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2019 Civil Law Last Minute Tips (Jurisprudence)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES / CONFLICT OF LAWS / PERSONS

(1) Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” does not mean the
publication requirement can be dispensed with; it refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of Page |
the law’s publication. Otherwise, such omission would offend due process as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed 1
to govern it. (Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, June 5, 2013)

Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations, except those which are interpretative ones, should be
published in order to be effective. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. (Manila Public Schools Teachers’ Association v. Garcia, Oct. 2, 2017) But, interpretative regulations add
nothing to law and do not affect substantial rights of any person. (Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative v. ERC, Feb. 3, 2016)

(2) The Civil Code prevails over the Administrative Code in the computation of time. In Administrative Code, a “year” is twelve calendar
months; “month” is thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days
the specific month contains; “day” is a day of twenty-four hours and, “night” is from sunrise to sunset. Thus, one calendar month from Jan. 31,
2008 will be from Feb. 1, 2008 to Feb. 29, 2008. (CIR v. Primetown Property, Aug. 28, 2007)

(3) Pro hac vice ruling violates Article 8 and the Constitution. Pro hac vice decision means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent
because the decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. It violates Article 8: judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot be pro
hac vice because, by mandate of the law, every decision of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another case comes
up with the same facts as former case, that case must be decided in the same way as the former case; otherwise, the equal protection clause of
the Constitution will be violated. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI, Apr. 18, 2017)

(4) Elements of abuse of rights. The elements are: (i) there is a legal right or duty; (ii) which is exercised in bad faith; and (iii) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, there is abuse of right where the storeowner who wrote about the incident to an employer of an
employee whom he confronted on alleged non-payment of goods. In sending the letter, the storeowner intended to tarnish the employee’s
reputation in her employer’s eyes. (California Clothing v. Quinones, Oct. 23, 2013) But there is no abuse of right if electric company
representative enters premises of the complainant for routine inspection pursuant to contract. (Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, Mar. 26, 2014)

(5) There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property
of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It has two conditions: (i) a person must have been
benefited without a real or valid basis or justification; and (ii) the benefit was derived at another person’s expense or damage. (Loria v. Muñoz,
Oct. 15, 2014)

(6) Article 26(1), providing that there is cause of action for “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” includes business offices where
the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter. The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The right extends to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
(Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, June 26, 2013)

(7) Death is presumed to have taken place on the last day of the period of absence required by law. Thus, the heirs of a missing seaman may
file their claim for death compensation benefits within the time fixed by law from the time the seaman has been presumed dead. (Pantollano v.
Korphil Ship Management, Mar. 30, 2011)

(8) Under R.A. No. 9048, correction of clerical or typographical errors and change of first name must be done administratively. Jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is primarily lodged with administrative officers mentioned under said law. The intent and effect of
said law is to exclude change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry), until and unless and administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. Also, the law
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction of clerical or typographical errors. (Onde v. Local Civil Registrar, Sept. 10, 2014)

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(9) Doctrine of processual presumption or presumed identity approach explained. The party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Failing to do so, this doctrine applies – if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts presume that the foreign law is the same as our domestic law. (Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, Dec. 10, 2014)

(10) Three consecutive phases involved in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems. The phases are: (i) jurisdiction, (ii) choice of law, and
(iii) recognition and enforcement of judgments. (Hasegawa v. Kitamura, Nov. 23, 2007)
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Choice of law distinguished from forum non conveniens. The former is an offshoot of the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts 2
while the latter is designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue
of litigation were left entirely to the whim of either party. Contractual choice of law provisions factors into transnational litigation and dispute
resolution in one of or in a combination of four ways: (i) procedures for settling disputes; (ii) forum; (iii) governing law; and (iv) basis for
interpretation. (Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, Jan. 14, 2015) The latter gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it
appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another. (PNC v. Asiavest Merchant, Aug. 19, 2015)

Requisites when Philippine court can properly assume jurisdiction over a case if it chooses to do so. The requisites are: (i) that the
Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (ii) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and (iii) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. (Saudi Arabian
Airlines v. Rebesencio, Jan. 14, 2015)

(11) Doctrine of renvoi explained. It is one under which court in resorting to foreign law adopts rules of foreign country as to conflict of law,
which rule may in turn refer to back to law of the forum. (Agpalo, Conflict of Laws)

FAMILY RELATIONS

(12) The regional trial court judge is incorrect in dismissing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36, FC, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that marriages solemnized by the Church are governed by its Canon Law and not by the civil
law. Although marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic Church, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code. Proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is
still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Also, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, regional trial courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all actions involving contract of marriage and marital relations. (Tilar v. Tilar, July 12, 2017)

(13) Some principles on essential and formal requisites of marriage:

(a) Marriage between two persons, contracted for the sole purpose of one party acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000 is valid and not void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent. There was consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage. While the purpose of marriage is to establish conjugal life, no law declares marriage void if entered into
for purposes other than what the law declares, such as acquisition of foreign citizenship. (Republic v. Albios, Oct. 16, 2013)
(b) Exceptions to the rule that judges must solemnize marriages only in his office or courtroom. Exceptions are: (i) when the marriage
is to be contracted on the point of death of one or both the parties; (ii) marriage is to be celebrated in a remote place in accordance with
the Family Code; and (iii) where both the parties had requested the solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or
place designated by them in their sworn statement to that effect. (Keuppers v. Murcia, Apr. 3, 2018)
(c) Marriage is void if the marriage contract states that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of
marriage, and the marriage does not fall under the circumstance where marriage license can be dispensed with. To be considered
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties. (Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, July 27, 2016) The certification from the local civil registrar is not required to contain a categorical
statement that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. (Kho v. Republic, June 1, 2016)
(d) The absence of legal impediment must exist throughout the five-year period, and not only during marriage, for cohabiting persons
to dispense with the marriage license. Otherwise, if that continuous five-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships. (Office of Administrator v. Necessario, Apr. 2, 2013)

(14) Some principles on divorce:

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(a) Divorce obtained by a former Filipino citizen who is naturalized abroad is valid, even if at the time of celebration of the marriage,
the naturalized spouse is still a Filipino citizen. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him to remarry. (Republic
v. Orbecido III, Oct. 5, 2005)
(b) Foreign divorce decree, initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse against the alien spouse, is cognizable in the Philippines and
capacitates the Filipino spouse to remarry pursuant to Article 26(2), FC. The law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce was granted. The purpose of Article 26(2), FC, is to avoid the absurd situation Page |
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it 3
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. (Republic v. Manalo, Apr. 24, 2018)
(c) An alien spouse who obtained divorce cannot invoke Article 26(2), FC, to remarry. The alien spouse’s status and legal capacity are
governed by his national law. (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, Aug. 11, 2010)
(d) Settlement of marital properties between two Filipinos as an incident of divorce obtained abroad cannot be given recognition here
in the Philippines. Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country will not be recognized. (Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, July 23, 2014)
(e) Joint agreement for custody of minor child executed by Filipinos who obtained divorce abroad will not be recognized here in the
Philippines. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. This policy is mandatory, grounded on sound policy
consideration, subject only to a narrow exception. (Dacasin v. Dacasin, Feb. 5, 2010)
(f) An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws. (Republic v. Manalo, Apr. 24, 2018)

(15) Some principles on bigamy and marriage:

(a) Subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage is not a defense in bigamy case. Bigamy is already consummated because
at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction is deemed valid and subsisting. (Montañes v. Cipriano, Oct. 22, 2012)
(b) Where a person appeared to have contracted a marriage to a foreigner but another person only made use of his identity in
contracting the marriage to said foreigner, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, such that he is not liable for bigamy.
the remedy is to file a petition for correction/cancellation of entries under Rule 108 and not a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage. (Republic v. Olaybar, Feb. 10, 2014)
(c) Bigamy is not committed where the parties to a purported second marriage merely signed a purported marriage contract without
a license. There was really no subsequent marriage. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. (Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan Jr., July 3, 2013) But, the crime of bigamy
is committed even if the second bigamous marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity because not all the effects of marriage
is totally wiped out (Tenebro v. CA, Feb. 18, 2004) or if there is no marriage license in the second marriage because the parties falsified
the affidavit of cohabitation, knowing fully well that they failed to comply with the five-year cohabitation period. It is height of absurdity
to allow the use of illegal act to escape criminal conviction. (Santiago v. People, July 15, 2015)

(16) The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition for recognition of foreign decree of divorce. A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment
or declaration of nullity defined under the Family Code. The petition for recognition of foreign decree of divorce with the corresponding petition
for cancellation of entry can be done under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. (Republic v. Cote, Mar. 14, 2018)

(17) Some principles on psychological incapacity as ground to declare nullity of marriage.

