REM - Consolidated Case Digests 2014-June 2016 PDF

REMEDIAL LAW DIGESTS 2014-June 2016
RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
RUFA A. RUBIO, ET AL. vs. LOURDES ALABATA

G.R. NO. 203947, FEBRUARY 26, 2014
J. MENDOZA
Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal

interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the
ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not
be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do
so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.
Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were
represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO
in particular, failed them, Hence, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxed
the rules and decides to allowed the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners.
Facts:
Petitioners and respondent were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of

declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before RTC of dumaguete. The
case was decided in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed the decision to the CA,
but the same was withdrawn. The decision, thereafter became final and executory, but the
petitioners, never knew of this because when they followed up the case, they were informed
that the appeal was still pending. It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of
Judgment was sent to the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had resigned.
Unfortunately, she failed to inform petitioners of the said entry of judgment before her
resignation. She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of such development. It was only in
November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that their victory was already final
after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of judgment from RTC-43.
On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of

judgment. After respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, the RTC granted
her Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners’ case for revival of judgment dismissed on
the ground of prescription. The CA affirmed the dismissal of their case for revival of
judgment. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the court a quo erred in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription and
dismissing the case based on the said ground, in spite of the fact that petitioners will suffer
manifest injustice and deprivation of their property due to a fault not attributable to them
Page 1 of 1553
Held:
The petition is granted.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or

order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.
Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and
jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil
Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues: xxx
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states that “the period for prescription of actions to demand
the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the
judgment became final.”
To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners
considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew
her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.
Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were
represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO
in particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by
respondent of her appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they could
not be faulted for their subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were
told that the case was still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or
downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete
and directly verify the status of the case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer
and wait.
No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal.1âwphi1

Withdrawing her appeal means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the
Page 2 of 1553
"Declaration of Heirship and Sale," dismissed respondent’s counterclaim, and ordered her
to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary
damages plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became final and executory, she has been
in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will continue to
hold on to the property just because of a technicality.
Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by
petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way
possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a wrong.
LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 173523, February 19, 2014
J. Del Castillo
Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he
failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court.
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among
the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
Facts:
Petitioner Lucena D. Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused
in criminal cases for violations of Section 3(h) of RA 3019, which cases are pending before
the Sandiganbayan.
On January 9, 2006, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan a
Motion to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA 3019arguing that under Section
13 of RA 3019, petitioner’s suspension from office was mandatory.
The Sandiganbayan held that preventive suspension was proper to prevent Demaala from
committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
On March 23, 2006, Demaala filed her Motion for Reconsideration. Her Motion for
Reconsideration, which was originally set for hearing on April 26, 2006, was reset to August
2 and 3, 2006 via the Sandiganbayan’s April 21, 2006 Order. Nonetheless, before the said
date could arrive, the anti-graft court supposedly precipitately issued the assailed May 23,
2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration, thus depriving her of the
opportunity to be heard. Hence, this petition.
Page 3 of 1553
Issue:
Whether petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23,
2006 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration without conducting a hearing
thereon
Held:
The petition is denied.
A reading and understanding of the April 21, 2006 Order of the Sandiganbayan indicates
that what it referred to were the two hearing dates of April 26 and 27, 2006 covering the
continuation of the trial proper – the ongoing presentation of the prosecution’s evidence –
and not the single hearing date of April 26, 2006 for the determination of petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial itself
unmistakably specified that what was being reset was the trial proper which was scheduled
on April 26 and 27, 2006 pursuant to the court’s previous January 19, 2006 Order; it had
nothing at all to do with petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
If petitioner truly believed that the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial
referred to the April 26, 2006 hearing of her Motion for Reconsideration, then she should
have attended the scheduled April 21, 2006 hearing thereof to reiterate her motion or object
to a resetting. Her failure to attend said hearing is a strong indication that she did not
consider the manifestation and motion to reset trial as covering or pertaining to her Motion
for Reconsideration which she set for hearing on April 26, 2006.
On the other hand, petitioner’s failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of
her own Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. Her excuse – that she no longer
bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006 since "she had no business to be there" – is
unavailing. By being absent at the April 21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the
prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial as related to her pending Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, it was incumbent upon her to have attended the hearing of her own
motion on April 26, 2006. Her absence at said hearing was inexcusable, and the
Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in considering the matter submitted for resolution
based on the pleadings submitted.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to
do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark
of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
Page 4 of 1553
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend
her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process
– it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial
evidence in court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to
be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
GRAND ASIAN SHIPPING LINES, INC., EDUARDO P. FRANCISCO AND WILLIAM

HOW vs. WILFREDO GALVEZ
G.R. NO. 178184, JANUARY 29, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
a. In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary
award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award. Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules
should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense. This is especially true in labor cases
wherein the substantial merits of the case must accordingly be decided upon to serve the
interest of justice. When there has been substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is
warranted.
b. In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or valid cause
rests on the employers. Failure on their part to discharge such burden will render the
dismissal illegal. The quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise. Here, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does
not automatically make the dismissal valid. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees.
However, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases
finds no application when the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The employee
must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal before shifting to the
employer the burden of proving the validity of such dismissal.
Facts:
Petitioner GASLI is a domestic corporation engaged in transporting LPG from Petron

Corporation’s refinery to Petron’s Plant and Petron’s Depot, while respondents are
Page 5 of 1553
crewmembers of one of GASLI’s vessels, M/T Dorothy Uno. Sometime in January 2000, one
of the vessel’s Oilers, Abis reported to GASLI’s Office and Crewing Manager Montegrico,
an alleged illegal activity being committed by respondents aboard the vessel. Abis revealed
that a substantial volume of fuel oil is unconsumed and stored in the vessel’s fuel tanks.
However, Gruta would misdeclare it as consumed fuel in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports,
with the saved fuel oil being siphoned and sold to other vessels out at sea. The proceeds
thereof were then divide by respondents among themselves. Hence, an investigation on the
alleged pilferage was conducted, which revealed for the period June 30, 1999 to February
15, 2000 fuel oil consumption was overstated.
Subsequently, a formal complaint for qualified theft was filed against respondents, which
respondents denied the charge by alleging that the complaint was based on conflicting and
erroneous computation/estimates of fuel consumption. CIDG referred the case to the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, which filed the corresponding Information for
Qualified Theft with the RTC.
Meanwhile, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension and after

administrative hearings, decided to terminate respondents from employment.
Respondents except Sales, were thus served with notices informing them of their
termination for serious misconduct, willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime or
offense against their employer. Respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, to
which the Labor Arbiter found that the dismissal of the respondents were illegal as the
filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against them did not justify their termination
from employment. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal With A Very Urgent Motion to
Reduce Bond before the NLRC and posted a cash bond. The NLRC denied petitioners’
motion to reduce bond and directing them to post an additional bond otherwise the appeal
would be dismissed. Petitioners failed to comply with the Order, prompting respondents
to move for the dismissal of the appeal. The NLRC later on reduced the amount of appeal
bond and gave due course to petitioner’s appeal. Respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration and petitioner their motion for partial reconsideration. The NLRC denied
the motion of the respondents and granted that of the petitioners. On appeal to CA, the
CA set aside the NLRC decision.
Issue:
a. Whether strict implementation of the rules may be relaxed to avoid miscarriage of

justice.
b. Whether the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid
cause.
Ruling:
Page 6 of 1553
a. In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary
award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may

be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid and
strict sense. This is especially true in labor cases wherein the substantial merits of the case
must accordingly be decided upon to serve the interest of justice. When there has been
substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is warranted.
In the case at bench, petitioners appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter awarding
to crewmembers the amount of P7,104,483.84 by filing a Notice of Appeal with a Very
Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond and posting a cash bond in the amount of P500,000.00 and
a supersedeas bond in the amount of P1.5 million. We find this to be in substantial
compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. It is true that the NLRC initially denied the
request for reduction of the appeal bond. However, it eventually allowed its reduction and
entertained petitioners’ appeal. We disagree with the CA in holding that the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion as the granting of a motion to reduce appeal bond lies within
the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of the reasonableness of the bond tendered
and the merits of the grounds relied upon. Hence, the NLRC did not err or commit grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of petitioners’ appeal before it.
b. In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or valid
cause rests on the employers. Failure on their part to discharge such burden will render the
dismissal illegal.
After examination of the evidence presented, however, we find that petitioners failed to
substantiate adequately the charges of pilferage against respondents. "[T]he quantum of
proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. x x x Substantial evidence
is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise."
Page 7 of 1553
Here, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the
dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the
degree of proof is met to justify respondents’ termination. The affidavit executed by
Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed
pilferage, which allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for
dismissing employees."54 The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support the
charge of pilferage. The findings made by GASLI’s port captain and internal auditor and
the resulting certification executed by De la Rama merely showed an overstatement of fuel
consumption as revealed in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports. The report of Jade Sea Land
Inspection Services only declares the actual usage and amount of fuel consumed for a
particular voyage. There are no other sufficient evidence to show that respondents
participated in the commission of a serious misconduct or an offense against their
employer.
However, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases
finds no application when the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal before shifting
to the employer the burden of proving the validity of such dismissal.
We give credence to petitioners’ claim that Sales was not dismissed from employment.
Unlike the other respondents, we find no evidence in the records to show that Sales was
preventively suspended, that he was summoned and subjected to any administrative
hearing and that he was given termination notice. From the records, it appears Sales was
not among those preventively suspended on February 26, 2000. To bolster this fact,
petitioners presented the Payroll Journal Register for the period March 1-15, 2000 showing
that Sales was still included in the payroll and was not among those who were charged with
an offense to warrant suspension. In fact, Sales’ signature in the Semi-Monthly Attendance
Report for February 26, 2000 to March 10, 2000proves that he continued to work as Chief
Mate for the vessel M/T Dorothy Uno along with a new set of crewmembers. It is likewise
worth noting that in the Supplemental Complaint Affidavit of Montegrico, Sales was not
included in the list of those employees who were accused of having knowledge of the
alleged pilferage. This only shows that he was never subjected to any accusation or
investigation as a prelude to termination. Hence, it would be pointless to determine the
legality or illegality of his dismissal because, in the first place, he was not dismissed from
employment.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 160758, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Page 8 of 1553
The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only
prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity
thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or above on
subsequent appeal. Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, reagitation,
reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court
has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even
on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed
in other cases. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or
issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
Facts:
Respondent applied for a loan from DBP to finance the development of its resort complex,
to which respondent executed a promissory note, real estate mortgage, and chattel
mortgage as security for the repayment of the loan. Also, prior to the release of the loan,
DBP required respondents to put up a cash equity for the construction of the buildings and
other improvements on the resort complex. Thereafter, the loan was released in several
instalments from which DBP withheld the interest. Respondent demanded the release of
the balance of the loan, but DBP refused and directly paid some suppliers of respondent
over its objection. Upon inspection, DBP found that the construction of the resort project
had not been completed, prompting DBP to demand from respondent the completion
thereof and warned respondent of foreclosing the property if the project could not be
completed. Nonetheless, respondent objected, causing DBP to initiate an extra-judicial
foreclosure over the property. Notice of foreclosure sale was sent to respondent, which was
soon published, leading to the clients of respondent to think that its business operation
had slowed down, and that its resort had closed.
Respondent sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance and to stop the
foreclosure of the mortgages, to which DBP moved for dismissal stating that the mortgaged
properties had been sold at a public auction to satisfy respondent’s obligation. As such,
respondent amended the complaint to seek nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and
cancellation of the certificate of sale, and thereafter trial ensued. Meantime, DBP applied
for the issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC, which the RTC initially denied but later
granted upon reconsideration. Feeling aggrieved, respondent assailed the decision via
certiorari before the CA, which CA dismissed causing DBP to seek the issuance of writ of
possession.
Page 9 of 1553
The RTC nullified the extra-judicial sales of the mortgaged properties, which the CA
sustained. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether law of the case doctrine is applicable.
Ruling:
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means,
more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule
of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon, 41 an American case,
thusly:
The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only
prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity
thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or above
on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason.
Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, re-agitation, re-examination, and
reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties
litigants were allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance
of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as
the law of a given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result
in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts
are allowed, if they so choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons. The administration of
justice is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial
use.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has
once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on
a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed
in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having
been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case
and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case,
Page 10 of 1553
like damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions
or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP's insistence
to be unwarranted.
To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance of the writ of
possession was entirely independent from the judicial demand for specific performance
herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the interlocutory appeal concerning the
issuance of the writ of possession while the main case was pending, was not at all
intertwined with any legal issue properly raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491,
which was the appeal to determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and
effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of
law involved herein because this case for specific performance was not a continuation of
C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAYMUNDO VIAJE, ET AL.

G.R. No.180993, January 27, 2016 [Reyes, J.]
The Court must exercise its equity jurisdiction and relax the rigid application of the rules
where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest.
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and as represented by
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), filed with the RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of
Title and Reconveyance. The RTC dismissed the case for failure of the Republic to appear
during pre-trial.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
OSG filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC. Subsequently, the
RTC issued an Order dated October 4, 2004 recalling its previous order that gave due
course to the OSG’s appeal. The ground for the recall was the OSG’s failure to indicate in
its notice of appeal the court to which the appeal was being directed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether a liberal application of the rules is proper under the circumstances.
Page 11 of 1553
RULING:
YES.
The Court cannot attribute error to the CA when it affirmed the RTC’s recall of its order
granting the OSG’s notice of appeal. The RTC simply applied the clear provisions of Section
5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which mandated that a "notice of appeal shall x x x specify
the court to which the appeal is being taken x x x." Nevertheless, under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, the Court resolves to relax the stringent application of the rules.
First, the OSG’s omission should not work against the Republic. For one, the OSG availed
of the proper remedy in seeking a review of the RTC’s order of dismissal by pursuing an
ordinary appeal and filing a notice of appeal, albeit without stating where the appeal will
be taken. For another, it is quite elementary that an ordinary appeal from a final
decision/order of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction can only be
elevated to the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the OSG's failure to
designate where the appeal will be taken was a case of inadvertence and does not appear
to be a dilatory tactic on its part. More importantly, the OSG's omission should not redound
to the Republic's disadvantage for it is a well-settled principle that the Republic is never
estopped by the mistakes or error committed by its officials or agents.
Second, the subject matter of the case before the RTC - the recovery by the Republic of a
342,842-sq m property in Cavite covered by an allegedly non-existent title - necessitates a
full-blown trial. To sustain the peremptory dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-1001 due to the
erroneous appreciation by the Republic's counsel of the applicable rules of procedure is an
abdication of the State's authority over lands of the public domain. The Court, therefore,
must exercise its equity jurisdiction and relax the rigid application of the rules where strong
considerations of substantial justice are manifest.
DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
Anonymous Complaint Against Otelia Lyn G. Maceda,

Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court, Palapag, Northern Samar
A.M. No. P-12-3093, March 26, 2014
J. Leonado-De Castro
A court employee who was charged with dishonesty cannot claim that the admission
of documentary evidence which were mere photocopies and were obtained without her
consent constitute a violation of her right to due process. Proceedings in administrative
investigation are not strictly governed by the technical rules of evidence. They are summary
in nature. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
Page 12 of 1553
strict judicial sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case
against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process,
what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard.
Facts:
An anonymous complainant filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) charging Maceda, Court Interpreter, MTC, Palapag, Northern Samar,
of falsifying her attendance in court so she could attend her law classes at UEP in Catarman,
Norther Samar.
The OCA referred the aforementioned letter-complaint to Executive Judge Falcotelo, who
later submitted a report finding recommending the dismissal of the letter-complaint
against Maceda, considering that Maceda pursued her law studies for self-improvement
and that Maceda merely relied on Judge Lagrimas’ permission for her to attend her classes
at UEP.
Upon receipt of Judge Falcotelo’s Report, the OCA directed Maceda to file her comment on
the letter-complaint against her. Maceda made a general denial of any wrongdoing in the
performance of her job and reporting of her official time, and that her only intention was
to enrich her knowledge in relation to her work in the judiciary by pursuing her law studies,
for which she was granted permission by the presiding judge of her court.
The OCA submitted its Report recommending that the instant administrative matter be
RE-DOCKETED as a regular complaint for Dishonesty against Maceda, Court; and that
respondent be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and be SUSPENDED for six (6) months
without pay, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. On October 15, 2012, the Court issued a
Resolution re-docketing the case as a regular administrative matter.
Issue:
Whether Maceda is guilty of dishonesty
Held:
Maceda questions the anonymity of the complainant and suspects that the complainant.
At the outset, we stress that an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution,
originating as it does from an unknown author. However, a complaint of such sort does not
always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may
Page 13 of 1553
be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by
other competent evidence. As this Court ruled in Anonymous Complaint Against Gibson
A. Araula10: Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases
are accepted in which the charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable
integrity, thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by complainant, whose
identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public
interest. x x x. Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary cannot be
countenanced. Hence, anonymous complaints of this nature should be acted upon by this
Court.
Second, Maceda contests the admissibility of the documentary evidence attached to the
letter-complaint, particularly, the photocopies of her certificate of registration at UEP; her
grades for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd year law subjects; and her Daily Time Records (DTRs) filed
with the court, for said documents were obtained without her authorization/consent or
that of the officers who are in custody of the documents. Maceda even insinuates the
possibility of a conspiracy between the complainant and the custodian of the said
documents.
Maceda’s opposition to the documentary evidence against her was grounded on how the
documents were obtained, but not on the falsity of the said documents or their contents.
Maceda argues that her consent was necessary for the release of copies of the documents
attached to the letter-complaint but she did not specifically cite the relevant court and
school rules to this effect. In so far as Maceda’s DTRs are concerned, these formed part of
her employee records, which the OCA and the Court can freely access even without her
consent.
Moreover, proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the

technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature. As we have declared in Office of
the Court Administrator v. Indar13: It is settled that “technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.” It is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
Maceda cannot claim that the admission and consideration of the documentary evidence
attached to the letter-complaint violated her right to due process. She undeniably had the
opportunity to contest the truth of the documents and/or submit controverting evidence
to the same, but she failed to do so.
Page 14 of 1553
Lastly, Maceda prays for additional time before resolution of this administrative matter so
she can engage the services of a lawyer to represent her. She points out that she was not
assisted by counsel in the earlier proceedings.
Maceda has knowingly and voluntarily participated in the administrative investigation

conducted by Judge Falcotelo, by the OCA, and finally, by this Court. The administrative
investigation began as early as November 10, 2010, but it was only in Maceda’s
Manifestation dated February 5, 2012 before this Court that she insisted on engaging the
services of a legal counsel. We can no longer accommodate Maceda’s request this far along
into the proceedings. Being a court employee and law student, Maceda is capable of
understanding the charges against her and adducing her defenses herself.
We already clarified in Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission the extent of the right to
counsel, thus: However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12
of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a

criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and
of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.
Maceda was accorded her right to due process during the administrative investigation
conducted in the instant case. She was given an opportunity to answer and be heard on the
charges against her, and that, it has often been said, is the essence of procedural due
process.
Now, we proceed to determining Maceda’s liability for falsification of her DTRs.
We see no reason to disturb the finding of the OCA that Maceda did indeed falsify her
DTRs and is, therefore, guilty of dishonesty.
Considering that Maceda has not been previously charged with an administrative offense
in her eleven (11) years in government service and that there is no proof of her being remiss
in the performance of her duties as court interpreter or causing specific damage or
Page 15 of 1553
prejudice to the court for her dishonest act, we find Maceda to be guilty of Less Serious
Dishonesty, for which the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is proper.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. JOSE T. CAPULONG

G.R. NO. 201643, MARCH 12, 2014
J. REYES
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on
the merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a
petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that
the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily
corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension,
we must not lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There
being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.
Facts:
The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Section 85 of R.A. No. 67136,
Perjury under Article 183 of the RPC, and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct under
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, filed on July 27, 2009, before
the Ombudsman by Joselito P. Fangon, Acting Director of the General Investigation Bureau
of the Ombudsman, against Capulong, Customs Operation Officer V of the Bureau of
Customs.
On March 30, 2011, Capulong received an undated Order issued by the Ombudsman placing
him under preventive suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is
terminated but shall not exceed six months effective from receipt of the Order. Capulong
filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Reconsider Order of Preventive Suspension with Motion to
Resolve.
Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening and coercive nature of
the Ombudsman’s order, Capulong, on April 19, 2011, filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA granted the petition and issued a TRO enjoining and prohibiting the Ombudsman
and any person representing them or acting under their authority from implementing the
preventive suspension order.
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman issued an order lifting Capulong’s preventive suspension. On

the same date, in the scheduled hearing, the Ombudsman’s representative manifested in
Page 16 of 1553
open court that the assailed order of preventive suspension had already been lifted, thus
the CA held in abeyance the application for preliminary injunction.
On July 29, 2011, the CA granted Capulong’s petition and dismissed the criminal charge.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter and can grant reliefs, whether
primary or incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of preventive
suspension
Held:
As a rule, it is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution
to the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. It is within the context of this well-
entrenched policy that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.
While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect
the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such
findings of fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is
clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing that the
administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious
and whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
These exceptions exist in this case and compel the appellate court to review the findings of
fact of the Ombudsman.
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against
Capulong does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts
from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation
of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the
merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a
petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true
Page 17 of 1553
that the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily
corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension,
we must not lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There
being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.
The decision of the appellate court to proceed with the merits of the case is included in
Capulong’s prayer for such “other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises.”
Such a prayer in the petition justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed
for. More importantly, we have ruled that it is the allegations in the pleading which
determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the
allegations and proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
Significantly, the power of adjudication, vested in the CA is not restricted to the specific
relief claimed by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said matter for determination
has been established by competent evidence during the hearing. The CA is not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that all disputes and other issues will
be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly
contained in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The Court, however, can substitute its own
judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, with a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its discretion
because it failed to sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of preventive
suspension. Capulong’s non-disclosure of his wife’s business interest does not constitute
serious dishonesty or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals that Capulong
deliberately placed “N/A” in his SALN despite knowledge about his wife’s business interest.
As explained by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the registration of the corporations
where his wife was an incorporator; hence, he deemed it not necessary to indicate it in his
SALN.
Ineluctably, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the
administrative complaint. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
However, the crime of perjury for which Capulong was charged, requires a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in a statement under oath or in an affidavit, and the
statement or affidavit in question here is Capulong's SALNs. It then becomes necessary to
Page 18 of 1553
consider the administrative charge against Capulong to determine whether or not he has
committed perjury. Therefore, with the dismissal of Capulong's administrative case, the CA
correctly dismissed its criminal counterpart since the crime of perjury which stemmed from
misrepresentations in his SALNs will no longer have a leg to stand on.
EDGAR BARROSO vs. HON. JUDGE GEORGE OMELIO, et al.

G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015, J. Peralta
The time-honored principle is that “no court has the power to interfere by injunction
with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The
various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should
not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less
with their orders or judgments.”
FACTS:
Edgar Barroso filed a complaint for sum of money, damages and attorney’s fees
against Dennis Li before the RTC of Davao City. Barroso’s prayer for writ of
attachment was approved. On the other hand, Li filed a counter-attachment bond
purportedly issued by private respondent Travellers Insurance & Surety
Corporation (TISC). Despite the compromise agreement perfected between the
parties during the trial, Li failed to pay the sum of money provided under said
judgment on the compromise agreement. Thus, Barroso filed a motion for
execution of Li’s obligation. The writ remained unsatisfied despite service by the
sheriff and Li filed a motion for execution of judgment upon the counterbond, a
copy of which was sent to TISC. Instead of appearing before the RTC, TISC filed a
separate case for declaration of nullity, prohibition, injunction and temporary
restraining order (TRO) against the sheriff and Barroso. Judge George Omelio
issued the writ. It should be noted that in one of Barroso’s pleadings, he alleged
that the counter-attachment bond is fake and has yet to be proven by TISC in the
proper forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or in excess of jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Yes. Verily, the issues in this case could have been competently resolved by the CA,
thus, the Court was initially inclined to reject taking cognizance of this case.
However, the Court cannot close its eyes to the unbecoming conduct exhibited by
Page 19 of 1553
Judge Omelio in obstinately issuing an injunction against the orders of a co-equal

court despite this Court's consistent reiteration of the time-honored principle that
"no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial
courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less
with their orders or judgments."The issue raised in this case, therefore, falls under
one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, i.e., where the order
complained of is a patent nullity.
Atty. Cabili v. Judge Balindong is closely analogous to the present case and it
states: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the
case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over Its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents,
and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting
in connection with this judgment.
Applying the foregoing ruling, it is quite clear that, in this case, the issuance of
the subject writ of preliminary injunction was improper and, thus, correctible by
certiorari. Herein Judge Omelio does not have jurisdiction to hinder the
enforcement of an order of a co-equal court. He must be aware that said co-equal
court had the exclusive jurisdiction or authority to correct its own issuances if ever
there was, indeed, a mistake. There is no question, therefore, that subject writ of
preliminary injunction is null and void. Further, had Judge Omelio not been
dismissed from the service in 2013 for gross ignorance of the law and violation of
judicial conduct, he could have been subjected to an investigation again for gross
ignorance due to his unprecedented acts in the case at bar.
JURISDICTION
DREAMLAND HOTEL RESORT AND WESTLEY J. PRENTICE vs. STEPHEN B.

JOHNSON
G.R. NO. 191455, MARCH 12, 2014
J. REYES
Page 20 of 1553
In an appeal to the SC of a CA decision dismissing a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer

for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
under Rule 47 for lack of proof of authority and affidavit of service of filing as required by
Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, the court held that “While it is desirable that the
Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses
that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to
ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they
seek which are the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the
parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the
operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should
no longer be subject to cavil.”
Facts:
Dreamland is a corporation engaged in the hotel, restaurant and allied businesses. Prentice
is its current President and Chief Executive Officer, while Respondent is an Australian
citizen who came to the Philippines as a businessman/investor without the authority to be
employed as the employee/officer of any business.
According to Johnson, he contacted petitioners to inquire on the terms for employment

offered in response to the petitioners’ advertisements for a resort manager for Dreamland
Hotel. It was Prentice who offered employment and convinced Johnson to give out a loan,
purportedly so the resort can be completed and operational by August 2007. Believing the
representations of petitioner, respondent accepted the employment as Resort Manager and
loaned money to petitioners to finish construction of the resort.
From the start of August 2007, as stipulated in the Employment Agreement, respondent
Johnson already reported for work. It was then that he found out that the resort was far
from finished. However, he was instructed to supervise construction and speak with
potential guests. Johnson remained unpaid since August 2007. He was also denied the
benefits promised him as part of his compensation. Johnson was also not given the
authority due to him as resort manager. Worse, he would even be berated and embarrassed
in front of the staff.
Thus, on November 3, 2007, respondent Johnson was forced to submit his resignation. In
deference to the Employment Agreement signed, Johnson stated that he was willing to
continue work for the three month period stipulated therein. However, in a text message
sent by Prentice to Johnson on the same day, he was informed that “… I consider [yo]ur
resignation as immediate”. Despite demand, petitioners refused to pay the salaries and
benefits due to Johnson.
Page 21 of 1553
On January 31, 2008, Johnson filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
salaries, among others, against the petitioners, where the LA rendered a Decision
dismissing Johnson’s complaint for lack of merit with the finding that he voluntarily
resigned from his employment and was not illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the
decision of the LA. Consequently, the petitioners elevated the NLRC decision to the CA by
way of Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 47, but the CA dismissed the petition for
lack of proof of authority and affidavit of service of filing as required by Section 13 of the
1997 Rules of Procedure. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition without giving due consideration to its
merits
Held:
The petition is partially granted.
“While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so
strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice.
If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because
of the higher objective they seek which are the attainment of justice and the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a
particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as
in the instant case, should no longer be subject to cavil.”
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. “From time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to
the Rules but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules
would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.” “It is true that procedural rules may be
waived or dispensed with in the interest of substantial justice.”
Brushing aside technicalities, in the utmost interest of substantial justice and taking into
consideration the varying and conflicting factual deliberations by the LA and the NLRC,
the Court shall now delve into the merits of the case.
As it could not be determined with absolute certainty whether or not Johnson rendered the
services he mentioned during the material time, doubt must be construed in his favor for
the reason that “the consistent rule is that if doubt exists between the evidence presented
Page 22 of 1553
by the employer and that by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of
the latter.” What is clear upon the records is that Johnson had already taken his place in
the hotel since July 2007.
The petitioners also maintain that they have paid the amount of P7,200.00 to Johnson for
his three weeks of service. Even so, the amount the petitioners paid to Johnson as his three-
week salary is significantly deficient as Johnson’s monthly salary as stipulated in their
contract is P60,000.00. In light of this deficiency, there is more reason to believe that the
petitioners withheld the salary of Johnson without a valid reason.
Another argument posited by the petitioners is that the employment contract executed by
the parties is inefficacious because the employment contract is subject to the presentation
of Johnson of his AEP and TIN.
Again, this statement is wanting of merit.
Johnson has adduced proof that as a permanent resident, he is exempted from the
requirement of securing an AEP. Anent the requirement of securing a TIN to make the
contract of employment efficacious, records show that Johnson secured his TIN only after
his resignation as operations manager. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that the
contract of employment had already become effective even prior to such date.
In addition to the foregoing, there is no stipulation in the employment contract itself that
the same shall only be effective upon the submission of AEP and TIN. The petitioners did
not present any proof to support this agreement prior to the execution of the employment
contract.
As regards the NLRC findings that Johnson was constructively dismissed and did not
abandon his work, the Court is in consonance with this conclusion with the following basis:
Even the most reasonable employee would consider quitting his job after working for three
months and receiving only an insignificant fraction of his salaries. There was, therefore, not
an abandonment of employment nor a resignation in the real sense, but a constructive
dismissal, which is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely x x x.
Since Johnson was constructively dismissed, he was illegally dismissed. An illegally

dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is
granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if
viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.
Page 23 of 1553
DIAMOND TAXI AND/OR BRYAN ONG vs. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR.

G.R. NO. 190724, MACRH 12, 2014
J. BRION
In this jurisdiction, courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual
findings of administrative agencies. These findings, however, are not infallible. This doctrine
espousing comity to administrative findings of facts cannot preclude the courts from
reviewing and, when proper, disregarding these findings of facts when shown that the
administrative body committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically or
arbitrarily disregarding evidence or circumstances of considerable importance that are
crucial or decisive of the controversy.
Facts:
Llamas worked as a taxi driver for petitioner. On July 18, 2005, Llamas filed before the Labor
Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners. In its position paper,
Petitioners argued that Llamas’ acts – traffic violations, insubordination and refusal to heed
management instructions – constitute grounds for the termination of Llamas’ employment.
Llamas failed to seasonably file his position paper. The LA rendered a decision dismissing
Llamas’ complaint for lack of merit.
Llamas received a copy of this LA decision on January 5, 2006. Meanwhile, he filed his
position paper on December 20, 2005. In his position paper, Llamas claimed that he failed
to seasonably file his position paper because his previous counsel, despite his repeated
pleas, had continuously deferred compliance with the LA’s orders for its submission.
Hence, he was forced to secure the services of another counsel on December 19, 2005 in
order to comply with the LA’s directive.
On January 16, 2006, Llamas filed before the LA a motion for reconsideration of its decision
dismissing Llama’ complaint. The LA treated Llamas’ motion as an appeal per Section 15,
Rule V of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules) (the
governing NLRC Rules of Procedure at the time Llamas filed his complaint before the LA).
The NLRC dismissed respondent Llamas’ appeal for nonperfection. This CA decision
reversed and set aside the resolution of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred when it reviewed the merits of the NLRC resolution
Held:

Page 24 of 1553
As presented by the petitioners, the petition before us involves mixed questions of fact and
law, with the core issue being one of fact. Whether the CA, in ruling on the labor case
before it under an original certiorari action, can make its own factual determination
requires the consideration and application of law and jurisprudence; it is essentially a
question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses.
In the context of this case, however, this legal issue is inextricably linked with and cannot
be resolved without the definitive resolution of the core factual issue – whether Llamas
abandoned his work or had been constructively dismissed. As a proscribed question of fact,
we generally cannot address this issue, except to the extent necessary to determine whether
the CA correctly found that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Llamas’ appeal on purely technical grounds.
For raising mixed questions of fact and law, we deny the petition outright. Even if this error
were to be disregarded, however, we would still deny the petition as we find the CA legally
correct in reversing the NLRC’s resolution on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
We agree that remanding the case to the NLRC for factual determination and decision of
the case on the merits would have been, ordinarily, a prudent approach. Nevertheless, the
CA’s action on this case was not procedurally wrong and was not without legal and
jurisprudential basis.
In this jurisdiction, courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of
administrative agencies. These findings, however, are not infallible. This doctrine
espousing comity to administrative findings of facts cannot preclude the courts from
reviewing and, when proper, disregarding these findings of facts when shown that the
administrative body committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically or
arbitrarily disregarding evidence or circumstances of considerable importance that are
crucial or decisive of the controversy.
Hence, in labor cases elevated to it via petition for certiorari, the CA can grant this
prerogative writ when it finds that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in arriving
at its factual conclusions. To make this finding, the CA necessarily has to view the evidence
if only to determine if the NLRC ruling had basis in evidence. It is in the sense and manner
that the CA, in a Rule 65 certiorari petition before it, had to determine whether grave abuse
of discretion on factual issues attended the NLRC’s dismissal of Llamas’ appeal.
Accordingly, we do not find erroneous the course that the CA took in resolving Llamas’
certiorari petition. The CA may resolve factual issues by express legal mandate and
pursuant to its equity jurisdiction.
Page 25 of 1553
In sum, the CA correctly found equitable grounds to warrant relaxation of the rule on
perfection of appeal (filing of the certificate of nonforum shopping) as there was patently
absent sufficient proof for the charge of abandonment. Accordingly, we find the CA legally
correct in reversing and setting aside the NLRC's resolution rendered in grave abuse of
discretion.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMMANUEL OÑATE

G.R. NO. 192371, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
a. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Thus, the test of
whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise,
it is a question of fact.
b. Before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to the
hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them must establish that: (1) the person who
made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made
at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to
know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were made in the professional capacity or in the
course of duty of the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course
of business or duty. In the case, Land Bank neither identified the persons who made the entries
in the passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify. While the
deposit entries in the bank’s passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity,
they are mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein
Facts:
From 1978 to 1980, Oñate opened and maintained seven trust accounts with Land Bank,
with each trust account being covered by an Investment Management Account (IMA) with
full discretion and corresponding passbook. It is indicated in the IMA that petitioner was
appointed as respondents agent to hold, invest and reinvest respondent’s fund and keep
the same invested, in the sole discretion of petitioner. However, in a letter, petitioner
demanded from respondent the return ofP4 million it claimed to have been inadvertently
deposited to respondent’s trust account, to which respondent refused. With the parties
failure to settle the miscrediting matter, petitioner soon unilaterally applied the
outstanding balance in all of resondent’s trust accounts against his resulting indebtedness
by reason of the "miscrediting" of funds, thereby exhausting all of respondent’s accounts,
Page 26 of 1553
without however, satisfying the obligation. Hence, to recoup the remaining balance of
Oñate’s indebtedness, Land Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against respondent,
to which respondent denied knowledge or involvement between petitioner and its clients,
and asserted that petitioner made a setoff without legal and factual bases. Respondent
further claimed that the funds in his accounts came from legitimate sources and was
unaware with the alleged miscrediting. Upon respondent’s motion, the RTC issued an
Order creating a Board of Commissioners to examine the records of respondent’s seven
trust accounts, as well as to determine the total amount of deposits, withdrawals, funds
invested, earnings, and expenses incurred.
Reports were submitted by the board, and as summarized by the RTC it found that the
reports revealed that there were undocumented and over withdrawals and drawings from
respondent’s trust accounts. Respondent asserted that the undocumented withdrawals
should not be considered as cash outflows, but instead it should be treated as unauthorized
transactions which must be credited back to his accounts. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed
petitioner’s complaint but explained that under IMA, petitioner had the authority to
withdraw funds from respondent’s account even without a letter of instruction or
withdrawal slip from respondent. Further, RTC denied petitioner’s claim for negative
balances as it was never sought in the complaint. The CA denied petitioner’s appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argued that under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the entries in the
passbooks must be accepted as proof of the regularity of the transactions reflected in the
trust accounts for they were made in the regular course of business. On the contrary,
respondent argued that the argument of petitioner raises question of fact which is not
proper under a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
a. Whether the petition raises question of fact.

b. Whether the entries in the passbook are sufficient to meet the rule on presumption of
regularity of entries in the course of business, under Section 43, Rule 130.
Ruling:
a. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue
Page 27 of 1553
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to
such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, none exists in this case.
Anent Land Bank’s contention that the determination of whether the CA erred in
retroactively applying the 2008 MORB poses a legal question, the same deserves scant
consideration. True, the CA included in its ratio decidendi a discussion on the 2008 MORB
to give emphasis to the duties of banks to keep an accurate record and regularly apprise
their clients of the status of their accounts. But the issue of whether Land Bank failed to
comply with those duties can be resolved even without the MORB as the same duties are
also imposed on Land Bank by the IMAs, the contract that primarily governs the parties in
this case. "As a general rule, a contract is the law between the parties. Thus, ‘from the
moment the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfilment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.’ Also, ‘the stipulations of the contract
being the law between the parties, courts have no alternative but to enforce them as they
were agreed [upon] and written’."
Based on the factual milieu of this case even without touching on the MORB, we found that
Land Bank still failed to perform its bounden duties to keep accurate records and render
regular accounting. We also found no cogent reason to disturb the other factual findings
of the CA.
b. But before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to
the hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them must establish that: (1) the
person who made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the
entries were made at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer; (3) the entrant
was in a position to know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were made in the
professional capacity or in the course of duty of the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made
in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Here, Land Bank has neither identified the persons who made the entries in the passbooks
nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify as required by Section
43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Also, and as correctly opined by the CA, "while the
deposit entries in the bank’s passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity,"
the same do "not indicate or explain the source of the funds being deposited or withdrawn
Page 28 of 1553
from an individual account." They are mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein –
the dates of the transactions, the amounts deposited or withdrawn, and the outstanding
balances. They do not establish that the total amount of P4,086,888.89 deposited in
Oñate’s Trust Account No. 01-125 in November 1980 came from the proceeds of the pre-
terminated loans of Land Bank’s corporate borrowers. It would be too presumptuous to
immediately conclude that said amount came from the checks paid to Land Bank by its
corporate borrowers just because the maturity dates of the loans coincided with the dates
said total amount was deposited. There must be proof showing an unbroken link between
the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans and the amount allegedly "miscredited" to
Oñate’s Trust Account No. 01-125. As a bank and custodian of records, Land Bank could
have easily produced documents showing that its borrowers pre-terminated their loans,
the checks they issued as payment for such loans, and the deposit slips used in depositing
those checks. But it did not.
SPOUSES TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN

G.R. No. 204970, February 01, 2016 [Del Castillo, J.]
While petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for specific
performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the
cancellation of Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627. In other words, petitioners' aim in filing Civil
Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed ownership and title to the subject property,
which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein.
FACTS:
Petitioners Trayvilla filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against
respondent Bernardo Sejas to compel Sejas to execute a final deed of sale over a certain
property allegedly sold to them and transfer the same to them. In an Amended Complaint,
this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and damages, petitioners impleaded
respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional defendant, claiming that Sejas
subsequently sold the subject property to her. However, the additional docket fees for the
moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise, for the
additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid.
Respondents moved for dismissal of the case arguing that petitioners' case was not
for specific performance but was in reality a real action or one involving title to and
possession of real property, in which case the value of the property should be alleged in the
complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be computed and paid; that since the
Page 29 of 1553
value of the land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper filing fee was not
paid. RTC denied the Motion. CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and dismissed the Amended
Complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the complaint by reason of alleged non-
payment of the correct docket fees.
RULING:
NO. While petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for
specific performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as
the cancellation of Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627. In other words, petitioners' aim in filing
Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed ownership and title to the subject
property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein.
Since Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint
later filed, petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
relative to declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax
declaration or zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such
allegation was made in the Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject property as
stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the Amended Complaint
should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid.
The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required
declaration of the fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or first level court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since the jurisdiction of
these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property.
However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could

rely on the declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at
P6,000.00. The handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the
property was purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the
civil case against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in
the absence of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR. Since the value of the
Page 30 of 1553
subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the RTC did
not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance; it should have dismissed
Civil Case No. 4633-2K5. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of the case, the
trial court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
JOSE ROMULO L. FRANCISCO v. LOYOLA PLANS CONSOLIDATED INC.

G.R. No. 194134, February 01, 2016 [Peralta, J.]
In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent upon: (1) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA's
initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (2) voluntary submission of the respondent
to the CA's jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco filed before the NLRC a case for illegal dismissal against
respondents. The Labor Arbiter ruled for the petitioner. The NLRC affirmed with
modifications the ruling of the LA. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the NLRC. The CA issued a Resolution
dated September 17, 2008 directing petitioner to file the necessary attachments, a copy of
which was served upon respondents. In another Resolution dated October 14, 2008, the CA
ordered respondents to file their comment on the petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from notice.
On October 28, 2008, respondents' counsel filed a Manifestation and Motion
denying any legal relations with respondent Monzon. It averred that respondent Monzon
has ceased to be in the employ of respondent Loyola and had not made any communication
with Loyola or its counsel. However, the CA denied the said motion. It held that without
any withdrawal of counsel filed before the CA, the latter's legal representation of
respondent Monzon subsists. Thereafter, respondents' counsel filed an Ex Parte Motion to
withdraw as counsel of individual respondent Monzon. The CA granted the motion in its
Minute Resolution and ordered that Monzon should be furnished with the copy of the said
resolution for compliance.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed the case with respect to Monzon. It held that the
CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Monzon since the copy of the Resolution
dated July 21, 2009 mailed to Monzon's address of record was returned unclaimed. Hence,
this Petition.
Page 31 of 1553
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the case with respect to Monzon on the ground
that it did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
RULING:
YES. In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent upon: (1) the service of the order or resolution indicating
the CA's initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (2) voluntary submission of the
respondent to the CA's jurisdiction.
In this case, records disclose that the CA served its Resolution dated September 17,
2008 indicating its initial action on the petition before it, directing petitioner to file
certified copies of the parties' position papers, among others. The said order was sent to
Monzon through his counsel of record. Case law instructs that when a client is represented
by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client.
However, the counsel of respondents denied its representation of Monzon in a
Motion and Manifestation dated October 28, 2008, or after the receipt of the Resolution
dated October 14, 2008 of the CA directing them to file their comment. It was only on May
8, 2009 that the counsel of respondents formally filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel of Monzon. Hence, prior to such notice of withdrawal as counsel, the CA aptly
held that without notice of withdrawal of counsel filed by Monzon or his counsel, the CA
rightly assumed that counsel of record continues to represent Monzon.
Considering that the CA had issued a Resolution dated September 17, 2008 directing
petitioner to file the necessary attachments, the resolution indicating the initial action
taken by the CA, it cannot be denied that respondents were already aware of the certiorari
proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired over their person. Thus,
the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties.
Therefore, the CA erred in dismissing the case with respect to Monzon on the
ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over his person when its minute resolution
granting the withdrawal of counsel was returned unclaimed. The CA acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Monzon upon the service of the resolution indicating its initial action to
his counsel of record.
Page 32 of 1553
WILFREDO DE VERA, et al. vs. SPOUSES SANTIAGO, et al.

G.R. No. 179457, June 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Section 19(2) of BP 129 provides that the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds P50,000.00 except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts; On the other hand, Section 33
(3) of BP 120 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00 or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50,000.00 exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended
by R.A. No. 7691)
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession with damages

against respondents before the MTC. Petitioners alleged that they are the respective owners
of and have been in actual, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation of the disputed
property for more than 30 years already without disturbance from any third person, thus,
making the same private property. Later on, however, they discovered that the said
property was already covered by Free Patent Titles in the names of respondents. Petitioners
contend that the Bureau of Lands has no jurisdiction to issue the said Free Patent titles
over the same for not being public land, thus, making them null and void. Respondents
alleged that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. As the combined assessed value of
the disputed land is more than P20,000.00, the case is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Page 33 of 1553
Ruling:
NO. In their complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages,
petitioners failed to indicate the assessed value of the subject real property. At any rate,
based on the Tax Declarations attached to their complaint, the disputed land has a
total assessed value of P54,370.00. In line with the jurisdictional provisions under BP 129,
therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners' civil action involving title to a real
property outside Metro Manila with a total assessed value in excess of P20,000.00. While
the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance
and recovery of ownership and possession of a land with an assessed value over P20,000.00,
the same cannot be said of its ruling with respect to the RTC. Under Section 8, Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC.
JESUS VELASQUEZ v. SPOUSES PATERNO C. CRUZ AND ROSARIO CRUZ

G.R. No. 191479 September 29, 2015, Perez, J.
Jurisdiction is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and

the law. A court does not lose its jurisdiction when a party simply raises as a defense
the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Facts:
In 1985, Jesus’ father-in-law relinquished his tenancy rights over the

parcel of land in Hagonoy, Bulacan, registered under the names of Sps. Cruz.
Although no other person was installed as tenant since then, the Sps. Cruz were
shocked to discover that Jesus Velasquez was already possessing the lot during
the interim without paying a single centavo for the rent of the land. In 1995, Sps.
Cruz leased the said farmland to a third person, but Jesus still refused to vacate
the property. This prompted Sps. Cruz to file a complaint for recovery of
possession against Jesus Velasquez before the RTC, alleging the above-stated
facts. Jesus filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss, contending that jurisdiction
pertains to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
since the controversy is an agrarian dispute. Jesus claimed that he was assisting
his father-in-law since 1975 and continued tilling the land until after the death
of his father-in-law. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
Page 34 of 1553
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ruling:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the
law, regardless if the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
reliefs sought. A court does not lose its jurisdiction when a party simply raises as
a defense the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely to
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown
to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Here, the averments of Sps.
Cruz, if taken to be true, establishes an action for recovery of possession or accion
pauliana. The allegations of Sps. Cruz that as registered owners, they were
deprived of lawful possession of the property by Jesus Velasquez for more than
one year clearly sets out a case for accion pauliana.
The case should also not be dismissed even if a hearing be made on the
existence of the tenancy relationship. For DARAB to have jurisdiction, there
must be an agrarian dispute. An agrarian dispute requires a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to arise,
all elements must be present: (1) Parties: landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) Subject Matter: an agricultural land; (3) consent
between the partiesto the relationship; (4) Purpose: bring about
agricultural production; (5) personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) sharing of harvest between the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee. In this case, there is neither consent nor an
agreement to share harvest between Sps. Cruz (landowners) and Jesus
Velasquez (tenant).
Calero, Aecaya Christine V. LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO

PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL,
PETOY BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD,
RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, and MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners, v. RAMON
ABERASTURI , CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A . LOPEZ, MERCEDES
L . GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ , EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA
S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A .VELEZ,
Page 35 of 1553
CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ ,

CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON, ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A.
ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A.
ASUNCION , ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ,
ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS,
CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA
CARMENCITA
T. LOPEZ, and as represented by attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015, Peralta, J.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and

determined by the allegations in the complaint.
FACTS:
Petitioners except for Brazil and Macapayag are members of Talaandig tribe who
claimed to have been living since birth on the land in Bukidnon, which they
inherited from their forefathers. Respondents claimed to be the lawful owners
and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land which appears to
be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe. Respondents filed
an original complaint for accion reivindicatoria against petitioners with the RTC.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. Respondents filed a Motion to Amend the complaint to
one for injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction
therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint
RULING:
Yes. In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has
jurisdiction, the Court considers the principle “that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, respondents
traced the provenance of their title to a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a
Deed of Sale. Together with their predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously
paid the real estate taxes and that they have been in possession of said land in
the concept of owners for more than 50 years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They
Page 36 of 1553
claimed that by means of fraud and stealth, petitioners entered the said land,
caused damages and harassed respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their
farm workers. In their amended complaint for injunction and damages,
respondents further alleged that petitioners harassed, intimidated, threatened,
and fired high-powered rifles upon respondents' farm workers to drive them
away from the land, without legal or justifiable reason. After a perusal of the
allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court
notes that respondents neither alleged that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs
nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains
of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint make up for
an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real
property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their
amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The mere fact that this case involves members
of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the
jurisdiction of the NCIP. Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall
have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only
when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper
Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners
belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus,
the RTC has jurisdiction.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) v.

JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015, J. Brion
When the cause of action has no reasonable connection with any of the claims
provided for in Article 224 of the Labor Code, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular
courts. Here, since Josephine's cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort under
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code, the civil courts (not the labor
tribunals) have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
Facts:
Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain
Colin R. Harrington opened a savings account with said branch in January
1985.The following day, Harrington presented 2 genuine bank drafts dated January
3, 1985, issued by the Bank of New Zealand. Upon receipt of the bank drafts,
Page 37 of 1553
Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts
payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the savings
account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving
from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of
the amounts reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip. On two
(2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington
withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered
that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to
pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action

should be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. After
due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding
Josephine grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of
established operating procedures. The memorandum required Josephine to pay the
amount of P50,600.00 through deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and
profit sharing until the amount is fully paid. Josephine filed a complaint for damages
with prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed
that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the
amount the bank had to pay Harrington. PCIB argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case because it was a labor dispute, which the labor tribunals
are more competent to resolve.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Josephine's complaint

despite the fact that her cause of action arose because her employer arbitrarily
deducted from her salary - an act expressly prohibited by our labor laws
Ruling:
Yes. Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiters have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual, moral,
exemplary, and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations.
Nevertheless, when the cause of action has no reasonable connection with any of
the claims provided for in Article 224 of the Labor Code, jurisdiction over the action
is with the regular courts. Here, since Josephine's cause of action is based on a quasi-
delict or tort under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code, the civil courts
(not the labor tribunals) have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages against the PCIB based on how her
employer quickly concluded that she was negligent and hence arbitrarily started
Page 38 of 1553
to deduct from her salary. Clearly, without having to dwell on the merits of the
case, Josephine opted to invoke the jurisdiction of our civil courts because her right
to fair treatment was violated. If the dismissal was done anti- socially or
oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondent violated Article 1701 of
the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against
the other, and Article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is
provided in article 2219, no. 10. Hence, the case at bar is intrinsically concerned
with a civil dispute because it has something to do with Josephine's right under
Article 19 of the Civil Code, and does not involve an existing employer-employee
relation within the meaning of Article 224 of the Labor Code. Josephine's complaint
was, therefore, properly filed with and exclusively cognizable by the RTC.
Province of Leyte v. Energy Development Corporation

G.R. No. 203124, June 22, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent upon: a) the service of the order or resolution indicating
the CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or b) the voluntary
submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction under Section 4, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court.
Facts:
Province of Leyte issued four separate franchise tax assessments against

EDC which the latter protested. When the Province of Leyte effectively denied
all protests, EDC appealed such denials before the RTC however despite the
pendency of cases Province of Leyte issued another tax assessment against EDC
prompting the latter in filing a Motion for the issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injuction enjoining Province of Leyte from assessing, or attempting to assess,
collection or attempting to collect franchise taxes until the pending cases shall
have been resolved with finality which was later on granted by RTC. It was later
on appealed to CA through a petition for certiorari but CA dismissed the petition
on the ground that there was no proper proof of service of the petition to adverse
party and the registry receipts can hardly be considered sufficient proper proof
of receipt by the addressee of registered mail. Thus, CA has failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the case
Issue
Whether the CA has acquired jurisdiction over the case
Page 39 of 1553
Ruling:
YES. Consequently, records reveal that CA served its Resolution indicating

its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it directing
EDC to file a comment to the petition. In fact EDC complied with such directive
by filing its comment. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both
parties in the instant case. Thus, the dismissal of the case by the CA was not
proper.
ABNER MANGUBAT v. BELEN MORGA-SEVA

G.R. No. 202611, November 23, 2015, J. Del Castillo
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished

from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not
the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise
of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
Facts:
On March 5, 1974, Gaudencio Mangubat and his wife Aurelia Rellora-Mangubat filed
with the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages against Belen Morga- Seva and two other defendants. Gaudencio, assisted
by Atty. Herrera and Belen by Atty. Relativo, entered into a Compromise
Agreement which provides that upon payment by Belen, the plaintiffs will transfer
the title to Belen. The RTC approved the Compromise Agreement and in 2001,
rendered a Decision in accordance therewith. Upon its finality, the Writ of
Execution was ordered by the said court. In 2003, Belen handed to Atty. Herrera
her payment of P91,280.00 in accordance with the Compromise Agreement.
Alleging, however, that the heirs refused to convey to Belen the lot covered by the
subject title, the RTC, upon motion of Atty. Herrera, directed Abner, who was
allegedly in possession of the owner's copy of the title, to surrender the same to
the Clerk of Court. Abner, however, manifested that as far as he is concerned, Belen
has not yet made any payment to the heirs as he was not notified by Atty. Herrera
of the same. Abner then terminated the services of Atty. Herrera.Subsequently
and purportedly in behalf of all the heirs, Abner, through Atty. Vista-Gumba, filed
a Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void.It was alleged therein
that Gaudencio acted only on his own behalf when he entered into the compromise
agreement with Belen, hence, the same is null and void for want of consent and
participation of the heirs who were indispensable parties.
Page 40 of 1553
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the case when its February
23, 2001 Decision became final, hence, any issuance subsequent thereto is made
without any jurisdiction.
Ruling
No. Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or
final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Here, it is undisputed
that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Abner, he having asked for
affirmative relief therefrom several times. As mentioned, what Abner questions is
the RTC's jurisdiction over the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment based
on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional
discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of
or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the
petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.
It is settled that once jurisdiction has been acquired, it is not lost until the court
shall have disposed of the case in its entirety. Abner's predecessor having elected
to enforce the compromise agreement, the RTC is still vested with jurisdiction until
compliance therewith has been fully enforced. Abner clearly confused lack of
jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as
the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered
therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal. The error raised by Abner pertains to the trial court's exercise of its
jurisdiction, not its lack of authority to decide the case. In a petition for annulment
of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an
abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear and
decide the case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant the petition
for annulment of judgment.
Page 41 of 1553
SPOUSES ERORITA vs. SPOUSES DUMLAO

G.R. No. 195477, January 25, 2016 [Brion, J.]
Although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations
contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for
unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s
assessed value. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case. Since a decision rendered by a
court without jurisdiction is void, the RTC’s decision is void.
FACTS:
Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) against Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita.The RTC decided in the
Spouses Dumlao’s favor. Spouses Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint
patently shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. On appeal, Spouses Erorita essentially argue that the RTC had
no jurisdiction because the allegations in the complaint show a case for unlawful detainer.
In their comment, the respondents argue that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction because this
case involves issues other than physical possession; (b) even assuming the RTC initially had
no jurisdiction, the petitioners’ active participation during the proceedings bar them from
attacking jurisdiction; and (c) this last issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
NO.
The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction
changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by
raising other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction.
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the
defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance;
(b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the
defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the
plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property. A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property
Page 42 of 1553
will not be considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional
facts is omitted.
A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the
petitioners to continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand
letter dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or
vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses
Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last demand to vacate
(February 12, 2004).
Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations
assessed value.
Considering that the complaint clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer
case, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this
case. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, the RTC’s decision
is void.
2. Whether the issue of jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal.
NO.
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or
even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by
laches. Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if
the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction
was raised for the first time after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had
been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the
proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the
movant.
In Figueroa v. People, the Court ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not
sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the
appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to apply. Laches
refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it."
Page 43 of 1553
The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application
of the estoppel by laches doctrine. As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTC’s
jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before
the CA does not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to
attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings
contemplated in Tijam. Thus, the general rule should apply. The petitioners timely
questioned the RTC's jurisdiction.
Heirs of Danilo Arrienda, Rosa G. Arienda, et al. vs. Rosario Kalaw

G.R. No. 204314, April 6, 2016
Under BP 129, RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by first level
courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, in the present case, when the RTC
took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment
suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law.
Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as the RTC has,
beyond question, jurisdiction to decide the appeal and its decision should be deemed
promulgated in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
FACTS:
On January 18, 2001, Danilo Arrienda (Arrienda) filed against herein respondent and three
other persons a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Calauan, Laguna. He claimed that he owned a parcel of land wherein he allowed
respondent and other persons to occupy, subject to the condition that they will
immediately vacate the same upon prior notice by Arrienda that he will be needing it. Later
on, Arrienda, informed respondent and the other defendants of his intention to use the
subject land; despite repeated demands, respondent and the other defendants failed and
refused to vacate the disputed premises. Hence, the complaint, praying that respondent
and the other defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and restore possession thereof
to Arrienda and payment of rent and damages.
The MTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Arrienda appealed the dismissal before the RTC, which dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over Arrienda's appeal of the MTC Decision
Page 44 of 1553
RULING:
1. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang. 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), as amended by Republic Act No.
7691 (RA 7691), RTCs are endowed with original and appellate jurisdictions. The
RTCs’ exclusive original jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to or possession of
real property or any interest therein. However, based on the amendments
introduced by RA 7691, real actions no longer reside under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTCs. Under the said amendments, Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTCs) now have jurisdiction over real actions if the assessed value of the property
involved does not exceed P20,000.00, or in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed P50,000.00. Otherwise, if the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00 or
P50,000.00, as the case may be, jurisdiction is with the RTC.
On the other hand, under BP 129, RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by first level courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, in the
present case, when the RTC took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal from the adverse
decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising
its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce, its decision may not be
annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as the RTC has, beyond question,
jurisdiction to decide the appeal and its decision should be deemed promulgated in
the exercise of that jurisdiction.
2. The assessed value of the disputed lot is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s
appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, all cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable
to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
3. It is also within the RTC's competence to make this finding in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, as it would, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
The Wellex Group, Inc. vs. Sheriff Edgardo A. Urieta of the Sandiganbayan Security
and Sheriff Services, et al.
G.R. No. 211098, April 20, 2016
FACTS:
Wellex obtained a loan from the IMA Account with BDO. As security for the loan, Wellex
mortgaged WPI shares. Wellex defaulted on its obligation to pay upon maturity. BDO, as
investment manager of the IMA Account, did not institute any foreclosure proceeding
Page 45 of 1553
against the WPI shares. Thereafter, BDO, informed Wellex that it shall cease to manage
the IMA Account and that the· Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a Notice of
Constructive Distraint against the IMA Account, which effectively froze the WPI shares,
which BOO could consequently neither remove nor dispose of without the express
authority of the BIR.
Subsequently, Wellex alleged that considering that BDO had relinquished its authority to
act as the investment manager of the IMA Account, and that Wellex had supposedly settled
its loan obligation in full directly as the principal of the IMA Account, should return the
WPI shares to Wellex. BDO, however, did not.
In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 found former President
Estrada guilty of the crime of plunder. The conviction ultimately carried with it the penalty
of forfeiture, wherein all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Estrada, including
the IMA Account and the assets therein, were forfeited in favor of the State. Consequently,
the Sandiganbayan, in the same case directed the forfeiture of, among others, the IMA
Account, including the WPI shares in favor of the State. Wellex sought to intervene in
Criminal Case No. 26558 and moved for the reconsideration of the above-mentioned
Resolution ordering the forfeiture.
Wellex filed Civil Case No. 09-399 with the trial court for the recovery of the possession of
the WPI shares. The Sandiganbayan Security and Sheriff Servicesfiled their respective
motions to dismiss in Civil Case No. 09-399, which motions were granted by the trial court
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction based on the principle of hierarchy of courts, and
failure to state a cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in its ruling dismissing Civil Case No. 09-399
RULING:
Yes. The case before the trial court does not involve the civil aspect of Criminal Case No.
26558. The same has nothing to do with the ownership of the IMA Account and/or any of
its financial assets, which, as ·stated above, has been adjudged forfeited in favor of the State.
In contrast, the said case is an ordinary civil case entailing the propriety of the actions of a
creditor in proceeding against the security for its loan, which necessitates the application
of the provisions of the Civil Code, therefore falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts.
Page 46 of 1553
This involves the third (3rd) party claim of Wellex against the WPI shares vis-a-vis the loan
obligation per se, which should be properly lodged before and heard by the regular trial
courts. It is clear that the same does not pertain to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and the right to act in a case, is conferred by the
Constitution and by law. Although the Sandiganbayan, a constitutionally-mandated court,
is a regular court, it has, nevertheless, only a special or limited jurisdiction.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS v. FELICIANO P. LEGASPI

G.R. No. 205966, March 02, 2016 [PERALTA, J.]
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to possession of real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the
amount of the property is not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration of
the property in question showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00.
FACTS:
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and
damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction). Respondent Legaspi
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action
because the complaint, a real action, failed to allege the assessed value of the subject
property. Petitioner BSP claimed that since the subject property contains an area of
4,838,736 square meters, it is unthinkable that said property would have an assessed value
of less than P20,000.00 which is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts.
Petitioner BSP further stated that a tax declaration showing the assessed value of
P28,538,900.00 and latest zonal value of P145,162,080.00 was attached to the complaint.
RTC denied the Motion. The CA reversed and dismissed BSP’s complaint. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case
No. 209-M-2008.
RULING:
YES.
Page 47 of 1553
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to possession of real
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Petitioner BSP insists that the property involved has
an assessed value of more than P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax Declaration attached to the
complaint. Incidentally, the complaint, on its face, is devoid of any amount that would
confer jurisdiction over the RTC.
The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property, however, is
not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration of the property in question
showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes
to a complaint are deemed part of, and should be considered together with the complaint.
In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also consider the
attachments to the complaint. Hence, being an annex to BSP's complaint, the tax
declaration showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a part of the complaint
and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction.
In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in taking judicial notice
of the assessed value of the subject property. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts
and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of
the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of
related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. Since a copy
of the tax declaration, which is a public record, was attached to the complaint, the same
document is already considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can now take
judicial notice of such..
Considering that the area of the subject land is four million eight hundred thirty-eight
thousand seven hundred and thirty-six (4,838,736) square meters, the RTC acted properly
when it took judicial notice of the total area of the property involved and the prevailing
assessed value of the titled property, and it would also be at the height of absurdity if the
assessed value of the property with such an area is less than P20,000.00.
SPOUSES TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN

Page 48 of 1553
interest therein.
FACTS:
Petitioners Trayvilla filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against
respondent Bernardo Sejas to compel Sejas to execute a final deed of sale over a certain
property allegedly sold to them and transfer the same to them. In an Amended Complaint,
this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and damages, petitioners impleaded
respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional defendant, claiming that Sejas
subsequently sold the subject property to her. However, the additional docket fees for the
moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise, for the
additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid.
Respondents moved for dismissal of the case arguing that petitioners' case was not for
specific performance but was in reality a real action or one involving title to and possession
of real property, in which case the value of the property should be alleged in the complaint
in order that the proper filing fee may be computed and paid; that since the value of the
land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper filing fee was not paid. RTC
denied the Motion. CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and dismissed the Amended Complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the complaint by reason of alleged non-payment of

the correct docket fees.
RULING:
NO.
interest therein.
Page 49 of 1553
Since Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later
filed, petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative
to declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or
zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made
in the Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject property as stated in the
handwritten document sued upon and restated in the Amended Complaint should be the
basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid.
The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required declaration
of the fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the
property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or first level court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since the jurisdiction of these courts is
determined on the basis of the value of the property.
However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the
declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000.00. The
handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was
purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case
against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence
of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR. Since the value of the subject
property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance; it should have dismissed Civil Case
No. 4633-2K5. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of the case, the trial court
clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
JOSE ROMULO L. FRANCISCO v. LOYOLA PLANS CONSOLIDATED INC.

G.R. No. 194134, February 01, 2016 [Peralta, J.]
In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent upon: (1) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA's
initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (2) voluntary submission of the respondent
to the CA's jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco filed before the NLRC a case for illegal dismissal against respondents.
The Labor Arbiter ruled for the petitioner. The NLRC affirmed with modifications the
ruling of the LA. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking
the nullification of the Resolution of the NLRC. The CA issued a Resolution dated
Page 50 of 1553
September 17, 2008 directing petitioner to file the necessary attachments, a copy of which
was served upon respondents. In another Resolution dated October 14, 2008, the CA
ordered respondents to file their comment on the petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from notice.
On October 28, 2008, respondents' counsel filed a Manifestation and Motion denying any
legal relations with respondent Monzon. It averred that respondent Monzon has ceased to
be in the employ of respondent Loyola and had not made any communication with Loyola
or its counsel. However, the CA denied the said motion. It held that without any withdrawal
of counsel filed before the CA, the latter's legal representation of respondent Monzon
subsists. Thereafter, respondents' counsel filed an Ex Parte Motion to withdraw as counsel
of individual respondent Monzon. The CA granted the motion in its Minute Resolution and
ordered that Monzon should be furnished with the copy of the said resolution for
compliance.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed the case with respect to Monzon. It held that the CA did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Monzon since the copy of the Resolution dated
July 21, 2009 mailed to Monzon's address of record was returned unclaimed. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the case with respect to Monzon on the ground that it
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
RULING:
YES.
In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent upon: (1) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA's initial
action on the petition to the respondent; or (2) voluntary submission of the respondent to
the CA's jurisdiction.
In this case, records disclose that the CA served its Resolution dated September 17, 2008
indicating its initial action on the petition before it, directing petitioner to file certified
copies of the parties' position papers, among others. The said order was sent to Monzon
through his counsel of record. Case law instructs that when a client is represented by
counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client.
Page 51 of 1553
However, the counsel of respondents denied its representation of Monzon in a Motion and
Manifestation dated October 28, 2008, or after the receipt of the Resolution dated October
14, 2008 of the CA directing them to file their comment. It was only on May 8, 2009 that
the counsel of respondents formally filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of
Monzon. Hence, prior to such notice of withdrawal as counsel, the CA aptly held that
without notice of withdrawal of counsel filed by Monzon or his counsel, the CA rightly
assumed that counsel of record continues to represent Monzon.
Considering that the CA had issued a Resolution dated September 17, 2008 directing
petitioner to file the necessary attachments, the resolution indicating the initial action
taken by the CA, it cannot be denied that respondents were already aware of the certiorari
proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired over their person. Thus,
the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties.
Therefore, the CA erred in dismissing the case with respect to Monzon on the ground that
it did not acquire jurisdiction over his person when its minute resolution granting the
withdrawal of counsel was returned unclaimed. The CA acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Monzon upon the service of the resolution indicating its initial action to his
counsel of record.
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and

ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father HadjiKalam T. Mala
G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014, J. Leonen
Vivencio filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that the
decision rendered by the Sharia District Court is void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. He asserts that he is a Christian which means that the Sharia District Court does
not have any jurisdiction to rule on the matter. The Supreme Court ruled that Article 143 of
the Muslim Code would reveal that Sharia courts has jurisdiction over real actions when the
parties are both Muslims. The fact that the Sharia courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the regular courts in cases of actions involving real property means that jurisdiction may only
be exercised by the said courts when the action involves parties who are both Muslims. In
cases where one of the parties is a non-muslim, the Shariah Courts cannot exercise
jurisdiction over it. It would immediately divest the Shariah court jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Facts:
Page 52 of 1553
Roldan E. Mala, the respondent, purchased a parcel of land in Maguindanao to

which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued under his name. He then caused the survey
of the said parcel of land. The geodetic engineer found that the said land was occupied by
herein petitioner, VivencioVillagracia. Because of this, Mala commenced a conciliation
proceeding with the Office of the Baranggay Chairman. Having failed to reach a settlement
agreement, Mala commenced an action for recovery of possession against Vivencio with
the Sharia District Court.
The court ruled in favor of Mala and rendered a decision ordering Vivencio to give
the possession of the land to Mala. Because of this, Vivencio filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court alleging that the decision rendered by the Sharia District Court is
void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. He asserts that he is a Christian which
means that the Sharia District Court does not have any jurisdiction to rule on the matter.
Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts shall have jurisdiction over
real actions only in cases where both parties are Muslims. It is the contention of Vivencio
that since he is a Christian, the Sharia District Courts does not have jurisdiction over the
case. Hence, the judgment rendered is void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction to render judgment when
one of the parties is a Christian.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Sharia District
Court. It ruled that a careful reading of Article 143 of the Muslim Code would reveal that
Sharia courts has jurisdiction over real actions when the parties are both Muslims. The fact
that the Sharia courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts in cases of
actions involving real property means that jurisdiction may only be exercised by the said
courts when the action involves parties who are both Muslims. In cases where one of the
parties is a non-muslim, the Shariah Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over it. It would
immediately divest the Shariah court jurisdiction over the subject matter. Since the Shariah
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision it rendered would
necessarily be declared null and void.
The fact that Vivencio only raised the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter
for the first time on certiorari is of no moment. The general rule is that lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be raised at any time and even for the first time on appeal. The
rationale for this ruling is that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter affects the very
Page 53 of 1553
power of the court to hear and try the case pending before it. The Supreme Court ruled that
the ruling of the Court in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy is merely an exception to the general rule.
Being an exception to the general rule, it must be applied with great care and only in
exceptional circumstances. In that case, the court ruled that a belated invocation of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be barred by estoppel by laches.
Invocation of the lack of jurisdiction of the court for an unreasonable length of time and
after having invoked the jurisdiction of the court by seeking an affirmative relief shall bar
an allegation of lack of jurisdiction.
SPOUSES RODOLFO BEROT AND LILIA BEROT vs. FELIPE C. SIAPNO

G.R. No. 188944, July 9, 2014, CJ. Sereno
Petitioners were correct when they argued that upon Macaria Berot’s death, her legal
personality ceased, and she could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure
suit. It is also true that her death opened to her heirs the succession of her estate, which in
this case was an intestate succession. However, it can be gleaned from the records of the case
that petitioners did not object when the estate of Macaria was impleaded as respondent in
the foreclosure case. Petitioners did not object either when the original Complaint was
amended and respondent impleaded him as the administrator of Macaria’s estate, in addition
to his being impleaded as an individual respondent in the case. Thus, the trial and appellate
courts were correct in ruling that, indeed, petitioners impliedly waived any objection to the
trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over their persons at the inception of the case.
Facts:
Macaria Berot (or "Macaria") and spouses Rodolfo and Lilia Berot (Spouses Berot)
obtained a loan from Felipe C. Siapno (Siapno) payable within one year together with
interest thereon at the rate of 2% per annum from that date until fully paid. As security for
the loan, Macaria, and Spouses Berot mortgaged to Siapno a parcel of land situated in
Banaoang, Calasiao, Pangasinan in the names of Macaria and her husband Pedro Berot (or
"Pedro"), deceased. On June 23, 2003, Macaria died.
Because of the mortgagors’ default, Siapno filed an action against them for
foreclosure of mortgag eand damages on in the RTC. In answer, Spouses Berot alleged that
the contested property was the inheritance of the former from his deceased father, Pedro;
that on said property is their family home; that the mortgage is void as it was constituted
over the family home without the consent of their children, who are the beneficiaries
thereof; that their obligation is only joint; and that the lower court has no jurisdiction over
Macaria for the reason that no summons was served on her as she was already dead.
Page 54 of 1553
With leave of court, the complaint was amended by substituting the estate of
Macaria in her stead. Thus, the defendants named in the amended complaint are now the
"ESTATE OF MACARIA BEROT, represented by Rodolfo A. Berot, RODOLFO A. BEROT
and LILIA P. BEROT".
After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Siapno, allowing the foreclosure if the
subject mortgage and order Spouses Berot to pay Siapno, within 90 days, the amount of
mortgage and the interest plus damages. If within the aforestated 90-day period the
Spouses Berot fail to pay Siapno, the sale of the property subject of the mortgage shall be
made and the proceeds of the sale to be delivered to Siapno to cover the debt and charges
mentioned above, and after such payments the excess, if any shall be delivered to the
Spouses Berot. Subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC with modification as to damages.
Issue:
Whether the intestate estate of Macaria Berot could be a proper party by waiver
expressly or impliedly by voluntary appearance
Ruling: Petition denied.
Petitioners were correct when they argued that upon Macaria Berot’s death on 23
June 2003, her legal personality ceased, and she could no longer be impleaded as
respondent in the foreclosure suit. It is also true that her death opened to her heirs the
succession of her estate, which in this case was an intestate succession. However, it can be
gleaned from the records of the case that petitioners did not object when the estate of
Macaria was impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure case. Rodolfo Berot did not object
either when the original Complaint was amended and respondent impleaded him as the
administrator of Macaria’s estate, in addition to his being impleaded as an individual
respondent in the case. Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in ruling that,
indeed, petitioners impliedly waived any objection to the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over their persons at the inception of the case.
The records of the case show that on 9 November 2004, a hearing was held on the
Motion for Leave to File filed by respondent to have her amended Complaint admitted.
During the said hearing, the counsel for Spouses Berot did not interpose an objection to
the said Motion for Leave. On 18 March 2005, a hearing was held on respondent’s Motion
to Admit Amended Complaint, wherein counsel for Spouses Berot again failed to interpose
any objection. Thus, the trial court admitted Siapno’s Amended Complaint and ordered
that a copy and a summons be served anew on Spouses Berot.
Page 55 of 1553
In an Order dated 14 April 2005, the RTC noted that Spouses Berot received the
summons and the copy of the amended Complaint on 3 February 2005 and yet they did not
file an Answer. During the trial on the merits that followed, Spouses Berot failed to
interpose any objection to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the estate of Macaria
Berot. Clearly, their full participation in the proceedings of the case can only be construed
as a waiver of any objection to or defense of the trial court’s supposed lack of jurisdiction
over the estate.
In Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Panlalapi, Inc., the Court held that a
party’s appearance in a case is equivalent to a service of summons and that objections must
be timely raised:
In this regard, petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court
that a defendant’s voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service
of summons. Further, the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may
be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he does not
wish to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion, and object thereto.
It should be noted that Rodolfo Berot is the son of the deceased Macaria and as such,
he is a compulsory heir of his mother. His substitution is mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Notably, there is no indication in the records of the case that
he had other siblings who would have been his co-heirs. The lower and appellate courts
veered from the real issue whether the proper parties have been impleaded. They instead
focused on the issue whether there was need for a formal substitution when the deceased
Macaria, and later its estate, was impleaded. As the compulsory heir of the estate of
Macaria, Rodolfo is the real party in interest in accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. At the time of the filing of the complaint for foreclosure, as well as
the time it was amended to implead the estate of Macaria, it is Rodolfo – as heir – who is
the real party in interest. He stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Rodolfo is also Macaria’s co-defendant in the foreclosure proceedings in his own

capacity as co-borrower of the loan. He participated in the proceedings of the case, from
the initial hearing of the case, and most particularly when Siapno filed his amended
complaint impleading the estate of Macaria. When Siapno amended his complaint, Rodolfo
did not file an amended Answer nor raise any objection, even if he was also identified
therein as the representative of the estate of the deceased Macaria. The lower court noted
this omission by Rodolfo in its Order dated 8 September 2006 ruling on his Motion for
Reconsideration to the said court’s Decision dated 30 June 2006. Thus, his continued
Page 56 of 1553
participation in the proceedings clearly shows that the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the heir of Macaria. As such, formal substitution of the parties in this case is not
necessary.
In this case, Rodolfo’s continued appearance and participation in the proceedings of

the case dispensed with the formal substitution of the heirs in place of the deceased
Macaria. The failure of petitioners to timely object to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over the estate of Macaria Berot amounted to a waiver on their part. Consequently, it would
be too late for them at this point to raise that defense to merit the reversal of the assailed
decision of the trial court. We are left with no option other than to sustain the CA’s
affirmation of the trial court’s Decision on this matter.
ESPERANZA TUMPAG, SUBSTITUTED BY HER SON, PABLITO TUMPAG BELNAS,

JR. vs. SAMUEL TUMPAG
G.R. No. 199133, September 29, 2014, J. Brion
Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to
determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a
rigid application of this rule may result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a
party’s substantial right. In Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Garcia, [the Court] allowed the RTC
to consider, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding
whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. In Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. vs. Heirs of Valdez, et al., [the Court] held that the factual allegations in a
complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the
documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts.
In the present case, [the Court finds] reason not to strictly apply the above-mentioned
general rule, and to consider the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property attached
to the complaint in determining whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the Esperanza’s case.
A mere reference to the attached document could facially resolve the question on jurisdiction
and would have rendered lengthy litigation on this point unnecessary.
Facts:
In March 1995, Petitioner Esperanza Tumpag (Esperanza) filed a complaint for

recovery of possession with damages against Respondent Samuel Tumpag (Samuel).
Esperanza alleges that she owned a parcel of land consisting of 12,992 square meters and
for a time she allowed Samuel to occupy around 1,000 square meters of such property which
the latter refused to vacate upon her demand.
Page 57 of 1553
In its decision, the trial court RTC ordered Samuel to return possession of the
subject portion of the property to Esperanza. On appeal, the CA reversed this ruling, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court due to the failure of Esperanza
to disclose the assessed value of the disputed property.
Esperanza now argues before the Court that Samuel, after having actively
participated in all stages of the civil case, is now estopped from assailing the trial court’s
jurisdiction and that she has a meritorious case.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the instant case.
Ruling:
YES, the dismissal of Esperanza’s complaint by the CA is unwarranted under the

given circumstances.
Under [BP] Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the jurisdiction of [RTCs] over
civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, is
limited to cases where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (PhP 20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer…
Here, [Esperanza] filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property before
the RTC but failed to allege in her complaint the property’s assessed value. Attached,
however, to the [Esperanza’s] complaint was a copy of a Declaration of Real Property
showing that the subject property has a market value of P51,965.00 and assessed value of
P20,790.00. The CA was fully aware of this attachment but still proceeded to dismiss the
[Esperanza’s] complaint[.]
Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to
determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when
a rigid application of this rule may result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to
a party’s substantial right. In Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Garcia, [the Court] allowed the
RTC to consider, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in
deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. In
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. vs. Heirs of Valdez, et al., [the Court] held that the factual
Page 58 of 1553
allegations in a complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and

inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts.
In the present case, [the Court finds] reason not to strictly apply the above-
mentioned general rule, and to consider the facts contained in the Declaration of Real
Property attached to the complaint in determining whether the RTC had jurisdiction over
the [Esperanza’s] case. A mere reference to the attached document could facially resolve
the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered lengthy litigation on this point
unnecessary.
[The Court rules] that [Samuel] is not estopped from assailing the RTC’s jurisdiction
over the subject civil case. Records show that the [he] has consistently brought the issue of
the court's lack of jurisdiction in his motions, pleadings and submissions throughout the
procee-dings, until the CA dismissed [Esperanza's] complaint, not on the basis of a finding
of lack of jurisdiction, but due to the insufficiency of the [Esperanza's] complaint, i.e. failure
to allege the assessed value of the subject property. Even in his comment filed before this
Court, [Samuel] maintains that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case can always be raised anytime,
even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Thus, [Samuel] is not prevented from raising the question on
the court's jurisdiction in his appeal...
APO CEMENT CORPORATION vs. MINGSON MINING INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 206728, November 12, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises
a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
The instant case arose from a dispute involving the mining claims known as "Allied
1 and 2" and "Lapulapu 31 and 32" (subject mining claims) between petitioner Apo Cement
Corporation (Apocemco) and respondent Mingson Mining Industries Corporation
Page 59 of 1553
(Mingson). For the supposed failure of the old locators to develop and put to productive
use the mineral properties found in the area, Apocemco submitted a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal on June 19, 1991 before the DENR, essentially seeking
to take over their current holder, Luvimin Cebu Mining Corporation (Luvimin).
On August 18, 19928 and March 2, 1993,9 the DENR - Central Visayas, Region 7
Office(DENR Regional Office) declared the subject mining claims, among others,
abandoned and open for location to other interested parties, prompting Luvimin to file an
appeal. The DENR Regional Office’s Legal Division issued a Resolution dated September 5,
1995, recommending that the subject mining claims be awarded, instead, to Apocemco,
subject, however, to the outcome of Luvimin’s appeal.
In a Decision dated May 3, 1996, the POA upheld the September 5, 1995 Resolution
and the September 20, 1995 Order, reiterating the findings therein made, without, however,
requiring the parties to file any pleading or setting the matter for hearing.
In a Decision dated June 13, 2012, the CA dismissed Apocemco’s appeal and sustained
the DENR MAB’s finding that Mingson was not afforded by the POA its right to due process,
given that none of the applicable procedures found in DENR DAO 95-23 were followed. As
an added ground for dismissal, the CA held that Apocemco failed to perfect its appeal in
accordance with the Rules of Court, considering that the DENR MAB was not served a copy
of its petition.27
Unconvinced, Apocemco filed a motion for reconsideration28 which was, however,

denied in a Resolution29 dated April 23, 2013, hence, the petition.
Issue:
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ordered the
dismissal of Apocemco’s appeal.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that
the court correctly ordered the dismissal of Apocemco’s appeal.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The violation of a party’s right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at
Page 60 of 1553
will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
In this relation, the Court finds it apt to clarify that the DENR MAB did not err in
taking cognizance of the due process issue. While such issue was not assigned as an error
in Mingson’s Appeal dated July 27, 1996, the same was squarely raised in Mingson’s August
8, 1996 letter to the DENR MAB. Given the lack of any formal procedure on appeals at that
time, the DENR MAB cannot be faulted for considering the letter and the issues raised
therein as part of Mingson’s appeal. It must be added that the DENR MAB is not a court of
law but an administrative body; hence, it is not bound by strict rules of procedure and
evidence, and is allowed to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case
speedily and objectively without resort to technical rules, as in this case.
Besides, an apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any time since
due process is a jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether administrative or judicial,
are duty bound to observe. In Salva v. Valle, the Court pronounced that "[a]decision
rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at any time directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked." The Court sees no defensible reason as to why this
principle should not be herein applied.
That being said, and considering too Apocemco’s failure to comply with Sections 5
and 7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in the proceedings before the appellate court, the
instant petition is hereby denied and thebnm rulings of the CA are affirmed.
HONDA CARS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. HONDA CARS TECHNICAL SPECIALIST AND
SUPERVISORS UNION
The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas
allowance and on the propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax matters,
and do not involve labor disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a labor relations
setting as they pertain to questions of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC.
They do not require the application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or
company personnel policies. The company and the union cannot agree or compromise on the
taxability of the gas allowance. Taxation is the State’s inherent power; its imposition cannot
be subject to the will of the parties.
Facts:
Page 61 of 1553
Petitioner Honda Cars Philippines, Inc., (company) and respondent Honda Cars
Technical Specialists and Supervisory Union (union), the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the company’s supervisors and technical specialists, entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) effective April 1, 2006 to March 31, 2011.
Prior to April 1, 2005, the union members were receiving a transportation allowance
of 3,300.00 a month. The company and the union entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) converting the transportation allowance into a monthly gasoline
allowance starting at 125 liters effective April 1,2005. The allowance answers for the gasoline
consumed by the union members for official business purposes and for home to office travel
and vice-versa. The company claimed that in the event the amount of gasoline is not fully
consumed, the gasoline not used may be converted into cash, subject to whatever tax may
be applicable. Since the cash conversion is paid in the monthly payroll as an excess gas
allowance, the company considers the amount as part of the compensation that is subject
to income tax on compensation.
The company deducted from the union members’ salaries the withholding tax
corresponding to the conversion to cash of their unused gasoline allowance.
The union argued that the gasoline allowance is a "negotiated item" under Article
XV, Section 15 of the new CBA on fringe benefits. It thus opposed the company’s practice
of treating the gasoline allowance that, when converted into cash, is considered as
compensation income that is subject to withholding tax.
The disagreement between the company and the union resulted in a grievance in
which they submitted the issue to a panel of voluntary arbitrators as required by the CBA.
The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators rendered a decision/award declaring that the

cash conversion of the unused gasoline allowance of the union is a fringe benefit subject to
the fringe benefit tax, not to income tax.
The CA denied the petition and upheld the voluntary arbitration decision. It agreed
that the cash conversion of the unused gasoline allowance is a fringe benefit granted under
Section 15, Article XV of the CBA on "Fringe Benefits." the CA held that the benefit is not
compensation income subject to withholding tax.
Issue:
Whether the cash conversion of the gasoline allowance of the union members is a
fringe benefit or compensation income, for taxation purposes.
Page 62 of 1553
Ruling:
The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax matters.
The Labor Code vests the Voluntary Arbitrator original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Upon agreement of the
parties, the Voluntary Arbitrator shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes,
including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
The Voluntary Arbitrator’s jurisdiction is limited to labor disputes. Labor dispute

means "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
The issues raised before the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators are: (1) whether the cash
conversion of the gasoline allowance shall be subject to fringe benefit tax or the graduated
income tax rate on compensation; and (2) whether the company wrongfully withheld
income tax on the converted gas allowance.
The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas
allowance and on the propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax
matters, and do not involve labor disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a
labor relations setting as they pertain to questions of law on the application of Section 33
(A) of the NIRC. They do not require the application of the Labor Code or the interpretation
of the MOA and/or company personnel policies. The company and the union cannot agree
or compromise on the taxability of the gas allowance. Taxation is the State’s inherent
power; its imposition cannot be subject to the will of the parties.
Under paragraph 1, Section 4 of the NIRC, the CIR shall have the exclusive and
original jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the NIRC and other tax laws, subject to
review by the Secretary of Finance. If the company and/or the union desire/s to seek
clarification of these issues, it/they should have requested for a tax ruling from the BIR.
Any revocation, modification or reversal of the CIR’s ruling shall not be given retroactive
application if the revocation, modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers,
except in the following cases:
Page 63 of 1553
(a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or any
document required of him by the BIR;
(b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by the BIR are materially different from the facts
on which the ruling is based; or
(c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
If the union disputes the withholding of tax and desires a refund of the withheld tax,
it should have filed an administrative claim for refund with the CIR. Paragraph 2, Section
4 of the NIRC expressly vests the CIR original jurisdiction over refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other tax matters. The
union has no cause of action against the company
Under the withholding tax system, the employer as the withholding agent acts as
both the government and the taxpayer’s agent. Except in the case of a minimum wage
earner, every employer has the duty to deduct and withhold upon the employee’s wages a
tax determined in accordance with the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the
Secretary of Finance, upon the CIR’s recommendation. As the Government’s agent, the
employer collects tax and serves as the payee by fiction of law. As the employee’s agent, the
employer files the necessary income tax return and remits the tax to the Government.
We hold that the union has no cause of action against the company. The company
merely performed its statutory duty to withhold tax based on its interpretation of the NIRC,
that interpretation may later be found to be erroneous. The employer did not violate the
employee's right by the mere act of withholding the tax that may be due the government.
The NIRC only holds the withholding agent personally liable for the tax arising from
the breach of his legal duty to withhold, as distinguished from his duty to pay tax. Under
Section 79 (B) of the NIRC, if the tax required to be deducted and withheld is not collected
from the employer, the employer shall not be relieved from liability for any penalty or
addition to the unwithheld tax.
Thus, if the BIR illegally or erroneously collected tax, the recourse of the taxpayer,
and in proper cases, the withholding agent, is against the BIR, and not against the
withholding agent. The union's cause of action for the refund or non-withholding of tax is
against the taxing authority, and not against the employer. Section 229 of the NIRC
provides:
Page 64 of 1553
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. - No suit or proceeding shall
be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or
in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed
with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not
such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
FELICIANO B. DUYON, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN vs. THE FORMER

SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ELEONOR P.
BUNAG-CABACUNGAN
G.R. No. 172218, November 26, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
administrative cases.
Bunag-Cabacungan's contention that the phrase "in all other cases" has removed the
distinction between administrative and criminal cases of the Ombudsman is ludicrous. It
must be stressed that the above-quoted Section 7 is provided under Rule III, which deals with
the procedure in administrative cases. When Administrative Order No. 07 was amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, Section 7 was retained in Rule III. It is another rule, Rule II,
which provides for the procedure in criminal cases. Thus, the phrase "in all other cases" still
refers to administrative cases, not criminal cases, where the sanctions imposed are different
from those enumerated in Section 7. It is important to note that the petition filed by Bunag-
Cabacungan in CA-G.R. SP No. 86630 assailed only the "administrative decision" rendered
against her by the OMB for Luzon.
Facts:
Petitioner Feliciano Duyon (Duyon) was issued CLT No. 0-005224 over the 6,358-
square meter parcel of land (subject land) he had been tilling since 1957. The subject land
was denominated as Lot 20 of Lot 797 under subdivision plan PSD-03-01259. Apparently,
the same parcel of land was also covered by TCT E.P. No. 44097 under Emancipation Patent
No. A-347307, which had been issued to private respondent Eleonor Bunag-Cabacungan
(Bunag-Cabacungan) on June 6, 1989.
Sometime in November 2002, Duyon discovered the double registration and filed a
complaint-affidavit for misconduct or abuse of authority, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0111-A
Page 65 of 1553
(administrative aspect of the case) and for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as
OMB L-C-03-0125-A (criminal aspect of the case) against Bunag-Cabacungan, who was an
employee of the Municipal Agriculture Office of Nueva Ecija under the Department of
Agriculture, and her husband, Eutiquio Cabacungan (Cabacungan), who then worked at
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), for allegedly taking advantage of their official
positions to cause the issuance of the TCT in favor of Bunag-Cabacungan. Duyon further
asseverated that Bunag-Cabacungan misrepresented herself in her application with the
DAR by stating therein that she was single despite having been married to Cabacungan
since 1979.
Cabacungan and Bunag-Cabacungan denied Duyon's accusations and alleged that

he was never deprived possession of the subject land. They claimed that an error had been
made in the issuance of the Emancipation Patent, such was not their fault, and that the
DAR Office in Nueva Ecija had already requested for its correction. Moreover, they argued,
the lot Bunag Cabacungan applied for had a bigger land area at 18,257 square meters than
the 6,358-square meter subject land of Duyon.
Finding that the Cabacungan spouses flaunted unlawful behavior and intentional
neglect, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for Luzon, on December 11, 2003,
issued its Decision in OMB-L-A-03-0111-A, finding the spouses guilty of simple
misconduct. The same OMB for Luzon recommended in OMB-L-C-03-0125-A, the filing of
an Information for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the
Cabacungan spouses in its Resolution dated December 11, 2003 for causing undue injury to
Duyon by evident bad faith.
Acting on the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the Cabacungan spouses and the
Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by Duyon, the OMB for Luzon, in a Joint
Orderdated August 27, 2004, modified its December 11, 2003 Decision and Resolution by
dismissing the charges filed against Cabacungan, and reducing the suspension imposed
against Bunag-Cabacungan.The Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to
file the hereto attached information against respondent Eleonor Bunag Cabacungan before
the proper court.
Accordingly, Bunag-Cabacungan filed a Petition for Review on Ceriorari before the

Court of Appeals, seeking the reversal of the December 11, 2003 Decision and August 27,
2004 Joint Order with respect to the administrative aspect of the case; while Duyon filed
his own Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the Joint Order dated
August 27, 2004.
Page 66 of 1553
Court of Appeals resolved Duyon's petition for certiorari and his motion to
consolidate the aforementioned cases. Duyon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA’s Resolution, claiming that a Petition for Certiorari would best serve him. CA denied
such motion for lack of merit. They dismissed the petition not because of strict adherence
to the rules of court on matters of appeal but because of jurisdictional grounds.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of an
Ombudsman case.
2. Whether or not the charge for misconduct in office against respondent Bunag-
Cabacungan has merit.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Duyon was correct in his insistence that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction
over the criminal aspect of an Ombudsman case.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore,
review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal
or non-administrative cases.
In Kuizon v. Han. Desierto the Court clarified:
The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only
to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated
that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as
a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.
Page 67 of 1553
Bunag-Cabacungan's argument that the Court of Appeals now has appellate

jurisdiction to review both the administrative and criminal aspects of orders and
decisions of the Ombudsman because of the September 15, 2003 amendment to Rule III
of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman deserves no merit at
all.
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative

Order No. 17, reads:
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is

absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written
Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Bunag-Cabacungan's contention that the phrase "in all other cases" has removed the
distinction between administrative and criminal cases of the Ombudsman is ludicrous.
It must be stressed that the above-quoted Section 7 is provided under Rule III, which
deals with the procedure in administrative cases. When Administrative Order No. 07
was amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Section 7 was retained in Rule III. It is
another rule, Rule II, which provides for the procedure in criminal cases. Thus, the
phrase "in all other cases" still refers to administrative cases, not criminal cases, where
the sanctions imposed are different from those enumerated in Section 7.
It is important to note that the petition filed by Bunag-Cabacungan in CA-G.R. SP

No. 86630 assailed only the "administrative decision" rendered against her by the OMB
for Luzon.
2. The charge for misconduct in office against respondent Bunag-Cabacungan has no

merit .
The Court of Appeals found the following facts to have been established:
Page 68 of 1553
As pointed out by Bunag-Cabacungan, she is an employee of the

Department of Agriculture and not the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) which office was responsible for the issuance of the
subject emancipation patent. No evidence was presented to show that
she acted in conspiracy with the officers or officials of the DAR or that
they acted with manifest partiality, bad faith or inexcusable
negligence. It must be noted that the charges against [Bunag-
Cabacungan]'s husband Eutiquio Cabacungan, who could have
provided some link between the DAR and [Bunag-Cabacungan], were
dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman for lack of evidence.
Other than the fact of misrepresenting herself as single in the
application form and her alleged failure to rectify the error
committed in the title, no specific allegations were made
regarding her actual or direct participation in the erroneous
issuance of the same. Neither was it specifically shown that she
committed the alleged prohibited acts in the performance of
her official duties or public functions. Likewise, while undue
injury was alleged by x x x Feliciano Duyon, he nevertheless failed to
present proof of such actual injury or damage to him or to the
government.
Bunag-Cabacungan and her husband were charged with misconduct for allegedly
taking advantage of their official positions to cause the issuance of the emancipation patent
in the name of respondent Bunag-Cabacungan and failing to rectify the erroneous issuance
of the said emancipation patent, as well as the wrongful use of respondent's maiden name
in her application for such emancipation patent. Misconduct in office has a specific legal
meaning in our jurisdiction. Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer." Moreover, "to be considered as 'misconduct,' the act must have a 'direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of his official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the
office.
As the Court of Appeals has determined, there were no specific allegations regarding
Bunag-Cabacungan's actual or direct participation in the erroneous issuance of the
emancipation patent, nor was it specifically shown that she committed prohibited acts in
the performance of her official duties or public functions. The Court of Appeals also found
no evidence to establish that she acted in conspiracy with the officials of the DAR, which
was the government office responsible for the issuance of the emancipation patent. Thus,
the charge for misconduct in office against respondent Bunag-Cabacungan has no merit.
Page 69 of 1553
ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO AND
DOLORES V. MOLINA, G.R. No. 109645
DOLORES V. MOLINA vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, QUEZON CITY, BR.
105 AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 112564
DOLORES V. MOLINA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EPIMACO

ORETA, G.R. No. 128422
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION AND ALBERTO V. REYES vs. DOLORES V.

