Second Division, Hernando, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Act No. 3135 governs only the manner of the sale and redemption of the mortgaged real
property in an extra-judicial foreclosure; proceedings beyond these, i.e., upon the lapse of the
redemption period and the consolidation of the purchaser's title, are no longer within its
scope.

FACTS:

Sps. Gemma and Jaime Torrecampo entered into a housing loan agreement with Wealth
Development Bank Corp. The housing loan agreement was secured by a real estate
mortgage over a property owned by the spouses Torrecampo known as Lot
No.5oftheconsolidatedsubdivisionplan. TheaggregateamountoftheloanisP10.5Million,
evidenced by promissory notes. Subsequently, the spouses Torrecampo defaulted on the
payment of their loan obligation. Thus, respondent bank commenced an action to foreclose
the real estate mortgage extra-judicially under the provisions of Act No. 3135, or an Act to
Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real-Estate
Mortgages, as amended. A certificate of sale was issued on June 11, 2010 and was duly
registered with the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on June 24, 2010.

After the lapse of the one-year redemption period without any attempt on the part of the
spouses Torrecampo to redeem the mortgaged property, the ownership of the lot was then
consolidated in favor of Wealth Development Bank Corp. as the purchaser in the auction
sale. The TCT in the name of the spouses Torrecampo was cancelled and a new TCT was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City in the name of Wealth Development Bank Corp.
When petitioners refused to vacate the property upon respondent bank's demand, the
latter filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was granted
by the RTC. A notice to vacate was issued by the sheriff.

RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the RTC's Order granting the
application for a writ of possession. Subsequently, the writ of possession was successfully
implemented and the petitioners were evicted from the property. The petitioners filed a
motion to set aside the extra-judicial foreclosure sale and cancel the writ of possession
with prayer for damages on the ground that there was no violation of the mortgage
contract.

Sps. Torrecampo’s arguments: (1) the agreed maturity date of the loan has not yet
arrived; (2) the term loan agreement, the real estate mortgage contract, the promissory
notes and the disclosure statement of loan/credit transaction did not provide for the
amount of the monthly amortizations; and (3) no demand letter or statement of account of
any amount payable for any given month was sent at their address. Further, they alleged
that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale did not conform to the prescribed procedures as no
notice was sent at their given address. Also, petitioners averred that the respondent bank's
ex- parte petition for writ of possession is fatally defective as it contains no allegation as to
the posting and publication of the first and second notices of extra-judicial foreclosure sale,
nor the sending of such notices at their given address. Lastly, petitioners contended that
they suffered damages arising from the extra-judicial foreclosure of their property and
their eviction therefrom, which were both improper, unjust and oppressive.

Wealth Development Bank’s argument: there was no violation of the real estate
mortgage contract. The contract contains an acceleration clause to the effect that in any
event of default, the entire obligation immediately becomes due and payable. Thus, as a
consequence of such default, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage, to have
the property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to the obligation. They followed the
requirements on posting and publication of the notice of extra-judicial foreclosure under
Act No. 3135. Finally, whatever damages petitioners may have suffered were due to their
own acts.

RTC: issued an Order denying petitioners' motion to set aside the extra-judicial foreclosure
sale and cancel the writ of possession with prayer for damages. The RTC ruled that
proceedings for the issuance of the writ of possession are non-litigious in nature such that
the court will not delve into the merits of the petition.

CA: CA denied the petitioners' appeal on the ground that the provisions of Act No. 3135,
particularly Section 8, are only applicable until the period of redemption. Once redemption
lapses and consolidation of the purchaser's title ensues, Act No. 3135 is not applicable
anymore. Thus, petitioners' recourse to the law is misplaced.

ISSUES

Whether the CA erred in retroactively applying the new doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court in 680 Home Appliances, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals despite the settled
doctrine that when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof?

RULING:

The two cases mentioned by petitioners are not in conflict with each other. To explain the
limitations of Act No. 3135, the CA relied on the case of 680 Home Appliances, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (680 Home Appliances, Inc.) in its ruling, in this wise:

In a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, it declared that Section 8 of Act No. 3135
is the available remedy to set aside a writ of possession, without considering whether the writ
involved in each of these cases was issued during or after the lapse of the redemption period.
However, in the recent case of 680 Home Appliances, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
et al., the Supreme Court re-evaluated the aforesaid cases and concluded that there is a
necessity to make a distinction and clarify when the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135
may be availed of.

The Supreme Court in the above-cited case made the following novel pronouncements:

Act No. 3135 governs only the manner of the sale and redemption of the mortgaged real
property in an extra-judicial foreclosure; proceedings beyond these, i.e., upon the lapse of
the redemption period and the consolidation of the purchaser's title, are no longer within
its scope. This is apparent from Section 1 of Act No. 3135.

In fact, the nine (9) sections of Act No. 3135 pertain to the proceedings governing extra-
judicial foreclosures, from the conduct of the foreclosure sale up to the exercise of the right
of redemption. Our reading of Act No. 3135, therefore, should be consistent with the law's
limited coverage.

However, petitioners contend that the 680 Home Appliances, Inc. case does not apply to
them because it was decided in 2014, or four years after the subject dispute. Petitioners
allege that the aforesaid case upholds a new doctrine and should only be applied
prospectively. Instead, petitioners claim that the pronouncements in the earlier case of
Mallari v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank (Mallari) should apply to them.

The Court disagrees. Not only are the doctrines of the two cases consistent with each other,
the set of facts and issues of the Mallari case are totally different from the set of facts and
issue of the case at bar.

Firstly, in the Mallari case, the action for the declaration of nullity of the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings was filed prior to the lapse of, or within, the redemption period.

Second, the issue in theMallaricase deals with the propriety of a petition for certiorari
remedy under Rule 65 vis-à -vis an ordinary remedy of appeal mandated under Section 8 of
Act No. 3135 in the case at bar.

Third, the Mallari ruling is not in conflict but is rather reinforced by and is in consonance
with the doctrine laid out in the 680 Home Appliances, Inc. case. Petitioners quoted in
piecemeal the discussion in Mallari in order to tailor fit and interpret the case to their
advantage. However, both the Mallari and 680 Home Appliances, Inc. cases clarify that the
writ of possession the debtor may petition to set aside under Section 8 of Act No. 3135
undoubtedly refers to the one issued pursuant to Section 7 of the same law during the
redemption period. Both cases emphasize that Section 8 cannot apply to the debtor when
the redemption period has already expired, and the purchaser in the foreclosure sale has
already consolidated his ownership over the property and moved for the issuance of the
writ of possession.

The CA was thus correct in ruling that petitioners' proper recourse should have been to file
a separate action in another proceeding, like for instance, an action for recovery of
ownership, for annulment of mortgage and/or annulment of foreclosure as the Supreme
Court pointed out in the aforementioned case. They cannot anymore avail of the remedy
provided under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 as the redemption period has already lapsed.
Respondents-Appellants' case can be properly threshed out in a separate proceeding where
it will be tried on the merits and the parties will be afforded an opportunity to present their
respective evidence in support of their allegations.
SPOUSES PARK v. LIWANAG

G.R. No. 248035. November 27, 2019, Second Division, Hernando, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice.

It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not
miscarriage of justice.

FACTS:

Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee are American citizens residing in
the Philippines. They are the petitioners in the Petition for Adoption with Change of Name
of the minor "Mayca Alegado" a.k.a. "Innah Alegado" before the RTC and presided over by
respondent Judge Liwanag. Petitioners have been residing in the Philippines since 2007 (in
the case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee). They have been
gainfully employed in the Philippines for almost the same length of time that they have
been residing in the country. Petitioner Park is the President of two PEZA-located
corporations, Wyntron, Inc. and Danam Philippines, Inc., while petitioner Lee is the Senior
Adviser of BDO’s Korean Desk.

Innah was born in Tuguegarao City. She was barely 22 days old when rescued by a non-
government organization from trafficking and referred to the DSWD Field Office in
Cagayan. Innah's biological mother attempted to give her away in exchange for
transportation fare. Innah is now six years old. She was a little over one year old when her
care and custody was officially bestowed by the DSWD upon petitioners, through a Pre-
Adoption Placement Authority.

Petitioners have also adopted another girl, Hannah, through domestic adoption. The RTC
granted Hannah's adoption. Hannah is now 10 years old, and Innah considers her as her
older sister. The DSWD processed petitioners' application for adoption of Innah, and issued
its Affidavit of Consent. The DSWD's Affidavit of Consent instructed petitioners to file a
petition for domestic adoption, stating that the prospective adoptive parent shall initiate
judicial proceedings by filing the petition to adopt not later than 30 days from date of
receipt of the DSWD's written consent to adoption.

RTC: respondent Judge found that since petitioners are both foreigners, then the Petition
for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor Innah presented a proper case of inter-
country adoption, instead of considering said petition as being appropriately filed under
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Thus, the trial court directed the transmittal of a copy
of the petition and its annexes to the Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) for appropriate
action.

On October 6, 2017, petitioners filed a First Motion for Reconsideration praying for
respondent Judge to: (a) reconsider and set aside the Order; (b) give petitioners time to
confer with the ICAB and submit a best interest assessment; and (c) allow the Deposition
through Written Interrogatories to proceed. Said Motion for Reconsideration was denied
by respondent Judge. Petitioners received a copy of said Order on July 2, 2018.

On July 4, 2018, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration,
which partly reads: Very recently, it has come to their attention that the Supreme Court and
ICAB entered into an agreement regarding the treatment of foreigners who reside in the
Philippines and file a petition for adoption through the courts. Accordingly, in reference to
OCA Circular 213-2017, foreigners who reside in the Philippines should secure a
certification from their Foreign Adoption Agencies and/or Embassies that since they are
not residents in their countries and they are residing in the Philippines, the said agencies
could not issue the documents required by the domestic courts in support of their Petition
for domestic adoption. "If ever their cases will be endorsed to ICAB by the court, ICAB
will file a manifestation on this matter so that the domestic adoption could be
pursued." In light of this supervening event, Petitioners pray for a reconsideration of the
Order dated 19 June 2018 and that they be given thirty (30) days from notice to secure the
necessary certification.

Judge Liwanag denied the foregoing Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration
for being a prohibited pleading. Petitioners received a copy of said Order on July 19, 2018.
Petitioners pointed out that they have 60 days from receipt of the Order, or until
September 17, 2018, to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with the CA.

CA: dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time. The CA reasoned that
the 60-day period should have been counted from the denial of petitioners' First Motion for
Reconsideration, not the second.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They argued that the transmittal of the
copies of the records of the case to the ICAB was in the nature of an interlocutory order,
and not a final decision; and as such, a second Motion for Reconsideration was permissible.
However, in the CAResolution, it denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. (1)  Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being filed out
of time?
2. (2)  Whether the petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998?
RULING:

1. YES. Thus, the instant case should be remanded to the RTC for continuation of the
adoption proceedings. First, the nature of the trial court's case disposal is being raised as an
issue. The Court finds that a relaxation of the rules of procedure is necessary in the instant
case in order to promote the best interest of the adoptee child, Innah. In Heirs of Deleste v.
Land Bank of the Phils., the Supreme Court pronounced that: a strict and rigid application
of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive: We have not been oblivious to or
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules,
allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due
course to the appeal. In cases where the Court dispenses with the technicalities, they do not
mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases
where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need
to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural
laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and
proper disposition of his cause.

In addition, the Court finds that the petitioners did not sleep on their rights and simply
allowed the 60-day period from the denial of the First Motion for Reconsideration to lapse.
Rather, petitioners filed the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration with the
RTC in order to secure the necessary certification from their Foreign Adoption Agencies
and/or Embassies which would reflect that since they are not residents in their countries
and are residing in the Philippines, the said agencies could not issue the documents
required by the domestic courts in support of their Petition for Adoption. The foregoing
effort of petitioners was not meant to cause a delay on the proceeding but to actually assist
the court in the speedy disposal of the case.

2. YES. The petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. The
Court noted that petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have
been gainfully employed in the Philippines since the year 2007 (for Park) and since 2009
(for Lee), and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to
the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption Act. In view of
the foregoing, the Court found that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately
filed under the Domestic Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to
take cognizance thereof. The Court also took cognizance of the agreement entered into
between the Supreme Court and the ICAB regarding the treatment of foreigners who reside
in the Philippines and who file a petition for adoption through the courts. This implies that
these foreigners should still secure a certification from their Foreign Adoption Agencies
and/or Embassies that since they are not residents in their countries and habitually
residing in the Philippines, the said agencies could not issue the documents required by the
domestic courts in support to their Petitions filed for domestic adoption. If ever their
cases will be endorsed to ICAB by the courts, ICAB will file a manifestation on this
matter so that the domestic adoption could be pursued. Thus, even if the instant
adoption proceeding would be referred to the ICAB, as what the RTC did, there is still a high
probability that the ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic adoption before the
trial court could be pursued, considering the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the
referral to the ICAB would only cause a delay in the adoption proceedings, a matter that
would be clearly prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee and the petitioners.

It must also be stressed that the OSG, noted that the dismissal by the CA was based purely
on procedural grounds. Citing Aguam v. Court of Appeals, the OSG opined that: "It is a far
better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford
the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of
the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of
speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
In addition, the Court also noted that petitioners' effort during the proceedings in the trial
court have already gone as far as securing authenticated copies of the relevant California
laws on adoption, U.S. immigration laws, the taking of expert witness Ms. Tifany Markee's
deposition through written interrogatories, and the submission of several documents to
support their petition for adoption. The Court also took cognizance of the fact that the child,
Innah, had been living with petitioners for six years and has recognized them as her
parents.

In view of this, the Court held that since the case properly falls under the Domestic
Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the child that the instant case be speedily
disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for the determination of whether
petitioners are indeed qualified to adopt the child, instead of inappropriately referring the
instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB where the proceedings may have to start anew
and might be referred back to the trial court for the continuation of, the domestic adoption
proceedings. Settled is the rule that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of
paramount interest. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was
appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 which the appropriate Family
Court or RTC can properly take cognizance of.
MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES V. SECRETARY OF THE DENR

G.R. No. 202897, G.R. No. 206823, G.R. No. 207969, August 6, 2019, En Banc,

DOCTRINE:

Hernando, J.:

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. Substantive due process
refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his
property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures
or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play
and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. In order
that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must
be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof.

FACTS:

The Regional Office of the DENR Environmental Management Bureau-Region III filed a
complaint before the DENR's Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS and its
concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, with failure to provide, install, operate, and
maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system
resulting in the degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading
to Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the DENR's mandate to implement the
operational plan for the rehabilitation and restoration of Manila Bay and its river
tributaries.

Regional Directors of the DENR EMB-National Capital Region (NCR) and Region VI-A also
instituted their complaints before the PAB. They similarly charged MWSS, Maynilad, and
Manila Water with failure to (a) provide, install, or maintain sufficient WWTFs compliant
with the standards and objectives of the Clean Water Act; (b) construct Sewage Treatment
Plants and Sewerage Treatment Facilities (STPs & STFs) for treatment of household
wastes; and, ultimately, (c) perform its obligations under the said law. According to the
EMB-NCR and EMB-RVI-A, the test results of water samples taken from Manila Bay showed
that the quality of water near the area has worsened without improvement in all
parameters.

Prompted by the said complaints, the SENR issued a Notice of Violation (NOV). The NOV
determined petitioners' violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in that they have not
provided, installed, or maintained sufficient WWTFs and sewerage connections satisfactory
enough in quantity to meet the standards and objectives of the law, notwithstanding court
orders and the lapse of the five-year period provided by the Clean Water Act.
After the requisite technical conference before the PAB, petitioners submitted their
respective answers to the charges. MWSS led the defense and averred that they were
compliant with the law. Maynilad and Manila Water also asserted the supremacy of the
Concession Agreements (Agreement/s) executed with MWSS containing service targets for
water supply, sewerage, and sanitation within specific milestone periods spread over the
twenty-five-year concession period. They sought refuge under Section 7 of the Clean Water
Act which first requires the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to prepare
and effect a national program on sewerage and septage management to guide the MWSS
and/or its concessionaires in implementing the law. They also claimed other factors
contributing to the continued pollution of Manila Bay and its river tributaries. They
likewise put forth their respective proposals, on-going projects, and accomplishments
relative to the performance of their obligations under the Agreements.

In refutation, the Regional Directors of the DENR-EMB maintained that the quantity of the
WWTFs is insufficient to meet the objectives of the law. Petitioners' proffered "significant
improvements" on domestic wastewater management actually did not fall within
acceptable parameters, where the river tributaries became heavily polluted, as evidenced
by the results of the laboratory analysis and monthly monitoring of various river systems
conducted by the DENR-EMBs. There remains no connection of the existing sewage lines in
the Cavite Area, and no sufficient STFs established in the San Juan area.

SENR: ruled that the Clean Water Act, specifically, the provisions on the five-year period to
connect the existing sewage lines, is mandatory, and the refusal of petitioners' customers to
connect to a sewage line is irrelevant to Section 8 of the law. Petitioners' failure to provide
a centralized sewerage system and connect all sewage lines is a continuing unmitigated
environmental pollution resulting in the release and discharge of untreated water into
various water areas and Manila Bay. The SENR found MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water
liable for violation of the Clean Water Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR),

CA: did not consolidate the petitions and ruled the same separately. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Maynilad's petition for violation of procedural rules on motions for
reconsideration. It found that Maynilad (1) belatedly moved for reconsideration of the
SENR's October 7, 2009 Order, which therefore became final and executory; and (2) its
second motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper for being a prohibited
pleading and did not toll the reglementary period. The Court of Appeals desisted from
ruling on Maynilad's petition for review since the ruling in DENR PAB already attained
finality. The Court of Appeals. CA also denied Maynilad's motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Orders of the SENR dated October 7 and December 2, 2009 did not comply
with the requirements under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act and Section 19 of Executive
Order No. 192.
2. Whether petitioners were deprived of procedural due process when the Secretary of the
DENR imposed a fine on them for violation of the Clean Water Act.

RULING:

1. The SENR's Orders are appealable to the Office of the President. In arguing that the
SENR violated petitioners' right to due process in imposing a fine without a valid complaint
or charge and without recommendation from the PAB, petitioners inadvertently highlight
the gravity of their procedural mistake, i.e., the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43
to the appellate court to question the Orders of the SENR.

The PAB is a separate office under the Department proper and is chaired by the Secretary
of the Department. In general, the PAB has exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication of
pollution cases, and all other matters related thereto, including the imposition of
administrative sanctions. The PAB also exercises specific jurisdiction over certain
environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act:

The PAB has the exclusive and original jurisdiction with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases based on exceedance of the DENR Effluent Standards and other acts defined as
prohibited under Section 27 of R.A. 9275.

In 2009, during the pendency of DENR-PAB Case No. NCR-00794-00, proceedings in the
PAB were governed by Resolution No. I-C, Series of 1997. It defined the Board's sole and
exclusive jurisdiction and the finality of its decisions. Its Rule III, on Jurisdiction and
Authority, read: SECTION 1. JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD. — The Board shall have sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of pollution, as defined herein, and all other
matters related thereto, including the imposition of administrative sanction, except as may
be provided by law.

Rule XI, on Finality of Decisions: SECTION 1. FINALITY OF ORDER, RESOLUTION OR

DECISION AND PERIOD TO APPEAL. — Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, any
order, resolution or decision of the Board shall become final and executory after fifteen
(15) days from the date of receipt thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an
appeal is perfected within said period. The mere filing of an appeal shall not stay the
decision of the Board. However, the Orders of the SENR are different from the issuances of
the PAB. While under its 1997 rules, the PAB had jurisdiction to impose the fine or
administrative sanction on all cases of pollution, it is Section 28 of the Clean Water Act and
its IRR, Rule 28 of DAO No. 2005-10, which must be correctly applied. It was already in
effect in 2009 and specifically bestows upon the Secretary of the DENR, upon
recommendation of the PAB, in cases of commission of prohibited acts under and
violations of the Clean Water Act, the power to impose fines, order the closure,
suspension of development or construction, or cessation of operations, or, where
appropriate disconnection of water supply.

The herein assailed Orders dated October 7 and December 2, 2009 were not issued by the
PAB but by the SENR. Thus, we affirm the appellate court's holding in CA-G.R. SP No.
112041 that the appropriate remedy from the Orders of the SENR is an appeal to the
Office of the President. Consequently, petitioners prematurely filed a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals and failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
These erroneous procedural steps effectively rendered petitioners' appeals dismissible,
resulting in the finality of the Orders of the SENR.

2. No Denial of Procedural Due Process Petitioners' claim of denial of due process is just
as infirm. Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. Substantive due
process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to
his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the
procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to
administer it. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due
process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural
requirements thereof. As nowhere in the voluminous records of these cases have
petitioners questioned the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the Clean Water Act, there is no
reason to dispute the said law.

In invoking their right to due process, petitioners mainly argue that the SENR, without a
valid complaint or charge, imposed a fine without the recommendation from the PAB and
arrogated unto itself the powers of the latter.

The Court disagrees. The records disclose the fact that this case was spawned by the
complaints commenced by the Regional Directors of the DENR-EMB-RIII, DENR-EMB-NCR,
and DENR-EMB-RVI-A before the DENR-PAB. The SENR acted upon the said complaints in
response, issuing the NOV against petitioners. In clear terms, the NOV stated the charges
against petitioners, gave a directive to attend the technical conference for simplification of
issues and stipulations of facts, and apprised them of the liability imposed on violators
under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act. Hence, petitioners were notified of the charges
against them, were given an opportunity to be heard during a technical conference
and were informed of the penalty for possible violations of the Clean Water Act.
These charges were the same accusations for which petitioners were eventually found
liable for. In addition, petitioners wrote several letters addressed to the PAB and the
Secretary of the DENR formalizing their position in response to the Complaint-Affidavits of
the Regional Directors of the DENR-EMB. In turn, the Regional Directors filed their
Comments thereto, which were amply refuted by the petitioners. Demonstrably, the SENR,
upon recommendation of the PAB, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, validly imposed the
fine after the charge, hearing, and due deliberation.

Moreover, the role of the PAB under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act is merely
recommendatory. This participation by the PAB in the imposition of fines as penalty under
Section 28 of the Clean Water Act is also phrased as recommendatory by the Revised Rules
of the Pollution Adjudication Board on Pleading, Practice and Procedure in Pollution Cases:
In any case, whatever procedural lapse that may have transpired during the proceedings
before the PAB and the SENR had already been cured when MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila
Water all moved for reconsideration of the SENR's Orders. Procedural due process, as
applied to administrative proceedings, means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. MANUEL F. SENO, JR.

G.R. No. 183478, February 10, 2020, Second Division, Hernando, J.:

DOCTRINE:

There are exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass upon and review the findings of
fact by the CA such as: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

FACTS:

Respondents are members of the Board of Directors of JMA Transport Services

Corporation, a domestic corporation and a duly covered member of SSS. SSS filed an
Affidavit-Complaint against respondents together with De Leon, Librando, and Froyalde, in
their capacities as JMA Transport's Board of Directors for failure to remit the social security
(SS) contributions of their employees in violation of the Social Security Act of 1997.

In its complaint, SSS averred that after inspecting the account of JMA Transport, it
discovered that the company was delinquent in its payment of contributions for the period
September 1997 to July 1999. As of August 31, 1999, the amount due was P838,488.13
inclusive of the 3% penalty per month. As a result, thereof, a Letter of Introduction was
served to JMA Transport to monitor its compliance with the Social Security Act of 1997 and
to inspect its SSS records. This was followed by a Billing Letter and a Demand Letter
informing the company of its outstanding obligation and demanding to pay it within 10
days from receipt of the demand. However, JMA Transport failed to settle its obligations
which prompted SSS to file the said Complaint.

During the preliminary investigation, respondents proposed to pay in installment JMA

Transport's outstanding obligation. Manuel issued 24 postdated checks in the total amount
of P609,370.50 as payment of JMA Transport's obligation inclusive of the penalty charges.
SSS, in turn, accepted the postdated checks. Thus, the Complaint was provisionally
withdrawn in view of the settlement between the parties. However, when two of the
postdated checks were dishonored by the drawee-bank, SSS notified JMA Transport to
replace the said checks and to pay its obligation. However, the company did not heed the
demand. Consequently, SSS filed another Complaint-Affidavit against respondents for
violation of R.A. No. 8282. SSS alleged that JMA Transport had unpaid obligations which
included the obligations subject of the first complaint plus delinquent SS contributions
from August 1999 to June 2004 and penalty thereon.

Manuel refuted SSS' claims and alleged that JMA Transport had already ceased operations
in July 1999. Therefore, he and the other respondents should not be held liable for the SS
contributions after July 1999. He further averred that the delinquent contributions as of
July 1999 had been settled by the two postdated checks, he issued to SSS and that the
remaining obligation of the company pertained only to the penalty charges. Furthermore,
Manuel asserted that he should not have been held responsible for the dishonor of the
checks as this was brought about by the drawee-bank's merger with another bank.
Fernando and Gemma, on the other hand, denied any participation in the alleged violation
of the Social Security Act of 1997. They asserted that as directors of JMA Transport, they
never handled matters relating to the SS contributions of the employees. They also
corroborated the contentions of respondent Manuel with respect to the cessation of
business operations of JMA Transport effective July 1999 as well as the payments of the
delinquent contributions and penalty charges that were the subjects of the previous
complaint.

SSS thereafter submitted its Reply maintaining that it assessed JMA Transport the
additional SS contributions on the presumption that the company was still in operation
since the records of the SSS did not show that it has ceased business operations.

DOJ: reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of
the Information. It held that JMA Transport could not be held liable for the SS contributions
after July 1999 because it had already ceased its business operations as of said month.
Furthermore, the company's unpaid delinquent SS contributions plus penalty charges had
already been settled by Manuel who had issued post dated checks. The DOJ ruled that the
dishonor by the drawee-bank of the checks due to its merger with another bank did not
constitute breach of the agreement on the part of Manuel to warrant the revival of the
complaint.

Meanwhile the prosecution filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the trial court in
accordance with the DOJ Resolution. During the hearing of the said motion, private
prosecutor Tendido manifested that SSS had a pending Motion for Reconsideration with
the DOJ.

RTC: In its May Order, The trial court denied the motion. It held that based on the three
Franchise Verifications issued by the LTFRB that were attached to SSS' Reply-Affidavit, JMA
Transport was in active status either from August 13, 2003 or June 4, 2004 until March 31,
2006. It therefore showed that from July 1999 onwards, it was still in continuous business
operation contrary to respondents' claim.

In its September Order and by way of action on the motion for reconsideration, the trial
court did not order the grant or denial thereof; rather, it directed the public prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation for the purpose of receiving respondents' controverting evidence
with respect to the Franchise Verifications.

CA: merely noted respondents' prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction
but directed the trial court to observe judicial courtesy. CA rendered its Decision granting
respondents' petition on the basis that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed May and September Orders. It held that the trial court went beyond the
records of the case when it based its May Order on Franchise Verifications that were not
attached to or even mentioned in SSS' Reply-Affidavit. Anent the September Order, the CA
ruled that the act of directing the public prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation brushed
aside respondents' arguments in their motion for reconsideration and infringed on their
constitutional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it ruled that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in the issuance of the assailed May and September Orders?

RULING:

The Court finds the petition partly meritorious. It is a settled rule that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, it will not entertain questions of facts as it is bound
by the findings of fact made by the CA when supported by substantial evidence.

There are, however, exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass upon and review
the findings of fact by the CA such as: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted
by the evidence on record.

The instant case falls under the exceptions since the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the RTC, and is based on the supposed absence of evidence, i.e., the
Franchise Verifications, but is contracted by the evidence on record. The Court observes
that the findings of the CA were premised mainly on the Franchise Verifications which
were allegedly not found in the records. The Court found that the said Franchise
Verifications were actually appended to the Reply of SSS contrary to the observation of the
appellate court. Hence, it is only proper to give due course to the instant petition. After a
thorough examination of the records of the case, the Court found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in issuing the May Order. There was no gross misapprehension of facts
on the part of the trial court with respect to the assailed May Order. In issuing the assailed
May Order, the trial court correctly found that there was factual basis in the allegation that
JMA Transport was in fact in continuous business operations.

Concerning the continued business operation of JMA, SSS submitted three (3) Franchise
Verifications issued by the LTFRB for JMA Transport Service Corporation. These
documents, which were attached to complainant's reply-affidavit, clearly show that JMA
remained in active status either from August 13, 2003 or June 4, 2004 until March 31, 2006,
despite the accused's claim that the business was retired in July 1999. Notably, accused
[Seno] did not refute these Franchise Verifications in his rejoinder-affidavit while the other
accused opted not to file any rejoinder-affidavits. After careful consideration of the
evidence submitted in this case, the Court believes that there exists probable cause against
the accused for the offense charged. Hence, the case should be maintained.