(a) Psychological incapacity explained. It refers to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. It must be characterized by (i) gravity,
(ii) juridical antecedence, and (iii) incurability. (Viñas v., Parel-Viñas, Jan. 21, 2015) Hence, pathological gambling, irresponsibility, and
inability to keep a job per se do not amount to psychological incapacity. (Singson v. Singson, Jan. 8, 2018)
(b) Lack of personal examination of the respondent spouse by a psychologist is not fatal. If the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
(c) Evaluation of testimony, report, and conclusions of psychologist who was unable to examine the respondent spouse must be done
with the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards. The psychologist must establish particular facts, not generalities,
that at the time the parties were married, respondent spouse was already suffering from a psychological defect, its incurability and gravity
that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. To make conclusions on the respondent’s

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psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence. (Viñas v., Parel-Viñas, Jan. 21, 2015)

(18) A petition for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, FC, is not proper if the present spouse is not seeking to remarry.
A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become “final” as
the same only confirms the existence of a disputable presumption. It is really unnecessary because the presumption is already established by
law. Thus, the petition filed by a present spouse who wishes to declare her missing spouse presumptively dead so that she would no longer be Page |
pestered by Philippine Constabulary must be dismissed. (Tadeo-Matias, Apr. 25, 2018) 4
“Well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41, FC, on the declaration of spouse as absentee is complied with only upon a showing
that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
The present spouse must prove that his belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort and must comply with the “strict standard approach,” which is not met (i) when there there is failure to present the persons from whom
the present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (ii) when there is failure to report
the missing spouse’s purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (iii) when the present spouse’s evidence might or would
only show that the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead (Republic v. Sareñogon, Feb.
10, 2016)

Requisites for the spouse declared presumptively dead to terminate the subsequent marriage contracted by the other spouse. The
requisites are: (i) non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (ii) recording in the civil registry
of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (iii) due notice to
the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (iv) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined. Hence, mere reappearance of absentee spouse is not enough. Unless the requisites are complied with, the reappearing spouse is
still legally an absentee. (Santos v. Santos, Oct. 8, 2014)

(19) Articles 147, FC, and 148, FC, distinguished. Article 147 applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Property acquired during marriage is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. (Salas Jr. v. Aguila, Sept. 23,
2013) Article 148 applies to cohabitation where the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, in which case, it is necessary for each partners
to prove hi actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to claim any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply. (Ventura Jr. v. Abuda, Oct. 23, 2013)

(20) A property registered “Ieuan, married to Janina” merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered owner
Ieuan; it does not necessarily mean the property is conjugal. It is possible that the property was acquired by one spouse while still single
and registered only after marriage. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless proven to be exclusive
property of one of the spouses. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with partnership funds, proof of acquisition
during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of this presumption. (Dela Peña v. Avila, Feb. 8, 2012)

(21) Status of sale of conjugal property without the consent of spouse. The sale is not merely voidable but void; hence it cannot be ratified.
Nonetheless, in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Aggabao v. Parulan, Sept. 1, 2010)

(22) No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Nonetheless, non-compliance with this requirement is not a
jurisdictional defect. It merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of
a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Otherwise, such
ground is deemed waived. (Heirs of Favis Sr. v. Gonzales, Jan. 15, 2014)

(23) Some principles on family home:

(a) Exceptions to the rule that family home is exempt from forced sale. Forced sale of family home is allowed for (i) debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution, (ii) non-payment of taxes, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home, and (iii) debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, and such persons who rendered service or furnished material for the

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construction of the building. Where the foregoing scenarios are absent, the exemption of family home from forced sale is limited to
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas. (Fortaleza v. Lapitan, Aug. 15, 2012; Article 155, FC)
(b) Requisites before the creditor can go after the family home if there is an increase in its value. The requisites are: (i) increase in its
actual value; (ii) increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by persons constituting the family home, its
owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (iii) increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed by law. (Eulogio v. Bell, July 8, 2015)
(c) Family home exemption from execution is not automatic. The right to exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
(possibly the owner or beneficiaries) and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the Page |
property at public auction. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the sheriff. (De Mesa v. Acero, Jan. 16, 2012) 5
(d) Rules on partition of family home. The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing
therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are already dead, the family home will
continue to exist. If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same
except when there are compelling reasons which will justify the partition. (Patricio v. Dario, Nov. 20, 2006)

(24) Family Code cannot be invoked to compel a foreigner father to support his illegitimate Filipino child. The laws of his country governs
as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. Mere claim that the foreigner father
is governed by his national law, however, does not automatically exempt him from his obligation to support. The national law must be pleaded
and proven in court; otherwise, the doctrine of processual presumption applies. (Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, Dec. 10, 2014)

(25) How filiation of illegitimate children can be established. Filiation of illegitimate children, like that of legitimate children, is established by
(i) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (i) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (i) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (ii) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Aguilar v.
Siasat, Jan. 28, 2015)

Rules on the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in ay private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made. The rules are: (i) where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and (ii) where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices
that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence. (Dela Cruz v. Garcia, July 31, 2009)

Baptismal certificate is not a good proof of paternity. Lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate
renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. It only serves as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. (Perla v. Perla, Nov. 12, 2012) It has evidentiary value to prove kinship
if considered alongside other evidence of filiation. (Heirs of Roldan v. Heirs of Roldan, Sept. 27, 2017)

(26) The signature of the mother is required in the birth certificates of her illegitimate children who must use her surname, unless legally
recognized by the father. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who
conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, if birth certificate was signed only by the illegitimate father and registered the child under
his name without the consent of the mother, said birth certificate is void and the child cannot use the void certificate to authorize him to use the
father’s name. (In re Tinitigan, Aug. 7, 2017) A father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate child even upon his recognition
of filiation. Illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father. The use of
the word “may” in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. (Grande v. Antonio, Feb. 18, 2014)

Father does not have right to parental custody of his illegitimate child upon his recognition of filiation. Illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of their mother. (Grande v. Antonio, Feb. 18, 2014)

An illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, can use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. The law is
silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Nevertheless, being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that the adoptee
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother. (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Mar. 31, 2005)

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(27) Filiation proceedings may be instituted together with an action for support. Since an action for compulsory recognition may be filed ahead
of an action for support, the direct filing of an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved,
is an equally valid alternative. (Abella v. Cabañero, Aug. 9, 2017)

(28) Exceptions to the rule that husband and wife shall jointly adopt. The exceptions are: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter, provided, that the other spouse has given his
consent; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, May 21, 2009) Page |
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(29) Parental authority reverts back to the biological parents of a minor adoptee whose adopter died. While this is not one of the grounds for
rescission of adoption, the provision on the effects of rescission of adoption, e.g. restoration of parental authority for minor, may apply by
analogy. The law on adoption goes for the best interest of the child, and the best interest of the child is that someone will remain charged for
his welfare and upbringing should his adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in
his formative years. (Bartolome v. SSS, Nov. 12, 2014)

(30) Right to make funeral arrangements of common-law husband is given to the relatives in accordance with the order established for
support, and not to common-law wife. The law confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner. (Valino v. Adriano, Apr. 22, 2014)

PROPERTY

(31) Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added (riparian owner), not
to the State. The deposit must not be artificial and man-made or a result of human intervention. (Daclison v. Baytion, Apr. 6, 2016) But, drying
up of the river cannot be considered as an accretion. The dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the
riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. (Republic v. Santos, Nov. 12, 2012)

The alluvial deposits are not automatically protected from acquisitive prescription by third persons. The riparian owner must register
the alluvial deposits under the Torrens system. (Parañaque v. Ebio, June 23, 2010)

(32) Good faith in relation to builder, planter, or sower on land owned by another under Article 448 explained. Good faith consists in the
belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title. (Aquino v. Aguilar, June 29, 2015)
The rights of the parties when the builder, planter, or sower and the landowner are in good faith: The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder
or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. (Angeles v. Pascual, Sept.
21, 2011)

Article 448 may be applied to a builder who has constructed improvements on the land of another with the consent of the owner. The
structures were built in good faith in those cases that owners knew and approved of the construction of improvements on the property. Thus,
the Department of Education is a builder in good faith when it constructed building and improvements to conduct classes on the property of
another, with the latter’s permission. (DepEd v. Casibang, Jan. 27, 2016) Where there is express prohibition from building a structure of the
property, this will not apply. (Aquino v. Aguilar, June 29, 2015)

Article 448 does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties. The owner of the land and the builder are already
bound by specific legislation, e.g. Condominium Code, on the property and by contract, e.g. Master Deed and the By-laws of the condominium
corporation. (Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc., Apr. 4, 2018)

A lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith under Article 448. As lessees, they recognize the ownership of another person.
Their rights are determined based on their contract of lease, and in the absence thereof, by provisions on law on lease. (Sulo sa Nayon v. Nayong
Pilipino, Jan. 20, 2009)

(33) A person who received casino chips from a foreign national as payment for services rendered is presumed to be the owner thereof.
Possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. There is no law which prohibits the use of chips outside casino,
and although unusual, payment by a foreign national of casino chips is not unlawful. (Subic Bay Legends v. Fernandez, Sept. 29, 2014)