MOLINA AND HON. MARCIANO BACALLA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 216, G.R.
No. 128911
January 21, 2015, J. Leonen
The Court reiterates its ruling in Crespo v. Mogul stating that, “[t]he rule therefore in
this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.”
In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice Secretary
from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of
control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable,
to refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor's finding when the
Information is already filed in court. In other words, the power or authority of the Justice
Secretary to review the prosecutor's findings subsists even after the Information is filed in
court. The court, however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must
evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
Facts:
Page 70 of 1553
These consolidated cases involve matters that have long been settled by this court.
However, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 112564 and 128422, Dolores V. Molina, remained incessant
in filing suits that led to the unnecessary clogging not only of this court's but the lower
courts' dockets as well.
G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564 were decided by this court on July 25, 1994. 1 A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by Dolores V. Molina (Molina) on August 10, 1994. She later
filed two supplements to the Motion for Reconsideration.2 Her Motion for Reconsideration
was denied with finality in the Resolution dated January 23, 1995. Despite the denial of
Molina's Motion for Reconsideration, she filed a "Motion for Leave to File the Herein
Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Allow x x x Dolores V. Molina a
Day in Court Relative to Her Petition for Reconstitution." In the Resolution dated March 1,
1995, this court denied with finality Molina's Motion for Reconsideration. The Court
directed that no further pleadings, motions or papers be henceforth filed in these cases
except only as regards the issues directly involved in the 'Motion for Reconsideration' (Re:
Dismissal of Respondent Judge) of Ortigas & Co. Ltd., dated August 15, 1994.
Despite these Resolutions stating that "no further pleadings, motions, or others
papers" be filed, Molina still filed the following:
(a) [m]otion to refer the cases to the Court En Banc dated April 5, 1995 (denied by
Resolution of June 19, 1995);
(b) [consolidated motion dated July 25, 1995, for reconsideration of the June 19, 1995
Resolution (denied by Resolution dated August 28, 1995); and
(c) [m]otion dated August 21, 1995 for reconsideration of the July 24, 1995 Resolution (Re:
increasing fines on counsels and directing entry of judgment) (denied by Resolution
dated October 25, 1995)."
In a subsequently ruling of the Court, it found Molina guilty of contempt of court.
Facts of G.R. No. 128422
A complaint was filed against Molina for falsification of public document before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City. The Assistant City Prosecutor initially
recommended the dismissal of the case, however, Chief State Prosecutor reversed the
Resolution of the City Prosecutor and directed the filing of "an information for falsification
of public document.” Molina filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to File
Documents, which was denied by then Secretary of Justice. Undaunted, Molina filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Molina's Petition on technical grounds. Molina filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was denied, hence, this petition.
Page 71 of 1553
Molina filed an action for quieting of title and annulment of title before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The Manila Banking Corporation (TMBC) filed a Motion to
Dismiss citing res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, bar by prior judgment, and forum
shopping. In addition, the Regional Trial Court cannot annul and set aside the Decision of
this court. Molina opposed the Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, she filed a 'With Leave
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint,’ which was granted by the RTC. The RTC did not
act on the Motion to Dismiss
“Considering that it is undisputed that TMBC is under receivership, the Motion to

Dismiss filed by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is hereby granted. This case is dismissed
as against Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, it appearing that Alberto Reyes is the receiver
and not the said bank.
Accordingly, the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint with leave is hereby

granted, and the amended complaint attached thereto wherein TMBC is dropped as
party-defendant and in lieu thereof, Alberto Reyes is impleaded as such is admitted.
Let summons be served on the newly named defendant.”
There is no need to act on TMBC's motion to dismiss given the above circumstances.
TMBC and Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. TMBC and
Reyes filed this Joint Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order.
Issue:
Whether Molina's failure to comply strictly with the requirements in appealing a

decision is enough to deprive her of her right to appeal.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Molina's Petition for Review on procedural
grounds. However, the Court affirms the dismissal of Molina's Petition based on other
grounds.
Page 72 of 1553
Prior to the filing of the Information, Molina had filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated April 18, 1996, which Resolution directed the City Prosecutor to file
an Information against her. The records show that the Information against Molina was filed
on May 27, 1996. Her Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals was filed on January
16, 1997. In other words, while the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, Molina
pursued another remedy, specifically, a review of the City Prosecutor's finding of probable
cause.
In Crespo v. Judge Mogul:
[t]he rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is

filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice
Secretary from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his
power of control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as
practicable, to refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor's finding
when the Information is already filed in court. In other words, the power or authority of
the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor's findings subsists even after the Information
is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary,
but must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice
Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
Page 73 of 1553
Chan v. Formaran III, et al. also discussed that the proper remedy to review the
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice was the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Molina's Petition.
In any case, a review of the records shows that no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to Secretary Guingona, Jr. when he affirmed the findings of Chief State
Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia (Chief State Prosecutor De Guia).
This court reminds Molina of the discussion in Punzalan v. Plata:
[T]he Court considers it a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed offenders. The rule is based not
only upon the respect for the investigatory and prosecutor powers granted by the
Constitution to the executive department but upon practicality as well.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
SPOUSES ERORITA vs. SPOUSES DUMLAO

Although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations
assessed value. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case. Since a decision rendered by a
court without jurisdiction is void, the RTC’s decision is void.
FACTS:
Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) against Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita.The RTC decided in the
Spouses Dumlao’s favor. Spouses Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint
patently shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. On appeal, Spouses Erorita essentially argue that the RTC had
no jurisdiction because the allegations in the complaint show a case for unlawful detainer.
Page 74 of 1553
In their comment, the respondents argue that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction because
this case involves issues other than physical possession; (b) even assuming the RTC initially
had no jurisdiction, the petitioners’ active participation during the proceedings bar them
from attacking jurisdiction; and (c) this last issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
ISSUE/RULING:
3. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
NO. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor is
jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily
delay a case by raising other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction.
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially,
the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by
plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession
is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its
enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the property. A complaint for accion publiciana or
recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as an action for unlawful
detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.
A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to
allow the petitioners to continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a
demand letter dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay
and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate the property; and (d) the
Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last demand
to vacate (February 12, 2004).
Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its
allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an
action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the
property’s assessed value.
Page 75 of 1553
Considering that the complaint clearly contained the elements of an unlawful

detainer case, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction
over this case. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, the RTC’s
decision is void.
4. Whether the issue of jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal.
NO. As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of
estoppel by laches. Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of
jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of
jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the
proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the
movant.
In Figueroa v. People, the Court ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during
trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised
before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to
apply. Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application
of the estoppel by laches doctrine. As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTC’s
jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before
the CA does not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to
attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings
contemplated in Tijam. Thus, the general rule should apply. The petitioners timely
questioned the RTC's jurisdiction.
Regional Trial Courts
TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al.

vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO.183191, FEBRUARY 11, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
Page 76 of 1553
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to
be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.
Facts:
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures,

Inc., Isabel Greenland Agri-based Resources, Inc., Isabel Evergreen Plantations, Inc.,
Michelle Farms, Inc., Isabel Greenmeadows Quality Products, Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro,
Claudio Villo, and Efren Nuevo (hereinafter, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al.) are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros
Oriental. The landholding consists of a total area of 641. 7895 hectares - about 200 hectares
thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657
between March 1995 and July 2000. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian
reform beneficiaries.
On June 10, 2004, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, a Petition for
Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order against the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), the DAR, and the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), docketed as Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V.
The DAR filed its Answer. Subsequently, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and for Admission of the
Amended Petition in order to change the nature of the action from a special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to an ordinary action of annulment of land titles.
The DAR, et al. opposed the motion.
On October 26, 2004 RTC it issued the Order admitting the amended petition and ruling
that it had jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order
Page 77 of 1553
of the RTC directing it to dismiss the civil action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the original and amended petitions filed by
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al
Held:
In the case at bar, the CA has correctly and succinctly synthesized that both the original
petition for the "Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order" and
the amended petition for "Judicial Review Through an Action to Annul Titles, and
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunctions with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
and Restraining Order" contain the same allegations.
The case at bar deals with acts of the DAR and the application, implementation,
enforcement, or interpretation of RA 6657 - issues which do not involve the "special
jurisdiction" of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Hence, when the court a quo
heard and decided the instant case, it did so without jurisdiction.
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

(CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even
though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature." In said case, it
was noted that the main thrust of the allegations in the Complaint was the propriety of the
Notice of Coverage and "not x x x the 'pure question of law' spawned by the alleged
unconstitutionality of EO 405 - but x x x the annulment of the DAR' s Notice of Coverage."
In this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. cloaked the issue
as a constitutional question - assailing the constitutionality of administrative issuances
promulgated to implement the agrarian reform law - in order to annul the titles issued
therein. It is, however, evident that the constitutional angle was an attempt to exclude the
case from the ambit of the jurisdictional prescriptions under RA 6657.
In case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a
controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies, 'even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character. In the instant case,
however, there is hardly any doubt that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. Consequently, it did not have authority to perform any of the following: order
Page 78 of 1553
the admission of the amended petition of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al., decide the amended petition on the merits, or issue a permanent
prohibitory injunction. In any case, such injunction issued by the RTC is a nullity in view
of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular
Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002 enjoining all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657,
viz.:
SECTION 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. - No

injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts
against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA),
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS v. FELICIANO P. LEGASPI,

G.R. No. 205966,
March 02, 2016 [PERALTA, J.]
FACTS:
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and
damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction). Respondent Legaspi
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action
because the complaint, a real action, failed to allege the assessed value of the subject
property. Petitioner BSP claimed that since the subject property contains an area of
4,838,736 square meters, it is unthinkable that said property would have an assessed value
of less than P20,000.00 which is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts.
Petitioner BSP further stated that a tax declaration showing the assessed value of
P28,538,900.00 and latest zonal value of P145,162,080.00 was attached to the complaint.
RTC denied the Motion. The CA reversed and dismissed BSP’s complaint. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 209-M-2008.
RULING:
YES. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to possession
of real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
Page 79 of 1553
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Petitioner BSP insists that the property
involved has an assessed value of more than P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax Declaration
attached to the complaint. Incidentally, the complaint, on its face, is devoid of any amount
that would confer jurisdiction over the RTC.
The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property,
however, is not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration of the property
in question showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be emphasized
that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of, and should be considered together with
the complaint. In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also
consider the attachments to the complaint. Hence, being an annex to BSP's complaint, the
tax declaration showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a part of the
complaint and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction.
In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in taking judicial

notice of the assessed value of the subject property. A court will take judicial notice of its
own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same
case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the
files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. Since
a copy of the tax declaration, which is a public record, was attached to the complaint, the
same document is already considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can now take
judicial notice of such..
Considering that the area of the subject land is four million eight hundred thirty-
eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-six (4,838,736) square meters, the RTC
acted properly when it took judicial notice of the total area of the property involved
and the prevailing assessed value of the titled property, and it would also be at the
height of absurdity if the assessed value of the property with such an area is less than
P20,000.00.
Heirs of Danilo Arrienda, Rosa G. Arienda, et al. vs. Rosario Kalaw

G.R. No. 204314, April 6, 2016
Under BP 129, RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by first level
courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, in the present case, when the RTC
took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment
suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law.
Page 80 of 1553
Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as the RTC has,
beyond question, jurisdiction to decide the appeal and its decision should be deemed
promulgated in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
FACTS:
On January 18, 2001, Danilo Arrienda (Arrienda) filed against herein respondent and
three other persons a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Calauan, Laguna. He claimed that he owned a parcel of land wherein he
allowed respondent and other persons to occupy, subject to the condition that they will
immediately vacate the same upon prior notice by Arrienda that he will be needing it. Later
on, Arrienda, informed respondent and the other defendants of his intention to use the
subject land; despite repeated demands, respondent and the other defendants failed and
refused to vacate the disputed premises. Hence, the complaint, praying that respondent
and the other defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and restore possession thereof
to Arrienda and payment of rent and damages.
The MTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Arrienda appealed the dismissal before the RTC, which dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over Arrienda's appeal of the MTC Decision
RULING:
1. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang. 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), as amended by Republic Act No.
7691 (RA 7691), RTCs are endowed with original and appellate jurisdictions. The
RTCs’ exclusive original jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to or possession of
real property or any interest therein. However, based on the amendments
introduced by RA 7691, real actions no longer reside under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTCs. Under the said amendments, Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTCs) now have jurisdiction over real actions if the assessed value of the property
involved does not exceed P20,000.00, or in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed P50,000.00. Otherwise, if the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00 or
P50,000.00, as the case may be, jurisdiction is with the RTC.
Page 81 of 1553
On the other hand, under BP 129, RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by first level courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, in the
present case, when the RTC took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal from the adverse
decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising
its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce, its decision may not be
annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as the RTC has, beyond question,
jurisdiction to decide the appeal and its decision should be deemed promulgated in
the exercise of that jurisdiction.
2. The assessed value of the disputed lot is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s
appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, all cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable
to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
It is also within the RTC's competence to make this finding in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, as it would, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan
The Wellex Group, Inc. vs. Sheriff Edgardo A. Urieta of the Sandiganbayan Security
and Sheriff Services, et al.
G.R. No. 211098, April 20, 2016
FACTS:
Wellex obtained a loan from the IMA Account with BDO. As security for the loan,
Wellex mortgaged WPI shares. Wellex defaulted on its obligation to pay upon maturity.
BDO, as investment manager of the IMA Account, did not institute any foreclosure
proceeding against the WPI shares. Thereafter, BDO, informed Wellex that it shall cease to
manage the IMA Account and that the· Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a Notice
of Constructive Distraint against the IMA Account, which effectively froze the WPI shares,
which BOO could consequently neither remove nor dispose of without the express
authority of the BIR.
Subsequently, Wellex alleged that considering that BDO had relinquished its
authority to act as the investment manager of the IMA Account, and that Wellex had
supposedly settled its loan obligation in full directly as the principal of the IMA Account,
should return the WPI shares to Wellex. BDO, however, did not.
Page 82 of 1553
In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 found former
President Estrada guilty of the crime of plunder. The conviction ultimately carried with it
the penalty of forfeiture, wherein all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Estrada,
including the IMA Account and the assets therein, were forfeited in favor of the State.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan, in the same case directed the forfeiture of, among
others, the IMA Account, including the WPI shares in favor of the State. Wellex sought to
intervene in Criminal Case No. 26558 and moved for the reconsideration of the above-
mentioned Resolution ordering the forfeiture.
Wellex filed Civil Case No. 09-399 with the trial court for the recovery of the
possession of the WPI shares. The Sandiganbayan Security and Sheriff Servicesfiled their
respective motions to dismiss in Civil Case No. 09-399, which motions were granted by the
trial court on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction based on the principle of hierarchy of
courts, and failure to state a cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in its ruling dismissing Civil Case No. 09-399
RULING:
Yes. The case before the trial court does not involve the civil aspect of Criminal Case
No. 26558. The same has nothing to do with the ownership of the IMA Account and/or any
of its financial assets, which, as ·stated above, has been adjudged forfeited in favor of the
State. In contrast, the said case is an ordinary civil case entailing the propriety of the actions
of a creditor in proceeding against the security for its loan, which necessitates the
application of the provisions of the Civil Code, therefore falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
This involves the third (3rd) party claim of Wellex against the WPI shares vis-
a-vis the loan obligation per se, which should be properly lodged before and heard
by the regular trial courts. It is clear that the same does not pertain to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and
the right to act in a case, is conferred by the Constitution and by law. Although the
Sandiganbayan, a constitutionally-mandated court, is a regular court, it has,
nevertheless, only a special or limited jurisdiction.
Page 83 of 1553
COURT OF APPEALS
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CAUSE OF ACTIONS
SPOUSES JUVY and MARIA LUISA MARANO vs. PRYCE GASES, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 196592, April 6, 2015, J. Brion
To allow the pendency of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of certificate
of title case in two (2) different courts would not subserve the orderly administration of justice
as the subject cases involve a common question of fact, i.e. the issue of validity of the
petitioners' certificate of title. In this situation, consolidation is the proper procedure to
prevent confusion, avoid multiplicity of suits, and save the parties, as well as the courts, time
and from incurring unnecessary cost and expense.
Facts:
Spouses Juvy and Maria Luisa Marano’s (petitioners) patent application for a parcel of land
in Leyte was granted and issued. The petitioners filed an ejectment complaint against Pryce
Gases, Incorporated (respondent), alleging that the latter illegally entered the subject lot
and constructed a building thereon. The MTC granted the petitioners’ complaint, but the
RTC reversed the same. On further appeal, the CA remanded the case before the MTC for
trial as a reivindicatory action. In the interim, the respondent filed a protest on the free
patent application filed by the petitioners. The DENR recommended the filing of reversion
proceedings against the petitioners, but no reversion proceedings were instituted. The
petitioners filed an action to quiet title against the respondent with the RTC. A month later,
the respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance against the petitioners before the same
RTC. The petitioners moved to dismiss the respondent’s complaint but the RTC denied
their motion.
Later on, the respondent amended its complaint from reconveyance to the cancellation of
the petitioners’ certificate of title. The petitioners moved for dismissal again on the ground
of litis pendentia, in view of the reivindicatory action with the MTC. The RTC denied the
motion again. The petitioner questioned the RTC’s ruling before the CA. In the
reivindicatory action at the MTC, the latter court ruled in the respondent’s favor, declaring
it the owner of the subject lot having the right of possession over it. The petitioners
appealed before the RTC. In the same year, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
Page 84 of 1553
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of title should be dismissed
because the question of validity of the certificate of title issued in their names over the
subject lot is already being litigated in the reivindicatory action case pending appeal before
the RTC.
Ruling:
NO. Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of
certificate of title, the Court finds that the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and
the cancellation of certificate of title case the appropriate remedy in the present situation.
Consolidation is proper when two (2) or more actions pending, not necessarily, before the
same court involve a common question of law or fact. In such cases, the court may: order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, order all the actions
consolidated, and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein for the purpose of
avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.
Considering that the validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title is the crucial issue in both
the reivindicatory action pending appeal before the RTC and the cancellation of certificate
of title case filed by the respondent, these two (2) cases should be consolidated in order to
avoid the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions and for the orderly administration
of justice. And since the issue of validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title has been
subjected to a full-blown trial before the MTC and is now the subject of appeal before the
RTC, allowing the cancellation of certificate of title case to proceed independently and
separately would be needlessly circuitous and would necessarily delay the resolution of the
present issue.
ONOFRE MONTERO et al. v. TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and SANTIAGO

RONDARIS, MENCORP TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R. MENDOZA and
REYNALDO MENDOZA
G.R. No. 190828, 16 March 2015, J. Reyes
The prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no
action has been filed at all.
Facts.
Page 85 of 1553
Petitioners are employees of respondent TTCI and union members of Times Employees
Union (TEU). On May 14, 1998, complainants filed several complaints against TTCI before
the NLRC but these cases were eventually withdrawn upon motion by TEU’s counsel. Four
years later, several complaints for ULP, illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and
attorney’s fees were filed against TTCI and others but the cases were dismissed on the
ground of prescription. As argued by the respondents, petitioners’ cause of action had
already been barred by prescription because the complaints were filed only in June 2002 or
after almost five years from the date of their dismissal.
Issue.
Whether or not the petitioners’ complaints for illegal dismissal have already prescribed.
Held.
NO, petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998 but
withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year
prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled that
the prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action
has been filed at all. The applicability of Article 1155of the Civil Code in labor cases was
upheld in the case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban where the
Court held that “although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the
statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff
leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced
at all.”
WESTMONT BANK (NOW UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS.) v. FUNAI

PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, et al. CARMELO V. CACHERO v. UNITED
OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. AND/OR WESTMONT BANK
G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, July 8, 2015,
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to
dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the
pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
Facts:
Page 86 of 1553
Respondents Funai Philippines Corporation and Spouses Antonio and Sylvia Yutingco
(original defendants) obtained loans from Westmont Bank, secured by several promissory
notes. For failure to pay the loans, Westmont filed a complaint for sum of money, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC. A Writ of
Preliminary Attachment was issued ordering the attachment of the properties of the
original defendants and the properties under their control. Pepito Ong Ngo filed an
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim over the properties seized in Sta. Lucia East Grand Mall,
claiming that Panamax is the true and lawful owner thereof. Westmont amended the
Complaint twice impleading as additional defendants, Panamax, Ngo, Aimee R. Alba,
Richard N. Yu, Annabelle Baesa, Nenita Resane, and Maria Ortiz, as they were allegedly
mere alter egos, conduits, dummies, or nominees of Sps. Yutingco to defraud their
creditors, including Westmont. The additional defendants moved to dismiss the
complaints and alleged that the complaints stated no cause of action against them.
The RTC ruled that the original defendants are jointly and severally liable to Westmont.
However, it dismissed the amended complaints for failure to state a cause of action against
the additional defendants and ordered the return of the items wrongfully seized, to the
premises of Panamax in Sta. Lucia. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA
ruled that Westmont has no cause of action against the additional defendants as they had
no participation whatsoever in the execution of the subject PNs. It further struck down the
writ of attachment issued, considering that the same was implemented against the
additional defendants prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over their persons.
Issue:
Whether or not the Amended Complaints should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.
Ruling:
YES.. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of
the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while
dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have
been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the
plaintiff."
Page 87 of 1553
The Amended and Second Amended Complaints are dismissible on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC. "A complaint states a cause of action
if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the
allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action."
EMILIANO S. SAMSON vs. SPOUSES JOSE and GUILLERMINA GABOR, TANAY

RURAL BANK, INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MORONG, RIZAL
G.R. No. 182970, July 23, 2014, J. Peralta
A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a
remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined
by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus it "must contain a
concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
action." Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint "warrants
its dismissal." A perusal of the complaint would show that aside from the fact that respondent
spouses had mortgaged the property subject herein to respondent bank, there is no other
allegation of an act or omission on the part of respondent Bank in violation of a right of
Samson. The RTC is, therefore, correct in dismissing the case for failure to state cause of
action.
Facts:
Respondent spouses Jose and Guillermina Gabor are the registered owners of a
parcel of land with an area of Sixty-One Thousand Eighty-Five (61,085) square meters in
Tanay, Rizal. Twenty Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-One (20,631) square meters undivided
portion of the of which was transferred in favor of petitioner Emiliano S. Samson as
attorney’s fees in payment for the services rendered by the latter for the former.
On April 4, 2006, petitioner Samson filed a Complaint before the RTC of Pasig City
for Recovery of Property or its Value against respondent spouses, Tanay Rural Bank, Inc.,
and the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, claiming that he had been paying his one-third
(1/3) share of realty taxes covering the subject portion of land for the years 2002 to 2004.
In 2005, however, his payment was rejected by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanay, Rizal, at
Page 88 of 1553
such time he discovered that respondent spouses had already mortgaged the entire
property in favor of respondent Bank back in November 2002.
On August 18, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action. Samson filed an appeal with the CA, which
likewise dismissed the same for having been improperly brought before it. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the RTC of Pasig is correct in dismissing Samson’s complaint on the
ground that the same states no cause of action.
Ruling:
Yes.
The complaint states no cause of action as herein defendant was impleaded without
stating any details of its liabilities nor any allegation of its violations to the plaintiff’s rights.
The only allegation of the rights violated are Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. More
importantly, there are no allegations in the complaint that defendant TRB has violated the
aforesaid laws. There is no detail on why the defendant TRB has been impleaded in the
instant case.
A perusal of the complaint would show that aside from the fact that respondent
spouses had mortgaged the property subject herein to respondent bank, there is no other
allegation of an act or omission on the part of respondent Bank in violation of a right of
Samson.
A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a
remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is
determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus it "must
contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s
cause of action." Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint
"warrants its dismissal."
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created;
Page 89 of 1553
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief. In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action,
"the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde
are not considered. The court may consider in addition to the complaint the appended
annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.
As already mentioned, there is nothing in the complaint herein which states specific
overt acts to show that respondent Bank acted in disregard of the Samson’s rights. Nowhere
in the complaint was it alleged that respondent Bank had knowledge nor could have known
with the exercise of due diligence that respondent spouses had acted illegally, in order to
commit a wrong against the Samson. Samson should have at least specified the details of
his cause of action against respondent Bank.
LOURDES SUITES (Crown Hotel Management Corporation) vs. NOEMI BINARO
G.R. No. 204729, August 6, 2014, J. Carpio
The petitioner Lourdes Suites filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
the respondent Noemi Binaro. After the presentation of the evidence, the Metropolitan Trial
Court found that there is lack of cause of action against Binaro as there was an insufficiency
of evidence presented by Lourdes Suites against Binaro. Hence, it dismissed the complaint.
After the presentation of the evidence, the Metropolitan Trial Court found that there is lack
of cause of action against Binaro as there was an insufficiency of evidence presented by
Lourdes Suites against Binaro. Hence, it dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court ruled
that failure to state a cause of actionand lack of cause of action are really different from each
other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the
pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 ofthe Rules of Court. On the other hand,
lack of cause [of] action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of
action alleged inthe pleading.
Facts:
Page 90 of 1553
The petitioner Lourdes Suites filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against the respondent Noemi Binaro alleging that Binaro failed to settle an unpaid
obligation with Lourdes Suites which arose out of a contract executed between the parties.
As a defense, Binaro claims that she has already paid the obligation because Lourdes Suites
billed her twice.
After the presentation of the evidence, the Metropolitan Trial Court found that there
is lack of cause of action against Binaro as there was an insufficiency of evidence presented
by Lourdes Suites against Binaro. Hence, it dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Hence, the current petition.
Lourdes Suites contends that the MeTC erred in dismissing the complaint because
a dismissal based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action cannot be
deemed a dismissal with prejudice under the Rules." Lourdes Suites further argued that
lack of cause of action is not a valid ground for dismissal of case, much more a dismissal
with prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint may be dismissed with prejudice on the ground of
lack of cause of action.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
It appears Lourdes Suites has misinterpreted our ruling in Macaslang v. Zamora,

which Lourdes Suites cited in its petition before this Court. In Macaslang, the court stated
that:
[f]ailure to state a cause of actionand lack of cause of action are really different from
each other.1âwphi1 On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 ofthe Rules
of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause [of] action refers to a situation where the
evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged inthe pleading. Justice Regalado,
a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:
x xxWhat is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is

provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec.
5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the
Page 91 of 1553
court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action.
This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of
action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is
tomove for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to
the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section.
The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state· a cause of
action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to
evidence, if such motion is warranted.
The remedies discussed in Macaslang are those which are available to the defendant.
The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action (i.e.
insufficiency of evidence). In civil cases, courts must determine if the plaintiff was able to
prove his case by a preponderance of evidence which is defined as "x xx the probability of
the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto."
As correctly stated by the RTC:
The basis of [the] public respondent in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action is the failure of Lourdes Suites to preponderantly establish its claim against
the private respondent by clear and convincing evidence. Hence, public respondent
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the Complaint for lack
of cause of action, as he referred to the evidence presented and not to the allegations
in the Complaint.
The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton
or palpable discretion.It must be noted that this case is an action for small claims
where decisions are rendered final and unappealable, hence, a [d]ecision dismissing
the same is necessarily with prejudice.
EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D. MONSANTO, SR., and REV. FR.

PASCUAL D. MONSANTO, JR. vs. LEONCIO LIM and LORENZO DE GUZMAN
G.R. No.178911, September 17, 2014,
J. Del Castillo
Pag-IBIG requested the intervention of the trial court through a letter on the alleged
anomalous auction sale conducted. The Court ruled that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case since no proper initiatory pleading was filed. Said letter could not
in any way be considered as a pleading. Also, no docket fees were paid before the trial court.
Page 92 of 1553
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court mandates that “upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed shall be paid in full.”
Facts:
In a letter, Flordelis B. Menzon, Regional Director of the Home Development

Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), requested the intervention of Executive Judge Sinforiano A.
Monsanto of the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged anomalous auction sale
conducted by Sheriff IV Lorenzo De Guzman.
According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman previously acceded to its request to move the

date of the auction sale to January 20, 2004. However, the sale proceeded as originally
scheduled on January 15, 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the winning bid of Leoncio Lim
in the amount of P500,000.00 was grossly disadvantageous to the government considering
that the outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor, Eduardo Monsanto, was more than
the bid amount.
It was reassigned to Judge Sibanah E. Usman because Executive Judge Monsanto was
related to Eduardo. In an Order captioned “In the Matter of the Extrajudicial Foreclosure
of Mortgage Filed by the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund),” Judge Usman
declared that the RTC conducted a hearing; that Atty. Cesar Lee argued on behalf of Pag-
IBIG; and that Pascual Monsanto appeared on behalf of Eduardo.
However, Judge Usman noted that no formal petition or complaint was actually filed
which presents a judicial issue and that the acts complained of partake of administrative
matter. The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for further action.
Pascual filed with the OCA, with a copy furnished to the RTC, Motion to Lift Writ
of Execution and Notice to Vacate. Acting on the motion, OCA, in a letter, directed Judge
Usman to conduct an investigation on the missing missing records of ‘Home Development
Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG) vs. Eduardo Monsanto’ and to report within 30 days from notice;
and take action on the ‘Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate’ and previous
letter of Home Development Mutual Fund.
Pursuant to such, Judge Usman notified the parties of a hearing. This time, the case
was captioned as “Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund), mortgagee, v.
Eduardo Monsanto, mortgagor.”
In a manifestation filed in the RTC, PAG-IBIG informed that the loan of Eduardo
had been restructured and he has commenced paying monthly amortizations and thus,
Page 93 of 1553
PAG-IBIG withdraws its petition for extra-judicial foreclosure and it is no longer pursuing
the administrative matter against Sheriff De Guzman.
Leoncio opposed. He filed a Manifestation with Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of

Writ of Possession, alleging that the redemption period has elapsed and such, he is entitled
to issuance of writ of possession.
RTC resolved two pending motions, the one filed by Leoncio, and the motion filed
earlier by Pascual with the OCA but with a copy furnished to the trial court. The RTC held
that the public auction conducted is in order and thus it granted the petition of Leoncio,
issuing a writ of possession in his favor. Pascual’s motion was denied. The appellate court
affirmed this ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
No, it did not. The Court held that no proper initiatory pleading was filed before the
trial court.
The filing of the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fees vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 5, Rule 1
of the Rules of Court specifically provides that “a civil action is commenced by the filing of
the original complaint in court.”
Records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court. The case was
supposedly “commenced” through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of Executive
Judge Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure sale. However, said letter could not
in any way be considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines
pleadings as “written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties
submitted to the court for appropriate judgment.”
It could not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties to the
case were not identified pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 and Section 1, Rule 7. Second, the so-
called claim or cause of action was not properly mentioned or specified. Third, the letter
miserably failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore
no caption; it was not even assigned a docket number; the parties were not properly
identified; the allegations were not properly set forth; no particular relief is sought; in fact,
Page 94 of 1553
only the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested; it was not signed by a
counsel; and most of all, there is no verification or certification against forum-shopping.
The said Manifestation with Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was
not even filed before Branch 28. It was submitted for consideration of Branch 27. Moreover,
the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate was filed by Pascual before the
OCA; the RTC Branches 27 and 28 of Catbalogan, Samar, were only furnished copies
thereof.
The letter of OCA could not be interpreted as vesting Judge Usman with the
authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. Jurisdiction is vested by law.
When OCA directed Judge Usman to take action on the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution
and Notice to Vacate, it did not deprive the latter of his discretion to dismiss the
matter/case for lack of jurisdiction, if the case so warrants.
Also, no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
mandates that “upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action
or proceeding, the fees prescribed shall be paid in full.”
Since no docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance of the same.
Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null and void, and
without force and effect.
ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS,* represented by her Attorney-in Fact, NYMPHA Z. SALES

vs. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN** and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA CITY
G.R. No. 197380, October 8, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three
(3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on
the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these
elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action.
Page 95 of 1553
It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be "stated"
but, importantly, the statement thereof should be "sufficient." This is why the elementary test
in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if
true would justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts
and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the
test. This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the
complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s
cause of action. A fact is essential if they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement
of the cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of
the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to the four corners of
the complaint, and no other.
Facts:
Eliza Zuñiga-Santos (Eliza), through her authorized representative, Nympha Z.

Sales, filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against respondents
Maria Divina Gracia Santos-Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before
the RTC. Eliza alleged that (a) she was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land
located in the Municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal prior to their transfer in the
name of private respondent Gran; (b) she has a second husband by the name of Lamberto
C. Santos (Lamberto), with whom she did not have any children; (c) she was forced to take
care of Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it
appear that the latter was Monsanto’s daughter; (d) pursuant to void and voidable
documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto succeeded in transferring the subject properties
in favor of and in the name of Gran; (e) despite diligent efforts, said Deed of Sale could not
be located; and (f) she discovered that the subject properties were transferred to Gran
sometime in November 2005. Accordingly, Monsanto prayed, inter alia, that Gran
surrender to her the subject properties and pay damages, including costs of suit.
Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that (a) the action filed by Monsanto
had prescribed since an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10)
years from the time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration
of the questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds; and (b) the Amended
Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to
be nullified were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth, thus,
precluding the RTC from rendering a valid judgment in accordance withthe prayer to
surrender the subject properties.
RTC granted Gran’s motion and dismissed the Amended Complaint for its failure to
state a cause of action, considering that the deed of sale sought to be nullified – an "essential
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and indispensable part of [Monsanto’s] cause of action" – was not attached. It likewise held
that the certificates of title covering the subject properties cannot be collaterally attacked
and that since the action was based on a written contract, the same had already prescribed
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. On appeal, CA sustained the dismissal of Monsanto’s
Amended Complaint but on the ground of insufficiency of factual basis. Aggrieved,
Monsanto moved for reconsideration and attached, for the first time, a copy of the
questioned Deed of Sale which she claimed to have recently recovered, praying that the
order of dismissal be set aside and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
In a Resolution, the CA denied Monsanto’s motion and held that the admission of the
contested Deed of Sale at this late stage would be contrary to Gran’s right to due process.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether CA was correct in dismissing the case on the ground of insufficiency of

factual basis.
Ruling:
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to
dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the
pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings
through a motion to dismiss under Rule16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of
cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the
basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.
It is apparent that the CA based its dismissal on an incorrect ground. From the
preceding discussion, it is clear that "insufficiency of factual basis" is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss. Rather, it is a ground which becomes available only after the questions
of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by
the plaintiff. The procedural recourse to raise such ground is a demurrer to evidence taken
only after the plaintiff’s presentation of evidence
At the preliminary stages of the proceedings, without any presentation of evidence

even conducted, it is perceptibly impossible to assess the insufficiency of the factual basis
on which the plaintiff asserts his cause of action, as in this case. Therefore, that ground
could not be the basis for the dismissal of the action.
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However, the Amended Complaint is still dismissible but on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC. Said ground was properly raised by
Gran in a motion to dismiss.
A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three
(3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission
on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the
concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be "stated"
but, importantly, the statement thereof should be "sufficient." This is why the elementary
test in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts
which if true would justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only
ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of
applying the test. This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states
that the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if they cannot be stricken out without leaving
the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency,
not the veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined
to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.
A judicious examination of Monsanto’s Amended Complaint readily shows its

failure to sufficiently state a cause of action. Contrary to the findings of the CA, the
allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts which would warrant an action for
nullification of the sale and recovery of the properties in controversy, hence, rendering the
same dismissible. While the Amended Complaint does allege that Eliza was the registered
owner of the subject properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its annexes would
show the basis of that assertion, either through statements/documents tracing the root of
Eliza’s title or copies of previous certificates of title registered in her name. Instead, the
certificates of title covering the said properties that were attached to the Amended
Complaint are in the name of Gran. At best, the attached copies of TCT Nos. N-5500 and
N-4234 only mention Monsanto as the representative of Gran at the time of the covered
property’s registration when she was a minor. Nothing in the pleading, however, indicates
that the former had become any of the properties’ owner. This leads to the logical
conclusion that her right to the properties in question – at least through the manner in
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which it was alleged in the Amended Complaint – remains ostensibly unfounded. Indeed,
while the facts alleged in the complaint are hypothetically admitted for purposes of the
motion, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that the hypothetical admission extends
only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint as well as to inferences
fairly deductible there from. Verily, the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the
sufficiency of the complaint does not hypothetically admit allegations of which the court
will take judicial notice of to be not true, nor does the rule of hypothetical admission apply
to legally impossible facts, or to facts inadmissible in evidence, or to facts that appear to be
unfounded by record or document included in the pleadings.
RESIDENTS OF LOWER ATAB & TEACHERS' VILLAGE, STO. TOMAS PROPER

BARANGAY, BAGUIO CITY, represented by BEATRICE T. PULAS, CRISTINA A.
LAPP AO. MICHAEL MADIGUID, FLORENCIO MABUDYANG and FERNANDO
DOSALIN vs. STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 198878, October 15, 2014, J. Del Castillo
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must be present,
namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy." Petitioners’ lack of equitable
title denies them the standing to institute a case for quieting of title.
Facts:
In May 2001, petitioners – residents of Lower Atab & Teachers’ Village, Sto. Tomas
Proper Barangay, Baguio City – filed a civil case for quieting of title with damages against
respondent Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. The case was assigned
to Branch 59 of the Baguio RTC. The Complaint in said case essentially alleged that
petitioners are successors and transferees-in-interest of Torres, the supposed owner of an
unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City (the subject property, consisting of 177,778 square
meters) which Torres possessed and declared for tax purposes in 1918; that they are in
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, declared their respective lots
and homes for tax purposes, and paid the real estate taxes thereon; that in May 2000,
respondent began to erect a fence on the subject property, claiming that it is the owner of
a large portion thereof by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-63184; that said TCT
No. T-63184 is null and void, as it was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. O-281,
which was declared void pursuant to PD 1271 and in the decided case of Republic v. Marcos;
and that TCT No. T-63184 is a cloud upon their title and interests and should therefore be
cancelled. Petitioners thus prayed that respondent’s TCT No. T-63184 be surrendered and
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cancelled; that actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, legal expenses, and
costs be awarded in their favor; and finally, that injunctive relief be issued against
respondent to prevent it from selling the subject property.
In its Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, respondent

claimed that petitioners have no cause of action; that TCT No. T- 63184 is a valid and
subsisting title; that the case for quieting of title constitutes a collateral attack upon TCT
No. T-63184; and that petitioners have no title to the subject property and are mere illegal
occupants thereof. Thus, it prayed for the dismissal of the case.
After trial, the Baguio RTC issued a Decision in favor of defendant Sta. Monica
Industrial and Development Corporation. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the trial court denied the same. On Appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA stood its ground. Hence, the
instant Petition.
Issue:
Whether or the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
Petitioners have no cause of action.
Ruling:
The Court denies the Petition.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must be present,
namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."
"Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership."
Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and capable
of being enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial owner. Black’s Law Dictionary
indicates that the term is used in two senses: first, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary
in trust property (also called "equitable ownership"); and second, to refer to the power of a
corporate shareholder to buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in
the corporation’s books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from
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naked ownership, which is the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as
against possession of the bare title to property.
Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently,
there are no certificates of title in their respective names. And by their own admission in
their pleadings, specifically in their pre-trial brief and memorandum before the trial court,
they acknowledged that they applied for the purchase of the property from the
government, through townsite sales applications coursed through the DENR. In their
Petition before this Court, they particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in
order that the said title would not hinder the approval of their townsite sales applications
pending with the DENR. Thus, petitioners admitted that they are not the owners of the
subject property; the same constitutes state or government land which they would like to
acquire by purchase. It would have been different if they were directly claiming the
property as their own as a result of acquisitive prescription, which would then give them
the requisite equitable title. By stating that they were in the process of applying to purchase
the subject property from the government, they admitted that they had no such equitable
title, at the very least, which should allow them to prosecute a case for quieting of title.
In short, petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the subject property
lies in the State. Thus, as to them, quieting of title is not an available remedy.
Lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation are public land. Laws and decrees
such as PD 1271 were passed recognizing ownership acquired by individuals over portions
of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, but evidently, those who do not fall within the
coverage of said laws and decrees – the petitioners included – cannot claim ownership over
property falling within the said reservation. This explains why they have pending
applications to purchase the portions of the subject property which they occupy; they have
no legal or equitable claim to the same, unless ownership by acquisitive prescription is
specifically authorized with respect to such lands, in which case they may prove their
adverse possession, if so. As far as this case is concerned, the extent of petitioners’
possession has not been sufficiently shown, and by their application to purchase the subject
property, it appears that they are not claiming the same through acquisitive prescription.
The trial and appellate courts are correct in dismissing the case; however, they failed
to appreciate petitioners’ admission of lack of equitable title which denies them the
standing to institute a case for quieting of title. Nevertheless, they are not precluded from
filing another case – a direct proceeding to question respondent’s TCT No. T-63184; after
all, it appears that their townsite sales applications are still pending and have not been
summarily dismissed by the government – which could indicate that the subject property
is still available for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. If TCT No. T-63184 is indeed null
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and void, then such proceeding would only be proper to nullify the same. It is just that a
quieting of title case is not an option for petitioners, because in order to maintain such
action, it is primarily required that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the
subject property – a condition which they could not satisfy.
CAPITOL SAWMILL CORPORATION and COLUMBIA WOOD INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION vs. CONCEPCION CHUA GAW, ANGELO CHUA GAW, JOHN
BARRY CHUA GAW, LEONARD BRANDON CHUA GAW and JULITA C. CHUA
G.R. No. 187843, June 9, 2014, J. PEREZ
A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred
by the defendants. Petitioners are pushing the case too far ahead of its limits. They are
themselves determining that the issue is whether the properties of the corporation can be
included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent when the only question to be resolved
in a demurrer to evidence is whether based on the evidence, respondents, as already well put
in the prior Chua Suy Phen case, have a right to share in the ownership of the corporation.
Facts:
This case traces its origins to an action for Determination of Shares in and Partition
of the Estate of Deceased Parents filed by Spouses Concepcion Chua Gaw and Antonio Gaw
against their siblings, and petitioner corporations, Capitol Sawmill Corporation and
Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela on 2 June 1995. In the Complaint, respondents alleged that deceased Spouses
Chua Chin and Chan Chi wholly-owned the entire assets of or the outstanding investments
in Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood Industries Corporation. Therefore,
the two corporations should constitute part of the estate of the deceased, which in turn
must be divided among the heirs. Despite demands of respondents, defendants therein
refused to collate and partition the entire estate of their deceased parents.
Petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that based on the allegations in

the Amended Complaint and the evidence presented, the case against them should be
dismissed. Citing the Court’s ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals, petitioners submitted that
the properties of the corporations cannot be included in the estate of the decedent.
In their Opposition/Comment, respondents opposed the filing of the Demurrer to

Evidence on the ground of res judicata. Respondents claimed that the issue raised by
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petitioners had already been resolved in Chua Suy Phen v. Concepcion Chua Gaw, wherein
the Court upheld their causes of action against the two corporations and declared that their
right to inherit and their right to share in the ownership of the corporations are matters to
be resolved in the case pending before the trial court.
The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari seeking to annul the lower court's orders denying
their demurrer to evidence. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue of whether the properties of the corporation can be the
proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person had
been resolved in the Lim case and such ruling is applicable to the petitioners.
Ruling:
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides that after the plaintiff has completed
the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Petitioners anchored
their demurrer to evidence on respondents’ lack of cause of action against the corporations,
in accordance with a court ruling that properties of a corporation cannot be included in
the inventory of the estate of a deceased person.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. The existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be
averred by the defendants.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals when it decided that the facts in the Lim
case are not on all fours with the instant case, thus:
The Lim case should not be applied in this case because it is an intestate probate
proceeding while this case is principally for the partition and distribution of the estate of
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the deceased parents. In the Lim case, the properties involved were real properties
registered under the Torrens system in the name of several corporations which are allegedly
owned by the decedent, whereas in this case, the same covers all assets, investments and
all other rights, titles and interests left by the deceased parents of private respondents
which are sought to be collated, partitioned and distributed among the legal heirs. It does
not involve particular properties which are owned by petitioners Capitol and Columbia but
the totality of investments made by the deceased parents in the said businesses.
The Court in Chua Suy Phen had already upheld the validity of respondents’ causes
of action against petitioners. The said ruling validated in fact the cause of action in this
case, i.e., that respondents were excluded by petitioners from their right to inherit or share
in the ownership of the two corporations.
Petitioners are pushing the case too far ahead of its limits. They are themselves
determining that the issue is whether the properties of the corporation can be included in
the inventory of the estate of the decedent when the only question to be resolved in a
demurrer to evidence is whether based on the evidence, respondents, as already well put
in the prior Chua Suy Phen case, have a right to share in the ownership of the corporation.
The question of whether the properties of the corporation can be included in the inventory
of the estate will be threshed out and resolved during trial.
HOMER C. JAVIER, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN,

SUSAN G. CANENCIA vs. SUSAN LUMONTAD
G.R. No. 203760, December 3, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party states the circumstances in the complaint of dispossession of a

property through force, intimidation and threat, the nature of the case shall be that of
forcible entry. It is the allegations in the complaint that determines the nature of the case.
Facts:
Homer is one of the sons of Vicente Javier. He inherited from his father a 360-square
meter land with a residential house erected therein. Homer and his mother Susan lived in
the subject realty since he was born and continued to possess the same after his father’s
death. Meanwhile, Susan Lumontad gained entry in the land in 2007, built a house therein
and refused to vacate.
This prompted Homer to file an action for forcible entry before the MTC. Lumontad
alleged that she was the rightful owner of 170sqm portion of the land after purchasing it
from Vicente’s other son from previous marriage, Anthony Javier. The MTC dismissed the
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case on the ground of lack of cause of action and jurisdiction as the case called for the
determination of ownership. It was also found by the court that Vicente had subdivided
the land for his two sons.
On appeal with the RTC, the court reversed the decision of the MTC and ruled that
the case was for forcible entry and ordered Lumontad to vacate the premises. Unyielding,
Lumontad raised the matter with the CA which remanded the case to the RTC for a trial
on the merits. The CA reiterated that the case was accion reivindicatoria which is under
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the action is forcible entry
Ruling:
Yes, the case is that of forcible entry.
As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, “[t]he invariable rule is that what
determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the
case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody
such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which
[Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in
forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a
land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint
should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up
showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff
must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the property. This
requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action
for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.”
A plain reading of Javier’s complaint shows that the required jurisdictional

averments, so as to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied
with. Said pleading alleges that Javier, as the original owner’s, i.e., Vicente’s, successor-in-
interest, was in prior physical possession of the subject land but was eventually
dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007 by respondent who, through
force and intimidation, gained entry into the same and, thereafter, erected a building
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thereon. Clearly, with these details, the means by which Javier’s dispossession was effected
cannot be said to have been insufficiently alleged as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later
affirmed by the CA. The “how” (through unlawful entry and the construction of the subject
building), “when” (March 26, 2007), and “where” (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land)
of the dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint. In Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan, the
Court held that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure
thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior possessor, would necessarily imply the use of
force, as what had, in fact, been alleged in the instant complaint.
Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first
level courts by express provision of Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court. Even in cases where the issue of possession is
closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive
and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make an
initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. It
must be clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar
or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. It is,
therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No.185590, December 03, 2014,
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint.
Three essential elements must be shown to establish a cause of action. In this case, the legal
rights of the petitioner Bank and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently
established in view of the failure of the Bank's evidence to show the provisions and conditions
that govern its legal relationship.
Facts:
This is an action for recovery of a sum of money and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary attachment filed by the Philippine Banking Corporation
against the Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) and Spouses Manuel
and Janet C. Ley.
LCDC, a general contracting firm, applied with the bank for the opening of a Letter
of Credit. The bank issued Letter of Credit, in favor of the supplier-beneficiary Global
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Enterprises Limited, in the amount of 802,500.00 U.S. dollars. The letter of credit covered
the importation by LCDC of 15,000 metric tons of Iraqi cement from Iraq.
Global Enterprises, Inc. negotiated its Letter of Credit with the negotiating bank
Credit Suisse of Zurich, Switzerland. Credit Suisse then sent a reimbursement claim by telex
to American Express Bank Ltd., New York for the amount of USD 766,708.00 with a
certification that all terms and conditions of the credit were complied with. Accordingly,
American Express Bank debited the bank’s account and credited Credit Suisse Zurich
Account with American Express Bank, Ltd., New York for the negotiation of Letter of
Credit.
Philippine Banking Corporation received from Credit Suisse the necessary shipping
documents pertaining to Letter of Credit that were in turn delivered to the LCDC. Upon
receipt, defendants executed a trust receipt. But the cement that was to be imported never
arrived in the Philippines. The prompt payment of the obligation of LCDC was guaranteed
by Spouses Ley under the Continuing Surety Agreement executed. The obligation covered
by the subject Letter of Credit in the amount of USD 802,500.00 has long been overdue and
unpaid, despite repeated demands for payment thereof.
LCDC filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that
plaintiff’s witness Mr. Fenelito Cabrera, Head of the Foreign Department of plaintiff’s Head
Office, was incompetent to testify with respect to the transaction between the plaintiff and
the defendant and that the plaintiff’s documentary exhibits were not properly identified
and authenticated. Cabrera was with the Bank’s Dasmariñas Branch and not with the Head
Office during the period the transaction covered by the documents took place. Thus, he
could not have properly identified and authenticated the Bank’s documentary exhibits.
Only the following exhibits were admitted: Continuing Surety Agreement,

Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit, Letter of Credit No. DC 90-
303-C, and the Statement of Outstanding Obligations. For the trial court, these were
insufficient to show that LCDC and the spouses Ley were responsible for the improper
negotiation of the letter of credit. Thus, the trial court held that the Bank failed to establish
its cause of action.
Although it admitted some of the exhibits previously rejected, the appellate court
affirmed such finding. The bank maintains that its cause of action is not predicated on the
improper negotiation of the letter of credit but on the breach of the terms and conditions
of the trust receipt.
Issue:
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Whether or not the bank has established a cause of action against LCBC and Spouses
Ley
Ruling:
No, the bank did not. First, the Bank’s petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. It
contravenes the elementary rule of appellate procedure that an appeal to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise
only questions of law. On the evidentiary weight given to the findings of fact of the trial
court which have been affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals–they are conclusive on
this Court.
There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented. There is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by
preponderant evidence is essentially a question of fact. The issue which the Bank raises in
this petition is whether the evidence it presented during the trial was preponderant enough
to hold LCDC and the spouses Ley liable. The question of sufficiency or insufficiency of
evidence, the basic issue presented by the Bank, pertains to the question of whether the
factual matters alleged by the Bank are true. Plainly, it is a question of fact and, as such,
not proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
It was incumbent upon the Bank to demonstrate that this case fell under any of the
exceptions to this rule but it failed to do so.
Second, the Bank attempts to avoid the “only questions of law” rule for appeals filed
under Rule 45 by invoking the misapprehension of facts exception. According to the Bank,
the trial and the appellate courts misapprehended the facts with respect to the
determination of the basis of the Bank’s cause of action. The Bank asserts that its cause of
action is not grounded on the Letter of Credit but on the Trust Receipt.
The Bank’s reference to the Trust Receipt as its “primary actionable document” is
mistaken and misleading. The nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint. Taken as a whole, the Bank’s allegations make a cause of action
based on the Letter of Credit. The Letter of Credit figures prominently in the Complaint as
it is mentioned in almost all of the paragraphs.
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In short, the Bank seeks to hold liable (1) LCDC for its obligations under the Letter
of Credit, and (2) the spouses Ley for their obligations under the Continuing Surety
Agreement which stands as security for the Letter of Credit and not for the Trust Receipt.
Third, a look at the Letter of Credit confirms the identical findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was
held that: In a letter of credit, there are three distinct and independent contracts: (1) the
contract of sale between the buyer and the seller, (2) the contract of the buyer with the
issuing bank, and (3) the letter of credit proper in which the bank promises to pay the seller
pursuant to the terms and conditions stated therein.
Here, what is involved is the second contract – the contract of LCDC, as the buyer
of Iraqi cement, with the Bank, as the issuer of the Letter of Credit. The Bank refers to that
contract when the Bank argued that, as LCDC and the spouses Ley have admitted the
issuance of the Letter of Credit in their favor, they are “deemed to have likewise admitted
the terms and conditions thereof, as evidenced by the stipulation therein appearing above
the signature of respondent Janet Ley.”
The importance of the provisions and conditions supposed to be stipulated on the

reverse side of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit is
underscored by the following note appearing below the space for the signature of Janet Ley:
“Important: Please read provisions and conditions on reverse side hereof before signing
above.” However, the reverse side of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter
of Credit is a blank page. Even the copy attached to the Bank’s Complaint also has nothing
on its back page.
A cause of action – the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another
– has three essential elements: (1) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (2)
a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission
by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from
the defendant.
In this case, however, even the legal rights of the Bank and the correlative legal duty
of LCDC have not been sufficiently established by the Bank in view of the failure of the
Bank's evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal relationship
with LCDC, particularly the absence of the provisions and conditions supposedly printed
at the back of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit. Even
assuming arguendo that there was no impropriety in the negotiation of the Letter of Credit
and the Bank's cause of action was simply for the collection of what it paid under said Letter
Page 109 of 1553

of Credit, the Bank did not discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of action
against LCDC. This failure of the Bank to present preponderant evidence that will establish
the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit necessarily benefits the spouses Ley whose
liability is supposed to be based on a Continuing Surety Agreement guaranteeing the
liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit.
PARTIES TO A CIVIL ACTION
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR.

vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ
A.C. NO. 9116, MARCH 12, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. The right to
institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof
of the charges. The Court found no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have
no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the
present suit was merely instituted to harass him.
Facts:
Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs
of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the
Spouses Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association before the RTC of
Quezon City for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of
their right of way.
The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the
Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and
hearing, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,
represented by said law firm, appealed to the CA. On February 5, 1999, the CA dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired
95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The
CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent
motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became
final.
Page 110 of 1553

Eight years later, complainants as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline for violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation
of his duties as an officer of the court.
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent

liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution suspending
Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03,
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03,
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Held:
The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality
to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit
was merely instituted to harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-
in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person
who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is
not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from
the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the
only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his
duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show
that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days
after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal
of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable negligence,
respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with
the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that
Page 111 of 1553
respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed
on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but “due to the
health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able to finish said Appellants’
Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him.” Thus, it is clear that
respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his
client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar
not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence
on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him
to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy
administration of justice.
JOEL CARDENAS v. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES SIMPLICIA P. AGUILAR AND

MAXIMO V. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 191079, March 02, 2016 [Perez, J.]
Under the Rules, the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30)
days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or
if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and
on behalf of the deceased.
FACTS:
Elinaida Alcantara filed a case for the Reformation of Instrument and Specific Performance
against respondents. After Alcantara passed away, she was substituted by her heir,
Cardenas, who filed an Amended Complaint. Before the filing of the Amended Complaint,
the counsel for respondent Spouses Aguilar also manifested that Maximo V. Aguilar
likewise passed away by filing a Notice of Death. It was stated in the said notice that
Page 112 of 1553
Maximo V. Aguilar is survived by his spouse, Simplicia P. Aguilar and his daughter, Melba
A. Clavo de Comer and that both were already impleaded as original defendants in the
complaint.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of rsepondents. The period to file for a motion for
reconsideration or for an appeal had lapsed but neither of the parties moved for the
reconsideration of the decision nor appealed therefrom. Respondents filed a Motion for
Execution of the RTC Decision which was surprisingly opposed on the ground that the
original respondents (the Spouses Aguilar) in Civil Case No. LP-02-0300 were already dead
and no proper substitution of the parties was effected by the counsel as mandated by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The RTC directed the issuance of the Writ
of Execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in issuing the Writ of Execution despite lack of formal
substitution of parties.
RULING:
NO.
Under the Rules, the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said
legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased
party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may
order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the deceased.
The purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to
due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-
compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and the judgment
of the trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the
legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.
Page 113 of 1553

In the case at bar, no right to procedural due process was violated when the counsel for the
respondents failed to notify the court of the fact of death of Simplicia P. Aguilar and even
if no formal substitution of parties was effected after the such death. The rationale behind
the rule on substitution is to apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to
the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased party by operation of law. The said
purpose was not defeated even if no proper substitution of party was made because Melba
A. Clavo de Comer, the heir of the deceased Simplicia P. Aguilar, was already impleaded by
petitioner as a party-defendant to Civil Case No. LP-02-0300 when the latter filed his
Amended Complaint. For sure, petitioner is very much aware that despite the passing of
the Spouses Aguilar, the case would still continue because de Comer, on her own behalf
and as the legal representative of her deceased parents, possessed the authority to pursue
the case to its end. Indeed, formal substitution of the heirs in place of the deceased is no
longer necessary if the heirs continued to appear and participated in the proceedings of the
case.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Diego Lim, et al.