The Court found that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the CA, the three Franchise
Verifications were appended to SSS' Reply-Affidavit. These verifications were even
mentioned in the Resolution of ACP Sarmiento-Flores who initially recommended the filing
of the Information against respondents. Interestingly, all that respondents have advanced
was a mere bare and unsubstantiated assertion that they were not furnished copies of the
same. Hence, their negative self-serving assertion carries no weight at all especially since it
was not supported by any evidence to prove the same. Verily, the trial court did not gravely
abuse its discretion in issuing the May Order. Its independent assessment with respect to
the issue whether JMA Transport was still in operation after the year 1999 was duly based
on the evidence adduced before the court.

However, with respect to the assailed September Order, the Court is one with the findings
of the appellate court. To recall, the trial court did not deny or grant the motion for
reconsideration; instead, it merely directed the public prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation and to receive respondents' evidence that would controvert the Franchise
Verifications, and to conclude the same thereafter. The trial court's directive was
erroneous.

It was already unnecessary for the trial court to direct the prosecution to conduct the
reinvestigation. What it should have done was to order the parties to submit additional

evidence and to admit the same if warranted during the hearing conducted for the purpose.
Notably, the Information was already filed before the trial court. Therefore, it is the best
and sole judge to determine the proper disposition of the case, which includes whether to
grant or to deny the motion to withdraw the Information filed by the prosecution.

Verily, to direct the prosecution to reinvestigate the case for the purpose of admitting
additional evidence would clearly undermine the power of the trial court to adjudicate the
case before it. Its directive gave the impression that the trial court might rely on the
findings of the prosecution on whether respondents' motion for reconsideration of the
assailed May Order denying the withdrawal of Information should be granted or not. This
should not be the case, for to do so would amount to an implied circumvention of a trial
court judge's role to independently assess the cases already filed before him/her based on
the evidence submitted by the parties concerned. At any rate, the records do not show that
respondents prayed for the conduct of a reinvestigation in their motion for
reconsideration. Jurisprudence dictates that the courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for
in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a case. Evidently, the trial
court gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed September Order. In doing
so, SSS' right to due process was violated when it ordered the conduct of a reinvestigation
that was not at the start prayed for by the respondents.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. v. MABALACAT INSTITUTE, INC. G.R.
No. 211563, September 29, 2021, Second Division, Hernando, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is whether
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata does not
exist, neither can forum shopping exist. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of res judicata,
also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be
a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

FACTS:

SVHFI claimed that it is the registered and absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mabalacat, Pampanga, issued in its name. Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (MII) occupies said lot
without paying rent and only through its tolerance since the year 1983 until March 14,
2002. Nevertheless, through SVHFI's letter, it informed MII that beginning April 1, 2002, it
will be charged a rental fee for its use and occupancy of the subject lot at the monthly rate
of P50 per sq.m. which is payable on or before the 5th day of each month. However, in MII's
reply letter, it refused to comply with SVHFI's demand. In view of MII's refusal, SVHFI
wrote another letter demanding the rental payment for the months of April to July 2002
within 15 days from receipt thereof. Otherwise, it must vacate the subject lot. However, MII
still failed to comply therewith. In view of the foregoing, SVHFI filed a Complaint for
collection of a sum of money against MII. Instead of filing an answer, MII filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo had not validly acquired
jurisdiction because it was not properly served with summons.

The court a quo denied MII's Motion to Dismiss. MII moved for reconsideration of the said
Order but the same was likewise denied in its September Order. MII then sought to nullify
the RTC's March 12, 2003 and September 25, 2003 Orders before the CA through a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was denied in the appellate court's
July Decision. MII moved for reconsideration, which was likewise denied in the appellate
court's September Resolution.

Unfazed, MII filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari . However, it was
dismissed through this Court's July Resolution.
MII filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim with the court a quo in the Collection
Case which was admitted in the Order. Thereafter, the court a quo set the Collection Case
for pre-trial. However, prior to the scheduled pre-trial, MII filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the ground of forum shopping. It argued that the failure of SVHFI to report to
the court a quo that it filed the Ejectment Case despite the explicit requirement of Section 5
(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court was a willful and deliberate act of forum shopping on
account of which its complaint should be dismissed. MII likewise charged SVHFI with
violating the rule on splitting of a single cause of action as set forth in Sections 3 and 4, Rule
2 of the same Rules. While the court a quo's proceedings were underway, SVHFI filed a
Complaint for Ejectment against MII.

RTC: granted MII's motion to dismiss, thereby dismissing the Collection Case,

CA: SVHFI filed an appeal with the appellate court, wherein the sole issue raised was
whether or not SVHFI was guilty of forum shopping when it filed two different actions, the
appellate court ruled in the affirmative.

ISSUE:

Whether SVHFI committed forum shopping when it filed two different actions, i.e., the
Collection and Ejectment Cases, in two different courts?

RULING:

NO. The Court held that SVHFI did not violate the rule on forum shopping when it filed the
Ejectment Case while the Collection Case has been pending for four years. The
determinative factor in violations of the rule against forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata does
not exist, neither can forum shopping exist.

Forum shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple fora for the same relief, to increase
the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. The elements of forum shopping are: (i)
identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interest; (ii) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the latter founded on the same facts; and (iii) any
judgment rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other action.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of res
judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c)
it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
SVHFI was not guilty of forum shopping. In the instant case, the Court found that the
second and third elements of forum shopping and litis pendentia are lacking. Thus, We are
of the firm view that there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between a
suit for collection of sum of money and an unlawful detainer case, and that any judgment
rendered in one of these actions would not amount to res judicata in the other action.

Firstly, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between both actions.
The only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the
property involved. Thus, in actions for unlawful detainer, a complaint sufficiently alleges
said cause of action if it states the following elements, to wit: (1) initially, the possession of
the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of
the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (4) within one
year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.

On one hand, the purpose of the Collection Case was to compel MII to pay its rent in view
of its occupancy on the subject lot from the time of SVHFI's initial demand to vacate the
subject lot. Thus, the party adjudged to be the lawful possessor in an ejectment suit is
entitled to compensation, reckoned from the time he demanded the adverse party to vacate
the disputed property. On the other hand, in the Ejectment Case, SVHFI's cause of action
stemmed from the prejudice it suffered due to the loss of possession of its property.
Nonetheless, its claims in the Collection Case do not have a direct relation to its loss of
material possession of the subject lot.

Secondly, any judgment rendered in ejectment cases of forcible entry or unlawful detainer
will not amount to res judicata in a civil case of collection of sum of money for unpaid rent
of the same property and vice versa. Settled is the rule that the only issue raised in
ejectment cases is that of physical possession of the property. Thus, in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or
the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. Hence, the
damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a
mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property. On
the other hand, in a civil suit for collection of sum of money, what is sought to be
recovered is the payment of rentals only without regard to the unlawfulness of the
occupancy.

In the Ejectment Case, the sole issue was the restoration to the rightful possessor of the
subject lot who was deprived of the same. The rightful possessor would then be entitled to
the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the property. On the other hand, in the
Collection Case, what is sought to be recovered is the payment of rentals, without regard to
the legality of MII's occupancy or damages which SVHFI allegedly suffered but which have
no direct relation to its loss of material possession. Both issues may be decided by the
courts wherein they are pending. However, any amount that the victor may have recovered
in the ejectment suit due to the damage caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, may no longer be recovered in the Collection Case on the ground of unjust
enrichment. The issue of the rightful possession was settled even if the issue of unpaid
rentals was still pending before the RTC in the complaint for specific performance. This
further strengthens our view that an institution of an ejectment suit does not constitute
forum shopping even if the issue of unpaid rentals between the same parties and of the
same property is pending before another court.

An action for collection of sum of money may not be joined with an ejectment suit,
otherwise a misjoinder of causes of action would ensue. In the instant case, the
Collection Case requires a full-blown trial for the parties to show evidence on the propriety
of paying rent and its rightful amount. These may not be accomplished in an ejectment
proceeding which is summary in nature. Therefore, this Court finds SVHFI not guilty of
forum shopping when it filed the Ejectment Case subsequent to the Collection Case, while
the latter is still pending. In both cases, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, and that any judgement on any of these cases would not amount to res judicata
on the other.

In the Ejectment Case, the cause of action stemmed from the prejudice that SVHFI allegedly
suffered due to the loss of possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, the Collection
Case was founded on the appropriate amount of rental fees that are allegedly due and the
damages that SVHFI allegedly suffered but which have no direct relation to its loss of
material possession.
GUILLERMA S. SILVA v. CONCHITA S. LO

G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

In our jurisdiction, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for
partition: first, the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that
partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a
decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if
the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to
agree), as the case may be.

FACTS

On May 20, 1975, Carlos, Jr. died intestate leaving behind a sizeable estate to his
compulsory heirs: the surviving spouse, Concepcion and their children, Ma. Enrica, Carlos
III, petitioner Guillerma, Lily, Pamela, respondent Conchita, and Teodoro. Sometime in
1976, the heirs of Carlos Jr. executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate which provided
that all properties of the decedent shall be owned in common, pro indiviso, by his heirs. In
September 1988, Carlos, Jr.'s heirs executed a Memorandum of Agreement for the physical
division of the estate. However, both agreements were never implemented, and the heirs
remained pro indiviso co-owners of the estate's properties.

On August 3, 1989, Enrica filed an action for partition docketed as Civil Case No. Q- 89-
3137 before the RTC impleading all the other heirs, her mother, and siblings as defendants.
Eventually, Teodoro withdrew as defendant and joined suit as plaintiff-in- intervention.
Opposing the physical division of the properties, defendants therein primarily asserted
Concepcion’s usufructuary rights over the estate’s real properties. They further alleged a
diminished value and use of the properties should these be physically divided. Given the
unanimity of their defense against the complaint, Conchita and two other heirs residing
abroad, Lily and Pamela, executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of their
mother Concepcion and their sister, Guillerma, respectively.

The RTC issued numerous orders reflecting the negotiations during court hearings for the
distribution and partition of the estate among the heirs. The trial court encouraged the
heirs to arrive at a mutually acceptable partition and distribution of the estate's properties.
In the course of the trial, the heirs agreed on the manner of division of each property — via
raffle conducted by the trial court. The heirs drew lots for an aliquot of each property of the
estate, with Concepcion drawing first. For three years, under the supervision of the RTC,
the heirs negotiated the terms of the estate's partition to be embodied in a compromise
agreement. After the plaintiffs, Enrica and Teodoro, signed the final draft of the
compromise agreement, the defendants, Concepcion and the rest of her children, tarried
signing thereof.
On January 11, 2000, the RTC issued an Order of Partition. On June 26, 2000, Conchita
executed a Revocation of the SPA. Conchita filed a copy of the Revocation with the RTC but
failed to furnish her agent, Concepcion, a copy thereof. The latest SPA dated June 8, 1999
issued by Conchita in favor of Concepcion.

Despite the RTC's January 11, 2000 Order of Partition, various properties of the estate
remained undivided and were not distributed among the heirs. Thus, on August 29, 2003,
Enrica filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners to Make Partition. On September 10, 2003,
Atty. Tuason, counsel for the defendants, filed a Manifestation opposing the appointment of
commissioners on the ground that the agricultural land tenants have already agreed to the
subdivision of the agricultural lands.

On October 17, 2003, the RTC granted the Motion to Appoint Commissioners. Yet again, the
appointment of commissioners did not happen as plaintiffs appeared to have acquiesced to
the defendants' proposed subdivision of the agricultural lands, including the herein subject
property.

Sometime in 2006, Concepcion, representing herself and the other defendants-heirs,

executed a second agreement with the tenants of the subject property designated as
"Kasunduan sa Pagwawakas/Pagtatapos ng Relasyon bilang May-ari ng Lupa at mga
Ortilano/Kasama ng Lupa" (2006 Kasunduan). Thereafter, the defendants filed a Motion for
Approval of New Agreement and New Subdivision Plan of certain agricultural properties,
including the subject property, which motion the plaintiffs no longer opposed.

The RTC granted defendant’s motions: it approved the New Agreement and Subdivision
Plan and ordered the plaintiffs Enrica and Teodoro to sign the document. In 2009, to
execute the RTC's Order and facilitate the issuance of new titles over the subject property,
Concepcion filed a Motion to Order Register of Deeds to Enter New Titles. On November 6,
2009, through a different counsel, Conchita opposed Concepcion's Motion on the ground
that the 2006 Kasunduan is void. The RTC granted Concepcion’s motion and ordered the
Register of deeds of Pampanga to enter new titles in the names of the tenants and the heirs
of Carlos, Jr., ruling that the 2007 Order approving the subdivision of the subject property
and its distribution via raffle had already become final and executory after the affected
parties did not file the appropriate remedy. Conchita filed a petition for Certiorari under
Rules 65 before the CA.

The CA invalidated the 2006 Kasunduan because it lacked the signature of all the heirs:
Enrica's, Teodoro's and Conchita's who now repudiates her mother's, Concepcion's,
signature on her behalf. The appellate court ruled that the 2006 Kasunduan did not
conform with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court on Partition.

ISSUES

1. Whether the petition for certiorari filed by Conchita is the proper remedy to assail the
February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders of the RTC;
2. Whether the tenants of the subject property should have been impleaded as
indispensable parties to Conchita's petition for certiorari;

RULING

1. NO. The CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari which failed to
implead indispensable parties and is an improper remedy to question the assailed orders
of the RTC. The (1) April 13, 2007, (2) February 9, 2010, and (3) August 27, 2010 Orders of
the RTC are final orders decreeing partition. Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court on
Partition provides:

Section 2. Order for partition and partition by agreement thereunder. — If after the trial the
court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate
among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall
confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with the
order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place
in which the property is situated.

A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby.

In connection thereto, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court could not be any clearer on
what may the subject of an appeal:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.

xxx xxx xxx

In our jurisdiction, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for
partition: first, the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that
partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a
decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties
(if the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to
agree), as the case may be.

In this case, while the property to be partitioned is the entirety of Carlos, Jr.'s estate, only
one of the properties thereof, the subject property, is the subject matter of the controversy
before us. The CA overlooked the fact that the first stage of the partition has long been
terminated by the RTC. In fact, the status of the parties as the compulsory heirs of Carlos, Jr.
was immediately stipulated among them. As early as January 11, 2000, the trial court had
already issued an Order of Partition of the Estate among the heirs pursuant to a
compromise agreement. Notably, none of the parties appeared to have appealed this final
order of partition.
Since Carlos, Jr.'s estate is sizeable, consisting in numerous properties, each property may
be the subject of separate agreements for its partition. The parties may also agree to a
project of partition which covers the entire estate of the decedent. These various partition
agreements must all be approved by court order which are considered final orders
decreeing partition appealable by an aggrieved party under the second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 69.

We find that the RTC's February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders pertain to the requirement
in Section 2, Rule 69 for the recording of the partition agreed upon by all the parties and
the order of the court confirming the deed of partition in the registry of deeds of the place
where the property is situated.

It is therefore plainly apparent that respondent sought to obliquely assail a final order of
partition of the trial court when she questioned the RTC's subsequent final orders of
partition, i.e., the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders, in a petition for certiorari before
the CA. Contrary to the rule laid down in Section 2 of Rule 69, respondent circumvented the
procedure to question the partition of the subject property via a record on appeal 34 by
treating the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders as interlocutory orders which could
not be the subject of an appeal.

2. YES, respondent should have impleaded the new title holders, the tenants, as
indispensable or necessary parties to the petition for certiorari before the CA.

The tenants are not strangers or third parties to the subject property. Prior to being
transferees of half of the subject property, they were the agricultural tenants thereof. We
note, however, that the subject property is private agricultural compulsorily covered for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries such as the tenants under the CARL. Hence, the heirs
entered a voluntary transfer arrangement, offering to sell half of the subject property
pursuant to the CARL. Notably, the parties have known, consented and acquiesced to the
voluntary sale of the subject property as contained in the 1999 Kasunduan executed prior
to the 2006 Kasunduan and the respondent's revocation of the agency relationship with
her mother, Concepcion, in 2000.

Concededly, the tenants are not heirs and are thus strangers to the estate of the decedent,
the subject matter of the action for partition. However, in relation to the subject property,
as tenants who are qualified beneficiaries thereof under the CARL and to whom new titles
had been issued, they are palpably real parties-in-interest. While the validity of the
partition of the subject property and consequent distribution thereof can still be finally
determined in CA-G.R. SP No. 116979, a complete relief for those already parties or the
complete determination of the claim could not be had since the tenants were not
impleaded. In short, the tenants are not indispensable parties but, at the least, are
necessary parties in the determination of the partition of the subject property.
JAY V. SABADO v. TINA MARIE L. SABADO, for herself and her minor children G.R. No.
214270, May 12, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The requirement of summons cannot be dispensed with. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case
against him, unless he was validly served with summons. xxx In a catena of cases, this Court
has ruled that voluntary appearance by the defendant results to his submission to the court's
jurisdiction.

FACTS

Petitioner Jay and respondent Tina were married on July 24, 1999, and bore two children.
Tina is a bank employee while Jay works overseas as a ship captain. He has an estimated
monthly income of $6,500.00. During their marriage, they acquired the following real
properties: (1) a 100-sqm parcel of land in Mandaluyong City; and (2) a condominium unit
in California Garden Square worth P1,650,000.00.

Tina alleged that she and Jay would quarrel often over petty things, even during her
pregnancy. There came a time when Jay abandoned Tina and their children, depriving them
of financial support. By February 2012, the monthly allotment from Jay which previously
amounted to $4,000.00 was reduced to $2,500.00. Jay also stopped visiting their children.
Tina tried to contact Jay numerous times to settle their issues, but her efforts were futile.
She even reached out to her mother-in-law, but the latter refused to intervene. As a result
of Jay's abandonment and utter disregard for his family, Tina suffered psychological and
emotional abuse.

Thus, Tina prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), the grant of
P120,000.00 monthly support to be remitted automatically by Jay's employer, and the
eventual issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO). On October 22, 2012, a TPO was
issued by the trial court in favor of Tina.

The court sheriff made several attempts to personally serve the summons, petition, and
TPO to Jay at his address but the security guard said he was not around. He also tried to
serve them at the office of his employer, only to be told that appellant was abroad for
deployment.

On November 16, 2012, Atty. Palmero, counsel of Jay in a criminal case for violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262), went to Branch 136 and received a copy of the Order and
Petition as evidenced by the latter's signature therein. On January 17, 2013, Jay filed an
Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order where
he asserted that he was merely a chief officer and not a ship captain. He also claimed that
the couple acquired four (4) properties during their marriage, and that the condominium
unit and parking slot are under the name of Tina. Although he admitted that he and Tina
had disagreements, he denied humiliating her in public in the presence of her officemates.
In truth, he has been a good provider for his family, as he sent his children to good schools.

The trial court issued an Order denying the admission of appellant's Opposition for having
been belatedly filed two (2) months after the issuance of the TPO. It held that under
Administrative Matter (AM) No. 04-10-11-SC, Jay only has a non-extendible period of five
(5) days within which to file his answer or opposition. His failure to do so allowed the court
to issue the corresponding order as warranted by the facts alleged in the Petition. On
January 30, 2013, the trial court issued a PPO in favor of Tina. It pointed out that Jay
already waived his opportunity to oppose the petition for his failure to file the necessary
pleading on time.

The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court. It held that there was no improper service of
summons. The notice received by counsel representing a party in an action in court is
equivalent to notice to the party himself. Consequently, when Atty. Palmero received the
copy of the Order and TPO, Jay was considered to have been duly notified as well. Indeed,
there was deprivation of Jay's right to present his side. Unfortunately, Jay's opposition was
only filed two (2) months after the service of the order and TPO. Indubitably, it was filed
beyond the non-extendible five (5)-day period. Thus, the trial court correctly denied the
admission of Jay's opposition

ISSUES

Whether the service of summons is valid.

RULING

YES. We have clarified the nature and purpose of summons vis-à -vis a TPO in Pavlow v.
Mendenilla, to wit:

Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by which the defendant is notified that an action
was brought against him or her. In an action in personam, brought to enforce personal
rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory. In such
actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of an
action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person.

A protection order is not a procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the

progression of an initiated action. Rather, it is itself a substantive relief which "prevent[s]
further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of [the Anti-
VAWC Law] and granting other necessary relief." x x x

xxx xxx xxx

x x x [S]ummons and temporary protection orders are entirely different judicial issuances.
It is true that the latter also serves the purpose of conveying information. However, this
information pertains not to the filing of an action but merely to the schedule of an
upcoming hearing. The similarities of a summons and a protection order begin and
end with their informative capacity. At no point does the Anti- VAWC Law intimate
that the temporary protection order is the means for acquiring jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly states that while it governs petitions for the
issuance of protection orders under the Anti-VAWC Law, "[t]he Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily." In the silence of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, service of summons — the means
established by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for informing defendants and/or
respondents of the filing of adverse actions, and for the acquisition of jurisdiction
over their persons — remains efficacious.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO
in Jay's residence and place of employment as per the Sheriff's Return. However, records
show that Jay was out of the country from August 7, 2012 to January 5, 2013 due to his
overseas employment. Since personal service could not be effected upon him, summons
should be served through substituted service, extraterritorial service, or by publication in
accordance with Sections 7, 15 and 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Notably, none of these modes of service were resorted to by Tina. While the CA is correct in
quoting GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Prinsipe that notice to counsel is equivalent to
notice to client, the very same case also states that it is notice sent to counsel of record
which is binding upon the client. In the case at hand, Atty. Palmero was Jay's counsel in a
separate criminal case filed against the latter for violation of RA 9262 pending at that time
before Branch 140 of the RTC of Makati.

Therefore, Jay had no counsel of record yet with Branch 136 of the RTC of Makati at the
time Atty. Palmero received the copy of the order and TPO. Granting arguendo that Jay
knew of the pending TPO case against him, whether through Atty. Palmero or another
person, the requirement of summons cannot be dispensed with. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the
pendency of a case against him, unless he was validly served with summons. Thus, serving
the order and TPO to Atty. Palmero cannot be considered a valid service of summons.

However, We note that Jay voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court when he filed the Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of the
Permanent Protection Order on January 17, 2013. By seeking affirmative relief in his
opposition without objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, he thereby voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction. In effect, this cured the invalid service of summons. In a catena
of cases, this Court has ruled that voluntary appearance by the defendant results to his
submission to the court's jurisdiction.
JORGENETICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION,
vs. THICK & THIN AGRI-PRODUCTS, INC.

G.R. No. 201044 & 222691, May 5, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired by service of summons.
However, "even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant if the latter voluntarily appears before it." "If the defendant
knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction
as to [them], like voluntarily appearing in the action, [they are] deemed to have submitted
[themselves] to the jurisdiction of the court.

FACTS

On November 10, 2008, Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc. (TTAI) filed a complaint for
replevin with damages against Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corporation, seeking
possession of 4,765 heads of hogs that were the subject of a chattel mortgage between the
parties. In its complaint, TTAI alleged that the parties entered into an agreement where
TTAI would supply, on credit, feeds and other supplies necessary for Jorgenetics' hog
raising business. As security for payment of their obligation amounting to
Php20,000,000.00, Jorgenetics executed a chattel mortgage over its hog livestock
inventories in favor of TTAI. While TTAI delivered feeds and supplies pursuant to the
agreement, Jorgenetics failed to pay for the same despite demand. Thus, TTAI alleged in its
complaint that as mortgagee it was entitled to take immediate possession of the livestock
subject of the mortgage which was wrongfully withheld by Jorgenetics to avoid compliance
of its obligation.

The next day, the trial court issued a writ of replevin and required Jorgenetics to post a
bond in the amount of Php40,000,000.00. While the writ of replevin was served on May 29,
2009, the return thereon indicated that the writ, together with a copy of TTAI's affidavit
and bond, as well as the summons and TTAI's complaint, were served on petitioner's farm
through its purchasing officer Rowena Almirol, who refused acknowledgment of the
documents. The return likewise stated that the 4,765 heads of hog livestock subject of the
writ were seized and delivered to respondent.

Jorgenetics moved to dismiss the complaint for replevin on the ground of invalid service of
summons, since service was made on its farm in Rizal instead of its place of business in
Quezon City, and in view of the lack of justification from the sheriff for availing of
substituted service to the person of Almirol. The trial court issued the February 4, 2010
Order directing the dismissal of the complaint for replevin for failure to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Jorgenetics by reason of the invalid service of summons. TTAI moved for
reconsideration but was denied.
Jorgenetics filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution with Application for
Damages against the replevin bond. The trial court set the hearing on the said Motion on
the same day and ordered TTAI to file its comment or opposition thereto and, upon receipt
thereof, for Jorgenetics to file a reply within the same period.

Aggrieved, TTAI filed a Petition for Certiorari against Jorgenetics and Judge Balut, where
TTAI faulted the trial court for taking cognizance of the subject Motion and continuing to
conduct trial on the merits in the guise of execution proceedings despite the dismissal of
the case, hence praying for the annulment of the February 4, 2010 and May 6, 2010 Orders
of the trail court.

On March 29, 2011, the appellate court issued the Decision nullifying the order of dismissal
and reinstating TTAI’s complaint for replevin, noting that Jorgenetics voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court in filing the application for damages against the
bond and motion for the issuance of a writ of execution without objecting to the trial
court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the dismissal of the action for replevin is wholly inconsistent
with the trial court's cognizance of Jorgenetics' application for damages against the
replevin bond. It opined that the dismissal of an action without prejudice means that no
trial shall be conducted thereon unless plaintiff refiles the case, while an application for
damages against the replevin bond presupposes that a trial on the merits of the case was
had and that the defendant obtained a favorable judgment from the court.

ISSUE

Whether Jorgenetics, in filing an application for damages and motion for issuance of a writ
of execution after the trial court's issuance of a decision dismissing the complaint for
replevin, may be considered to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

RULING

YES. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired by service of
summons. However, "even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant if the latter voluntarily appears before it." "If
the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of
personal jurisdiction as to [them], like voluntarily appearing in the action, [they are]
deemed to have submitted [themselves] to the jurisdiction of the court."

Thus, a defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of

the court if they seek affirmative relief from the court. This includes the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration.

Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the Court finds that Jorgenetics
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when it filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution and an application for damages against the replevin
bond without objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The Rules provide that an application for damages on the replevin bond shall only be
claimed, ascertained, and granted in accordance with Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of illegal attachment. — If the judgment on the
action be in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued, he may recover,
upon the bond given or deposit made by the attaching creditor, any damages resulting from
the attachment. Such damages may be awarded only upon application and after
proper hearing, and shall be included in the final judgment. The application must be
filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes
executory, with due notice to the attaching creditor and his surety or sureties, setting forth
the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof.

If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the
attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the
appeal by filing an application with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was
issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes
executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the
trial court. [Emphases supplied]

Jorgenetics' assertion that it was merely invoking the residual authority of the trial court
when it requested the latter to rule on its application for damages comes up empty. In
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Carpio, We clarified that a trial court acquires
residual jurisdiction over a case once a trial on the merits has been conducted, the court
renders judgment, and the aggrieved party appeals therefrom.

Hence, We ruled therein that the trial court may not be considered to have acquired
residual jurisdiction over a replevin case if the complaint is dismissed without prejudice,
and the trial court may not rule on the application for damages on the assumption that it
has residual powers over the case.

In any event, any doubt on the voluntary submission of Jorgenetics to the trial court's
jurisdiction has been eliminated by the multiple affirmative reliefs it sought from the trial
court as shown in the record, such as its urgent ex-parte motion for deposit of auction
proceeds, motion for inhibition, and motion for writ of execution and/or writ of possession.
These motions are clearly affirmative reliefs sought by Jorgenetics tantamount to voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

In light of the foregoing, We find that the CA did not commit any error in reinstating the
complaint for replevin in view of Jorgenetics' active participation in the proceedings before
the trial court, and in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance of the application for damages despite its earlier order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
INTER-ISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC., represented by JESSIE TAN TING, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION
(FORMER TENTH DIVISION) and CHAM Q. IBAY
G.R. No. 187323, June 23, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

It is settled that an extraordinary remedy of certiorari will not lie if there is a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as in this case. Petitioner should have
availed of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 as its petition was dismissed by the appellate court based on Section 3 of Rule
117 which is an adjudication on the merits and not merely an interlocutory order.

FACTS

Inter-Island is an internet service provider which hired respondent Cham Ibay on January
20, 2003 as a technical support in its Network Operations Center (NOC). Into seven (7)
months of his employment, Ibay received Memorandum No. 03-08-08 dated August 20,
2003 issued by a certain Scott Lam (Lam) informing him of his inclusion in the Q Linux
Schedule of Training. However, in a revised Memorandum No. 03-09-01 dated September
2, 2003 signed by Lam, Ibay was delisted as one of the trainees. When Ibay discussed his
exclusion with Marianne Rosellon (Rosellon), NOC's Technical Head, Rosellon explained
that he was delisted from the said training due to the expiration of his contract as would be
further explained to him by the Human Resource Department.