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(34) Requisites before co-owner acquires by prescription the share of his co-owners. The requisites are: (i) the co-owner has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (ii) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the other co-owners; and (iii) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. Thus, one who is merely related by affinity to a decedent does not
inherit from the decedent’s property; and not being an owner, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedent’s heirs. (Ining v. Vega, Aug. 12, 2013)
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(35) The law does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession 7
thereof. Thus, visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. (Fahrenbach v. Pangilinan, Aug. 8,
2017) Also, occupation of the land by a person’s caretaker is considered as evidence of that person’s occupation of said property. (Municipal
Rural Bank of Libmanan v. Ordoñez, Sept. 27, 2017)

(36) In ejectment case, the fact that a party’s title is questionable is immaterial. Only issue in ejectment case is physical or material possession
of the premises, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. (Santiago v. Northbay Knitting, Oct. 11, 2017)

Boundary dispute, e.g. two titles overlapping each other, cannot be resolved in an ejectment proceeding. It can only be resolved in the
context of an accion reivindicatoria as it involves issue other than possession – encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the
defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. (Heirs of Aoas v. As-il, Oct. 19, 2016)

(37) Easement explained. Easement or servitude, is a real right constituted on another's property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the
owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or
person. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. An acknowledgment of easement is an admission
that the property belongs to another. (Mercader v. Bardilas, June 27, 2016)

Mere writing of the phrase “with existing Right of Way” in the Transfer Certificate of Title result in the acquisition of the easement by
virtue of a title. It is not one of the modes of acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title refers to the juridical
act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator. (Mercader v. Bardilas, June 27, 2016)

(38) Requisites for legal easement of right of way. The requisites are: (i) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (ii) proper indemnity has been paid; (iii) isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; (iv) right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (v) right of way must be absolutely necessary for the
normal enjoyment of the dominant estate by its owner. There must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for the right of way, and the
right cannot be claimed merely for the convenience of the owner of the enclosed estate. (AMA Land v. WWRAI, July 19, 2017)

Easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. In case of conflict between the criterion of least
prejudicial and the criterion of the shortest way, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
Criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate prevails over criterion of shortest distance. (Quintanilla v. Abangan, Feb. 12, 2008)

Payment of indemnity does not amount to buying of property without the issuance of titles and not having the right to exercise dominion
over it. Payment of the value of the land for permanent use of the easement does not mean alienation of the land occupied. In fact, when the
owner of the dominant estate has joined it to another abutting on a public highway, and the servient estate demands that the easement be
extinguished, the value of the property received by the servient estate by way of indemnity shall be returned in full to the dominant estate. (De
Guzman v. Filinvest, Jan. 14, 2015)

(39) Nuisance explained. It is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (i) injures or endangers the
healthor safety of others; or (ii) annoys or offends the senses; or (iii) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (iv) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (v) hinders or impairs the use of property.

Nuisance per se vis-a-vis nuisance per accidens. Nuisance may either be: (i) a nuisance per se – or one which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity – or (ii) a nuisance per accidens – or that which
depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon
in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. (Rana v. Wong, June 30, 2014)

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(40) The sister’s loan obligation amounting to P700,000 shouldered by the brother is not a donation if there is no proof in writing of such
donation and its acceptance. If the value of the personal property donated exceeds P5,000.00, the donation and acceptance shall be made in
writing; otherwise, the donation shall be void. (Carinan v. Cueto, Oct. 8, 2014)

(41) Characteristics of donation mortis causa. The characteristics are: (i) it conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership, full or naked, and control of the property while
alive; (ii) that before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by Page |
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (iii) that the transfer should be void if the transferor should 8
survive the transferee. (Del Rosario v. Ferrer, Sept. 20, 2010)

(42) Effect of defective notarization. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument,
and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on preponderance of evidence. (Diampoc v. Buenaventura, Mar. 19, 2018) Thus,
When the law requires notarization as requirement for validity of document, a defective notarization will render the document void, e.g.
donation of real property. (Heirs of Jose v. City of Naga, Mar. 12, 2018)

(43) While donations of immovable property must be made in a public document, remuneratory donations of immovable property need not
be in a public instrument. Instead of law on donations, the rules on contract should govern because the donation is onerous as the burden is
imposed upon the donee of a thing with an undetermined value. The contract need not be in a public instrument, as the requirement that
transmission of real rights over immovable must appear in a public document is only for convenience and does not affect validity or
enforceability. (Reyes v. Asuncion, Nov. 11, 2015)

(44) In order to bind third persons, the donation, such as a donation propter nuptias, must be registered in the Registry of Property. As an
exception, in order for prior unregistered interest to affect third persons despite the absence of registration, the law requires actual knowledge
of that interest; mere possession of the property is not enough. (Cano v. Cano, Dec. 14, 2017)

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

(45) Registration under the Torrens System merely confirms registrant’s title but does not vest ownership. Registration under said System is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. (Heirs of Corazon v. Heirs of Bandong, Aug. 9, 2017)

(46) An inalienable public land cannot be proper object of possession. Since it cannot be appropriated, it follows that it cannot be the proper
object of possession. (Republic v. Cortez, Sept. 7, 2015)

Certificates of title covering inalienable and non-disposable public land can be cancelled even if the same are already in the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value. A spring cannot rise higher than its source. Having acquired no title to the property in question, there is no
other recourse but for the alleged innocent purchaser for value to surrender to the rightful ownership of the State. (Republic v. AFPRSBS, Jan.
16, 2013)

(47) Doctrine of indefeasibility of title explained. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. (Abobon v. Abobon, Aug. 15, 2012) As between tax declarations/receipts and title, the title
prevails. (Alcantara v. Belen, Apr. 25, 2017) Thus, possession over the property by anyone other than the registered owner gives rise to the
presumption that said possession is only by mere tolerance. (DepEd v. Heirs of Banguilan, June 20, 2018)

Mirror doctrine explained. The mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition
of the property. Exceptions to this doctrine: (i) when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. (Locsin v. Hizon, Sept. 17, 2014); and (ii) in
case of banks, the ascertainment of the status or condition, through ocular inspection, of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be
a standard and indispensable part of its operations. (Heirs of Macalalad v. Rural Bank of Pola, June 20, 2018)

(48) When a forged or fraudulent tile can become the root of a valid title. This can happen if the property has already been transferred from the
name of the owner to that of the forger, and then to that of an innocent purchaser for value. This emphasizes that a person who deals with

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registered property in good faith acquires good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title. (Tolention v. Latagan, June
22, 2015)

(49) Attack on the title explained. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging
the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. Attack can be direct or collaterally. The attack is direct when an action is instituted to
annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. (Oño v. Lim, Mar. 9, 2010) A certificate of title shall not Page |
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Firaza v. Ugay, 9
Apr. 3, 2013) Whether there is prohibited collateral attack on title:
(a) Yes: Assailing validity of title in a recovery of possession. (Firaza v. Ugay, Apr. 3, 2013)
(b) No: Action for partition/petition for annulment of sale assailing title to subject land. What cannot be collaterally attack is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. Certificate of title is the document. The title is ownership which is, more often than not, represented
by that document. (Bagayas v. Bagayas, Sept. 18, 2013)
(c) No: Counterclaim for annulment of title and reconveyance based on fraud. (Firaza v. Ugay, Apr. 3, 2013)
(d) No: Collateral attack on a spurious title. Spurious titles do not enjoy indefeasibility. (Oliveros v. San Miguel, Feb. 1, 2012)
(e) No: Quieting of title. There is no attack at all, only removal of cloud in the property. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in
truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title. (Oño v. Lim, Mar. 9, 2010) In said action, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in,
the property which is the subject matter of the action. (Delos Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo, Feb. 26, 2018)

(50) The earlier title prevails over a subsequent one when there are two apparently valid titles over a single property. The existence of the
earlier valid title renders the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered twice. (NHA v. Laurito, July 31, 2017) But,
when the prior title is spurious, or the one alleging that he is a holder of a title has not shown that the same land had already been registered
and that an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. (Oliveros v. San Miguel, Feb. 1, 2012)

(51) Registration of the notice of levy produces constructive notice that would bind third persons despite failure of the Register of Deeds to
annotate the same in the certificate of title. Entry in the primary entry book produced the effect of registration, so long as the registrant had
complied with all that was required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remained to be done but a duty incumbent
solely on the Register of Deeds. A third person who builds a house over a land which should belong to the owner by virtue of a registered
notice of levy is a builder in good faith; the rights of the parties are governed by Article 448. (Saberon v. Saberon, Apr. 21, 2014)

(52) Adverse claim and notice of lis pendens distinguished. The former protects the right of a claimant during the pendency of a controversy
while the latter protects the right of the claimant during the pendency of the action or litigation. The former may only be cancelled during filing
of a petition before the court which shall conduct a hearing on its validity while the latter may be cancelled without a court hearing. The notice
of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. Both remedies may be availed of at the
same time. (Valderama v. Arguelles, Apr. 2, 2018)

An adverse claim remains valid even beyond its effectivity period of 30 days from date of registration, unless cancelled. If the adverse
claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of the said period, its cancellation would no longer be necessary and the process of
cancellation provided under the law would be a useless ceremony. The law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
(Torbela v. Rosario, Dec. 7, 2011)

(53) Doctrines in acquisition of public land through prescription.