G.R. No. 195611, April 18, 2016
Petitioner has no standing to appeal the RTC’s decision because petitioner’s Motion
for Intervention was denied, and it did not appeal such denial.
FACTS:
The Director of Lands filed with the then Court of First Instance of Zambales (CFI) a
petition for cadastral hearing to settle and adjudicate Lot 42, which he claimed was part of
the public domain. Romamban and Parong opposed the petition, claiming ownership of
Lot 42-E, which is a portion of Lot 42. The CFI of Zambales adjudicated in favor of
Romamban and Parong. The Republic appealed the Decision. Meanwhile, Romamban was
able to secure in his name Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT).
Two other oppositors in the cadastral cases, Lim and Josefat, filed a Complaint for accion
publiciana and cancellation of deeds of absolute sale and titles against Romamban and
Parong, and asserted that they were the actual occupants of Lot 42-E, and have filed with
the government applications to acquire the same. Thus, they prayed that Romamban,
Parong, and the other respondents be ordered to vacate Lot 42-E and pay damages and that
the deeds of sale and titles issued in their favor be nullified and cancelled. Petitioner r filed
a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto a Complaint in Intervention, arguing that
Romamban’s OCT and all the other derivative titles were null and void since, by virtue of
Page 114 of 1553

the final and executory Decision of the CA in the cadastral case, Lot 42-E did not cease to
be inalienable public land.
Petitioner’s motion for intervention was granted and its complaint in intervention was
admitted. However, the said complaint in intervention was later dismissed for failure to
prosecute. Later on, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Romamban. Petitioner
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has the standing to file the Petition for Review before the CA.
RULING:
Petitioner has no standing to appeal the RTC’s decision because petitioner’s Motion for
Intervention was denied, and it did not appeal such denial. A prospective intervenor’s right
to appeal applies only to the denial of his intervention. Not being a party to the case, a
person whose intervention the court denied has no standing to question the decision of the
court , but only the trial court's orders denying his intervention, not the decision itself.
Since petitioner had no right to appeal the RTC’s Decision, it was not entitled to a
resolution of the substantive issues it raised – particularly who, by law, is properly entitled
to the land in question.
SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO LAW OFFICES v. HON. NORMA

CHIONLO-SIA
G.R. No. 181186, February 03, 2016 [Jardeleza, J.]
While the general rule (which limits the availability of the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65 only to parties in the proceedings before the lower court) must be strictly adhered to,
it is not without exception. In this case, the order of reimbursement was directed to SRMO in
its personal capacity—not in its capacity as counsel for either Remedios or Gerardo.
Considering that the RTC's order of reimbursement is specifically addressed to SRMO and
the established fact that SRMO only received the subject money in its capacity as
counsel/agent of Gerardo, SRMO's interest can hardly be considered as merely incidental.
That SRMO is being required to reimburse from its own coffers money already transmitted
to its client is sufficient to give SRMO direct interest to challenge the RTC's order. Neither
can SRMO be considered a total stranger to the proceedings.
FACTS:
Page 115 of 1553

Petitioner Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) acted as counsel for
Remedios N. Rodriguez (Remedios) when she commenced an action for the intestate
settlement of the estate of her deceased husband Susano J. Rodriguez before the RTC.
During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Remedios asked for the payment of
widow's allowance. This, however, was denied by the RTC. On review, the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the RTC's Order and granted Remedios a monthly widow's allowance.
While the case was pending before the CA, Remedios executed a Deed of Sale of Inheritance
(Deed of Sale) wherein she sold all her rights, interests and participation in the estate of
Susano J. Rodriguez to a certain Remigio M. Gerardo (Gerardo).
After the CA's decision regarding the widow's allowance became final and executory, SRMO
accordingly filed a motion with the RTC for the payment of the allowance. A few months
after, the Estate of Deceased Susano J. Rodriguez (Estate) remitted to SRMO three (3)
checks representing said allowance.
Remedios filed an "Urgent Omnibus Motion and Notice of Termination of the Services of
Petitioner's Counsel of Record" where she denied the execution of the Deed of Sale in favor
of Gerardo. Thereafter, the RTC directed SRMO to reimburse the Estate the amount
representing the widow's allowance it received.
Aggrieved by the RTC's orders, SRMO elevated the case to the CA through a petition for
certiorari. Without going into the merits of the case, however, the CA denied SRMO's
petition on the ground that the latter was not a party in the case before the lower court and
therefore had no standing to question the assailed order.
ISSUE:
Whether a law firm acting as counsel for one of the parties in the intestate proceedings a
quo can file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to protect its own interests.
RULING:
YES.
The general rule is that a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court cannot
maintain an action for certiorari in the CA or the Supreme Court to have the order or
decision of the trial court reviewed. Under normal circumstances, the CA would have been
Page 116 of 1553

correct in dismissing a petition for certiorari filed by a non-party. The peculiar facts of this
case, however, call for a less stringent application of the rule.
While the general rule (which limits the availability of the remedy of certiorari under Rule
65 only to parties in the proceedings before the lower court) must be strictly adhered to, it
is not without exception. In this case, the order of reimbursement was directed to SRMO
in its personal capacity—not in its capacity as counsel for either Remedios or Gerardo.
Considering that the RTC's order of reimbursement is specifically addressed to SRMO and
the established fact that SRMO only received the subject money in its capacity as
counsel/agent of Gerardo, SRMO's interest can hardly be considered as merely incidental.
That SRMO is being required to reimburse from its own coffers money already transmitted
to its client is sufficient to give SRMO direct interest to challenge the RTC's order. Neither
can SRMO be considered a total stranger to the proceedings.
Another important consideration for allowing SRMO to file a petition for certiorari is the
rule on real party in interest, which is applicable to private litigation. A real party in interest
is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit." Simply put, a real party in interest is the person who will
suffer (or has suffered) the wrong. In this case, it is SRMO who stands to be injured by the
RTC's order of reimbursement considering that it is being made to return money received
on behalf of, and already accounted to, its client.
MAE FLOR GALIDO vs. NELSON P. MAGRARE, et. al.

G.R. No. 206584, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
Indispensable parties are parties in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action. Petitioner’s action was for the cancellation of titles, including TCT No.
T-22376. In its Order, the trial court itself recognized that the controversy was contentious
in nature, and required the participation of Bayombong, among others. Bayombong stood to
be benefited or prejudiced by the outcome of the case. Since he was already dead at the time
the case was filed by petitioner, the heirs of Bayombong stand in his stead not only as parties
in interest, but indispensable parties. Without the heirs of Bayombong to represent the
interest of Bayombong, there can be no complete determination of all the issues presented by
petitioner.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mae Flor Galido filed before the RTC of San Jose, Antique a petition to
cancel all entries appearing on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-22374, T-22375
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and T-22376, and to annul TCT No. T-24815 and all other titles issued pursuant to RTC Civil
Case No. 2001-2-3230.
Finding that the case was contentious in nature, the trial court ordered petitioner to amend
her petition to implead the following: (1) Magrare, in whose name TCT No. T-24815 was
registered and who had earlier registered an adverse claim on TCT No. T-22374; (2) Palcat,
who had registered an adverse claim on TCT No. T-22375; and (3) Bayombong, who had
registered an adverse claim on TCT No. T-22376.
After petitioner amended her petition, the trial court issued summons to Magrare, Palcat
and Bayombong. However, the sheriff reported that Bayombong was not served because he
was already dead. Petitioner moved to substitute the heirs of Bayombong, but the trial
court ruled that the substitution was without legal basis because Bayombong was not
properly impleaded. Hence, the trial court dismissed the case against Bayombong.
Petitioner moved to amend her petition for the second time to include the heirs of
Bayombong. The trial court ruled that the names and addresses of all the heirs of
Bayombong were not identified, and that there was no showing that the widow of
Bayombong represented all the heirs. Hence, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to
further amend the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to implead the heirs of
Bayombong.
RULING:
YES.
The heirs of Bayombong are indispensable parties, and thus, the trial court erred in not
impleading the heirs of Bayombong.
Indispensable parties are parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action. Petitioner’s action was for the cancellation of titles, including TCT No. T-
22376. In its Order, the trial court itself recognized that the controversy was contentious in
nature, and required the participation of Bayombong, among others. Bayombong stood to
be benefited or prejudiced by the outcome of the case. Since he was already dead at the
time the case was filed by petitioner, the heirs of Bayombong stand in his stead not only as
parties in interest, but indispensable parties. Without the heirs of Bayombong to represent
Page 118 of 1553

the interest of Bayombong, there can be no complete determination of all the issues
presented by petitioner.
By denying petitioner’s motion to implead the heirs of Bayombong due to technicalities,

the trial court in effect deprived petitioner a full adjudication of the action, and the heirs
of Bayombong any beneficial effects of the decision.
Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as
the remedy in such case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable, considering
that parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action. Given the Court’s authority to order the inclusion of an
indispensable party at any stage of the proceedings, the heirs of Bayombong are hereby
ordered impleaded as parties-defendants.
FELIPE JHONNY A. FRIAS, JR. AND HEIRS OF ROGELIO B. VENERACION vs. THE
HONORABLE EDWIN D. SORONGON, ASSISTING JUDGE, BRANCH 211, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG CITY; FIRST ASIA REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND/OR SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., AND ORTIGAS &
COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
G.R. No. 184827, February 11, 2015, J. Villarama
The RTC issued an order denying the Frias’ motion for leave to lititgate as indigents.
Petitioners argue that respondent judge did not conduct the proper hearing as prescribed
under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. They claim that private respondents neither
submitted evidence nor were they required by respondent judge to submit evidence in support
of their motions on the issue of indigency of petitioners. The Supreme Court ruled that the
hearing requirement, contrary to petitioners’ claim, was complied with during the hearings
on the motions to dismiss filed by respondents. In said hearings, petitioners’ counsel was
present and they were given the opportunity to prove their indigency. Clearly, their non-
payment of docket fees is one of the grounds raised by respondents in their motions to dismiss
and the hearings on the motions were indeed the perfect opportunity for petitioners to prove
that they are entitled to be treated as indigent litigants and thus exempted from the payment
of docket fees as initially found by the Executive Judge.
Facts:
On May 24, 2007, petitioner Felipe Jhonny Frias, Jr. and Rogelio Veneracion
(predecessor of petitioner heirs) filed before the Mandaluyong City RTC a complaint3 for
declaration of nullity of certificates of title with damages against respondents First Asia
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Realty Development Corporation and/or SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (First Asia Realty/SM)
and Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas). They alleged to be the co-owners
of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 which embraces
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 126575 registered in the
name of Ortigas. They claimed that TCT No. 126575 is falsified and spurious and that
consequently, all derivative titles of TCT No. 126575 including those now registered in the
name of First Asia Realty/SM are also void.
On even date, Frias, Jr. and Veneracion filed a Motion for Leave and to Admit
Complaint of Indigent Litigants. Said motion was granted by Mandaluyong City RTC
Executive Judge. Petitioners argue that respondent judge did not conduct the proper
hearing as prescribed under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. They claim that private
respondents neither submitted evidence nor were they required by respondent judge to
submit evidence in support of their motions on the issue of indigency of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents should be considered as indigent litigants and be

exempted from payment of docket fees.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC. The respondents can be
considered as indigents.
Petitioners cite Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 21. Indigent party. – A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful
fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent
was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing
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that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by
the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose.
Respondents, on the other hand, cite Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC and A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which reads:
SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. – Indigent litigants (a)
whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real
property with A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION of more than THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00)
PESOS shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an

affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached
to the litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause
to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
In the case of Spouses Algura v. Local Gov’t. Unit of the City of Naga, this Court had
the opportunity to explain how the two rules cited by the opposing parties can stand
together and are compatible with each other, to wit:
In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand
together and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an
indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with
the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—
that is, the applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s immediate family do
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not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the
applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant
meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent
litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met,
then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has
“no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce
countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after
which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence
adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may
later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered
by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the
time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the
proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of
court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such
other sanctions as the court may impose.
In the instant case, based on the list of documents submitted by petitioners in

support of their Motion for Leave and to Admit Complaint of Indigent Litigants, it cannot
be disputed that petitioners failed to complete the requirements set forth in Section 19,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. They did not execute their own affidavit as required by said
Section 19. And as this Court ruled in Spouses Algura, if the trial court finds that one or
both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant
to prove that the applicant has “no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.”
As correctly argued by Ortigas, the hearing requirement, contrary to petitioners’

claim, was complied with during the hearings on the motions to dismiss filed by
respondents. In said hearings, petitioners’ counsel was present and they were given the
opportunity to prove their indigency. Clearly, their non-payment of docket fees is one of
the grounds raised by respondents in their motions to dismiss and the hearings on the
motions were indeed the perfect opportunity for petitioners to prove that they are entitled
to be treated as indigent litigants and thus exempted from the payment of docket fees as
initially found by the Executive Judge. Moreover, not only were petitioners properly
represented during the hearings on the motions to dismiss, they even filed on July 10, 2007
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a Manifestation wherein they adopted the Comment/Opposition to Defendant Ortigas’

Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Cite Plaintiffs and Counsel in Contempt
filed in Civil Case No. MC07-3226 before Branch 214 and on July 11, 2007, a
Comment/Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of First Asia Realty/SM. Thus, it is erroneous
for them to claim that respondents neither submitted evidence nor were they required by
respondent judge to submit evidence on the issue of indigency and that respondent judge
disregarded their constitutional right to free access to courts. In sum, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to respondent judge in issuing the assailed orders.
DAVID M. DAVID vs. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS, JR.

G.R. No. 176973, February 25, 2015, J. Mendoza
Olympia is a separate being, or at least should be treated as one distinct from the
personalities of its owners, partners or even directors. Under the doctrine of processual
presumption, this Court has to presume that Hong Kong laws is the same as that of the
Philippines particularly with respect to the legal characterization of Olympia’s legal status
as an artificial person. Elementary is the rule that under Philippine corporate and
partnership laws, a corporation or a partnership possesses a personality separate from that
of its incorporators or partners. Olympia should, thus, be accorded the status of an artificial
being at least for the purpose of this controversy.
On that basis, Olympia’s interest should be detached from those of directors Paragas,
Lobrin, Datoy, and even David. Individual directors interests are merely indirect, contingent
and inchoate. Because Olympia’s involvement in the compromise was not the same as that of
the other parties who were, in the first place, never part of it, the compromise agreement
could not have the force and effect of a judgment binding upon the litigants, specifically Datoy
and Paragas. Conversely, the judicially approved withdrawal of the claims on the basis of that
compromise could not be given effect for such agreement did not concern the parties in the
civil case.
Facts:
Sometime in 1995, David M. David (David), Federico M. Paragas, Jr. (Paragas) and
Severo Henry G. Lobrin (Lobrin) agreed to venture into a business in Hong Kong (HK).
They created Olympia International, Ltd. (Olympia) under HK laws. Olympia had offices
in HK and the Philippines. David handled the marketing aspect of the business while
Lobrin and Datoy were in charge of operations. In early 1998, Olympia became the exclusive
general agent in HK of Philam Plans Inc.’s (PPI) pre-need plans through the General Agency
Agreement. In late 2001, Olympia launched the Pares-Pares program by which planholders
would earn points with cash equivalents for successfully enlisting new subscribers. The
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cash equivalents, in turn, would be used for the payment of monthly premiums of the
planholders. PPI authorized Olympia to accept the premium payments, including the cash
equivalent of the bonus points, and to remit the same, net of commissions, to PPI in the
Philippines. The money from HK was to be remitted through Olympia’s account in RCBC.
In turn, Olympia was to pay the planholders’ bonuses as well as the share of profits for the
directors. David was tasked to personally remit said amounts to PPI as he was the only
signatory authorized to transact on behalf of Olympia regarding the RCBC accounts.
Paragas alleged that the amount remitted by Olympia to RCBC from September 2001
to May 25, 2002 reached P82,978,543.00, representing the total net earnings from the pre-
need plans, 30% of which comprised the bonus points earned by the subscribers under
the Pares-Pares program. The rest was to be distributed among the four partners.
In 2002, the state of affairs among the partners went sour upon Lobrin’s discovery
that David failed to remit to PPI the 30% cash equivalent of the bonus points. In a meeting
held on June 1, 2002 in HK, David tried to explain his side, but no settlement was reached.
Later, Lobrin discovered that only P19,302,902.13 remained of the P82,978,543.00 remitted
from HK to the RCBC account. As the Chairperson of Olympia’s Board of Directors (BOD),
he demanded the return of the entire P82,978,543.00.
David filed a complaint for Declaratory Relief, Sum of Money and Damages before
the RTC as the Olympia stripped him from his position from venture and he was not
permitted to board on a plane pursuant to a hold-departure order. Several counterclaims
were filed by the other party. Thus, David filed the supplemental complaint, with a
manifestation that an amicable settlement was struck with Lobrin and Datoy whereby they
agreed to withdraw the complaint and counterclaims against each other. This was later on
affirmed by Lobrin and Olympia through their counsel. The agreement clearly stated that
Lobrin was acting on Olympia’s behalf, on the basis of a resolution passed during the board
meeting held on March 21, 2003.
Paragas questioned the existence of the cited BOD resolution granting Lobrin the
authority to settle the case, as well as the validity of the agreement through an affidavit
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul, Domingo Lucinario, Jr. He pointed to the fact
that Olympia, as an entity, was never a party in the controversy.
RTC granted David’s Motion to Admit the Supplemental Complaint and approved
the compromise agreement. Paragas moved for reconsideration, claiming that although the
parties had the prerogative to settle their differences amicably, the intrinsic and extrinsic
validity of the compromise agreement, as well as its basis, may be questioned if illicit and
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unlawful. RTC denied the motion of Paragas. On petition for certiorari, CA denied the
same. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether a compromise agreement could not be the basis of dismissal/withdrawal

of a complaint and counterclaims if it was entered into with a non-party to the suit.
Ruling:
A compromise agreement could not be the basis of dismissal/withdrawal of

a complaint and counterclaims if it was entered into with a non-party to the suit.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal

concessions in order to resolve their differences and, thus, avoid or put an end to a
lawsuit. They adjust their difficulties in the manner they have agreed upon, disregarding
the possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by the danger
of losing. It must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, and must
have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. A compromise
agreement may be executed in and out of court. Once a compromise agreement is given
judicial approval, however, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the
parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a
controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment.
Verily, a judicially approved compromise agreement, in order to be binding upon

the litigants with the force and effect of a judgment, must have been executed by them. In
this case, the compromise agreement was signed by David in his capacity as the
complainant in the civil case, and Olympia, through Lobrin as its agent. The agreement
made plain that the terms and conditions the “parties” were to follow were agreed upon by
David and Olympia. Datoy and Paragas never appeared to have agreed to such terms for it
was Olympia, despite not being a party to the civil case, which was a party to the
agreement. Despite this, David claims that the concessions were made by Olympia on
behalf of the non-signatory parties and such should be binding on them.
David must note that Olympia is a separate being, or at least should be treated as
one distinct from the personalities of its owners, partners or even directors. Under the
doctrine of processual presumption, this Court has to presume that Hong Kong laws is the
same as that of the Philippines particularly with respect to the legal characterization of
Olympia’s legal status as an artificial person. Elementary is the rule that under Philippine
corporate and partnership laws, a corporation or a partnership possesses a personality
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separate from that of its incorporators or partners. Olympia should, thus, be accorded the
status of an artificial being at least for the purpose of this controversy.
On that basis, Olympia’s interest should be detached from those of directors

Paragas, Lobrin, Datoy, and even David. Their (individual directors) interests are merely
indirect, contingent and inchoate. Because Olympia’s involvement in the compromise was
not the same as that of the other parties who were, in the first place, never part of it, the
compromise agreement could not have the force and effect of a judgment binding upon the
litigants, specifically Datoy and Paragas. Conversely, the judicially approved withdrawal of
the claims on the basis of that compromise could not be given effect for such agreement
did not concern the parties in the civil case.
David, nevertheless, points out that the validity of the dismissal of the claims and
counterclaims must remain on the argument that the compromise agreement was made in
their personal capacities inasmuch as he filed the complaint against Paragas, Lobrin and
Datoy also in their personal capacities.
While David repeatedly claims that his complaint against Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy
was personal in character, a review of the causes of action raised by him in his complaint
shows that it primarily involved Olympia. As defined, a cause of action is an act or omission
by which a party violates a right of another. It requires the existence of a legal right on the
part of the plaintiff, a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right and an
act or omission of such defendant in violation of the plaintiffs’ rights.
Essentially, David was asking for judicial determination of his rights over Olympia’s
revenues, funds in the RCBC bank accounts and the amounts used and expended by
Olympia through the acts of its directors/defendants. Nothing therein can be said to be
“personal” claims against Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy, except for his claim for damages
resulting from the humiliation he suffered when he was prevented from boarding his
Singapore-bound plane. Obviously, the argument that they executed the compromise
agreement in their personal capacities does not hold water.
For even if the Court looks closer at the concessions made, many provisions deal
with Olympia’s interests instead of the personal claims they have against one another. A
review of the Joint Omnibus Motion would also show that the compromise agreement dealt
more with David and Olympia. Given this, Olympia did not have the standing in court to
enter into a compromise agreement unless impleaded as a party. The RTC did not have
the authority either to determine Olympia’s rights and obligations. Furthermore, to allow
the compromise agreement to stand is to deprive Olympia of its properties and interest for
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it was never shown that the person who signed the agreement on its behalf had any
authority to do so.
More importantly, Lobrin, who signed the compromise agreement, failed to

satisfactorily prove his authority to bind Olympia. The CA observed, and this Court agrees,
that the “board resolution” allegedly granting authority to Lobrin to enter into a
compromise agreement on behalf of Olympia was more of a part of the “minutes” of a board
meeting containing a proposal to settle the case with David or to negotiate a settlement. It
should be noted that the said document was not prepared or issued by the Corporate
Secretary of Olympia but by a “Secretary to the Meeting.” Moreover, the said resolution was
neither acknowledged before a notarial officer in Hong Kong nor authenticated before the
Philippine Consul in Hong Kong. Considering these facts, the RTC should have denied the
Joint Omnibus Motion and disapproved the compromise agreement. In fine, Olympia was
not shown to have properly consented to the agreement, for the rule is, a corporation can
only act through its Board of Directors or anyone with the authority of the latter. To allow
the compromise agreement to stand is to deprive Olympia of its properties and interest for
it was never shown that Lobrin had the necessary authority to sign the agreement on
Olympia’s behalf.
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF THE LATE

SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA vs. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA,
CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, and MAUDE NOBLEZA
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
With regard to actions for partition, the Rules of Court requires that all persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. The Court ruled that the co-heirs to
the subject property are indispensable parties. The Court also held that the CA erred in
ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to implead all the
indispensable parties in his complaint. In instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties,
the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case. The non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Facts:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. owned a parcel of land at Iloilo City covered by TCT No. T-
12255. During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages: the first was with Lolita Palermo
with whom he had two children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and the second was
with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion,
Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr.
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He also begot three illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo.
Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased his father and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin,
Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased him and was
survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon
(in representation of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia,
Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the subject land to
Santiago, as embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of
Sale, which was not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares,
namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr.,
and their children).
However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the deed
registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to surrender the said title.
This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the subject
land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint for judicial partition and for receivership.
The RTC ordered the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the one
hand, and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e., Felcon, et al.) on
the other hand and the cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and
the heirs of Mateo, Sr.
The RTC found that through the deed, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject
land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the RTC
held that Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land,
considering that Felcon admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to
Mateo, Sr.’s share thereon.
The CA set aside this decision and dismissed Santiago’s complaint for judicial
partition. It held that Felcon’s siblings, as well as Maude’s children, are indispensable
parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-inclusion as
defendants in Santiago’s complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are
indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition
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2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the complaint
Ruling:
1. Yes, the Court held that they are indispensable parties.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in
the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity.
In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the
court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires
that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-
heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties. As such, an
action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
A reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only
Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly,
with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his
wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 97235 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives
to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Santiago’s omission
of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
The Court disagreed with Santiago’s contention that he had already bought the
interests of the majority of the heirs and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as
indispensable parties. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to
divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in
an action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership
is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties.
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As a vendee, Santiago merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his
interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors, the latter should
first be determined as co-owners.
The absence of the indispensable parties in the complaint for judicial partition
renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. The CA correctly set aside the
RTC’s decision.
2. No, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of

Santiago’s failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In instances of
non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to
dismiss the case.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an

action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may
be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
The Court ruled that the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its
remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded
and for the disposition of the case on the merits.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BATAAN,

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN, PASTOR B. VICHUACO (IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATAAN) and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF BATAAN
G.R. No. 180654, April 21, 2014, J. Abad
An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the controversy or subject

matter and in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Such that, when the facilities of
a corporation, including its nationwide franchise, had been transferred to another
corporation by operation of law during the time of the alleged delinquency, the former cannot
be ordered to pay as it is not the proper party to the case. In this case, the transferees are
certainly the indispensable parties to the case that must be necessarily included before it may
properly go forward.
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Facts:
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax
delinquency from the respondent Provincial Government of Bataan (the Province) for
P45.9 million covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The Province based its assessment
on the NPC’s sale of electricity that it generated from two power plants in Bataan. Rather
than pay the tax or reject it, the NPC chose to reserve its right to contest the computation
pending the decision of the Supreme Court in National Power Corporation v. City of
Cabanatuan, a case where the issue of the NPC’s exemption from the payment of local
franchise tax was then pending.
On May 12 and 14, 2003 the Province again sent notices of tax due to the NPC, calling
its attention to the Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan
that held the NPC liable for the payment of local franchise tax. The NPC replied, however,
that it had ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax after Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took
effect on June 26, 2001. The new law relieved the NPC of the function of generating and
supplying electricity beginning that year. Consequently, the Province has no right to
further assess it for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 local franchise tax.
Ignoring the NPC’s view, the Province issued a "Warrant of Levy" on real properties
that it used to own in Limay, Bataan. In March 2004 the Province caused their sale at public
auction with itself as the winning bidder. Shortly after, the NPC received a copy of the
Certificate of Sale of Real Property covering the auctioned properties for P60,477,285.22,
the amount of its franchise tax delinquency.
On July 7, 2004 the NPC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles,
Bataan, a petition for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Province, the provincial treasurer, and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. NPC alleged that it had ceased by operation of the EPIRA in
2001 to engage in power transmission, given that all its facilities for this function, including
its nationwide franchise, had been transferred to the National Transmission Corporation
(TRANSCO).
The RTC dismissed the NPC’s petition which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not NAPOCOR is the proper party liable for franchise tax delinquency
given that all its facilities, including its nationwide franchise, had been transferred to the
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National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) by operation of law during the time of the
alleged delinquency.
Ruling:
No, NAPOCOR is not the proper party liable.
Section 8 of the EPIRA created the TRANSCO and transferred to it the NPC’s
electrical transmission function with effect on June 26, 2001. The NPC, therefore, ceased to
operate that business in Bataan by operation of law. Since the local franchise tax is imposed
on the privilege of operating a franchise, not a tax on the ownership of the transmission
facilities, it is clear that such tax is not a liability of the NPC.
The legislative emasculation of the NPC also covered its former power generation
function, which was the target of the Province’s effort to collect the local franchise tax for
2001, 2002, and 2003. Section 49 of the EPIRA created the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM Corp.) and transferred to it all of the NPC's
"generation assets" which would include the Bataan Thermal Plant. Clearly, the NPC had
ceased running its former power transmission and distribution business in Bataan by
operation of law from June 26, 2001.
It is, therefore, not the proper party subject to the local franchise tax for operating
that business. Parenthetically, Section 49 also transferred "all existing xx x liabilities" of the
NPC to PSALM Corp., presumably including its unpaid liability for local franchise tax from
January 1 to June 25, 2001. Consequently, such tax is collectible solely from PSALM Corp.
An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the controversy or subject

matter and in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court which is effective, complete or equitable.
Here, since the subject properties belong to PSALM Corp. and TRANSCO, they are
certainly indispensable parties to the case that must be necessarily included before it may
properly go forward. For this reason, the proceedings below that held the NPC liable for
the local franchise tax is a nullity.
PETRONIO CLIDORO, et al., vs. AUGUSTO JALMANZAR, et al.

It should be borne in mind that the action for revival of judgment is a totally separate
and distinct case from the original civil case for partition. As explained in Saligumba v.
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Palanog, “An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing
the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five
years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It isnot intended to re-
open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or
correctness of the first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent
action, different and distinct fromeither the recovery of property case or the reconstitution
case [in this case, the original action for partition], wherein the cause of action is the decision
itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered.”
With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that there would be instances where
the parties in the original case and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment would not
be exactly the same. The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the complaint for
revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in the original case would not
necessarily mean that they are not the real parties-in-interest. What is important is that, as
provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case
for revival of judgment would be benefited by the enforcement of the decision in the partition
case.
Facts:
The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint for revival of judgment filed by
Rizalina Clidoro, et al. against Onofre Clidoro, et al., praying that the Decision dated
November 13, 1995 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 19831, be revived and
that the corresponding writ of execution be issued. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
The estate of the late Mateo Clidoro, excepting that described in paragraph
(i) of the Complaint, is hereby ordered partitioned in the following manner:
1. One-fifth portion to the Plaintiffs-Appellees, by right of representation to
the hereditary share of Gregorio Clidoro, Sr.;
2. One-fifth portion to Defendant-Appellant Antonio Clidoro or his legal
heirs;
3. One-fifth portion to Appellant Josaphat Clidoro;
4. One-fifth portion to Appellant Aida Clidoro; 5. One-tenth portion to
Gregoria Clidoro, as her legitime in the hereditary share of Onofre Clidoro;
and
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6. One-tenth portion to Catalino Morate, as successor-ininterest to the

legitime of Consorcia Clidoro.
SO ORDERED.
On September 3, 2003, defendants-appellees except Gregoria Clidoro-Palanca,

moved to dismiss the said complaint on the following grounds: "1.) The petition, not being
brought up against the real parties in-interest, is dismissible for lack of cause of action; 2.)
The substitution of the parties defendant is improper and is not in accordance with the
rules; 3.) Even if the decision is ordered revived, the same cannot be executed since the
legal requirements of Rule 69, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has not been
complied with; and 4.) The Judgment of the Honorable Court ordering partition is merely
interlocutory as it leaves something more to be done to complete the disposition of the
case."
After the filing of plaintiffs-appellants' Comment/Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss, defendants-appellees' Reply, plaintiffs-appellants' Rejoinder and defendants-
interestedparties' Sur-Rejoinder, the RTC issued the assailed Order dated December 8,
2003 dismissing the instant complaint for lack of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellants
moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order with prayer to admit the attached
Amended Complaint impleading the additional heirs of the interested party Josaphat
Clidoro and the original plaintiffs Rizalina Clidoro-Jalmanzar, Cleneo Clidoro and
Aristoteles Clidoro. The same was,however, denied in the second assailed order.
Respondents then appealed to the CA, the CA promulgated its Decision reversing
and setting aside the Orders of the RTC, and remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the complaint for revival of judgment may be dismissed for lack of cause
of action as it was not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest.
Ruling:
The Court emphasizes that lack of cause of action is not enumerated under Rule 16
of the Rules of Court as one of the grounds for the dismissal of a complaint. As explained
in Vitangcol v. New Vista Properties, Inc., to wit:
Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the
complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the
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determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial.
What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made
on the ground "that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action."
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the

truth ofthe material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's
complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure tostate a cause of
action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the
complaint.x x x
xxxx
In a motion to dismiss for failureto state a cause of action, the focus is on the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of
facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not
the court, admitting the facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance
with the prayer of the complaint.x x x
In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival of judgment that the parties
therein were also the parties in the action for partition. Applying the foregoing test of
hypothetically admitting this allegation in the complaint, and not looking into the veracity
of the same, it would then appear that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as
the plaintiffs in the complaint for revival of judgment (hereinafter respondents), as the
prevailing parties in the action for partition, had a right to seek enforcement of the decision
in the partition case.
It should be borne in mind that the action for revival of judgment is a totally separate
and distinct case from the original Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition. As explained in
Saligumba v. Palanog, to wit:
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of

securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the
passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party.
It isnot intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor's
case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for revival of
judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct fromeither the
recovery of property case or the reconstitution case [in this case, the original action
for partition], wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of
the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. x x x
Page 135 of 1553

With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that there would be instances

where the parties in the original case and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment
would not be exactly the same. The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the
complaint for revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in the original
case would not necessarily mean that they are not the real parties-in-interest. What is
important is that, as provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit." Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the previous case for partition,
the plaintiffs in the case for revival of judgment would be benefited by the enforcement of
the decision in the partition case.
In Basbas v. Sayson, the Court pointed out that even just one of the co-owners, by
himself alone, can bring an action for the recovery of the coowned property, even through
an action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement of the judgment would result
in such recovery of property. Thus, as in Basbas, it is not necessary in this case that all of
the parties, in whose favor the case for partition was adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the
action for revival of judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who had an interest
in the enforcement of the decision, may file the complaint for revival of judgment, even
just by himself.
GERVE MAGALLANES vs. PALMER ASIA, INC.

G.R. No. 205179, July 18, 2014, J. Carpio
Under our procedural rules, “a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon
proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a
cause of action.” In this case, the corporation that initiated the complaint for B.P. 22 is
different from the corporation that filed the memorandum at the RTC and the petition for
review before the CA. The RTC Decision absolving Magallanes from civil liability has attained
finality, since no appeal was interposed by a real party-in-interest.
Facts:
Andrews International Product, Inc. (Andrews) is a domestic corporation that

manufactures and sells fire extinguishers. Gerve Magallanes (Magallanes) was employed by
Andrews as a Sales Agent.
Magallanes negotiated with three (3) prospective buyers of Andrews fire

extinguishers: Cecile Arboleda, Jose Cruz, and Proceso Jarobilla, who all issued checks
payable to Andrews. These checks, however, bounced.
Page 136 of 1553

Angel Palmiery (Palmiery), the President of Andrews, returned the bum checks to
Magallanes. Desirous of obtaining his accrued commissions, and upon the advice of
Palmiery, Magallanes signed Sales Invoices covering the fire extinguishers that were
intended to be sold to the prospective buyers, and he also issued five (5) checks covering
the purchase price of the items. However, Magallanes’ checks were dishonored upon
presentment to the bank.
In 1995, Andrews International and Palmer Asia Inc. merged whereby all the
business of Andrews were to be handled by Palmer Asia. The purpose according to Angel
was to appeal to a larger market. Being a family corporation, the legal niceties were
dispensed with. Andrews remained existing, though not operational. It was neither
dissolved nor liquidated. Palmer Asia simply took over the business of Andrews
International.
Andrews then sent demand letters to Magallanes to pay the face value of the checks,
but the same were all unheeded. Thus, Andrews filed several cases for violation of BP 22
against Magallanes, which Informations were filed before the MTC of Makati City. The
counsel of Palmer then filed an entry of appearance in the case; however, the docket
numbers were for a different case and a different court, Branch 67; no copy of the motion
was furnished Magallanes. Angel, the president of Andrews explained that Andrews
transferred all its business to Palmer. Thus Magallanes filed an Omnibus Motion to
Disqualify Private Prosecutor and Strike Out Testimony of Angel. According to him, since
all the business of Andrews were taken over by Palmer it should be the latter who is the
real party in interest and must file the case, not Andrews. In its opposition, Angel averred
that the two corporations share the same set of officers, same offices, had the same set of
customers and had the same products, thus for all intents and purposes, Palmer should be
regarded as an agent of Andrews.
The trial court in a Joint Order, denied Magallanes’ motion, acquitted him on the
criminal aspect, but held him civilly liable. Magallanes filed his partial appeal on the civil
aspect, arguing that the checks were not issued for valuable consideration. Andrews did
not file its appeal. When the RTC required the parties to submit their memoranda, it was
Palmer who submitted the Memorandum. The RTC granted Magallanes’ appeal and held
him not civilly liable, because the complaining party has not fully established the debt of
Magallanes in its favor, thus Palmer filed a petition for review under Rule 42 to the Court
of Appeals, which the appellate court granted. It held that Magallanes issued the checks for
valuable consideration, thus liable to pay the face value of the checks. Magallanes thus
elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
Page 137 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction?
Ruling:
Yes.
The petition is granted. The RTC Decision absolving Magallanes from civil liability
has attained finality, since no appeal was interposed by the private complainant, Andrews.
While Palmer filed a petition for review before the CA, it is not the real party in interest; it
was never a party to the proceedings at the trial court.
Under our procedural rules, “a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon
proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state
a cause of action.” In the instant case, Magallanes filed a motion to dismiss in accordance
with the Rules of Court, wherein he claimed that:
x x x the obvious and only real party in interest in the filing and prosecution of the
civil aspect impliedly instituted with x x x the filing of the foregoing Criminal Cases for B.P.
22 is Andrews International Products, Inc.
The alleged bounced checks issued by x x x Magallanes were issued payable in the
name of Andrews International Products, Inc. The [n]arration of [facts] in the several
Informations for violation of B.P. 22 filed against Magallanes solely mentioned the name of
Andrews International Products, Inc.
The real party in this case is Andrews, not Palmer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
In Goco v. Court of Appeals, the court explained that:
This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be
the real party in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party
Page 138 of 1553

in interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.
Parties who are not the real parties in interest may be included in a suit in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or

defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may
sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal.
The CA erred in stating that Palmer and Andrews are the same entity. These are two
separate and distinct entities claiming civil liability against Magallanes. Andrews
was the payee of the bum checks, and the former employer of Magallanes. It filed
the complaint for B.P. 22 before MeTC Branch 62. Thus when the MeTC Branch 62
ordered Magallanes to “pay the private complainant the corresponding face value of
the checks x x x”, it was referring to Andrews, not Palmer.”
xxx
“Under the Corporation Code, specifically Sections 117, 118 120 and 121, a corporation
can only be dissolved in two ways, voluntary and involuntary. In the case of Andrews
International, no document was presented that majority of its Board of Directors
passed a [r]esolution terminationg its corporate life. No complaint was also filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission to involuntarily terminate the same,
thus, for all intents and purposes, it is still existing although not operational.
Given the foregoing facts, it is clear that the real party in interest here is Andrews.
Following the Rules of Court, the action should be in the name of Andrews. As previously
mentioned, Andrews instituted the action before the MeTC Branch 62 but it was Palmer
which filed a petition for review before the CA. In fact, the case at the CA was entitled
Palmer Asia, Inc. v. Gerve Magallanes.
Page 139 of 1553

In NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining

Company, NM Rothschild changed its name to Investec Australia Limited, in accordance
with Australian law, pending resolution of its petition before this Court. Thus, when the
court required the parties to file memoranda, NM Rothschild referred to itself as Investec
Australia Limited (formerly “NM Rothschild & Sons [Australia] Limited”). Lepanto sought
the dismissal of the case because the petition was not filed by the real party in interest. The
Court held that:
[The] submissions of Magallanes on the change of its corporate name [are]

satisfactory and resolved not to dismiss the present Petition for Review on the ground of
not being prosecuted under the name of the real party in interest. While the court stands
by our pronouncement in Philips Export on the importance of the corporate name to the
very existence of corporations and the significance thereof in the corporation’s right to sue,
the court shall not go so far as to dismiss a case filed by the proper party using its former
name when adequate identification is presented. A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. There is no doubt in our minds that the party who filed the present
Petition, having presented sufficient evidence of its identity and being represented by the
same counsel as that of the defendant in the case sought to be dismissed, is the entity that
will be benefited if this Court grants the dismissal prayed for.
This case is different, however, because it involves two separate and distinct entities.
The corporation that initiated the complaint for B.P. 22 is different from the corporation
that filed the memorandum at the RTC and the petition for review before the CA. It appears
that Palmer is suing Magallanes in its own right, not as agent of Andrews, the real party in
interest.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAMBOKU PEAK, INC.