Two days later, Lam talked to Ibay over the phone urging the latter to submit his
resignation letter so that Jesse Tan Ting, the Human Resource Manager, would not get
angry at him. Lam further said that in exchange for his submission of resignation letter,
Inter-Island would issue a Certificate of Employment which he could use as reference for
his application in other companies. Lam also threatened to block his applications with
other companies should he refuse to resign. On October 3, 2003, Ting allegedly summoned
respondent to his office and told him to submit his resignation letter. However, when
respondent refused, Ting told him "Kung ayaw na namin sa inyo ay wala kayong
magagawa."

On October 31, 2003, respondent was allegedly prevented from entering Inter- Island's
premises. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The LA rendered a Decision reinstating Ibay to his former position with full payment of his
backwages which as of July 31, 2005 already amounted to P159,640.00. The LA found
respondent's assertion of facts to be more credible than petitioner's. The fact that there
was a scheduled training in 2003 which included respondent was fully substantiated.
However, petitioner failed to justify why respondent was delisted from joining the training.
The NLRC dismissed the company’s appeal for lack of merit, and ruled that respondent was
illegally dismissed. His filing of the complaint barely seven days after he was allegedly
dismissed showed his intention not to sever the employer-employee relationship. His
failure to report to work was justified as he was prevented from entering Inter-Island's
premises. His subsequent filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal belied any suggestion
that he was abandoning his work.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. On April 30, 2008, the appellate court
issued a Resolution 22 directing Ibay to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt.
However, the Resolution sent to Ibay's counsel was returned unserved. The CA issued a
Resolution dated June 27, 12008, directing petitioner to furnish the court within ten (10)
days from notice the present and complete address of both respondent Ibay and his
counsel. However, petitioner Inter-Island failed to comply.

On September 12, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for
failure of petitioner to comply with its June 27, 2008 Resolution pursuant to Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was
denied by the CA in its February 6, 2009 Resolution. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner properly availed the remedy of petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

NO. Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that when a party desires to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the CA, he or she may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari which shall raise only questions of law. Clearly, the
assailed September 12, 2008 and February 6, 2009 Resolutions of the appellate court may
be elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on pure
questions of law. However, as can be gleaned from the records, the petitioner availed of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead. It is settled that an extraordinary remedy of
certiorari will not lie if there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, as in this case. Petitioner should have availed of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as its petition was dismissed
by the appellate court based on Section 3 of Rule 117 which is an adjudication on the
merits and not merely an interlocutory order.

Nonetheless, it must be clarified that for purposes of discussion, the petition was filed
within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65, contrary to the contention of the
respondent that it was filed out of time or 64 days from receipt of the CA's February 6,
2009 Resolution on February 16, 2009. The records clearly show that the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was filed on April 16, 2009 which is within the 60-day
reglementary period to file a petition.
Despite the foregoing, We are inclined to dismiss the petition. The right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of the party to
conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory.
CHARLO P. IDUL vs. ALSTER INT’L SHIPPING, INC., HOGANN MKBLUMENTHAL GMNNH
REEDEREI and SANTIGAO D. ALMODIEL
G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. While the Court has, in several cases,
previously granted a petition for certiorari despite the availability of an appeal, it only
applies (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when
the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

FACTS

Petitioner Charlo P. Idul was employed by Alster Int'l. Shipping Services, Inc. (Alster
Shipping) on behalf of its principal, Johann Mkbluementhal GMBBH Reederei, for a period
of 12 months. On April 14, 2008, he boarded the vessel M/V IDA to commence his services
as a bosun. On December 4, 2008, Idul figured in an accident while working when the
lashing wires broke and hit his left leg resulting to a fracture. He disembarked the vessel
and underwent surgery in a hospital in France. Thereafter, he was repatriated back to the
Philippines for further medical attention.

On December 11, 2008, he was referred by the company to Metropolitan Medical Center
(MMC) under the care of Dr. Lim, and orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Chuasuan. He was given
medication, instructed to undergo rehabilitation therapy, and come back for follow-up
check-ups.

The company-designated physician issued medical reports dated February 2, 2009, March
9, 2009, March 30, 2009, June 15, 2009, and July 6, 2009. In the medical report dated July 6,
2009, Dr. Chuasuan gave Idul a Grade 10 disability rating due to "immobility of ankle joint
in abnormal position." Prior to this, or on March 16, 2009, Idul sought the opinion of his
own doctor of choice, Dr. Venancio P. Garduce Jr. After a single consultation, Dr. Garduce
assessed Idul to be totally and permanently disabled. Thereafter, Alster Shipping offered to
pay Idul the amount of $10,750.00 as disability benefit in accordance with the POEA-SEC).

However, Idul rejected the offer and insisted that he was entitled to full disability benefits.
On June 3, 2009, Idul filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits with
damages before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). During the preliminary
mandatory conference, the parties failed to reach a settlement. In Idul's Position Paper, he
claimed that he was entitled to full disability benefits since the injury he suffered rendered
him incapable of performing his grueling duties as a bosun.

On May 31, 2010, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor if Alster Shipping and gave more
credence to the findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan who were able to monitor and
observe Idul while he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation, rather than Dr.
Garduce’s assessment which was made after a single consultation.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA findings and explained that it is the loss of earning
capacity and not the mere medical significance of the injury that determines the gravity of
disability. The CA upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that Idul's condition
cannot be considered a permanent total disability that would entitle him to the maximum
disability benefit of $60,000.00. It stressed that a temporary total disability becomes
permanent only when the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the
240-day period, or when after the lapse of said period, the physician fails to make such
declaration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner’s mode of appeal is correct.

RULING

NO. While the caption of the pleading is denominated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner likewise manifested that "the Honorable
Court of Appeals is the impleaded public respondent in this Petition conformably with
Section 5 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended . . . x x x"

Notably, what is being assailed in this petition is the Decision dated May 14, 2013 and
September 20, 2013 Resolution of the CA. Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an
appeal is the proper remedy to obtain the reversal of judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the CA. Petitioner received the Resolution of the CA denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on October 3, 2013. Thus, he had 15 days or until October 18, 2013 to file
its Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. However, the present petition was only
filed on November 15, 2013 or way beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

Seemingly, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was filed to make up for the loss of
petitioner's right to an ordinary appeal. However, it is elementary that the special civil
action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy
is available. While the Court has, in several cases, previously granted a petition for
certiorari despite the availability of an appeal, it only applies (a) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Conversely, the case at bar does not
fall under any of the exceptions.

In order to avail of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, the following must concur: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. However, Idul failed to satisfy these requisites. It bears stressing that in filing the
present petition for certiorari, Idul raised the following arguments, which delve into the
wisdom and soundness of the Decision of the CA, and not errors in jurisdiction.
HEIRS OF AURIO T. CASIÑO, SR. v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
Nos. 204052-53, March 11, 2020, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

It bears stressing that the doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts:
(1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. The second concept which is
conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit
and was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential
that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and
the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second
if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. In this case,
identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of issues.

FACTS

Spouses Baldomero and Leonarda Casiñ o obtained a loan from the Development Bank of
the Philippines in the amount of P130,000.00, secured by a real estate mortgage over three
parcels of land situated within the municipalities of Valencia and Lantapan, Bukidnon. After
the Spouses failed to settle their loan obligation, DBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage. In the auction sale, DBP made the winning bid, and was issued a Sheriff
Certificate of Sale. The certificate of sale was subsequently registered with the Register of
Deeds of Bukidnon. Upon failure of the Spouses Casiñ o to redeem the properties within the
prescribed redemption period, DBP finally caused the consolidation of the title of the
properties in its name.

Baldomero later filed a complaint against DBP for annulment of real estate mortgage and
foreclosure proceedings, quieting of title, redemption, and damages before the RTC
docketed as Civil Case No. 1465. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint. Baldomero appealed the dismissal, but the CA affirmed in toto
the assailed decision. Unperturbed, Baldomero went to the Supreme Court via Petition for
Review on Certiorari, but it was denied.

Meanwile, Baldomero executed a document denominated as Kasabotan where he

relinquished to his son, Aurio T. Casiñ o, all his rights over the three properties, including
the land at Sitio Kibulay, Barrio Cawayan, Municipality of Lantapan. On the other hand, DBP
sold the Kibulay property in favor of Green River Gold, Inc. Subsequently, DBP and Green
River, the latter in its capacity as intervenor, filed before the RTC an ex-parte petition for
issuance of a writ of possession over the Kibulay property. A writ of possession was issued
however the court sheriff was unable to enforce the same due to alleged threats of several
armed men employed by Aurio.

Aurio filed with the RTC an affidavit of third-party claim, alleging that he is the owner and
possessor of the Kibulay property parcel of land. The following day, Aurio filed the instant
complaint for quieting of title. In response, DBP filed an Answer arguing that Aurio's
complaint is already barred by res judicata, as the former already has ownership over the
subject property through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held as valid in a decision dated
August 3, 1990, and affirmed by the CA and even the Supreme Court. Moreover, DBP
argued that the complaint is defective for failure to implead Green River, a real party-in-
interest, to which it later sold the subject property in litigation.

ISSUE

Whether res judicata bars the filing of Civil Case No. 2685-97.

RULING
YES. Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or

decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” The elements of res judicata are:

1. the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the

subject matter and the parties;

3. the disposition or the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

4. there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties,

subject matter, and causes of action.

There is identity of subject matter. While the landholdings respectively claimed by

respondents and petitioners have different technical particulars, the evidence on record
would clearly reveal that the property subject of the writ of possession issued by RTC Br. 8
is part and parcel of the property being claimed by petitioners.

There is identity of parties. Aurio is not only an heir of Baldomero, but may also be
considered a successor-in-interest by virtue of the Kasabotan dated April 25, 1994.
Although the parties involved in the two cases are not exactly the same, there is
substantially an identity of parties for purposes of res judicata. The fundamental rule is that
for res judicata to apply, only substantial, not absolute, identity of parties is required.
There is identity in the cause of action. This Court has previously employed various tests in
determining whether or not there is identity of causes of action as to warrant the
application of the principle ofres judicata. One test of identity is the "absence of
inconsistency test" where it is determined whether the judgment sought will be
inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment shall
not constitute a bar to subsequent actions.
HEIRS OF PROCOPIO BORRAS v. THE HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIO BORRAS

G.R. No. 213888, April 25, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want
of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. Jurisdiction is not the
same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein

FACTS

Procopio Borras was the owner of several parcels of land, one of which was Lot No. 5275
located at Barrio Bigaa, Legazpi City, and covered by an original Certificate of Title. Upon
Procopio's death, the properties were inherited by his five children namely: Inocencio,
Vicente, Aurelia, Severina and Leonila. Upon the death of all the siblings, the properties
were inherited by their respective children, including Eustaquio Borras (Eustaquio), son of
Inocencio.

The Heirs of Eustaquio (respondents) claimed ownership of Lot No. 5275. This was
contested by petitioners. The dispute was referred to barangay conciliation which resulted
to the discovery of petitioners that Lot No. 5275 is already registered in the name of
Eustaquio Borras. During his lifetime, Eustaquio claimed ownership over Lot No. 5275
when he filed a petition for reconstitution before the then CFI of Albay for the
reconstitution of OCT No. NA 2097, with prayer for issuance of a transfer certificate of title
in his name. Pursuant to the Order, TCT No. 21502 was issued in the name of Eustaquio.
Upon learning of the existence of TCT No. 21502, petitioners filed an action for quieting of
title before the RTC of Legazpi which rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners.
Respondents filed an appeal before the CA, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in
declaring TCT No. 21502 null and void.

The CA granted the appeal and ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of TCT No. 21502 in an action for quieting of title. The CA ruled that while a TCT
should not have been issued to Eustaquio in an action for reconstitution, the declaration of
its nullity can only be had either in an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court before the CA, or in an action for reconveyance before the RTC. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied by the CA. Thereafter,
petitioners filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment. The CA dismissed the
petition for annulment of judgment on the ground that petitioners failed to prove the
existence of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction of the CFI. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 18 but the appellate court denied it hence the instant petition.

ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in not considering that the petition for annulment of
judgment is the proper remedy resorted by the petitioners given that the respondent trial
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties when it allowed the
cancellation of the reconstituted title in the name of Procopio Borras and ordered the
issuance of TCT No. 21502 in favor of Eustaquio Borras in a reconstitution proceeding.

RULING

NO. Annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground that a judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. It is a remedy in
equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are
wanting. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner
must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject
matter is conferred by law.

In this case, there is no question that the then CFI had jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution at inception. The purpose of a reconstitution action is merely to reproduce a
certificate of title, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was when it was lost or
destroyed. Hence, in such action, a trial court cannot order the cancellation of the original
title nor direct the issuance of a new TCT in favor of another.

While there is no question that the CFI acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it went
beyond ordering the reconstitution of OCT No. NA 2097 by ordering its cancellation, and
directing the issuance of a new TCT in favor of Eustaquio, nevertheless, such order of the
CFI was done in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not the lack thereof. Jurisdiction is not
the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered
therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on
all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors
which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.

The lack of jurisdiction envisioned in Rule 47 is the total absence of jurisdiction over the
person of a party or over the subject matter. When the court has validly acquired its
jurisdiction, annulment through lack of jurisdiction is not available when the court's
subsequent grave abuse of discretion operated to oust it of its jurisdiction. Unfortunately,
petitioners erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment based on the ground of
the trial court's exercise in excess of its jurisdiction, which is not a ground in an action for
annulment of judgment. The proper recourse for petitioners should have been to file an
action for reconveyance.
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC.
v. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP. and PHILIPPINE FOREMOST MILLING CORP.

G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120, September 27, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge
"for the benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts
against the court's authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the
court or judge. In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved
party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected.
In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.

FACTS

HCPTI, the operator of the Manila Harbour Centre, on one hand, and La Filipina Uygongco
Corp. (LFUC), an enterprise engaged in the importation and trading of fertilizers, milk and
dairy products, soybean meal and sugar, together with its sister company Philippine
Foremost Milling Corp. (PFMC), an entity primarily organized to import and mill wheat,
flour and animal foods, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which provided,
among others, priority berthing rights to the domestic and foreign vessels of respondents
LFUC and PFMC.

Years later, HCPTI sent a letter to respondents LFUC and PFMC informing them of their
accountabilities amounting to P362,670,820.42 representing rental, overhauling, and
additional wharfage fees, short payments, and other receivables. Respondents LFUC and
PFMC alleged that HCPTI failed to provide priority berthing to their vessels and to conduct
dredging to maintain the depth of the navigational access channel and berthing area.
Consequently, respondents LFUC and PFMC filed a Complaint for Compliance with
Maritime Law, Regulation and Contract, Breach of Contract, Specific Performance and
Damages.

The respondents' application for a 72-hour restraining order was granted. Moreover, the
trial court granted respondents' application for a 20-day Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO). Eventually, a WPI was issued by the RTC of Manila on September 25, 2008, which
enjoined HCPTI from preventing respondents LFUC and PFMC access to its rail lines and
unloaders, and from using the port facilities of HCPTI, among others. However, from March
9, 2009 to June 28, 2009, around twenty-four (24) barges and tugboats classified as
domestic vessels chartered by respondents LFUC and PFMC were either not allowed access
to their unloaders and rail lines, or were delayed in using the berthing area, fronting their
facilities, in violation of the MOA and the WPI. This prompted respondents LFUC and PFMC
to file a Petition for Indirect Contempt but was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, respondents
elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court did not sustain the finding of the trial court.
ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in holding petitioners liable for indirect contempt.

RULING

YES. In Oca v. Custodio, the Court distinguished criminal contempt from civil contempt. Civil
contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for
the benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against
the court's authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court
or judge. In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party,
or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In
criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.

While the reliefs prayed for by respondents in their petition for indirect contempt is a
combination of both criminal and civil punishment, the nature of the contempt proceeding
in this case is more civil than criminal. Clearly, the purpose of the contempt petition was for
the enforcement of the September 25, 2008 WPI. It is a remedy resorted to preserve and
enforce the rights of respondents and to compel obedience to the injunctive writ which was
issued for their benefit. Hence, the petition for contempt is civil in nature. Accordingly, an
appeal from the decision dismissing the same is not barred by double jeopardy. The
appellate court was therefore correct in holding that the petition for indirect contempt
instituted by the respondents herein is civil in nature.

In this case, HCPTI's failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents' vessels
during the period material to the case was not intended to undermine the authority of the
court or an act of disobedience to the September 25, 2008 WPI of the RTC Branch 24.
Under the MOA, respondents were given priority berthing rights over the berth fronting
their facility, subject to the conditions set forth in the MOA. The same is conditioned on: 1)
the submission of the required documents such as a written FAA of its vessels to HCPTI;
and 2) the availability of the designated berthing area. In this case, the RTC Branch 24
found that respondents did not submit a written FAA to HCPTI in violation of the MOA. In
fine, considering that petitioners' failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents'
vessels during the time material to the instant case was due to respondents' own failure to
comply with the requirements mandated in the November 19, 2004 MOA, we find that
petitioners did not commit any act amounting to indirect contempt.
PATRICIO G. GEMINA v. HEIRS OF GERARDO V. ESPEJO, JR.

G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The absence of defendants' counsel would not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the
defendant in default and cause the ex parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence. With the
advent of AM 19-10-20-SC, said Section 5 has been clarified by already including the word
counsel and putting the conjunctive word and, to the effect that it is only when both the party-
litigant (plaintiff or defendant) and his counsel fail to appear in pre-trial that there be the
concomitant consequence of either a dismissal (plaintiff and counsel were absent), or
presentation of evidence ex parte (defendant and counsel were absent).

FACTS

Gemina claims that he purchased, owned, occupied with his family, and possessed the
subject property openly, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of an owner since
1978. On the other hand, the heirs of Espejo averred that they are co-owners of the subject
property which is covered by a TCT and Tax Declaration. On December 15, 2004, the Espejo
heirs, through their representative, sent Gemina a demand letter asserting their ownership
over the subject property, and demanding him and his family to vacate said property
because they have been unlawfully occupying the lot where the latter's house was built.
Gemina refused to heed the demand to vacate the property. The Espejos filed an action for
recovery of possession and prayed for the trial court to order Gemina and all persons
claiming in his behalf to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property, and to
pay reasonable compensation from the time that their possession have become unlawful,
among others.

On the scheduled date of pre-trial, Gemina was present but his counsel failed to attend. As a
result, the trial court reset the pre-trial for the last time and directed him to inform his
counsel of the schedule of hearing. Gemina's counsel still failed to attend the said pre-trial
schedule. However, the trial court allowed the heirs of Espejo to present their evidence ex
parte. Soon thereafter, Gemina's counsel filed a Withdrawal of Counsel with Attached
Motion for Reconsideration citing health reasons as justification for his withdrawal, and
invoking the trial court's compassion so as not to prejudice Gemina's cause due to the heirs
of Espejo's ex parte presentation of evidence. The trial court granted the withdrawal of
Gemina's counsel and directed Gemina to secure the services of a new counsel. However,
the trial court regarded the motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper since it
lacked the requisite notice of hearing. Meantime, the heirs of Espejo's ex parte presentation
of evidence proceeded as scheduled. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming the court a quo's order allowing the respondents
to present their evidence ex parte due to the absence of the petitioner's counsel during the
pre-trial, thereby denying petitioner the right to present evidence in violation of his right to
due process.

RULING

YES. Section 4 and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate the appearance
of the parties and their counsels, and the consequences for their failure to appear during
the scheduled pre-trial:

SECTION 5. Effect of Failure to Appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

When read plainly, the then Section 5 gives the impression that only the failure of the
plaintiff or the defendant (and not their counsels) to appear in pre-trial would bring about
the dismissal of the action or the eventual ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff,
respectively. This confusion in the import of Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court was
aptly addressed in Paredes v. Verano (Paredes) where this Court categorically concluded
that the absence of defendants' counsel would not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare
the defendant in default and cause the ex parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence. With
the advent of AM 19-10-20-SC, said Section 5 has been clarified by already including the
word counsel and putting the conjunctive word and, to the effect that it is only when both
the party-litigant (plaintiff or defendant) and his counsel fail to appear in pre-trial that
there be the concomitant consequence of either a dismissal (plaintiff and counsel were
absent), or presentation of evidence ex parte (defendant and counsel were absent).

In this case, the Espejo's ex parte presentation of evidence following the non- appearance
of Gemina's counsel was unwarranted. Paredes is instructive to the extent that it allows
resort to other remedies available instead of ordering the ex parte presentation of
plaintiff's evidence when the defendants' counsel had not appeared during pre-trial.
Simply, Gemina's cause of action should not have been prejudiced by the non-appearance
of his counsel, particularly since on record, the former had been religiously appearing in
the course of the proceedings, including during the pre-trial.

Lastly, In Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corp., this Court pronounced that
the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration is cured when the adverse
party filed pleadings opposing said motion and had the opportunity to be heard in
compliance with the requirements of due process. Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration in
this case should not have been denied on the mere basis of lack of notice of hearing.
EVANGELINE ENGAO ASIS, HEIRS OF FELICITATION ENGAOBAUTISTA, HEIRS OF
ERMA ENGAO TROCINO v. HEIRS OF ROSELLO CALIGNAWAN

G.R. No. 242127, September 15, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.) DOCTRINE

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections are deemed waived
when they are not pleaded in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.

FACTS

The spouses Cesario and Romana Engao begot two children, namely Felipe Engao and
Angeles Engao-Calignawan. Felipe had four children, herein petitioner Evangeline, Erma
Engao-Trocino, Felicitation EngaoBautista, and petitioner Cesar. Meanwhile Rosello
Calignawan, father of herein respondents, grew up with the spouses Vicente and Angeles in
Tacloban City.

Lot No. 581 and Lot No. 2064 (subject properties) were registered under the names of
Romana and Angeles. The controversy stemmed from Rosella's Complaint for declaration
of nullity of documents, partition and damages against Evangeline, Felicitation, Erma, Cesar
and Felipe. He alleged that when Romana died in 1975, Angeles became the owner of the
three-fourths portion of the subject properties with one-half as her own share and one-
fourth was as inheritance from Romana. The remaining one-fourth belonged to Felipe.
Rosello also averred that Angeles executed a Deed of Donation in his favor on May 25,
1984, hence, he is entitled to a share in the subject properties. Moreover, Rosello unearthed
a Deed of Adjudication of the Estate of the Deceased Persons (Deed of Adjudication) and a
Deed of Consolidation and Subdivision of Real Properties (Deed of Consolidation).
However, Rosello claimed that his signature appearing thereon was a forgery.

These revelations prompted Rosello to file a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Documents, Partition and Damages with Preliminary Injunction before the RTC. The trial
court promulgated its assailed holding that the subject properties are owned by Romana
and Angeles, not by Romana and her spouse Cesario, on the strength of the certificates of
title in their names, which were conclusive evidence of their ownership over the subject
properties. Aggrieved, Rosello filed a Notice of Appeal and eventually the Appellant's Brief
which challenged the trial court's decision. Rosello primarily contended that the trial court
erred in declaring the Deed of Donation as null and void. The CA primarily held that the
Deed of Adjudication, the Deed of Consolidation, and the Extrajudicial Settlement are null
and void. On the other hand, it held as valid the Deed of Donation that was executed in
favor of Rosello. The appellate court compared the case of Heirs of Felipe Engao with the
instant case. The similarity as to parties and issues in the case of Heirs of Felipe Engao with
the instant case led the appellate court to hold that the decree of this Court as to the
validity of the Deed of Donation is already binding and conclusive in this present case.
Lastly, the appellate court found that Rosello did not commit forum shopping when he
failed to disclose.
ISSUES

1. Whether the respondents' predecessor committed willful forum-shopping.

2. Whether the finality of RTC of Burauen's decision constitutes res judicata in the instant
case.

RULING

1. YES. While the observation of petitioners as to Rosello's commission of forum- shopping

is correct, raising said issue on appeal is already too late in the day. First, there must be
identity of parties. Both petitioners and respondents or their predecessors were the
contending parties in the Complaints for Declaration of Nullity and Recovery of Ownership.
Second, there must be similarity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, where the relief is
anchored on the same facts. While the caption of both complaints are evidently distinct, the
allegations contained in their respective bodies seek a similar relief, that is, the entitlement
to the properties and reconveyance thereof in favor of Rosello and eventually to the
respondents who are the latter's heirs. Third, the judgment rendered in any of the actions
would amount to res judicata as to the other.

Since the three elements are attendant in this case, Rosello indeed committed forum-
shopping. However, petitioners opted to actively participate in the proceedings before the
RTC of Burauen instead of raising the issue of forum-shopping in their answer or in a
motion to dismiss. This issue was only raised on appeal. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, defenses and objections are deemed waived when they are not pleaded in
the answer or in a motion to dismiss.

2. YES. Parties invoking the application of res judicata must establish the following
elements: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.

These four elements are present in this case. First, the decision of the RTC of Burauen had
already attained finality by virtue of the Resolution of this Court denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration with finality. Second, said RTC of Burauen acquired jurisdiction
over the lots which were outside Tacloban City as well as jurisdiction over the parties when
Rosello filed his Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and when petitioners voluntarily
submitted themselves to the court's authority by filing their answer and actively
participating in the proceedings thereon. Third, the disposition of the RTC of Burauen as to
the validity of the Deed of Donation was based on the merits as it comprehensively
considered the evidence and testimonies which pointed to the document's validity. It
settled the issue of the alleged forgery and the ownership of Angeles in said Decision.
Lastly, both the Complaints for Declaration of Nullity and Recovery of Ownership involved
the petitioners and respondents or their predecessors at the outset and had similar causes
of action as previously mentioned during the discussion of the issue of forum-shopping.
The SC recognized the immutability of the RTC of Burauen's Decision especially when it
adjudicated a matter on the merits, which is also an issue in this case. By the operation of
res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, the Deed of Donation is valid.
GABUTINA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 205572, October 7, 2020, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Section 5(g), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, also known as the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, prohibits second
motions for reconsideration and/or re-investigation in administrative cases filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman,

Section 7, Rule III of the same Administrative Order, which is essentially similar to Section 47
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, additionally provides that in
all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Com1 of Appeals on a verified petition for
review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.

FACTS

On January 21, 2004, John Kenneth T. Moreno (Moreno) filed an Affidavit-Complaint

against Gabutina, Chief of Staff of Congressman Oscar S. Moreno (Congressman Moreno),
and Metodio G. Baldivino, Jr., a.k.a. "Jun Balds" (Baldivino), Manager for Infrastructure
Projects of Congressman Moreno, before the Office of the Ombudsman Preliminary
Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-A. The Affidavit-Complaint charged
both Gabutina and Baldivino with the following crimes: (1) Violation of Republic Act No.
6713 or the Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; (2)
Violation of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (3)
Swindling (Estafa) under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding Gabutina guilty as charged while
dismissing the administrative case against Baldivino. On March 17, 2005, Gabutina received
the February 18, 2005 Order from the Office of the Ombudsman. On March 27, 2005,
instead of filing an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA, Gabutina filed a
Motion for Leave to File and Admit 2nd Motion for Reconsideration and a 2nd Motion for
Reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman, on the belief that "a 2nd Motion for
Reconsideration would still be the most preferable course of action or ground xx x in
consonance with the administration and interest of justice and fair play."

While his 2nd Motion for Reconsideration was pending with the Office of the Ombudsman,
Gabutina also filed on May 10, 2005 with the same Office a Petition for Review of the
Decision dated 29 October 2004 approved by the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, assailing the
aforesaid Decision. In his Petition for Review, Gabutina admitted that his Motion for Leave
and a 2nd Motion for Reconsideration were still pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman.

On May 6, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order treating Gabutina's Petition
for Review dated May 10, 2005 as his third Motion for Reconsideration and denying the
same. Citing Rule III, Section 8 of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman, it emphasized that only one motion for
reconsideration may be filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, thus, Gabutina's second
and third Motions must fail. Furthermore, these Motions shall not stop the Decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman from attaining finality. The Office of the Ombudsman denied the
Motion.

Despite the repeated denial of the Office of the Ombudsman of his motions, Gabutina filed
yet again a Motion for Reinvestigation on June 21, 2011, raising the same issues and
grounds as contained in his motions for reconsideration. On September 8, 2011, the Office
of the Ombudsman issued another Order, dismissing Gabutina's Motion for Reinvestigation.

On December 21, 2011, Gabutina filed a Petition for Review. The CA dismissed outright
Gabutina's Petition for Review due to several technical infirmities.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA should have given due course and consideration to the Petition for
Review.

RULING

NO. Section 5(g), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, also known as the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17,
prohibits second motions for reconsideration and/or re-investigation in administrative
cases filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.

Section 7, Rule III of the same Administrative Order, which is essentially similar to Section
47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, additionally provides
that in all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Com1 of Appeals on a verified
petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory.