(a) Under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, public lands can be acquired through adverse possession, which must begin on or before June 12, 1945.
The said public lands must be declared to be alienable and disposable. Adverse possession prior to the declaration of the land being
alienable and disposable can be counted in favor of the claimant. That is, the property sought to be registered must be declared already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of the title is filed.
(b) Under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529, public lands can be acquired by acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession of which must be for
10 years (ordinary) or 30 years (extraordinary). The said public lands must be formally and expressly declared as patrimonial property of
the State; that is, it is no longer intended for public use or for public service. Adverse possession prior to the declaration of the land being
alienable and disposable cannot be counted in favor of the claimant. That is, all throughout the 10 year- or 30 year-period, the land must
already be declared patrimonial property. (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, Sept. 3, 2013)

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The classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department. This is exercised by the latter through the President, or such other persons vested with authority to exercise the
same on his behalf. (Republic v. Heirs of Cabrera, Nov. 8, 2017) If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, lands Page |
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as 10
agricultural. (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, Sept. 3, 2013)

What applicant for land registration must prove that a land has been declared alienable and disposable. He must present (i) certificate
of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR; (ii) proof that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO; and (iii) the
applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. (Republic v. Javier, Apr. 4, 2018)

SUCCESSION

(54) Judicial declaration of heirship is not necessary before an heir can assert his right to the property of the deceased. The title to the
property owned by a person who dies passes at once to his heir. (Gloria v. BSLAI, June 4, 2018)

(55) Heirs can file a complaint for sum of money against the debtor of decedent for a loan granted before the latter’s demise. The rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. While the decedent’s estate has a different juridical personality
than that of the heirs, the heirs certainly have an interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties. (Pasco v. Heirs of
De Guzman; July 26, 2010)

(56) Failure to sign the last page of the notarial will which contained the Acknowledgment does not automatically result to its invalidity.
When the law requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last
testamentary disposition ends. The last page of said will does not contain any testamentary disposition. (Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra, Apr. 18,
2018) But, a statement in the Acknowledgment stating that the will “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written” is not substantial compliance if the will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment. The
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. (In the matter of
Probate of Will of Lopez, Nov. 12, 2012)

(57) Waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living is void. No contract shall be
entered into upon a future inheritance. Thus, an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such void waiver is equally
void and does not bind subsequent owners. The adverse claim is without any basis and must be cancelled. (Ferrer v. Diaz, Apr. 23, 2010)

(58) Being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties,
or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It is sufficient if the testator was able at the
time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary
act. (Baltazar v. Laxa, Apr. 11, 2012)

(59) Preterition explained. It consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named
as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving
the heir of his legitime. It requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his
legitime. Preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid
insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Hence, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the
direct line will result in total intestacy. (Morales v. Olondriz, Feb. 3, 2016)

(60) Reserva troncal explained. It is a special rule designed to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to
the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting line. Thus, the

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ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.

Three lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The lines are: (i) the first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation,
from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus; (ii) the second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus
to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista; and (iii) the third and last transmission is from reservista to reservees or Page |
reservatarios who must be relatives within third degree from which the property came. (Mendoza v. Delos Santos, Mar. 20, 2013) 11
(61) An illegitimate child cannot inherit intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his parents (iron curtain rule). An illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or
relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children
in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. (Heirs of Arado v. Alcoran, July 8, 2015)

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

(62) Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership explained. It is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the people in the neighborhood. (Imuan v. Cereno, Sept. 11, 2009)

(63) Article 1142, providing that a mortgage action prescribes in ten years, does not apply to actions to annul foreclosure of mortgage. While
the prescriptive period is also ten years, the basis is Article 1144, the action being upon a written contract. (Rural Bank of Malasiqui v. Ceralde,
Nov. 25, 2015)

(64) Prescription does not run against the State and its subdivision regardless of the nature of the government property. There can be no
defense grounded on laches or prescription. (Ramiscal v. COA, Oct. 10, 2017)

(65) Injury, damage, and damages explained. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. There can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
(De Peralta v. PCIB, July 3, 2017)

(66) Rescission under Article 1191 (the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him) vis-à-vis rescission under Article 1381 of rescissible contracts. Article 1191 refers to rescission
applicable to reciprocal obligations, or those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other,
such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. When a party seeks the relief of rescission as provided in Article
1381, there is no need for reciprocal prestations to exist between or among the parties. All that is required is that the contract should be among
those enumerated in Article 1381 for the contract to be considered rescissible. Unlike Article 1191, rescission under Article 1381 must be a
subsidiary action. (Wellex Group, Inc. v. U-Land Airlines, Jan. 14, 2015)

Rescission under Article 1191 can be extrajudicial. Nothing in this law prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a violation
of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention. In contracts providing for automatic revocation,
judicial intervention is only necessary to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. (Asmeron v. DBP, Nov. 23, 2011)

(67) Instances when demand is not necessary to put debtor in default. The instances are: (i) there is an express stipulation to that effect; (ii) the
law so provides; (iii) the period is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and (iv) demand would
be useless. In the first two, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state expressly that after
the period lapses, default will commence. (Rivera v. Salvador, Jan. 14, 2015)

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(68) If an obligation is conditioned on the non-occurrence of a particular event at a determinate time, that obligation arises (i) at the lapse
of the indicated time, or (ii) if it has become evident that the event cannot occur. Thus, when such a condition is declared void by the court,
it becomes evident that the same will not occur, thereby making the obligation due and demandable. (Osmeña v. PSALM, Oct. 5, 2016)

(69) Requisites for constructive fulfillment of a suspensive condition. The requisites are: (i) intent of the obligor to prevent fulfillment of the
condition; and (ii) actual prevention of fulfillment. Thus, mere intention of the debtor to prevent the happening of the condition, or to place
ineffective obstacles to its compliance, without actually preventing the fulfillment, is insufficient. Page |
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Constructive fulfillment of a mixed conditional obligation explained. When the fulfillment of a condition is dependent partly on the will of
one of the contracting parties, or of the obligor, and partly on chance, hazard or the will of a third person, the obligation is mixed. The existing
rule in a mixed conditional obligation is that when the condition was not fulfilled but the obligor did all in his power to comply with the
obligation, the condition should be deemed satisfied. (International Hotel Corp. v. Joaquin Jr., Apr. 10, 2013)

(70) A contract which provides: “CONTRACT DURATION. The project is estimated to be completed in six (6) years,” is not an obligation
with a period. The termination of the contract is a mere estimate and cannot be considered a period or a "day certain" or that which must
necessarily come, although it may not be known when. (Salonte v. COA, Aug. 19, 2014)

(71) Alternative obligation exists when a debtor is granted the option to either (i) pay the price or (ii) deliver the finished products of
equivalent value. Thus, when debtor tendered a check to creditor representing partial payment, he exercised the option to pay the price. (Arco
Pulp v. Lim, June 25, 2014)

(72) If in a contract of sale, two persons are denominated as the “SELLER,” the nature of obligation is solidary. The contract to sell did not
state "SELLERS" but "SELLER," which could only mean that the two persons are considered as one seller in the contract. (AFP Retirement v.
San Victores, Aug. 17, 2016)

(73) Article 1267, providing that when the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the
obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part, will not exempt a debtor from liability when he sought to pre-terminate
his contract of lease citing business reverses brought by 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The debtor’s obligation to pay rentals is “to give.”
Article 1267 applies only to prestations “to do.” Said article speaks of a prestation involving service which has been rendered so difficult by
unforeseen subsequent events as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.

Principle of rebus sic stantibus will not also exempt the foregoing debtor. The principle of rebus sic stantibus holds that parties stipulate in
light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions cease to exist, the contract also ceases to exist. The parties to the contract must
be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is therefore only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances
that equity demands assistance. There is no showing that the poor financial condition of the country rendered the performance of the lease
contract impractical and inimical to the corporate survival of the debtor. (Comglasco v. Santos, Mar. 25, 2015)

(74) Tender of payment and consignation explained. Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities
whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. Tender of payment is the
manifestation by the debtor to the creditor of his desire to comply with his obligation, with the offer of immediate performance. Tender of
payment may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to make a private settlement
before proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. Tender and consignation, where validly made, produces the effect of payment and
extinguishes the obligation. (Del Carmen v. Sabordo, Aug. 11, 2014)

Instances when tender of payment maybe dispensed with. Consignation alone is sufficient even without a prior tender of payment when (i)
the creditor is absent or unknown or does not appear at the place of payment; (ii) he is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due;
(iii) without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt; (iv) two or more persons claim the same right to collect; and (v) the title of the obligation
has been lost.

