JURISDICTIONOFLABORTRIBUNALS

Preparedby:Atty.EdwinE.Torres(2018)

SINGLEENTRYAPPROACH(SEnA)

RA10396(“AnActStrengtheningConciliation-MediationAsAVoluntaryMode
OfDisputeSetlementForAlLaborCases”):

"ART.228.MandatoryConciliationandEndorsementofCases.–(a)Except
asprovidedinTitleVI-A,BookVofthisCode,asamended,orasmaybe
exceptedbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,alissuesarisingfrom
laborandemploymentshalbesubjecttomandatoryconciliation-mediation. The
laborarbiterorthe appropriate DOLE agencyoroffice thathas
jurisdictionoverthedisputeshalentertainonlyendorsedorreferredcasesby
thedulyauthorizedofficer.”

"(b) Anyorbothpartiesinvolvedinthedisputemaypre-terminatethe
conciliation-mediationproceedingsandrequestreferralorendorsementtothe
appropriateDOLEagencyorofficewhichhasjurisdictionoverthedispute,orif
bothpartiessoagree,refertheunresolvedissuestovoluntaryarbitration."

UndertheRulesofProcedureoftheSingleEntryApproach(25February2011),allabor
disputesshalbereferedforconciliation-mediationby“SingleEntryAssistanceDeskOfficers”
(SEADO)stationedintheDOLEofficesexcept:

1. NoticesofStrikesorlockouts,orpreventivemediationcaseswhichshal
remainwiththeNationalConciliationandMediationBoard(NCMB);and

2. Issuesarisingfrom interpretationorimplementationofthecolective
bargaining agreementand those arising from interpretation or
enforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicieswhichshouldbeprocessed
throughtheGrievanceMachineryandvoluntaryarbitration.

3. Issues involving violations ofthe folowing permits,licenses or registrations:

i. AlienemploymentPermit(AEP)

i. PRPAauthorityorlicense;

i. Workingchildpermit(WCP)andviolationsofRA9231(Anti
-ChildLaborLaw);

iv. RegistrationunderDepartmentOrderNo.18-02;

v. POEAissuedlicensesundertheMigrantWorker’sAct,as
amended;

vi. ProfessionallicenseissuedbythePRC;

vi. TESDAaccreditations;and

vi. Othersimilarpermits,licensesorregistrationsissuedby
theDoleoritsatachedagencies.
LABORARBITERVIS-À-VISVOLUNTARYARBITRATOR
 2

LABORCODE:

Art.223.JurisdictionofLaborArbiterandtheCommission.—(a)Exceptas
otherwiseprovidedunderthisCodetheLaborArbitershalhaveoriginalandexclusive
jurisdictiontoheartohearanddecide...thefolowingcasesinvolvingalworkers,
whetheragriculturalornon-agricultural:

1. Unfairlaborpracticecases;

2. Terminationdisputes;

3. Ifaccompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement,thosecasesthat
workersmayfileinvolvingwages,ratesofpay,hoursofworkand
othertermsandconditionsofemployment;

4. Claimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages
arisingfromtheemployer-employeerelations;

5. Casesarisingfrom anyviolationofArticle264ofthisCode,
includingquestionsinvolvingthelegalityofstrikesandlockouts;
and,

6. ExceptclaimsforEmployeesCompensation,SocialSecurity,
Medicareandmaternitybenefits,alotherclaims,arisingfrom
employer-employee relations,including those ofpersons in
domesticorhouseholdservice,involvinganamountexceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000) regardless of whether
accompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Casesarisingfrom theinterpretationorimplementationof

colectivebargainingagreementandthosearisingfrom theinterpretationor
enforcementofcompanyprocedure/policiesshalbedisposedofbythe
LaborArbiterbyreferringthesametothegrievancemachineryandvoluntary
arbitratorsomaybeprovidedinsaidagreement.

Art.267.JurisdictionofVolutaryArbitratororPanelofVoluntary
Arbitrators–TheVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitratorsshal
haveoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidealunresolved
grievancesarisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementationoftheColective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcementofcompanypersonnelpoliciesreferredtointheimmediately
precedingarticle.Accordingly,violationsofaColectiveBargainingAgreement,
exceptthosewhicharegrossincharacter,shalnolongerbetreatedasunfair
laborpracticeandshalberesolvedasgrievancesunderthecolective
bargainingagreement.ForpurposesofthisArticle,grossviolationsof
ColectiveBargainingAgreementshalmeanflagrantand/ormaliciousrefusal
tocomplywiththeeconomicprovisionsofsuchagreement.xxx.

Art.268. Jurisdictionoverotherlabordisputes.— TheVoluntary

ArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators,uponagreementoftheparties,
shalalsohearanddecidealotherlabordisputesincludingunfairlabor
practicesandbargainingdeadlocks.

1. TheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiterunderArticle217(c)for
moneyclaimsislimitedonlytothosearisingfromstatutesorcontractsotherthanaColective
BargainingAgreement.TheVoluntaryArbitratororPanelofVoluntaryArbitratorswilhave
originalandexclusivejurisdictionovermoneyclaims"arisingfrom theinterpretationor implementation
ofthe Colective Bargaining Agreementand,those arising from the
 3

interpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies,"underArticle261.1

2. GrossviolationsofaCBAisanunfairlaborpracticewithinthejurisdictionoftheLabor
Arbiter.ThejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiterincludesthemoneycomponentoftheviolation.
GrossviolationsoftheCBAisdefinedinArticle261as"flagrantand/ormaliciousrefusalto
complywiththeeconomicprovisions"oftheCBA.Butwherethemoneyclaimbringsforthan
issue“arisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementation”oftheCBA,thejurisdictioniswiththe
VoluntaryArbitrator.ThereisnogrossviolationoftheCBAamountingtounfairlaborpractice
wheretheissuearisesfromCBAinterpretationorimplementation. 2

3. UnderArt.223,itisclearthatalaborarbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionover
terminationdisputes.Ontheotherhand,underArticle267,avoluntaryarbitratorhasoriginal
andexclusivejurisdictionovergrievances“arisingfrom theinterpretationorenforcementof
companypolicies.”Asageneralrulethen,terminationdisputesshouldbebroughtbeforea
laborarbiter,exceptwhentheparties,underArt.267,unmistakablyexpressthattheyagreeto
submitthesametovoluntaryarbitration.3

4. Thevoluntaryarbitratororpanelofvoluntaryarbitratorshasoriginalandexclusive
jurisdictionoveradisabilityclaim thataroseoutofaseaman’semploymentandwherehis
relationshipwithhisemployeriscoveredbyaCBAwhichprovidesforagrievanceprocedure
fortheresolutionofgrievancesordisputeswhichinvolvesatwo-tieredmechanism,with
voluntaryarbitrationasthelaststep.4

5. ItistruethatR.A.8042isaspeciallawgoverningoverseasFilipinoworkers.However,
acarefulreadingofthisspeciallawwouldreadilyshowthatthereisnospecificprovision
thereunderwhichprovidesforjurisdictionoverdisputesorunresolvedgrievancesregarding
theinterpretationorimplementationofaCBA.Section10ofR.A.8042simplyspeaks,in
general,of"claimsarisingoutofanemployer-employeerelationshiporbyvirtueofanylawor
contractinvolvingFilipinoworkersforoverseasdeploymentincludingclaimsforactual,moral,
exemplaryandotherformsofdamages."Ontheotherhand,Articles223(c)and267ofthe
LaborCodeareveryspecificinstatingthatvoluntaryarbitratorshavejurisdictionovercases
arisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementationofcolectivebargainingagreements.Stated
differently,theinstantcaseinvolvesasituationwherethespecialstatute(R.A.8042)refersto
asubjectingeneral,whichthegeneralstatute(LaborCode)treatsinparticular.Inthepresent
case,thewifeofadeceasedseamanisclaimingfordeathbenefitsunderaCBA.Hence,
jurisdictioniswiththevoluntaryarbitrator.ThisviewisbolsteredbyRuleVI,Section7ofthe
presentOmnibusRulesandRegulationsImplementingtheMigrantWorkersandOverseas
FilipinosActof1995,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.10022,whichstatesthat"[f]orOFWs
withcolectivebargainingagreements,thecaseshalbesubmitedforvoluntaryarbitrationin
accordancewithArticles261and262oftheLaborCode."5