G.R. No. 169745, July 18, 2014
&
PHIL-JAPAN WORKERS UNIONSOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PIDLIPPINES
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (P JWU-SUPER), MEDARBITER CLARISSA
G. BELTRANLERIOS and SECRETARY PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, vs. PHIL-JAPAN INDUSTRIAL
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170091, July 18, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only real parties-in-interest who
participated in the litigation of the case before the CA can avail of an appeal by certiorari.
The Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in-interest vested with personality to file the
Page 140 of 1553

present petitions. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. As thus defined, the
real parties-in-interest in these cases would have been PALCEA-SUPER and PJWU-SUPER. It
would have been their duty to appear and defend the ruling of the Secretary of Labor for they
are the ones who were interested that the same be sustained. As to the Secretary of Labor,
she was impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party
because one of the issues involved therein was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction.
But that does not make her a real party-in-interest or vests her with authority to appeal the
Decisions of the CA in case it reverses her ruling.
Facts:
Namboku is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower

services to various clients, mainly airline companies. On April 28, 2003, the Philippine
Aircraft Loaders and Cargo Employees Association Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines
for Empowerment and Reforms (PALCEA-SUPER) filed a Petition for direct certification
election before the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of
Namboku assigned at the Cargo and Loading Station of the Philippine Airlines (PAL) in
Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
Namboku opposed the Petition on the ground of inappropriateness. It claimed that

the members of the PALCEA-SUPER are project employees. Hence, they cannot represent
its regular rank-and-file employees. On June 17, 2003, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order
holding that the members of PALCEA-SUPER are regular employees of Namboku.
Namboku appealed the Med-Arbiter’s Order to the Secretary of the Labor, maintaining that
the members of PALCEA-SUPER are mere project employees.
In the meantime, Namboku received a summons setting the pre-election conference

on July 31, 2003 and stating that the Order granting the conduct of a certification election
in an unorganized establishment is not appealable. Whereupon, Namboku filed a
Manifestation and Motion seeking to suspend the conduct of certification election pending
resolution of its appeal. The Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and affirmed the Med-
Arbiter’s June 17, 2003 Order. Undeterred, Namboku filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari.
With regard to the Phil-Japan case, an examination of the records reveals the
following Facts:
Phil-Japan is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing mufflers, chassis

and other car accessories for local and international markets. On June 6, 2003, PJWU-
Page 141 of 1553

SUPER filed before the Med-Arbiter a Petition seeking to determine the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of rank-and-file employees in Phil-Japan.
Phil-Japan opposed the Petition, claiming that the members of PJWUSUPER are not
its employees. It alleged that the listed members of PJWUSUPER have either resigned,
finished their contracts, or are employees of its job contractors CMC Management and
PEPC Management Services. Subsequently, the Med-Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering
the conduct of certification election. It held, among others, that the documents submitted
are not sufficient to resolve the issue of the existence of employer employee relationship.
Considering, however, that Section 15, Rule VIII of the Rules Implementing Book V
of the Labor Code prohibits the suspension of proceedings based on the pendency of such
issue, she allowed the employees to vote. Aggrieved, Phil-Japan appealed the Decision of
the Med-Arbiter to the Office of the Secretary of Labor asserting that the Med-Arbiter
gravely abused her discretion in not resolving the issue of whether employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties.
Hearing Officer Lourdes T. Ching informed Phil-Japan that its appeal will not be
acted upon pursuant to Section 17, Rule VIII of Department Order No. 40-03 and that the
certification election will proceed accordingly. Undaunted, Phil-Japan filed before the CA
a Petition for Certiorari.
The CA issued its Decision granting Namboku’s Petition and reversing the letter-
resolution of the Secretary of Labor. It sustained Namboku’s position that the members of
PALCEA-SUPER are project employees and, hence, they are not similarly situated with the
company’s regular rank-and-file employees. The CA also nullified Section 17, Rule VIII of
Department Order No. 40-03 for being in conflict with Article 259 of the Labor Code.
The Secretary of Labor filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This prompted Namboku
to file a Motion to Expunge on the ground that the Secretary of Labor is a mere nominal
party who has no legal standing to participate or prosecute the case. It argued that the
Secretary of Labor should have refrained from filing the said Motion for Reconsideration
and should have maintained the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The CA issued a Resolution denying the Secretary of Labor’s Motion for

Reconsideration on the ground, among others, that she is merely a nominal party to the
case and has no personal interest therein. With regard to the Phil-Japan case, the CA
reversed the ruling of the Med-Arbiter. It likewise agreed with Phil-Japan that before
extending labor benefits, the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship
exists is a primordial consideration. Hence, this petition.
Page 142 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor is a mere nominal party and has no legal
standing to participate or prosecute the case.
Ruling:
The Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in interest vested with personality to file
the present petitions. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. As thus
defined, the real parties-in-interest in these cases would have been PALCEA-SUPER and
PJWU-SUPER. It would have been their duty to appear and defend the ruling of the
Secretary of Labor for they are the ones who were interested that the same be sustained.
Of course, they had the option not to pursue the case before a higher court, as what they
did in these cases. As to the Secretary of Labor, she was impleaded in the Petitions for
Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party because one of the issues involved therein
was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction. But that does not make her a real
party-in-interest or vests her with authority to appeal the Decisions of the CA in case it
reverses her ruling. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only real parties-in-
interest who participated in the litigation of the case before the CA can avail of an appeal
by certiorari.
But the Secretary of Labor next contends that with the nullification of Department
Order No. 40-03, she has now become a party adversely affected by the CA ruling. In
support of her contention, the Secretary of Labor poses the question: who may now appeal
the Decisionsof the CA to the Supreme Court? Certainly, neither Namboku nor Phil-Japan
would appeala favorable decision.
The National Appellate Board v. P/Insp. Mamauag provides the complete answer.
Thus:
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or
tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal
from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result
where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and
detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
Page 143 of 1553

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought
before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal
party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who
should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for
review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed
from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and
agencies," not to litigate.
Here, both cases emanated from the petitions for certification election filed with the
Med-Arbiter and subsequently appealed to the Secretary of Labor. She had occasion to hear
the parties’ respective contentions and rule thereon. As the officer who rendered the
decision now subject of these cases, the Secretary of Labor should have remained impartial
and detached from the time the cases reached her until the same were being scrutinized
on appeal.
True, the issue of whether Section 17, Rule VIII of Department Order No. 40-03 is
unconstitutional is a matter of great concern and deserves everyone’s attention. But this
Court cannot pass upon and resolve the same in these Petitions. Otherwise, it will
countenance the objectionable actions of the Secretary of Labor and run afoul of the above
cited settled decisions.
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR

HERNANDEZvs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC., and WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN
G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014, J. Carpio
The petitioner Association of Flood Victims and its representative Jaime Hernandez
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the court assailing Resolution No. 12-
0859. The Supreme Court ruled that under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties to a civil
action, which must be prosecuted and defended by a real party-in-interest. A real party-in-
interest is the person who stands benefitted or injured to the outcome of the case or is entitled
to the avails of the suit. Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court the facts
showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of the party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons
that is made a party, must be averred.
Page 144 of 1553

Facts:
The petitioner Association of Flood Victims and its representative Jaime Hernandez
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the court assailing Resolution No. 12-
0859. The Association alleges that the Comelec committed grave of abuse of discretion
when it issued the questioned resolution and seeks to compel the publication of the said
resoulution in a newspaper of general circulation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec may be compelled by mandamus to publish the

resolution by the petitioner Association of Flood Victims.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ruled that Association of Flood
Victims has no legal capacity to sue and therefore is not a real party-in-interest to bring
forth the petition.
Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only natural and juridical
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties to a civil action, which must be
prosecuted and defended by a real party-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the person
who stands benefitted or injured to the outcome of the case or is entitled to the avails of
the suit. Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court the facts showing the
capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of the party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
made a party, must be averred.
In the case at bar, the capacity of Association of Flood Victims to sue nor its
authority as representative to sue was not averred in the petition. In the petition, it stated
that it is an association that is soon to be incorporated. An unincorporated association, in
the absence of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the
name of the association. Such unincorporated association is not a legal entity distinct from
its members. If an association, like petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no juridical
personality, then all members of the association must be made parties in the civil action.
In this case, other than his bare allegation that he is the lead convenor of the Association
of Flood Victims, petitioner Hernandez showed no proof that he was authorized by said
association. Aside from petitioner Hernandez, no other member was made signatory to the
petition. Only petitioner Hernandez signed the Verification and Sworn Certification
Against Forum Shopping, stating that he caused the preparation of the petition. There was
Page 145 of 1553

no accompanying document showing that the other members of the Association of Flood
Victims authorized petitioner Hernandez to represent them and the association in the
petition.
More so in this case where there is no showing that petitioner Hernandez is validly
authorized to represent petitioner Association of Flood Victims.
Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue, petitioner
Hernandez, who is filing this petition as a representative of the Association of Flood
Victims, is likewise devoid of legal personality to bring an action in court. Neither can
petitioner Hernandez sue as a taxpayer because he failed to show that there was illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
MAJESTIC FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., vs.

JOSE D. TITO
x-----------------------x
ORNELIO MENDOZA and PAULINA CRUZ vs.
JOSE NAZAL and ROSITA NAZAL
G.R. No. 197442, October 22, 2014, J. Estela Perlas-Bernabe
Verily, where a transfer of interest was effected before the commencement of the suit
– as in this case – the transferee must necessarily be the plaintiff (or defendant, as the case
may be) as it is he who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Thus, on
the supposition that they were the case’s plaintiffs, Sps. Nazal should bear the obligation
imputed by the RTC upon Tito to diligently and expeditiously prosecute the action within a
reasonable length of time. The RTC, however, pointed out that Sps. Nazal failed in this regard.
Facts:
Petitioner Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. (Majestic) was the judgment
obligee in a case for rescission of contract the RTC. In order to satisfy the judgment by
default, the Sheriff levied upon the property of the judgment obligor, Thomas D. Cort and
sold the same at a public auction to Paulina Cruz, the highest bidder. After the redemption
period had lapsed, Cruz secured in her name and, thereafter, sold the subject property to
Cornelio Mendoza (Mendoza).
Respondent Jose D. Tito (Tito) filed with the same RTC against Majestic a petition
to declare the proceedings and the Decision in the rescission case null and void. He
Page 146 of 1553

contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of his predecessor-
in-interest, Cort, who had passed almost five years (5) prior to the filing of the rescission
case. His standing to file the annulment case was based on his purported ownership of the
subject property, which he allegedly inherited from Cort by way of a devise under his Last
Will and Testament that was later probated and allowed in Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania, United States of America.
Prior to the institution of the annulment case, Tito had, however, already
transmitted his interest over the subject property to spouses Jose and Rosita Nazal (Sps.
Nazal) prompting the latter to join him in the proceedings as intervenors, impleading Cruz
and Mendoza. Earlier, Mendoza filed against Sps. Nazal a case for forcible entry and
another case for recovery of possession, which were dismissed.
Meanwhile, Sps. Nazal remained in possession of the subject property. Thereafter,

Sps. Nazal received summons in an unlawful detainer case filed by the new registered
owners of the subject property, spouses Mariano and Rhodora Lim (Sps. Lim), which
apparently prompted Sps. Nazal to set the annulment case for hearing. Learning of the loss
of the records, Sps. Nazal moved for reconstitution of judicial records and for revival of the
proceedings in the annulment case, which was opposed by Majestic. Later, Majestic filed
an Urgent Motion to Declare Case as already Closed and Terminated with Opposition to
Revive the Case, contending, among others, that Tito, the principal Majestic in the
annulment case, had lost interest in prosecuting the case and that Sps. Nazal have no
personality to further prosecute the same.
RTC held that as both Majestic and Sps. Nazal were guilty of inaction since 1987 after
the latter’s Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial was filed, no one should be allowed to benefit
from the other and the case must be allowed to proceed on the merits. CA reversed and set
aside the RTC’s Order, holding that Sps. Nazal are entitled to proceed with the prosecution
of their cause of action against Majestic after having been duly allowed to intervene in the
annulment case.
Issue:
Whether or not Sps. Nazal is allowed to prosecute their claim against Majestic.
Ruling:
No, Sps. Nazal is not allowed to prosecute their claim against Majestic.
Page 147 of 1553

Sps. Nazal, who were joined as intervenors in the proceedings, had already lost their
right to participate therein, in view of the RTC’s dismissal of the main action which was
decreed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, stemming from the failure of
the putative plaintiff, Tito, to diligently and expeditiously prosecute the same for an
unjustified and unreasonable length of time.
Case law states that intervention is never an independent action, but is merely
ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or
unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one
not an original party, who is claiming a certain right or interest in the pending case, the
opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests. In
other words, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original
party. Thus, as a general rule, where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is
nothing to aid or fight for and, consequently, the right of intervention ceases.
It bears pointing out that, despite having been joined in the annulment case as
intervenors, Sps. Nazal should have actually been deemed as the case’s plaintiffs
considering that Tito had already transferred his interest over the disputed property to the
former, even prior to the institution of the proceedings. Verily, where a transfer of interest
was effected before the commencement of the suit – as in this case – the transferee must
necessarily be the plaintiff (or defendant, as the case may be) as it is he who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Thus, on the supposition that they were
the case’s plaintiffs, Sps. Nazal should bear the obligation imputed by the RTC upon Tito
to diligently and expeditiously prosecute the action within a reasonable length of time. The
RTC, however, pointed out that Sps. Nazal failed in this regard.
As the records would bear, while Sps. Nazal moved to set the case for pre-trial, no
further action was taken by them after the court a quo failed to calendar the case and set
the same for pre-trial. Disconcerting is the fact that it took Sps. Nazal almost eleven (11)
years to move for the setting of the case for hearing, as they were apparently compelled to
act only upon the threat of being dispossessed of the subject property with the filing of the
unlawful detainer case by the new registered owners, Sps. Lim. Notably, while under both
the present and the old Rules of Court, the clerk of court has the duty to set the case for
pre-trial, the same does not relieve the plaintiffsof their own duty to prosecute the case
diligently. Truth be told, the expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of the
plaintiff as the court.
All told, whether one treats Sps. Nazal as mere intervenors or, properly speaking, as
the plaintiffs in the annulment case, the Court finds no cogent reason as to why the same
Page 148 of 1553

should not be dismissed. In fine, Sps. Nazal are precluded from prosecuting their claim
against Majestic.
ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO and SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN

CHURCH vs. SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON and RODOLFO T. CALDERON
G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014, J. Villarama JR.
The fact that one of the respondents did not file their answer to the complaint does
not divest the court of jurisdiction. So long as the case has been prosecuted against the
indispensable parties, the court retains its jurisdiction.
Facts:
On May 15, 2006, respondents spouses Estela and Rodolfo Calderon filed a verified
complaint before the HLURB Regional Office against Silverland Realty &Development
Corporation, Silverland Village I Homeowners Association, Silverland Alliance Christian
Church, Joel Geronimo, Annie Geronimo, Jonas Geronimo and Susan Geronimo, for
specific performance and for the issuance of cease and desist order and damages.
Sometime in May 2005, a building was erected beside the house of Estela and
Rodolfo. Jonas Geronimo directed the construction. When the Calderons asked about the
building, Susan Geronimo told them that her son, Joel, had bought the adjacent lot to build
an extension house in order to create a wider playing area for the Geronimo grandchildren
because their two-storey house could no longer accommodate their growing family. When
the construction was finished, the building turned out to be the church of SACC. The
church was used for different religious activities including daily worship services, baptisms,
summer school, choir rehearsals, band practices, playing of different musical instruments
and use of a loud sound system which would last until late in the evening. The noise
allegedly affected Calderon’s health and caused inconvenience to them because they were
forced to leave their house if they want peace and tranquility. They sought assistance from
the President of the homeowners’ association. SACC, through Atty. Alan Alambra promised
that it will take steps to avoid church activities beyond 10:00 p.m. However, the intolerable
noise still continued. Due to the added noise and tension, Estela’s nose bled. The HLURB
Arbiter rendered a Decision6 on October 22, 2007 and ordered the Geronimos not to use
the property at #46 Silverlane Street for religious purposes and as a location of a church.
Issue:
Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the case considering that the
developer did not file its answer to the complaint.
Page 149 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes, it does.
The Calderons have sued not only the Geronimos but also the developer corporation
and the homeowners’ association. That Silverland Realty & Development Corporation and
Silverland Village 1 Homeowners Association did not file their answer, did not divest the
HLURB of jurisdiction over the case. A prior judgment directing and commanding the
developer Silverland Realty & Development Corporation to enforce its contractual
obligations is not necessary. Judgment against the Geronimos is enough considering that
they are indispensable parties for they were the ones who built and operate the church
inside the subdivision and without them no final determination can be had of the
action. The Geronimos are the ones who will be affected by the judgment. In fact, they are
the ones who are prohibited from using the subject property as a church.
INDISPENSABLE PARTY
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO

vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 196894, MARCH 3, 2014
J. MENDOZA
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those
present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void.
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to
Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons
whose interests are indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a
protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the
annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach
this Court. To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration of justice,
the CA should have applied liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of
legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides,
this lacking requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the
reason why this controversy arose.
Facts:
Page 150 of 1553

Petitioners were the plaintiffs in two collection cases against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc,
et al. Respondent JEWM was the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in
another collection case against the same defendants.
Based on a compromise agreement, ownership over the subject property was vested in Sy
Sen Ben. The title over the subject property was later transferred to JEWM. A year
thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection. When this decision
attained finality, a writ of execution was eventually issued. A public auction was scheduled
and a notice of sale was posted including, among others, the subject properties now, in the
name of JEWM.
In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and
the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from
the notice of sale. Upon the denial of the petition, Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order
to proceed with the execution.
JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties and the issuance
of a permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. Spouses Crisologo filed an
Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the application for writ or preliminary injuction
filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to intervene was,
however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo. The RTC denied the said motion and granted
JEWM’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Spouses prayed for reconsideration and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010 Order.
This was denied in the for lack of legal standing in court considering that their counsel
failed to make the written formal notice of appearance. However, on October 27, 2010, they
received another order, likewise dated October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time to comment on
their Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on October 1, 2010. On November 9, 2010,
however, RTC denied the said motion.
On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was
granted in an order given in open court on November 19, 2010. Spouses Crisologo then filed
their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be
deemed as defaulting parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and
order of default.
Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the RTC
orders denying their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance
of a TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied the application for a TRO,
but directed Spouses Crisologo to amend their petition. Pending disposition of the
Page 151 of 1553

Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM filed a motion on asking for the resolution of the case
on the merits. The RTC ruled in favor of JEWM. The CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in
failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation
of lien.
Held:
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of

title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as
annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, to wit:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure, alteration or

amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title
or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds,
except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person
having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court
upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased;
or that new interest not appearing upon the certificates have arisen or been created; or that
an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear
and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a
certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or
bond if necessary, as it may consider proper.
In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of the
annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties
annotated in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend
that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the
back of a certificate of title.
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the
back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should
Page 152 of 1553
have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no

final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as
regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as
indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule.
This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion.
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM
asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule 65.
At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of an appeal, is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Only then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have already been proper, except
for one last issue, that is, Spouses Crisologo’s legal standing to file the same. JEWM cites
DBP v. COA where the Court held: The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is
not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions. The ‘person aggrieved’ under Section 1 of Rule
65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party
in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise
would open the courts to numerous and endless litigations.
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of
legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the
latter’s recourse via Rule 65. This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the
Court has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate
the cause of justice.
MARCELINO M. FLORETE, JR., ET. AL. vs. ROGELIO M. FLORETE, ET. AL.
GR. No. 174909, January 20, 2016 [Leonen, J.]
Page 153 of 1553

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a
failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.
Thus, the general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the
joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine
qua non of the exercise of judicial power.
FACTS:
Marcelino, Jr., Ma. Elena, and Raul Muyco (Marcelino, Jr. Group) filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and Sale of Shares in People’s
Broadcasting Service, Inc. and all Posterior Subscriptions and Increases thereto with
Damages against Diamel Corporation, Rogelio, Sr., Imelda Florete, Margaret Florete, and
Rogelio Florete, Jr. (Rogelio, Sr. Group). The Complaint was anchored on violations of and
liabilities arising from the Corporation Code and ultimately prayed that People’s
Broadcasting’s entire capital structure be reconfigured.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint stating, among others, that indispensible parties were
not joined in the Complaint. Rogelio, Sr. Group’s counterclaim for damages was granted by
the RTC. Rogelio, Sr. then filed a Motion for the immediate execution of the award of moral
and exemplary damages, which motion was granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC’s dismissal and ruled that the Marcelino, Jr. Group did not have a cause
of action against those whom they have impleaded as defendants. It also noted that the
principal obligors in or perpetrators of the assailed transactions were persons other than
those in the Rogelio, Sr. Group who have not been impleaded as parties.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure to implead indispensable parties renders the trial court’s Decision null
and void for want of jurisdiction.
RULING:
YES.
What the Marcelino, Jr. Group asks is the complete reversal of a number of corporate acts
undertaken by People’ Broadcasting’s different boards of directors. These boards
supposedly engaged in outright fraud or, at the very least, acted in such a manner that
Page 154 of 1553

amounts to wanton mismanagement of People’s Broadcasting’s affairs. Hence, Marcelino

Group should have filed a derivative suit, where the corporation concerned ought to have
been impleaded as a party.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there
is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no
effectiveness. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
to those present. Thus, the general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil
action requires the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.
All subsequent actions of lower courts are void as to both the absent and present
parties. The inclusion of an indispensable party is a jurisdictional requirement: While the
failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an
action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of
the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it
remains essential — as it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in
the proceedings before the court renders judgment. This is because the absence of such
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Courts must first acquire jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable party. Any
decision rendered by a court without first obtaining the required jurisdiction over
indispensable parties is null and void for want of jurisdiction: "the presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is ‘the authority
to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.’" Thus, the Supreme Court has
annulled judgments rendered by lower courts in the absence of indispensible parties.
In this case, considering that People Broadcasting is an indispensable party which was not
impleaded, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction and its Decision awarding damages is void.
From the conclusion that the Decision awarding damages is void and unwarranted, it
necessarily follows that the Order of the Regional Trial Court to immediately execute its
Decision is likewise null and void.
DAVID M. DAVID vs. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS, JR.

Page 155 of 1553

The Court reiterated that an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom

no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable
parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case.”
Considering that David was asking for judicial determination of his rights in Olympia,
it is without a doubt, an indispensable party as it stands to be injured or benefited by the
outcome of the main proceeding. It has such an interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect its rights. Not having been impleaded, Olympia cannot be prejudiced
by any judgment where its interests and properties are adjudicated in favor of another even if
the latter is a beneficial owner. It cannot be said either to have consented to the judicial
approval of the compromise, much less waived substantial rights, because it was never a party
in the proceedings.
Facts:
Sometime in 1995, David M. David (David), Federico M. Paragas, Jr. (Paragas) and
Severo Henry G. Lobrin (Lobrin) agreed to venture into a business in Hong Kong (HK).
They created Olympia International, Ltd. (Olympia) under HK laws. Olympia had offices
in HK and the Philippines. David handled the marketing aspect of the business while
Lobrin and Datoy were in charge of operations. In early 1998, Olympia became the exclusive
general agent in HK of Philam Plans Inc.’s (PPI) pre-need plans through the General Agency
Agreement. In late 2001, Olympia launched the Pares-Pares program by which planholders
would earn points with cash equivalents for successfully enlisting new subscribers. The
cash equivalents, in turn, would be used for the payment of monthly premiums of the
planholders. PPI authorized Olympia to accept the premium payments, including the cash
equivalent of the bonus points, and to remit the same, net of commissions, to PPI in the
Philippines. The money from HK was to be remitted through Olympia’s account in RCBC.
In turn, Olympia was to pay the planholders’ bonuses as well as the share of profits for the
directors. David was tasked to personally remit said amounts to PPI as he was the only
signatory authorized to transact on behalf of Olympia regarding the RCBC accounts.
Paragas alleged that the amount remitted by Olympia to RCBC from September 2001
to May 25, 2002 reached P82,978,543.00, representing the total net earnings from the pre-
need plans, 30% of which comprised the bonus points earned by the subscribers under
the Pares-Pares program. The rest was to be distributed among the four partners.
In 2002, the state of affairs among the partners went sour upon Lobrin’s discovery
that David failed to remit to PPI the 30% cash equivalent of the bonus points. In a meeting
Page 156 of 1553

held on June 1, 2002 in HK, David tried to explain his side, but no settlement was reached.
Later, Lobrin discovered that only P19,302,902.13 remained of the P82,978,543.00 remitted
from HK to the RCBC account. As the Chairperson of Olympia’s Board of Directors (BOD),
he demanded the return of the entire P82,978,543.00.
David filed a complaint for Declaratory Relief, Sum of Money and Damages before
the RTC as the Olympia stripped him from his position from venture and he was not
permitted to board on a plane pursuant to a hold-departure order. Several counterclaims
were filed by the other party. Thus, David filed the supplemental complaint, with a
manifestation that an amicable settlement was struck with Lobrin and Datoy whereby they
agreed to withdraw the complaint and counterclaims against each other. This was later on
affirmed by Lobrin and Olympia through their counsel. The agreement clearly stated that
Lobrin was acting on Olympia’s behalf, on the basis of a resolution passed during the board
meeting held on March 21, 2003.
Paragas questioned the existence of the cited BOD resolution granting Lobrin the
authority to settle the case, as well as the validity of the agreement through an affidavit
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul, Domingo Lucinario, Jr. He pointed to the fact
that Olympia, as an entity, was never a party in the controversy.
RTC granted David’s Motion to Admit the Supplemental Complaint and approved
the compromise agreement. Paragas moved for reconsideration, claiming that although the
parties had the prerogative to settle their differences amicably, the intrinsic and extrinsic
validity of the compromise agreement, as well as its basis, may be questioned if illicit and
unlawful. RTC denied the motion of Paragas. On petition for certiorari, CA denied the
same. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Olympia is an indispensable party to the case.
Ruling:
Olympia is an indispensable party
In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, the Court reiterated that an indispensable party
is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and
who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties
is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
Page 157 of 1553

jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a
case.”
Considering that David was asking for judicial determination of his rights in
Olympia, it is without a doubt, an indispensable party as it stands to be injured or benefited
by the outcome of the main proceeding. It has such an interest in the controversy that a
final decree would necessarily affect its rights. Not having been impleaded, Olympia
cannot be prejudiced by any judgment where its interests and properties are adjudicated
in favor of another even if the latter is a beneficial owner. It cannot be said either to have
consented to the judicial approval of the compromise, much less waived substantial rights,
because it was never a party in the proceedings.
Moreover, Olympia’s absence did not confer upon the RTC the jurisdiction or
authority to hear and resolve the whole controversy. This lack of authority on the part of
the RTC which flows from the absence of Olympia, being an indispensable party,
necessarily negates any binding effect of the subject judicially-approved compromise
agreement.
Time and again, the Court has held that the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The failure to implead an
indispensable party is not a mere procedural matter. Rather, it brings to fore the right of a
disregarded party to its constitutional rights to due process. Having Olympia’s interest
being subjected to a judicially-approved agreement, absent any participation in the
proceeding leading to the same, is procedurally flawed. It is unfair for being violative of its
right to due process. In fine, a holding that is based on a compromise agreement that
springs from a void proceeding for want of jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable
party can never become binding, final nor executory and it may be “ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.”
VENUE
VIRGILIO C. BRIONES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CASH ASIA CREDIT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Briones filed a complaint directly assailing the validity of the subject contracts,
claiming forgery in their execution. However, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue. In this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the
subject contracts which is Malati Cityand as such, Briones’s complaint should be dismissed
Page 158 of 1553

for having been filed in the City of Manila. The Court ruled that a complaint directly assailing
the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on
venue.
Facts:
Upon investigation, Briones discovered that: (a) he purportedly executed a

promissory note, loan agreement, and deed of real estate mortgage covering the subject
property (subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in order to obtain a loan in the amount
of 3,500,000.00 from the latter; and (b) since the said loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia
proceeded to foreclose his property. Briones filed a complaint directly assailing the validity
of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution.
For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. In
this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating
that “all legal actions arising out of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage
subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court
of Makati City.” In view thereof, it contended that all actions arising out of the subject
contracts may only be exclusively brought in the courts of Makati City, and as such,
Briones’s complaint should be dismissed for having been filed in the City of Manila.
The RTC denied Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The CA annulled
the RTC Orders, and accordingly, dismissed Briones’s complaint without prejudice to the
filing of the same before the proper court in Makati City.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright
dismissal of Briones’s complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Ruling:
Yes.
At the outset, the Court stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, [Majestic] must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion
connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’ discretion must be exercised in a despotic
Page 159 of 1553
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of law.”
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA gravely abused
its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint against Cash Asia,
without prejudice to its re-filing before the proper court in Makati City.
The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the
venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi
v. Rep. of the Phils. instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either
introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or
restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails
only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the
exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus,
the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. Conversely,
therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should
not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in
accordance with the general rules on venue. To be sure, it would be inherently consistent
for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact,
precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive
in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to
the courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones's complaint
directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution.
Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue
stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their
validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint
before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
NICOMEDES J. LOZADA vs. EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL,

ESTELLITA BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, BRACEWELL,
JOHN ERIC BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF GEORGE BRACEWELL
G.R. No. 179155, April 2, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe,
Page 160 of 1553

Lozada filed an application and confirmation of title over a parcel of land before RTC
of Makati. The application was approved by the said court. Within a year from the issuance
of the aforementioned decree, Bracewell filed a nullification of the degree before RTC Las
Piñas which was given by the said court. Lozada questioned the jurisdiction of RTC Las Piñas
in cognizing the matter. In upholding the jurisdiction of RTC Las Piñas, the Supreme Court
ruled that jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still vested on the CFI (now,
RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated. Since the land is situated in Las Piñas,
it is proper that the cancellation of the decree was filed before RTC Las Piñas.
Facts:
On February 23, 1989 RTC of Makati City, acting as a land registration court
approved the application and registration and confirmation of Nicomedes Lazada title over
a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU129514. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued
Decree No. N217036 in the name of Majestic, who later obtained OCT No. 078 covering the
said parcel of land.
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree,
James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of registration under
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the “Property
Registration Decree,” before the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 (Las Piñas CityRTC),
claiming that a portion of Plan PSU 129514, consisting of 3,097 square meters— of which he
is the absolute owner and possessor — is fraudulently included in Decree No. N217036.
The Las Piñas City RTC ruled in favor of Bracewell. Aggrieved, Lozada elevated his
case on appeal before the CA, arguing mainly that the Las Piñas City RTC had no
jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD
1529, which should be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the decision and
ordered the issuance of the decree. In a Decision dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court
affirmed the assailed judgment of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Which court should take cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the
cadastral court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Page 161 of 1553

Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the “Land Registration Act,” as amended, — which
was the law in force at the time of the commencement by both parties of their respective
registration proceedings — jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was
conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces
in which the land sought to be registered is situated. The land registration laws were
updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979, and under
Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still vested on the
CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated.
This case was only filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during
that time, i.e., December 1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the
aforesaid application should not have been filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134
pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing at that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, the proper venue for real
actions, such as an application for original registration, lies with the CFI of the province
where the property is situated, viz.:
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.—(a) Real actions.—Actions affecting

title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the
province where the property or any part thereof lies.
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the
application for its original registration should have been filed before the Las Piñas City-
RTC were it not for the fact that the said court had yet to be created at the time the
application was filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the complication at
hand is actually one of venue and not of jurisdiction, the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity
of the situation, holds that the Las Piñas City- RTC has the authority over the petition for
the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for
review before the Las Piñas City-RTC was only but a rectificatory implementation of the
rules of procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back only because of past
exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the Court perceives no compelling
reason to deviate from applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of
procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly
PLEADINGS
Allegations in the Pleadings and Counterclaims
Page 162 of 1553

Jorge B. Navarra Vs. People of the Philippines,

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
G.R. No. 203750. June 6, 2016
Facts:
Criminal cases for violation of BP22 were filed against petitioner. After the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati rendered a judgment convicting him of seven counts of
violation of BP22, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, which
affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, Navarra filed a petition for review before the CA, which dismissed said
petition for failure to attach a certification of non-forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether the CA should have applied the rule on forum shopping liberally
Ruling:
As a general rule, petitions that lack or have a defective certificate of non-forum
shopping cannot be cured by its subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a
reasonable need to relax the rules on the ground of substantial compliance or presence of
special circumstances or compelling reasons. The court has the discretion to dismiss or not
to dismiss an appellant's appeal but said discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the unique
circumstances obtaining in each case. Technicalities, as much as possible, must be avoided.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon since the policy
of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and not to apply the rules
of procedure in a very rigid, technical sense. It would be more prudent for the courts to
forego a technical lapse and allow the review of the parties' case on appeal to attain the
ends of justice rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice
to the parties, giving nothing but false impression of speedy disposal of cases.
Page 163 of 1553

UWE MATHAEUS v. SPOUSES MEDEQUISO

Specifically with respect to certifications against forum-shopping, it has been

repeatedly held that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special
circumstances or compelling reasons.'" Here, the Court is not inclined to relax the rules for
the petitioner's benefit as it perceives no compelling reasons or circumstances to rule in his
favor. Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus notarize documents or
administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official
functions. Clerks of court should not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution
of private documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions.
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 5579, the Tagbilaran Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 1 issued a Decision ordering petitioner to pay respondents spouses Eric and
Genevieve Medequiso, the amount of P30,000.00. RTC affirmed.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA which dismissed the Petition
because the required Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping was sworn to
not before a notary public but before a clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court in
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition.
RULING:
NO. Under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA, submitting together with
the petition a certification on non-forum shopping. Under Section 3 of the same Rule, "[t]he
failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
Specifically with respect to certifications against forum-shopping, it has been
repeatedly held that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
Page 164 of 1553

is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is
a need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special
circumstances or compelling reasons.'" Here, the Court is not inclined to relax the rules for
the petitioner's benefit as it perceives no compelling reasons or circumstances to rule in his
favor. Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus notarize documents or
administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official
functions. Clerks of court should not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution
of private documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions.
ARTURO C. ALBA, JR., vs. RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO, et. al.

G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016 [Peralta, J.]
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, the Court has

devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the defendants’ counterclaim? and (d) Is there
any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City
a Complaint against respondents for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or
cancellation of title and damages alleging, among others, that his title over a parcel of land
was canceled by virtue of a deed of sale he allegedly executed in favor of respondents. He
claimed that the deed of sale was a forged document which respondents Malapajo were the
co-authors of.
Respondents Malapajo filed their Answer with Counterclaim contending that

petitioner had, on separate occasions, obtained loans from them and their mother which
were secured by separate real estate mortgages covering the subject property; that the two
real estate mortgages had never been discharged. Respondents counterclaimed for
damages and for reimbursement of petitioner's loan from them plus the agreed monthly
interest in the event that the deed of sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery.
Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stating,

among others, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of respondents'
permissive counterclaim. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing
Page 165 of 1553
as if a Motion to Dismiss had been filed alleging that respondents’ counterclaims are in the
nature of a permissive counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of docket fees and filing
of a certification against forum shopping. The RTC denied the Motion finding that
respondents’ counterclaims are compulsory.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari saying that there was no proper proof of service of the petition to the
respondents, and that only the last page of the attached copy of the RTC Order was signed
and certified as a true copy of the original while the rest of the pages were mere machine
copies.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner's petition

for certiorari after the latter had clearly shown compliance with the proof of service of
the petition as required under Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
YES. Under Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, service made
through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and
an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with the rule. In this case,
Nerissa Apuyo, the secretary of petitioner’s counsel, had executed an affidavit of personal
service and service by registered mail which she attached to the petition marked as original
filed with the CA. She stated under oath that she personally served a copy of the petition
to the RTC of Roxas, as evidenced by a stamp mark of the RTC on the corresponding page
of the petition; that she also served copies of the petition by registered mail to respondents'
counsels as evidenced by registry receipts numbers "PST 188" and "PST 189", both issued
by the Roxas City Post Office. The registry receipts issued by the post office were attached
to the petition filed with the CA. Petitioner had thus complied with the rule on proof of
service.
2. Whether respondents’ counterclaim, i.e., reimbursement of the loan obtained from

them in case the deed of absolute sale is declared null and void on the ground of
forgery, is permissive in nature which requires the payment of docket fees and a
certification against forum shopping for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
same.
Page 166 of 1553

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing
party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A counterclaim is
permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed
separately in another case.

Based on the above-mentioned tests, the nature of respondents’ counterclaim is

permissive.
Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property by assailing the validity of the deed
of sale on the subject property which he allegedly executed in favor of respondents
Malapajo on the ground of forgery. Respondents counterclaimed that, in case the deed of
sale is declared null and void, they be paid the loan petitioner obtained from them plus the
agreed monthly interest which was covered by a real estate mortgage on the subject
property executed by petitioner in favor of respondents. There is a logical relationship
between the claim and the counterclaim, as the counterclaim is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
Notably, the same evidence to sustain respondents' counterclaim would disprove
petitioner's case. In the event that respondents could convincingly establish that petitioner
actually executed the promissory note and the real estate mortgage over the subject
property in their favor then petitioner's complaint might fail. Petitioner's claim is so related
logically to respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials for the claim
and the counterclaim would result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of
the court and the parties.
Page 167 of 1553

Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action;

otherwise, it would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in
a different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed
subsequently, it would meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore,
no need for respondents to pay docket fees and to file a certification against forum
shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.
ADERITO Z. YUJUICO v. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., ATTY.

RICHARD J. NETHERCOTT and ATTY. HONORATO R. MATABAN
G.R. No. 211113, 29 June 2015, J. Perez
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter
of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is
served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served).
Facts:
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the orders of the RTC
allowing URAMI to file its amended answer more than two years after it filed its original
answer. Petitioner argues that URAMI should not have been so allowed for the following
reasons: First, URAMI had not shown that the admissions it made under the original
answer were made through "palpable mistake." Hence, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule129 of
the Rules of Court, URAMI is barred from contradicting such admissions through the filing
of its amended answer. Second, the amended answer is merely a ploy of URAMI to further
delay the proceedings. Thus, petitioner prays that SC set aside the decision of the CA,
disallow URAMI’s amended answer and direct the RTC in to resolve his motion for
summary judgment with dispatch.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in allowing respondent to file amended answer more
than two years after it filed its original answer.
Ruling:
NO. Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter
of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is
served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served).
Page 168 of 1553
Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. As a matter of
judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with
liberality. This is especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of
proceedings or, at least, before trial.
First: We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court precludes URAMI from filing its amended answer. To begin with, the said
provision does not set the be-all and end-all standard upon which amendments to
pleadings may or may not be allowed. Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are
primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129
of the Rule of Court. Second: We also cannot agree with the petitioner’s accusation that the
amended answer was only interposed to further delay the proceedings. As the previous
discussion reveal, the amended answer aims to correct certain allegations of fact in the
original answer which, needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper disposition of the
civil case. It is, therefore, in the best interest of justice and equity that URAMI should be
allowed to file the amended answer.
CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. MAXIMIANO AGUINALDO

G.R. No. 200018, April 6, 2015, J. Reyes
The Court, in Limbauan v. Acosta, held that: “It is well-settled that amendment of
pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to
determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This
principle is generally recognized in order that the real controversies between the parties are
presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary
delay to prevent circuity of action and needless expense.”
Facts:
Maximiano Aguinaldo, claiming that he is the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in
Paranaque City, discovered that a certain Rolando Mojica, Jr. had fraudulently obtained a
certificate of title over the same property in the latter’s name. Aguinaldo filed a complaint
for the nullification of the title with the RTC against Mojica, likewise causing the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens in the said title. The RTC nullified Mojica’s title but
before Aguinaldo discovered Mojica’s title, Mojica had already executed a real estate
mortgage over the property in favor of Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. as a security for a loan.
When Mojica was unable to pay the said loan, Citystate extrajudicially foreclosed the
Page 169 of 1553

property and was declared the highest bidder in the public auction. Consequently, Citystate
consolidated its title over the subject property and a new TCT was issued in its favor.
Aguinaldo filed a complaint for annulment of title with the RTC against Citystate. In its
answer, Citystate asserted that it was the real and registered owner of the property. After
the parties have presented their respective evidence, but before the presentation of rebuttal
evidence, Aguinaldo filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint before the court. He
alleged that Citystate was able to secure a writ of possession during the pendency of the
case, thereby evicting Aguinaldo from the subject property. He also claimed that Citystate
further sold the property to Syndica Phil. Corporation. The RTC denied Aguinaldo’s motion
on the ground that the amendments substantially altered the cause of action which would
result in delay of the case’s resolution. The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling.
Issue:
Whether a proposed amended complaint may be admitted.
Ruling:
YES. Granting arguendo that the amendment of the complaint would substantially alter or
change the cause of action or defense in said controversy, this Court nonetheless holds that
in the higher interest of substantial justice, the introduction of amendments to the
complaint is apropos at this particular instance to forestall further delay in the resolution
of the actual merits of the parties' respective claims and defenses. To reiterate, the Rules of
Court seek to eliminate undue reliance on technical rules and to make litigation as
inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient as can be done. Rules of procedure, after all,
are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the
Supreme Court is empowered to suspend their operation. This Court will not hesitate to
set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
In this case, the CA allowed the amended complaint in order to grant complete relief to
Aguinaldo. The additional reliefs being sought in the amended complaint does not alter
Aguinaldo's cause of action or the theory of case. These are mere remedies to which
Aguinaldo became entitled to as a result of the alleged supervening events, which rendered
the relief being sought in the original complaint inadequate. The Court notes that when
the instant case was instituted, Aguinaldo's prayer was for the nullification of Citystate's
Page 170 of 1553

certificate of title. He claims that the property over which said title was issued, is owned
and possessed by him, while Citystate's certificate of title emanated from another title,
which had been adjudged a nullity for having been issued fraudulently. However, during
the pendency of the case for annulment of title against Citystate, several intervening
circumstances rendered the original relief sought by Aguinaldo inadequate. The amended
complaint effected no change in the cause of action, defense, or theory of the case since it
remained to be an action for the nullity of a title that was erroneously issued in another's
name.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and CBK

POWER COMPANY LIMITED
G.R. Nos. 203054-55. July 29, 2015. Third Division. Peralta, J.
Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default, for default judgments are
frowned upon, and unless it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for
delay, it is best that trial courts give both parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in
the open, without resort to technicality.
Facts:
On separate dates, CBK Power Company Limited (CBK) filed with the CTA (Division) two
judicial claims for the issuance of tax credit certificates pursuant to Section 112 (A) of the
1997 Tax Code. Summonses were served to the petitioner requiring it to file Answers. The
first Answer was filed by Atty. Christopher C. Sandico on behalf of the petitioner and the
case was set for pre-trial conference on July 21, 2011. The second Answer was filed by Atty.
Leo D. Mauricio on behalf of the petitioner and the case was set for pre-trial conference on
September 29, 2011. Later, CBK moved for the consolidation of the claims and the
postponement of both pre-trial conferences. The CTA granted the motion for consolidation
and set the pre-trial conference on November 3, 2011. Atty. Mauricio failed to appear due
to health reasons and the pretrial was reset to December 1, 2011. However on the aforestated
date, Atty. Sandico, who was then assigned to handle the consolidated cases, failed to
appear. This prompted CBK to file a motion to declare petitioner in default.
The CTA ruled in favor of CBK and allowed it to present its evidence ex-parte. Due to this,
petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default alleging that the failure to attend the pre-
trial conference was due to confusion in office procedure in relation to the consolidation
of the two claims, the resetting of the pre-trial conference and the conflicting schedule of
Page 171 of 1553
the petitioner’s counsel. CTA, however, denied the motion ruled citing Section 5 of Rule 18
of the Revised Rules of Court. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this
present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the CTA declaring the petitioner in default and allowing
the respondent to present evidence ex-parte is proper.
Ruling:
No. Unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to

provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should consider
lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end. The same criteria
on a defendant who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference.
In this case, there is no showing that petitioner intentionally disregarded the CTA's
authority. The two claims were filed on different dates and were handled by different
lawyers, i.e., Atty. Sandico and Atty. Mauricio, respectively. The cases were later on
consolidated per private respondent's motion and the pre-trial was set on November 3, 2011
but petitioner's counsel, Atty. Mauricio, was not able to attend for health reasons; and Atty.
Sandico to whom the consolidated cases were later on assigned was not able to attend the
pre-trial on time on December 1, 2011 as he was attending another case in another division
of the CTA. The Court found nothing to show that petitioner had acted with the deliberate
intention of delaying the proceedings as petitioner had timely filed its pre-trial brief for
the consolidated cases.
It is not to say, however, that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with lightly, but
that, rather, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their
application. It is within the CTA's sound judicial discretion to give party-litigants every
opportunity to properly present their conflicting claims on the merits of the controversy
without resorting to technicalities. It should always be predicated on the consideration that
more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of
justice and fairness would be served thereby. Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders
of default, for default judgments are frowned upon, and unless it clearly appears that the
reopening of the case is intended for delay, it is best that trial courts give both parties every
chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicality.
Page 172 of 1553

LEONARDO L. VILLALON v.RENATO E. LIRIO

G.R. No. 183869, August 03, 2015, BRION, J.
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake

must be stated with particularity
Facts:
Semicon Integrated Electronics Corporation leased Renato Lirio’s property in Pasig City.
Villalon, who was then Semicon's president and chairman of the board, represented the
lessee corporation in the lease contract. Prior to the expiration of the lease, Semicon
terminated the contract and allegedly left unpaid rentals, damages, and interest. Lirio
demanded payment but Semicon and Villalon failed to pay.Lirio then filed a complaint for
sum of money with prayer for preliminary attachment against Semicon and
Villalon.Villalon argued that the case against him should be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action since he is not a real party-in-interest in the action as he is merely an officer
of Semicon. RTC dismissed the complaint against Villalon stating that under the theory of
separate corporate entity, the action should be limited against Semicon.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint against Villalon should be dismissed.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 8, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires that in all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity, unlike
in cases of malice, knowledge, or other conditions of the mind which may be averred
generally.In the present case, the only allegation of fraud in the complaint reads: "With
intent to defraud the plaintiff... the defendants surreptitiously and fraudulently removed
their merchandise...”. Lirio's mere invocation of the words "surreptitiously and
fraudulently" does not make the allegation particular without specifying the circumstances
of Villalon's commission and employment of fraud, and without delineating why it was
fraudulent for him to remove Semicon’s properties in the first place.
KAREN GO v. LAMBERTO ECHAVEZ

G.R. No. 174542, August 3, 2015, Brion, J.
Page 173 of 1553
party. The one who filed a counterclaim then becomes the plaintiff, while one who filed the
complaint becomes the defendant in the counterclaim. Thus, it would create different causes
of action which are independent from one another.
Facts:
Kargo Enterprises, owned and operated by Go, and Nick Carandang, Kargo’s Manager in
one of its branches, entered into a lease contract over a truck. They stipulated that a deed
of absolute sale would be executed upon full payment of the purchase price. For failure to
do so, Carandang should return back the truck and forfeit his payments as rentals. The
contract also prohibited Carandang from assigning his rights to third persons. When
Carandang failed to pay, Go demanded the return of the truck. Carandang, instead of
returning the truck, sold it to Echavez without Go’s knowledge. Go learned about the sale
but did not know to whom the truck was sold. She then filed a complaint against Carandang
and Echavez as an unidentified buyer. Echavez filed his answer with cross-claim and
counterclaim, denying knowledge of the lease contract and claimed that he is buyer in good
faith and for value. RTC held Go and Carandang solidarily liable to Echavez for actual
damages. However, in a motion for reconsideration, the RTC still maintained that Echavez
is entitled to damages, but held Carandang liable to Go. Go appealed before the CA but the
same was dismissed, and further denied her motion for reconsideration. When Echavez
then moved for execution of the RTC’s decision, Go filed a motion for clarification and
claimed that the modified RTC decision is unenforceable as it contains materially
conflicting rulings. However, such motion was denied. Go filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari but the same was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the modified RTC decision contains materially conflicting rulings.
Ruling:
NO. The flaw in Go’s argument springs from her misconception that Echavez’s
counterclaim is a component part of the main action. The Rules of Court define a
counterclaim as any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
The Rules of Court also provides that the term “plaintiff” may refer to the counterclaimant
or cross-claimant while the term “defendant” may refer to the defendant in the
Page 174 of 1553

counterclaim, or in the cross-claim. Thus, when Echavez filed his counterclaim, he became
the plaintiff in the counterclaim, while Go became the defendant. Furthermore, Go’s
complaint against Carandang is separate from the complaint against Echavez because they
were not sued as alternative defendants. In effect, there are four causes of action in this
case. Considering that these causes of action are independent from each other, the RTC
can grant Go’s complaint against Carandang but dismiss that against Echavez, and at the
same time, grant Echvez’s counterclaim and cross-claim against Go and Carandang,
respectively. These rulings are not incompatible with one another.
Paramount Life & General Insurance Corporation vs. Cherry T. Castro and Glenn
Anthony T. Castro/Cherry T. Castro and Glenn Anthony T. Castro vs. Paramount
Life & General Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 195728/G.R. No. 211329, April 19, 2016
The soundness of admitting a third-party complaint hinges on causal connection

between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or
other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.
FACTS:
The PPSBI applied entered into a Group Master Policy with Paramount. Under Section 20,
Article IV of the said policy, "all death benefits shall be payable to the creditor, PPSBI, as
its interest may appeal." Meanwhile, Virgilio J. Castro (Virgilio) obtained a housing loan
from the PPSBI, which then required Virgilio to apply for a mortgage redemption insurance
(MRI) from Paramount to cover the loan. Paramount issued Certificate No. 041913 effective
12 March 2008 in his favor, subject to the terms and conditions of Group Master Policy No.
G-086. Virgilio died of septic shock. Consequently, a claim was filed for death benefits
under the individual insurance coverage issued under the group policy. Paramount
however denied the claim, on the ground of the failure of Virgilio to disclose material
information, or material concealment or misrepresentation.
Paramount filed a Complaint with the RTC praying that Application and Insurance
Certificate No. 041913 covering the individual insurance of Virgilio be declared null and
void. The Castro’s filed a Motion for Leave to File a Third Party-Complaint and to Admit
Attached Third-Party Complaint. The RTC denied the motion. Upon a Petition for
Certiorari, the CA partially granted the Petition by allowing a third-party complaint to be
filed against the PPSBI. Meanwhile, he Castro’s filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
on the ground of failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. The RTC denied
the motion. Owing to its previous Order dated 26 May 2010, which declared the Castro’s as
Page 175 of 1553
in default for failure to attend the pretrial, the RTC treated the Motion to Dismiss as a mere
scrap of paper and expunged it from the records.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that the Third-Party Complaint should be allowed.
RULING:
1. Yes. The CA correctly ruled that to admit the Castro’s Third-Party Complaint, in
which they can assert against the PPSBI an independent claim they would otherwise
assert in another action, would prevent multiplicity of suits. Considering also that
the original case from which these. Present Petitions arose has not yet been resolved,
the Court deems it proper to have all the parties air all their possible grievances in
the original case still pending with the RTC.
In allowing the inclusion of the PPSBI as a third-party defendant, the Court

recognizes the inseparable interest of the bank (as policyholder of the group policy)
in the validity of the individual insurance certificates issued by Paramount. The
PPSBI need not institute a separate case, considering that its cause of action is
intimately related to that of Paramount as against the Castro’s. The soundness of
admitting a third-party complaint hinges on causal connection between the claim
of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other
relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant. In this case, the Castro’s
stand to incur a bad debt to the PPSBI - the exact event that is insured against by
Group Master Policy No. G-086 - in the event that Paramount succeeds in nullifying
Virgilio's Individual Insurance Certificate.
Moreover, the same defenses the third-party plaintiff has against the original
plaintiff are just some of the allegations a third-party defendant may raise in its
answer. Section 13, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court even gives the third-party defendant
the prerogative to raise a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of the
latter's original claim against the defendant/third-party plaintiff. A defendant is
permitted to bring in a third-party defendant to litigate a separate cause of action
in respect of the plaintiffs claim against a third party in the original and principal
case. The objective is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of
lawsuits, as well as to expeditiously dispose of the entire subject matter arising from
one particular set of facts, in one litigation.
Page 176 of 1553

ARTURO C. ALBA, JR., vs. RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO, et. al.