Requisites of a valid consignation. The requisites are: (i) there was a debt due; (ii) valid prior tender of payment, unless dispensed with; (iii)
previous notice of consignation given to persons interested in the performance of the obligation; (iv) amount or thing due was placed at the
disposal of court; and (v) after consignation, persons interested were notified thereof. Thus, there is no valid consignation if the monthly rentals
were deposited in a non-drawing savings account as it was not placed at the disposal of the court. (PNB v. Chan, Mar. 13, 2017)

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(75) Dacion en pago, which partakes the nature of a contract of sale, may or may not totally extinguish the obligation, depending on the
parties’ intention. It extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may
be proved, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which
case the obligation is totally extinguished. (Desiderio Dalisay Investments v. SSS, Apr. 4, 2018)

(76) Delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange, or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment
only when they have been encashed, or when through the fault of the creditor, they have been impaired. Hence, a payee of a check is a Page |
creditor and if its non-payment is caused by the creditor-payee’s negligence, payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the 13
check was given as conditional payment will be discharged. Thus, delivery of a check by the debtor, despite subsequent failure of creditor to
encash them within a period of 10 years or more, had the effect of payment. (Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc., Nov. 20, 2017)

(77) Unpaid rentals cannot be legally compensated against unliquidated expenses by the lessee for repairs and structural defects. In legal
compensation, it is required that (i) each one of the obligors be bound principally and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the
other; (ii) both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if
the latter has been stated; (iii) the two debts are due; (iv) the debts are liquidated and demandable; (v) over neither of them be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third parties and communicated in due time to the debtor. Here, the expenses for repairs and structural defects are
not yet liquidated. (Lao v. Special Plans, June 29, 2010)

(78) Extinctive novation vis-a-vis modificatory novation. The former has the twin effects of, first, extinguishing an existing obligation and,
second, creating a new one in its stead. This kind of novation presupposes presence of four requisites: (i) a previous valid obligation; (ii) an
agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (iii) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (iv) the birth of a valid new
obligation. The latter is where the change brought about by any subsequent agreement is merely incidental to the main obligation, e.g., a change
in interest rates or an extension of time to pay; in this instance, the new agreement will not have the effect of extinguishing the first but would
merely supplement it or supplant some but not all of its provisions. (Azarcon v. People, June 29, 2010)

Mere assumption of obligation by another person is not novation. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by novation, it is
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations are on every point incompatible with each other.
(Land Bank v. Ong, Nov. 24, 2010) Hence, where there is no agreement to release the original debtor from liability, he is still liable,
notwithstanding the execution of a compromise agreement. (Ever Electrical v. PBCOM, Aug. 3, 2016)

Expromision and delegacion explained. In the former, the initiative for the change does not come from the debtor and may even be made
without his knowledge, since it consists in a third person assuming the obligation. As such, it logically requires the consent of the third person
and the creditor. In the latter, the debtor offers and the creditor accepts a third person who consents to the substitution and assumes the
obligation, so that the intervention and the consent of these three persons are necessary. In both, consent of the creditor is an indispensable
requirement (BPI v. Domingo, Mar. 25, 2015) and the old debtor must be released from the obligation, otherwise, there is no valid novation
(S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada, Sept. 11, 2013)

(79) Mere forgetfulness, without evidence that the same has removed from a person the ability to intelligently and firmly protect his
property rights, does not by itself incapacitate a person from entering into contracts. The law presumes that every person is fully
competent to enter into a contract until satisfactory proof to the contrary is presented. (Almeda v. Heirs of Almeda, Sept. 14, 2017)

(80) Principle of relativity of contracts explained. Contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and cannot favor or prejudice a third
person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. Where there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no
obligation or liability to speak about. (Asian Terminal, Inc. v. Padoson Stainless Steel, June 25, 2018)

An extrajudicial settlement which is not notarized, is still valid, but cannot prejudice third persons. But, heirs who are parties to the
extrajudicial settlement, which was not notarized, are bound by the same. The principle of relativity precludes the heirs of contracting parties
from denying the binding effect of the agreement entered into by their predecessors-in-interest. (Pontigon v. Heirs of Sanchez, Dec. 5, 2016)

(81) Requisites of stipulation pour autrui. The requisites are: (i) stipulation in favor of third person, (ii) stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the
contract, (iii) contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person – the favor is not an incidental benefit; (iv) favor
is unconditional and uncompensated; (v) third person communicated his acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (vi) contracting
parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the third party. (Republic v. Africa, Aug. 19, 2015)

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(82) The stipulation in the credit agreement executed between a bank and its borrowers stating that the loan would be subjected to interest
at a rate "determined by the bank to be its prime rate plus applicable spread, prevailing at the current month," is invalid. It violates
the principle of mutuality of contracts, which provides that the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be
left to the will of one of them. The stipulation does not require the conformity of the maker before a new interest rate could be enforced. (PNB
v. Manalo, Feb. 24, 2014)

(83) Status of a sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others. The sale by a co-owner is Page |
unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller. (MCIAA v. Heirs of Ijordan, Jan. 11, 2016) 14
Status of deed of extra-judicial partition when the person who signed the same failed to obtain authority from his co-heirs. The
extrajudicial partition is unenforceable, not voidable, as it is an unauthorized contract. (Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, Sept. 14, 2011)

(84) Advertisement to possible bidders is an invitation to make proposals; the advertiser cannot be compelled to accept a bidder’s proposal
and execute a contract in its favor. An advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder unless the contrary appears. (NMIPSC
v. Iligan Cement Corporation, Apr. 23, 2018)

(85) Elements of tortious interference (a third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party). The elements are: (i) existence of a valid contract; (ii) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the
contract; and (iii) interference on the part of the third person without legal justification or excuse. (Ferro Chemicals v. Garcia, Oct. 5, 2016)

(86) There is fraud sufficient for rescission of the contract to sell where the seller represented a condominium unit to be 95 sqm. which
turns out to be only 70 sqm. There is fraud when, through insidious words and machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is
induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. Space and dimensions are significant to buyers of
condominium units in urban areas, especially in central business districts, where the scarcity of space drives vertical construction and propels
property values. (Poole-Blunden v. Union Bank, Nov. 29, 2017)

(87) Requisites for reformation of contracts. The requisites are: (i) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract; (ii)
the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (iii) failure of the instrument to express true intention of the parties is due
to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident. (Makati Tuscanny Condominium v. Multi-Realty Development, Apr. 18, 2018)

(88) Kinds of simulated contracts. The kinds are (i) absolute, and (i) relative. Simulation is absolute when there is color of contract, but without
any substance, the parties not intending to be bound thereby. It is relative when the parties come to an agreement that they hide or conceal in
the guise of another contract. (Buenaventura v. Metrobank, Aug. 3, 2016)

(89) Contract of adhesion explained. It is one wherein a party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other. It is a contract whereby almost
all of its provisions are drafted by one party, with the participation of the other party being limited to affixing his signature to the contract. This
kind of contract is not invalid per se, but may be struck down when the weaker party has been imposed upon in dealing with the dominant
bargaining party and reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
(Encarnacion Construction v. Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete, Sept. 4, 2017)

(90) Accion pauliana explained. It is a legal action of last resort filed by a creditor to rescind a contract executed by his debtor to defraud him. The
requisites are: (i) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later; (ii) the debtor has made a
subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (iii) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim, but would
benefit by rescission of the conveyance to third person; (iv) the act being impugned is fraudulent; and (e) the third person who received the
property conveyed, if by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. (Anchor Savings v. Furigay, Mar. 13, 2013)

(91) While avoid contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary
to allow restitution of what has been given under it when any of its terms t is performed. If a void contract has already been performed,
the restoration of what has been given is in order. This principle springs from Article 22 (accion in rem verso), which states that: every person
who through an act of performance of another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same. (Tan v. Hosana, Feb. 3, 2016)

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(92) Effect if both parties are in pari delicto. When both parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault, none of them may expect positive relief from
the courts in the interpretation of their agreement; instead, they shall be left as they were at the time the case was filed. (Nicolas v. Mariano,
Aug. 1, 2016)

(93) Kinds of estoppels. The kinds are: (i) estoppel in pais; (ii) estoppel by deed; and (iii) estoppel by laches. Under the first kind, a person is
considered in estoppel if by his conduct, representations, admissions or silence when he ought to speak out, whether intentionally or through
culpable negligence, "causes another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, as a consequence Page |
of which he would be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts." Under estoppel by deed, a party to a deed and 15
his privies are precluded from denying any material fact stated in the deed as against the other party and his privies. Under estoppel by laches,
an equitable estoppel, a person who has failed or neglected to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time is presumed to
have abandoned such right and cannot later on seek to enforce the same, to the prejudice of the other party, who has no notice or knowledge
that the former would assert such rights and whose condition has so changed that the latter cannot, without injury or prejudice, be restored to
his former state. (Go v. BSP, July 8, 2015)

SPECIAL CONTRACTS

(94) Contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is void. Prior to partition, a sale of a definite
portion of common property requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling
his or her share. Without the consent of his co-owners, a co-owner could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property. (Cabrera v. Ysaac,
Nov. 19, 2014)