In this case, the facts and the multiple number of pleadings filed by Gabutina are
undisputed. After the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated its Decision on October 29,
2004 finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct and Violation of Anti-Graft laws, Gabutina filed
his first and only legally allowable Motion for Reconsideration dated December 14, 2004.
When Gabutina received the February 18, 2005 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman
denying his December 14, 2004 Motion for Reconsideration, Gabutina had only 15 days
from the date of receipt of the written Order on March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005,
within which to file a verified petition for review with the CA. Instead, Gabutina filed the
following pleadings before the Office of the Ombudsman on the following dates: (1) Motion
for Leave to File and Admit 2nd Motion for Reconsideration on March 27, 2005; (2) 2nd
Motion for Reconsideration on March 27, 2005; (3) Petition for Review on May 10, 2005
while the Motion for Leave and 2nd Motion for Reconsideration were still pending; and (4)
Motion for Reinvestigation on June 21, 2011.

Gabutina finally filed a Petition for Review with the CA on December 21, 2011, or more
than six years from his receipt of the February 18, 2005 Order on March 17, 2005. Under
the above-mentioned provisions of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, the filing of
the four enumerated pleadings, which ought to be stricken off the records of the case, did
not have the effect of tolling the prescriptive period for taking an appeal on the October 29,
2004 Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Said pleadings, though differently captioned, are all in the nature of a motion for
reconsideration since they uniformly pray for the reversal of the October 29, 2004
Decision. More importantly, since the filing of the said pleadings did not stop the
reglementary period for taking an appeal, their filing necessarily did not prevent the
October 29, 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman from attaining finality. Even the June 21,
2011 Motion for Reinvestigation wherein Gabutina allegedly raised new evidence, should
be stricken off the record as well for having been filed out of time and for being a
prohibited pleading. Gabutina's filing of multiple pleadings, despite the clear restrictions
under the law, constitute a clear mockery of the judicial system. He must be reminded that
though access to the courts is guaranteed, there is and there must be a limit to it. In fine, the
CA correctly held that the December 21, 2011 Petition for Review of Gabutina should be
dismissed outright due to severe procedural lapses.
ESICO v. ALPHALAND CORP.
G.R. No. 216716, November 17, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission provides that: The
important principle that runs through [Article 217] is that where the claim to the principal
relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations
statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over
the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management
relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment but rather in
the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale
for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.

FACTS

The labor dispute between Esico and respondents Alphaland originated from the former's
employment relationship with PhilWeb Corporation (Phil Web), a part of respondents'
group of companies. Esico is a well-decorated officer, former pilot of the Philippine Airforce
who retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is licensed to fly both fixed wing and
rotary wing civilian aircrafts and had just topped the Certified Security Professional
Examinations at the time of his employment within respondents' group of companies.

Given his impressive credentials, PhilWeb initially hired Esico as Risk & Security
Management Officer (RSMO) under a letter-proposal. By April 19, 2010, respondents
Alphaland concurrently engaged Esico as a rotary wing pilot assigned to fly the
Chairperson of respondents' group of companies; Roberto V. Ongpin (Ongpin); to his
various engagements within and outside the country.

In May 2011, along with four (4) other pilots of respondents Alphaland, Esico underwent
flight training in the United States of America to operate the brand new Cessna Grand
Caravan 208B purchased by respondents Alphaland for the resort development of its
affiliate and subsidiary, Alpha]and Balesin Island Resort Corporation (Balesin Resort).

On June 6, 2011, after numerous verbal attempts to raise the matter of his employment
status as a helicopter pilot to his superiors went unheeded. On August 22, 2011, Esico
received a job offer sheet as pilot from Alphaland Corporation with the level of manager. It
offered, among others, a total monthly gross compensation of Php 15,000.00 including a
monthly representation allowance of Php 25,000.00, subject to liquidation. Esico signed the
job offer sheet, believing that it is the compensation package that he had asked for
separately from his work as Risk & Security Management Officer for Phil web. Despite the
job offer, Esico claimed that he was never paid his salary as stated in the job offer.
On December 23, 2011, Esico found out that he had been transferred from Phil web to
Alphaland because he could not access his payroll with Phil web. On February 20, 2012,
Esico sent an e-mail to the officers of the corporation to inquire about the veracity of his
impending job tern1.ination. No reply was heard from these corporate officers.

Esico alleged that he was due for recurrent training by July 2, 2012. However, despite
formal request upon Alphaland to grant such training, they did not provide for Esico's
recurrent training. Thus, without recurrent raining, Esico could no longer fly the company
helicopter as pilot-in-command. On July 3, 2012, Esico tendered his letter of resignation
stating the following reasons: (a) serious embarrassments and insults had been committed
against his person, honor and reputation on several occasions by a company officer; (b)
serious flight safety concerns; (c) absence of employment contract with Alphaland
Corporation; (d) absence of helicopter recurrent training; (e) unresolved issues on services
already rendered in favor of Alphaland Corporation as fixed wing pilot from May 2, 2011 to
Jnne 2012; and (f) other related matters. On July 16. 2012, Esico received a demand letter
from Alphaland's legal officer. Among other things, the letter demanded that Esico
reimburse Alphaland in the amount of P977,720.00 representing the portion of his flight
training expenses.

On July 19, 2012, Esico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, docketed as NCR-07-10970-12.

ISSUE

Whether or not the LA and the NLRC have jurisdiction over NLRC-NCR Case No. 08- 11647-
12.

RULING

NO. Jurisdiction is the power and authority conferred by the Constitution and by statute to
hear and decide a case. The authority to decide a case is what makes up jurisdiction. The
decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is a nullity; it does not bear
any effect.

Article 224 of the Labor Code explicitly bestowed original and exclusive jurisdiction to the
LA and the NLRC in cases involving all workers.

San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (San Miguel Corporation)
provides that: The important principle that runs through [Article 217] is that where the
claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or
other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil
law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise,
not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions
of employment but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall
outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies
disappears.

In this case, the bone of contention between the parties lies in the interpretation of the
employment contract, specifically the clause on the minimum service requirement in
consideration of expenses (advances) for flight trainings. Unarguably, respondents
Alphaland claim payment of actual damages equivalent to the amount they advanced for
Esico's flight training who reneged on his contractual obligation by his premature
resignation. Respondents Alphaland's cause of action, the supposed violation of the right-
duty correlative between the parties, hinges on the enforceability of the contentious clause
in the employment contract. Clearly, respondents' recourse against Esico is based on our
law on contracts.

Respondents Alphaland seek to enforce their rights under the employment contract
considering Esico's failure to comply with his contractual obligation when he resigned from
respondent corporations. The April 19, 2010 letter engaging Esico as pilot states that in the
event of his resignation before completion of the required minimum service, Esico is
obliged to reimburse the costs of his flight trainings pro-rated to the number of years
already served. Failure to comply with either of the alternative obligations resulted in
respondents Alphaland 's cause of action against Esico, which suit is cognizable by the
regular courts of law.
EAST WEST BANKING CORP. v. CRUZ

G.R. No. 221641, July 12, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes to appeal a decision or final judgment of the
RTC. The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is
brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, the petition
for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law.

FACTS

East West Banking Corporation (petitioner/Bank) filed a Complaint before the RTC for Sum
of Money with Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against
respondents Ian Y. Cruz (Ian) and Paul Andrew Chua Hua (Paul), seeking to recover the
total amount of P16,054,541.66. In the same Complaint, the Bank impleaded herein
respondents Francisco T. Cruz (Francisco), Ian's father, and Alvin Y. Cruz (Alvin), Ian's
brother, as unwilling co-plaintiffs. Apparently, Ian, Francisco, and Alvin maintained
separate accounts at the Bank's Davao Lanang Branch. Paul, as the Bank's Sales Officer,
handled their deposit accounts.

The Bank alleged that Paul debited P16,054,541.66 from the accounts of Francisco and
Alvin and then credited the same amount to Ian's account by representing that Francisco
and Alvin undertook to "regularize" the transactions later on. Using the debited amounts,
Ian successfully obtained a "back-to-back" loan from the Bank. Ian then purportedly used
the same amount to pay for the said loan. However, instead of "regularizing" the
transactions, Francisco and Alvin demanded the payment of P16,054,541.66 from the Bank
as evidenced by Foreign Exchange Forward Contracts (FEFCs).

The Bank, however, rejected Francisco and Alvin's demand stating that the FEFCs are
spurious. The incident prompted the Bank to conduct an audit of all the transactions of the
respondents. The Bank asserted that the issuance of spurious FEFCs was part of the scheme
of Ian and Paul to defraud Francisco, Alvin, and the Bank.

In an Order dated November 25, 2013, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action as the Bank did not sufficiently allege its right. Likewise, it failed to allege
that Ian violated the Bank's supposed right, which would have constituted as a breach of
his obligation, if any, to the Bank. Also, the latter did not specify Ian's actual participation in
the allegedly unauthorized withdrawals.
Aggrieved, the Bank elevated the case to the CA by filing a Notice of Appeal under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Bank availed of the correct remedy in assailing the RTC's November 25,
2013 Order of dismissal of its Complaint.

RULING

NO. Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes to appeal a decision or final judgment
of the RTC. The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and
resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal,
the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the
RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions
of law.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the
doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts."

In the case at bench, the RTC released its November 25, 2013 Order of dismissal, a final
judgment, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, the RTC's order may be
reviewed through: 1) a Notice of Appeal under Rule 41 which addresses questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law, and is brought to the CA; or 2) a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 which contemplates a discussion on purely questions of law, and
is brought to the Supreme Court.

Here, the RTC deemed the Bank's allegations in its Complaint as insufficient, hence the
declaration that it failed to state a cause of action. The Bank's failure to state a cause of
action, then, justifies the RTC's dismissal of its Complaint. Given that Ian called for the
dismissal of the Complaint, the trial court correctly considered the allegations in the
Complaint and the annexes in eventually assessing that the Bank failed to state a cause of
action.

The pronouncements of the RTC in its May 21, 2013 Order should not dictate how the trial
court should dispose of the main action. Although the trial court can consider in the main
case those which were presented as evidence during the hearing for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment, such findings should not control the outcome of the main case
because the purposes for both are different. One is for the issuance of the writ as an
ancillary or interlocutory remedy while the other is for the actual disposition of the case. In
view of the foregoing, the CA correctly dismissed the Bank's appeal because the issues
involved are pure questions of law which cannot be appealed through a notice of appeal
under Rule 41. It is settled that "an appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed; and that an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall be dismissed outright.''

To stress, since the Bank availed of the wrong mode of appeal, its case was correctly
dismissed by the CA. As a consequence, the RTC's November 25, 2013 Order became final
and executory, given that the filing of a notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
period to file a petition for review on certiorari, the proper remedy to assail the dismissal
order of the trial court. Although unfortunate for the Bank, it should be reminded that
"[r]ules of procedure are essential to the proper, efficient and orderly dispensation of
justice. Such rules are to be applied in a manner that will help secure and not defeat
justice."
DY BUNCIO v. RAMOS
G.R. No. 206120, March 23, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Section 50-A of RA 6557, as amended by RA 9700, expressly provides that "if there is an
allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is
a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the
prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from refen-al
whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, that from the determination of the DAR, an
aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse." Hence, the proper recourse of Buncio upon the
trial court's referral of the case to await the DARAB 's resolution. Thereafter, Buncio can
assail the determination of the DARAB by appeal to the CA. Plainly, her immediate recourse to
the CA via a Petition for Certiorari was improper and thus, correctly struck down by the
appellate court.

FACTS

Buncio filed a complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria and Damages. Buncio claimed that she
is a registered co-owner, together with nine others, of a parcel of land located at San Josef
Sur, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. She further alleged that respondents Leontina Sarmenta
Ramos (Leontina) and Fernando Ramos (collectively, respondents) are the unlawful and
unauthorized possessors of the land who should be directed to vacate the same.

On the other hand, respondents asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case because there existed a leasehold agreement between the late Luis de
Guzman and Erlina Santos de Guzman (who are the parents of the registered owners of the
subject property), with Leontina and her late husband, Hilario Ramos (Hilario).

Prior to the pre-trial conference, the RTC heard the respective sides of the parties for a
preliminary determination of the existence of tenancy. In its January 30, 2008 Order, the
RTC initially held that it had jurisdiction over the case since respondents failed to prove the
existence of all elements of agricultural tenancy relationship.

Respondents filed a motion with the RTC and reiterated their claim to refer the case to
DAR, asserting that they are tenants-lessees of the subject land. In its assailed October 28,
2010 Resolution, the RTC referred the case to the DAR, citing Section 50-A of Republic Act
No. (RA) 6657, as amended by RA 9700. The RTC held that based on the ocular inspection
and proceedings conducted by the court, it found that the entire area is devoted to palay
production and traversed by a cemented City Road of Cabanatuan City. Thus, the trial court
referred the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) since
there was an allegation of landowner-tenant relationship between the parties. The RTC
pointed out that the foregoing provision has granted the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) special and original authority to hear and adjudicate cases involving agrarian
disputes.

Buncio filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's October 28, 2010
Resolution which the trial court denied. Aggrieved with the RTC's ruling, Buncio filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Buncio's Petition for Certiorari.

RULING

YES. The CA correctly dismissed Buncio's Petition for Certiorari for being a wrong remedy.
Clearly, Buncio had other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy before the DAR.

Section 50-A of RA 6557, as amended by RA 9700, expressly provides that "if there is an
allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties
is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or
the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from
refen-al whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, that from the determination of the
DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse." Hence, the proper recourse of Buncio
upon the trial court's referral of the case to await the DARAB 's resolution. Thereafter,
Buncio can assail the determination of the DARAB by appeal to the CA. Plainly, her
immediate recourse to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari was improper and thus, correctly
struck down by the appellate court.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is "conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission
of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court." Consequently, contrary to
Buncio's claim, she did not acquire any vested right from the January 30, 2008 Order, if
subsequently during the trial court's proceedings, it became apparent that the case should
be properly referred to the DAR which has the jurisdiction over the subject matter or issues
raised.

The trial court is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary conference and, if necessary, to

receive evidence to determine if such tenancy relationship had, in fact, been shown to be
the real issue. If it is shown during the hearing or conference that, indeed, tenancy is the
issue, the trial court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Relevantly, in the fairly recent case of Dayrit v. Norquillas, the Court held that: The
amended CARL adds that the judge or prosecutor shall automatically refer the case to the
DAR if there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and
one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or tenant. In the instant case, the Court finds that
the RTC correctly referred the case to the DAR in view of the respondents' allegation of a
tenancy relationship.

Moreover, the DARAB has jurisdiction to adjudicate an agrarian dispute. Even prior to RA
9700 and DAR AO 04, Series of 2009 which Buncio argues should not have been given
retroactive effect as to set aside the RTC's January 30, 2008 Order, similar provisions of RA
6657 and the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure were already in place upon the filing of her
January 8, 2007 Complaint, the provisions of which indicate that it is the DARAB that has
jurisdiction to adjudicate an agrarian dispute.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy relationship
between the parties. As a rule, the existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed
and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.
Thus, in order for tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, viz.: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject
matter is agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

All the foregoing requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the absence
of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. In Macalanda,
Jr. v. Acosta, the Court emphasized that "[c]rucial for the creation of tenancy relations
would be the existence of two of the essential elements, namely, consent and sharing
and/or payment of lease rentals.

In the instant case, respondents substantially alleged that there existed a tenancy
relationship among the parties, in particular among the parents of Buncio and Hilario in
view of their leasehold agreement. Furthermore, respondents' claim that pursuant to said
agreement, she and her husband, Hilario, have been paying the agreed rentals of the
landholdings, to the lessors or Buncio's parents. These allegations suffice for the referral of
the dispute to the DAR. "As stated by law, mere allegation of an agrarian dispute is enough."
DUMARAN v. LLAMEDO

G.R. No. 217583, August 4, 2021, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Non-payment of a debt or nonperformance of an obligation does not automatically equate to

a fraudulent act. Being a state of mind, fraud cannot be merely inferred from a bare
allegation of non-payment of debt or non-performance of obligation.

Under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there are two remedies a party can avail of to discharge
their attached property: (1) Under Section 12, make a cash deposit equal to the claim or give
a counter-bond which will take the place of the attached property; or (2) Under Section 13,
file a motion to discharge the attachment on the following grounds:

1. (a)  that it was improperly or irregularly issued; or

2. (b)  that it was improperly or irregularly enforced; or
3. (c)  that the bond of the plaintiff is insufficient.

FACTS

Ignacio S. Dumaran (Dumaran) is an authorized dealer of Pilipinas Shell Philippines

operating two gasoline stations within General Santos City, namely Linmax Shell Station
and Lagao Traveller Shell Station.

In September 2009, Sharon Magallanes (Magallanes), a former employee of Linmax Shell

Station, introduced Teresa Llamedo (Llamedo) and Ginalyn Cubeta (Cubeta) to Dumaran.
They proposed for Dumaran to supply them diesel and gasoline fuel. They all agreed that
Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta will pay in cash. Although they initially paid in cash, they
subsequently paid for the purchase of the fuel using Llamedo's personal checks.

On November 23, 2009, Dumaran filed a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and
Attorney's Fees with a Prayer for the Ex-Parte Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta.

On December 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on
Attachment. Subsequently, Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta filed their Very Urgent Motion
to Quash Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on Attachment, alleging that the said Writ
of Attachment and Notice of Levy on Attachment is illegal, improper and unjustly issued in
violation of their right to due process; has no basis in fact and in law, therefore, null and
void; and violates Rule 39, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC denied Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta's Motion to Quash Writ of Attachment.
The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari due to technical grounds.
The CA set aside the Order of the RTC and held that the applicant for a writ of preliminary
attachment, in this case Dumaran, did not sufficiently show factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud.

According to the CA, the allegations of Dumaran do not meet the requirements of the law
regarding fraud. The allegations do not show: (1) that he was defrauded in accepting the
offer of the petitioners; and (2) that from the beginning, the petitioners intended that they
will not pay their obligation considering that by his own admission, petitioners initially
paid in cash and personal checks. "[A] writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a
provisional remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud.

ISSUES

(1) Whether or not the allegations of fraud in the complaint and the affidavit meet the
requirements of the law to sustain the issuance of a writ of attachment; and

(2)Whether or not a counter-bond was necessary for the discharge of the writ of
preliminary attachment.

RULING
(1) NO. The allegations of fraud in the complaint and the affidavit do not meet the

requirements of the law to sustain the issuance of a writ of attachment.

The case of Republic v. Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. explained the term "fraud" as related to
the above-mentioned legal provision in this wise: Fraud may be characterized as the
voluntary execution of a wrongful act or a willful omission, while knowing and intending
the effects that naturally and necessarily arise from that act or omission. In its general
sense, fraud is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive - including all acts and
omission and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed - resulting in damage to or in undue advantage over another. Fraud is also
described as embracing all multifarious means that human ingenuity can device, and is
resorted to for the purpose of securing an advantage over another by false suggestions or
by suppression of truth; and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any
other unfair way by which another is cheated.

The CA rightfully held that Dumaran's allegations in both his Complaint and Affidavit failed
to show that Dumaran was defrauded into accepting the offer of Llamedo, Magallanes and
Cubeta; and that Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta intended from the beginning to not pay
their obligations. The Complaint and Affidavit did not specifically show wrongful acts or
willful omissions that Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta knowingly committed to deceive
Dumaran to enter into the contract or to perform the obligation. The pleadings filed lacked
the particulars of time, persons and places to support the serious assertions that Llamedo,
Magallanes and Cubeta were disposing of their properties to defraud Dumaran.
Non-payment of a debt or nonperformance of an obligation does not automatically equate
to a fraudulent act. Being a state of mind, fraud cannot be merely inferred from a bare
allegation of non-payment of debt or non-performance of obligation. Dumaran failed to
prove with sufficient specificity the alleged fraudulent acts of Llamedo, Magallanes and
Cubeta.

(2) NO. A counter-bond is not necessary for the discharge of a writ of preliminary
attachment that was found to be irregularly issued.

Citing the case of FCY Construction v. Court of Appeals (FCY Construction), Dumaran alleged
that the CA was incorrect in discharging the writ of preliminary attachment without the
fulfillment of the requirement of a counter-bond. In the case at bar, Llamedo, Magallanes
and Cubeta alleged that the CA bad already found and ruled that the writ of preliminary
attachment was improperly issued. The CA had already ruled that Dumaran failed to prove
that fraud existed, thus, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the RTC was a "too
harsh" provisional remedy that must be denied. The Court agrees with the contention of
Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta.

Under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there are two remedies a party can avail of to
discharge their attached property: (1) Under Section 12, make a cash deposit equal to the
claim or give a counter-bond which will take the place of the attached property; or (2)
Under Section 13, file a motion to discharge the attachment on the following grounds:

(a) that it was improperly or irregularly issued; or (b) that it was improperly or irregularly
enforced; or (c) that the bond of the plaintiff is insufficient.

For the second remedy to apply, a writ of attachment may be discharged without filing a
cash bond or counter-bond only if the writ of preliminary attachment itself has already
been proven to be improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or the bond is insufficient.
The limitation enunciated in FCY Construction will not apply when a regular trial on the
merits of the mam action, not only of the motion to discharge the writ, was conducted.
Here, the CA found that, after reading and hearing the allegations of both parties,
Dunmran's allegations did not meet the requirements of the law regarding fraud. The CA
found that the writ of preliminary attachment had been irregularly issued, thus, a motion to
discharge the writ under Rule 57, Section 13 was the proper remedy. A counter-bond under
Section 12 is not necessary.
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORP. v. UY, JR.

G.R. No. 219317, June 28, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Preponderance of evidence "evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than

that which is in opposition to it". It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the
testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of
truth is on one side than on the other.

FACTS

Cathay hired Uy as section supervisor at its Novaliches plant. Uy was assigned as the
material handling officer tasked with checking, accepting, and releasing steel products that
go through the Novaliches plant premises, and the sale of special assorted (below standard
length) steel bars known as retazos, authorized to accept cash payments directly from
customers to be remitted immediately to Cathay's treasury department. Sometime in
March 2008, Cathay's management conducted a special audit of sales of retazos for the
period covering the first quarter of 2008. As a result of the special audit, Cathay discovered
that cash proceeds from the sale of retazos for the month of February 2008 covered by
several delivery receipts amounting to P409,280.00 were not remitted to its treasury
department. Uy's signature was on the delivery receipts. On May 29, 2008, Cathay sent a
demand letter for payment of the amount covered by the questionable transactions within
five days from receipt, but Uy failed to pay or settle with Cathay; and, the unlawful refusal
of Uy to settle his obligation to Cathay caused Cathay to file a Complaint against Uy for Sum
of Money and Damages.

Cathay presented the testimonies of Elmer San Gabriel, Gerardo Delos Reyes Capitulo, and
Angelita Kong Ong. San Gabriel testified, among others, that Uy was tasked to monitor,
check and authorize the release of steel products going in and out of the plant; Uy was also
assigned to handle the sale of retazos on cash transaction basis; the treasury department
conducted an audit by looking at the records of the remittances made by Uy and found that
there were five (5) transactions in the month of February 2008 where the proceeds of the
sale of the retazos were not remitted to Cathay's treasury department; the amount involved
was more or less P409,000.00; Uy, who is also in charge of authorizing the release of sold
retazos, authorized the release of the retazos in these five (5) transactions which are
covered by Scrap Miscellaneous Sales (SMS), because the products will not be released
without his signature.

Capitulo testified that Cathay issues SMS as receipts in the sale of retazos; the signature of
Uy appeared on the SMSes subject of the investigation. As for Ong, he found an unpaid
account at the Novaliches plant; since Uy was the person in-charge of the material handling
office and the sale transactions, he attempted to call the attention of Uy about the unpaid
balance of a particular customer in March 2008, but Uy had stopped reporting to the office;
hence, he referred the matter to their legal department.

In addition to the testimonial evidence offered by Cathay, it also presented the delivery
receipts, also known as "scrap miscellaneous sales (SMS)," covering the five transactions
when Uy allegedly authorized the release of the retazos on a cash transaction basis, as well
as the corresponding statements of account to prove that during such transactions, Uy did
not remit the payments to Cathay's treasury department.

For his part, Uy presented the records of Cathay's prior criminal complaint against him for
qualified theft, to prove that Cathay had earlier instituted a similar complaint and that it
had been dismissed by Quezon City's Office of the City Prosecutor.

ISSUE

Whether or not Cathay was able to prove by preponderance of evidence its cause of action
against Uy?

RULING

YES. Cathay was able to establish by a preponderance of evidence Uy's liability.

Preponderance of evidence "evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than

that which is in opposition to it". It "does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the
testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability
of truth is on one side than on the other”.

Cathay was able to prove that in February 2008, Uy authorized on four occasions the
release of the retazos sold on a cash transaction basis, for which he had the duty to accept
cash payment, but failed to remit the payments to Cathay's treasury department. First, the
collective testimonies of San Gabriel, Capitulo and Ong sufficiently establish that Uy had the
duty to accept cash payment for the sale of the retazos. San Gabriel, who was Cathay's
corporate operations officer, testified that Uy was responsible for authorizing the release of
the retazos on a cash transaction basis. Accordingly, in every sale of the retazos, Uy's
signature must appear on the delivery receipt before the retazos may be released. Without
his signature, the retazos may not be taken out of the Novaliches plant, as the same likewise
served as a gate pass to be shown to the plant's guard. Thus, the release of the retazos was
conditioned upon Uy's authorization, which was in turn conditioned upon the customer's
cash payment. This setup was confirmed by Capitulo and Ong who likewise worked with Uy
in Cathay.

Second, the delivery receipts and the statements of account presented by Cathay
sufficiently prove the existence of the unremitted payments for the subject transactions in
February 2008. Significantly, the delivery receipts bore Uy's signature, the due execution
and authenticity of which he never denied. This only shows that Uy authorized the release
of the retazos subject of the delivery receipts. Because he authorized such release, it follows
that he accepted cash payment therefor, as the retazos were sold only on a cash transaction
basis. However, Uy never remitted the payments to Cathay's treasury department as
evidenced by the corresponding statements of account showing the unpaid balance of
Cathay's customers. Thus, Uy is liable for such amount.

The Court is aware that there is no conclusive proof that Uy actually received payments
from the sale of the retazos. Such only follows from the established fact that the retazos
were sold on a cash transaction basis. However, even if there was no such conclusive proof,
Uy would still be liable for the same amount because it was sufficiently established that he
was responsible for accepting cash payment before authorizing the release of the retazos.
The lack of conclusive proof showing actual payment does not negate his liability.

For these reasons, the Court is constrained to rule that the greater weight of evidence is on
the side of Cathay. Uy should be held liable for the umemitted payments from the sale of the
retazos.
MILAGROS MANOTOK DORMIDO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROSELLER DE LA
PEÑA, ERNESTO ADOBO, JR., FELICITAS MANAHAN, and ROSENDO MANAHAN

G.R. No. 198241, February 24, 2020 (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."

The very basic prerequisite of a petition for certiorari is to allege the acts constituting grave
abuse purportedly committed by the public officer, tribunal, or court.

FACTS

Involved in this case is Lot 823 (Lot 823), a parcel of land then covered by TCT No. RT
22481 (372302). Dormido and the spouses Manahan had brought their respective
disputing claims over Lot 823 before the Lands Management Bureau (LMB). At that time,
Adobo was the LMB's OIC-Director of Lands.

De la Peñ a, DENR’s then Undersecretary for Legal Affairs, issued a memorandum stating
among other matters, that the Office of the DENR Undersecretary was not in a position to
question Adobo's factual conclusions as to the validity of Felicitas Manahan's claims of
ownership over Lot 823, that the government no longer retains ownership thereof, and
that the title to the said property supposedly held by Dormido's family, the Manotoks, was
void ab initio. De la Peñ a also recommended in his Memorandum that it was ministerial
upon the LMB to issue a deed of conveyance in favor of the spouses Manahan.

Adobo issued Deed of Conveyance conveying Lot 823 in favor of the spouses Manahan.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance, petitioner Dormido filed a Complaint
before the Ombudsman charging the respondents with conspiracy and violation of Section
3 (e) in relation to Section 4 (b) of RA 3019. She alleged that respondents disregarded the
basis of her claims on Lot 823, particularly the existence of the Manotoks' titles thereto. She
also posited that the validity of a Torrens title may only be questioned in a direct
proceeding before the trial courts.

The Ombudsman dismissed Dormido's Complaint, holding that while the Complaint
charged respondents with violation of RA 3019, the main issue therein was who between
the Manotoks and the spouses Manahan hold a valid title over the disputed property. Citing
Section 19 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP
129) and Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 or RA 6770, the Ombudsman held that
the regional trial courts and not the Ombudsman had jurisdiction over such civil
actions involving the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

Petitioner Dormido moved for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido's criminal complaint against respondents for alleged
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

RULING

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido's criminal
complaint against respondents for alleged violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Higher tribunals may disturb the findings of a fact-finding body and its ensuing conclusions
upon a determination of grave abuse of discretion through the writ of certiorari. For
certiorari to issue against the public officer, court, or tribunal complained of, the standard
is:

Grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."