FACTS:
Petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a
Complaint against respondents for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or
cancellation of title and damages alleging, among others, that his title over a parcel of land
was canceled by virtue of a deed of sale he allegedly executed in favor of respondents. He
claimed that the deed of sale was a forged document which respondents Malapajo were the
co-authors of.
Respondents Malapajo filed their Answer with Counterclaim contending that petitioner
had, on separate occasions, obtained loans from them and their mother which were secured
by separate real estate mortgages covering the subject property; that the two real estate
mortgages had never been discharged. Respondents counterclaimed for damages and for
reimbursement of petitioner's loan from them plus the agreed monthly interest in the event
that the deed of sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery.
Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stating, among
others, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of respondents'
permissive counterclaim. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing
as if a Motion to Dismiss had been filed alleging that respondents’ counterclaims are in the
nature of a permissive counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of docket fees and filing
of a certification against forum shopping. The RTC denied the Motion finding that
respondents’ counterclaims are compulsory.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari saying that there was no proper proof of service of the petition to the
respondents, and that only the last page of the attached copy of the RTC Order was signed
and certified as a true copy of the original while the rest of the pages were mere machine
copies.
Page 177 of 1553

ISSUE/RULING:
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner's petition

for certiorari after the latter had clearly shown compliance with the proof of service of
the petition as required under Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
YES.
Under Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, service made through
registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit
of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with the rule. In this case, Nerissa
Apuyo, the secretary of petitioner’s counsel, had executed an affidavit of personal service
and service by registered mail which she attached to the petition marked as original filed
with the CA. She stated under oath that she personally served a copy of the petition to the
RTC of Roxas, as evidenced by a stamp mark of the RTC on the corresponding page of the
petition; that she also served copies of the petition by registered mail to respondents'
counsels as evidenced by registry receipts numbers "PST 188" and "PST 189", both issued by
the Roxas City Post Office. The registry receipts issued by the post office were attached to
the petition filed with the CA. Petitioner had thus complied with the rule on proof of
service.
4. Whether respondents’ counterclaim, i.e., reimbursement of the loan obtained from

them in case the deed of absolute sale is declared null and void on the ground of
forgery, is permissive in nature which requires the payment of docket fees and a
certification against forum shopping for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
same.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A counterclaim is permissive
if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately
in another case.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, the Court has devised

the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
Page 178 of 1553

Based on the above-mentioned tests, the nature of respondents’ counterclaim is permissive.
Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property by assailing the validity of the deed of sale
on the subject property which he allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo on
the ground of forgery. Respondents counterclaimed that, in case the deed of sale is declared
null and void, they be paid the loan petitioner obtained from them plus the agreed monthly
interest which was covered by a real estate mortgage on the subject property executed by
petitioner in favor of respondents. There is a logical relationship between the claim and the
counterclaim, as the counterclaim is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. Notably, the same evidence
to sustain respondents' counterclaim would disprove petitioner's case. In the event that
respondents could convincingly establish that petitioner actually executed the promissory
note and the real estate mortgage over the subject property in their favor then petitioner's
complaint might fail. Petitioner's claim is so related logically to respondents' counterclaim,
such that conducting separate trials for the claim and the counterclaim would result in the
substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.
Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action;

otherwise, it would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in
a different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed
subsequently, it would meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore,
no need for respondents to pay docket fees and to file a certification against forum
shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.
VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD vs. SUBIC BAY MARINE
EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by its Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND
G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014, J. Perez
Petitioners filed counterclaim against respondents. However, the latter alleged that
the dismissal of the main action results to the dismissal of the counterclaims. The Court ruled
that as the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of
the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter
may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that such counterclaim,
Page 179 of 1553

states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant
its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim
that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated
by the dismissal of the main action. The court’s authority to proceed with the disposition of
the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the
counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court
based on its own merits and evidentiary support
Facts:
SBME decided to expand its business by operating a beach resort inside the property
administered by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). For the business venture
to take off, SBME needed to solicit investors who are willing to infuse funds for the
construction and operation of the beach resort project. HSE thru its authorized director,
Dio, agreed to invest the amount of US$2,500,000.00 with SBME by purchasing 750,000
common shares with a par value of P100 per share from the increase in its authorized capital
stock. The agreement was reduced into writing wherein HSE, in order to protect its interest
in the company, was afforded minority protection rights such as the right to appoint a
member of the board of directors and the right to veto certain board resolutions. After HSE
initially paid US$200,000.00 for its subscription, it refused to further lay out money for the
expansion project of the SBME due to the alleged mismanagement in the handling of
corporate funds.
SBME essentially alleged that HSE unjustly refused to pay the balance of its unpaid
subscription effectively jeopardizing the company’s expansion project. Apart from their
refusal to honor their obligation under the subscription contract, it was further alleged by
SBME that Dio tried to dissuade local investors and financial institutions from putting in
capital to SBME by imputing defamatory acts against Desmond. To protect the interest of
the corporation and its stockholders, SBME sought that petitioners be enjoined from
committing acts inimical to the interest of the company. RTC denied SMBE ruled that the
belated submission of a board resolution evidencing Desmond’s authority to bind the
corporation did not cure the initial defect in the complaint (no certification against non-
forum shopping) and declared that strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined for
the orderly administration of justice. The matter was elevated to the CA but the decision
of CA became final and executor due to failure of SMBE to move for reconsideration.
Appellate court having been resolved with finality, petitioners went back to the RTC to file
a motion to set their counterclaims for hearing which was opposed by the respondents on
the ground that the filing of the compulsory counterclaims was not accompanied by
payment of the required docket fees precluding the court from acquiring jurisdiction over
the case.
Page 180 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the counterclaim may still remain for independent adjudication
despite the dismissal of the main case
Ruling:
Yes. Counterclaim may still proceed
As the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the
dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim,
and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that such
counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that
may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the
counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief
thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court’s authority to
proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is
premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may
be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
In Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporartion, a case on all
fours with the present one, the court expounded our ruling in Pinga and pointed out that
the dismissal of the counterclaim due to the fault of the plaintiff is without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute any pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the
same or separate action, thus: Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Court, if the dismissal
of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim
cannot survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states sufficient cause of action then
it should stand independently of and survive the dismissal of the complaint. Now, having
been directly confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory counterclaim by
reason of the unfounded suit may prosper even if the main complaint had been dismissed,
the court rules in the affirmative.
It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim against respondent is for

damages and attorney's fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's
Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have very well already
incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's fees since it was forced to
engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon
it. Hence, the cause of action of petitioner's counterclaim is not eliminated by the mere
dismissal of respondent's complaint.
Page 181 of 1553

PHILIPPINE WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC.

vs. TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC.
The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is determined
by the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of
the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts. In this case, TRY Foundation is actually
seeking to recover the possession and ownership of the subject property from PWCTUI and
not merely the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT. As such, recovery of possession and
ownership of the subject property cannot be settled by filing a mere petition for cancellation
of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
Facts:
On May 19, 2004, respondent Teodoro R. Yangco (2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs)
Foundation, Inc. (TRY Foundation) filed before the RTC of Quezon City, acting as a Land
Registration Court, a Petition for the Issuance of New Title in Lieu of Transfer Certificate
of Title of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City docketed.
TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation heirs and
successors-in-interest to the first generation testamentary heirs of the late philanthropist
Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) who donated on May 19, 1934 Philippine Woman’s Christian
Temperance Union, Inc. (PWCTUI) a 14,073square meter parcel of land (subject property)
located at 21 Boni Serrano Avenue, Quezon City in the following manner:
a. the property shall be used as a site for an institution to be known as the Abierrtas
House of Friendship the purpose of which shall be to provide a Home for needy and
unfortunate women and girls, including children of both sexes and promote, foster
all efforts, work and activities looking toward their protection from the ravages of
all forms of immoralities;
b. Should the property herein be used for any other purpose or purposes not herein
specified, the present gift shall become ipso facto null and void and property given
shall automatically revert to the donor, his heirs and assigns, but any improvement
or improvements placed, constructed and/or maintained on said premises by the
Donee, shall remain the property of said Donee to be by it removed there[f]rom (sic)
at its expense after reasonable notice from the donor, his heirs and assigns.
PWCTUl’s corporate term expired in September 1979. Five years thereafter, using
the same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration No. 12208812 and forthwith
Page 182 of 1553

applied for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT over the subject
property. The application was granted and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT which,
however, bore only the first condition imposed on the donation.
TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUI’s corporate term in 1979
effectively rescinded the donation pursuant to the “unwritten resolutory condition”
deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code prescribing that the Corporation Code,
specifically Section 122 thereof, be read into the donation. Interestingly the latter provision
mandates dissolved corporation to wind up their affairs and dispose of their assets within
three years from the expiration of their term. Being comprised of the heirs of the donor,
TRY Foundation claimed that it is entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in their
name pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. TRY Foundation
prayed for the issuance of a new title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT.
The RTC ruled that PWCTUI, with SEC Registration No. PW959 in whose name the
property was registered is separate and distinct from oppositor PWCTUI with SEC
Registration No. 122088. The legal personality of PWCTUI (PW959) ipso facto ended when
its registration expired in September 1979. The new PWCTUI (122088) has its own
personality separate and distinct from PWCTUI (PW959) hence the latter is not the donee
and thus has no claim to the property. As such, the reversion clause in the donation came
about and the property must revert to the donor or his heirs
In its Decision dated November 6, 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings. The CA
added that the subsequent reregistration of PWCTUI (122088) did not revive or continue
the corporate existence of PWCTUI (PW959). Hence, PWCTUI (122088) is not the real
donee contemplated in the donation made by Yangco and as such any issue on revocation
of donation is improper.
On December 23, 2011, PWCTUI filed the herein petition captioned as one for
“Prohibition & Certiorari and to Re-Open the Case with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) &/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.”
Issue:
Whether or not PWCTUI has a better right over TRY Foundation over the subject
property.
Ruling:
Yes. PWCTUI has a better right.
Page 183 of 1553

While firmly ingrained as a basic procedural tenet in Philippine jurisprudence,

immutability of final judgments was never meant to be an inflexible tool to excuse and
overlook prejudicial circumstances. The doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness
and substantial justice. Hence, it’s application admits the following exceptions: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Here, the third exception is attendant. The nullity of the RTC judgment and all
subsequent rulings affirming the same, render inoperative the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, and consequently justify the propriety of giving due course to the present
petition.
To expound, the RTC judgment in LRC and all proceedings taken in relation thereto
were void because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the fundamental subject
matter of TRY Foundation’s petition for the issuance of a title which was in reality, a
complaint for revocation of donation, an ordinary civil action outside the ambit of Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529.
It has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular
action is determined by the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and the principal relief
he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts. Jurisdiction
should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties
but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy.
The petition is premised on allegations that the deed of donation from whence
PWCTUI derived its title was automatically revoked when the latter’s original corporate
term expired in 1979. Consequently, reversion took effect in favor of the donor and/or his
heirs. As relief, TRY Foundation sought the cancellation of TCT No. 20970 T22702 and the
issuance of a new title in its name.
The above contentions and plea betray the caption of the petition. Observably, TRY
Foundation is actually seeking to recover the possession and ownership of the subject
property from PWCTUI and not merely the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT. The propriety
of pronouncing TRY Foundation as the absolute owner of the subject property rests on the
resolution of whether or not the donation made to PWCTUI has been effectively revoked
when its corporate term expired in 1979. Stated otherwise, no judgment proclaiming TRY
Foundation as the absolute owner of the property can be arrived at without declaring the
deed of donation revoked.
Page 184 of 1553

Whether the donation merits revocation and consequently effect reversion of the
donated property to the donor and/or his heirs cannot be settled by filing a mere petition
for cancellation of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
All told, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the
actual subject matter contained in TRY Foundation’s petition for issuance of a new title.
TRY Foundation cannot use the summary proceedings in Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to
rescind a contract of donation as such action should be threshed out in ordinary civil
proceedings. In the same vein, the RTC had no jurisdiction to declare the donation
annulled and as a result thereof, order the register of deeds to cancel PWCTUI’s TCT and
issue a new one in favor of TRY Foundation.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for revocation of donation
disguised as a land registration case, the judgment in LRC Case is null and void. Being void,
it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. It can never become
final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. It may even be considered as a
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.
AIDA PADILLA vs. GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY HOLDINGS CORPORATION,

FILMAL REALTY CORPORATION, DELFIN S. LEE and DEXTER L. LEE
G.R. No. 207376, August 6, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of
the complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action."
Since Padilla’s counterclaim is compulsory in nature and its cause of action survives that of
the dismissal of respondent’s complaint, then it should be resolved based on its own merits
and evidentiary support.
Facts:
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) instituted a civil case against Globe Asiatique
Realty Holdings Corporation, Filmal Realty Corporation, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee
(respondents) for recovery of sum of money and damages with prayerfor writ of preliminary
attachment.
In their complaint, PNB alleged the fraudulent acts and misrepresentations committed
by the respondents, in obtaining PNB’s conformity to the Contract to Sell (CTS) Facility
Agreements and the release of various sums to respondents. PNB accused respondents of
falsely representing that they have valid and subsisting contracts to sell, which evidently
showed they had no intention to pay their loan obligations. The Verification and
Page 185 of 1553
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint was signed byPNB’s Senior
Vice-president of the Remedial Management Group, Aida Padilla, who likewise executed
an "Affidavit in Support of the Application for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment."
Meanwhile the respondents Globe Asiatique, Filmal, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee
filed a complaint for Damages against Aida Padilla, sued in her personal capacity. The
respondents claimed that the malicious and devastating unfounded civil action filed by
Aida Padilla wrought havoc to their businesses and lives. Furthermore despite Padilla’s
knowledge of the novation and that the obligation was not yet due and demandable, Padilla
with malice and evident bad faith still executed a "perjured" Affidavit in support of the
application for writ of preliminary attachment.
Aida Padilla filed her answer with compulsory counterclaim.
The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the respondents for lack of jurisdiction.
Subsequently, Padilla filed a motion to set counterclaims for pre-trial conference.
The RTC dismissed Padilla’s counterclaim on the ground that to hear the counterclaims
of Padilla, the court will be forced to dwell upon issues involving the pending civil case in
the RTC Branch 199, Pasay City, thereby interfering, albeit indirectly, with said issues.
Therefore, upholding the principle of judicial stability, this Court is impelled to refuse to
hear the counterclaims of defendant Padilla.
Issue:
Whether a court can take cognizance of a compulsory counterclaim despite the fact
that the corresponding complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Ruling:
Yes.
party. It is in the nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct and independent cause of action
which, though alleged in the answer, is not part of the answer.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal
of the complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action."
It bears to emphasize that Padilla’s counterclaim against respondents is for damages
and attorney’s fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent’s complaint against
Padilla is already dismissed, Padilla may have very well already incurred damages and
Page 186 of 1553

litigation expenses such as attorney’s fees since it was forced to engage legal representation
in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of jurisdiction of the courts over
its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the cause of action
of Padilla’s counterclaim is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of respondent’s complaint.
Since Padillas’ counterclaim is compulsory in nature and its cause of action survives
that of the dismissal of respondent’s complaint, then it should be resolved based on its own
merits and evidentiary support.
FE U. QUIJANO vs. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE
G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014, J. Bersamin
Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation,
the possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer
is an improper remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without
any allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant was by means of force,
intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
Facts:
Fe U. Quijano (Fe) and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from
their father, the late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in their father's name.
On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share,
measuring 600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante (Amante), with the
affected portion being described in the deed of absolute sale Eliseo executed. On July 25,
1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share in the
property to Amante, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the
approval of Eliseo’s siblings.
Subsequently, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
to divide their father’s estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among
themselves. Pursuant to the deed extrajudicial partition, the original certificate was
cancelled, and on July 12, 1994 the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 6555, TCT No. 6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 6558 to Fe, Gloria, Jose, and
Eliseo, respectively. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the
Amante being adjudicated to Fe instead of to Eliseo.
As Fe needed her portion that was then occupied by the Amante, she demanded that
Amante vacate it. Despite several demands, the Amante refused to vacate, prompting Fe to
file against him a complaint for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Cebu City (MTCC), alleging therein that she was the registered owner of the parcel
Page 187 of 1553

of land covered by TCT No. 6555, a portion of which was being occupied by Amante, who
had constructed a residential building thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the
property she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided,
and was thus still co-owned by them; and that the respondent’s occupation had become
illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.
On the other hand, Amante denied that his possession of the disputed portion had
been by mere tolerance of Eliseo, further asserting that he was in fact the owner and lawful
possessor of the property, having bought it from Eliseo. Eliseo informed him that he and
his co-heirs had already orally partitioned the estate of their father, and that the portion
being sold to him was Eliseo’s share; and that with his having already purchased the
property before the Quijano acquired it under the deed of extrajudicial partition, she
should respect his ownership and possession of it.
MTCC rendered its decision in favor of Fe Quijano ruling that the deeds of sale
executed by Eliseo in favor of the respondent did not have the effect of conveying the
disputed property to him inasmuch as at the time of the sale, the parcel of land left by their
father, which included the disputed property, had not yet been partitioned, rendering
Eliseo a mere co-owner of the undivided estate who had no right to dispose of a definite
portion thereof. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision, holding that the summary
proceeding for ejectment was not proper because the serious question of ownership of the
disputed property was involved. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the Court is justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry.
Ruling:
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit.
An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a

summary proceeding designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The sole question for
resolution in the case is the physical or material possession (possession de facto)of the
property in question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure)nor an
averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking
due cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question
of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question
Page 188 of 1553

of possession. The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely provisional, and

will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the
property.
Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed property,
the CA properly ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who
between them had the better right to possess the disputed property.
The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano
Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death. Prior to the
partition, the estate was owned in common by the heirs, subject to the payment of the
debts of the deceased. In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different
persons, with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising her rights over
the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that
until a division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and
every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.
Even if an heir’s right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and
partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Codegives the heir the right
to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to
Amante in 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell
only that portion that would be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property to Amante but transferred only
the seller’s pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-owner
of the disputed property until it is partitioned.
As Eliseo’s successor-in-interest or assignee, Amante was vested with the right

under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to
challenge the partition undertaken without his consent. Article 497 states:
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the
division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their
concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there
has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition
presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to
maintain its validity.
Page 189 of 1553

Amante could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew that the property he was
buying was not exclusively owned by Eliseo. He knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered
into an oral agreement of partition vis-à-vis the estate, such knowledge being explicitly
stated in his answer to the complaint. His knowledge of Eliseo’s co-ownership with his co-
heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did not
exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo made it appear to the respondent that
the partition had already been completed and finalized, the co-heirs had not taken
possession yet of their respective shares to signify that they had ratified their agreement, if
any. For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he himself had
served as the lawyer of Eliseo and the Quijano herself. In that sense, it would have been
easy for him to ascertain whether the representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it turned
out, there had been no prior oral agreement among the heirs to partition the estate;
otherwise, Eliseo would have questioned the deed of extrajudicial partition because it did
not conform to what they had supposedly agreed upon. Had the respondent been vigilant
in protecting his interest, he could have availed himself of the rights reserved to him by
law, particularly the right to take an active part in the partition and to object to the partition
if he wanted to. It was only on September 30, 1992, or two years and five months from the
time of the first sale transaction, and a year and two months from the time of the second
sale transaction, that the co-heirs executed the deed of extrajudicial partition. Having been
silent despite his ample opportunity to participate in or toobject to the partition of the
estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately agreed upon by the Quijanos.
There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the
property thereby covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the Court cannot
ignore that the statements in Fe’s complaint about Amante’s possession of the disputed
property being by the mere tolerance of Eliseo could be the basis for unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involves the defendant’s withholding of the possession of the property
to which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to
hold possession under the contract, whether express or implied. A requisite for a valid
cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned
unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession
must then be established. With the averment here that the respondent’s possession was by
mere tolerance of the Quijano, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of
tolerance did not suffice. At least, the Quijano should show the overt acts indicative of her
or her predecessor’s tolerance, or her co-heirs’ permission for him to occupy the disputed
property. But she did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not
clear and definite as to his possession of the disputed property being merely tolerated by
Eliseo.
Page 190 of 1553

Considering that the allegation of the Quijano’s tolerance of the respondent’s

possession of the disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be
deemed illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to
fail. Even so, the Court would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible
entry because the complaint contained no allegation that his entry in the property had been
by force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still remain. To finally
resolve such issue, they should review their options and decide on their proper recourses.
In the meantime, it is wise for the Court to leave the door open to them in that respect. For
now, therefore, this recourse of the Quijano has to be dismissed.
ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS,* represented by her Attorney-in Fact, NYMPHA Z. SALES
vs. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN** and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA CITY
In an earlier ruling, the Court had stated that a pleading should state the ultimate
facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere
conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal,
or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a
contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating
facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. Hence, when the Sanots merely
stated a legal conclusion, he amended complaint presented no sufficient allegation upon
which the Court could grant the relief Santos prayed for.
Facts:
Eliza Zuñiga-Santos (Eliza), through her authorized representative, Nympha Z.

Sales, filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against respondents
Maria Divina Gracia Santos-Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before
the RTC. Eliza alleged that (a) she was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land
located in the Municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal prior to their transfer in the
name of private respondent Gran; (b) she has a second husband by the name of Lamberto
C. Santos (Lamberto), with whom she did not have any children; (c) she was forced to take
care of Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it
appear that the latter was Santos’ daughter; (d) pursuant to void and voidable documents,
i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto succeeded in transferring the subject properties in favor of
and in the name of Gran; (e) despite diligent efforts, said Deed of Sale could not be located;
and (f) she discovered that the subject properties were transferred to Gran sometime in
Page 191 of 1553
November 2005. Accordingly, Santos prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her the
subject properties and pay damages, including costs of suit.
Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that (a) the action filed by Santos had
prescribed since an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years
from the time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of
the questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds; and (b) the Amended Complaint
failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified
were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth, thus, precluding the RTC
from rendering a valid judgment in accordance withthe prayer to surrender the subject
properties.
RTC granted Gran’s motion and dismissed the Amended Complaint for its failure to
state a cause of action, considering that the deed of sale sought to be nullified – an "essential
and indispensable part of [Santos’s] cause of action" – was not attached. It likewise held
that the certificates of title covering the subject properties cannot be collaterally attacked
and that since the action was based on a written contract, the same had already prescribed
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. On appeal, CA sustained the dismissal of Santos’s
Amended Complaint but on the ground of insufficiency of factual basis. Aggrieved, Santos
moved for reconsideration and attached, for the first time, a copy of the questioned Deed
of Sale which she claimed to have recently recovered, praying that the order of dismissal
be set aside and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In a Resolution,
the CA denied Santos’s motion and held that the admission of the contested Deed of Sale
at this late stage would be contrary to Gran’s right to due process. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether Eliza’s pleadings contain sufficient allegations.
Ruling:
Eliza’s allegations with respect to her right to the subject properties sought to be
recovered, the ultimate facts supposedly justifying the "annulment of sale," by which the
reconveyance of the subject properties is sought, were also insufficiently pleaded. The claim
that the sale was effected through "voidable and void documents" partakes merely of a
conclusion of law that is not supported by any averment of circumstances that will show
why or how such conclusion was arrived at. In fact, what these "voidable and void
documents" are were not properly stated and/or identified. In Abad v. Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, the Court pronounced that:
Page 192 of 1553

A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or
defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of
law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair, and
reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void,
voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.
Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion, the Amended Complaint presented no

sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief Santos prayed for. Thus,
said pleading should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause of action, as
correctly held by the RTC.
That a copy of the Deed of Sale adverted to in the Amended Complaint was
subsequently submitted by Santos does not warrant a different course of action. The
submission of that document was made, as it was purportedly "recently recovered," only
on reconsideration before the CA which, nonetheless, ruled against the remand of the case.
An examination of the present petition, however, reveals no counter-argument against the
foregoing actions; hence, the Court considers any objection thereto as waived.
LIM TECK CHUAN vs. SERAFIN UY and LEOPOLDA CECILIO, LIM SING CHAN @
HENRY LIM
G.R. No. 155701, March 11, 2015, J. Reyes
Respondents, including the plaintiff, filed for joint dismissal of the case. It was granted
by the RTC, dismissing also the Chuan’s counterclaim and cross-claim. The Court ruled that
Chuan’s preference to have his counterclaim prosecuted in the same action is valid and in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A dismissal of an action is different
from a mere dismissal of the complaint. Since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the
same action.
Facts:
The subject matter is a piece of land known as Lot 5357, covered by TCT No. T-0500,
owned by Antonio Lim Tanhu, married to Dy Ochay.
Lot 5357 was sold by Antonio to the spouses Francisco Cabansag and Estrella
Cabansag as evidenced by a Deed of Sale in 1966. Apparently, Francisco failed to transfer
the title of the property to their names because of his work and frequent travels abroad.
Page 193 of 1553

In 1988, Spouses Cabansag sold the lot to Serafin, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. To
transfer of title to Serafin’s name, Spouses Cabansag attempted to have the same
transferred under their names first. However, Francisco failed to do so as he lost the owner’s
copy of TCT No. T-0500 together with other documents pertaining to the sale of the subject
lot. This prompted Serafin to exert efforts to secure copies of the lost documents himself.
Serafin filed a petition before the RTC, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 21 praying for
the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate TCT in his name, thereby cancelling TCT No. T-
0500 in the name of Antonio. Cadastral Court directed the Register of Deeds to issue a new
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-0500.
The order was recalled and nullified on the ground that Lim Teck Chuan opposed,
alleging that he is one of the six legitimate descendants of Antonio, and that the original
owner’s copy of TCT No. T-0500 was not lost and has always been in his custody.
In the meantime, Lim Sing Chan alias Henry Lim executed an Affidavit of Sole
Adjudication/Settlement of the Estate of Antonio Lim Tanhu with Deed of Sale claiming
that he is the only surviving heir of Antonio. In the same document, Henry sold Lot 5357
to Leopolda.
Serafin filed complaint for quieting of title before the RTC. Impleaded as defendants
were Leopolda, Henry, and Lim Teck Chuan.
With counterclaim, and cross-claims against Leopolda and Henry, Lim Teck Chuan
averred that Lot 5357 was never transferred nor encumbered to any person during
Antonio’s lifetime. The deed of sale in favor of Spouses Cabansag was simulated and
spurious, and was intended to defraud the estate of Antonio. Furthermore, Lim Teck Chuan
questioned Henry’s claim that he was an heir of Antonio. He also questioned the validity
of Henry’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and Leopolda’s claim of title to the subject
property.
Thereafter, Serafin and Leopolda submitted a Joint Motion to Dismiss, stating that
they have amicably settled their differences in the case at bench and that Serafin has already
secured a certificate of title to Lot No. 5357 in his name and has also agreed for the
cancellation of the same, and for issuance of a new one in their common names. They also
averred that whatever claim Lim Teck Chuan may have, it may be ventilated in an
appropriate independent action.
Page 194 of 1553

Lim Teck Chuan prayed for denial of the Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
bad faith, He also filed his Motion to Implead Indispensable Parties, averring that there is
a need to implead Spouses Cabansag.
The RTC granted the joint motion to dismiss and denied Lim Teck Chuan’s motion
to implead. Lim Teck Chuan’s cross-claim and counterclaims were dismissed without
prejudice.
Lim Teck Chuan filed petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme
Court, alleging that RTC erred for dismissing the case in its entirety in spite of his
counterclaim and cross-claim. He asserted that within 15 days from notice of the filing of
the joint motion to dismiss, he filed his opposition thereto and expressed his preference to
have his counterclaim and cross-claim resolved in the same action.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint, specifically upon motion of the
plaintiff under Section 2 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court also calls for the dismissal of the
defendant’s counterclaim
Ruling:
No, the Court ruled that the RTC erred in dismissing Lim Teck Chuan’s
counterclaim.
The Court held that the remedy of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 by
Lim Teck Chuan was proper since the issue is clearly one of law as it calls for the correct
application of the Rules of Court.
The RTC granted the Joint Motion to Dismiss on the main ground that the case had
become moot and academic since his title to Lot 5357 had been allegedly quieted and the
reliefs prayed for were obtained.
The Rules of Court state that the dismissal shall be limited only to the complaint. A
dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. Since only the
complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may still
prosecute his counterclaim in the same action. Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion
of the plaintiff, now recognizes the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim
either in the same or separate action notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, and
without regard as to the permissive or compulsory nature of the counterclaim.
Page 195 of 1553

Lim Teck Chuan’s preference to have his counterclaim and cross-claims be

prosecuted in the same action was timely manifested. The Court held that there are valid
reasons why the he objected to the dismissal of the case upon the joint motion of Serafin
and Leopolda and insisted to have his counterclaim prosecuted in the same action.
Records show that Serafin had been aware of the Lim Teck Chuan’s claim over the
property as descendants of Antonio and Dy Ochay even before the institution of this case,
which was why he impleaded him. Then, the Joint Motion to Dismiss was filed by Serafin
and Leopolda on the ground that both parties were able to settle their differences. Clearly,
Lim Teck Chuan was left out of the picture. From the case’s inception, his interests and
that of his siblings over the subject property were vigilantly defended as evidenced by the
numerous and exchange of pleadings made by the parties. It cannot therefore be denied
that he has certainly valid defences and enforceable claims against the respondents for
being dragged into this case.
Thus, his preference to have his counterclaim prosecuted in the same action is valid
and in accordance with Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 159691, February 17, 2014
J. Bersamin
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the
other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action
under consideration.
There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return
of the properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among the
heirs. In the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palicte’s right
in the properties had been declared exclusivse. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293
and the other cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the
factual and legal issues raised. The Court saw through the petitioners’ "ploy to countermand
the previous decisions’ sustaining Palicte’s rights over the properties."
Page 196 of 1553

Facts:
The instant case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don
Filemon Y. Sotto respecting four real properties that had belonged to Filemon’s estate.
The first case held that Matilde. one of four declared heirs of Filemon, had validly redeemed
the four properties pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have
the title over the four properties transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three
other declared heirs to join her in the redemption of the four properties within a period of
six months.
The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde (to annul the former’s waiver
of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four
properties.
The third was an incident in a suit brought by the heirs of Carmen Rallos against the Estate
of Sotto wherein the heirs of Miguel prayed for their inclusion as Matilde’s co-
redemptioners.
The fourth was a case whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the
probate court in Cebu City denying the administrator’s motion to require Matilde to turn
over the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.
The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous cases did
not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their being the successors-in-interest of two of the
declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the previous cases either directly or in
privity. They now pray that the Court undo the decision declaring their action for the
partition of the four properties as already barred by the judgments previously rendered.
In its June 13, 2013 decision, the Court has given Atty. Mahinay the chance to explain why
he should not be sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Mahinay is guilty of forum shopping when he filed this action for partition
notwithstanding the earlier rulings favoring Matilde’s exclusive right over the four
properties
Held:
The explanation is unsatisfactory.
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
Page 197 of 1553

transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court."
Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles
with the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and
adds to the already congested court dockets.
An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and
the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in
the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of the
properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among the heirs.
In the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palicte’s right in the
properties had been declared exclusivse. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and
the other cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the
factual and legal issues raised. The Court saw through the petitioners’ "ploy to
countermand the previous decisions’ sustaining Palicte’s rights over the properties."
Atty. Mahinay’s disclosure of the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 in filing the Motion
to Require Matilde Palicte To Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate
in Her Possession is not enough compliance with the rule against forum shopping. The
disclosure alone of the pendency of a similar case does not negate actual forum shopping.
The acts of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum shopping
shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions against the lawyer.
Forum shopping can be committed in either of three ways, namely: (1) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata);
or (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia
or res judicata). If the forum shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases
shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. But if
Page 198 of 1553

the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions
shall be dismissed with prejudice.
In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay was guilty of forum shopping. Under Revised
Circular No. 28-91, any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his counsel
through the filing of multiple petitions or complaints to ensure favorable action shall
constitute direct contempt of court. Direct contempt of court is meted the summary
penalty of fine not exceeding P2,000.00.
ATTY. EMMANUEL D. AGUSTIN, et al. vs. ALEJANDRO CRUZ-HERRERA

G.R. NO. 174564, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
J. REYES
It has been repeatedly emphasized that in the case of natural persons, the certification
against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties themselves and not by the
attorney. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of
the principal parties and not by the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal
representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other
tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and
causes of action. Hence, the petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a
defective certification of non-forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of
the complainants as the principal parties.
Facts:
Respondent Herrera was the President of Podden while complainants were assemblers
and/or line leader assigned at the production department. In 1993, the complainants were
terminated from employment due to financial reverses. Upon verification, however, with
the Department of Labor and Employment, no such report of financial reverses or even
retrenchment was filed. This prompted the complainants to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal, monetary claims and damages against Podden and Herrera. They engaged the
services of Atty. Agustin to handle the case.
The Labor Arbiter issued an order to immediately reinstate the complainants to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with full backwages
from date of dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement. Podden and Herrera were further
ordered to pay complainants their money claims representing their underpayment of
wages, 13th month pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days and service incentive leave
pay to be computed by the Fiscal Examiner of the Research, Information and Computation
Unit of the Commission in due time. Podden and Herrera were furthermore ordered to pay
Page 199 of 1553

each complainant moral and exemplary damages, as well as ten (10%) of the total awards
as attorney’s fee.
No appeal was taken from the foregoing judgment hence, a motion for execution was filed.
Herrera filed a Manifestation and Motion to deny issuance of the writ stating, among
others, that Podden ceased operations on almost four years before judgment was rendered
by the LA on the illegal dismissal complaint and that nine of the eleven employees have
executed Waivers and Quitclaims rendering any execution of the judgment inequitable.
Atty. Agustin opposed Herrera’s motion and argued that the issuance of a writ of execution
is ministerial because the LA decision has long been final and executory there being no
appeal taken therefrom. He further claimed that the alleged Waivers and Quitclaims were
part of a scheme adopted by Podden to evade its liability and defraud the complainants.
The LA denied the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The LA sustained as valid
the Waivers and Quitclaims signed by all and not just nine of the complainants. The NLRC
reversed the LA Order for the reason that it unlawfully amended, altered and modified the
final and executory LA Decision. The quitclaims were also held invalid based on the
unconscionably low amount received by each of the complainants as against the judgment
award for each individual complainant.
Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the issuances of the NLRC.
During the pendency of the petition, a joint compromise agreement was submitted to the
CA. The CA approved the joint compromise agreement and entered judgment in
accordance therewith. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the petition filed by Atty. Agustin is meritorious
Held:
The petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective certification of

non-forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the complainants as
the principal parties.
Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have
been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against
forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification.
Page 200 of 1553

The Court has espoused leniency and overlooked such procedural misstep in cases bearing
substantial merit complemented by the written authority or general power of attorney
granted by the parties to the actual signatory. However, no analogous justifiable reasons
exist in the case at bar neither do the claims of Atty. Agustin merit substantial
consideration to justify a relaxation of the rule.
It cannot be said that Herrera negotiated for the compromise agreement in bad faith. It
remains undisputed that Podden has ceased operations almost four years before the LA
Decision was rendered. In view thereof, the implementation of the award became
unfeasible and a compromise settlement was more beneficial to the complainants as it
assured them of reparation, albeit at a reduced amount. This was the same situation
prevailing at the time when Herrera manifested and reiterated before the CA that a
concession has been reached by the parties. Thus, the motivating force behind the
settlement was not to deprive or prejudice Atty. Agustin of his fees, but rather the inability
of a dissolved corporation to fully abide by its adjudged liabilities and the certainty of
payment on the part of the complainants.
DIONES BELZA vs. DANILO T. CANONERO

G.R. NO. 192479, JANUARY 27, 2014
J. ABAD
a. A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided in
the second paragraph of Section 26 above. But this assumes that such client has given counsel
a notice of dismissal so the latter could immediately cease to represent him. Indeed, it would
have been more prudent for newly hired counsel to refrain from entering his appearance in
the case until he has ascertained that the previous counsel has been dismissed from it.
b. Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically requires
that a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this
Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement
of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3)
legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the
required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties. b) A
mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop
the running of the period of perfecting an appeal.
Insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC under its rule
making power considering the great volume of appeals filed with it from all over the country.
Page 201 of 1553

Facts:
Petitioner DNB hired respondents as technicians assigned to repair and maintain its clients'
electronic and communications equipment. Respondent technicians were particularly
assigned at the Makati Medical Center, one of its clients. However, DNB lost in the bidding
for the services it was rendering to the medical center. As a consequence, DNB terminated
respondent technicians from employment without giving them new assignments or paying
separation pays. Subsequently, respondent technicians filed a complaint against DNB for
constructive illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay.
Following DNB’s failure to file its position paper despite notice, the Labor Arbiter rendered
a Decision holding it liable for illegal dismissal and ordering it to pay respondent
technicians "backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the filing of the
complaint" plus separation pay of one month salary for every year of service. DNB appealed
but the NLRC dismissed the same as a non-perfected appeal given that DNB did not
accompany its memorandum of appeal with the required certification of non-forum
shopping. Later, DNB filed, through new counsel, Atty. Carpio, a motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC’s dismissal order with a belated certification of non-forum
shopping. A few days later the original counsel of record, Atty. Claveria, filed for DNB a
separate motion for reconsideration of the same order.
The NLRC issued a Resolution ignoring the motion for reconsideration that Atty. Carpio
filed for DNB considering that Atty. Claveria, the counsel of record, had not yet withdrawn
from the case; and denying the motion for reconsideration that the latter counsel filed for
lack of merit. This prompted DNB to appeal to the CA, which dismissed the petition and
affirmed that of the NLRC.
Issue:
a. Whether a client may dismiss counsel of record any time.

b. Whether an appeal to the NLRC requires accompaniment of certification of non-forum
shopping.
Ruling:
a. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 26. Change of Attorneys.— An attorney may retire at any time from any
action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He
may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent
of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
Page 202 of 1553
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of

the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court place of
the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place x x
x.
A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided in
the second paragraph of Section 26 above. But this assumes that such client has given
counsel a notice of dismissal so the latter could immediately cease to represent him.
Indeed, it would have been more prudent for newly hired counsel to refrain from entering
his appearance in the case until he has ascertained that the previous counsel has been
dismissed from it. As it happened, apparently unaware that Atty. Carpio had already filed
a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Order dismissing DNB’s appeal, Atty. Claveria
filed still another motion for reconsideration on its behalf. He had no inkling that his client
had decided to replace him.
Clearly, the fault in this case did not lie with the NLRC but with DNB which failed in its
duty to inform Atty. Claveria of his dismissal. And, since DNB had no right to file two
motions for reconsideration, the NLRC would have been well within its right to altogether
disregard both motions. Instead, however, it chose the more lenient option of acting on the
one filed by the original counsel of record who had not withdrawn from the case or been
properly substituted. This action cannot be regarded as constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
b. Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically
requires the submission of such certification of non-forum shopping in appeals to the
NLRC. Thus:
Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within
the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the
appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a
statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or
order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i)
proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv)
proof of service upon the other parties.
Page 203 of 1553

b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated
shall not stop the running of the period of perfecting an appeal.
The fact that DNB had not actually engaged in forum shopping is not an excuse for its
failure to comply with the requirement, an omission that allowed the period for perfecting
the appeal to run inexorably. The NLRC was, therefore, justified in dismissing DNB’s
appeal.
DNB points out that the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping has no
meaning in relation to its appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC since
such a certification is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court only in
initiatory pleadings and since it was respondent technicians, not DNB, who initiated the
labor case with their complaint. But insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a
prerogative of the NLRC under its rule making power considering the great volume of
appeals filed with it from all over the country. In Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, the Court held that substantial compliance with the requirement
may be allowed when justified under the circumstances but the Court finds no grave abuse
of discretion on NLRC's part when it found no such justification in this case.
Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs of the Port of Batangas and The

Bureu of Customs vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSCP), et al.
G.R. No. 205002, April 20, 2016
To constitute forum shopping the following elements must be present:
(1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
actions;
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same
set of facts; and
(3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.
FACTS:
Petitioner District Collector demanded PSPC to pay the excise tax and value-added tax
(VAT), plus penalty on its importation of petroleum. Respondent PSPC appealed the
matter to petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC) who denied the same. PSPC filed
with the CTA a Petition for Review. It likewise filed a Verified Motion for the issuance of a
Suspension Order against the collection of taxes with a prayer for immediate issuance of a
Page 204 of 1553
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which the CTA granted, but denied PSPC’s request
for a suspension order.
Petitioner District Collector issued a Memorandum ordering the personnel of petitioner

Bureau of Customs (BOC) in the Port of Batangas to hold the delivery of all import
shipments of respondent PSPC to satisfy its excise tax liabilities. Respondent PSPC filed
with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Injunction. In the Verification and
Certification attached to the Complaint for Injunction, respondent Vice President for
Finance Sarmient) declared that there is a pending case before the CTA, however, it
involves different issues and/or reliefs. Petitioners filed with the CTA a Motion to Cite
respondents for Direct Contempt of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents should be cited for direct contempt of court for submitting willfuly
and deliberately submitting a false certification on non-forum shopping
RULING:
No.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, forum shopping can be committed in three ways, to wit:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia);
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and [with] the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); or
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata).
Corollarily, there is forum shopping when a party seeks a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by an appeal or by certiorari, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause, hoping that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition on his case. In
other words, "[f]orum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different courts, [either] simultaneously or successively, all [of which
are] substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court."
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Hence, to constitute forum shopping the following elements must be present:
(1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
actions;
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same
set of facts; and
(3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.
In this case, a careful reading of the Verified Motion in the CTA case vis-àvis the Complaint
for Injunction filed with the RTC of Batangas reveals that although both cases have the
same parties, originated from the same factual antecedents, and involve Section 1508 of the
TCCP, the subject matter, the cause of action, the issues involved, and the reliefs prayed
for are not the same.
The subject matter and the causes of action are not the same. The subject matter in
the CTA case is the alleged unpaid taxes of respondent PSPC on its importation of CCG and
LCCG for the years 2006 to 2008 in the total amount of P21,419,603,310.00, which is sought
to be collected by petitioners. On the other hand, the subject matter of the Batangas
injunction case is the 13 importations/shipments of respondent PSPC .
The issues raised are not the same. Respondent PSPC filed the CTA case to assail the
Letter-Decisions of petitioner COC, finding it liable to pay excise taxes and VAT on its
importation of CCG and LCCG. While in the Verified Motion, the issue raised is respondent
PSPC’s entitlement to a suspension order pending the resolution of the validity of the
Letter-Decisions.
The reliefs prayed for are not the same. In the Petition for Review before the CTA, the
prayer was for the nullification of the Letter-Decision dated 11 November 2009 and Letter-
Decision dated 26 November 2009 and permanently enjoining petitioners from collecting
thereon. In the Verified Motion with the CTA, to refrain or stop from exercising any action
described in, under, or pursuant to, Section 1508 of the TCCP, including holding delivery
or release of imported articles, and/or from performing any act of collecting the disputed
amounts by distraint, or similar acts. In the Complaint for Injunction with the RTC, the
prayer was to enjoin petitioners from entering the Refinery or property of [respondent]
PSPC and/or seize, confiscate, or forcibly take possession of the imported shipments of
[respondent] PSPC that are already in the latter’s physical custody and/or possession.
Page 206 of 1553

Lynman Bacolor, et al. vs. VL Makabali Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al.