6. Generaly,thevoluntaryarbitratorisexpectedtodecideonlythosequestionsexpressly
delineatedbythesubmissionagreement.However,sincearbitrationisthefinalresortforthe
adjudicationofdisputes,thearbitratorcanassumethathehasthepowertomakeafinal
setlement.Thus,assumingthatthesubmissionempowersthearbitratortodecidewhetheran
employeewasdischargedforjustcause,thearbitratorinthisinstancecanreasonableassume
thathispowersextendedbeyondgivingayes-or-noanswerandincludedthepowerto
reinstatehimwithorwithoutbackpay.6

7. Giventhefactofdismissal,itcanbesaidthatthecaseswereeffectivelyremovedfrom
thejurisdictionofthevoluntaryarbitrator,thusplacingthemwithinthejurisdictionofthelabor
arbiter.Wherethedisputeisjustintheinterpretation,implementationorenforcementstage,it
maybereferedtothegrievancemachinerysetupintheCBA,orbroughttovoluntary arbitration.
But,wheretherewasalreadyactualtermination,withalegedviolationofthe

1
SanJosevs.NLRCandOceanTerminalServices,Inc.(G.R.No.121227,17August1998).
2
UniversityofSantoTomasFacultyUnionvs.UniversityofSto.Tomas(G.R.No.203957,30July2014).
3
NegrosMetalCorporationvs.Lamayo(G.R.No.186557,25August2010).
4
AceNavigationCo.,Inc.,etal.vs.Fernandez(G.R.No.197309,10October2012).
5
EstateofDulayvs.AboitizJebsenMaritime,Inc.,etal.(G.R.No.172642,13July2012).
6
Ludo&LuymCorporationvs.Saornido,etal.(G.R.No.140960,20January2003).
 4

employee’srights,itisalreadycognizablebythelaborarbiter.7

8. Doesthedismissalofanemployeeconstitutea"grievancebetweentheparties,"as
definedundertheprovisionsoftheCBA,andconsequently,withintheexclusiveoriginal
jurisdictionoftheVoluntaryArbitrators,therebyrenderingtheNLRCwithoutjurisdictionto
decidethecase? ANSWER: No. Wheretheworkerwaschalengingthelegalityofhis
dismissalforlackofcauseandlackofdueprocess,thedisputeisprimarilyatermination
dispute.TheissueofwhethertherewasproperinterpretationandimplementationoftheCBA
provisionscomesintoplayonlybecausethegrievanceprocedureprovidedforintheCBAwas
notobservedafterhesoughthisUnion’sassistanceincontestinghistermination.Thus,the
questiontoberesolvednecessarilyspringsfrom theprimaryissueofwhethertherewasa
validtermination;withoutthis,thentherewouldbenoreasontoinvoketheneedtointerpret
andimplementtheCBAprovisionsproperly.8

9. Thevoluntaryarbitrator,uponagreementoftheparties,shalalsohearanddecideal
otherlabordisputesincludingunfairlaborpracticesandbargainingdeadlocks. Forthis
exceptiontoapply,theremustbeagreementbetweenthepartiesclearlyconferringjurisdiction
tothevoluntaryarbitrator. Suchagreementmaybestipulatedinacolectivebargaining
agreement.However,intheabsenceofacolectivebargainingagreement,itisenoughthat
thereisevidenceonrecordshowingthepartieshaveagreedtoresorttovoluntaryarbitration.
(Inthiscase,theagreementwasbetweenthecounselsofthepartiesasshownbythe
transcriptofrecords).9

10. Inanilegaldismissalcase,theemployerpresentedacross-claim thattheunion

shouldbeheldfinancialyliableforthedismissalofanemployeebyreasonofexpulsionfrom
theunionasprovidedintheCBA.TheLaborArbiterfoundthattherewasilegaldismissalbut
didnotholdtheunionliableforit.IstheLaborArbitercorect? RULING:Yes,theLabor
Arbiteriscorect.Thecross-claimcannotbeentertainedbytheLaborArbiterintheabsence ofemployer-
employeerelationshipbetweentheemployerandtheunion.Furthermore,the
cross-claimcalsfortheimplementationofaprovisionofaCBAwhichiswithintheoriginal
andexclusivejurisdictionofthevoluntaryarbitratorunderArticle261oftheLaborCode.10

11. TheGrievanceProcedureagreedbythecompanyandtheunionprovidesthata
grievancewilfirstberesolvedbyaUnion-ManagementGrievanceCommiteeand,ifnot
resolvedbythecommitee,byaBoardofArbitratorsforfinaldecision.AftertheCommitee
failedtoreachanagreement,theemployeewhocomplainedthathissalarywasnotincreased
filedacasebeforetheLaborArbiter.IstherecoursetotheLaborArbitertenable?ANSWER:
No.ThegrievanceinvolvesinterpretationandimplementationofaCBA.Whenpartieshave
validlyagreedonaprocedureforresolvinggrievancesofsuchnatureandtosubmitadispute
tovoluntaryarbitrationthenthatprocedureshouldbestrictlyobserved.11

12. Anemployeeandhiscompanyagreedtosubmitthelegalityoftheformer’sdismissal
forvoluntaryarbitration.Theirsubmissionagreementraisedonlytheissuesoftheemployee’s
entitlementtoseparationpayandtoearnedsalescommissions.Didthevoluntaryarbitrator
exceededhisjurisdictionwhenheadjudgedtheemployerguiltyofilegaldismissal?ANSWER: No.
Thevoluntaryarbitratorcorectlyassumedthatthecoreissuebehindtheissueof
separationpayisthelegalityofthedismissalofrespondent.Avoluntaryarbitratorhasplenary
jurisdictionandauthoritytointerpretanagreementtoarbitrateandtodeterminethescopeof
hisownauthoritywhenthesaidagreementisvague.12

13. Acolectorofamagazinecompanyobtainedaloanfromadealerwithoutpayingthe
same.Thecompanyorderedhissuspensionandtransfertoanotherdepartment.Hewrote
thecompanythathewantedtosignatransfermemobeforeassuminghisnewpost.Buthe

7
AtlasFarms,Inc.vs.NLRC,etal.(G.R.No.142244,18November2002).
8
Vivierovs.CA,etal.(G.R.No.138938,24October2000).
9
TheUniversityoftheImmaculateConception,etal.vs.NLRC,etal.(G.R.No.181146,26January
2011).
10
DelMontePhilippines,Inc.etal.vs.Saldivar,etal.(G.R.No.158620,11October2006).
11
Octaviovs.PLDTCompany(G.R.No.175492,27February2013).
12
7KCorporationvs.Albarico(G.R.No.182295,25June2013).
 5

washandedaPayrolChangeAdvice(PCA)indicatinghisnewassignment.Thecolectorthen
filedacaseforconstructivedismissalagainstthecompany.RULINGONJURISDICTION:It
appearsthattheissueofvalidityoftheemployee’sreassignmentstemmedfromtheexercise
ofamanagementprerogativewhichisamateraptforresolutionbyaGrievanceCommitee,
thepartieshavingoptedtoconsidersuchasagrievableissue.Further,thematerof
reassignmentisonenotdirectlyrelatedtothechargeoftheemployee’shavingcommitedan
actwhichisinimicaltothecompany’sinterest,sincethelaterhadalreadybeenaddressedto
bythecolector’sserviceofasuspensionorder.Thetransfer,ineffect,isonewhichproperly
falsunderSection1,ArticleIVoftheColectiveBargainingAgreementand,assuch,questions
astotheenforcementthereofisonewhichfalsunderthejurisdictionofthelaborarbiter.13