The very basic prerequisite of a petition for certiorari is to allege the acts constituting grave
abuse purportedly committed by the public officer, tribunal, or court.

In this case, Dormido aims to overturn the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
Ombudsman. In gist, Dormido complains that Adobo and De la Peñ a, in the exercise of their
official duties, gave the spouses Manahan an unwarranted benefit, and that despite prima
facie showing of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the Ombudsman dismissed her
Complaint. Such accusations against respondents, without more, cannot be seen as grave
abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty.

At most, these only express mere disagreement with the Ombudsman's judgment that do
not proceed from grave abuse of discretion. Plainly, the Petition contained no allegations of
the Ombudsman's supposed acts of grave abuse of discretion adequate to reverse the
latter's pronouncements and indict respondents instead for the charges of graft and
corruption. Even if so alleged, there is no clear showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
Ombudsman in dismissing Dormido's Complaint.
In dismissing the Complaint and denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Ombudsman
relied on the Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited relevant jurisprudence, and squarely applied
the foregoing to the facts of the case at hand. This negates Dormido's allegation that grave
abuse of discretion might have attended the Ombudsman's conclusions. Whether these
determinations by the Ombudsman were correct or wrong is not remediable by
certiorari. Whimsicality in the issuance of a decision, not accuracy, is the core of certiorari
proceedings. An unfavorable evaluation of the evidence presented by a party will not be
inquired into via certiorari unless it is shown that it was done in an arbitrary manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal enmity.

The term grave abuse of discretion has, ironically, fallen victim to procedural abuse. As a
last-ditch remedy to turn the odds to their favor, vengeful litigants resort to indiscriminate
imputation of the term to the public officer that issued a verdict adverse to them, in
manifest indifference to the soundness of its exercise or the frailty of their cause. Rules
must not be stretched for personal retribution, or even if such purpose be pursued, it must
have a solid grounding in fact and law. Such situation is not the case at hand.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. 219340, April 28, 2021 (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in

anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other
than appeal or certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are
as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in
both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of reliefs sought.

In sum, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Clearly,
forum shopping does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

FACTS

Petitioner CIR is the head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), a government agency
tasked with the power and duty of assessing and collecting all national internal revenue
taxes, fees, and charges among others. Respondent Standard Insurance is a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and engaged in the business
of non-life insurance.

Respondent received from the BIR a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) regarding its
liability amounting to P377,038,679.55 arising from a deficiency in the payment of
documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable year 2011. Despite a number of requests for
reconsideration, it received a Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) declaring its
liability for the DST deficiency, including interest and compromise penalty, totaling
P418,830,567.46. Thereafter, respondent objected to the tax imposed pursuant to
Section 184 of the NIRC as violative of the constitutional limitations on taxation.

Respondent also received a demand for the payment of its deficiency income tax, value-
added tax (VAT), premium tax, DST, expanded withholding tax, and fringe benefit tax for
taxable year 2012 which respondent protested in its letter on the ground that the VAT rate
and DST rate imposed on premiums charged on non-life property insurance
pursuant to Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC are violative of the constitutional
limitations on taxation.

In 2014, respondent Standard Insurance commenced Civil Case No. 14-1330 in the RTC
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) for the judicial determination of the constitutionality of Sections 108
and 184 of the NIRC with respect to the taxes charged against the non- life insurance
companies.

The RTC issued a TRO enjoining the BIR, its agents, representatives, assignees, or any
persons acting for and in its behalf from implementing the provisions of the NIRC adverted
to with respect to the FDDA for the respondent's taxable year 2011, and to the pending
assessments for taxable years 2012 and 2013. Further, the RTC issued an Order granting
the application for WPI of respondent and thereby ordering the CIR and his/her
representatives to refrain from further proceeding with the implementation or
enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC until further orders, upon posting by
respondent of the requisite bond.

Petitioner BIR then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which was dismissed by the CA for failure to comply with the resolution to
submit copies of pertinent pleadings.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC praying for the reversal
and setting aside of the RTC Decision and RTC Order to which the Court granted. It ruled
that RTC grossly erred and acted without jurisdiction in giving due course to the petition
for declaratory relief and permanently enjoining the enforcement of Sections 108 and 184
of the NIRC, in violation of Section 218 of the NIRC and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125.

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent argues that the Court erred in not dismissing the Petition outright on the
ground that petitioner committed deliberate and willful commission of forum shopping,
and that the issues raised in the Petition are factual in nature and are barred under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Moreover, respondent alleges that the RTC has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of respondent's action for declaratory relief and that the latter has fully
satisfied the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of the Court.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Petition must be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping and/or
non-compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement
2. Whether the Petition must be dismissed on the ground of raising issues of fact,
which are barred under a Rule 45 petition
3. Whether the RTC should have dismissed respondent's petition for declaratory relief
for failure to comply with the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the ROC

RULING
1. NO. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping and has
complied with the certification against non-forum shopping requirement under Section 4,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in

anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than appeal or certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis
pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. They are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent
the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity
of reliefs sought.

In sum, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Clearly,
forum shopping does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes
of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

Under the foregoing test, the Court find that petitioner did not commit forum shopping in
filing the instant Petition during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 140403 with the CA. At the
outset, petitioner assailed different orders of the RTC — the first pertaining to
interlocutory orders of the RTC in connection with the grant of the WPI and the other
which decided the main action. Moreover, a comparison of the allegations and reliefs
sought in the instant Petition and the Petition for Certiorari undoubtedly shows that
petitioner prayed for different reliefs and ultimately, sought different objectives.

Being interlocutory in nature, the RTC orders assailed in CA-G.R. SP No. 140403 dealt with
the preliminary matter of whether the implementation of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC
against respondent should be held in abeyance at a stage when the trial on the merits has
yet to be held and the judgment rendered. Thus, petitioner, in assailing the RTC orders
which granted and upheld the WPI in favor of respondent, merely sought the dissolution of
the said writ which prevented petitioner from implementing Sections 108 and 184 against
respondent until further orders and while the main case had yet to be decided on the
merits.

On the other hand, the RTC Order and RTC Decision assailed in the instant Petition were in
the nature of a final judgment or order which disposed of the main case on the merits. This
is so since the Petition for Declaratory Relief was granted, thereby permanently enjoining
petitioner from enforcing Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC against respondent until the
Congress shall have enacted and passed into law HB 3235 in conformity with the
provisions of the Constitution. Being in the nature of a final judgment, petitioner merely
pursued his correct remedy, which was to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, the Court notes that the issue on forum shopping may be considered moot
once the proliferation of contradictory decisions, which is precisely what the prohibition on
forum shopping seeks to avoid, is no longer possible. In connection thereto, CA-G.R. SP No.
140403 has already been dismissed by the appellate court on technical grounds; hence, the
danger which the rules on forum shopping seeks to prevent will no longer materialize in
the instant case.

Respondent's claim that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement for a certification
against forum shopping must likewise fail. Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides
that the sworn certification against forum shopping must be attached to the petition for
review on certiorari. In contrast, there is no requirement that motions for extension of time
be accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

2. NO. The Petition raises only questions of law that are cognizable through a Rule 45
petition. It is settled that only questions of law should be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.

In this case, an examination of the present petition shows that petitioner is challenging the
RTC's grant of the petition for declaratory relief on the premise that a petition for
declaratory relief is inapplicable to contest tax assessments; that the petition for
declaratory relief failed to comply with the basic requisites of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court;
and the constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC vis-à -vis the equal protection
clause. Moreover, petitioner assailed the propriety of the RTC's grant of injunctive relief
vis- a-vis Section 218 of the NIRC and the rule that a judicial decision must bring a final
determination of rights, obligations, and responsibilities of parties.

These are clearly questions of law which merely call for an examination and interpretation
of the These are clearly questions of law which merely call for an examination and
interpretation of the prevailing law and jurisprudence, and are cognizable by the Court in a
petition for review on certiorari.

3. YES. Even assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition, the RTC
should have dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief for failure to comply
with the requisites for the said action.

A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
The said action must comply with the following requisites:

1. the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;

2. the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction;
3. there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4. there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one

between persons whose interests are adverse;

5. the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and

6. adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or

proceeding.

In this case, the Court finds no reason to disturb its finding that the RTC should have
dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief for failure to comply with the
abovementioned third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites.

All told, this Court finds no reason to overturn the assailed Decision. The assailed Decision
is in accord with law and existing jurisprudence and with due regard to extant facts and
evidence.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by its Chairman, THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, represented by its Commissioner, and THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
represented by its Commissioner v. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 26, SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO

G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020 (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. It must be filed before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers; otherwise, the court can
no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Thus, "the only issue that may be raised in such
an action is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute."

FACTS

Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS), a political party duly registered with the
Commission on Elections, filed with the RTC of Manila, a Petition for Declaratory Relief
against Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex), and
Petron Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to as the "Big 3."

Respondent SJS raised as an issue the oil companies' business practice of increasing the
prices of their petroleum products whenever the price of crude oil increases in the world
market despite that fact that they had purchased their inventories at a much lower price
long before the increase. SJS argued that such practice constitutes monopoly and
combination in restraint of trade, prohibited under Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

The Big 3 separately moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of lack of legal
standing, lack of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

Public respondent RTC then issued an Order denying the motions to dismiss and directing
the parties to refer the matter to the Joint Task Force of the Department of Energy (DOE)
and Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to Section 11 of RA 8479. In the meantime,
public respondent RTC ordered the suspension of the proceedings.

Thereafter, the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force submitted its Report 13 finding no clear evidence
that the Big 3 violated Article 186 of the RPC or Section 11 (a) of RA 8479. Based on the
said report, the Big 3 orally moved for the dismissal of the case. Private respondents, on the
other hand, moved to open and examine the books of account of the Big 3 to enable the
court to determine whether Section 11 (a) of RA 8479 had been violated.

The RTC denied the motions to dismiss by the Big 3; grant private respondents' motion to
open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3; and ordered the Commission on Audit
(COA), Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to open and
examine the books of accounts of the Big 3.

The Big 3 separately sought reconsideration. Public respondent RTC issued the second
assailed Order, directing the Chairman of COA and the Commissioners of the BIR and the
BOC to form a panel of examiners to conduct an examination of the books of accounts of the
Big 3 and to submit a report thereon within three (3) months from receipt of the Order.

Though not parties to the case, the COA, the BIR, and the BOC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), were constrained to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the orders
of the RTC on the ground that the order of examination is unwarranted and beyond their
respective jurisdictions.

Meanwhile, private respondent-intervenor Pangkalahatang Sanggunian Manila and

Suburbs Drivers' Association Nationwide (Pasang Masda), Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention with attached Petition-in-Intervention, which the Big 3 opposed.

Public respondent RTC issued the third assailed Order, granting Pasang Masda's Motion for
Intervention and thereby admitting its Petition-in-Intervention. Further, RTC issued the
fourth assailed Order denying the motions for reconsideration of the Big 3 and the OSG and
granting private respondents' motion to include private respondent Cabigao as part of the
panel of examiners. Public respondent RTC stood pat on its first order citing the doctrine of
parens patriae.

A few days later, the RTC, acting on the manifestation of private respondents that the
government agencies have not acted to comply with its order, directed the COA, the BIR,
and the BOC to explain within 72 hours from notice why they should not be cited in
contempt for failure to comply.

After the lapse of the 72-hour period, private respondents moved for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the Chairman of COA and the Commissioners of the BIR and BOC
for their refusal to obey the orders of the RTC. Accordingly, the RTC issued an Order giving
the Chairman of COA and the Commissioners of the BIR and BOC five (5) days from receipt
of the notice within which to file a comment or opposition to the motion for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against them.

Left with no other recourse, the COA, represented by its Chairman, the BIR and the BOC,
represented by their respective Commissioners, through the OSG, filed before this Court a
Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the orders of the RTC. Direct resort to this Court
was made because the issues raised were purely legal, which is an exception to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts.

Finding the application for TRO meritorious, this Court issued a TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the first and second Orders of public respondent RTC. Chevron and
Petron followed suit and filed with this Court their respective petitions for certiorari. Shell,
on the other hand, filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the first, third
and fourth Orders of public respondent RTC.

The CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent RTC, it reversed
and set aside the first, third and fourth orders of the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the
case for declaratory relief for lack of cause of action. The appellate court, in essence, opined
that the issues raised by private respondents cannot be made subject of an action for
declaratory relief. As to the propriety of the intervention of Pasang Masda, it ruled that
Pasang Masda had no legal interest in the matter.

ISSUES

1. Whether public respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not

dismissing the Amended Petition for Declaratory Relief;
2. Whether public respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to examine the books of accounts of the Big 3 and in
including private respondent Cabigao as part of the "panel of examiners; and
3. Whether public respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
Pasang Masda to intervene in the case.

RULING

1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the action for declaratory relief is not the proper

remedy.

A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. It must be
filed before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers;
otherwise, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Thus, "the only issue
that may be raised in such an action is the question of construction or validity of provisions
in an instrument or statute."

In this case, private respondents, in their Amended Petition, alleged that "the Big 3 now and
then increase the price of their petroleum products" and that "an increase in prices
declared by one of them is inevitably followed by increases by the others." The core issue
involved in the Amended Petition is whether the business practice of the Big 3 violates
the RPC and RA 8479. This, however, cannot be made the subject matter of a
declaratory relief.

Private respondents filed their Amended Petition based on acts already committed or being
committed by the Big 3, which they believe are in violation of the RPC and RA 8479. It
appears therefore that the filing of the Amended Petition was done on the assumption that
there was already a breach or violation on the part of the Big 3, which cannot be the subject
of a declaratory relief. It must be stressed that an action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach as such action is filed only for the purpose of securing
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a contract,
deed or statute. It cannot be availed of if the statute, deed or contract has been breached or
violated because, in such a case, the remedy is for the aggrieved party to file the
appropriate ordinary civil action in court. Thus, the Court has consistently ruled that "if
adequate relief is available through another form or action or proceeding, the other action
must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief."

2. YES. It is beyond the mandates of the COA, the BIR and the BOC to open and examine the
books of accounts of the Big 3 in the instant case.

Without a doubt, the case of the Big 3 would not fall under the audit jurisdiction of COA.
They are not public entities nor are they non-governmental entities receiving financial aid
from the government.

With respect to the BIR, its Commissioner is authorized to examine books, paper, record, or
other data of taxpayers but only to ascertain the correctness of any return, or in making a
return when none was made, or in determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax, or in collecting such liability, or evaluating the person's tax compliance. The
BOC, on the other hand, is authorized to audit or examine all books, records, and
documents of importers necessary or relevant for the purpose of collecting the proper
duties and taxes. Since there are no taxes or duties involved in this case, the BIR and the
BOC likewise have no power and authority to open and examine the books of accounts of
the Big 3.

As previously discussed, it is the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force that has the sole power and
authority to monitor, investigate, and endorse the filing of complaints, if necessary, against
oil companies. Considering that the remedy against cartelization is already provided
by law, the public respondent trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to open and
examine the books of account of the Big 3 and allowed private respondent Cabigao, a
certified public accountant, to become part of the panel of examiners. Clearly, the RTC not
only failed to uphold the law but worse, he contravened the law.

3. YES. Pasang Masda failed to satisfy all the requirements for intervention.
As regards the issue of intervention, Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that:
(1) the movant must have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention
must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the
claim of the intervenor must not be capable of being properly decided in a separate
proceeding. The right to intervene, however, is not an absolute right as the granting of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may only be
allowed if the movant is able to satisfy all the requirements.

In this case, Pasang Masda's allegation that its members consume petroleum products is
not sufficient to show that they have legal interest in the matter being litigated considering;
that there are other oil players in the market aside from the Big 3. Jurisprudence mandates
that legal interest must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent or expectant. Such is not the situation in this case. In fact, there is no
showing that Pasang Masda has something to gain or lose in the outcome of the case. Thus,
it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent RTC in allowing Pasang
Masda to intervene despite its failure to comply with the first requirement.

Besides, even if the Court relaxes the definition of "legal interest" in the instant case, the
granting of the motion to intervene would still be improper because the subject matter of
the petition-in-intervention, just like the petition, cannot be the subject of an action for
declaratory relief. Since an intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and
supplement to the main case, the dismissal of the main case would necessarily include the
dismissal of the ancillary case.

All told, the Court finds grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent RTC as to
its issuance of the Assailed Orders.
GIL G. CHUA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 202004, November 4, 2020 (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the court
where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the defendant
may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the defendant. The
provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant may not dispose of
the property attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured
by the plaintiff from the former.

FACTS

On several occasions, Interbrand Logistics & Distribution, Inc. (Interbrand) represented by

its duly authorized officer, Caras, applied with China Bank for the issuance of Domestic
Letters of Credit (L/C) for the purchase of goods from Nestlé Philippines. Accordingly,
twelve (12) L/Cs with corresponding trust receipts were issued to Interbrand. The goods
were all delivered to Interbrand's warehouses. Due to advances made by China Bank, the
parties jointly executed two Surety Agreements whereby in the first Agreement, Interbrand
and its officers, petitioner Chua, Mijares, and Caras served as sureties; while San Luis was
the individual surety in the second Agreement.

When the obligation became due, Interbrand failed to pay respondent China Bank despite
repeated demands. China Bank likewise demanded payment from the sureties, including
Chua, but the latter failed and refused to pay.

Respondent China Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Application
for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment against Chua and the other sureties before
the RTC. China Bank averred that Interbrand, with knowledge and consent of Chua and
other individuals as officers of the company, had committed acts of fraud, deceit and gross
bad faith in contracting their indebtedness from China Bank, with manifest intention not to
comply in good faith with their respective obligations both in the trust receipts and in the
surety agreements.

The RTC granted the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment which was later lifted by
the same court. Petitioner Chua, in filing the Motion to Lift Writ of Attachment, alleged that
they are not debtors, thus should not be guilty of fraud in incurring the obligation. Chua
also argued that he is neither an officer, director nor a stockholder of Interbrand.

China Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Application for TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA. The CA granted the petition and directed the
branch sheriff to attach the properties of Chua. The appellate court noted that Chua
voluntarily signed the Surety Agreement and his liability therein is not limited during his
incumbency as an officer and stockholder of Interbrand.

Chua asserts that the remedy from the order lifting the writ of attachment is not through a
writ of certiorari but may be corrected only by appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is proper.

RULING

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that on the face of the allegations, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment is regular and proper. The CA is correct in directing the issuance of
a writ of attachment against the properties of Chua.

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the
court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the
defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the
satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the
defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant
may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.

In this case, China Bank's basis in applying for the writ of preliminary attachment is Section
1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, i.e., "in an action against a party who has been guilty of
a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought,
or in the performance thereof." Section 3 of the same rule requires that an affidavit of merit
be issued alleging the following facts:

1. that a sufficient cause of action exists;

2. that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof;
3. that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the
action; and
4. that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of
which he/she is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is
granted above all legal counterclaims.

Further, the applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the
factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred
from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.

A perusal of the allegations in the affidavit reveals fraud in the violation of trust receipt
agreements. According to China Bank, it advanced a total of P189 Million as payment for
the goods of Nestlé in favor of Interbrand. These goods are considered highly saleable thus
they naturally expected immediate and regular remittance of the sales proceeds. However,
instead of remitting the sales proceeds to China Bank, Interbrand misappropriated the
same by deliberately diverting the delivery of the goods covered by the L/Cs to a location
different from that indicated in the sales invoice. This act of misappropriation
demonstrates a clear intent of fraud.

Chua, having signed the surety agreement, bound himself to jointly and solidarily fulfill the
obligation of Interbrand to China Bank. The question of whether he was an officer and
stockholder at the time when the Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of
Attachment was filed was raised by petitioner and considered by the trial court in lifting
the writ of attachment against him. The court holds that such finding would necessarily
delve into the merits of the case as China Bank seeks to hold petitioner and other sureties
liable under the Suretyship Agreements.

Suffice it to say that on the face of the allegations, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment is regular and proper. Thus, the Court agrees with the CA in reinstating the
March 3, 2010 Order directing the issuance of a writ of attachment against the properties of
Chua.
CERVANTES, et al. v. AQUINO III, et al. G.R. No. 210805, May 11, 2021 (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no
actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss
it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose
or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.

FACTS

The petitioners in this case are patients and employees of Philippine Orthopedic Center
(POC), health-allied professionals and legislators. They contend that they are suing on their
own behalf and on behalf of the general public, who will be directly affected by the
privatization of the POC which is the country's only specialized orthopedic hospital that
treats patients who are mostly indigents or otherwise unable to pay the high cost of
medical care. They assert that being taxpayers, they have a clear interest in the
disbursement of public funds to be allocated for the whole process of privatizing the POC,
hence, they will suffer direct and substantial injury therefrom, thus clothing them with
legal standing to institute the instant petition.

Further, petitioners invoke the concurrent jurisdiction of this Court to resolve the present
controversy claiming that they do not have other available practical administrative
remedies. Moreover, given the paramount importance or transcendental significance of the
issues involved and the magnitude of the actual and imminent injury as well as the adverse
effects of the questioned acts of respondents, petitioners submit that they have no speedy,
plain and adequate remedy except to seek urgent judicial intervention from this Court.

Public respondents, on the other hand, are being sued in their capacity as officials of the
government while private respondents are private corporations duly registered under
Philippine laws.

Modernization of the POC Project (MPOC Project) consists of the construction of a new
hospital facility within the National Kidney and Transplant Institute Compound. The
concessionaire will design, build, finance, operate and maintain the facility for a period of
25 years and thereafter, transfer the said facility to the DOH. The MPOC Project shall be
implemented through a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement under the provisions
of Republic Act No. (RA) 6957 as amended by RA 7718, otherwise known as the "Build-
Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law" and pursuant to the Public Private Partnership (PPP)
Program of public respondent former President Benigno S. Aquino III (respondent Aquino).
Petitioners filed a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks to
annul and set aside the proposed privatization or commercialization of the POC and the
subsequent award of the MPOC Project to private respondents. It further seeks to
permanently prohibit and restrain public respondents from implementing the said
modernization project.

Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

against public respondents when they, among others:

1. relinquished the duty and responsibility to provide and ensure basic social service
such as health to a private entity through privatization or commercialization of a
government hospital (the POC) to the prejudice of the poor and underprivileged;
and
2. expanded the application of the Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) Law to cover the
privatization of health services.

Respondents counter that petitioners have no legal standing to initiate the instant action as
they do not stand to suffer any direct substantial injury from the implementation of the
MPOC Project. As taxpayers, they lack the requisite capacity in the absence of any illegal
expenditure or an allegation of disbursement of public funds. Anent petitioners- employees
of the POC and health-related professionals, they will not sustain direct or substantial
injury from the implementation of the MPOC Project as they will not be terminated from
their employment.

Also, respondents contend that the petition is premature because the petitioners failed to
exhaust all available administrative remedies.

ISSUE

Whether the special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order prosper.

RULING

NO. In light of the supervening "Notice of Termination" of the BOT Agreement served by
private respondents upon public respondent DOH on November 10, 2015 and received by
the latter on even date, the dismissal of the case on the ground of mootness is warranted.

On November 27, 2015, private respondents filed a Manifestation before this Court
manifesting that in view of this development, the instant petition has been rendered moot
and academic. Accordingly, the Court finds that the petition at bar has indeed become moot
and academic by virtue of the supervening termination of the BOT Agreement that
transpired after the filing of the instant petition.
To expound, "a case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case
or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is
no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve
any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it
cannot be enforced."

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners has been mooted by the termination of the BOT Agreement of private
respondents. The staleness of the claims becomes more manifest considering the reliefs
sought by petitioners, i.e., to annul and set aside the BOT Agreement for the modernization
of the POC; and to permanently enjoin respondents from implementing the MPOC Project,
are hinged on the existence of the BOT Agreement.

Corollarily, the eventual termination of the BOT Agreement rendered the resolution of the
issues relating to the prayers for certiorari and prohibition of no practical or legal effect.
Simply stated, petitioners in this case would no longer be entitled to any actual substantial
relief regardless of this Court's disposition on the merits of the present petition.
ARTURO C. CALUBAD v. BILLY M. ACERON AND OLIVER R. SORIANO

G.R. No. 188029, September 02, 2020, Second Division, (HERNANDO, J.) DOCTRINE

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases

as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. In addition, it may be invoked only
on two grounds, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. None of these grounds are
present in this case.

FACTS

Sometime in April 1992, Billy M. Aceron (Aceron) and Oliver R. Soriano (Oliver) entered
into an unnotarized Deed of Conditional Sale for a consideration of P1.6 million over a
parcel of land in Quezon City registered in the name of spouses Francisco R. Soriano and
Rosa R. Soriano (Spouses Soriano). The latter had donated the subject property to their son,
Oliver. Since the title over the subject property was yet to be reconstituted in the name of
Oliver, the parties entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale which provided that Oliver shall
cause the reconstitution of title and transfer of ownership to Aceron. Meanwhile, Aceron
may take possession of the subject property upon payment of P300,000.00.

In October 1992, the title was reconstituted, prompting Aceron to demand from Oliver the
execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, Oliver informed Aceron that he would
cancel the Deed of Conditional Sale. Hence, on October 19, 1993, Aceron filed a Complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that Oliver execute the Deed of Absolute Sale
and pay damages. On the other hand, Oliver claimed that he had to cancel the Deed of
Conditional Sale because Aceron failed to pay the total amount of the contract.

The RTC ruled in favor of Aceron and ordered Oliver to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the subject property and pay P25,000.00 as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
denied the subsequent appeal and affirmed the RTC's Decision dated December 26, 1996
which became final and executory on August 5, 2003. Thereafter, on July 4, 2003, the trial
court granted the motion for writ of execution filed by Oliver.

Aceron moved for the execution of the RTC's Decision, which was granted by the trial court
in its March 5, 2004 Order. Thus, on April 1, 2004, Aceron deposited the amount of
P970,000.00 at the Office of the Clerk of Court. However, Oliver failed to deliver the TCT.

Hence, Aceron moved that Oliver be divested of his title over the subject property and that
it be transferred to him. However, Oliver manifested that he could not surrender the title
because it was already mortgaged to petitioner Calubad before the issuance of the RTC's
March 5, 2004 Order. On July 23, 2004, Aceron moved that Oliver's title and ownership
over the subject property be transferred to his name, free from all liens and encumbrances,
pursuant to the CA's Decision dated February 18, 2002.
On October 3, 2004, Aceron filed an Omnibus Motion praying that: (a) petitioner Calubad
deliver TCT No. N-253373 in the name of Oliver; (b) Oliver and Calubad refrain from doing
acts that would adversely affect the delivery of TCT No. N-253373; (c) Oliver execute a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aceron; (d) Oliver be divested of his title over the subject
property; and (e) the ownership over the subject property be transferred to Aceron free
from all liens and encumbrances.

On December 13, 2004, the trial court granted Aceron's Omnibus Motion which became
final and executory on January 20, 2005. On August 23, 2007, Calubad filed a Petition for
Annulment of Final Resolution under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, which sought to annul
the RTC's Resolution dated December 13, 2004.

However, on September 19, 2007, the appellate court dismissed outright Calubad's petition
on the ground that he had been negligent in not pursuing an action or remedy to protect his
legal interest upon knowledge of Aceron and Oliver's pending case.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Petition for Annulment of Final Resolution should be granted.

RULING

NO. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in

exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. In addition, it
may be invoked only on two grounds, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. None
of these grounds are present in this case.

First, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the motion for execution filed
by Aceron and consequently issued Resolution dated December 13, 2004 which divested
Oliver of his ownership over the subject property and directed the Register of Deeds to
issue a new title in the name of Aceron. It further declared petitioner Calubad's real estate
mortgage and foreclosure sale as null and void.

Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein.
Evidently, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of
Oliver and Aceron. Moreover, the present case has already become final and executory
when the court a quo issued its assailed Resolution which justifies its subsequent issuance
thereof to put the judgment into effect. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner Calubad must show not merely abuse of jurisdictional
discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear and decide the case which he failed to
do so.

Neither is there extrinsic fraud in the case at bar which would deprive petitioner Calubad
to intervene and present his case in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011. The records show that
Oliver, admittedly, mortgaged the subject property to petitioner Calubad after the decision
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 had become final and executory. Hence, at the time Oliver
mortgaged the subject property to petitioner Calubad, the issue of ownership over the
subject property was already settled in favor of Aceron. On these reasons, petitioner
Calubad failed to convince this Court that there are valid grounds to grant the petition for
annulment of judgment.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. COURT OF APPEALS-CAGAYAN DE ORO STATION

G.R. No. 192809, April 26, 2021, Third Division, (HERNANDO, J.)