G.R. No. 204325, April 18, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a case for constructive illegal dismissal against respondents. The Labor
arbiter ruled in petitioners’ favor. On appeal, the NLRC revsed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in giving due course to the appeal despite its
alleged lack of appeal bond; and in reversing the LA Decision. The Petition was
accompanied by three separate Verifications/Certificates of Non-Forum Shopping signed
by respondents Drs. Galura, Bacolor and Helen. Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Raphael N.
Francisco executed and signed a Verification/Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping with
Undertaking in behalf of respondents Drs. Villegas, Canlas and Zheila. The CA dismissed
the petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari on the ground that the Verification/Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping executed by petitioners’ counsel on behalf of the parties violated
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari because of the defective the
Verification/Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
RULING:
No, the CA should not have dismissed the Petition. While petitioners’ counsel is not shown
to have been authorized by the petitioners to sign a certificate of non-forum shopping on
their behalf, the execution of said certificate by counsel violates well-settled rules.
However, here, three of six petitioners signed the certificate of non-forum shopping. At the
least, the CA could have ordered that those who did not sign it be dropped as parties, but
not the outright dismissal of the Petition. The Court, nevertheless, holds that there are
justifiable reasons for the relaxation of the rules on the filing of a certificate of non-forum
shopping and that the certificate against forum shopping signed by three out of six
petitioners suffices.
Specifically, petitioners’ cause of action revolves on the same issue, that is, respondents
illegally dismissed them under similar circumstances. They were all resident physicians
who were purportedly 1) re-employed by the Hospital even after the expiration of their
respective one year contracts; 2) forced to resign and offered to be re-engaged as fixed term
employees but declined; 3) demoted; 4) accused of violations of the Hospital rules and
Page 207 of 1553

regulations; and, 5) dismissed. Moreover, substantial justice dictates that the Petition for
Certiorari be given due course and be resolved on the merits. This is especially so since the
findings of the LA are contrary to those of the NLRC,43 particularly on the issues of whether
respondents illegally dismissed petitioners and of whether they were afforded due process
of law.
In Altres v. Empleo, the Court summarized the basic tenets involving noncompliance with
the requirements on, or filing of defective verification and certificate against forum
shopping, to wit:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or

submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on
or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not

necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission
or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission
or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
“substantial compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling
reasons”.
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to
the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
Page 208 of 1553

party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney

designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Robina Farms Cebu/Universal Robina Corporation vs. Elizabeth Villa

G.R. No. 175869, April 18, 2016
The filing of the certification with the initiatory pleading was mandatory, and the
failure to do so could not be cured by a later submission. The non-submission of the
certification, being a ground for dismissal, was fatal to the petition. There is no question that
the non-compliance with the requirement for the certification, or a defect in the certification,
would not be cured by the subsequent submission or the correction of the certification, except
in cases of substantial compliance or upon compelling reasons. Accordingly, the dismissal of
the petitioner's appeal cannot be reversed or undone.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for resintatement and
payment of backwages against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ordered respondent’s
resintatement but failed to award backwages. Both parties appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which granted respondent’s appeal but dismissed that of
petitioner for being fatally defective, since it lacked the proper verification and certificate
of non-forum shopping.
In resolving petitioner’s Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, the CA treated the petitioner's
appeal as an unsigned pleading because the petitioner did not present proof showing that
Florabeth P. Zanoria, its Administrative Officer and Chief Accountant who had signed the
verification, had been authorized to sign and file the appeal. It opined that the belated
submission of the secretary's certificate showing the authority to represent the petitioner,
and the special power of attorney executed by Bautista to authorize Zanoria to represent
the petitioner did not cure the defect.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in upholding the NLRC’s finding that petitioner’s appeal
should be dismissed
2. Whether respondent’s appeal, on the other hand, should also be treated as an
unsigned pleading because she had accompanied her appeal with the same
verification attached to her position paper.
RULING:
Page 209 of 1553

1. No. The filing of the certification with the initiatory pleading was mandatory, and
the failure to do so could not be cured by a later submission. The non-submission
of the certification, being a ground for dismissal, was fatal to the petition. There is
no question that the non-compliance with the requirement for the certification, or
a defect in the certification, would not be cured by the subsequent submission or
the correction of the certification, except in cases of substantial compliance or upon
compelling reasons. Accordingly, the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal cannot be
reversed or undone.
2. On the other hand, respondent’s appeal was correctly given due course by the nLRC.
Section 4(a), Rule VI of the Amended NLRC Rules of Procedure requires an appeal to
be verified by the appellant herself. The verification is a mere formal requirement
intended to secure and to give assurance that the matters alleged in the pleading are
true and correct. The requirement is complied with when one who has the ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, or when the matters contained in the petition have been alleged in
good faith or are true and correct. Being a mere formal requirement, the courts may
even simply order the correction of improperly verified pleadings, or act on the same
upon waiving the strict compliance with the rules of procedure. It is the essence of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure to extend to every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Accordingly, the substantial compliance with the
procedural rules is appreciated in favor of respondent.
JUAN TRAJANO a.k.a. JOHNNY TRAJANO vs. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB
G.R. No. 190253, June 11, 2014, J. Brion
The main issue of this case is whether or not there is poper verification of the
complaint. Contrary to Uniwide’s claim, the records of the case show that the petition’s
verification page contains Trajano’s competent evidence of identity, specifically, Passport No.
XX041470. Trajano’s failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of the petition containing his
competent evidence of identity is a minor error that this Court may and chooses to brush
aside in the interest of substantial justice. This Court has, in proper instances, relaxed the
application of the Rules of Procedure when the party has shown substantial compliance with
it. In these cases, The court have held that the rules of procedure should not be applied in a
very technical sense when it defeats the purpose for which it had been enacted, i.e., to ensure
the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases
Page 210 of 1553

Facts:
Uniwide entered into a sales arrangement with Golden Sea and Trajano for the
importation of goods from China in 2001. Under this arrangement, Uniwide ordered
merchandise from Golden Sea, which delivered the goods to Uniwide. Since Uniwide was
under corporate rehabilitation at that time, Trajano allegedly "guaranteed the payment" of
the goods to Golden Sea. In turn, Uniwide delivered to Trajano and a certain Vicente Kua
post-dated checks payable to "Golden Universal/Cash" or "Golden Sea/Cash" whose face
value represented the goods’ purchase price plus a monetary interest rate of 36% per
annum. Golden Sea delivered P178,199,054.60 worth of unsaleable, defective and/or
damaged goods as well as merchandise that Uniwide did not agree to purchase. Thus,
Golden Sea allegedly agreed to credit in Uniwide’s account the price of these goods, upon
which Uniwide requested for credit amounting to P163,199,054.60 in its favor. However,
Golden Sea did not heed Uniwide’s request; instead, Golden Sea and Trajano encashed all
the post-dated checks Uniwide issued (except those maturing from July 2005 to September
2006), which totaled to P86,284.028.00.7 Aggrieved, Uniwide filed the complaint to get the
refund of the total value of misdelivered, unsaleable, defective and/or damaged goods, and
to enjoin Golden Sea and Trajano from encashing the remaining post-dated checks in their
possession. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-0265, was raffled to RTC of
Parañaque – Branch 274, which was presided by Judge Fortunito Madrona. On August 11,
2005, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting Golden Sea and Trajano
from encashing the postdated checks. Trajano moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ
for lack of factual basis. Subsequently, Trajano filed a motion to post counterbond to lift
the writ of preliminary injunction. Uniwide opposed this, and filed a motion for ocular
inspection of the goods to support its opposition to the motion to post counterbond. On
December 22, 2005, the RTC issued an order: (1) sustaining the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction; (2) granting Uniwide’s motion for ocular inspection; and (3)
deferring the resolution of Trajano’s motion to post counterbond pending the ocular
inspection of the subject goods. On January 11, 2006, Trajano sought a partial
reconsideration of the December 22, 2005 order insofar as the RTC held that his motion to
post counterbond would only be resolved after the ocular inspection. Trajano claimed that
Uniwide entered into a contract of sale with Golden Sea for the importation of
merchandise. On the other hand, Uniwide entered into a contract of loan with Trajano for
the payment of these imported goods. Consequently, the determination of whether Golden
Sea should credit in Uniwide’s account the total value of misdelivered, unsaleable, defective
and/or damaged goods was a separate matter from Uniwide’s contractual obligation to pay
Trajano the matured loan. The condition of the purchased goods was irrelevant with
respect to Uniwide’s obligation to pay him the overdue loan. Trajano thus prayed that he
be allowed to post a counter bond and to encash the post-dated checks. On the same date,
Golden Sea and Trajano also separately moved for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Page 211 of 1553

Madrona for his alleged bias towards Uniwide. On January 12, 2006, Trajano filed a
supplemental motion to his motion for partial reconsideration dated January 11, 2006.In his
supplemental motion, Trajano called the trial court’s attention to the statement of
Uniwide’s counsel during the August 5, 2005 hearing that the agreement for the credit of
misdelivered, unsaleable, defective and/or damaged goods only involved Uniwide and
Golden Sea. On February 15, 2006, Judge Madrona recused himself from the case, but
Uniwide moved to reconsider his voluntary inhibition. Thereafter, the case was re-raffled
to the RTC of Parañaque – Branch 195, which was presided by Judge Aida Estrella
Macapagal. Uniwide contested the re-raffling of the case due to its pending motion for
reconsideration of Judge Madrona’s voluntary inhibition. On June 30, 2006, Judge Madrona
denied Uniwide’s motion for reconsideration and the records of the case were subsequently
transferred to Branch 195. On March 17, 2006, Trajano filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93492before the CA. In his petition, Trajano sought to dissolve
the writ enjoining him from encashing the post-dated checks. On January 22, 2008, the CA
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction with respect to Trajano for lack of factual
basis. The CA held that Uniwide failed to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable right
to be protected that warrants the issuance of the writ. This decision eventually became final
and entry of judgment was made on February 27, 2008.
Meanwhile, on March 29, 2006, Trajano filed before the RTC motions to resolve his
motion to post counterbond and for partial reconsideration dated January 11, 2006. Trajano
reiterated his motion to resolve on May 22, 2007. On August 28, 2006, Uniwide assailed
Judge Madrona’s inhibition from the case in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 95885 before the CA. Uniwide argued that Judge Madrona’s perceived bias in its
favor was unfounded, and that the preservation of the parties’ trust and confidence was an
insufficient ground for Judge Madrona’s inhibition.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petition should be denied outright for procedural infirmities; in
particular:
(a) Whether the petition lacks proper verification; and
(b) Whether the petition availed of the proper remedy in appealing the CA decision
dated January 3, 2008 and resolution dated October 28, 2009;
Ruling:
1. No, The petition is not procedurally infirm

Page 212 of 1553
A. The petition contains proper verification
Contrary to Uniwide’s claim, the records of the case show that the petition’s
verification page contains Trajano’s competent evidence of identity, specifically, Passport
No. XX041470. Trajano’s failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of the petition containing his
competent evidence of identity is a minor error that this Court may and chooses to brush
aside in the interest of substantial justice. This Court has, in proper instances, relaxed the
application of the Rules of Procedure when the party has shown substantial compliance
with it. In these cases, The court have held that the rules of procedure should not be applied
in a very technical sense when it defeats the purpose for which it had been enacted, i.e., to
ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases. The court maintain this ruling in
this procedural aspect of this case.
B. Trajano properly availed of a Rule 45 petition in assailing the January 3, 2008

decision and the October 28, 2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals
The court also see no merit in Uniwide’s claim that Trajano improperly availed of
the present petition for review on certiorari in assailing the RTC orders dated June 19 and
October 15, 2007. The body of the petition clearly and unequivocably challenges the CA
decision dated January 3, 2008 and resolution dated October 28, 2009. A petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court invokes the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
over questions of law that has been decided by the lower courts with finality. The CA
decision assailed by the present petition involves its final order regarding the alleged grave
abuse of discretion involved in the RTC’s interlocutory orders. This CA decision should not
be confused with the RTC’s interlocutory orders that had been disputed before the CA,
which was correctly contested by Trajano through a petition for certiorari. In J.L. Bernardo
Construction v. Court of Appeals the court stated that a petition for certiorari is an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1) when the tribunal issued such order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and (2) when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief. Thus, Trajano correctly filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA in order to strike down the RTC’s interlocutory orders that he claims to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the same vein, Trajano’s present petition for
review on certiorari is also the proper remedy, as it questions the CA’s final order regarding
the RTC’s interlocutory orders.
ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC., vs. VICTOR S. CHIONGBIAN, BENJAMIN D.

GOTHONG, and CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC. (CAGLI)
G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014, J. Leonen
Page 213 of 1553

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test
for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. In turn, prior judgment or
res judicata bars a subsequent case when the following requisites concur: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and
the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. As to the
third requisite, it has been settled that the dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may
very well be considered a judgment on the merits and, thereby, operate as res judicata on a
subsequent case.
Facts:
On January 8, 1996, Aboitiz Shipping Corporation ("ASC"), principally owned by the

Aboitiz family, CAGLI, principally owned by the Gothong family, and William Lines,
Inc.(WLI), principally owned by the Chiongbian family, entered into an agreement (the
"Agreement"), whereby ASC and CAGLI would transfer their shipping assets to WLI in
exchange for WLI’s shares of stock. WLI, in turn, would run their merged shipping
businesses and, henceforth, be known as WG&A, Inc. (WG&A). Sec. 11.06 of the said
Agreement required all disputes arising out of or in connection with the Agreement to be
settled by arbitration. Among the attachments to the Agreement was Annex SL-V. This was
a letter dated January 8, 1996, from WLI, through its President (herein respondent) Victor
S. Chiongbian addressed to CAGLI, through its Chief Executive Officer Bob D. Gothong
and Executive Vice President for Engineering (herein respondent) Benjamin D. Gothong.
Annex SL-V confirmed WLI’s commitment to acquire certain inventories of CAGLI which
would have a total aggregate value of, at most, P400 million. The acquisition of inventories,
as agreed upon, was carried out. However, these inventories were assessed to have a value
of 514 million later adjusted to 558.89 million. Of the said total amount, CAGLI was paid
the amount of 400 Million plus, Chuan Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) noted that WG&A
shares with a book value of 38.5 million were also transferred to it. As there was still a
balance, in 2001, CAGLI sent WG&A (the renamed WLI) demand letters for the return of
or the payment for the excess inventories. AEV alleged that to satisfy CAGLI’s demand,
WLI/WG&A returned inventories amounting to 120.04 million.
Sometime in 2002, the Chiongbian and Gothong families decided to leave the
WG&A enterprise and sell their interest in WG&A to the Aboitiz family. As such, a share
purchase agreement (SPA) was entered into by AEV and the respective shareholders groups
of the Chiongbians and Gothongs. In the SPA, AEV agreed to purchase the Chiongbian
Page 214 of 1553

group's 40.61% share and the Gothong group's 20.66% share in WG&A’s issued and
outstanding stock. Also, Section 6.5 of the SPA provided for arbitration as the mode of
settling any dispute arising from the SPA. Section 6.8 of the SPA further provided that the
Agreement (of January 8, 1996) shall be deemed terminated except its Annex SL-V. As part
of the SPA, the parties entered into an Escrow Agreement whereby ING Bank N.V.-Manila
Branch was to take custody of the shares subject of the SPA and which also provided an
arbitration clause. As a result of the SPA, AEV became a stockholder of WG&A.
Subsequently, WG&A was renamed Aboitiz Transport Shipping Corporation (ATSC).
Petitioner AEV alleged that in 2008, CAGLI resumed making demands despite
having already received 120.04 million worth of excess inventories. Such demand was
initially made to ATSC (the renamed WLI/WG&A) through a letter and CAGLI
subsequently resorted to a "shotgun approach" and directed its subsequent demand letters
to AEV as well as to FCLC (a company related to respondent Chiongbian).
AEV responded to CAGLI’s demands through several letters where it rebuffed the
latter’s demands noting that: (1) CAGLI already received the excess inventories;(2) it was
not a party to CAGLI's claim as it had a personality distinct from WLI/WG&A/ATSC; and
(3) CAGLI's claim was already barred by prescription. Subsequent correspondences
between them ensued. Later on it was established that the amount of excess inventories
delivered (120.04 million) was actually in excess of the value of the supposedly unreturned
inventories (119.89 million). Thus, it was pointed out that it was CAGLI which was liable to
return the difference between 120.04 million and 119.89 million. Its claims not having been
satisfied, CAGLI filed on November 6, 2008 the first of two applications for arbitration (first
complaint/Civil Case No. CEB-34951) against respondent Chiongbian, ATSC, ASC, and
petitioner AEV, before the Cebu City RTC, Branch 20. In response, AEV filed a motion to
dismiss.
Eventually, the first complaint was dismissed with respect to AEV. It sustained
AEV’s assertion that there was no agreement binding AEV and CAGLI to arbitrate CAGLI’s
claim. On February 26, 2010, the RTC issued an order directing the parties remaining
therein (after the discharge of AEV) to proceed with arbitration. Notwithstanding the said
order, CAGLI filed a notice of dismissal which, later on, was allowed. ATSC (the renamed
WLI/WG&A), for its part, filed a motion for reconsideration as regards the said allowance
which was, however, denied.
On September 1, 2010, while the first complaint was still pending, CAGLI, now joined
by respondent Benjamin D. Gothong, filed a second application for arbitration (second
complaint/ Civil Case No. CEB-37004) before the Cebu City RTC, Branch 10. Clearly, it was
also in view of the return of the same excess inventories subject of the first complaint. AEV,
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for its part, filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the following grounds: (1)
forum shopping; (2) failure to state a cause of action; (3) res judicata; and (4) litis pendentia.
However, AEV’s motion was denied. Aggrieved, it filed the present petition.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-37004 constitutes forum
shopping and/or is barred by res judicata and/or litis pendentia.
Ruling:
The complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-37004 is barred by res judicata and constitutes
forum shopping.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the
test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there
is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. In turn, prior judgment
or res judicata bars a subsequent case when the following requisites concur: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the
first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
First, between the first and second complaints, there is identity of parties. The first
complaint was brought by CAGLI as the sole plaintiff against Victor S. Chiongbian, ATSC,
and AEV as defendants. In the second complaint, CAGLI was joined by Benjamin D.
Gothong as (co-)plaintiff. As to the defendants, ATSC was deleted while Chiongbian and
AEV were retained. While it is true that the parties to the first and second complaints are
not absolutely identical, this court has clarified that, for purposes of forum shopping,
absolute identity of parties is not required and it is enough that there is substantial identity
of parties.
Even as the second complaint alleges that Benjamin D. Gothong "is suing in his
personal capacity," Gothong failed to show any personal interest in the reliefs sought by
the second complaint. Ultimately, what is at stake in the second complaint is the extent to
which CAGLI may compel AEV and Chiongbian to arbitrate in order that CAGLI may then
recover the value of its alleged unreturned inventories. This claim for recovery is pursuant
to the agreement evinced in Annex SL-V which was entered into by CAGLI and not by
Benjamin D. Gothong. While it is true that Benjamin D. Gothong, along with Bob D.
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Gothong, signed it, he did so only in a representative, and not in a personal, capacity. As
such, Benjamin D. Gothong cannot claim any right that personally accrues to him on
account of Annex SL-V. From this, it follows that Benjamin D. Gothong is not a real party
in interest hence, his inclusion in the second complaint is an unnecessary superfluity.
Second, there is identity in subject matter and cause of action. There is identity in
subject matter as both complaints are applications for the same relief. There is identity in
cause of action as both complaints are grounded on the right to be paid for or to receive
the value of excess inventories (and the supposed corresponding breach thereof) as spelled
out in Annex SL-V.
Third, the first and second complaints are both applications for arbitration and are
founded on the same instrument — Annex SL-V. Moreover, the intended arbitrations in
both complaints cater to the same ultimate purpose, i.e., that CAGLI may recover the value
of its supposedly unreturned inventories earlier delivered to WLI/WG&A/ATSC.
Furthermore, in both complaints, the supposed propriety of compelling the defendants to
submit themselves to arbitration were anchored on the same bases and the same factual
averments have been relied into.
Fourth, the parties did not dispute that the December 4, 2009 order was issued by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Specifically as to
jurisdiction over the parties, jurisdiction was acquired over CAGLI as plaintiff when it filed
the first complaint and sought relief from the Cebu City Regional Trial Court, Branch 20;
jurisdiction over defendants AEV, ATSC, and Victor Chiongbian was acquired with the
service of summons upon them.
Fifth, the dismissal of the first complaint with respect to AEV was a judgment on
the merits. A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective
of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is rendered after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. Also, it is not necessary that there
be a trial in order that a judgment be considered as one on the merits. What appears to be
essential to a judgment on the merits is that it be a reasoned decision, which clearly states
the facts and the law on which it is based. Further, it has been settled that the dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action may very well be considered a judgment on the merits and,
thereby, operate as res judicata on a subsequent case.
To reiterate, the Cebu City Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 made a definitive
determination that CAGLI had no right to compel AEV to subject itself to arbitration vis-
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a-vis CAGLI’s claims under Annex SL-V. This determination was arrived at after due
consideration of the facts established and the arguments advanced by the parties.
Accordingly, the Cebu City Regional Trial Court, Branch 20’s December 4, 2009 order
constituted a judgment on the merits and operated as res judicata on the second complaint.
Clearly, the requisites for res judicata have been satisfied and the second complaint should,
thus, have been dismissed. From this, it follows that CAGLI committed an act of forum
shopping in filing the second complaint. CAGLI instituted two suits in two regional trial
court branches, albeit successively and not simultaneously. It asked both branches to rule
on the exact same cause and to grant the exact same relief. CAGLI did so after it had
obtained an unfavorable decision (at least with respect to AEV) from the Cebu City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20. These circumstances afford the reasonable inference that
the second complaint was filed in the hopes of a more favorable ruling.
LOURDES C. FERNANDEZ vs. NORMA VILLEGAS and any person acting in her
behalf including her family
G.R. No. 200191, August 20, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Sisters Lourdes and Cecilia filed a petition to recover possession of a land. However,
only Lourdes was the signatory in the verification and certification against forum shopping.
Norma questioned the propriety of the petition. The Court then ruled that where the
petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of
the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification
of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
Facts:
Lourdes C. Fernandez (Lourdes) and her sister, Cecilia Siapno (Cecilia), filed a
Complaint for Ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, against respondent
Norma Villegas (Norma) and any person acting in her behalf including her family, seeking
to recover possession of a parcel of land situated in Guilig Street, Dagupan City.
Lourdes and Cecilia averred that they are the registered owners of the subject
property on which both Lourdes and Norma previously lived under one roof. However,
when their house was destroyed by typhoon "Cosme," Lourdes transferred to a nipa hut on
the same lot, while Norma, Cecilia’s daughter-in-law, and her family were advised to
relocate but, in the meantime, allowed to use a portion thereof. Instead, respondents
erected a house thereon over Lourdes and Cecila’s objections and, despite demands,
refused to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
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By way of defense, Norma alleged that Lourdes already donated her portion in favor
of Cecilia, adding too that the latter is bound by her declaration that "the house and lot
belong[s] to Eddie," who is Norma’s late husband. Norma further asserted that there was
no compliance with the required conciliation and mediation under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
The MTCC found that respondents failed to impugn the validity of plaintiffs’
ownership over the subject property. On appeal to the RTC, the RTC, Branch 40 granted
respondents’ appeal and ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint. On appeal with the
CA, the CA granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal, holding that the verification
and certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition was defective.
Issue:
Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the requirements of

verification and certification against forum shopping
Ruling:
Yes, there was substantial compliance with both requirements.
It is undisputed that Lourdes is not only a resident of the subject property but is a
co-owner thereof together with her co-plaintiff/sister, Cecilia. As such, she is "one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the CA petition" and is therefore
qualified to "sign x x x the verification".
To reiterate, both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus,
they share a commonality of interest and cause of action as against respondents. Hence,
the lone signature of Lourdes on the verification attached to the CA petition constituted
substantial compliance with the rules.
Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interestin the
property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the
verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding
with the action.
It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances - as in this case
where the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense - the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the
certification against forum shopping may be relaxed.
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ANTONIO M. GARCIA vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC.,

G.R. No. 172505, October 01, 2014, J. Leonen
There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before the SC assailing
the same trial court decision. The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case
amounts to res judicata in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following
elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount tores judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive
of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
Facts:
Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as
buyer, entered into a deed of absolute· sale and purchase of shares of stock on July 15,
1988. These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio Garcia. On March 3, 1989, a deed
of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of the deed of absolute sale and
purchase of shares of stock was entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals,
Inc.
Before the end of the 180-day period, Antonio Garcia exercised his right to
repurchase the properties. However, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase
of the shares of stock. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an action for specific performance and
annulment of transfer of shares.
On September 6, 1989, the class “A” share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and
proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., which were included in the
contracts entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at
public auction to Philippine Investment System Organization.
RTC found Antonio Garcia not guilty of estafa, and no civil liability was awarded to
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. However, at present, there is a conflicting decision from the Court of
Appeals awarding Ferro Chemicals, Inc. civil indemnity arising from the offense charged.
On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals the order
of the Regional Trial Court as to the civil aspect of the case. On October 15, 1997, the Makati
Page 220 of 1553

City Prosecutor’s Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also filed a petition for certiorari the SC,
assailing the Regional Trial Court’s decision which was subsequently dismissed. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals, in its decision dated August 11, 2005, granted the appeal
and awarded Ferro Chemicals, Inc. the amount of 1 million for actual loss and found that
Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings Organization’s lien
over the club shares.
Issues:
Whether the act of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the Court
of Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision amounted
to forum shopping
Ruling:
Yes.
Forum shopping is defined as “the act of a litigant who ‘repetitively availed of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by
some other court . . . to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one
court, then in another’.”
Once clearly established that forum shopping was committed willfully and
deliberately by a party or his or her counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with
prejudice, and the act shall constitute direct contempt and a cause for administrative
sanctions.
The test and requisites that must concur to establish when a litigant commits forum
shopping are the following:
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements
of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are
present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
Page 221 of 1553

tores judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the
requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before the SC
assailing the same trial court decision. This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled “Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad
Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case).” The “civil aspect of the case” referred to by
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed to
make a reservation before the trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
There is identity of parties. Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., are both
parties in the appeal filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari before
this court. There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At
a glance, it may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal
before the Court of Appeals is purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while
the petition for certiorari before this court is allegedly only on the criminal aspect of the
case. However, the civil liability asserted by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of
Appeals arose from the criminal act. It is in the nature of ciiability ex delicto. Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal
case. Thus, it is an adjunct of the criminal aspect of the case.
When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition
for certiorari before this court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal.
Thus, the relief prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil liability ex
delicto, is asserted in both actions before this court and the Court of Appeals.
As to the third requisite, on the assumption that the trial court had jurisdiction over
the case, this court’s decision in G.R. No. 130880 affirming the trial court’s decision
acquitting the accused for lack of an essential element of the crime charged amounts to res
judicata to assert the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense.
ZARSONA MEDICAL CLINIC vs. PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191225, October 13, 2014, J. Perez
The submission of an SPA authorizing an attorney-in-fact to sign the verification and

certification against forum-shopping in behalf of the principal party is considered as
Page 222 of 1553

substantial compliance with the Rules. At the very least, the SPA should have granted the
attorneys-in-fact the power and authority to institute civil and criminal actions which would
necessarily include the signing of the verification and certification against forum-shopping.
Hence, there is lack of authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition filed before the Court of Appeals when the SPA reveals that the
powers conferred to attorneys-in-fact only pertain to administrative matters.
Facts:
A complaint was filed against petitioner Zarsona Medical Clinic (ZMC) for violation
of Section 149 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7875
or the National Health Insurance Act of 1995. Section 149 penalizes any health care provider
that increases the period of actual confinement of any patient with revocation of
accreditation.
ZMC filed a claim with the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) on
the confinement of National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) member Lorna M. Alestre
(Alestre) on 10-12 August 2003. Said claim was denied on the ground of "extended
confinement." It was stated on the claim form that Alestre was admitted to ZMC on August
6, 2003 and was discharged on August 12, 2003. It was also revealed in her Salaysay dated
January 12, 2004 that Alestre’s actual confinement at ZMC was on August 10-11, 2003.
Alestre, who is a teacher at Rizal Elementary School, was found to have reported for work
on August 12, 2003.
In defense of ZMC, Dr. Sylvia Bragat (Dr. Bragat), its Medical Director, stated that
ZMC’s Midwife/Clerk Jennifer R. Acuram (Acuram) committed an honest mistake when
she wrote August 6-12, 2003 as the confinement period in the claim form. Dr. Bragat
asserted that the hospital had in fact claimed only for two (2) days.
ZMC also presented an Affidavit of Explanation dated January 21, 2005 from Alestre
recanting her previous Salaysay. Alestre explained that the previous statement she gave
does not reflect the truth because she was protecting herself when she logged-in at the
school’s time record on August 12, 2003 when she was supposedly still confined at ZMC.
She narrated that her son were admitted at ZMC on August 10, 2003 at around 1:30 p.m.
and was discharged on August 12, 2003. In the morning of August 12, 2003, after her
attending physician went to check on her, she managed to slip out of the hospital. She
proceeded to the school, which was a mere ten minute drive away from ZMC. She reported
for work and came back to the hospital at noon to take her medicines and look after her
child. Thereafter, she again went back to the school and at about 1:30 p.m., she asked
permission from the school principal that she needed to go back to the hospital. She then
Page 223 of 1553

went back to ZMC to attend to her child and process her discharge papers. At around 2:00
p.m., she finally came back to the school. Dr. Ariel dela Cruz, attending physician of Alestre,
confirmed that he ordered Alestre’s discharge in the morning of August 12, 2003.
Eventually, ZMC was found liable for the charge of "Extending Period of
Confinement" in violation of Section 149 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of Republic
Act No. 7875 and was meted the penalty of suspension from participating in the NHIP for
a period of three (3) months and a fine of P10,000.00. It appealed but the Philhealth Board
of Directors (the Board) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the Philhealth
Arbiter.
ZMC filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which was, however,
dismissed due to failure on the part of ZMC to attach a valid SPA. The appellate court found
the SPA defective on the ground that it does not explicitly authorize Dr. Bragat to sign and
execute the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping in this case. The
appellate court noted that the powers granted to Dr. Bragat pertain only to her
administrative functions as Medical Director of ZMC. It moved for reconsideration but It
was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or Dr. Bragat has the authority to sign the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping in the petition filed before the Court of Appeals.
Ruling:
Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement intended to

secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive
strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." Rule 7, Section
5 of the Rules of the Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the
"petitioner or principal party" himself. The rationale behind this is "because only the
Page 224 of 1553

petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions
or proceedings in different courts or agencies."
It has been settled that the submission of an SPA authorizing an attorney-in-fact to

sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping in behalf of the principal
party is considered as substantial compliance with the Rules. In this case, Philhealth found
the SPA defective. The SPA granted by Dr. Zarsona to his attorneys-in-fact, Dr. Bragat and
William Bragat, authorizes the latter to do the following: A) To represent, process, follow
up, transact and facilitate all claims, benefits and privileges belonging to or owing to
Zarsona Medical Clinic in the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Department of
Health and in other agencies, may it be private or government; B) To receive, withdraw,
and encash any check or checks belonging to or in the name of Zarsona Medical Clinic; C)
To make, execute, and sign any contract, documents or all other writings of whatever kind
and nature which are necessary to the foregoing powers. Indeed, a reading of the SPA
reveals that the powers conferred by Dr. Zarsona to his attorneys-in-fact pertain to
administrative matters. The phrase "claims, benefits and privileges belonging to or owing
to Zarsona Medical Clinic" clearly does not include the filing of cases before the courts or
any quasi-judicial agencies. The term"claims" in particular refers to those claims for
payment of services rendered by the hospital during a Philhealth member’s confinement.
These claims are filed by the hospital with Philhealth. Furthermore, the SPA makes no
mention of any court, judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. The enumeration of agencies in the
first paragraph of the SPA, such as Philhealth and Department of Health, refers to those
agencies which are health-related. There is no explicit authorization for Dr. Bragat to sign
and execute the required verification and certification in this case. At the very least, the
SPA should have granted the attorneys-in-fact the power and authority to institute civil
and criminal actions which would necessarily include the signing of the verification and
certification against forum-shopping.
ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO AND
DOLORES V. MOLINA, G.R. No. 109645
DOLORES V. MOLINA vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, QUEZON CITY, BR.
105 AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 112564
DOLORES V. MOLINA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EPIMACO
ORETA, G.R. No. 128422
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION AND ALBERTO V. REYES vs. DOLORES V.
MOLINA AND HON. MARCIANO BACALLA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 216, G.R.
No. 128911
January 21, 2015, J. Leonen
Page 225 of 1553

When there has been a final and executory ruling by the Court, petitioner filing an
action for quieting of title constitutes deliberate forum shopping.
Forum shopping consists of the following elements:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
All the elements of forum shopping are present in this case. The parties in G.R. No.
112564 and this case are the same: Molina and TMBC.
Facts:
These consolidated cases involve matters that have long been settled by this court.
However, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 112564 and 128422, Dolores V. Molina, remained incessant
in filing suits that led to the unnecessary clogging not only of this court's but the lower
courts' dockets as well.
G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564 were decided by this court on July 25, 1994.1 A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by Dolores V. Molina (Molina) on August 10, 1994. She later
filed two supplements to the Motion for Reconsideration. Her Motion for Reconsideration
was denied with finality in the Resolution dated January 23, 1995. Despite the denial of
Molina's Motion for Reconsideration, she filed a "Motion for Leave to File the Herein
Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Allow x x x Dolores V. Molina a
Day in Court Relative to Her Petition for Reconstitution." In the Resolution dated March 1,
1995, this court denied with finality Molina's Motion for Reconsideration. The Court
directed that no further pleadings, motions or papers be henceforth filed in these cases
except only as regards the issues directly involved in the 'Motion for Reconsideration' (Re:
Dismissal of Respondent Judge) of Ortigas & Co. Ltd., dated August 15, 1994.
Despite these Resolutions stating that "no further pleadings, motions, or others
papers" be filed, Molina still filed the following:
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(a) [m]otion to refer the cases to the Court En Banc dated April 5, 1995 (denied
by Resolution of June 19, 1995);
(b) [consolidated motion dated July 25, 1995, for reconsideration of the June 19,
1995 Resolution (denied by Resolution dated August 28, 1995); and
(c) [m]otion dated August 21, 1995 for reconsideration of the July 24, 1995
Resolution (Re: increasing fines on counsels and directing entry of
judgment) (denied by Resolution dated October 25, 1995)."
In a subsequently ruling of the Court, it found Molina guilty of contempt of court.
A complaint was filed against Molina for falsification of public document before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City. The Assistant City Prosecutor initially
recommended the dismissal of the case, however, Chief State Prosecutor reversed the
Resolution of the City Prosecutor and directed the filing of "an information for falsification
of public document.” Molina filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to File
Documents, which was denied by then Secretary of Justice. Undaunted, Molina filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Molina's Petition on technical grounds. Molina filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was denied, hence, this petition.
Molina filed an action for quieting of title and annulment of title before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The Manila Banking Corporation (TMBC) filed a Motion to
Dismiss citing res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, bar by prior judgment, and forum
shopping. In addition, the Regional Trial Court cannot annul and set aside the Decision of
this court. Molina opposed the Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, she filed a 'With Leave
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint,’ which was granted by the RTC. The RTC did not
act on the Motion to Dismiss
“Considering that it is undisputed that TMBC is under receivership, the Motion to

Dismiss filed by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is hereby granted. This case is dismissed
as against Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, it appearing that Alberto Reyes is the receiver
and not the said bank.
Accordingly, the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint with leave is hereby

Page 227 of 1553
granted, and the amended complaint attached thereto wherein TMBC is dropped as
party-defendant and in lieu thereof, Alberto Reyes is impleaded as such is admitted.
Let summons be served on the newly named defendant.”
There is no need to act on TMBC's motion to dismiss given the above circumstances.
TMBC and Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. TMBC and
Reyes filed this Joint Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order.
Issue:
Whether the action for quieting of title by Molina constitutes forum shopping and
res judicata.
Ruling:
Molina actually filed an action for quieting of title, in clear violation of this court's
ruling in G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564, constitutes deliberate forum shopping.
Forum shopping is defined as:
[w]hen a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,

simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Forum shopping consists of the following elements:

(d) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;
(e) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
(f) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
All the elements of forum shopping are present in this case. The parties in G.R. No.
112564 and this case are the same: Molina and TMBC.
Page 228 of 1553

For the second element, the test in determining whether the causes of action are the
same: ascertain[s] whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is
an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in
the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
In this case, Molina asserts that the reconstitution case she previously filed was a
special proceeding and did not touch upon the issue of ownership. On the other hand, Civil
Case No. Q-97-29856, an action for quieting of title, involved the issue of ownership.
Molina's arguments do not hold. These two cases involved relitigating her claim of
ownership over the properties covered by the nullified TCT No. 124088.
Further, the ruling in G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564 is res judicata on this case.
The elements of res judicata are:

a) the former judgment must be final;
b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;
c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
d) there must be between the first and the second actions
i. identity of parties,
ii. identity of subject matter, and
iii. identity of cause of action.
These requisites are fulfilled. The former judgment, Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco, is final and executory. This court had jurisdiction over the former
case, and the judgment was on the merits. Further, although the causes of action may
appear to be different, the end result would be the same: to determine the validity of
Molina's claim of ownership over the properties covered by the nullified TCT No. 124088.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. SPOUSES RUNE AND LEA

STROEM
G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015, J. Leonen
There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The Rules of Court
mandates petitioner to submit a Certification Against Forum Shopping and promptly inform
the court about the pendency of any similar action or proceeding before other courts or
Page 229 of 1553

tribunals. Failure to comply with the rule is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
Facts:
Respondents spouses Rune and Lea Stroem entered into an Owners-Contractor

Agreement with Asis-Leif & Company, Inc. (Asis-Leif) for the construction of a two-storey
house on the lot they owned.
On November 15, 1999, pursuant to the Agreement, Asis-Leif secured Performance

Bond No. LP/G(13)83056 from Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold) in which,
Stronghold and Asis-Leif, through Ms. Ma. Cynthia Asis-Leif, bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay the spouses the agreed amount in the event that the construction project
is not completed.
Eventually, Asis-Leif failed to finish the project on time despite repeated demands
of the spouses Stroem. The spouses subsequently rescinded the agreement and hired an
independent appraiser to evaluate the progress of the construction project.
On April 5, 2001, petitioner Stronghold sent a letter to Asis-Leif, requesting that the
company settle its obligations with the spouses but Asis-Leif did not reply.
On September 12, 2002, spouses Stroem filed a Complaint (with Prayer for
Preliminary Attachment) for breach of contract and for sum of money with a claim for
damages against Asis-Leif, Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif, and Stronghold.
On July 13, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment in favor of spouses
Stroem and ordered Stronghold to pay the Spouses Stroem 4,500,000.00 with 6% legal
interest from the time of first demand.
Both Stronghold and spouses Stroem appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court’s Decision with modification as to the amount of attorney’s fees.
Thus, Stronghold filed the instant petition with the Supreme Court.
Spouses Stroem argue that Stronghold deliberately committed forum shopping

when it filed the present petition despite the pendency of the respondents’ Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the CA’s Decision; thus, warranting dismissal of the case. They
alleged that petitioner received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution requiring
Comment on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration but, still, petitioner did not disclose
Page 230 of 1553

in its Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping the pendency of respondents’
Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Nonetheless, petitioner Stronghold claimed that it did not commit forum shopping
as it fully disclosed in its Petition that it sought CA’s Decision to be reviewed. It argued
that that what the rules mandate to be stated in the Certification Against Forum Shopping
is the status of “any other action.” This other action involves the same issues and parties
but is an entirely different case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Stronghold committed forum-shopping.
Ruling:
Yes, Stronghold committed forum-shopping.
There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The elements of
forum-shopping are as follows:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties represent the same interests in both
actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and,
(c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-

shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who
asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.
Meanwhile, Rule 42, Section 245 in relation to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court mandates petitioner to submit a Certification Against Forum Shopping and promptly
inform this court about the pendency of any similar action or proceeding before other
courts or tribunals. The rule’s purpose is to deter the unethical practice of pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different forums, which “wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
Page 231 of 1553

procedure.” Failure to comply with the rule is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
Here, petitioner failed to carry out its duty of promptly informing this court of any
pending action or proceeding before this court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency. Hence, this case should be dismissed.
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION vs. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY

AND MANAGEMENT, INC.,
G.R. No. 204796, February 04, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
When the complainant declared a certain address as its business address in its
complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since
changed its address or had moved out, appellant cannot be faulted for adopting the said
address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition in light of the requirement under Sections 3
and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules.
It must also be noted that in ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object
to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be made when said party
specifically objects to the service of summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not
the complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same
on the service of the complainant’s initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be
considered as an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over his person. It must be underscored
that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it is the
propriety of the trial court’s service of summons – same as the CA’s service of its resolution
indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition – which remains material to the matter
of the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the defendant’s/respondents’ person. Hence, the
Court observes that jurisdiction over the person of respondent had already been acquired by
the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation, filed by its counsel,
who, as the records would show, had consistently represented Diamond before the
proceedings in the court a quo and even before this Court.
Facts:
Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey building erected thereon.
It entered into a Contract of Lease with Diamond, who later sublet portions of the subject
property to Jollibee and Maybunga, represented by its proprietor, Andrew.
Page 232 of 1553

Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due which prompted Reicon to send a
letter demanding the payment of the accrued rentals and terminating the contract.
Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions
of property they respectively occupy.
Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon,
Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, and a certain Mary before the Regional Trial Court. By way of
special appearance, Reicon filed a motion to dismiss which was, however, denied by the
RTC.
Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules. CA , in a Resolution, required Reicon to show cause as to why its petition for
certiorari should not be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Diamond as required under Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules because it appears that the CA’s
earlier Resolution addressed to Diamond, with address at “Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire
Tower, ADB Ave., cor[.] Garnet50 Road, Ortigas Center 1605 Pasig City” was returned to it,
with the notation “RTS-Moved Out.”
Reicon, in its Compliance, stated that above stated address was Diamond’s address
on record in Civil Case No. 72319, the civil case from which the certiorari petition originated
and Diamond has not submitted any paper or pleading notifying the RTC of any change in
its address. As such, Reicon maintained that the service of its petition to Diamond’s address
as above-indicated should be deemed effective. In the alternative, it proffered that
Diamond may be served through its counsel of record in Civil Case No. 72319, Atty.
Marqueda at the latter’s office address.
Diamond, through its counsel, filed a manifestation, under a special appearance,
averring that Reicon’s petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright for its failure to
serve a copy thereof on its counsel of record, Atty. Marqueda.
CA dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition based on the following grounds: (a) non-
compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules, and (b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a
party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules.
Issue:
Whether or not Reicon’s certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon
the person of Diamond despite non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service
of the petition and with the rule on service upon a party through counsel under the Rules.
Ruling:
Yes, it was properly served.
Page 233 of 1553

A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed by

Reicon before the CA, shows that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the
registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service and/or filing of the person who filed and
served the petition via registered mail on behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of
Reicon’s certiorari petition had been served to the RTC as well as to Diamond through its
address at “Suite 305 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City,” in compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of
service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above-quoted.
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its
business address in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to
show that it had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be
faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond
in light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which merely
entails service of the petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature,
an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that
had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the
preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it
cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel.
Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that
if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel,
should not apply.
The Court further observes that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already
been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation,
filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had consistently
represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before this Court.
Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the petition, i.e., the
Resolution dated January 5, 2011 requiring Diamond to comment, was returned with the
notation “RTS-Moved Out,” the alternative mode of Diamond’s voluntary appearance was
enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over its person. Diamond cannot escape this
conclusion by invoking the convenient excuse of limiting its manifestation as a mere
“special appearance,” considering that it affirmatively sought therein the dismissal of the
certiorari petition.
Seeking an affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary
appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection,
necessitates submission to the Court’s jurisdiction. Here, Diamond’s special appearance
cannot be treated as a specific objection to the CA’s jurisdiction over its person for the
reason that the argument it pressed on was about the alleged error in the service of Reicon’s
Page 234 of 1553
certiorari petition, and not the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on
the said pleading. Properly speaking, this argument does not have anything to do with the
CA’s acquisition of jurisdiction over Diamond for it is the service of the appellate court’s
resolution indicating its initial action, and not of the certiorari petition itself, which is
material to this analysis.
In ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object to a trial court’s
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be made when said party specifically
objects to the service of summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the
complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same
on the service of the complainant’s initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be
considered as an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over his person. It must be
underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it
is the propriety of the trial court’s service of summons – same as the CA’s service of its
resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition – which remains material
to the matter of the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the defendant’s/respondents’
person.
NESTOR BRACERO vs. RODULFO ARCELO AND THE HEIRS OF VICTORIANO

MONISIT
G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015, J. Leonen
Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that “if any party has appeared
by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service
upon the party himself is ordered by the court." In the case at bar, Atty. Pilapil was furnished
a copy of the motion for execution which states that the trial court rendered a decision, yet
petitioner's counsel filed no opposition. At that time, he did not file any motion asserting
that he was not furnished a copy of the Decision. It was only when his client informed him
of the Writ of Execution did petitioner's counsel file an Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ
of Execution on the ground that he did not receive a copy of the RTC decision. The receipt
of Atty. Pilapil of a copy of the motion for execution amounts to effective official notice of
the Regional Trial Court Decision albeit he was not furnished a copy of the Decision
Facts:
The heirs of Victoriano Monisit filed a Complaint for Quieting of Titles/Ownership,

Recovery of Possession with Damages against Rodulfo Arcelo and Nestor Bracero over a
48,632-square-meter parcel of land located in Lubo, Sogod, Cebu. The Complaint stated
Page 235 of 1553

that Victoriano Monisit owned said land. The heirs of Victoriano Monisit inherited this
property upon his death and declared it under their names for tax purposes in 2002.
During Victoriano Monisit's lifetime, 5,000 square meters of the land was mortgaged
to Rodulfo Arcelo's grandmother, Damiana Mendoza. Damiana Mendoza's death was
followed by her son's death, and Rodulfo Arcelo inherited the right over the mortgaged
portion of the property. Nestor Bracero, claiming to be Rodulfo Arcelo's tenant, cultivated
this 5,000-square-meter mortgaged portion of the property.
Monisit sued Bracero for the recovery of the property he cultivated for his failure to
share the products. Bracero countered that the land he cultivated belonged to Rodulfo
Arcelo. Both complaint and counterclaim were dismissed.
Monisit died single and his legal heirs extra-judicially partitioned his properties.
Meanwhile, Bracero expanded his occupation of the mortgaged portion of the property to
the entire 48,632 square meters. He consequently drove out Victoriano Monisit's tenant
worker Salvacion Montecillo and his family.
Arcelo denied that Bracero was his tenant. He did not claim ownership of the 5,000-
square-meter portion. Nestor Bracero filed a Motion to Dismiss. The RTC denied Bracero's
Motion to Dismiss and also denied reconsideration. CA dismissed his Petition for Certiorari
and/or Prohibition and also denied reconsideration. Meanwhile, trial proceeded. On
motion by the heirs of Monisit, the RTC declared Bracero in default for failure to file an
answer.
The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Monisit. It served Bracero with a copy of its
Decision. The period to appeal lapsed. The heirs filed a motion for execution and furnished
the counsels of Bracero and Arcelo with copies. The trial court issued the Writ of Execution
on without opposition. Bracero received the Notice to Vacate on Execution. On the same
day, his counsel Atty. Pilapil filed the Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution on
the ground that counsel was not furnished a copy of the RTC. The RTC denied Urgent
Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC. Hence, Bracero
filed this Petition. Atty. Pilapil alleges that even if the motion for execution indicated that
he was furnished a copy, he never received such copy. Respondent heirs did not present a
post office certification to prove they furnished counsel with a copy. Assuming he received
a copy of this motion, he still could not have filed an opposition since petitioner was
declared in default and had lost standing to file any motion. He also could not have
appealed the Regional Trial Court Decision since he was not furnished with a copy.
Page 236 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the receipt of Atty. Pilapil of a copy of the motion for execution
amounts to effective official notice of the Regional Trial Court Decision albeit he was not
furnished a copy of the Decision
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that “if any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them,
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court."Notice sent directly to client
is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule admits of exceptions. In Santiago, this court
considered the filing of a motion for reconsideration as actual notice of the assailed
Decision: The petitioners also maintain that they should have first been furnished with a
copy of the final decision before a writ of execution could be validly enforced against them.
Formal service of the judgment is indeed necessary as a rule but not, as it happens, in the
case at bar. The reason is that the petitioners had filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of Judge Guadiz, which would indicate that they were then already informed of
such decision. The petitioners cannot now invoke due process on the basis of a feigned
ignorance as the lack of formal notice cannot prevail against the fact of actual notice.
Atty. Pilapil was furnished a copy of the motion for execution on September 11,
2009. This motion states that the trial court rendered its Decision on April 16, 2009, yet
petitioner's counsel filed no opposition. At that time, he did not file any motion asserting
that he was not furnished a copy of the Decision. It was only on January 8, 2010 when his
client informed him of the Writ of Execution did petitioner's counsel file an Urgent Motion
to Vacate the Writ of Execution on the ground that he did not receive a copy of the RTC
decision. The explanation of petitioner's counsel that his client only finished Grade 6 and
lives in a remote mountain barangay fails to convince. Petitioner immediately informed his
counsel about the Notice to Vacate on Execution on the same day he was served a copy.
This contradicts counsel's explanation implying difficulty in communicating with his
client. This even raises the possibility that his client did immediately inform him about the
RTC Decision upon receiving a copy.
This court has held that "relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence." Petitioner, through his counsel, did not file an answer to the Complaint. After
the trial court declared petitioner in default for failure to file an answer, his counsel did not
file an opposition to or motion to lift the Order declaring him in default. After petitioner's
counsel was furnished a copy of the motion for execution, he did not immediately file an
Page 237 of 1553
opposition to the motion or raise the ground that he was not furnished a copy of the
Decision.
Petitioner Nestor Bracero, through his counsel Atty. Danilo Pilapil, had several
opportunities to argue his position before the courts but failed to take them. Petitioner
should now be considered in estoppel from assailing the Regional Trial Court Order dated
February 11, 2010 denying petitioner's Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Also, "[t]o frustrate the winning party's right through
dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the] courts, which
thereby increases the costs of litigation."
PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC
G.R. NO. 171590, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
Non-payment of docket fees is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims

interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof,
this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the docket
fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer,
the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. The
counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are a sic
permissive counterclaims.
Facts:
On March 21, 1994, Bignay filed Civil Case No. 94-1129 for breach of warranty against
eviction under Articles 1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with damages, against Union Bank
and Robles. Union Bank interposed a Motion to Dismiss grounded on lack of or failure to
state a cause of action, claiming that it made no warranties in favor of Bignay when it sold
the property to the latter. The RTC deferred the resolution of the motion on finding that
the ground relied upon did not appear to be indubitable.
Union Bank thus filed its Answer Ad Cautelam, where it alleged that Bignay was not an
innocent purchaser for value. It interposed a counterclaim as well, grounded on two
promissory notes signed by Siy in favor of the bank – 1) Promissory Note No. 90-1446 dated
December 20, 1990 for the amount of P1.5 million payable on demand with annual interest
of 33%, and 2) Promissory Note No. 91-0286 dated February 26, 1991 for the amount of P2
million payable on demand with annual interest of 30% – which resulted in outstanding
Page 238 of 1553
liabilities, inclusive of interest and penalties, in the total amount of more than P10.4 million
as of December 20, 1996.
Evidence for the main action and for the counterclaim were received by the trial court. The
RTC held that Bignay was entitled to the return of the value of the, as well as the cost of
the building erected thereon, since Union Bank acted in bad faith. At the same time, the
trial court held that the bank’s counterclaim was not at all connected with Bignay’s
Complaint, which makes it a permissive counterclaim for which the docket fees should
accordingly be paid. Since the bank did not pay the docket fees, the trial court held that it
did not acquire jurisdiction over its counterclaim; thus, it dismissed the same.
The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment ordering Bignay to pay Union Bank the principal
amounts due under the promissory notes plus the stipulated interests and stipulated
penalty charges from date of maturity of the loans until full payment thereof. The CA held
that Union Bank timely paid the docket fees at the time it filed its Answer Ad Cautelam as
shown by official receipts to such effect and the rubberstamped mark on the face of the
answer itself. It added that since the trial court received the bank’s evidence on the
counterclaim during trial, it should have made a ruling thereon. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the court can dismiss permissive counterclaims in the event of non-payment of
docket fees for the said counterclaims
Held:
Bignay correctly observes that if the bank indeed paid the docket fees therefor, the trial
court would have so held in its March 21, 2000 Decision; yet in its judgment, the trial court
specifically declared that the docket fees remained unpaid at the time of its writing.
Anent the counterclaims interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of
money adverted earlier hereof [sic], this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same
as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were
denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected
with the plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently from the
plaintiff’s complaint hence they are a [sic] permissive counterclaims. During the pre-trial,
this Court had already ruled that the counterclaims were permissive yet the records showed
that defendant had not paid the docket fees. This Court therefore has not acquired
jurisdiction over said case.
Page 239 of 1553