14. Avoluntaryarbitrator,whetheractingsolelyorinapanel,enjoysinlawthestatusofa quasi-

judicialagency;hence,hisdecisionsandawardsareappealabletotheCA.Thisisso
becausetheawardsofvoluntaryarbitratorsbecomefinalandexecutoryuponthelapseofthe
periodtoappeal;andsincetheirawardsdeterminetherightsofparties,theirdecisionshave
thesameeffectasjudgmentsofacourt.Therefore,theproperremedyfrom anawardofa
voluntaryarbitratorisaPETITIONFORREVIEW totheCA,folowingRevisedAdministrative
CircularNo.1-95,whichprovidedforauniform procedureforappelatereview ofal
adjudicationsofquasi-judicialentities,whichisnowembodiedinSection1,Rule43ofthe
1997RulesofCivilProcedure.14

15. NotwithstandingSection4,Rule43oftheRulesofCourtthatprovidesfora15-day
reglementaryperiodforfilinganappeal,theVoluntaryArbitrator’sdecisionmustbeappealed
beforetheCourtofAppealswithin10calendardaysfromreceiptofthedecisionasprovidedin
theLaborCode.ThisissobecauseArticle262-AoftheLaborCodeprovidesthatavoluntary
arbitrator’sdecision“shalbefinalandexecutoryafterten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptof
thecopyoftheawardordecisionbytheparties.”Appealisa"statutoryprivilege,"whichmay
beexercised"onlyinthemannerandinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthelaw."
"Perfectionofanappealwithinthereglementaryperiodisnotonlymandatorybutalso
jurisdictionalsothatfailuretodosorenderedthedecisionfinalandexecutory,anddeprives
theappelatecourtofjurisdictiontoalterthefinaljudgmentmuchlesstoentertainthe appeal."15

LABORARBITERVIS-À-VISREGULARCOURT

1. Noteverycontroversyinvolvingworkersandtheiremployerscanberesolvedonlyby
thelaborarbiters.Thiswilbesoonlyifthereisa"reasonablecausalconnection"betweenthe claim
assertedandemployee-employerrelationstoputthecaseundertheprovisionsof
Article217.Absentsuchalink,thecomplaintwilbecognizablebytheregularcourtsofjustice
intheexerciseoftheircivilandcriminaljurisdiction.InMedinav.Castro-Bartolome,two
employeesfiledintheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizalacivilcomplaintfordamagesagainst
theiremployerforslanderousremarksmadeagainstthembythecompanypresident.Theirs
isasimpleactionfordamagesfortortuousactsalegedlycommitedbytheemployerwhichis
cognizablebytheregularcourt.

2. InSingaporeAirlinesLtd.v.Paño,wheretheplaintiffwassuingfordamagesfor
alegedviolationbythedefendantofan"AgreementforaCourseofConversionTrainingatthe
ExpenseofSingaporeAirlinesLimited,"theCourtruledjurisdictioniswiththeregularcourt
becausewhatissoughtisliquidateddamagesforbreachofacontractualobligation.The
otheritemsdemanded arenotlaborbenefitsdemanded byworkersgeneralytaken
cognizanceofinlabordisputes,suchaspaymentofwages,overtimecompensationor
separationpay.Theitemsclaimedarethenaturalconsequencesflowingfrom breachofan
obligation,intrinsicalyacivildispute.

13
MetromediaTimesCorporationvs.Pastorin(G.R.No.154295,29July2005).
14
LeyteIVElectricCooperative,Inc.vs.LeyecoIVEmployeesUnion-ALU(G.R.No.157775,19October
2007).
15
PhilippineElectricCorporationvs.CA,etal.(G.R.No.168612,10December2014).
 6

3. InMolaveSales,Inc.v.Laron,theCourtheldthattheclaimoftheplaintiffagainstits
salesmanagerforpaymentofcertainaccountspertainingtohispurchaseofvehiclesand
automotiveparts,repairsofsuchvehicles,andcashadvancesfrom thecorporationwas
properlycognizablebytheRegionalTrialCourtofDagupanCityandnotthelaborarbiter,
because"althoughacontroversyisbetweenanemployerandanemployee,theLaborArbiters
havenojurisdictioniftheLaborCodeisnotinvolved."

4. ThelatestrulingonthisissueisfoundinSanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,wherethe
abovecasesarecitedandthechangesinArticle217arerecounted.Thatcaseinvolveda
claimofanemployeeforaP60,000.00prizeforaproposalmadebyhimwhichhealegedhad
beenacceptedandimplementedbythedefendantcorporationintheprocessingofoneofits
beerproducts. Wheretheclaim totheprincipalreliefsoughtistoberesolvednotby
referencetotheLaborCodeorotherlaborrelationsstatuteoracolectivebargaining
agreementbutbythegeneralcivillaw,thejurisdictionoverthedisputebelongstotheregular
courtsofjusticeandnottotheLaborArbiterandtheNLRC.

5. ThecasebeforetheCourtinvolvesacomplaintfordamagesformaliciousprosecution
whichwasfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofLeytebytheemployeesofthedefendant
company.Itdoesnotappearthatthereisa"reasonablecausalconnection"betweenthe
complaintandtherelationsofthepartiesasemployerandemployees.Thecomplaintdidnot arisefrom
suchrelationsandinfactcouldhavearisenindependentlyofanemployment
relationshipbetweentheparties.Nosuchrelationshiporanyunfairlaborpracticeisasserted.
Whattheemployeesarealegingisthatthepetitionersactedwithbadfaithwhentheyfiledthe
criminalcomplaintwhichtheMunicipalTrialCourtsaidwasintended"toharassthepoor
employees"andthedismissalofwhichwasaffirmedbytheProvincialProsecutor"forlackof
evidencetoestablishevenaslightestprobabilitythataltherespondentshereinhave
commitedthecrimeimputedagainstthem."Thisisamaterwhichthelaborarbiterhasno
competencetoresolveastheapplicablelawisnottheLaborCodebuttheRevisedPenal Code.16

6. Inacase,whencustomersboughtappliancesoninstalmentfrom astore,thesales
managerdirectlyboughttheappliancesandpersonalysoldthem oninstalmenttothe customers.
Asthemanagerboughttheappliancesatlowpricesashewasgivensuch
privilege,thestorelostprofitsfrominstalmentarrangements.Theemployerthenfiledbefore
thecourtacaseforrecoveryoflostprofit.RULING:JurisdictioniswiththeLaborArbiter
sincetheactualdamages(“lostprofits”)arosefrom employer-employeerelationship.The
LaborArbiterhasjurisdictiontoawardnotonlythereliefsprovidedbyLaborlaws,butalso
damagesgovernedbytheCivilCodeprovidedthattheyaredamages“arisingfromemployer-
employeerelationship.”17

7. Jurisprudencehasdevelopedthe"reasonablecausalconnectionrule."Underthisrule,
ifthereisareasonablecausalconnectionbetweentheclaim assertedandtheemployer-
employeerelations,thenthecaseiswithinthejurisdictionofourlaborcourts.Intheabsence
ofsuchnexus,itistheregularcourtsthathavejurisdiction. The"reasonablecausal
connectionrule"emergedinthe1987caseofPrimerov.IntermediateAppelateCourt,where
theCourtrecognizedthejurisdictionofthelaborarbitersoverclaimsfordamagesin
connectionwithterminationofemployment. Thequestionofthelegalityoftheactof
dismissalisintimatelyrelatedtotheissueofthelegalityofthemannerbywhichthatactof
dismissalwasperformed.ButwhiletheLaborCodetreatsofthenatureof,andtheremedy
availableasregardsthefirst–theemployee’sseparationfromemployment–itdoesnotatal
dealwiththesecond–themannerofthatseparation–whichisgovernedexclusivelybythe
CivilCode.Inaddressingthefirstissue,theLaborArbiterappliestheLaborCode;in
addressingthesecond,theCivilCode.Andthisappearstobetheplainandpatentintendment
ofthelaw.ForapartfromthereliefsexpresslysetoutintheLaborCodeflowingfromilegal dismissalfrom
employment,nootherdamagesmaybeawardedtoanilegalydismissed
employeeotherthanthosespecifiedbytheCivilCode.Hence,thefactthattheissue—of
whetherornotmoralorotherdamagesweresufferedbyanemployeeandintheaffirmative,