DOCTRINE

A writ of preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantial

rights and interests. It is not a cause of action itself, but a mere provisional remedy adjunct to
a main suit. It is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts; it may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be
known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. It may be granted by the court where the
action or proceeding is pending. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied,
and its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. The
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is governed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS

Reta is the owner and operator of Acquarius Container Yard (ACY).ACY's operation as a
container yard outside the customs territory has been approved by the BOC in 2006. On
January 9, 2009, Reta entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the BOC for
the free use of his container yard as the designated examination area for the container vans
in the Port of Davao for a period of 25 years. The MOA also provided that the parties may
revoke it for cause at any time.

BOC claimed that on February 26, 2010, Reta closed the container yard and barred customs
examiners from entering the premises. On the same date, Atty. Castigador informed Reta,
through a letter, of his intention to conduct the examination of the container vans at the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) premises and to reexamine the MOA as its purpose no
longer exists.

This prompted Reta to file a Complaint with Application for Preliminary Injunction and
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order against petitioners. Reta claimed that after the
BOC agreed to use ACY as the designated examination area, he invested in various
machineries and equipment for the examination and inspection of container vans. He
denied closing the container yard; he alleged that it was Atty. Castigador who directed the
stoppage of the hauling and scanning of the container vans in ACY.

The Complaint prayed: (a) for the issuance of a restraining order or injunctive relief; (b) for
the nullification of Atty. Castigador's February 26, 2010 letter for being issued without due
process and in violation of the MOA; (c) for petitioners to respect and perform their
obligations under the MOA; and, (d) for the payment of damages, attorney's fees, and costs
of suit.
The Executive Judge of the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting the
BOC from removing the container vans in ACY and directing the BOC to resume its
operations inside ACY. After raffle of the case, Presiding Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio (Judge
Carpio) of RTC Branch 14 extended the TRO for another 17 days.

Meanwhile, on March 19, 2010, Judge Carpio denied Reta's application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Reta then moved for the inhibition of Judge Carpio from further hearing the case, which
motion was granted. The case was re-raffled to Judge Omelio of RTC Branch 14. Now under
a different judge, Reta moved for the reconsideration of the March 19, 2010 RTC Order.

On April 19, 2010, Judge Omelio issued the assailed Order setting aside the March 19, 2010
Order of Judge Carpio. The April 19, 2010 Order granted the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, prohibited them from closing the designated
examination area in ACY and from revoking the MOA with Reta.

ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Reta.

RULING

YES. the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction in its Order dated April 19, 2010,
prohibiting the BOC from closing the designated examination area in ACY, from revoking
the MOA, and ordering them to resume operations in the ACY. The Order was appealed to
the CA via a Petition for Certiorari which the appellate court dismissed finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

Upon review of the records, the Supreme Court holds that the appellate court committed
reversible error. Contrary to its findings, the trial court actually acted with grave abuse of
discretion as Reta was not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction.

A writ of preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantial

rights and interests. It is not a cause of action itself, but a mere provisional remedy adjunct
to a main suit. It is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts; it may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall
be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. It may be granted by the court where the
action or proceeding is pending. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied, and its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully
heard. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is governed by Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court.
Jurisprudence laid down the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
as follows: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that
is a right in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is
an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and, (d) no other
ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

Before the courts may issue a writ of preliminary injunction, it is essential that the party
seeking its issuance be able to establish the existence of a right to be protected. It must be a
right that is actual, clear, and existing; not a mere contingent, abstract, or future right.
Further, the invasion of that clear and unmistakable right must be material and substantial.

There must also be a showing of urgency to prevent irreparable injury on the part of the
party seeking injunction. Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which its
amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.

To satisfy the requisites for the issuance of the writ, mere prima facie evidence is needed to
establish the clear and unmistakable right, and the substantial and material invasion
thereof; complete and conclusive proof is not needed. Injunction should therefore not be
issued "if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima
facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant."

In the instant case, the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, as laid
down, were not met.

First, Reta has no clear and unmistakable right on the conduct of examination in ACY.

The conduct of examination in ACY premises is governed by the MOA between Reta and the
BOC. It is undisputed that the parties consented to the MOA which stipulated that any of the
parties may revoke it for cause at any time before the end of its term. On March 5, 2010,
BOC has already revoked the MOA on the ground of strained relations due to Reta's closure
of the ACY premises. The revocation was made before the issuance of the assailed RTC
Order.

As the BOC is empowered to revoke the MOA, Reta has no clear and unmistakable right on
the continuation of customs operations in ACY premises. To reiterate the case of Sumifru,
the right, to be clear and unmistakable, shall not be vitiated by substantial challenge or
contradiction. In this instance, the substantial challenge or contradiction to Reta's claimed
right is the BOC's own right to revoke the MOA.

Second, it follows that there is no substantial or material invasion of Reta's right. As the
right does not exist, there can be no substantial or material invasion thereof.

Third, the damage or injury allegedly sustained by Reta is not irreparable. As set out, the
damages or injury suffered by the party applying for injunction must be unquantifiable. The
Petition correctly pointed out that Reta was able to state in his Complaint an amount (i.e.,
P100,000.00) pertaining to the loss of earnings he suffers for each day the BOC is not
conducting examinations in ACY. Therefore, the requisite of irreparable injury is not met.

Based on the foregoing, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Reta is
not proper. Plainly, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ because Reta is
not entitled thereto.
ELIZABETH BRUAL v. JORGE BRUAL CONTRERAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022, Second Division, (HERNANDO, J.)

DOCTRINE

Thus, the rules are clear. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and record of
appeal shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order.

Here, considering that the respondents intended to appeal the final order of the denial of their
motion for intervention in the special proceedings case, they should have filed both a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within the period prescribed by the rules.

FACTS

Fausta Brual (Fausta) remained single during her lifetime and was under the care of her
nephew, Ireneo Brual, and his wife Elizabeth Brual (Elizabeth; petitioner). On July 22, 2009
Elizabeth, as instituted heir and co-executor, filed before the RTC a petition for probate of
the last will and testament of the late Fausta.

The special proceedings ensued. However, Jorge Brual Contreras, Lourdes Brual- Nazario,
Erlinda Brual-Binay, Rodolfo Brual, Renato Brual, Violeta Brual, David De Jesus and Antonio
De Jesus (respondents), as nephews and nieces of Fausta, filed a manifestation and motion
for intervention and supplemental allegations before the probate court.

The respondents alleged that Fausta's testamentary act of supposedly leaving all her
properties to Elizabeth and her husband was dubious. Elizabeth was a mere niece by
affinity and a de facto guardian of the decedent. Hence, she and her husband should not
have been made heir or executor. Respondents also averred that the petition for probate
was defective in form since it did not contain the names, ages and addresses of decedent's
blood relatives.

On November 4, 2010, the RTC denied the respondents' motion for intervention and
supplemental allegation. The RTC held that Fausta, who died single and without
compulsory heirs, may dispose of her entire estate by will pursuant to Article 842 of the
Civil Code. As to the allegation on the formal defects of the petition, the respondents were
not considered as compulsory or testamentary heirs who were entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings.

Respondents then filed their motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its
January 14, 2011 Order. Hence, on February 3, 2011, the respondents filed their notice of
appeal. The RTC ordered Elizabeth to file a comment to the motion which the latter
complied with.
On April 27, 2011, the RTC issued an Order dismissing respondents' appeal due to their
failure to file a record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

The CA granted respondents' petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's dismissal of
respondents' appeal. It held that an appeal must not be dismissed based on mere
procedural technicalities. Elizabeth filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the CA in its January 16, 2013 Resolution. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether the CA committed a reversible error that warrants the discretionary review of this
Court.

RULING

YES. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is
a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law.

Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court enunciates that an appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. Parenthetically, in special
proceedings, Section 1 of Rule 109 enumerates orders and judgments from which appeals
may be taken.

The remedy of appeal in special proceedings is not limited to appealable orders and
judgments rendered in the main case, but extends to other orders or dispositions that
completely determine a particular matter in the case. This includes the denial of a motion
for intervention as in the case at bar.

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provide for the modes of appeal:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing
a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal

shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or

separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Meanwhile, under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final
order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within
which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a
record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse
party, to wit:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from notice of judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas
corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)

Thus, the rules are clear. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and record
of appeal shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order.

Here, considering that the respondents intended to appeal the final order of the denial of
their motion for intervention in the special proceedings case, they should have filed both a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within the period prescribed by the rules.

The period for appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from receipt of the notice of the
final order dismissing the motion for intervention, or from November 15, 2010, the date
respondents' counsel received the order of denial. Respondents had until December 15,
2010 within which to file their notice and record on appeal.

Since they filed their motion for reconsideration on November 26, 2010, the period for
filing of the appeal was duly interrupted. When respondents however received the final
order denying their motion for reconsideration on January 24, 2011, the period to appeal,
applying the fresh period rule, resumed and they had 30 days thereafter or until February
23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in accordance with the rules. Verily, respondents filed their
notice of appeal on February 3, 2011 without a record on appeal. Thus, on April 27, 2011,
the RTC dismissed the notice of appeal due to its non- perfection and failure to file the
required record on appeal. It was only on June 27, 2011 that respondents filed their
omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to admit record on appeal while claiming
inadvertence and lack of knowledge on the timing of the filing of the record on appeal.

There is ample jurisprudence holding that both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
are required for appealing final orders in a special proceeding case. Here, respondents' long
delayed filing of the record on appeal without any justifiable reason clearly violated the
settled rules thereon.

Hence, this Court finds no error when the RTC denied respondents' notice of appeal and the
subsequent omnibus motion for reconsideration. As correctly observed by the RTC,
excusable negligence to be "excusable" must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against. A mere reading of the rules could have prevented
respondents' blunder.
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 205466, January 11, 2021, Third Division, (HERNANDO, J.)

DOCTRINE

Being a government instrumentality, the BCDA is exempt from payment of legal fees including
docket fees pursuant to Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Thus, it was
erroneous for the CTA En Banc to affirm the CTA Second Division's dismissal of the BCDA's
Petition for Review. That the BCDA belatedly filed the docket fees did not strip the CTA Second
Division of jurisdiction as it was exempt from payment in the first place.

FACTS

In 2011, BCDA filed via registered mail a Petition for Review with Request for Exemption
from Payment of Filing Fees (Petition for Review) with the CTA involving its claim for
refund against the CIR. The BCDA received a letter from Atty. Apolinario, CTA's Executive
Clerk of Court IV, acknowledging the receipt of the Petition for Review. However, in the
same letter, Atty. Apolinario informed the BCDA that she was returning the said Petition for
Review as it was not deemed filed without the payment of the correct legal fees. On April 7,
2011, the BCDA paid the docket fees under protest.

On December 27, 2011, the CIR filed a Motion to Dismiss the BCDA's Petition for Review on
the ground of prescription and/or lack of jurisdiction. The CIR argued that since the
deadline to file the Petition for Review was on February 16, 2011, and the docket fees were
paid only on April 7, 2011, then the Petition for Review was not filed on time. Thus, the CTA
Second Division did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

The CTA Second Division resolved the CIR's Motion to Dismiss through a Resolution
dismissing the BCDA's Petition for Review for non-payment of docket fees. The CTA En
Banc denied due course to the BCDA's Petition for Review.

ISSUE

Whether the BCDA is exempt from payment of docket fees before the CTA.

RULING

YES. The BCDA is a government instrumentality and therefore exempt from payment of
docket fees. The resolution of this case hinges on whether the BCDA is a government
instrumentality and consequently exempt from payment of docket fees under Section 22,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, as amended:
Section. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in the rule.Local
governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees. (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, this issue has already been resolved inBases Conversion and Development
Authority v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, where this Court affirmed BCDA's status as
a government instrumentality.

Being a government instrumentality, the BCDA is exempt from payment of legal fees
including docket fees pursuant to Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Thus, it was erroneous for the CTA En Banc to affirm the CTA Second Division's dismissal of
the BCDA's Petition for Review. That the BCDA belatedly filed the docket fees did not strip
the CTA Second Division of jurisdiction as it was exempt from payment in the first place.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Petitioner, v. BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS AND THE MONETARY BOARD

G.R. No. 200642, April 26, 2021, Third Division, (HERNANDO, J.)

DOCTRINE

FACTS

The instant case originated from the same factual background as another case filed with
this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 200678 (Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas),which disposed of a Rule 45 petition involving the RTC's denial of the
Motion to Dismiss of Bangko Sentral and the Monetary Board in Civil Case No. 10-1042. The
Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 200678 was promulgated on June 4, 2018, became
final and executory, and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on April 8, 2019.

On October 20, 2010, Banco Filipino filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against Bangko Sentral and the Monetary Board, docketed as Civil Case No. 10-1042.Banco
Filipino alleged, in essence, that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in
requiring it to withdraw its cases and waive all future claims as a condition to the approval
of the business plan.

It is settled that the office of a writ of preliminary injunction is limited only to the
preservation of the status quo until an action or proceeding could be fully decided; whereas a
TRO is merely the maintenance of such status until an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction can be heard. Evidently, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition
sine qua non before a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO may lie.

Thus, the bank prayed that the trial court: (a) render judgment declaring the condition
illegal and therefore void, and making the writ of preliminary mandatory and preventive
injunction permanent; (b) issue a writ of certiorari, finding grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents; and (c) issue a
writ of mandamus to compel Bangko Sentral and the Monetary Board to approve and
implement its business plan and release its financial assistance and regulatory reliefs
package.

In addition, Banco Filipino prayed for the issuance of a TRO and a WPI, restraining
respondents from (a) employing acts inimical to the enforcement and implementation of
the business plan, (b) continuing and committing acts prejudicial to Banco Filipino's
operations, (c) withdrawing or threatening to withdraw the approval of the business plan
containing financial assistance and package of regulatory reliefs, and (d) otherwise
enforcing other regulatory measures and abuses calculated to coerce Banco Filipino into
agreeing to the condition.
After hearing, the RTC in an October 28, 2010 Order granted the request for the issuance of
a TRO against Bangko Sentral and the Monetary Board. The RTC denied respondents'
motion to dismiss. Respondents assailed the RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss before
the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for issuance of a TRO and WPI.

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's grant of the TRO and WPI in favor of Banco
Filipino. In so ruling, the CA stressed that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the TRO and WPI. It held that since the trial court had no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 10-1042, in line with Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus involving the acts or
omissions of a quasi- judicial agency shall be filed in and be cognizable only by the CA
unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court.

The appellate court likewise noted, among others, that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the persons of respondents at the time of issuance of the TRO.

ISSUE

Whether the Petition should be denied for being moot and academic.

RULING

YES. After a careful review of the records and applicable law and jurisprudence, the
Petition is denied on grounds of mootness and lack of jurisdiction. Cases involving the
propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs, as mere adjuncts to the main suit, become moot
and academic upon disposal of the main action.

TROs and WPIs "constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
action" and are "preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights" of the
parties. They are ancillary because "they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the
result of the main action."Ancillary writs are not causes of action in themselves; they are
mere adjuncts to the main suit with the sole object of preserving the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard. Being ancillary in nature, the existence of a main action or
proceeding is a condition sine qua non before a WPI or TRO may lie:

In our jurisdiction, writs of preliminary injunction and TROs are considered as provisional
injunctive reliefs that are only permitted to be issued in connection with — or as an
ancillary to — a main action or proceeding pending in court. It is settled that the office of
a writ of preliminary injunction is limited only to the preservation of the status quo
until an action or proceeding could be fully decided; whereas a TRO is merely the
maintenance of such status until an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
can be heard. Evidently, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition
sine qua non before a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO may lie.
Thus, any preliminary writ cannot survive the resolution of the main case of which it is an
incident because an ancillary writ "loses its force and effect after the decision in the main
petition." When a main action is dismissed, any provisional remedy in this case is dissolved.
It then follows that once a decision disposing of the main case becomes final and executory,
any disposition by a court on the propriety of a TRO and WPI issued in the case serves no
practical purpose and renders such a disposition moot and academic.

Hence, this Court, in City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, dismissed a Rule 65 petition involving
only the propriety of the issuance of a WPI in view of the trial court's final and executory
Decision disposing of the main case. This Court ruled therein that the WPI was merely an
incident in the main case and has thus been rendered moot and academic in view of the
disposition of the main action.

In the same vein, the Supreme Court discovered in the course of its review of the records
that its Decision in G.R. No. 200678 (MTD Case) already disposed of the main action in Civil
Case No. 10-1042. It denied Banco Filipino's petition and found, among others, that the CA
did not err in dismissing the case before the trial court, which did not have jurisdiction over
the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner against respondents in Civil Case No. 10-
1042.The said Decision has already attained finality and was entered in the Book of Entries
of Judgment on April 8, 2019.

There being no actual substantial relief to which the parties will be entitled to even if the
Petition is granted, instant Petition must be dismissed for being moot and academic.
ESPERANZA P. GAOIRAN v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 12 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, SPS. TIMOTEO S. PABLO and
PERLITA PABLO, MARY NYRE DAWN S. ALCANTARA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
LAOAG CITY

G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment
are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In case of
absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the
prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment
is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights
are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and
under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in
contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also follows that such a
void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.

From the foregoing, it appears that for an order of reconstitution to be issued, it must be
clearly shown that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title has
not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is
void and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.

Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial
in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings.

FACTS

Petitioner alleged that on September 22, 2009, her friends introduced to her a certain
Timoteo H. Pablo, Jr. who was allegedly looking for a buyer of a land registered under the
name of his wife, Perlita S. Pablo. Timoteo offered for sale the subject property to petitioner
and her husband. Timoteo was able to convince petitioner to purchase the said property
upon the representation that he was authorized by his wife, Perlita to sell the same. On the
same day, petitioner delivered the purchase price to Timoteo in the amount of P500,000.00
and in exchange, Timoteo surrendered the first owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 to
petitioner and undertook to deliver a deed of absolute sale signed by his wife on or before
October 22, 2009. Timoteo, however, did not make good his promise.
Demands were made by petitioner upon Timoteo to return the amount of P500,000.00 or
to deliver the appropriate deed of conveyance, but to no vail. This prompted

petitioner to institute before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City a complaint for
Estafa against Timoteo. Finding probable cause, an Information for Estafa was filed before
the RTC of Laoag City.

Meanwhile, on the claim that the owner's duplicate copy of the subject property's title was
missing, respondent Mary Nyre Dawn Alcantara (Mary), representing herself as the niece of
respondent Perlita, and the latter's trustee of TCT T-34540, filed before the RTC of Laoag
City on June 25, 2012 a petition praying that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT T- 34540
that had been lost be declared as null and void. She likewise prayed for the issuance of a
second owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540.

The petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the RTC of Laoag
City in a Decision dated August 28, 2012, ordered the issuance of a second owner's
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540. Pursuant to which, the RTC of Laoag City declared the lost
owner's duplicate copy as null and void.

On May 17, 2013, petitioner instituted before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment
seeking to annul the August 28, 2012 Decision of the RTC of Laoag City, which granted
Mary's petition for the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540.
Essentially, she contended that the reconstituted title was obtained by the respondents by
means of fraud and deceit. She further argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue a
new title as the first owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 was never lost, and in fact, is in
her possession all along.

On August 15, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment declaring
that a petition under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court cannot be used to impugn the second
owner's duplicate certificate of title which was issued in the reconstitution proceeding
before the trial court for to do so would constitute a collateral attack upon the issued
certificate of title which is sanctioned by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529.

ISSUES

1. Whether the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of
the Rule 47 petition filed with the CA.
2. Whether the CA erred in failing to annul the Decision of the RTC on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

RULING
1. NO. Prefatorily, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of appeal when she filed before the
Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the August 15, 2014 Decision and
November 14, 2014 Resolution of the CA. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In this case, the CA acted within its jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed August 15,
2014 Decision. The decision was a final judgment that disposed of the case in a manner
leaving the court with nothing more to do. Accordingly, petitioner should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
in this Court.

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural lapse committed by petitioner, in the interest of

justice and to prevent further prolonging the proceedings in this case, the Court resolves to
give due course to her petition and rule on the merits thereof. This is so especially
considering that petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just
determination of her case.

2. YES. The Court finds that the CA erred in denying petitioner's petition for annulment of
judgment holding that the same was a subtle experiment to collaterally dispute the owner's
duplicate certificate of title which was issued in favor of Perlita in the reconstitution
proceeding before the RTC.

Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment
are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of

jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case.
Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter,
the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by
which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor
bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is
not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata.

Section 109 of PD 1529 provides for the procedure in case of loss of an owner's duplicate
certificate of title:

Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. — In case of loss or theft
of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner
or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the
registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction
may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after
notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate,
but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall
thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.

From the foregoing, it appears that for an order of reconstitution to be issued, it must be
clearly shown that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title
has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted
title is void and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.

Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is
crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings.

Reconstitution presupposes the existence of an original certificate of title which was lost or
destroyed. If there was no loss or destruction as in the case at bar, there is actually nothing
to reconstitute. Here, petitioner clearly alleged in her petition before the CA that, contrary
to the claim of Mary in the reconstitution proceeding, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-
34540 was not really lost, as the same was surrendered to her by Timoteo and was in her
possession all along. The alleged lost TCT was in fact offered in evidence by petitioner
before the CA and private respondents did not contest the genuineness and authenticity of
the same. Thus, with evidence that the first owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-34540 was
not lost but was actually in the possession of another, the RTC decision was null and void
for lack of jurisdiction.

That there was no valid contract of sale executed between Perlita and petitioner is of no
moment. The indelible fact remains that the allegedly lost genuine certificate of title was all
the while in the custody of petitioner. Ergo, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the reconstitution proceeding.

The parties in the instant case did not impugn their respective titles to the property in
question. An examination of the petition for annulment of judgment before the CA reveals
that petitioner never questioned Perlita's ownership of the subject property. In fact,
petitioner acknowledged Perlita's ownership thereof. Neither did respondents Perlita and
Mary in any way challenge the genuineness and authenticity of the first owner's duplicate
copy of TCT T-34540 submitted by petitioner. To stress, what petitioner sought in her Rule
47 petition with the CA was the annulment of the RTC Decision reconstituting TCT T-
34540, on the ground that the first owner's duplicate copy thereof was never lost but was
in fact in her possession all along. Petitioner only needed to show the fact that the owner's
duplicate copy was not, in truth, missing in order to determine the lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court resulting in the annulment of judgment thereof.
ANGONO MEDICS HOSPITAL, INC. v. ANTONINA Q. AGABIN

G.R. No. 202542, December 9, 2020, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

To reiterate, in SP No. 113939, while the appellate court affirmed both the rulings of the
Arbiter and the NLRC as regards the issue of Agabin's illegal dismissal, it did not delve into the
computation of separation pay and backwages. In this regard, it cannot be said that there
was a bar by conclusiveness of judgment by virtue of the finality of SP No. 113939 which
would in turn bar Agabin from further contesting the computation of her monetary awards.
As it stands, the said computation can still be questioned since the CA in SP No. 113939 did
not expressly make a definitive finding that the NLRC's ruling in limiting the award prevailed
over the Arbiter's Decision to grant full backwages and separation pay to Agabin.

FACTS

Agabin was hired by Angono Medics Hospital, Inc. (AMHI) as a staff midwife. While
working, she was allowed by Andres Villamayor (Villamayor), the former President of
AMHI, and Antoinette E. Antiojo (Antiojo), the Chief Nurse, to study nursing
simultaneously.

On June 23, 2007, Agabin requested permission to go on leave without pay from June 29,
2007 to September 15, 2007 as she needed to work as an affiliate in Mariveles, Bataan as
part of her school requirement. Antiojo approved the request on the same day.

On September 15, 2007, Agabin returned to AMHI to inform Antiojo that she was ready to
report back to work. Consequently, Agabin was included in the Schedule of Duty for the
period September 16 to 30, 2007 with a 10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. shift and off-duty days on
September 23 and 30, 2007. However, on September 19, 2007, Villamayor berated Agabin
for coming in to work and told her to go home and take a vacation. Agabin explained to
Villamayor that Antiojo approved her leave of absence but Villamayor ignored her
explanation and retorted that she should go home since she had been away from work for a
long time. Villamayor also told Agabin that she would not be compensated for her work
rendered on September 17 and 18, 2007.

The next day, Antiojo informed Agabin that as per Villamayor's instructions, Agabin should
not report for work anymore. Thus, Agabin filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal,
separation pay, backwages and other monetary claims.

The Arbiter found that Agabin was illegally dismissed from her job. Likewise, AMHI did not
accord due process to Agabin. However, since Agabin opted for separation pay due to her
strained relations with AMHI, the Arbiter awarded full backwages and separation pay, in
lieu of reinstatement, in addition to service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and wages
for work performed on September 17 and 18, 2007, and attorney's fees.
The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Arbiter. However, considering Agabin's refusal to
AMHI's offer for reinstatement, the computation of her separation pay and backwages
should be modified in that it should be limited for the period September 19, 2007 until
January 16, 2008 while her separation pay should be computed from September 1, 2002 up
to January 16, 2008.

AMHI and Agabin both asked for a reconsideration but the NLRC denied their motions in its
February 26, 2010 Resolution. Dismayed, AMHI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
which was docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 113939 (SP No. 113939) and entitled "Angono
Medics Hospital, Inc. v. NLRC and Antonina Q. Agabin." Agabin also filed a Petition for
Certiorari which was docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 114001 (SP No. 114001) and entitled
"Antonina Q. Agabin v. NLRC and Angono Medics Hospital, Inc." Unfortunately, both
petitions were not consolidated by the appellate court.

The CA dismissed AMHI's Petition (SP No. 113939). Undeterred, AMHI filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. AMHI's Petition for Review on Certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 194465 was denied by this Court in its February 9, 2011 Resolution;
AMHI's motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied with finality in a June 13,
2011 Resolution. An Entry of Judgment was subsequently issued.

Meanwhile, in SP No. 114001, the appellate court reinstated the Arbiter's December 19,
2008 Decision in its assailed April 27, 2012 Decision.

AMHI mainly argues that the decision in SP No. 113939 (G.R. No. 194465), which is already
final and executory, has the effect of res judicata upon SP No. 114001. It opines that the
decision in SP No. 114001 should be considered null and void since there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases contemplated herein.

Agabin counters that the legal issues raised by the parties in the separate Petitions for
Certiorari before the CA are entirely different from each other. She clarifies that the
question in SP No. 114001 (G.R. No. 202542, the case at bench) before the CA is the
computation of her monetary awards.

ISSUE

Whether the ruling in SP No. 113939 (G.R. No. 194465) serves as res judicata upon SP No.
114001, the case at bench.

RULING
NO. The instant case should be resolved on the basis of the rule on "conclusiveness of
judgment" since although there is identity of parties in both SP Nos. 113939 and 114001,
the causes of action are not identical. Moreover, strictly speaking, there is only
conclusiveness of judgment insofar as the finding of illegal dismissal is concerned and not
as to the computation of the monetary awards.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.

Monterona v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. exhaustively explains the two rules of res
judicata which are:

x x x (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b); and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Oropeza Marketing Corporation v.
Allied Banking Corporation differentiated between the two rules of res judicata:

There is 'bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of
the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or any other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes
of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to the matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known as 'conclusiveness of judgment.' Stated differently, any right,
fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of
an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.

There is no conflict between the two CA rulings. In SP No. 113939, the appellate court dealt
with the illegal dismissal aspect of the case as well as the Arbiter's denial of AMHI's motion
to further examine Agabin's documents and to set the case for formal hearing.

On the other hand, in SP No. 114001, the CA delved on the correct basis and computation of
Agabin's backwages and separation pay. Relevantly, the appellate court in SP No. 113939
did not discuss at all the computation of the monetary awards; it merely quoted the rulings
of both the Arbiter and the NLRC.
MARYLOU R. ANCHETA, in her and on behalf of her missing former common-law
husband RICARDO DIONILA v. MARY CAMBAY

G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Accordingly, we hold that while Ancheta had previously availed of the remedy of a petition for
relief with the RTC, she is not precluded from filing with the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment — one that is essentially anchored on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If she can
prove that she and Dionila were indeed not duly served with summons, the RTC never
acquired jurisdiction over them, hence, its August 31, 2005 Judgment would be void ab initio,
and the CA would thus be duty-bound to strike it down. We have observed, however, that
instead of fully addressing the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised before it, the CA opted to
dismiss the case outright based on a mere technical, albeit erroneous, interpretation of the
rules. This the Court cannot countenance.

Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of a judgment, and one which may
negate the court's acquisition of jurisdiction, including defective service of summons, it is a
well-founded cause for an action for annulment of a judgment.