(95) The principle nemo dat quod non habet is a requirement at the consummation stage, or at the time of delivery, not during the perfection
of the contract of sale. The fact that the seller is not the owner of the subject matter of the sale at the time of perfection does not make the sale
void. (Cahayag v. Commercial Credit Corporation, Jan. 13, 2016)

(96) Contract of sale vis-a-vis a contract to sell. In the former, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in
a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is
resolved or rescinded; whereas, in the latter, title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the
price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from becoming effective. (Reyes v. Tuparan, June 1, 2011) A stipulation in the contract stating that the seller shall execute a deed of sale only
upon or after payment of the purchase price is a contract of sell. The stipulation shows that the vendors reserved title to the subject property
until full payment of the purchase price. (Diego v. Diego, Feb. 20, 2013)

A seller, whose offer is unconditionally accepted by the buyer, cannot issue an invoice stipulating that ownership is reserved until
compliance of the terms and conditions and payment of the price. The contract perfected is one of sale, not a contract to sell. The title
reservation stipulation in the invoice did not change the complexion of the transaction from a contract of sale into a contract to sell as there is
no showing that the said stipulation novated the contract of sale between the parties. (Ace Foods v. Micro Pacific, Dec. 11, 2013)

(97) The right of first refusal is not deemed a perfected contract of sale. In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate,
the exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with
another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely
belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent
scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct.

Right of first refusal is not the same as an option contract. An option contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first refusal
in that in the former, the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period and at a determined price. Lacking these two essential requisites,
what is involved is only a right of first refusal. (Tuazon v. Suarez, Dec. 8, 2010)

(98) A party cannot rely on Article 1354: “Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless
the debtor proves the contrary,” to prove that an option contract has a consideration. When the written agreement itself does not state
the consideration for the option contract, the offeree or promisee bears the burden of proving the existence of a separate consideration for the
option. The offeree cannot rely on Article 1354, which presumes the existence of consideration, since Article 1479 is a specific provision on
option contracts that explicitly requires the existence of a consideration distinct from the purchase price.

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Absence of consideration supporting the option contract does not render it invalid. An option unsupported by a separate consideration
stands as an unaccepted offer to buy (or to sell) which, when properly accepted, ripens into a contract to sell.

When offer in the option contract can be withdrawn anytime. When an offer is supported by a separate consideration, a valid
option contract exists, i.e., there is a contracted offer which the offerer cannot withdraw from without incurring liability in damages. When the
offer is not supported by a separate consideration, the offer stands but, in the absence of a binding contract, the offeror may withdraw it any Page |
time. (PNOC v. Keppel Philippines Holdings, Inc., July 25 2016) 16
(99) Sales on an as-is-where-is basis does not encompass matters that require specialized scrutiny, as well as features and traits that are
immediately appreciable only by someone with technical competence. As-in-where-is pertains only to the readily perceptible physical state
of the object of a sale. (Poole-Blunden v. Union Bank, Nov. 29, 2017)

(100) Prohibition in Article 1491(5) from purchasing property and rights which are the object of any litigation in which lawyers may take
part by virtue of their profession do not extend to lawyers’ immediate families or relatives. The enumeration cannot be extended to include
relatives. Express mention of one person, thing, or act, excludes all others. (Santos v. Arrojado, June 27, 2018)

(101) Sale of Philippine land to an alien but is titled in the name of the Filipino spouse contravenes the Constitution and is thus void. This is
true even if the alien provided the funds used to purchase the land. By entering into an illegal contract, no implied trust was created and no
reimbursement can be allowed. (Manigque-Stone v. Cattleya Land, Inc., Sept. 5, 2016) Same principle applies where a marriage between an
alien and Filipino is declared void, in which case, during the liquidation, the alien cannot be considered be considered co-owner of parcels of
land and will not be entitled to reimbursement based on the principle of in pari delicto; principle of unjust enrichment does not apply in cases
of violation of Constitution. (Buemer v. Amores, Dec. 3, 2012)

(102) Option money distinguished from earnest money. The distinctions are: (i) earnest money is part of the purchase price, while option money
is the money given as a distinct consideration for an option contract; (ii) earnest money is given only where there is already a sale, while option
money applies to a sale not yet perfected; and, (iii) when earnest money is given, the buyer is bound to pay the balance, while when the would-
be buyer gives option money, he is not required to buy, but may even forfeit it depending on the terms of the option. (Rizalino v. Paraiso
Development, Feb. 5, 2007)

Prior payment of earnest money even before the property owner can agree to sell his property is irregular, and cannot be used to bind
the owner to the obligations of a seller under an otherwise perfected contract of sale. Thus, a letter sent accompanied by a check indicating
it was a deposit by a prospective buyer during negotiations does not mean that the contract is already perfected, even if the agents of the
prospective seller mistakenly issued a provisional receipt acknowledging the payment as earnest money. (First Optima v. Securitron, Jan. 28,
2015)

(103) Rules on double sale of immovable property under Article 1544. Ownership of an immovable property which is the subject of a double sale
shall be transferred: (i) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (ii) in default thereof, to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and (iii) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith. The requirement of the law is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith. If it would be shown that a buyer was in
bad faith, the alleged registration made is no registration at all. (Rosaroso v. Soria, June 19, 2013) Rules on double sale do not apply:
(a) Where one of the contracts involved is a contract of sale, and the other, a contract to sell where there was no full payment of the
price. Since failure to pay the price in full in a contract to sell renders the same ineffective and without force and effect, then there is no
sale to speak of. There is only one sale. Hence, the rule on double sale will not apply. (Domingo v. Manzano, Nov. 16, 2016)
(b) Sales involving unregistered land. What applies is Act No. 3344, which provides for the system of recording of transactions over
unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better
right. Mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of the
land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by
petitioners, which is null and void. (Sabitsana v. Muertegui, Aug. 5, 2013)

(104) Warranty explained. It is a collateral undertaking in a sale, that if the property sold does not possess certain incidents or qualities, the purchaser
may either consider the sale void or claim damages for breach thereof. An express warranty pertains to any affirmation of fact or any promise
by the seller relating to the thing, the natural tendency of which is to induce the buyer to purchase the same. An implied warranty is one which

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the law derives by application or interference from the nature of transaction or the relative situation or circumstances of the parties, irrespective
of any intention of the seller to create it. (Pilipinas Makro, Inc. v. Coco Charcoal, Oct. 4, 2017)

(105) Equitable mortgage is where a contract entered into by the parties is denominated as sale yet their intention is to secure an existing
debt by way of a mortgage. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: (i) when the price of
a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (ii) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (iii) when upon or
after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (iv) Page |
when the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (v) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (vi) 17
in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt
or the performance of any other obligation. (Torda v. Jaque, Nov. 12, 2014)

(106) Article 1484 or the Recto Law applies only when there is vendor-vendee relationship. Thus, buyer who purchased a car through a loan
granted by a bank for which he executed a promissory note with chattel mortgage, providing a twenty stated installments, in favor of such bank
cannot raise Article 1484 as defense when he defaults on his fifth installment if the bank forecloses the mortgage on the car and files an action
for late payments. A loan contract with accessory chattel mortgage contract – and not a contract of sale of personal property in installments –
was entered into by the parties. There is no vendor-vendee relationship. (Equitable Savigns v. Palces, Mar. 9, 2016)

(107) Requirements for cancellation of contract under R.A. No. 6552 or the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act. The requirements are:
(i) notarized notice of cancellation and (ii) a refund of the cash surrender value. The notice of cancellation must be acknowledged before a
notary public; jurat is insufficient. (Orbe v. Filinvest, Sept. 6, 2017)

R.A. No. 6552 does not cover a loan, e.g. housing loan, extended by an employer to enable its employee to finance the purchase of house
and lot. The law protects buyers of real estate on installment payments, not borrowers or mortgagors who obtained a housing loan to pay the
costs of their purchase of real estate and used the real estate as security for their loan. (Sebastian v. BPI Family Bank, Oct. 22, 2014)

(108) Assignment of credit and subrogation distinguished. In an assignment of credit, the consent of the debtor is not necessary in order that the
assignment may fully produce legal effects. What the law requires in an assignment of credit is not the consent of the debtor but merely notice
to him as the assignment takes effect only from the time he has knowledge thereof. A creditor may, therefore, validly assign his credit and its
accessories without the debtor’s consent. Meanwhile, subrogation requires an agreement among the three parties concerned — the original
creditor, the debtor, and the new creditor. It is a new contractual relation based on the mutual agreement among all the necessary parties (Liam
v. UCPB, June 15, 2016)

(109) Some principles on lease:

(a) The act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. Where a customer simply pays a fee, parks his
car in any available space in the lot, locks the car and takes the key with him, the possession and control of the car – necessary elements
in bailment – do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual relationship between the parties is one of lease. Thus, where a
vehicle parked overnight went missing, the lessor cannot be held liable, especially if there are security guards hired to secure the premises.
The lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee
shall have a direct action against the intruder. (Spouses Mamaril v. BSP; Jan. 14, 2013)
(b) Parties may stipulate automatic rescission/termination clause in a lease contract in case of breach. Parties may agree on certain
mandatory provisions concerning their rights and obligations, such as the rescission clause. They may establish stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as long as such are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. (D.M. Ragasa Enterprises v.
BDO, June 20, 2018)
(c) Lessees are entitled to suspend the payment of rent if their legal possession is disturbed; acts of physical disturbance that do not
affect legal possession is beyond the scope of this rule. A lessee may postpone payment of rent if the lessor fails to either make necessary
repairs on the property or maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased, which means the lessee’s legal
possession is disrupted. (Racelis v. Javier, Jan. 29, 2018)
(d) A person who was allowed to occupy the land by mere tolerance is not granted the right under Article 1678 allowing a lessee who
built in good faith useful improvements to be entitled to ½ of the value of improvements at the time of termination of the lease. A
possessor by tolerance has no contractual right. (Aquino v. Aguilar, June 29, 2015)
(e) Assignment of lease vis-à-vis sublease. In the former, there is novation by the substitution of the person of one of the parties – the lessee.
The personality of the lessee, who dissociates from the lease disappears; only two persons remain in the juridical relation – the lessor and
the assignee who is converted into new lessee. Thus, the lessee cannot assign the lease without consent of the lessor, unless there is
stipulation to the contrary. In the latter, the lessee becomes in turn a lessor to a sublessee. The juridical relation between the lessor and

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lessee is not dissolved. The parties continue to be bound by the original lease contract. There are at least three parties and two distinct
juridical relations. When there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased. (Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose, Sept.
25, 2013)
(f) Requisites for an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion. The requisites are: (i) the term of the original contract of lease has expired;
(ii) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and (iii) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the
acquiescence of the lessor. (Samelo v. Manotok Services, June 27, 2012)
Page |
(110) Doctrine of apparent authority/holding out theory/doctrine of ostensible agency explained. Based on the principle of estoppel, it provides 18
that even if no actual authority has been conferred on an agent, his acts, as long as they are within his apparent scope of authority, bind the
principal. The principal’s liability is limited to third persons who are reasonably led to believe that the agent was authorized to act for the
principal due to the principal’s conduct. (Calubad v. Ricarcen Development, Aug. 30, 2017) Thus, this doctrine renders a bank liable to innocent
third persons where the representation is made in the course of its business by an agent acting within the general scope of his authority even
though, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person, for his own
ultimate benefit. (Citystate Savings Bank v. Tobias, Mar. 7, 2018)

(111) Special power of attorney (SPA) is not required to execute a deed of extra-judicial partition. Article 1878 requires SPA in cases of acts
of strict dominion. Partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. The deed of
extra-judicial partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. (Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, Sept. 14, 2011)

SPA is not required to be in writing. As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral; it must be written, however, when the law requires
a specific form, for example, in a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein through an agent. Article 1878 does not state that the authority
be in writing. The requirement refers to the nature of the authorization and not to its form. (Patrimonio v. Guitierrez, June 4, 2014)

(112) Requisites before an agent may sue or be sued in his own name. The requisites are: (i) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction;
(ii) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and (iii) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal.

Filing of a suit for a collection of sum of money is an act of strict dominion. While the power to collect and receive payments on behalf of
the principal is an ordinary act of administration covered by the general powers of an agent, the filing of suit is not. An agent's authority to file
suit cannot be inferred from his authority to collect or receive payments; the grant of special powers cannot be presumed from the grant of
general powers. (V-Gent v. Morning Star, July 22, 2015)

(113) Agency coupled with interest explained. A bilateral contract that depends upon the agency is considered an agency coupled with an interest,
making it an exception to the general rule that agency is revocable at will. When an agency is established for both the principal and the agent,
an agency coupled with an interest is created. (IEB v. Briones, Mar. 29, 2017)

(114) “Trust pursuit rule” explained. Where certain property entrusted to an agent and impressed by law with a trust in favor of the principal is
wrongfully diverted, such trust follows the property in the hands of a third person and the principal is ordinarily entitled to pursue and recover
it so long as the property can be traced and identified, and no superior equities have intervened. (Estate of Cabacungan v. Laigo, Aug. 15, 2011)

“Purchase money resulting trust” explained. This is the first sentence of Article 1448: there is an implied trust when property is sold and
the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. (Trinidad
v. Imson, Sept. 16, 2015)

When an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes and when it does not. As a general rule, an action
for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust prescribes 10 years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of
the certificate of title over the property. If the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property, the action for
reconveyance effectively becomes an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. (Gabutan v. Nacalaban, June 29, 2016)

(115) Commodatum explained. One of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain
time and return it. It is essentially gratuitous. The bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period
stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he
may demand its return for temporary use. (Pajuyo v. CA, Jume 3, 2004) The bailor may demand the thing at will, and the contractual relations
is called a precarium, a kind of commodatum, if (i) neither the duration of the contract nor the use to which the thing loaned should be devoted,
has been stipulated; or (ii) the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the owner. (Milan v. NLRC, Feb. 4, 2015)

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(116) Some principles on interest:

(a) Monetary and compensatory interests explained. The former is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money.
The latter is one imposed by law or by courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. (PNB v. Heirs of Alonday, Oct. 12, 2016)
(b) Forbearance of money explained. It is an arrangement other than loan, where a person acquiesces to the temporary use of his money
pending happening of certain events or fulfillment of certain conditions. Thus, in a conditional contract of sale, buyer grants forbearance
of money to the seller to use his money pending fulfillment of the conditions. He is deprived of the use of his money for the period pending Page |
fulfillment of the condition and when the condition is breached, he is entitled not only to the return of the principal but also to compensation 19
for the use of money in the form of monetary interest, which can be recovered even if there is no stipulation. (Estores v. Supangan, Apr.
18, 2012)
(c) Lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount disallows a creditor from charging monetary interest. No interest
shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. (Dela Paz v. L&J Development, Sept. 8, 2014) Thus, where interest has
been paid when it was not due, or it was excessive, and it was delivered through mistake, the one who received the same must return it
pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti. (Abella v. Abella, July 8, 2015)
(d) Rules on award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages:
A. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
(a) In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand, starting July 1, 2013 pursuant to BSP Circular No. 799.
(b) BSP Circular No. 799 does not apply when there is a law that states otherwise or impose a different interest.
(c) The interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.
B. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may
be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
(a) No interest shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty.
(b) Where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially.
(c) When such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
C. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls
under A or B, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
D. Judgments that became final and executory before July 1, 2013 shall continue to apply the previous legal rate of 12%.
E. In situations where the legal rate of interest applies before and after July 1, 2013, the interest rate is 12% prior to July 1, 2013 and
starting July 1, 2013, the interest rate is 6%. (Nacar v. Gallery Frames, Aug. 13, 2013; Sameer Overseas v. Cabiles, Aug. 5, 2014)

(117) Guaranty and suretyship distinguished. A surety is an insurer of the debt, whereas a guarantor is an insurer of the solvency of the debtor. A
suretyship is an undertaking that the debt shall be paid; a guaranty, an undertaking that the debtor shall pay. A surety promises to pay the
principal’s debt if the principal will not pay, while a guarantor agrees that the creditor, after proceeding against the principal, may proceed
against the guarantor if the principal is unable to pay. A surety binds himself to perform if the principal does not, without regard to his ability
to do so. A guarantor, on the other hand, does not contract that the principal will pay, but simply that he is able to do so. (Trade and Investment
Development v. Asia Paces, Feb. 12, 2014)

Both a guarantor and a surety may set up compensation against amount owned by the creditor to the principal. While Article 1280
provides that “the guarantor may set up compensation as regards what the creditor may owe the principal debtor,” the provision equally applies
to a surety, as contracts of guaranty and surety are closely related in the sense that in both, there is a promise to answer for the debt or default
of another. (FGU Insurance v. Roxas, Aug. 9, 2017)

Benefit of excussion explained. The guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the
debtor, and has resorted to all legal remedies against the debtor. (Aglibot v. Santia, Dec. 5, 2012) Nonetheless, a guarantor can be held
immediately liable without the benefit of excussion if he agreed that his liability is direct and immediate, e.g. solidarily liable. (Orix Metro
Leasing v. Cardline, Inc., Jan. 13, 2016)

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(118) Compromise explained. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end
to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial,
if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. A judicial compromise, while immediately
binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. (Land Bank v.
Heirs of Soriano, Jan. 30, 2013) No compromise can be made on the following: (i) civil status of persons; (ii) validity of marriage or legal
separation; (iii) any ground for legal separation; (iv) future support; (v) jurisdiction of courts; and (vi) future legitime. (Uy v. Chua, Sept. 18,
2009) Page |
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(119) When a pledge binds third persons. To have a binding effect on third parties, a contract of pledge must appear in a public instrument. (Union
Bank v. Juniat, Aug. 1, 2011)

(120) Some principles of mortgage:

(a) As an accessory contract, a mortgage contract’s validity depends on the loan contract’s validity. Validity of accessory contracts
flows from the validity of the principal contracts. (Luntao v. BAP Credit, Sept. 20, 2017)
(b) Registration of a real estate mortgage is not essential to its validity. It is not one of the requisites for validity. (Coca-Cola Bottlers v.
Soriano, Apr. 11, 2018)
(c) Dragnet clause/ blanket mortgage clause explained. Generally, a mortgage liability is limited only to the amount mentioned in the
contract. A dragnet clause, as intended by the parties, allows mortgages to secure future advancements, which must be sufficiently
described in the mortgage contract (Producer’s Bank v. Excelsa, May 8, 2009) and past obligations. If the requirement could be imposed
on a future loan that was uncertain to materialize, there is greater reason that it should be applicable to a past loan, which is already
subsisting and known to the parties. (PNB v. Heirs of Alonday, Oct. 12, 2016)
(d) Substantial error in a notice of sale renders the notice insufficient and vitiates the sale. Statutory provisions governing publication
of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom invalidates the notice. An error is
substantial if it will deter or mislead bidders, depreciate the value of the property or prevent it from bringing a fair price. Thus, misstating
the lot number in the technical description attached to the notice of sale invalidates the foreclosure, as the notice effectively identified lots
other than the ones sought to be sold. (Security Bank v. Mercado, June 27, 2018)
(e) Rules on right of redemption of foreclosed properties. The rules are: (i) in case of judicial foreclosure, there is no right of redemption,
except where the mortgagee is a bank, in which case the mortgagee shall have the right to redeem the property within one year after the
sale; (ii) in case of extrajudicial foreclosure, redemption may be made within one year from the date of registration of sale with the Register
of Deeds; (iii) by way of exception, where the mortgagee is a bank and the mortgagor is juridical person, redemption may be made within
three months from date of foreclosure sale or date of registration of certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds, whichever is earlier.
(Goldenway Merchandising v. Equitable PCI, Mar. 13, 2013)
(f) Upon expiration of period to redeem, the buyer in foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property. Consolidation of
ownership in favor of the purchaser becomes a matter of right. The previous owner has no enforceable right to repurchase the subject
property. (PNB v. Bacani, June 20, 2018)
(g) Piecemeal redemption of properties sold at one foreclosure proceeding is allowed. The doctrine of indivisibility of mortgage does not
apply once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof. What the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion
of the property or a number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where before foreclosure
proceedings partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. (Yap v. Dy, July 27, 2011)

(121) Instances when writ of possession may issue: The instances are: (i) land registration proceedings; (ii) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the
debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (iii) extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage; (iv) execution sales. (Reyes v. Chung, Sept. 13, 2017)

(122) Elements of pactum commissorium. The elements are: (i) there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein property is pledged or mortgaged by
way of security for the payment of the principal obligation; and (ii) there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor
of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.

Elements of dacion en pago. The elements are: (i) the existence of a money obligation; (ii) the alienation to the creditor of a property by the
debtor with the consent of the former; and (iii) the satisfaction of the money obligation of the debtor. To have a valid dacion en pago, the
alienation of the property must fully extinguish the debt. Thus, pactum commissorium, and not dacion en pago, transpired if the mortgaged
property of the borrower – who obtained a loan secured by a real estate mortgage over said property, the title of which was given to the lender,
was required by the lender to sign an undated and unfilled deed of sale of said property, and failed to pay said loan – had been registered in the
name of the lender. (Pen v. Julian, Jan. 11, 2016)

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(123) Antichresis explained. It involves an express agreement between parties whereby: (i) the creditor will have possession of the debtor's real
property given as security; (ii) such creditor will apply the fruits of the said property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the
principal amount; (iii) the creditor retains enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally paid what he owes; and (iv) should the
obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding from the accessory character of the agreement.

Contract of antichresis exists if a Kasulatan stipulates that the creditor has, for six years, or until the loan is fully paid, the right to the Page |
fruits of the land owned by the debtor, who borrowed P600,000; and when before full payment of the loan, the debtor died and the 21
creditor then took possession of the land pursuant to the Kasulatan. While the Kasulatan did not expressly provide for the transfer of
possession of the land, the contemporaneous acts of the parties show that such possession was intended to be transferred. The antichretic credito
ris entitled to retain enjoyment of the subject land until the debt has been totally paid. (Reyes v. Heirs of Malance, Aug. 24, 2016)

TORTS AND DAMAGES

(124) Hotel owner is liable for civil damages to the surviving heirs of its hotel guest whom strangers murder inside his hotel room. When one
registers as a guest of a hotel, he makes the establishment the guardian of his life and his personal belongings during his stay. The murder could
have been avoided had the security guards of the hotel dutifully observed this standard procedure. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only
lodging for their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. (Makati Shangri-la v. Harper, Aug. 29, 2012)

(125) Elements to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Elements are: (i) prosecution did occur, and defendant was himself the prosecutor
or he instigated its commencement; (ii) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (iii) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and (iv) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice, an improper or a sinister motive. Thus, an employee who was
wrongly accused of criminal acts, illegally arrested and detained, presented to media at humiliating press conference against his will, and
prosecuted in unfounded criminal suit is entitled to damages for malicious prosecution. (Marsman v. Ligo, Aug. 19, 2015)

(126) Proximate cause explained. It is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces,
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (Shangri-la v. Harper, Aug. 29, 2012) Thus, proximate cause of the eight-
month old child’s falling from the chair is the negligence of the mother where the mother entrusted the momentary safety of her child to a
mascot, McDo’s Birdie, who had no arms to hold the child and whose diminished ability to see, hear and move was readily apparent. (Latonio
v. McGeorge Food Industries, Dec. 6, 2017) The doctrine is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of
contract. It is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, however, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely
to regulate the relation thus created. (Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la, Feb. 7, 2011)

(127) Res ipsa loquitur explained. It is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the
accident happened provided the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the
alleged wrongdoer. The requisites for its application are: (i) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (ii) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (iii) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. (Jarcia v. People, Feb. 15, 2012)

In medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is generally required. It is generally required to define the standard of behavior by which
the court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient. This is so considering that the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of a patient is usually a matter of expert opinion. By way of exception, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence. (Rosit v. Davao Doctor’s Hospital, Dec. 7, 2015)

(128) Enrollment contract principle explained. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning have the built-in obligation of providing a conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant
threats to life and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained. Thus, a rural community clinic is considered premises of a medical
school if in the course description of the clerkship program, said clinic serves as base of operation of thereof; where said clinic is a unsafe and

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constructed in violation of Philippine fire code and is thus a virtual fire trap, the medical school is negligent when students died because the
clinic was burned. (St. Luke’s College of Medicine v. Perez, Sept. 28, 2016)

(129) Manner of determining liability of defendant in quasi-delict actions involving a motor vehicle, where the defendant is the both the
registered owner of the vehicle (registered owner rule) and the employer of the driver of the motor vehicle (vicarious liability under
Article 2180). In cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the Page |
requirements of Article 2180 have been proven – that first, there exists an employment relationship between the driver and the owner; second, 22
that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to show that no liability
under Article 2180 has arisen. (Caravan Travel v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, Feb. 10, 2016)

(130) Lack of documentary evidence is not fatal to a claim for deceased’s lost earning capacity. Testimony from a witness familiar with his
salary is a sufficient basis to determine the deceased’s income before his death. Allowing testimonial evidence to prove loss of earning capacity
is consistent with the nature of civil actions requiring establishing claim by preponderance of evidence. (Torreon v. Aparra, Dec. 13, 2017)

Exception to the general rule that damages for loss of earning capacity must be proven. Exceptions are: (i) the deceased is self-employed
and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's
line of work no documentary evidence is available; (ii) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws (Philippine Hawk v. Lee, Feb. 6, 2010); or (iii) deceased is a student with good academic record that had he not died,
it can reasonably be assumed that he could have finished his studies and would be gainfully employed. (Perena v. Zarate; Aug. 29, 2012)

(131) A third party who did not commit a violation or invasion of the plaintiff or aggrieved party’s right cannot be held liable for nominal
damages. Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of
vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying any loss suffered. (One Network v. Baric, Mar. 5, 2014)

(132) While for death caused by quasi-delict, recovery of moral damages is limited to the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants,
and ascendants of the deceased, a person exercising substitute parental authority are to be considered ascendants. A person exercising
substitute parental authority are intended to stand in place of a child's parents in order to ensure the well-being and welfare of a child. He is an
injured party, whose moral suffering resulting from the tortious act may properly be recompensed by moral damages. (Caravan Travel and
Tours v. Abejar, Feb. 10, 2016) But, surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks during a voyage entitled to recover
moral damages from the vessel owner. Law does not include succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover moral damages.
(Sulpicio Lines v. Curso, Mar. 17, 2010)

By: Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura αφß2006A, 10th Place 2015 Bar. May the GAOTU bless you.

-o0o-

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