16
PepsiColaDistributorsofthePhilippines,Inc.,etal.vs.Galang,etal.(G.R.No.89621,24September
1991).
17
Bañesvs.Valdevila,etal.(G.R.No.128024,9May2000).
 7

theamountthatshouldproperlybeawardedtohiminthecircumstances—isdeterminedunder
theprovisionsoftheCivilCodeandnottheLaborCode,obviouslywasnotmeanttocreatea
causeofactionindependentofthatforilegaldismissalandthusplacethematerbeyondthe
LaborArbiter’sjurisdiction.18

8. Wheretheemployer-employeerelationshipismerelyincidentalandthecauseofaction
proceedsfrom adifferentsourceofobligation,theCourthasnothesitatedtoupholdthe
jurisdictionoftheregularcourts.Wherethedamagesclaimedforwerebasedontort,
maliciousprosecution,orbreachofcontract,aswhentheclaimantseekstorecoveradebt from
aformeremployeeorseeksliquidateddamagesintheenforcementofaprior
employmentcontract,thejurisdictionofregularcourtswasupheld.Thescenariothatobtains
in thiscaseisobviouslydifferent.Thealegationsin privaterespondent’scomplaint
unmistakablyrelatetothemannerofheralegedilegaldismissal.19

9. Anemployeefiledacaseformoneyclaimsagainstheremployer. Heremployer
claimedthesetoffofliquidateddamagesfortheemployee’sviolationofhercontract’s
“GoodwilClause"whichprovidesthatshewilnotcompetewiththeemployer’sbusiness
withinthreeyearsfrom separationfrom theservice.RULING:The“GoodwilClause”isa
postemploymentissuebecausetheemploymentoftheemployeehadalreadyceased.The
"GoodwilClause"orthe"Non-CompeteClause"isacontractualundertakingeffectiveafterthe
cessation ofthe employmentrelationship between the parties.In accordance with
jurisprudence,breachoftheundertakingisacivillawdispute,notalaborlawcase.Hence,
whilethejurisdictionovertheemployee’sclaimisvestedinthelaborarbiter,thejurisdiction
overtheemployer’sclaimrestsontheregularcourts.20

10. Thewidowofashipcaptainwhodiedonboardhisshipfiledacomplaintfordamages
againstthemedicalofficerandchiefmateforgrossnegligencethatresultedtoherhusband’s
death.ItisnottheNLRCbuttheregularcourtsthathavejurisdictionoveractionsfordamages,
inwhichtheemployer-employeerelationismerelyincidental,andinwhichthecauseofaction
proceedsfrom adifferentsourceofobligationsuchasatort.Sincethewidow’sclaim for
damagesispredicatedonaquasidelictortortthathasnoreasonablecausalconnectionwith
anyoftheclaimsprovidedforinArticle217,otherlaborstatutes,orcolectivebargaining
agreements,jurisdictionovertheactionlieswiththeregularcourts-notwiththeNLRCorthe
laborarbiters.21

11. Cananemployee’smoneyclaimsforunpaidsalariesbeoffsetagainsttheemployer’s
claimforliquidateddamagesfortheemployee’sviolationofthe“GoodwilClause’wherehe
commitednottoengageinsimilarbusinesseswithin3yearsfromterminationofemployment?
RULING:Whiletheemployee’sclaimforunpaidsalariesisamoneyclaimthatarisesoutofor
inconnectionwithanemployer-employeerelationship,theemployer’sclaim againstthe
employeeforviolationofthegoodwilclauseisamoneyclaimbasedonanactdoneafterthe
cessationoftheemploymentrelationship.Whilethejurisdictionovertheemployee’sclaimis
vestedinthelaborarbiter,thejurisdictionovertheemployer’sclaim restsontheregular courts.22

12.Anengineer,whowasdiagnosedwithChronicPolySinusitisandAlergicRhinities,filedacivilcase
againsthisemployerbeforetheRTCforilegaldismissalandforpaymentofbackwages,separationpay,
actualdamagesandatorney’sfees.Hisemployerisengagedinthebusinessofmanufacturingthread
forweaving.Healegedthathecontractedthediseasebecausebyreasonofthegrossnegligenceof
hisemployertoprovidehim withasafe,healthyandworkableenvironment.Itisabasictenetthat
jurisdictionoverthesubjectmaterisdetermineduponthealegationsmadeinthecomplaint,
irrespectiveofwhetherornottheplaintiffisentitledtorecoverupontheclaimassertedtherein,whichis
amaterresolvedonlyafterandasaresultofatrial.Neithercanjurisdictionofacourtbemadeto
dependuponthedefensesmadebyadefendantinhisanswerormotiontodismiss.Inthiscase,a
perusalofthecomplaintwouldrevealthatthesubjectmaterisoneofclaimfordamagesarisingfrom quasi-
delict,whichiswithintheambitoftheregularcourt'sjurisdiction.Inthecase,theemployee

18
Kawachi,etal.vs.DelQuero,etal.(G.R.No.163768,27March2007).
19
Ibid.
20
Portilovs.RudolfLietz,Inc.,etal.(G.R.No.196539,10October2012).
21
Tolosavs.NRC,etal.(G.R.No.149578,10April2003).
22
Portilovs.RudolfLietz,Inc.,etal.(G.R.No.196539,10October2012).
 8

alegesthatduetothecontinuedandprolongedexposuretotextiledustseriouslyinimicaltohishealth,
hesufferedwork-contracteddiseasewhichisnowireversibleandincurable,anddeprivedhimofjob
opportunities.Clearly,injuryanddamageswerealegedlysufferedbyrespondent,anelementofquasi-
delict.Secondly,thepreviouscontractofemploymentbetweenpetitionerandrespondentcannotbe
usedtocountertheelementof"nopre-existingcontractualrelation"sincepetitioner’salegedgross
negligenceinmaintainingahazardousworkenvironmentcannotbeconsideredamerebreachofsuch
contractofemployment.Itfalssquarelywithintheelementsofquasi-delictunderArticle2176ofthe
CivilCodesincethenegligenceisdirect,substantiveandindependent.Jurisdictionovertheactionis,
therefore,withtheregularcourts.Italsobearsstressingthattheemployeeisnotprayingforanyrelief
undertheLaborCodeofthePhilippines.Heneitherclaimsforreinstatementnorbackwagesor
separationpayresultingfrom anilegaltermination. Thecauseofactionhereinpertainstothe
consequenceofpetitioner’somissionwhichledtoawork-relateddiseasesufferedbyrespondent, causingharm
ordamagetohisperson.Suchcauseofactioniswithintherealm ofCivilLaw,and
jurisdictionoverthecontroversybelongstotheregularcourts.23

LABORARBITERVIS-À-VISSECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSION

(NOWREGIONALTRIALCOURT)

1. UponthepassageofRepublicActNo.8799,otherwiseknownasTheSecurities
RegulationCode,theSEC’sjurisdictionoveralintra-corporatedisputeswastransferedtothe
RTC,pursuanttoSection5.2ofsaidlaw.