FACTS

On June 12, 2003, Vivian Ancheta (Vivian) obtained a loan from Cambay in the amount of
P25,000.00 with a 10% monthly interest. As security for the loan, Vivian executed a Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of Cambay over a parcel of land registered under the names of
Ancheta and her former common-law spouse Ricardo Dionila (Dionila). Ancheta and
Dionila allegedly executed on June 10, 2003 a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of
Vivian authorizing her to use the land as collateral for her loan with Cambay. On June 16,
2003, Vivian obtained another loan from Cambay in the amount of P25,000.00 evidenced
by a Promissory Note.

Alleging that Vivian failed to settle her obligation upon maturity despite repeated demands,
Cambay filed on August 30, 2004 a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage against
Vivian, Ancheta, and Dionila before the RTC. Ancheta narrated that while summons was
served on and received by Vivian, no summons ever reached her (Ancheta) and/or Dionila.
Meanwhile, Vivian filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer with the RTC, which
the latter favorably acted upon per its September 29, 2004 Order. However, neither Vivian,
Ancheta, nor Dionila filed an Answer to Cambay's Complaint.

After trial on the merits, the RTC, on August 31, 2005, rendered a Decision by default
against Vivian, Ancheta, and Dionila. The August 31, 2005 Decision of the RTC became final
and executory, and entered in the book of entries of judgment on September 26, 2005.
On August 14, 2006, Ancheta filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment arguing,
among others, that: (1) Ancheta came to know of the case docketed as SPL Civil Action No.
64 only sometime in February 2006; (2) no summons was personally served on her and/or
Dionila; and (3) the June 10, 2003 SPA purportedly executed by Ancheta and Dionila
empowering Vivian to utilize the land as security for her loan with Cambay was falsified,
and thus, null and void.

The RTC dismissed Ancheta’s Petition for Relief of Judgement. Undeterred, Ancheta filed
with the CA on February 29, 2008 a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of Ancheta and
Dionila. The CA dismissed Ancheta’s Petition for Annulment of Judgement on the ground
that Petitioner already resorted to Petition for Relief from Judgement and lost therefrom.

Ancheta maintains that only the ground of extrinsic fraud, not lack of jurisdiction, is
excluded as a valid ground for a petition for annulment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
if the same ground was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a petition for relief
under Rule 38 of the same rules. Ancheta also insists that "a party who has previously
availed of the remedy of Petition for Relief of Judgment, albeit an erroneous remedy, is not
precluded from resorting to the correct remedy of Petition for Annulment of Judgment.

Cambay maintains in her Comment that Ancheta can no longer resort to an action for
annulment of judgment since she had already filed a petition for relief with the RTC which
she lost.

ISSUE

Whether Ancheta is already barred from filing with the CA a petition for annulment of
judgement under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

NO. Ancheta is not precluded from filing a petition for annulment of judgement with the CA.

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment of judgment with the
appellate court of the judgments, final orders, and resolutions of the RTCs in civil actions
for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Significantly, Section 2,
Rule 47 of the Rules limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
On the other hand, the overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in
court. At this juncture, worth reiterating is the rule that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid
ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief.

This means that the remedy of annulment of judgment, albeit a "last remedy," is not an
alternative remedy to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or a petition for relief. It
must show or allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Notably,
we have held in Jose v. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation that "it is only extrinsic fraud, not
lack of jurisdiction, which is excluded as a valid ground for annulment if it was availed of,
or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief." This is
because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction by the trial court is fundamentally void
or nonexistent, and therefore, can be "assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it
is invoked."

Thus, considering that the ground relied upon in the petition for annulment is lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of Ancheta and Dionila, it was not necessary nor was it
essential on the part of the CA to establish first, before it could have ruled on the merits of
the petition for annulment, whether the remedy of petition for relief was earlier availed of
by Ancheta. This is all the more so in this case where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was
not even categorically ruled upon by the RTC. At most, Ancheta may have been barred from
raising the defense of fraud in her petition for annulment with the CA. However, this should
not have prevented the appellate court from ruling on the merits of the petition for
annulment filed before it, and definitively rule on the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised
therein.

Accordingly, we hold that while Ancheta had previously availed of the remedy of a petition
for relief with the RTC, she is not precluded from filing with the CA a petition for annulment
of judgment — one that is essentially anchored on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If she
can prove that she and Dionila were indeed not duly served with summons, the RTC never
acquired jurisdiction over them, hence, its August 31, 2005 Judgment would be void ab
initio, and the CA would thus be duty-bound to strike it down. We have observed, however,
that instead of fully addressing the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised before it, the CA opted
to dismiss the case outright based on a mere technical, albeit erroneous, interpretation of
the rules. This the Court cannot countenance.

Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of a judgment, and one which may
negate the court's acquisition of jurisdiction, including defective service of summons, it is a
well-founded cause for an action for annulment of a judgment.
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. v. PHILIPPINE CHARTER
INSURANCE CORP., BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, VYTONNE SO, GERRY Y. TEE,

HENRY M. SUN, EMMANUEL R. QUE, BENJAMIN S. TY, ROBERT T. YU, EDWIN V.

SALVAN AND ATTY. MARIA LUISA CECILIA E. GARCIA

G.R. No. 203756, February 10, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

An amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original complaint

is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. The settled rule is that the
filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original
pleading; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment. It is
true that as an exception, this Court has held that an amendment which merely supplements
and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the
commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired
after the service of the original complaint. Thus, when the amended complaint does not
introduce new issues, cause of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on
the date the original complaint was filed.

In the present case, We find that the exception does not apply to petitioner's case as to allow
the period of prescription to run and for prescription to ultimately set in. A perusal of
petitioner's Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that the latter pleading introduced
new demands that were not specified and averred expressly in the original complaint.

FACTS

Petitioner Alpha Plus International Enterprises Corporation (Alpha Plus), a company

engaged in optical media business, obtained two fire insurance policies from respondent
Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. (PCIC). On February 24, 2008, petitioner's warehouse
was gutted by fire destroying its equipment and pieces of machinery stored therein. Thus,
it sought to recover from its insurance policies with the PCIC but its claim was denied in a
letter dated January 22, 2009, a copy of which was received by petitioner on January 24,
2009. The parties exchanged clarification and reply letters but they failed to arrive at a
settlement.

On January 20, 2010, Alpha Plus filed a Complaint against respondent PCIC and its officers
for Specific Performance, Collection of Sum of Money and Damages. Petitioner prayed that
respondents be ordered to pay the following: the amount due as per insurance coverage
plus legal interest thereon as actual damages; amount of not less than P1 million as
exemplary damages; amount of not less than P1 million as attorney's fees; and costs of suit
and litigation expenses. The initial docket fees paid by petitioner amounted to P42,545.00
representing the P1 million claim for exemplary damages and another P1 million for
attorney's fees.

On February 9, 2010, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint praying for similar reliefs as
stated in its original complaint but, this time, it specifically claimed the amount of P300
million as actual damages and that respondents be ordered to pay "two (2) times the legal
interest per annum on the proceeds of the policies for the duration of the delay." Petitioner
paid additional docket fees in the amount of P6,056,465.00 for its P300 million claim
against respondents.

In the Order dated April 5, 2011, the RTC denied respondents' Motion for Preliminary
Hearing of Affirmative Defenses and/or Motion to Dismiss. It also did not pass upon the
issue of prescription despite the fact that it was squarely raised by the respondents in their
motion to dismiss.

The appellate court granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondents. The CA found that
since petitioner raised new demands in its Amended Complaint, the period of prescription
should be counted from the filing thereof, and not from the filing of the original complaint.

Petitioner insists that the prescriptive period should have been counted from the filing of
its original complaint and not from the filing of the amended complaint. As a rule, when the
amended complaint does not introduce new issues or causes of action, the suit is deemed to
have commenced on the date that the original complaint was filed. Petitioner asserts that
its amended complaint did not introduce new or different causes of action. Hence, the
prescriptive period should be counted from the time that the original complaint was filed.

Respondents, on the other hand, riposte that the CA correctly reckoned the prescriptive
period from the date of filing of the Amended Complaint on February 9, 2010. Petitioner
alleged in its Amended Complaint the amount of P300 million as its insurance claim against
respondents. In its original complaint, petitioner merely paid the measly sum of P42,545.00
as docket fees, and it was only upon the filing of the amended complaint that Alpha Plus
paid additional docket fees of P6,056,465.00 representing its P300 million claim against
the respondents.

Thus, the prescriptive period has not been interrupted by the filing of petitioner's original
complaint considering that it raised the additional claim of P300 million in its Amended
Complaint. Petitioner received the notice denying its insurance claim on January 24, 2009,
hence it had until January 24, 2010 within which to bring a court action. In this case,
petitioner's amended complaint was only filed on February 9, 2010 which clearly shows
that its action had already prescribed.

ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint on the ground of
prescription.
RULING

NO. Petitioner’s insurance claim had already prescribed.

Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going into trial on the
merits. Prescription is based on a fixed time and is concerned with the fact of delay. When
it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that an action is barred by
prescription, the court is mandated to dismiss the same.

An amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original

complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. The settled
rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of
the original pleading; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the
amendment. It is true that as an exception, this Court has held that an amendment which
merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to
the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations
which expired after the service of the original complaint. Thus, when the amended
complaint does not introduce new issues, cause of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to
have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed.

In the present case, We find that the exception does not apply to petitioner's case as to
allow the period of prescription to run and for prescription to ultimately set in. A perusal of
petitioner's Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that the latter pleading introduced
new demands that were not specified and averred expressly in the original complaint.

In paragraph 26 of the original complaint, what was merely claimed was actual damages
against respondents without specifying therein any definite amount. Legal interest was
also claimed by petitioner. On the other hand, in paragraph 26 of petitioner's Amended
Complaint, it was specified therein that the actual damages being claimed is in the amount
of P300 million and that payment of respondents shall be for "two times the legal interest
per annum on the proceeds of the policies."

Clearly, petitioner essentially introduced new demands against respondents in their

Amended Complaint. The disparity of the claims between the original complaint and the
amended complaint is magnified by the fact that petitioner was required to pay additional
docket fees in the amount of P6,056,465.00 for its Amended Complaint.

With petitioner's filing of the Amended Complaint which raised new demands, the original
complaint of petitioner must be deemed to have been abandoned and to have been
rendered functus officio. Consequently, petitioner could not argue that the filing of the
Amended Complaint should retroact to the date of filing of the original complaint.

Verily, as the Amended Complaint superseded the original complaint of petitioner, the suit
of the latter is deemed to have been commenced on the date of filing of the Amended
Complaint on February 9, 2010. During this time, prescription had already set in as
petitioner had only until January 24, 2010 within which to file its insurance claim. In sum,
We agree with the appellate court as to its ruling that petitioner's Amended Complaint
should have been dismissed by the RTC on the ground of prescription. No hearing by the
RTC was even needed thereon since it could determine the fact of prescription by simply
looking at the date of filing of the complaints.
ALJEM'S CREDIT INVESTORS CORPORATION v. SPOUSES CATALINA AND PORFERIO
BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 215175, April 25, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties to avoid long litigation and
delays, where the pleadings show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. A
genuine issue of fact is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived, or false claim. As such, an issue of fact is
genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be resolved.

FACTS

Petitioner alleged that a parcel of land owned by the spouses Bautista was mortgaged to it
as security for a loan. The Bautistas failed to pay the loan; thus, petitioner foreclosed the
mortgage. As the spouses Bautista did not redeem the property within the reglementary
period, title to the property was consolidated in petitioner's name.

When petitioner was about to take possession of the property, Catalina Bautista (Catalina),
the wife, offered to repurchase the property. Petitioner accepted the offer, so they entered
into a Contract to Sell on August 29, 2000. The Spouses Bautista, however, failed to comply
with the Contract to Sell resulting to its cancellation. The parties entered into another
Contract to Sell on September 27, 2001; however, despite several demands to pay or vacate
the property, the spouses Bautista still failed to comply even with a new contract.

Thus, petitioner sent demand letters to Catalina to vacate the property. All demands were
to no avail, resulting to petitioner's filing of the complaint.

The spouses Bautista alleged that the mortgage contract is void as it did not bear the
conformity of Porferio Bautista (Porferio), the husband. They also contended that the
contract to sell contains a provision on pactum commissorium, which is illegal, and that the
contract should be considered as an equitable mortgage. They likewise contested the high
interest rates imposed.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In its July 11, 2007 Order,
the RTC denied petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. It held that there are genuine
issues of facts that should be threshed out in a full-blown trial.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA. The CA
affirmed the RTC. It held that the defenses raised by the spouses Bautista are triable issues.

Still aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. Petitioner argues that the CA
erred in: (a) ruling that the mortgage contract is void despite not being the subject matter
of the complaint; (b) failing to rule on the issues relating to accion publiciana and rescission
of the contract to sell, which are the subject matter of the complaint; and, (c) not holding
that there is absolutely no pactum commissorium or equitable mortgage to speak of.

Nonetheless, petitioner prays for the reversal of the CA Decision and the rendering of
judgment in its favor. In their Comment, the Bautista couple argue that petitioner raised
factual issues to be resolved during trial; this in fact reinforces the propriety of the denial of
the Motion for Summary Judgment.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgement is proper.

RULING

YES. The RTC properly denied the Motion for Summary Judgement.

Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties to avoid long litigation and
delays, where the pleadings show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. A
genuine issue of fact is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived, or false claim. As such, an issue of fact is
genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be resolved.

To determine if genuine issues of fact exist, the Court stated in Philippine Racing
Commission v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.:

In Calubaquib v. Republic, the Court explained how trial courts may determine genuine
issues in this manner:

"A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The test of the propriety
of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact, "as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived, or false claim." A factual issue raised by a
party is considered as sham when, by its nature, it is evident that it cannot be proven, or it
is such that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate
evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the
sake of having an issue, and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their
answers are not under oath anyway.

In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a
summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or
contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their
witnesses in the affidavits that they submittal with the motion and the corresponding
opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a
summary judgment is proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine."
The Court finds that summary judgment will be improper. The RTC is correct in holding
that there are genuine issues of fact to be threshed out in the trial.

On petitioner's argument that the spouses Bautista admitted that the TCT is already in its
name, the Court finds that this is just one of the pieces of evidence for the trial court to
assess in making a ruling for this case.

On the argument on the lack of specific denials in the Answer, the Court is not convinced. A
specific denial is made by specifying each material allegation of fact, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The purpose of requiring the defendant
to make a specific denial is to make him briefly disclose the matters alleged in the
complaint which he intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he
relied upon to support the denial." An examination of the Answer reveals that the spouses
Bautista made specific denials of the allegations in the Complaint.

The spouses Bautista were able to point out the exact allegations in the Complaint that they
intend to deny, even without expressly using the word "specific," (or any of the word's
derivatives), in the wording of the Answer. It is not required for them to set out the
substance of the matters on which they rely to support their denial. The Rules state that the
defendant can set out their basis for denial whenever practicable — there is no stringent
requirement.

As regards petitioner's contention that the spouses Bautista's defenses of equitable

mortgage and pactum commissorium are legal issues and not factual, We hold that the
question of whether a contract is an equitable mortgage is a question of fact. There is a
need for the trial court to review evidence, including the assailed document itself, and the
intent of the parties, to determine if there is an equitable mortgage, considering that the
law provides for instances when a contract can be presumed to be an equitable mortgage.
The same goes with the existence of pactum commissorium: it is a question of fact as the
trial court needs to look into the contractual stipulations, and the intent of the parties to
determine, if there is such. Though these defenses pertain to the preceding mortgage
contract, resolving these in the trial will affect the resolution on the rescission of the
contract to sell because, as alleged by the Bautistas, the former document is the basis of the
latter.

Lastly, the spouses Bautista raise the defense that Porferio's signature in the contract to sell
is forged. It is well-settled that the question of whether forgery exists is a question of fact.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there are still genuine issues of fact that need to be
resolved in the trial. Hence, this Court holds that the denial of petitioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment is proper (which, again, is the issue here in this appeal). Petitioner's
recourse now is to participate in the trial proper.

Also worth mentioning is that the Court's pronouncement here is in line with the
provisions of the 2019 Amended Rules of Civil Procedure on motions for summary
judgment, which provides that "any action of the trial court on a motion for summary
judgment shall not be subject of an appeal or petition for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus."
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (now known as BANCO DE ORO
UNIBANK, INC.) v. LAGUNA NAVIGATION, INC., BENIGNO D. LIM, CARMEN LIZARES
LIM, and VICENTE F. ALDANESE

G.R. No. 195236, February 8, 2021, Third Division, (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 3110 provide for the procedure for reconstitution in civil cases
that are pending in the trial court. The provisions require the parties to initially apply for
reconstitution. The destroyed records may be reconstituted by authentic copies certified by
the parties or their respective counsels. Section 4 of Act No. 3110 covers civil cases that are
still pending trial in the trial court when the records are lost or destroyed.

There is failure to prosecute when the party evidently no longer desires to pursue its case by
not appearing or by showing a pattern to delay the disposition of the case.

FACTS

PCIB and Laguna Navigation are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines.The Spouses Lim and Aldanese are individuals who transacted with PCIB.
On September 8, 1972, PCIB filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against the
respondents before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that judgment be
rendered ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay PCIB the following amounts:
(a) P2,083,598.00, inclusive of interests, penalty and bank charges as of May 31, 1972, plus
interests and bank charges on the total amount until full payment; and, (b) P208,359.80 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

PCIB alleged that on March 30, 1965, the Spouses Lim executed a real estate mortgage over
a parcel of land in favor of PCIB to secure letters of credit. Eventually, PCIB foreclosed the
mortgage on failure of the Lims to satisfy their obligation. The property was then awarded
to the highest bidder.A deficit in the amount of Pl,578,695.65 remained after the auction of
the mortgaged property.

Between March 1967 and February 1969, Laguna Navigation applied with PCIB for the
opening of various letters of credit in favor of Overseas Investors, Inc. As of May 31, 1972,
Laguna Navigation's outstanding obligation amounted to P504,902.35, inclusive of interest
and other charges. Meanwhile, on January 19, 1967, the Spouses Lim and Aldanese
executed a Contract of Continuing Guaranty in favor of PCIB, for and in consideration of
Laguna Navigation's indebtedness. The obligations became overdue, but the respondents
failed to pay despite PCIB's repeated demands. Hence, PCIB filed the complaint.
The trial court issued an Order recognizing the parties' agreement to enter into a partial
stipulation of facts to simplify the issues. After the parties' submission of their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for decision.

The trial court subsequently ordered Court Stenographers Rogelio Bugtong and Angelina
Nambayan to submit their transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) on the case. However,
they failed to do so since court records including their TSNs on the case were destroyed in
a fire that gutted the fourth floor of the Manila City Hall on November 21, 1981.

The TSNs for trial dates March 26 & 31, 1976, and February 4, 1980 which pertained to the
direct examination of Atty. De Jesus, PCIB's witness, were not restored. On July 24, 1997,
the parties, except for Laguna Navigation, filed a Joint Formal Manifestation submitting the
case for decision sans the missing TSNs. The Spouses Lim, however, subsequently
withdrew the Manifestation.

The RTC ordered the parties to appear anew. Several postponements and re-settings of the
trial followed. In its October 20, 1998 Order, the RTC dismissed the case for PCIB's utter
lack of interest and failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. It ruled that
PCIB failed to prove its case by preponderance of evidence despite several opportunities
afforded to it. The trial court held that it cannot base its findings on Atty. De Jesus'
testimony without considering his direct examination.

In its October 11, 2010 Decision, the CA agreed with the RTC that the case cannot be fairly
and justly disposed without the records being complete and intact, especially since all the
parties were asserting diametrically opposed versions of the facts. The appellate court
stated that either party could have filed a petition for reconstitution of the records of the
case under Act No. 3110 or Section 5(h), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the
appellate court found that PCIB, which had the burden of proving its case, showed no
interest to reconstitute the lost TSNs. The CA held that PCIB's several motions for
postponements and re-settings showed that it was not interested in continuing with the
proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of the instant case.

RULING

NO. The CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case. Preliminarily, on the issue of
reconstitution, the RTC was correct in ordering the parties to provide their copies of the
destroyed TSNs, and in setting subsequent hearing dates for PCIB to present a witness in
lieu of the testimony contained in the lost TSNs. Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 3110 provide
for the procedure for reconstitution in civil cases that are pending in the trial court. The
provisions require the parties to initially apply for reconstitution. The destroyed records
may be reconstituted by authentic copies certified by the parties or their respective
counsels.
Section 4 of Act No. 3110 covers civil cases that are still pending trial in the trial court when
the records are lost or destroyed.

As there were no available authentic copies of TSNs for trial dates March 26 & 31, 1976,
and February 4, 1980, the trial court allowed PCIB to present a new witness. In this regard,
Section 3 of Act No. 3110 which requires either party to file an application for
reconstitution becomes irrelevant since the trial court took the initiative to order the
appearance of the parties for purposes of reconstitution. It cannot be said then that the
bank was at fault in not applying for reconstitution. Further, courts have the inherent
power to "authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and
used instead of the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in its records and
proceedings."

Corollary to this, it cannot be said that there was failure on the part of PCIB to prosecute its
case as contended by respondents. There is failure to prosecute when the party evidently
no longer desires to pursue its case by not appearing or by showing a pattern to delay the
disposition of the case.In the instant case, it is not accurate to state that the PCIB failed to
prosecute its case considering its repeated failure to present a new witness after the
destruction of the TSNs pertaining to its witness.

To recall, the bank actively participated in the proceedings before the fire that destroyed
the TSNs; it also entered into a Joint Stipulation of Facts with respondents, presented its
witness, and formally offered documentary evidence. To stress, the case was already
submitted for decision before the fire took place. Moreover, after the discovery of the loss
of the TSNs, PCIB and the respondents submitted a Joint Formal Manifestation submitting
the case for decision sans the missing TSNs, though the Spouses Lim subsequently
withdrew their manifestation.

The foregoing shows that PCIB did not lack interest in pursuing its case. On the contrary, it
pursued its case diligently up until the destruction of the records when the case was
already submitted for decision. Further, its subsequent filing of a Manifestation with
respondents showed that it clearly desired the immediate resolution of the case even
without the missing TSNs. Applying Gomez, PCIB was, under the circumstances then, not
chargeable with "want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on [its] complaint with
reasonable promptitude."

However, the issues raised by PCIB are clearly questions of fact. Indeed, the bank seeks
mainly for the examination by this Court of the evidence in the records. This entails
appreciation of evidence that the trial court has passed upon. Doing so would be disturbing
the findings of fact made by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. It is well settled that the RTC is
in a better position to determine which party was able to present evidence with greater
weight.

The trial court had already made an examination of the available evidence of the parties
and determined that there was no preponderance of evidence. The trial court still afforded
PCIB to present a new witness, and it may have been possible to have a completely
different ruling favorable to the bank had it presented its new witness. But this was not the
situation because PCIB failed to do so. Hence, the dismissal of this case can be considered
as the consequence that PCIB must suffer for its failure to present a new witness despite
several opportunities afforded to it.
ANGELINA DAYRIT, represented by JULIE E. DAYRIT v. JOSE I. NORQUILLAS, ROGELIO
I. NORQUILLAS, ROMIE I. NORQUILLAS, HERDANNY I. NORQUILLAS, DANILO M.
NORQUILLAS, ANTHONY APUS, TECLO P. MUGOT, ALLAN A. OMPOC, JONI CLARIN,
CANDELARIA MEJORADA, LILIA 0. TAGANAS, SYLVIA SABAYANON, ARSENIO CATIIL,
VERONICO MAESTRE, and MARIO TAGAYLO

G.R. No. 201631 December 7, 2021, En Banc (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

It should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases of whatever nature falls on
first-level courts; it should be read and understood to provide that first-level courts have
jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as long as the case is not
an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction
over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the
first- level courts will be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended.
The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not
the character of the subject land.

FACTS

Angelina was the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental. In 1993, the parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the CARP.
Hence, Angelina's titles to the parcels of land were cancelled, and new titles (pursuant to
CLOAs) were issued in favor of respondents. Angelina filed a petition for the annulment of
the CLOAs before the DARAB. She also applied for exemption from CARP coverage with the
DAR.

While the appeal of the petition for annulment was pending in the DARAB Manila Office,
Angelina claimed that the respondents surreptitiously entered the property and refused to
vacate despite repeated demands. This prompted Angelina to file the instant complaint for
forcible entry.

Respondents, in their answer, acknowledged that Angelina was the previous owner of the
parcels of land. However, they alleged that Angelina lost her ownership the properties
when these were awarded to respondents as CARP beneficiaries. It follows that Angelina
lost her right of possession. Respondents also argued that they remain owners of the
parcels of land despite Angelina's pending petition for annulment of the CLOAs. Hence,
Angelina cannot claim forcible entry as she already lost her right of possession.

The MCTC ruled in favor of Angelina. Aggrieved, respondents appealed the case to the RTC.
The RTC affirmed the MCTC Decision in its entirety.
With respondents still aggrieved, they further elevated the case to the CA. The CA reversed
and set aside the rulings of the MCTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint. The CA
ruled that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any
incident involving the implementation of the CARP. In the instant case, petitioner's parcels
of land in dispute were included in the CARP Portions were awarded to respondents
pursuant to the CLOAs that resulted to the issuance of new titles. As beneficiaries,
respondents occupied the parcels of land, which was considered by Angelina as unlawful
entry, resulting in the filing of the instant case to recover possession.

Angelina moved for reconsideration but was subsequently denied by the CA.

ISSUE

Whether or not the MCTC has jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry.

RULING

NO. The case of David v. Cordova (David) should not be understood that jurisdiction on
ejectment cases of whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be read and
understood to provide that first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if
the land is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public
character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases.
However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will
be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling
aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of
the subject land.

Then there is the more recent case of Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon
(Chailese), which clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over agrarian disputes:

Thence, having settled that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the
Court now proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision,
the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the
DAR when the following requisites are present:

1. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in
nature; and
2. b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.

From this, the Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction on the instant complaint for
forcible entry. As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, this case meets the
two requirements for automatic referral, as set out by RA 9700 and as summarized in
Chailese. Thus, the Court finds that the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.

The first requirement is the presence of an allegation from any one or both of the parties
that the case is agrarian in nature. Here, despite the filing of the forcible entry case,
respondents have been consistent on alleging that the controversy is agrarian in nature. In
their answer filed before the MCTC, they alleged that the land in dispute were awarded to
them as CARP beneficiaries. The RTC, on appeal, also touched upon matters of allegations
of agrarian dispute in relation with jurisdiction of the courts. The CA also did the same and
in fact dismissed the complaint after finding that the issue of possession was linked to an
agrarian dispute brought by the issuance of CLOAs to respondents. In their comment filed
before this Court, respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute.

As stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence of an agrarian dispute is enough. In

this case, this requirement was met when respondents made consistent allegations of the
existence of an agrarian dispute pursuant to the CLOAs issued to them.

As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that proof must be adduced as to the person's
status as farmer, farmworker, or tenant. In this case, it is undisputed that respondents are
farmers of the subject lands. Indeed, the records did not expressly show any agreement of
whatever kind that respondents were farmers of Angelina's lands. However, the CA and the
DAR Secretary (in the exemption from CARP case) here recognized the status of
respondents as farmers.95 This was not disputed by Angelina. Further, their status as
farmers was cemented by the subsequent award of Angelina's lands to them by virtue of
CLOAs. This is also shown by the cases Angelina initiated regarding the annulment of
CLOAs, exemption from CARP coverage, and this forcible entry case. Thus, the second
requirement is met.

The Court, therefore, agrees with the CA in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for
being an agrarian dispute.
ARIEL PAOLO A. ANTE v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES STUDENT DISCIPLINARY
TRIBUNAL AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 227911. March 14, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

“Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to
petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must
be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.”

FACTS

The present case stemmed from seven disciplinary actions filed by UP before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) against Ante et. al. over the alleged hazing activities/initiation
rites conducted by the Sigma Rho Fraternity, that led to the death of Chris Anthony Mendez.
In particular, the formal charges accused them of participating in the alleged hazing
activities/initiation rites, leaving Mendez in the hospital, and failing to give information to
the authorities, and to comply with the directives of UP's Vice Chancellor for Student
Affairs to give information on the circumstances surrounding Mendez's death.

Ante in his answer emphasized that under Section 1, Rule III of the UP Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Fraternities, Sororities, and other Student Organizations (Rules
Governing Fraternities), a valid preliminary inquiry must first be conducted to determine
whether a formal charge against any member or officer of a fraternity, sorority, or other
student organization is warranted. Thus, Ante filed an omnibus motion seeking for: (a) the
quashal of the formal charges and declaration of all the proceedings as void due to an
invalid preliminary inquiry; and (b) the inhibition of the members of SDT who conducted
the invalid preliminary inquiry on the ground of prejudgment, considering that SDT has
concluded that a prima facie case already existed against Ante and others. In seeking for the
quashal of the formal charges, Ante reasoned that the preliminary inquiry was invalid for
violating Section 1, Rule III of the Rules Governing Fraternities, which requires that the
preliminary inquiry be conducted "by any member of the Tribunal."