2. Anemployeewasdismissedwhileholdingthepositionof“VicePresidentforFinance
andAdministration,apositioncreatedbytheemployer’sPresidentpursuanttothecompany’s By-
laws.Istheofficeacorporateoffice?RULING:Apositionmustbeexpresslymentionedin theBy-
Lawsinordertobeconsideredasacorporateoffice.Thus,thecreationofanoffice
pursuanttoorunderaBy-Lawenablingprovisionisnotenoughtomakeapositionacorporate office.
Theonlyofficersofacorporationwerethosegiventhatcharactereitherbythe
CorporationCodeorbytheBy-Laws;therestofthecorporateofficers.Section25ofthe
CorporationCodestatesthatthecorporateofficersarethePresident,Secretary,Treasurerand
suchotherofficersasmaybeprovidedforintheBy-Laws.Accordingly,thecorporateofficers
inthecontextofPDNo.902-Aareexclusivelythosewhoaregiventhatcharactereitherbythe
CorporationCodeorbythecorporation’sBy-Laws.24

3. Thefactthatthedismissedemployeeisastockholderdoesnotmakehimacorporate
officerandhisdismissalanintra-corporatecontroversy.Inthecaseatbar,theemployeewas
notappointedasVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministrationbecauseofhisbeinga
stockholderorDirectorofMatling.Herosefromtheranksfirstasabookkeeperin1966and
after33yearsbecametheVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministrationin2000. Even
thoughhebecameastockholderin1992,hispromotiontothepositionofVicePresidentfor
FinanceandAdministrationin1987wasbyvirtueofthelengthofqualityservicehehad
renderedasanemployee.Thus,hisemploymenthistoryindicatesthatheisnotacorporate
officer.Consequently,theLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionoverthequestionoflegalityofhis
dismissalfromtheservice.25

4. Thecompany’sBoardofDirectorspassedaresolutionthatthepositionof“General
Manager”isacorporateoffice.IstheGeneralManageracorporateofficer?ANSWER:No.
TheGeneralManagerisnotacorporateofficerbecausehispositionwasnotspecificaly
mentionedintherosterofcorporateofficersinitscorporateby-laws.Theenablingclausein
thecompany’sby-lawsempoweringitsBoardofDirectorstocreateadditionalofficers,i.e.,
GeneralManager,andthealegedsubsequentpassageofaboardresolutiontothateffect
cannotmakesuchpositionacorporateoffice.Theboardofdirectorshasnopowertocreate
othercorporateofficeswithoutfirstamendingthecorporateby-lawssoastoincludetherein
thenewlycreatedcorporateoffice.Thoughtheboardofdirectorsmaycreateappointive
positionsotherthanthepositionsofcorporateofficers,thepersonsoccupyingsuchpositions

23
IndophilTextileMils,Inc.vs.Adviento(G.R.No.171212,4August2014).
24
MatlingIndustrialandCommercialCorporation,etal.vs.Coros(G.R.No.157802,13October2010).
25
Ibid.
 9

cannotbeviewedascorporateofficersunderSection25oftheCorporationCode.26

5. An employee who occupied the position of“Vice Presidentand Treasurer

(EVP/Treasurer)”isacorporateofficerbecausesaidpositionisprovidedinthecompany’sby-
lawsandhewaselectedtosaidpositionbythecompany’sBoardofDirectors.27

6. Thecompany’smanager,whoisalsoastockholderanddirector,wasdismissedfrom
theservicebyresolutionoftheBoardofDirectors. Ishisdismissalanintra-corporate controversy?
ANSWER:No.Thetwo-tiertesttodeterminetheexistenceofintra-corporate controversyis:
(a)relationshiptest;and(b)natureofcontroversytest.Themereexistenceof relationship–
i.e.,ofbeingastockholderormanager-doesnotfulysatisfytherelationship
test.Onemustbeacorporateofficer.Furthermore,themereexistenceofintra-corporate
relationshipdoesnotgiverisetoanintra-corporatecontroversy. Theincidentsofthat
relationshipmustalsobeconsideredforthepurposeofascertainingwhetherthecontroversy
itselfisintra-corporate.Thecontroversymustnotonlyberootedintheexistenceofanintra-
corporaterelationship,butmustaswelpertaintotheenforcementoftheparties’corelative
rightsandobligationsundertheCorporationCodeandtheinternalandintra-corporate
regulatoryrulesofthecorporation.Iftherelationshipanditsincidentsaremerelyincidentalto
thecontroversyoriftherewilstilbeconflicteveniftherelationshipdoesnotexist,thenno intra-
corporatecontroversyexists.Inthecase,themanager’spositionwasnotprovidedinthe company’sBy-
lawsnoristhereashowingthathewaselectedorappointedbytheBoard.
Hence,therelationshiptestisnotsatisfied.Next,themanagerwasdismissedbecause(a)of
hiscontinuousabsencesathispost;(b)lossoftrustandconfidence;and(c)tocutdown
expenses.Thereasonsgivenforhisdismissalaresomethingtodowiththeemployee’swork
asmanagerandnothingwithhisbeingadirectororstockholder. Hence,thenatureof
controversyasanintra-corporatecontroversyisnotalsosatisfied.28

7. BeforeadismissalorremovalcouldproperlyfalwithinthejurisdictionoftheSEC,it
hastobefirstestablishedthatthepersonremovedordismissedwasacorporateofficer.
“Corporateofficers"inthecontextofPresidentialDecreeNo.902-Aarethoseofficersofthe
corporationwhoaregiventhatcharacterbytheCorporationCodeorbythecorporation’sby-
laws.TherearethreespecificofficerswhomacorporationmusthaveunderSection25ofthe
CorporationCode. Thesearethepresident,secretaryandthetreasurer. Thenumberof
officersisnotlimitedtothesethree.Acorporationmayhavesuchotherofficersasmaybe
providedforbyitsby-lawslike,butnotlimitedto,thevice-president,cashier,auditororgeneral
manager.Thenumberofcorporateofficersisthuslimitedbylawandbythecorporation’sby-laws.29

LABORARBITERVIS-À-VISDOLEREGIONALOFFICE

“Art. 128. Visitorialand Enforcement Power – x x x. (b)

NotwithstandingtheprovisionsofArticle129and217ofthisCodetothe
contrary,andincaseswheretherelationshipofemployer-employeerelation
stilexists,theSecretaryoflaborandEmploymentorhisdulyauthorized
representativesshalhavethepowertoissuecomplianceorderstogive
effecttothelaborstandardsprovisionsofthisCodeandotherlabor
legislationbasedonthefindingsoflaboremploymentandenforcement
officersorindustrialsafetyengineersmadeinthecourseofinspection.The
Secretaryorhis dulyauthorized representatives shalissue writs of
executiontotheappropriateauthorityfortheenforcementoftheirorders,
exceptincaseswheretheemployerconteststhefindingsofthelabor
employmentand enforcementofficerand raisesissuessupported by
documentaryproofswhichwerenotconsideredinthecourseofinspection.

“An orderissued bythe dulyauthorized representative ofthe

SecretaryofLaborandEmploymentunderthisarticlemaybeappealedtothe

26
MarchIMarketing,Inc.etal.vs.Joson(G.R.No.171993,12,2011).
27
Locsinvs.NissanLeasePhils.Inc.,etal.(G.R.No.185567,20October2010).
28
Realvs.SanguPhilippines,Inc.,etal.(G.R.No.168757,19January2011).
29
Garciavs.EasternTelecommunicationsPhilippines,Inc.,etal.(G.R.No.173115,16April2009).
 10

later.Incasesaidorderinvolvesamonetaryaward,anappealbythe
employermaybeperfectedonlyuponthepostingofacashorsuretybond
issuedbyareputablebondingcompanydulyaccreditedbytheSecretaryof
LaborandEmploymentintheamountequivalenttothemonetaryawardin
theorderappealedfrom.”(AmendedbyRA7730)

1. ThevisitorialandenforcementpowersoftheSecretaryofLabor,exercisedthroughhis
representatives,encompasscompliancewithallaborstandardslawsandotherlabor
legislation,regardlessoftheamountoftheclaimsfiledbyworkers.Whileitistruethatunder
Articles129and223oftheLaborCode,theLaborArbiterhasjurisdictiontohearanddecide
caseswheretheaggregatemoneyclaim ofeachemployeeexceedsP5,000.00,these
provisionsoflawdonotcontemplateorcoverthevisitorialandenforcementpowersofthe
SecretaryofLabororhisdulyauthorizedrepresentatives.Thus,theRegionalDirectorhas jurisdiction
even ifthe amountawarded exceeded P5,000.00 peremployee. This
notwithstanding,thepoweroftheRegionalDirectortohearanddecidethemonetaryclaimsof
employeesisnotabsolute.ThelastsentenceofArticle128(b)oftheLaborCode,otherwise
knownasthe"exceptionclause,"providesaninstancewhentheRegionalDirectororhis
representativesmaybedivestedofjurisdictionoveralaborstandardscase.The“exception
clauses”havethefolowingelements,alofwhichmustconcur:

(a) Thattheemployerconteststhefindingsofthelaborregulationsofficer
andraisesissuesthereon;

(b) Thatinordertoresolvesuchissues,thereisaneedtoexamine
evidentiarymaters;and

(c) thatsuchmatersarenotverifiableinthenormalcourseofinspection.

"Tocontest"meanstoraisequestionsastotheamountscomplainedofortheabsenceof
violationoflaborstandardslaws;or,asintheinstantcase,issuesastothecomplainants’
righttolaborstandardsbenefits.Raisinglackofjurisdictionaloneisnotthe"contest"
contemplatedbytheexceptionclause.Itisnecessarythattheemployerconteststhefindings
ofthelaborregulationsofficerduringthehearingorafterreceiptofthenoticeofinspection results.
Moreimportantly,thekeyrequirementfortheRegionalDirectorandtheDOLE
Secretarytobedivestedofjurisdictionisthattheevidentiarymatersbenotverifiableinthe
courseofinspection.Wheretheevidencepresentedwasverifiableinthenormalcourseof
inspection,theRegionalDirector,andlatertheDOLESecretary,maystilexamineit;andthese
officersarenotdivestedofjurisdictiontodecidethecase.30

2. IndispensabletotheDOLE'sexerciseofitsvisitorialandenforcementpowersisthe
existenceofanactualemployer-employeerelationshipbetweentheparties. Itcanbe
assumedthattheDOLEintheexerciseofitsvisitorialandenforcementpowersomehowhas
tomakeadeterminationoftheexistenceofanemployer-employeerelationship.Such
determination,however,cannotbecoextensivewiththevisitorialandenforcementpoweritself.
Indeed,suchdeterminationismerelypreliminary,incidentalandcolateraltotheDOLE's
primaryfunctionofenforcinglaborstandardsprovisions.Thedeterminationoftheexistence
ofemployer-employeerelationshipisstilprimarilylodgedwiththeNLRC.Thisisthemeaning
oftheclause"incaseswheretherelationshipofemployer-employeestilexists"inArt.128(b).
Thus,beforetheDOLEmayexerciseitspowersunderArticle128,twoimportantquestions
mustberesolved:

(I)Doestheemployer-employeerelationshipstilexist,oralternatively,was
thereeveranemployer-employeerelationshiptospeakof;and

(2)ArethereviolationsoftheLaborCodeorofanylaborlaw?

3. Theexistenceofanemployer-employeerelationshipisastatutoryprerequisitetoanda
30
Meteoro,eta.vs.CreativeCreatures,Inc.(G.R.No.171275,13July2009).
 11

limitationonthepoweroftheSecretaryofLabor,onewhichthelegislativebranchisentitledto
impose.Therationaleunderlyingthislimitationistoeliminatetheprospectofcompeting
conclusionsoftheSecretaryofLaborandtheNLRC,onamaterfraughtwithquestionsoffact
andlaw,whichisbestresolvedbythequasi-judicialbody,whichistheNRLC,ratherthanan
administrativeofficialoftheexecutivebranchofthegovernment.IftheSecretaryofLabor
proceedstoexercisehisvisitorialandenforcementpowersabsentthefirstrequisite,hisoffice
confersjurisdictiononitselfwhichitcannototherwiseacquire.31

4. ThelawdidnotsaythattheDOLEwouldfirstseektheNLRC'sdeterminationofthe
existenceofanemployer-employeerelationship,orthatshouldtheexistenceoftheemployer-
employeerelationshipbedisputed,theDOLEwouldreferthematertotheNLRC.TheDOLE
musthavethepowertodeterminewhetherornotanemployer-employeerelationshipexists,
andfromtheretodecidewhetherornottoissuecomplianceordersinaccordancewithArt.
128(b)oftheLaborCode,asamendedbyRA7730.LiketheNLRC,theDOLEhastheauthority to rule on
the existence ofan employer-employee relationship between the parties,
consideringthattheexistenceofanemployer-employeerelationshipisaconditionsinequa
nonfortheexerciseofitsvisitorialpower.Nevertheless,itmustbeemphasizedthatwithout anemployer-
employeerelationship,orifonehasalreadybeenterminated,theSecretaryof
Laboriswithoutjurisdictiontodetermineifviolationsoflaborstandardshadinfactbeen commited,and to
directemployersto complywith theiraleged violationsoflabor standards.32

SECRETARYOFLABORVIS-À-VISLABORARBITER

Article.269.Strikes,picketing,andlockouts.—xxx

(g)When,inhisopinion,thereexistsalabordisputecausingorlikelytocause
astrikeorlockoutinanindustryindispensabletothenationalinterest,the
SecretaryofLaborandEmploymentmayassumejurisdictionoverthedispute
and decideitorcertifythesameto theCommissionforcompulsory
arbitration.Such assumption orcertification shalhave the effectof
automaticalyenjoiningtheintendedorimpendingstrikeorlockoutas
specifiedintheassumptionorcertificationorder.Ifonehasalreadytaken
placeatthetimeofassumptionorcertification,alstrikingorlockedout
employees shalimmediately return to work and the employershal
immediatelyresumeoperationsandreadmitalworkersunderthesame
termsandconditionsprevailingbeforethestrikeorlockout.xxx.

1. Article266(g)oftheLaborCodegivestheSecretaryofLabordiscretiontoassume
jurisdictionoveralabordisputelikelytocauseastrikeoralockoutinanindustry
indispensabletothenationalinterestandtodecidethecontroversyortoreferthesametothe
NLRCforcompulsoryarbitration.Indoingso,theSecretaryofLaborshalresolvealquestions
andcontroversiesinordertosetlethedispute.Hispoweristhereforeplenaryand
discretionaryinnaturetoenablehimtoeffectivelyandefficientlydisposeoftheissue.Hence,
hehasjurisdictiontodecidethevalidityofdismissalsoccasionedbyastrikethejurisdictionof
whichheassumed.33

2. TheSecretary’sauthoritytoassumejurisdictionoverthelabordisputemustinclude
andextendtoalquestionsandcontroversiesarisingtherefrom,includingcasesoverwhich
thelaborarbiterhasexclusivejurisdiction.Hence,hehastheauthoritytoconsolidatecases
alreadyfiledbythepartiesbeforetheNLRCsuchasULPandilegalstrikeagainsteachother
anddecidethemtogetherorcertifythemtotheNLRCfordecision.34

3. ThediscretiontoassumejurisdictionmaybeexercisebytheSecretaryofLaborand
Employmentwithoutthenecessityofpriornoticeorhearinggiventoanyoftheparties.The