SDT denied the omnibus motion maintaining that a valid preliminary inquiry was
conducted. Aggrieved, Ante filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of
Quezon City. The RTC found merit in Ante's petition and nullified the proceedings of SDT.
However, on appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE

1. (1)  Whether or not a valid preliminary inquiry was conducted by SDT.

2. (2)  Whether or not SDT is guilty of prejudging the case against Ante, thereby
violating the latter's right to due process.

RULING

(1) YES. The disagreement as to the validity of the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT
all boils down to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule III of the Rules Governing
Fraternities, which states:

“SECTION 1. No member or officer of a fraternity, sorority or student organization shall be

formally charged before the SDT unless a preliminary inquiry has been conducted by any
member of the SDT, which must be finished not later than five (5) working days from the
date of filing of the complaint.”

In particular, the parties argue over the correct interpretation of the phrase "by any
member of the SDT." Since it is undisputed that the University Prosecutor performed the
preliminary inquiry, Ante theorizes that this is in violation of the provision, by making a
distinction between the terms "by" and "before"; he argues that the preliminary inquiry
was done by the University Prosecutor, and not by SDT, although before it. On the other
hand, SDT, citing Black's Law Dictionary, contends that the phrase should be construed as
"through the means, act, agency or instrumentality" of "any member of the SDT," thus
making the preliminary inquiry compliant with the provision and therefore, valid.

Ante suggests that the terms "by" and "before" are mutually opposed; that one necessarily
negates the other — they are not and do not. As correctly held by the CA, simply because
SDT stated in the formal charges that the preliminary inquiries were conducted "before"
them, does not mean that they themselves did not conduct nor participate in the same. The
term "inquiry," which means "to request for information" in its ordinary sense, necessarily
implies that SDT took part in the conduct of such. This alone, satisfies the requirement that
the preliminary inquiry be conducted "by a member of the SDT." Moreover, we agree with
the CA that it would be bordering absurdity if the statement be interpreted to mean that
SDT "merely served as observers of the University Prosecutor, with themselves physically
present thereat but meaning nothing at all." Thus, contrary to Ante's assertion, to split hairs
between the phrases "by the Student Disciplinary Tribunal" and "before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal" is actually a trifling matter.

Another reason which militates against Ante's postulate is the fact that, closely analyzing
the provision in question, it is apparent that the charges are to be filed before SDT. Again,
the provision states:
“SECTION 1. No member or officer of a fraternity, sorority or student organization shall be
formally charged before the SDT unless a preliminary inquiry has been conducted by any
member of the SDT, which must be finished not later than five (5) working days from the
date of filing of the complaint.”

In other words, SDT will act as the judge that will hear and decide the case filed before it.
Given this, if we are to follow Ante's submissions — that SDT, alone and in itself, conducts
the preliminary inquiry preparatory to the filing of the formal charges — then what will
result is an anomalous situation of a judge hearing his/her own case.

(2) NO. In asserting that his right to due process was violated, Ante claims that SDT is guilty
of prejudice when it found a prima facie case against him, even though what is required by
the school regulations is merely the determination of the sufficiency of a report or
complaint. Ante contends:

“8.28. Section 8 of the UP Rules and Regulations on Student Council and Discipline state
that the function of a preliminary inquiry is merely to determine the sufficiency of a report
or complaint against a UP student, to wit:

Section 8. Preliminary Inquiry. — Upon receipt of the complaint or report, the tribunal of
the Dean of the College, as the case may be shall determine whether such complaint or
report is sufficient to warrant formal investigation.

8.29. The rule is clear. In the required preliminary inquiry, only the sufficiency of a
complaint or report to warrant a formal investigation should be determined. The
(sic) present case, the UP Prosecutor went further to find not only the sufficiency of the
complaint against Petitioner Ante but to rule, with the acquiescence of the SDT, that there
existed a prima facie case against him.”

Ante then proceeds to state that the finding of aprima facie case against him amounts to a
prejudgment, since a prima facie case denotes "evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts,
or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction." Ante likewise
stresses that this effectively shifts the burden of proof to him, in violation of the
presumption of innocence in his favor.

In the landmark case of Guzman v. National University, the Court laid down the requisites
for the satisfaction of due process in disciplinary cases involving students. It held that,
there are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
In the present case, and following Guzman, we fail to see how can there be a violation of
Ante's right to due process when formal proceedings are only yet to begin. SDT is in fact
asking Ante to participate — the very essence of due process — but the latter so stubbornly
refuses to do so and instead resorts to procedural devices meant to avoid the proceedings.
HEIRS OF JOSE DE LARA, SR. v. RURAL BANK OF JAEN, INC.

GR No. 212012, March 28, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Tenancy relationship between the parties must exist for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction.
The following indispensable elements should first be established: 1) that the parties are
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

Although petitioners did not question DARAB’s jurisdiction, citing Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs
of Cruz: “Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties... ”

FACTS

Jose, a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer of PD No. 27, was awarded a
parcel of land. TCT No. EP-86727 under DAR Emancipation Patent (EP) No. 00735825
covering the subject land was issued in his favor.

Jose obtained a loan from respondent bank, secured by a mortgage over the land. He failed
to pay so it was foreclosed. A public auction was held; respondent bank was the highest
bidder. RTC issued a Certificate of Sale to respondent bank, and it registered said sale with
the Register of Deeds. A year passed but Jose or his heirs did not redeem the subject land.
Hence, respondent bank executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership.

Respondent bank filed a verified petition for cancellation of TCT No. EP-86727 before
PARAD. Petitioners sought its dismissal, arguing: 1) that PARAD did not acquire
jurisdiction over them for failure to implead necessary parties; 2) that the petition lacked
cause of action as the mortgage was void ab initio, it being executed within the 10-year
prohibitory period under Sec 27, RA 6657 (CARP); and 3) that the mortgage was void for
being executed without consent of Jose’s wife, Marcela.

PARAD granted respondent’s bank petition for cancellation and for a new one to be issued
in respondent bank’s name, Jose having failed to pay his obligation and them having failed
to present the mortgage contract to prove that it was not signed by Marcela. DARAB
reversed, holding that respondent bank’s act of consolidating ownership over the subject
land is prohibited under agrarian laws. CA reversed, Jose and Marcela having fully paid
Land Bank their amortizations covering the land before it was mortgaged.

ISSUE
Whether the subject land covered by an EP can be foreclosed and its title canceled by
PARAD in favor of respondent bank

RULING
NO. DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case as there is no agrarian dispute between the
parties.

Tenancy relationship between the parties must exist for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction.
The following indispensable elements should first be established: 1) that the parties are
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that harvest is
shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

These elements are not present. There was no tenancy relationship between petitioners
and respondent bank over the subject land. What is clear is that respondent bank’s petition
for cancellation of certificate of title stemmed from a foreclosure. There was no agrarian
dispute despite the land being an agricultural land. Thus, the petition should have been
dismissed by DARAB for lack of jurisdiction.

Although petitioners did not question DARAB’s jurisdiction, citing Heirs of Dela Cruz v.
Heirs of Cruz: “Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by
the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties... ” Respondent
bank’s recourse should have been with the Register of Deeds pursuant to Sec 63 of PD
1529, which states that “in case of non-redemption, purchaser at foreclosure sale shall file
with the Register of Deeds xxx”

Subject land is deemed non-transferrable under PD 27 and RA 6657, as amended by RA

9700. PD 27 states that, “title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform
Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to
the Government. These lands are “not subject to foreclosure, except by the Land Bank,
because foreclosure contemplates the transfer of ownership over the mortgaged lands.”
This is for the government to develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to
have an adequate and sustained agricultural production.

Sec 27 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700, states that, “Lands acquired by beneficiaries

under this Act or other agrarian reform laws shall not be sold, transferred, or conveyed xxx
for a period of 10 years. Hence, although Sec 71 & Sec 73-A of RA 6657 allows banks and
financial institutions in general to foreclose mortgages on agricultural lands, the facts of the
case impel the Court to invalidate the foreclosure sale to respondent bank. Records show
that at the time the foreclosure sale was held, only 4 years had passed from the time he
acquired said land in his name. There was a factual impediment to respondent’s action to
foreclose.
Pursuant to Art 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose cause, object, or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, are inexistent and
void from the beginning. Therefore, the sale by foreclosure to respondent is void ab initio.
PROVINCE OF BATAAN VS. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING
OMBUDSMAN, ET AL./RODOLFO H. DE MESA, ET AL. VS. THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 197510-11/G.R. No. 201347, April 18, 2022, Second Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Jurisprudence states that "[a] petition for certiorari, pertaining to the regularity of a
preliminary investigation, becomes moot after an information is filed and a trial court issues
an arrest warrant upon finding probable cause against the accused." By analogy, the same
rationale should be applied in this case. This is because the Sandiganbayan acts as a "trial
court" in resolving criminal cases against government officials or employees. "'The
Sandiganbayan is a special court tasked to hear and decide cases against public officers and
employees[,] and entrusted with the difficult task of policing and ridding the government
ranks of the dishonest and corrupt."

FACTS

To aid the efforts of the Bataan Provincial Anti-Illegal Fishing Task Force, Provincial
Agriculturist Imelda D. Inieto (Inieto) requested for a patrol boat equipped with a 6-
cylinder gas engine through Purchase Request No. 442, dated June 8, 2005 costing
Pl50,000.00. For failure of the first bidding, a re-bidding was conducted, but no supplier
submitted a letter of intent. Thus, the BAC recommended a Limited Source or Selective
Bidding, and invited three suppliers, namely: (1) Marcelino G.Rodriguez (Rodriguez), (2)
Agrifino M. Otor (Otor), and (3) accused Ernesto R. Asistin, Jr. (Asistin). Asistin offered the
lowest bid of Pl50,000.00 based on quotations and a canvass summary. Thereafter, the
contract was awarded to Asistin as evidenced by a Notice of Award.

The award pertained to the delivery of a 4-cylinder gas engine patrol boat for Pl50,000.00.
Notably, there was a handwritten correction in terms of the capacity of the gas engine from
6-cylinder to 4-cylinder.

Accused Provincial Treasurer Emerlinda S. Talento (Talento) issued Check No. 788858
dated February 16, 2006 in the amount of Pl 42,500.00, with a notation that it was being
issued for the payment of the 4-cylinder gas engine patrol boat. Asistin acknowledged
receipt of the check as evidenced by Disbursement Voucher No. 110-06-0-951 for
Pl42,500.00, also indicating one unit of 4-cylinder gas engine patrol boat, which was signed
by Alicia Magpantay, Provincial Accountant, and De Mesa, representing then Governor
Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Governor Garcia). The Journal Entry Voucher, however, indicated the
total amount of Pl50,000.00 for the patrol boat.

Eventually, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Supplemental Complaint dated September 29, 2008 before the Ombudsman,
recommending the filing of criminal and administrative cases against the involved public
officials and individuals for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The FIO essentially alleged that the purchase of the
patrol boat equipped with a 4-cylinder gas engine is tainted with anomalies as the
documents related to its procurement were altered, the process occurred without public
bidding, and because it gave undue advantage to Asistin.

In its Decision dated May 12, 2011 in OMB-C-A-08-0659-L, the Ombudsman found that the
members of the BAC violated the law when they chose to negotiate with Asistin, Rodriguez,
and Otor who are not bona fide suppliers since they did not have the legal and financial
capacity to enter into a contract with the govermnent. Moreover, there were anomalies in
the purchase of the patrol boat as can be gleaned from the documents. Instead of a 6-
cylinder gas engine, a patrol boat with 4-cylinder gas engine was procured without the
corresponding reduction in the purchase price and conduct of a new procurement process.

Moreover, Provincial Administrator De Mesa approved the necessary documents for the
payment of the 4-cylinder gas engine patrol boat, by authority of Governor Garcia, even if
the latter was apprised only of the proceedings pertaining to the procurement of a 6-
cylinder boat. Thus, the collective acts of the public officials in the procurement of the 4-
cylinder patrol boat constituted as grave misconduct. Likewise, they committed dishonesty
because they claimed that one unit of patrol boat equipped with 6-cylinder gas engine was
acquired when such was not the case.

However the Ombudsman found that Governor Garcia's re-election as governor of Bataan
had rendered the administrative case against him moot. As for Angelina M. Villanueva, she
cannot be administratively penalized as she is no longer in the government service. De
Mesa, Inieto, Magpantay, Talento, Banzon, and other officials of the Province of Bataan
involved in the said transaction were found guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, and
was imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service.

As regards the criminal case for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, it was
found that the three suppliers invited by the BAC in the Selective Bidding are not bona fide
suppliers because they have no legal and financial capacity to enter into a contract with the
government. The documents pertinent to the purchase of the patrol boat revealed several
anomalies: "(l) on the item to be procured, (2) the change of specification, (3) erasures on
the Notice of Award, Notice to Proceed and Contract Agreement, and ( 4) approval of the
documents necessary for payment."

All the documents relevant to the supply and delivery of the patrol boat referred to one
unit of patrol boat equipped with 6-cylinder gas engine, and not a 4-cylinder one. For these
reasons, the Ombudsman found basis to indict the public officials responsible for the
procurement of the patrol boat with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Thus, on June 23, 2011, an Information was filed against the involved public officials and
Asistin before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as SB-11-CRM-0251 for violating Section 3(e)
of RA 3019. These cases before the Sandiganbayan ensued in due course. Eventually, the
Province of Bataan filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Urgent
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The
Ombudsman argues that since the two criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are
now in their advanced stages (i.e., past arraignment and in the trial stage or nearing
rendition of judgment), the Petitions as to such criminal aspect before this Court have
become moot.

ISSUE

Whether or not the actions taken by respondent Casimiro, charging petitioner's officials
and employees before the Sandiganbayan and dismissing them from service, are valid

RULING

NO. As pointed out by the Ombudsman, the issues concerning the criminal aspect in the
petitions (G.R. Nos. 197510-11 and 201347) have been rendered moot, and thus, should be
dismissed.

Jurisprudence states that "[a] petition for certiorari, pertaining to the regularity of a
preliminary investigation, becomes moot after an information is filed and a trial court
issues an arrest warrant upon finding probable cause against the accused." By analogy, the
same rationale should be applied in this case. This is because the Sandiganbayan acts as a
"trial court" in resolving criminal cases against government officials or employees. "'The
Sandiganbayan is a special court tasked to hear and decide cases against public officers and
employees[,] and entrusted with the difficult task of policing and ridding the government
ranks of the dishonest and corrupt."

To stress, the petitions herein assail the finding of probable cause to indict the involved
public officers for the criminal charges. However, the attendant circumstances revealed
that: (1) Informations have already been filed against the concerned individuals; (2)
warrants of arrest have been issued against them; (3) they have been arraigned; and (4)
the trials before the Sandiganbayan have begun. These incidents presuppose that the
Sandiganbayan already found the existence of probable cause to criminally charge the
accused, and put them to trial. Case No. SB-ll-CRM-0251 (People v. De Mesa, et. al. I RA
3019 case) has already been submitted for decision while Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0029 to
0030 (People v. Jnieto, et. al. I Falsification of Public Document case) are undergoing trial.
Even the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence has been denied by the
Sandiganbayan, holding that the evidence of the prosecution, if unrebutted, would be
sufficient to support a conviction for the accused. Hence, with respect to the criminal aspect
of the cases, and because of these supervening events, "this Court is left with no justiciable
controversy to resolve, and a declaration on it would be of no practical use or value."

To reiterate, a case is rendered moot when, because of supervening events, this Court is left
with no justiciable controversy to resolve, and a declaration on it would be of no practical
use or value.
Simply put, a moot and academic case ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, and thus, this Court should refrain from rendering a ruling on the
criminal aspect of the petitions.
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. TICO INSURANCE COMPANY, INC, GLOWIDE
ENTERPRISES INC, AND ASIA PACIFIC MILLS

G.R. No. 204226, April 18, 2022, Second Division, Hernando, J:

DOCTRINE

A successful litigant who has secured a final judgment in its favor cannot later be impleaded
by its defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove its claim anew
against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
judgment. An action for interpleader may not be utilized to circumvent the immutability of a
final and executory judgment. It is settled that when a decision has attained finality.

Duties, taxes, and fees due the Government enjoy priority only when they are with reference to
a specific movable property, under Article 2241 (1) of the Civil Code, or immovable property,
under Article 2242 (1) of the same Code. However, with reference to the other real and
personal property of the debtor, sometimes referred to as "free property," the taxes and
assessments due the National Government, other than those in Articles 2241 (1) and 2242 (1)
of the Civil Code, will come only in ninth place in the order of preference.

FACTS

TICO Insurance Company is engaged in the sale of insurance until it was placed under
liquidation by the Insurance Commission in 2002. Glowide and PMT are clients of TICO that
took out a fire insurance policy over several properties in 1997.

While Glowide and PMI’s fire insurance with TICO was in effect, a fire broke out that
destroyed the said properties. Due to TICO’s failure to pay the full amount of the insurance
proceeds, Glowide and PMI filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages, with prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment against TICO’s Units 7A and 7B of Trafalgar Plaza
Condominium.

Meanwhile, on January 31, 2000, the BIR served on TICO several final assessment notices
for its alleged deficiency in internal revenue taxes, i.e. income tax, annual registration fee,
value-added tax, percentage tax, withholding tax on wages, expanded withholding tax, and
documentary stamp tax for years 1996 – 1997, amounting to a total of PHP69,479,440.59.

On November 23, 2000, the court granted Glowide and PMI’s application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment to attach all properties of TICO sufficient to satisfy the
claim. On December 22, 2000, the notice of levy on attachment was issued on TICO’s
condominium units.

On October 03, 2001, the RTC ordered TICO to pay Glowide and PMI the amount of
PHP5,442,209.97. On January 08, 2002, Glowide and PMI moved for execution of the
October 03 judgment. TICO has not filed a motion for reconsideration or appeal from said
judgment. The motion for execution was granted on June 03, 2002 and notices of levy on
execution were annotated on June 13, 2002.

On April 22, 2002, the Insurance Commission placed TICO under liquidation and appointed
Atty Rommel Frias as liquidator. TICO filed a petition for relief from judgment and writ of
execution claiming that it has tax assessments from 1996-1998 which enjoy preference
above all other credits. The petition for relief from judgment was denied being filed out of
time. On February 16, 2004, the RTC denied the petition and noted that Glowide and
PMI’s claims are preferred over the BIR’s claims because tax assessments are not
preferred credits in specific immovable property.

TICO assailed the February 2004 order of the RTC via a petition for certiorari. The CA
dismissed TICO’s petition finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC. TICO
no longer appealed the CA Decision.

The auction sale for the condo units were conducted on April 14, 2004 and were sold to
Glowide and PMI as the highest bidders. The certificate of sale was annotated on the title of
the property on April 15, 2004. On the other hand, on February 15, 2005, the BIR caused
the annotation of the notice of tax lien on the said condo units. BIR posited that it has a
superior claim over the condo units considering its claim for unpaid revenue taxes enjoys
absolute preference under the Civil Code and a tax lien over TICO’s properties had already
attached at the time the assessments were made on January 31, 2000.

TICO did not exercise any redemption of the property and the period of redemption lapsed.
A final deed of sale was issued in favor of Glowide and PMI on April 15, 2005.

On August 07, 2006, TICO filed a complaint for interpleader with the RTC Makati to
determine who between respondents Glowide and PMI, on one hand, and petitioner BIR on
the other hand, has a superior right over the two condominium units.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not TICO’s complaint for interpleader is proper. (NO)

2. Whether or not BIR’s claim over the condominium units are superior to Glowide and PMI
in accordance with the system of concurrence and preference of credits. (NO)

RULING

1. TICO’s interpleader complaint is improper because it amounts to a collateral

attack on the final and executed judgment in favor of Glowide and PMI.

The special civil action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double
vexation in respect of a single liability. However, a successful litigant who has secured a
final judgment in its favor cannot later be impleaded by its defeated adversary in an
interpleader suit and compelled to prove its claim anew against other adverse claimants, as
that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. An action for interpleader
may not be utilized to circumvent the immutability of a final and executory judgment. It is
settled that when a decision has attained finality.

In light of the foregoing, the Court held that there was a belated attempt on TICO's part to
assail the final and executed judgment in favor of Glowide and PMI. Aside from the October
3, 2001, which ruled in favor of Glowide and PMI, the RTC QC in its February 16, 2004
Order had previously ruled that Glowide and PMI's credits enjoy preference over BIR's
claim over the condominium units. This was then affirmed by the CA in a decision which
became final and executory. Moreover, despite knowledge of its unpaid tax liabilities with
the BIR, TICO failed to implead the BIR in the proceedings before the RTC QC, and initiated
the complaint for interpleader only after it was defeated in the said proceedings. As a
result, the interpleader suit has forced Glowide and PMI to defend their rights anew over
the condominium units, and has unduly deferred their right to a satisfaction of their claims
under a final court decision in their favor. Verily, the RTC Makati should not have allowed
TICO to disturb the final and executed ruling in Glowide and PMI's favor through an
interpleader suit.

2. Glowide and PMI’s rights over the condominium units are superior to the BIR’s
claim and are thus entitled to possession and conveyance of the condominium units.

Under the system of concurrence and preference of credits, which finds application in
insolvency proceedings, credits are classified into three general categories: (a) special
preferred credits listed in Articles 2241 and 2242, (b) ordinary preferred credits listed in
Article 2244, and (c) common credits under Article 2245. The special preferred credits
enumerated in Articles 2241 (with respect to movable property) and 2242 (with respect to
immovable property) are considered as mortgages or pledges of real or personal property,
or liens within the purview of Act No. 1956. These credits, which enjoy preference with
respect to a specific movable or immovable property, exclude all others to the extent of the
value of the property. Credits which are specially preferred because they constitute liens
(tax or non-tax) in turn take precedence over ordinary preferred credits so far as the
property to which the liens have attached.

The tax claim is only an ordinary preferred credit under Article 2244 since it is not based
on taxes due on the condominium units but on TICO's deficiency in payment of its income
tax, annual registration fees, value-added tax, percentage tax, withholding tax on wages,
expanded withholding tax, and documentary stamp tax. On the other hand, Glowide and
PMI's claim is a special preferred credit under Article 2242 (7) of the Civil Code, and thus
superior to BIR's tax claim which is only an ordinary preferred credit.

Duties, taxes, and fees due the Government enjoy priority only when they are with
reference to a specific movable property, under Article 2241 (1) of the Civil Code, or
immovable property, under Article 2242 (1) of the same Code. However, with reference to
the other real and personal property of the debtor, sometimes referred to as "free
property," the taxes and assessments due the National Government, other than those in
Articles 2241 (1) and 2242 (1) of the Civil Code, will come only in ninth place in the order
of preference.
MARILYN L. GO RAMOS-YEO, LAURENCE L. GO, and MONTGOMERY L. GO, v. SPOUSES
RICHARD O. CHUA and POLLY S. CHUA, CENTURY TRADING INC., MULTI-REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ET AL

G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076 (Resolution), April 18, 2022, (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

Materially altered the boundaries of the properties affects the integrity of their title over their
respective lands. It is, therefore, the trial court sitting as a land registration court which has
jurisdiction over the case under PD 1529. Consequently, the RTC Amended Decision is null and
void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Therefore, not barred
by laches.

FACTS

To recall, the Court, in its November 5, 2018 Decision, found the CA to have committed a
reversible error in denying the Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the
January 27, 1992 Amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch 18 of Tagaytay City, in Civil Case that was filed by Marilyn Go Ramos-Yeo,
Laurence Go and Montgomery Go (the Gos). In so ruling, We held that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Gos because of invalid substituted service of
summons. Neither did it have jurisdiction over the subject matter which is within the
jurisdiction of a court sitting as a land registration court. This is because the Complaint for
Accion Reinvindicatoria filed by Spouses Chua sought, in reality, to re-open, amend, and
review the transfer of certificates of titles issued to the Gos and the Multi-Realty
Development Corporation (Multi-Realty), and not merely a correction of the exact
boundaries of the subject properties. The action is therefore tantamount to an indirect and
collateral attack on the validity of their respective certificates of title in violation of Sections
32 and 108 of PD 1529.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is merit to Spouses Chua’s assignment of errors re Court’s granting
petitioners' petition (granting of titles to Multi-Realty).

RULING

NO. There is no merit in the motion. No procedural misstep can be attributed to the Court
in rendering the Resolution and the assailed Decision on the same date, it simply means
that the Court has already received and considered the Comments that are required to be
submitted by the parties within the prescribed period of filing the same. Contrary to the
Spouses Chua's claim, the determination of the propriety of substituted service effected on
the Gos is a question of law. It is a question of what and how the law should be applied.
Hence, the petition is within the purview of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

The Court further held that the certificates of title conferred to the Gos and Multi- Realty
are already incontrovertible considering that more than one year had lapsed since the
decree of registration was issued in their favor. Consequently, We ruled that the Gos and
Multi-Realty are not barred by laches. Considering that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over their persons and subject matter, the trial court's decision is therefore null and void.
Spouses Chua ascribed errors on the part of this Court in granting petitioners' petition.

The Spouses Chua also argue that the rule on substituted service should not be strictly
applied as the Gos were guilty of evident avoidance. Their contention is misplaced.
Contrary to the findings of the CA, Alampay's receipt of the Spouses Chua's Motion for
Reconsideration that was filed on November 23, 1990 does not conclude that the Gos
flagrantly refused or avoided to receive the service of summons. At most, it only showed
that Alampay received a copy of the motion of the Chuas. This alone does not validate the
presence of the requisites prescribed by law so as to effect a valid substituted service. Thus,
the impossibility of personal service of summons is clearly wanting in this case to warrant
a substituted service.

On the Spouses Chua's claim that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, the Court reiterates that the amended complaint of accion reinvidicatoria is a disguise
to review a final decree of registration in the names of the Gos and Multi-Realty in violation
of Section 108 of PD 1529. Consequently, the RTC Amended Decision is null and void
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Gos and Multi-
Realty are therefore not barred by laches. No rights were also conferred in favor of the
Spouses Chua or imposed obligations against the parties.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPOUSES NESTOR AND FELICIDAD VICTOR AND
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND GAVINA VICTOR

G.R. No. 207377, July 27, 2022, First Division (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE

The twin-period requirement in seeking relief from judgment is mandatory, jurisdictional,

and must be strictly complied with otherwise, the petition may be dismissed outright.

FACTS

Spouses Nestor and Felicidad and spouses Reynaldo and Gavina (collectively respondent-
spouses for brevity) filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of real estate mortgage,
extra-judicial foreclosure, and cancellation of title of a parcel of land against PNB. Said
complaint questioned the mortgage and transfer of title in favor of PNB.

PNB filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, which in turn, the respondent-
spouses filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. PNB failed to file any comment or
opposition. The complaint was deemed submitted for decision where RTC cancelled PNB's
title on the subject properties.

In June 2011, the RTC denied PNB's Motion to Nullify Proceedings with Opposition to
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution because PNB's counsel failed to appear during the
hearing for said motion.

PNB filed a Petition for Relief asseverating that it was deprived of due process because it
failed to present its defenses due to the gross negligence of its previous counsel. RTC
denied the petition.

On appeal to CA, it was initially observed that PNB failed to attach the required pleadings
for a petition for certiorari. This failure alone would be sufficient to warrant dismissal of
the petition. However, even based on the substance of the petition, the appellate court
found no merit in the averment of PNB. It resolved that strict compliance with the periods
set forth in Rule 38 is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of
liberality. Following the period, the last day to file such petition would have been June 27,
2011, yet PNB filed the same only on July 15, 2011.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for relief from judgment should be granted.

RULING
NO. The following requirements must be shown in order for a petition for relief from
judgment to prosper. (1.) No adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or an appeal
is available to the petitioner. (2.) Petitioner was prevented through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence from availing said remedies; (3.) Petitioner should comply
with the twin-period of within 60 days from the time the petitioner learned of the
judgment or final order, and not more than six months after the judgment or final order
was entered, in filing the petition for relief from judgment.

The twin-period is mandatory, jurisdictional, and must be strictly complied with,

otherwise, the petition may be dismissed outright. Evidently, PNB failed to file its petition
for relief from judgment within the twin-period.

PNB's counsel was notified of the decision on April 27, 2011; however, the Petition for
Relief from judgment was filed only on July 15, 2011, or beyond the 60th day which fell on
June 27, 2011 (June 26, 2011 being a Sunday). PNB's averment, that the reckoning period
should have been counted from May 18, 2011, the time it had knowledge of its counsel's
gross negligence when it received the trial court's denial of the Motion for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration, is misplaced. It has been a long-standing principle
that notice sent to a counsel of record is equivalent to notice to the client-litigant. Hence,
the correct reckoning point of the twin-period was when PNB's counsel received the
decision on April 27, 2011.