31
SouthCotabatoCommunicationsCorporationandBenzonanvs.Sto.Tomas,etal.(G.R.No.217575,
15June2016).
32
Ibid.
33
Santuyo,etal.vs.RemercoGarmentsManufacturing,Inc.(G.R.No.174420,22March2010).
34
InternationalPharmaceuticals,Inc.vs.SecretaryofLabor(G.R.No.92981-83,9January1992).
 12

rationale forhis primaryassumption ofjurisdiction can justifiablyreston his own

considerationoftheexigencyofthesituationinrelationtothenationalinterests.35

4. TheremedyofanaggrievedpartyinadecisionorresolutionoftheSecretaryofLabor
whoexercisesjurisdictionunderArt.269(g)oftheLaborCodeistotimelyfileamotionfor
reconsiderationasapreconditionforanyfurtherorsubsequentremedy,andthenseasonably
fileaspecialcivilactionforcertiorariunderRule65ofthe1997RulesonCivilProcedure.The
authorityoftheSecretaryofLabortoassumejurisdictionoveralabordisputecausingorlikely
tocauseastrikeorlockoutinanindustryindispensabletonationalinterestincludesand
extendstoalquestionsandcontroversiesarisingtherefrom.Thepowerisplenaryand
discretionaryinnaturetoenablehim toeffectivelyandefficientlydisposeoftheprimary
dispute.ThiswidelatitudeofdiscretiongiventotheSecretaryofLabormaynotbethesubject ofappeal.
xxx. ThespecialcivilactionshouldbefiledwiththeCourtofAppealsin
observanceofthedoctrineonthehierarchyofthecourtsemphasizedinSt.MartinFuneral
Homesv.NLRCcase.xxx.ConsideringthatadecisionoftheSecretaryofLaborissubjectto
judicialreviewonlythroughaspecialcivilactionofcertiorariand,asarule,cannotberesorted
towithouttheaggrievedpartyhavingexhaustedadministrativeremediesthroughamotionfor
reconsideration,theaggrievedparty,mustbealowedtomoveforareconsiderationofthe
samesothathecanbringaspecialcivilactionforcertioraribeforetheSupremeCourt.
Certiorariinherentlyrequiresthefilingofamotionforreconsideration.Unlessitisfiled,there
couldbenooccasiontorectify.Worse,theremedyofcertiorariwouldbeunavailing.Simply
put,regardlessoftheproscriptionagainstthefilingofamotionforreconsideration,thesame
maybefiledontheassumptionthatrectificationofthedecisionorordermustbeobtained,
andbeforeapetitionforcertiorarimaybeinstituted.36

5. TheauthoritytocreatethetripartitecommiteeflowsfromthejurisdictionconferredbyArticle
263(g)totheSecretary.Agrantofjurisdiction,intheabsenceofprohibitivelegislation,impliesthe
necessaryandusualincidentalpowersessentialtoeffectuateit— alsoreferedtoas"incidental
jurisdiction."Incidentaljurisdictionincludesthepowerandauthorityofanofficeortribunaltodoal
thingsreasonablynecessaryfortheadministrationofjusticewithinthescopeofitsjurisdiction,andfor
theenforcementofitsjudgmentandmandates.Incidentaljurisdictionispresumedtoatachuponthe
confermentofjurisdictionoverthemaincase,unlessexplicitlywithheldbythelegislature.Inthisregard,
wefindnothingintheLaborCodethatprohibitstheSecretaryfromcreatingadhoccommiteestoaid
intheresolutionoflabordisputesafterhehasassumedjurisdiction.TheprimaryobjectiveofArticle
263(g)isnotmerelytoterminatelabordisputesbetweenprivateparties;rather,itisthepromotionof
thecommongoodconsideringthataprolongedstrikeorlockoutinanindustryindispensabletothe
37

nationalinterestcanbeinimicaltotheeconomy.

BUREAUOFLABORRELATIONSVIS-À-VISSECRETARYOFLABOR

Art.232.BureauofLaborRelations.––TheBureauofLaborRelationsand
theLaborRelationsdivisionsintheregionalofficesoftheDepartmentof
Laborshalhaveoriginalandexclusiveauthoritytoact,attheirowninitiative
oruponrequestofeitherorbothparties,onalinter-unionandintra-union
conflicts,andaldisputes,grievancesorproblemsarisingfrom oraffecting
labor-managementrelationsinalworkplaceswhetheragriculturalornon-
agricultural,exceptthosearisingfromtheimplementationorinterpretationof
colectivebargainingagreementswhichshalbethesubjectofgrievance
procedureand/orvoluntaryarbitration.

1. Anintra-unionconflictreferstoaconflictwithinorinsidealaborunionandaninter-
unioncontroversyordisputereferstoaconflictoccuringorcariedonbetweenoramong
unions.Section1,Rule1,BookV,OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,providesthe
folowingdefinitions:

(x) “Inter-Union Dispute”refers to anyconflictbetween and among

35
CapitolMedicalCenter,Inc.vs.Trajano,etal.(G.R.No.155690,30June2005).
36
PHILTRANCOSERVICEENTERPRISES,INC.vs.PHILTRANCOWORKERSUNION-ASSOCIATIONOF
GENUINELABORORGANIZATIONS(PWU-AGLO)(G.R.No.180962,26February2014).
37
UniversityoftheImmaculateConceptionvs.OfficeoftheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,etal.
(G.R.Nos.178085-178086,14September2015).
 13

legitimatelaborunionsinvolving representationquestionsforthe
purposesofcolectivebargainingortoanyotherconflictordispute
betweenlegitimatelaborunions.

(bb) “Intra-UnionDispute”referstoanyconflictbetweenandamongunion
members,includinggrievancesarisingfromanyviolationoftherights
andconditionsofmembership,violationofadisagreementoverany
provisionoftheunion’sconstitutionandby-laws,ordisputesarising
fromcharteringoraffiliationofunion.

2. Acontroversybetweenanemployeeandhisunionrespectingtheformer’srightsunder
thelater’s“MutualAidPlan”wouldbeanintra-unionconflictunderArticle232oftheLabor
Codeandhence,withintheexclusive,originaljurisdictionoftheMed-ArbiteroftheBureauof
LaborRelationswhosedecisionisappealabletotheSecretaryofLabor.38

3. Employees’petitiontonulifyaunionresolutionforcheck-offofspecialassessments
withoutauthorityfromthemajorityofalmembersinageneralassemblymeetingiswithinthe
jurisdictionoftheBLR.Theinclusionoftheemployerasaco-respondentandthemonetary
claimagainstitisonlyincidentalorancilarytotheprincipalreliefandisaconsequenceofthe
employerpetitionerhavingactedasacolectionagentoftheunionofficers.Theaction,
therefore,isnotessentialyamoneyclaimforunderpaymentofwagesthatwouldfalunder
thejurisdictionofthelaborarbiter.39

4. Intheexerciseofthisjurisdictionoverlabor-managementrelations,themed-arbiterof
theBLRhastheauthority,originalandexclusive,todeterminetheexistenceofanemployer-
employeerelationshipbetweentheparties.Theauthoritytodeterminetheemployer-employee
relationshipisnecessaryandindispensableintheexerciseofjurisdictionbythemed-arbiter,
andoftheSecretaryofLaborincaseofappeal,todecideacertificationelectioncase.Their
findingscannotbemadenugatorybyacontraryfindingofthelaborarbiterinaseparate
disputeformoneyclaimsbetweensameparties.40

5. ApetitiontocancelunionregistrationmaybefiledbeforetheDOLERegionalOfficeor
directlywiththeBureauofLaborRelations(BLR).AdecisionoftheRegionalOfficecanceling
aunion’scertificateofregistrationmaybeappealedtotheBLRwhosedecisiononthemater
shalbefinalandinappealable.However,whenthepetitionisfileddirectlywiththeBLR,a
decisionofthelatermaybeappealedtotheSecretaryofLaborwhosedecisiononthemater
shalbefinalandinappealable.Therefore,itiserrorfortheSecretaryofLabortoassume
appelatejurisdictionofadecisionconcerningcancelationofunionregistrationrenderedby
theBLRinexerciseofitsappelatejurisdiction.41

BUREAUOFLABORRELATIONSANDLABORRELATIONSDIVISION

VIS-À-VISLABORARBITER

1. Adecisioninacertificationelectioncase,bytheverynatureofthatproceeding,does
notforeclosealfurtherdisputebetweentheparties–suchasanilegaldismissalcase-asto
theexistenceornon-existenceofanemployer-employeerelationshipbetweenthem.TheMed
-Arbiter’sorderinthecasedismissingapetitionforcertificationelectiononthebasisofnon-

38
Pepsi-ColaSalesandAdvertisingUnionvs.SecretaryofLabor(G.R.No.97092,27July1992).
39
PhilippineNationalConstructionCorporationvs.DirectorPuraFerer-Caleja,etal.(G.R.No.80485,11
November1988).
40
M.Y.SanBiscuits,Inc.vs.Laguesma(G.R.No.95011,22April19991).
41
AbbotLaboratoriesPhilippines,Inc.vs.AbbotLaboratoriesEmployeesUnion,etal.(G.R.No.131374,
26January2000).
 14

existenceofemployer-employeerelationshipwasissuedafterthemembersoftherespondent
unionweredismissedfrom theiremployment.Thepurposeofapetitionforcertification
electionistodeterminewhichorganizationwilrepresenttheemployeesintheircolective
bargainingwiththeemployer.Therespondentunion,withoutitsmember-employees,was
thusstrippedofitspersonalitytochalengetheMed-Arbiter’sdecisioninthecertification
electioncase.Thus,themembersoftherespondentunionwereleftwithnooptionbutto
pursuetheirilegaldismissalcasefiledbeforetheLaborArbiter.Todismisstheilegal
dismissalcasefiledbeforetheLaborArbiteronthebasisofthepronouncementoftheMed-
Arbiterinthecertificationelectioncasethattherewasnoemployer-employeerelationship
betweentheparties,whichtherespondentunioncouldnotevenappealtotheDOLESecretary
becauseofthedismissalofitsmembers,wouldbetantamounttodenyingdueprocesstothe
complainantsintheilegaldismissalcase.42

SECRETARYOFLABOR

1. Article263(g)oftheLaborCodeprovides:“When,inhisopinion,thereexistsalabor
disputecausingorlikelytocauseastrikeorlockoutinanindustryindispensabletothe
nationalinterest,theSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentmayassumejurisdictionoverthe
disputeanddecideitorcertifythesametotheCommissionforcompulsoryarbitration.Per
Article263(i),thedecisionoftheSecretaryofLaborshalbefinalandexecutorten(10)
calendardaysafterreceiptthereofbytheparties.Noappealisprovidedfromadecisionofthe
SecretaryofLabor.Hence,theremedyofanaggrievedpartyistofileapetitionforcertiorari
underRule65oftheRulesofCivilProcedure.LikedecisionsoftheNLRCwhichunderArt.223
oftheLaborCodebecomefinalafterten(10)days,petitionsforcertiorarifromdecisionsof
theSecretaryofLabormaybemadeevenbeyondtheten-dayperiodprovidedintheLabor
CodeandtheimplementingrulesbutwithinthereglementaryperiodsetforthinRule65ofthe
RulesofCourt.43

2. TheSecretaryorderedthecreationofatripartitecommiteeforthepurposeof
resolvingoneofthecontentiousissuesinOS-AJ-003-95,i.e.,thecomputationofthenet
incrementalproceedsunderRepublicActNo.6728,asincreasedbymutualagreementofthe
parties.Theauthoritytocreatethetripartitecommiteeflowsfromthejurisdictionconfered
byArticle263(g)totheSecretary. Agrantofjurisdiction,intheabsenceofprohibitive
legislation,impliesthenecessaryandusualincidentalpowersessentialtoeffectuateit—also
referredtoas"incidentaljurisdiction."Incidentaljurisdictionincludesthepowerandauthority
ofanofficeortribunaltodoalthingsreasonablynecessaryfortheadministrationofjustice
withinthescopeofitsjurisdiction,andfortheenforcementofitsjudgmentandmandates.
Incidentaljurisdictionispresumedtoatachupontheconfermentofjurisdictionoverthemain
case,unlessexplicitlywithheldbythelegislature.ThereisnothingintheLaborCodethat
prohibitstheSecretaryfrom creatingadhoccommiteestoaidintheresolutionoflabor
disputesafterhehasassumedjurisdiction.TheprimaryobjectiveofArticle263(g)isnot
merelytoterminatelabordisputesbetweenprivateparties;rather,itisthepromotionofthe
commongoodconsideringthataprolongedstrikeorlockoutinanindustryindispensableto
thenationalinterestcanbeinimicaltotheeconomy.Hence,providedthattheSecretary’s
ordersarereasonablyconnectedwiththeobjectiveofthelaw,asitisinthiscase,courtswil
notdisturbthesame.44

APPELLATEJURISDICTIONOFSECRETARY

OFLABOROVERTHEPOEA

1. Section10ofRA8042(“MigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995”) providesthat:

42
HijoResourcesCorporationvs.Mejares,etal.(G.R.No.208986,13January2016).
43
PIDLTRANCOServiceEnterprises,Inc.vs.PhiltrancoWorkersUnion-AssociationofGenuineLabor
Organizations(PWU-AGLO)(G.R.No.180962,26February2014).
44
UniversityoftheImmaculateConceptionvs.OfficeoftheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,etal.
(G.R.Nos.178085-178086,14September2015).
 15

"MoneyClaims–Notwithstandinganyprovisionoflawtothecontrary,the
LaborArbitersoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)shalhave
theoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecide,withinninety(90)
calendardaysafterthefilingofthecomplaint,theclaimsarisingoutofan employer-
employeerelationshiporbyvirtueofanylaworcontractinvolving
Filipinoworkersforoverseasdeploymentincludingclaimsforactual,moral,
exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.xxx”

AlthoughRA8042transferredtheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidemoney
claimsinvolvingoverseasFilipinoworkersfromthePOEAtotheLaborArbiters,thelawdidnot
removefromthePOEAtheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidealdisciplinary
actioncasesandotherspecialcasesadministrativeincharacterinvolvingsuchworkers.The
obviousintentofRA 8042wasto havethePOEA focusitseffortsinresolvingal
administrativematersaffectingandinvolvingsuchworkers.Thisintentwasevenexpressly
recognizedintheOmnibusRulesandRegulationsImplementingtheMigrantWorkersand
OverseasFilipinosActof1995promulgatedonFebruary29,1996,viz:

“Section28.JurisdictionofthePOEA.–ThePOEAshalexerciseoriginaland
exclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecide:

(a) alcases,whichareadministrativeincharacter,involvingorarisingoutof
violationsorrulesandregulationsrelatingtolicensingandregistrationof
recruitmentandemploymentagenciesorentities;and

(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases,which are

administrativeincharacter,involvingemployers,principals,contracting
partnersandFilipinomigrantworkers.”

TheNLRChasnoappelatejurisdictiontoreviewthedecisionofthePOEAindisciplinarycases
involvingoverseascontractworkers.TheappelatejurisdictionisvestedintheSecretaryof
LaborinaccordancewithhispowerofsupervisionandcontrolunderSection38(1),Chapter7,
TitleI,BookIoftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1987.Section1,PartVI,RuleVofthe
2003POEARulesandRegulationsspecificalyprovides,asfolows:“Section1.Jurisdiction.–
TheSecretaryshalhavetheexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictiontoactonappealsorpetitionfor
reviewofdisciplinaryactioncasesdecidedbytheAdministration.”45
45
EasternMediterraneanMaritimeLtd.andAgemarManningAgency,Inc.vs.Surio,etal.(G.R.No.
154213,23August2012).