And if it is true that the bank paid the docket fees on its counterclaim as early as in 1994, it
would have vigorously insisted on such fact after being apprised of the trial court’s March
21, 2000 Decision. It is indeed surprising that the supposed payment was never raised by
the bank in a timely motion for reconsideration, considering that the trial court dismissed
its counterclaim; if there is any opportune time to direct the court’s attention to such
payment and cause the counterclaim to be reinstated, it was at that point and no other. All
it had to do was prove payment by presenting to the court the official receipts or any other
acceptable documentary evidence, and thus secure the proper reversal of the ruling on its
counterclaim. Still, nothing was heard from the bank on the issue, until it filed its brief with
the CA on appeal. Indeed, "whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge,
observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance."
More than the above, this Court finds true and credible the trial court's express declaration
that no docket fees have been paid on the bank's counterclaim; the trial court's
pronouncement enjoys the presumption of regularity. Indeed, the sudden appearance of
the receipts supposedly evidencing payment of the "docket fees is highly questionable and
irregular, and deserves to be thoroughly investigated; the actuations of the bank relative
thereto go against the common experience of mankind, if they are not entirely anomalous.
ALONZO GIPA, IMELDA MARO LLANO, JUANITO LUDOVICE, VIRGILIO GOJIT,

DEMAR BIT ANGCOR, FELIPE MONTALBAN AND DAISY M. PLACER vs.
SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE AS REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT FOR
OPERATIONS AND CORPORATE SECRETARY, RUBEN G. ASUNCION
G.R. No.177425, June 18, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The Court may only grant liberal application of technical rules to the party seeking
the same only on meritorious grounds and upon proof. The full payment of docket fees is
mandatory to perfect an appeal and the rules on payment may only be relaxed after the party
has proven that a valid ground exists to warrant the liberal application of the rules, otherwise,
the appeal shall be dismissed despite payment of a substantial amount.
Facts:
Southern Luzon Institute (SLI), an educational institution filed a complaint for

recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Alonzo Gipa and Rosita
Montalban et al. During trial, defendant Rosita executed a Special Power of Attorney in
favor of her sister Daisy M. Placer (Placer) authorizing the latter to represent her in the
case and to sign any and all papers in relation thereto.
SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by an Original
Certificate of Title. However, Gipa and Motalban et.al who had been informally occupying
Page 240 of 1553
a portion of the said property refused to vacate the same despite demand. They contended
that they have the right to stay on the said property relying on their occupation thereof and
that of their predecessors-in-interest which, according to them, dates back to as early as
1950 and that SLI had not even for a single moment taken possession of the subject property
and was merely able to procure a title over the same thru fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation.
The RTC ruled in favor of SLI holding that Gipa and Montalban et al. filed Revocable
Permit Applications over the same property which were denied on March 4, 1964, precisely
because the areas applied for were already included as SLI’s.
Gipa and Montalban et al appealed to the CA which dismissed the same on the
ground of failure to pay appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees. In a motion for
reconsideration, Gipa et al showed that they have paid the docket fees and the motion was
granted by the CA. However, the court directed them to pay the P30.00 research fee and
Gipa et al failed to comply after the lapse of nine months. As a result, the CA dismissed the
appeal. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the appeal by the CA was proper despite the fact
that the appeal fee was paid and only the meager amount of P30.00 was left unsettled
Ruling:
Yes, the dismissal is proper.
Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory
and jurisdictional and relaxation of the rule on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in
this case. Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the
record on appeal. (Emphases supplied)
In Gonzales v. Pe, the Court’s explanation anent the requirement of full payment of
docket and other lawful fees under the above-quoted provision was iterated, viz:
Page 241 of 1553

In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same

ruling, the Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4
of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must
be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk
of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The
requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment
of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection
of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed
by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the
non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount
of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In
both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the CA
at the outset. It may be recalled that while petitioners paid a substantial part of the docket
fees, they still failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment was short
of P30.00.Based on the premise that the questioned Decision of the RTC has already
become final and executory due to non-perfection, the CA could have dismissed the appeal
outright. But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of P30.00 was lacking and
considering that the CA may opt not to proceed with the case until the docket fees are
paid, it still required petitioners, even if it was already beyond the reglementary period, to
complete their payment of the appeal fee within 10 days from notice. Clearly, the CA acted
conformably with the pronouncement made in Camposagrado, a case cited by petitioners,
that "[a] party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period
confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal.
The CA’s leniency over petitioners’ cause did not end there. Although they were given only
10 days to remit the P30.00 deficiency, the said court allowed an even longer period of nine
months to lapse, apparently in the hope that petitioners’ compliance would be on its way.
Page 242 of 1553

But as no payment was remitted, it was constrained to finally dismiss the appeal for non-
perfection.
Suffice it to say that "[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of

procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately
explain his failure to abide by the rules." Those who seek exemption from the application
of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason
warranting such departure. Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as to why they
failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same within the period
allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on the
payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted.
SUMMONS
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA vs.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO
G.R. NO. 185145, FEBRUARY 5, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand
is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied
in Section 6, Rule 25.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that
a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most
likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the
witness stand as its witness. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written
interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the
calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the
stand. Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or
harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or
bungling its own case. In the case, Metrobank’s officers were sought to be presented by the
petitioner as its initial witness and to present documents in the possession of Metrobank,
which move cannot be allowed in the petitioner’s presentation of its evidence-in-chief.
Facts:
Petitioners, spouses Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage,

foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against
respondents Metrobank and Ortega. Upon the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a
Page 243 of 1553
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s

officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006
hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative
to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and
sale of petitioners’ land. With this, Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that the Motion
must be denied for lack of proper notice of hearing as it is a litigated motion. Petitioners
replied by stating that the lack of proper notice was cured by Metrobank’s filing of
Opposition, hence the defect may be ignored.
The RTC denied petitioner Motion. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
Subsequently, petition for certiorari was raised to the CA, which it later on dismissed
holding that petitioners’ Motion is a litigated motion that requires a proper notice of
hearing to the parties specifying the date and time of hearing, as contained under Section
4 and 5 of Rule 15. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Hence, the present Petition.
Issue:
Whether the request by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other
parties to the action.
Ruling:
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is
not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied
in Section 6, Rule 25.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays;
it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a
party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most
likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the
witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or
an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written
interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s
testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling
party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information
useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery,
then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its
Page 244 of 1553

own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony,
which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may
limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or
harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or
harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or
bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own
in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court
practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases.
Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court’s precious
time, if not pointless entertainment.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as
their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as
part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be
allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to
present Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the
principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents – as
their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary
evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole
case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on
petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own
evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its
own defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure
of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served
written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice
and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to
prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do.
Nena C. Ang, et al. vs. China Trust Commercial Bank Corporation and the Asia
Debt Fund
G.R. No. 200693, April 18, 2016
Immediate resort to substituted service was unwarranted for failure to establish the
impossibility of personal service.
Page 245 of 1553

FACTS:
On October 11, 2006, respondent Chinatrust (Philippines) Banking Corporation

(Chinatrust) filed a money claim against Nation Petroleum Corporation (Nation) and
petitioners. The Sheriff issued an Officer’s Return claiming that summons had validly been
served via substituted service upon Nation’s property supply custodian. Nation entered a
Special Appearance with a Motion to Dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that
the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over Nation because service of summons was made
on Charlotte Magpayo, a mere property supply custodian, and the process server
improperly resorted to substituted service and failed to comply with its strict requirements.
ISSUE:
Whether the substituted service of summons was valid
RULING:
Immediate resort to substituted service was unwarranted for failure to establish the
impossibility of personal service. Thus, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
petitioners for failure to comply with the rules on substituted service under Rule 14, Section
8.
1. The impossibility of prompt personal service was not established. The server must
have made at least three attempts on two different dates within a reasonable period
of one month before substituted service becomes available. The return stated that
the process server and the assisting sheriffs made two attempts at personal service
on the morning and the afternoon of October 30, 2006. The server claims that in
between the two attempts, he made diligent efforts to locate the whereabouts of the
other defendants outside their office. The process server only made two attempts at
Nation’s office and both attempts were made on the same date. He did not even
attempt to serve the defendants at their homes.. This does not establish the
impossibility of personal service within a reasonable period of time; this only shows
a halfhearted attempt that hardly satisfies the diligence and best efforts required
from a serving officer.
Without the narration of the particular efforts, the courts cannot sufficiently
conclude whether or not the efforts taken were, in fact, diligent. While defendants
are expected to avoid and evade service of summons, a serving officer is likewise
expected to be resourceful.
Page 246 of 1553

2. A property custodian is not a competent person in charge of the defendant’s

workplace. A “competent person in charge” refers to one managing the office or the
business, such as the president, manager, or the officer-in-charge. The rule
presupposes the existence of a relation of confidence between such person and the
defendant. Service here was made on Charlotte Magpayo, a Property Custodian at
Nation Petroleum. Her position denotes limited responsibility to office equipment,
inventory, and supplies. Chinatrust did not submit any evidence that Magpayo’s job
description includes the management of Nation Petroleum’s Makati office.
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT

G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016 [Mendoza, J.]
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court

jurisdiction over the defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or
defect in the service of summons may be cured by the defendant’s subsequent voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an
answer. In this case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective
summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary appearance.
FACTS:
Gacott filed a complaint for damages against Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) and
the latter’s employee, Rey Medestomas (Medestomas). Summons was served upon QSC and
Medestomas, after which they filed their Answer. QSC and Medestomas did not present
any evidence during the trial.
RTC decided in favour of Gacott. The decision became final as QSC and Medestomas did
not interpose an appeal. Gacott then secured a Writ of Execution. During the execution
stage, Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but was in fact a general partnership
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the articles of
partnership, petitioner Guy was appointed as General Manager of QSC.
The Sheriff attached Guy’s vehicle prompting Guy to file a Motion to Lift Attachment,
arguing that he was not a judgment debtor and, therefore, his vehicle could not be attached.
The RTC issued an order denying Guy’s motion. Not satisfied, Guy moved for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion. He argued that he was neither impleaded as a
defendant nor validly served with summons and, thus, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person. The motion was denied by the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling.
Page 247 of 1553

ISSUE:
Whether or not jurisdiction over the person of the partnership was not acquired because
the summons was never served upon it or through any of its authorized office.
RULING:
NO.
While the service of summons was flawed, voluntary appearance cured the defect.
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant
is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines
with a juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive
enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities.
In this case, QSC was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of
the enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons
upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial
compliance is not sufficient service of summons. The CA was obviously mistaken when it
opined that it was immaterial whether the summons to QSC was served on the theory that
it was a corporation.
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction
over the defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the
service of summons may be cured by the defendant’s subsequent voluntary submission to
the court’s jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this
case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus,
jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary appearance.
CATHAY METAL CORPORATION vs. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE

COOPERATIVE, INC.,
G.R. No. 172204, July 10, 2014, J. Leonen
Cathay Metal argued that Laguna West was sufficiently served with summons and a
copy of its petition for cancellation of annotations because it allegedly sent these documents
Page 248 of 1553

to Laguna West's official address as registered with the Cooperative Development Authority.
Cathay Metal further argued that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the Cooperative Code
with respect to notices because the Cooperative Code is substantive law, as opposed to the
Rules of Procedure, which pertains only to matters of procedure. The Court ruled that the
Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as
administered by the Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are not procedural
rules that will govern court processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives
to have an official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take
the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding.
Facts:
Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative entered into a joint venture agreement

with farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in Silang,
Cavite. While Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative was negotiating with the farmer-
beneficiaries, Cathay Metal Corporation entered into Irrevocable Exclusive Right to Buy
(IERB) contracts with the same farmer-beneficiaries. Under the IERB, the farmer-
beneficiaries committed themselves to sell to Cathay Metal their agricultural properties
upon conversion to industrial or commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of
prohibition from transferring title to the properties. As a result, Laguna West caused the
annotation of its adverse claim on the farmer-beneficiaries’ certificates of title.
On November 9, 1998, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an order

converting the properties from agricultural to mixed use. In 1999, Cathay Metal and the
farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of sale of the properties. Transfer certificates of
title were also issued in the name of Cathay Metal in the same year.
Cathay Metal filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on its
transfer certificates of title with the Regional Trial Court. It served a copy of the petition by
registered mail to Laguna West's alleged official address at “Barangay Mayapa, Calamba,
Laguna.” The petition was returned to sender because Laguna West could not be found at
that address. The postman issued a certification stating that the reason for the return was
that the “cooperative [was] not existing.” Since no one received the summons, Cathay Metal
insisted that the trial court issue an order to effect substituted service.
Later, Orlando dela Peña and Mr. Geriberto Dragon, claiming to be officers of the
cooperative, filed manifestation and motion purportedly on behalf of Laguna West. They
claimed that Laguna West was already holding office at No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc,
Calamba, Laguna.
Page 249 of 1553

Cathay Metal argued that summons could only be validly served to Laguna West's
official address as indicated in its registration with the Cooperative Development
Authority. This is because Laguna West as a registered cooperative is governed by Republic
Act No. 6938, a substantive law that requires summons to be served to respondent’s official
address. Substantive law takes precedence over procedural rules.
Laguna West was unable to appear at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration
of the court order allowing it to file its answer or opposition. Within the period allowed
for Laguna West file its petition for certiorari, the trial court rendered judgment granting
Cathay Metal's petition to cancel the annotations of adverse claims on the title.
Laguna West appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court remanded the
case to the lower court so that Laguna West could be allowed to present evidence. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative was properly served
with summons or notices of the hearing on the petition for cancellation of annotations of
adverse claim on the properties
Ruling:
No. The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only in
this court. Article VIII, Section 5(5) provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Page 250 of 1553

This means that on matters relating to procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of
Procedure that will govern. Proper court procedures shall be determined by the Rules as
promulgated by this court.
Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special

proceeding is court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure.
The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’

activities as administered by the Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are
not procedural rules that will govern court processes. A Cooperative Code provision
requiring cooperatives to have an official address to which all notices and communications
shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court
concerning a court proceeding.
This is not to say that the notices cannot be sent to cooperatives in accordance with
the Cooperative Code. Notices may be sent to a cooperative’s official address. However,
service of notices sent to the official address in accordance with the Cooperative Code may
not be used as a defense for violations of procedures, specially when such violation affects
another party’s rights.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of summons
upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only
through its officers.
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
The Court already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is

exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in
Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons.
This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers’ places of residence
or offices. If summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences
or offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.
Hence, Cathay Metal cannot use Laguna West failure to amend its Articles of
Incorporation to reflect its new address as an excuse from sending or attempting to send
to respondent copies of the petition and the summons. The Rules of Court provides that
Page 251 of 1553

notices should be sent to the enumerated officers. Cathay Metal failed to do this. No notice
was ever sent to any of the enumerated officers.
Cathay Metal insists that it should not be made to inquire further as to the
whereabouts of respondent after the attempt to serve the summons by registered mail to
Laguna West's address as allegedly indicated in its Articles of Incorporation. The Rules does
not provide that it needs to do so. However, it provides for service by publication. Service
by publication is available when the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown. Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. – In
any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.
This is not a matter of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of respondent since
this is an action in rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person is not required as
long as there is jurisdiction over the res. This case involves the issue of fair play and
ensuring that parties are accorded due process.
In this case, Cathay Metal served summons upon respondent by registered mail and,
allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in respondent’s Certificate of
Registration. Summons was not served upon Laguna West's officers. It was also not
published in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a result, Laguna West was not given
an opportunity to present evidence, and Cathay Metal was able to obtain from the Regional
Trial Court an order cancelling Laguna West's annotations of adverse claims.
Laguna West was, therefore, not validly served with summons.
PRUDENTIAL BANK (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) as the duly appointed
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JULIANA DIEZ VDA. DE GABRIEL
vs. AMADOR A. MAGDAMIT, JR., on his behalf and as substituted heir (son) of
AMADOR MAGDAMIT, SR., and AMELIA F. MAGDAMIT, as substituted heir
(Widow) of AMADOR MAGDAMIT, SR.
G.R. No. 183795, November 12, 2014, J. Perez
In actions in personam such as ejectment, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. Before
substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility
Page 252 of 1553

of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular
place of business of the defendant. The readily acceptable conclusion in this case is that the
process server at once resorted to substituted service of summons without exerting enough
effort to personally serve summons on respondents. In the case at bar, the Returns contained
mere general statements that efforts at personal service were made. Not having specified the
details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, there
was a failure to comply strictly with all the requirements of substituted service, and as a result
the service of summons is rendered ineffective.
Facts:
This is a case of unlawful detainer filed by petitioner Prudential Bank its capacity as
administrator of the Estate of Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel (Estate). It is based on the
ground of respondents’ failure to pay rentals and refusal to vacate the subject property,
which is allegedly part of the Estate. In the Original Complaint filed before the MeTC,
Prudential Bank impleaded Amador A. Magdamit, Jr. (Magdamit, Jr.), as respondent.
Instead of filing an Answer, Magdamit, Jr. filed a Notice of Special Appearance with Motion
to Dismiss. Among others, Magdamit, Jr. argued that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person because the summons was served at his former address. Prudential Bank
then filed an Amended Complaint, this time, impleading both Magdamit, Jr. and Amador
Magdamit, Sr. (Magdamit, Sr.).
In response to the Amended Complaint, both Magdamit, Jr. and Magdamit, Sr. filed
their Answers separately. Magdamit, Jr., filed his Answer with Counterclaim (In a Special
Appearance Capacity). Magdamit, Sr. argued that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person because the summons was not properly served as the summons was
received by Madel Magalona, who is not authorized to receive summons being a mere
housemaid of Magdamit, Sr.’s daughter, Arleen Marie Cabug. Pending litigation of the case,
Magdamit, Jr., who was made an original defendant in the MeTC, substituted his deceased
father, Magdamit, Sr.
Issue:
Whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents.
Ruling:
No.
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Defect in the Service of Summons
In actions in personam such as ejectment, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However,
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal
service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled
right to resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted service of summons
is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant;
and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business
of the defendant.
The service of summons on Magdamit, Sr. failed to comply with the rule laid down
in Manotoc. The resort to substituted service after just two (2) attempts to personally serve
the summons on Magdamit, Sr., is premature under our pronouncement that: For
substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts"
means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. Worse, the Return
also to Magdamit, Jr. did not make mention of any attempt to serve the summons at the
actual residence of Magdamit, Jr. The Return merely expressed a general statement that the
sheriff exerted efforts to serve the summons and that the same was futile, "that on several
occasions despite diligent (sic) efforts exerted to serve the said processes personally to
defendant/s herein the same proved futile," without any statement on the impossibility of
service of summons within a reasonable time. Further, the summons was served on a
certain Dara Cabug, a person not of suitable age and discretion, who is unauthorized to
receive the same.
The readily acceptable conclusion in this case is that the process server at once
resorted to substituted service of summons without exerting enough effort to personally
serve summons on respondents. In the case at bar, the Returns contained mere general
statements that efforts at personal service were made. Not having specified the details of
the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, there was a
failure to comply strictly with all the requirements of substituted service, and as a result
the service of summons is rendered ineffective.
Filing of Answer Did Not Amount to Voluntary Appearance
Section 20, Rule14 of the Rules of Court clearly states:
Page 254 of 1553

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
However, such is not the case at bar. Contrary to Prudential Banks’s contention,
respondents are not deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by
virtue of filing an Answer or other appropriate responsive pleadings and by participating
in the case. Jurisprudence holds that filing of an answer in a special appearance
(Appearance to challenge, among others the court’s jurisdiction) cannot be construed as
voluntary appearance or submission to the court’s jurisdiction:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in
court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This,
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates
as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e.,
set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or
motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
Parallel to Jurisprudence, the respondents’ act of filing their respective Answers with
express reservation should not be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of the
MeTC over their person because of non-service/defective/improper service of summons
and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, sans voluntary submission to
the court’s jurisdiction, filing an answer in compliance with the rules on summary
procedure in lieu of obtaining an adverse summary judgment does not amount to voluntary
submission. As we already held, a party who makes a special appearance in court,
challenging the jurisdiction of said court, is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. It should not be construed as voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Page 255 of 1553

AURORA N. DE PEDRO vs. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014, J. Leonen
Regardless of the type of action — whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem —

the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of
substituted service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and a
showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The
sheriff’s return, which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and
on this basis, the court may allow substituted service. Should the sheriff’s return be wanting
of these details, substituted service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve
summons was presented. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance.
Facts:
This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and
original certificates of title, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is De
Pedro Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro). The complaints were filed by Respondent Romasan
Development Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on July 7, 1998.
Romasan filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication. The
Regional Trial Court granted the motion. The summons and the complaint were published
in People’s Balita on its April 24, May 1, and May 8, 1998 issues.
Romasan moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in

default for failure to file their answers. Romasan also moved to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The Regional Trial Court granted the motions.
The Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free
patents issued to all defendants in Romasan’s complaint, including the free patent issued
to De Pedro.
Accordingly the Court declares as a nullity the following titles and Free Patents
issued to the Defendants.
De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion for new
trial. De Pedro argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person because of improper and defective service of summons. Citing the officer’s return
dated February 22, 1999, De Pedro pointed out that summons was not personally served
Page 256 of 1553

upon her “for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their (sic)
is no person in the said given address.”
De Pedro also argued that the case should have been dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia. She alleged that there was a pending civil case filed by her, involving the same
property, when Romasan filed the complaints against her and several others. The Regional
Trial Court issued an order denying De Pedro’s motion for new trial.
De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the
Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for
new trial.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed
the denial of De Pedro’s motion for new trial.
De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied. De Pedro elevated the case to
this court, but this was likewise denied for failure to pay the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary and sheriff’s fees.
De Pedro filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having
been dispossessed of her property without due process. The Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision denying De Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment. De Pedro’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
De Pedro filed before this Court a Rule 45 petition, seeking the reversal of the Court
of Appeals decision denying De Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment and the Court
of Appeals resolution denying De Pedro’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of De Pedro Aurora N. De Pedro; and
2. Whether or not filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from
filing a petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
Page 257 of 1553

The sheriff’s return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve
summons upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by
publication is availed.
The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the
summons personally upon De Pedro is a deviation from this court’s previous rulings that
personal service is the preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or
her return the efforts made to effect personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case
was defective. No substituted service or service by publication will be allowed based on
such defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due

process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would
have been dismissible had De Pedro learned about the case while trial was pending. At
that time, a motion to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have
been the proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment.
De Pedro learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of
filing an action for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial
without alleging any proper ground.
De Pedro insisted in her motion for new trial that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person. She did not allege that fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence impaired her rights. Neither did she allege that she found newly discovered
evidence that could have altered the trial court decision. When her motion for new trial
was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari, insisting that her motion for new trial should
have been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege any ground for new trial. The court
cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of Appeals for this denial because, indeed,
lack of jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a new trial.
What cannot be denied is the fact that De Pedro was already notified of respondent’s
action for annulment of De Pedro’s title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a
petition for certiorari. At that time, De Pedro was deemed, for purposes of due process, to
have been properly notified of the action involving her title to the property. Lack of
jurisdiction could have already been raised in an action for annulment of judgment.
Thus, when De Pedro erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for
certiorari instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have
voluntarily participated in the proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she
Page 258 of 1553

chose to avail bound her. De Pedro’s failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at
this time was fatal to her cause. The court cannot conclude now that she was denied due
process
De Pedro is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.
In this case, De Pedro’s main grounds for filing the action for annulment are lack of
jurisdiction over her person, and litis pendentia. These are the same grounds that were
raised in the motion for new trial filed before and denied by the Regional Trial Court.
The Court of Appeals did not err in denying De Pedro’s petition for annulment of
the Regional Trial Court’s judgment. De Pedro had already filed a motion for new trial and
petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction as ground.
De Pedro’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a
motion for new trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent
to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies
provided by law.
This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its
application, and stated in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment
cannot be invoked when other remedies had already been availed.
Litigation must end sometime. It is essential to an effective and efficient

administration of justice that, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party should
not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that undesirable result. Thus, the court deems it fit to finally put
an end to the present controversy.
Thus, an action for annulment of judgment “will not so easily and readily lend itself
to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments.” De Pedro cannot abuse the court’s
processes to revive a case that has already been rendered final against her favor, for the
purpose of securing a favorable judgment. An action for annulment of judgment cannot
be used by De Pedro who has lost her case through fault of her own, to make “a complete
farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.”
SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUE vs. RAMON ONG

Page 259 of 1553

Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is
served. A defendant’s address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant.
What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the
defendant, not the locus of service.
Facts:
On December 21, 2009, respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the Regional Trial
Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, a complaint for accion reivindicatoria. Ong charged the
Spouses Manuel with having constructed improvements — through force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly owned.
On January 19, 2010, Ong filed an "amended complaint." On February 3, 2010,

summons was issued directed to the Spouses Manuel.
On April 23, 2010, Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the
Spouses Manuel in default. Per the sheriff’s return on summons, on February 12, 2010,
Sheriff Joselito Sales, along with Ong’s counsel, Atty. Christopher Donaal, and a certain
Federico Laureano, attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their
address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. The Spouses Manuel, however,
requested that service be made at another time considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's
mother was then critically ill. The sheriff’s return further indicates that on March 16, 2010,
another attempt at personal service was made. After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally
explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and the complaint, the
latter refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was
thus prompted to merely tender the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel
and to advise her to file their answer within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses Manuel failed
to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that they be declared in default.
The Regional Trial Court issued an order granting Ong's motion to declare the
Spouses Manuel in default. Following this, Ong moved for the ex parte presentation of
evidence, which the Regional Trial Court granted.
On September 13, 2010, the Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default.
They alleged that it is the siblings of petitioner Sandra Manuel who resided in Lower
Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet. Thus,
summons could not have been properly served on them in the former address. They
surmised that Ong and his companions mistook petitioner Sandra Manuel’s siblings as the
defendants. They further claimed that they only subsequently received via registered mail
Page 260 of 1553

copies of (1) a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and (2) the Regional Trial Court’s
order scheduling the ex parte presentation of evidence. Attached to the Spouses Manuel’s
motion to lift order of default was their answer.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default.
It noted that, first, their motion was not sworn to, as required by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and, second, they did not show that their failure to timely file an answer "was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence." Furthermore, the Regional Trial
Court denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, the Spouses Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Spouses Manuel’s Rule 65 petition for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants was validly acquired.
2. Whether the Spouses Manuel may be granted relief from the Regional Trial
Court’s June 28, 2010 order of default.
Ruling:
1. Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582 —
the Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel — was validly acquired. This is so because
personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff
Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010.
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall

be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule

14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its
alternative — substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section 7:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
Page 261 of 1553

effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
In this case, the sheriff’s return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales
endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses
Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the first occasion in
deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra Manuel’s mother. On the second
occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons and copy of the complaint as
petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them.
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the
sheriff’s return but claimed that no valid service of summons was made. They claimed that
they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of
summons was made. From this, they surmised that the "Sandra Manuel" who was
specifically identified in the sheriff’s return was someone other than petitioner Sandra
Manuel.
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address.

Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served.
A defendant’s address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant
(albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is
determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant,
not the locus of service.
2. The Spouses Manuel are not entitled to relief from the order of default
As valid service of summons was made on them, it was incumbent upon the Spouses
Manuel, pursuant to Rule 11, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to file their
answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so, they were rightly
declared to be in default.
Rule 9, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for when a party to
an action may be declared in default. Further, Rule 9, Section 3(b) governs the grant of
relief from orders of default:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.— If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
Page 262 of 1553

defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief
as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to
submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of

subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.
(b)Relief from order of default.— A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default
upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
interest of justice.
Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 3, a court may proceed to render judgment as the

pleading may warrant should a defendant fail to timely file his or her answer. However, a
court may decline from immediately rendering judgment and instead require the plaintiff
to present evidence. Per Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party declared to be in default shall
nevertheless be "entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings," although he or she may no
longer take part in the trial.
As explained in Spouses Delos Santos v. Carpio, "there are three requirements which
must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending
party in default:
(1) the claiming party must filea motion asking the court to declare the defending
party in default;
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default;
(3) the claiming party must provethat the defending party has failed to answer
within the period provided by the Rule."
All these requisites were complied with by respondent Ramon Ong.
It is not disputed that Ong filed a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default.
It is also not disputed that the latter filed their answer after the fifteen-day period, counted
from March 16, 2010, had lapsed. The Spouses Manuel only filed their answer along with
their motion to lift order of default on September 13, 2010.
Page 263 of 1553

It is similarly settled that the Spouses Manuel were notified that a motion to declare
them in default had been filed. They acknowledged in the present petition for certiorari
that on June 23, 2010, Ong filed a compliance to the Regional Trial Court’s April 30, 2010
order that required the submission of the registry return card evidencing the mailing to the
Spouses Manuel of a copy of the motion to have them declared in default.
Not only were the requisites for declaring a party in default satisfied, the Spouses
Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was also shown to be procedurally infirm.
In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift
order of default was not made under oath. We add that this motion was not accompanied
by an affidavit of merit specifying the facts which would show that their non-filing of an
answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2010 was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence.
Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of
merits, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It
is not even worthy of consideration.
Certainly, there is jurisprudence to the effect that an affidavit of merit is not

necessary "where a motion to lift an order of default is grounded on the very root of the
proceedings [such as] where the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
defendants. Similarly, there is jurisprudence stating that "when a motion to lift an order of
default contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the facts constituting the
prospective defense of the defendant and it is sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal
verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is necessary."
However, in this case, the Spouses Manuel failed not only in attaching an affidavit
of merit but also in making their motion under oath. They are, therefore, left without any
alternative on which to rest. Their motion is utterly ineffectual.
Apart from their failure to make their motion to lift order of default under oath and
to attach to it an affidavit of merit, the Court of Appeals also noted that the Spouses Manuel
set their motion to lift order of default for hearing on the same date that they filed it(i.e.,
September 13, 2010). Thus, they also violated Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that service of a motion upon an adverse party must be made in
such a manner that ensures receipt by the latter "at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing. . . ."
Page 264 of 1553

YUK LING ONG vs. BENJAMIN T. CO

Substituted service of summons require that the process server should first make
several attempts on personal service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts
were unsuccessful. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made
to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of
defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service. These matters must be clearly and
specifically described in the Return of Summons. Thus, where the server’s return utterly lacks
sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the
summons on Ong, a defendant in a case for nullity of marriage; that the return did not
describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of Ong, and that her
husband, the respondent, failed to indicate any portion of the records which would describe
the specific attempts to personally serve the summons, then the substituted service was
invalid and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Ong. Co cannot rely on
the presumption of regularity on the part of the process server when, like in the instant case,
it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is defective.
Facts:
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, received in 2008 a subpoena
from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation directing her to appear before the said
agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation
proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.
Upon appearance before the BID, she was furnished copies of petitions for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Co, and an RTC decision in Civil
Case No. 02-0306 dated December 11, 2002, which declared the marriage void ab initio. The
documents showed that in April 26, 2001, Co filed the first petition, and on July 19, 2002,
Co filed the second petition, stating that Ong’s address was at 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2
Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In his
Server’s Return, the process server stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of
summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve
the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa,
a security officer.
Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA on the ground of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, claiming that she was never notified of the cases
Page 265 of 1553

filed. The CA denied the petition, holding among others that the service of summons was
valid.
Issue:
Was there an invalid substituted service of summons?
Ruling:
Petition granted.
In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her
person because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the
defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary
appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can
be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and
7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous

requirements of a substituted service of summons, in part: "Several attempts" means at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must
cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. These
matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
There are cases, however, in which Manotoc was applied, but, nevertheless, it was
ruled that there was no lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In Sagana v.
Francisco, the diligent efforts exerted by the sheriff to locate the respondent were
determined, not only based on the sheriff's return, but also on the process server's notation
and case records. In the case of Wong v. Factor-Koyama, on the other hand, even if the
sheriff performed an invalid substituted service of summons, jurisdiction over the person
of defendant was obtained because the latter had actively participated in trial, amounting
to a voluntary appearance under Section 20 of Rule 14.
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was issued on July 29,
2002. In his server’s return, the process server resorted to substituted service of summons
on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted
service of summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons.
Page 266 of 1553

The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the
process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a
general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the
personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were
made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if
there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case.
These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified
in the return to justify substituted service.
The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons,
on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly
Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.” It did not expound
on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Also, aside from the server’s return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the
records which would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the summons.
Respondent did not even claim that petitioner made any voluntary appearance and actively
participated in Civil Case No. 02-0306.
The CA likewise erred in ruling that the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty could be applied in the case at bench. This presumption of
regularity, however, was never intended to be applied even in cases where there are no
showing of substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure. Such
presumption does not apply where it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is
defective. As earlier explained, the server's return did not comply with the stringent
requirements of substituted service of summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not
inclined to uphold the CA's denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service
of summons. Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and
void.
MOTIONS
MAGELLAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE

G.R. No. 216566, February 17, 2016 [MENDOZA, J.]
Page 267 of 1553

The averment that Chervin acted as PAF's mere agents in subsequently contracting MAC to
perform the overhauling services is not an ultimate fact. What MAC entirely did was to state
a mere conclusion of law, if not, an inference based on matters not stated in the pleading. To
clarify, a mere allegation that PAF, as a principal of Chervin, can be held liable for non-
payment of the amounts due, does not comply with the ultimate fact rule. Without the
constitutive factual predicates, any assertion could never satisfy the threshold of an ultimate
fact.
FACTS:
Petitioner Magellan Aerospace Corporation (MAC) filed a complaint for sum of money
before the RTC against Chervin Enterprises, Inc. (Chervin) together with its Managing
Director, Elvi T. Sosing (Sosing), and the Philippine Air Force (PAF). It prayed that Chervin
be ordered to pay the amount of US$264,577.00 and that in the event of failure of Chervin
to pay the amount claimed, PAF be ordered to pay the said amount. MAC alleged that
Chervin merely acted as an agent of PAF.
PAF moved to dismiss the complaint averring that its contract with Chervin was one for
repair and overhaul and not for agency and that it was never privy to any contract between
Chervin and MAC. Chervin also asked the RTC to dismiss the complaint against them
asserting that MAC had no capacity to sue.
The RTC granted both motions to dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed
by MAC. The CA partly granted MAC's appeal by reversing the RTC order of dismissal of
the complaint against Chervin and Sosing. It, however, affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint against PAF. The CA explained that the complaint against PAF failed to
sufficiently state a cause of action because MAC failed to show that PAF had a correlative
duty of paying under the overhauling contract as it was obvious that the contract was
executed only between MAC and Chervin.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the complaint does not state a cause of action against
respondent PAF.
RULING:
In essence, MAC asserts that the allegations in the Complaint stating that Chervin "acted
for and in behalf of a "principal," PAF, in tapping its services for the overhaul of the aircraft
engines, completed with the requirements of sufficiency in stating its cause of action
Page 268 of 1553

against PAF. MAC claims that its allegation of Chervin being "mere agents" of PAF in the
overhaul contract, establishes clearly, under the premise of admitting them as true for
purposes of a Rule 16 challenge, its entitlement to recover from PAF, the latter being the
"principal" and "beneficiary."
However, the assumption of truth (commonly known as hypothetical admission of truth),

accorded under the test, does not cover all the allegations pleaded in the complaint. Only
ultimate facts or those facts which the expected evidence will support are considered for
purposes of the test. It does not cover legal conclusions or evidentiary facts. Evidently,
matters that are required and expected to be sufficiently included in a complaint and, thus,
accorded the assumption of truth, exclude those that are mere legal conclusions,
inferences, evidentiary facts, or even unwarranted deductions.
In this case, the averment that Chervin acted as PAF's mere agents in subsequently
contracting MAC to perform the overhauling services is not an ultimate fact. Nothing can
be found in the complaint that can serve as a premise of PAF's status as the principal in the
contract between Chervin and MAC. No factual circumstances were alleged that could
plausibly convince the Court that PAF was a party to the subsequent outsourcing of the
overhauling services. Not even in the annexes can the Court find any plausible basis for the
assertion of MAC on PAF's status as a principal. What MAC entirely did was to state a mere
conclusion of law, if not, an inference based on matters not stated in the pleading. To
clarify, a mere allegation that PAF, as a principal of Chervin, can be held liable for non-
payment of the amounts due, does not comply with the ultimate fact rule. Without the
constitutive factual predicates, any assertion could never satisfy the threshold of an
ultimate fact.
Not being an ultimate fact, the assumption of truth does not apply to the aforementioned
allegation made by MAC concerning PAF. Consequently, the narrative that PAF can be held
liable as a principal in the agreement between Chervin and MAC cannot be considered in
the course of applying the sufficiency test used in Section 1(g) Rule 16. It, therefore,
produces no link to the alleged PAF's correlative duty to pay the amounts being claimed by
MAC - a necessary element of a cause of action that must be found in the pleading.
Lacking that essential link, and after hypothetically admitting the truth of all the
allegations other than those that are ought to be excluded for not being ultimate facts, it is
demonstrable that the CA correctly ruled for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of MAC’s failure to state its cause of action against PAF.
Page 269 of 1553

SHERYL M. MENDEZ vs.Shari'a District Court

The notice of hearing is intended to prevent surprise and to afford the adverse party a
chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the court. A seasonable service of a copy
of the motion on the adverse party with a notice of hearing indicating the time and place of
hearing is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with as this is the minimum
requirement of procedural due process. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is
a mere scrap of paper and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration
of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules, and, hence, even the
clerk has no right to receive it.
FACTS:
Mendez and Maliga were married under Muslim rites. Prior to their marriage, the couple
was already blessed with a daughter. Their marriage, however, soured shortly after their
wedding.
Maliga filed with the 1st Shari'a Circuit Court (ShCC) a petition for the judicial confirmation
of talaq, with a prayer for the grant of probational custody of their minor child pending the
resolution of the case. Before Mendez could file her answer, Maliga filed his urgent
motion reiterating his plea to be awarded temporary custody of Princess Fatima. The ShCC
issued an Order granting Maliga's urgent motion.
Thereafter, Mendez filed her opposition to Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of
temporary custody. She argued that the motion did not contain the requisite notice of
hearing and was, therefore, a mere scrap of paper. She pointed out that the motion was
filed prior to the filing of the main case. In its Order, the ShCC partially reconsidered its
initial order awarding temporary custody to Maliga by granting the right of visitation to
Mendez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ShCC erred in acting on Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of
temporary custody.
RULING:
YES.
Page 270 of 1553

Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant. Every written motion is required to be heard and the notice of hearing shall be
served in such manner as to insure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
The notice of hearing is intended to prevent surprise and to afford the adverse party a
chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the court. A seasonable service of a
copy of the motion on the adverse party with a notice of hearing indicating the time and
place of hearing is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with as this is the
minimum requirement of procedural due process. A motion that does not contain a notice
of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and presents no question which merits the attention
and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules,
and, hence, even the clerk has no right to receive it.
In this case, the urgent motion lacked the requisite notice of hearing. It is immediately
evident from the face of the motion that it did not contain the notice of hearing required
by the Rules of Court which has suppletory application to the present case. Thus, the award
of custody to Maliga by the ShCC was void as it was rendered in violation of the
constitutional right of Mendez to due process.
CESAR V. AREZA and LOLITA B. AREZA vs. EXPRESS SAVINGS BANK, INC. and
MICHAEL POTENCIANO
G.R. No. 176697, September 10, 2014, J. Perez
The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the
time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion. There is substantial compliance with the foregoing Rule if a copy of the said motion
for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party.
Facts:
Petitioners Cesar V. Areza and Lolita B. Areza maintained two bank deposits with
respondent Express Savings Bank’s Biñan branch (the Bank).
Acting on the alleged arbitrary and groundless dishonoring of their checks and the
unlawful and unilateral withdrawal from their savings account, petitioners filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against the Bank and Potenciano with the RTC
of Calamba. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
Page 271 of 1553

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioners filed a motion for
execution from the Decision of the RTC on the ground that respondents’ motion for
reconsideration did not conform with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court; hence, it was
a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the running of the period to appeal. The RTC granted
the motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court but deleted
the award of damages. Hence, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law
and grave abuse of discretion in upholding the legality and/or propriety of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
Ruling:
Sections 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all

parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which
must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Petitioners claim that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court and
not to the adverse party as the rules require. Petitioners add that the hearing on the motion
for reconsideration was scheduled beyond 10 days from the date of filing.
As held in Maturan v. Araula, the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to the
adverse party has been substantially complied with when a copy of the motion for
reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party, coupled with the fact
that the trial court acted on said notice of hearing and, as prayed for, issued an order setting
the hearing of the motion on 26 March 2004.
The court would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the
foregoing Rule if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel
of the adverse party.
Page 272 of 1553

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED vs. SAMIR

FARAJALLAH, VIRGILIO D.C. HERCE, RACHEL P. FOLLOSCO, JESUSITO G.
MORALLOS, and MA. GERALDINE S. GARCIA (directors and officers of NEW
FIELDS (ASIA PACIFIC), INC.)
G.R. No. 205800, September 10, 2014, Acting C.J Carpio
In every written motion, the three-day notice rule for hearing is not absolute. The
purpose of the rule on hearing is to safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus,
if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study the motion and oppose it,
then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be dispensed with.
Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitions for review by certiorari "shall
raise only questions of law." A question of fact exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of
certain facts, and it can only be resolved through a reexamination of the body of evidence.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted
the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses.
For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight.
In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their comment
on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the
three-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent
judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners the opportunity to study and
oppose the arguments stated in the motion.
Facts:
Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated (petitioners) are

corporations organized and existing under the laws of the United States. Microsoft
Corporation is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and
editions of Microsoft software and the corresponding user’s manuals, and the registered
owner of the "Microsoft" "MS DOS" trademarks in the Philippines. Adobe Systems
Incorporated is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and
editions of Adobe Software. Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco,
Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia (respondents) are the directors and
officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation.
Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was
unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support,
Inc.(OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification of this information. Two
OSI Market Researchers, Norma Serrano (Serrano) and Michael Moradoz (Moradoz) were
Page 273 of 1553

assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect
unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software. Counsel for petitioners filed a letter-
complaint with the Chief of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group. The case was assigned to Police Senior Inspector Ernesto Padilla (Padilla).
Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of respondents. Using a legitimate
business pretext, they were able to use two computers owned by New Fields and obtained
the following information regarding the installed Microsoft and Adobe software.
In their Joint Affidavit, Serrano and Moradoz stated that there are at least two (2)
computers using common product identification and/or serial numbers of MICROSOFT
and ADOBE software. They also observed that New Fields had 90 computers in their office
with Microsoft software, none of which had the Certificate of Authenticity issued by
Microsoft.
After being informed of the results of the investigation, petitioners then issued
certifications that they have not authorized New Fields to "copy, print, reproduce and/or
publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe software products. An application for
search warrants was filed by Padilla before Judge Amor Reyes in her capacity as Executive
Judge of the RTC. The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields
employees witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several items were seized,
including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized copies of Microsoft
and/or Adobe software.
New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two warrants served. During
the hearing on the motion, petitioners were allowed by the RTC to file their
Comment/Opposition stating that the Motion to Quash failed to comply with the
mandatory 3-day notice rule under the Rules of Court. Hence it is nothing but a worthless
piece of paper.
RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that all the items seized
from the respondents be returned. According to the RTC, petitioners should have identified
which specific computer had the pirated software. The RTC added that no criminal charge
has been filed yet, despite the fact that the seized items have been in petitioners’ possession
for several weeks since the warrants were issued. Lastly, the RTC dismissed the petitioners’
contention that the three day notice rule was not complied with because petitioners were
already notified of the motion personally.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. The RTC denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
Page 274 of 1553

65 before the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition for certiorari and held that
when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion to quash,
it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Amor Reyes of RTC
Manila did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in quashing the search warrants and directing the immediate release of the items seized
pursuant to the said warrants, despite the pendency of appellate proceeding.
Ruling:
The Court rules that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed
in this case. However, it sustains petitioners’ contention that there was probable cause for
issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should have upheld the validity of both
warrants.
As regards compliance with the three-day notice rule, in Anama v. Court of Appeals,
the Court ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the rule is to
safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a
reasonable opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the
three-day notice rule may be dispensed with.
In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their
comment on the motion toquash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court.
Thus, while the three-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied
when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners the
opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.
Now, as to the existence of probable cause, Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, petitions for review by certiorari "shall raise only questions of law." A question of
fact exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it can only be resolved
through a reexamination of the body of evidence. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp,
Inc., Court ruled that the existence of probable cause is a question of fact.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his
witnesses. For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing
Page 275 of 1553

court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts
before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.
This Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the courts defer to the lower
courts’ appreciation and evaluation of evidence. This general rule, however, is not absolute.
The court will review the factual findings of the CA in any of the following instances:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings
of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the Appellate Court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension
of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence
of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.36
In this case, the Supreme Court find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and
CA, since there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. The CA sustained
the quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had "no personal knowledge of the facts
upon which the issuance of the warrants may be justified," and the applicants and the
witnesses merely relied on the screen shots acquired from the confidential informant. The
Court disagrees with the conclusions of the CA.
Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient
and validated. Looking at the records, it is clear that Padilla and his companions were able
to personally verify the tip of their informant.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION vs.

ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 189669, February 16, 2015, J. Peralta
Page 276 of 1553

The motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed
by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of
the motion to suppress. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available
and existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash.
Facts:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) and Petron Corporation (Petron)

received information that Romars International Gases Corporation (RIGC) was selling,
offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel
cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of
Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team to
investigate. The investigators went to RIGC’s premises bringing along with empty cylinders
of Shellane, Gasul, Total and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. RIGC's
employees then refilled said cylinders at their refilling station. The refilled cylinders were
brought to the Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that RIGC was not
authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or
use or imitate any Petron trademarks.
Shell and Petron then requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
investigate said activities of RIGC for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting
establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale of LPG products using
the same containers of Petron and Shell.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial
quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at RIGC's warehouse. They
also witnessed trucks coming from said refilling facility loaded with Gasul, Shellane and
Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places. The
investigators then bought Shellane and Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which
they were issued an official receipt.
The NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the court two application for a
search warrant for Violation of Section 155.1, in relation to Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293
against respondent and/or its occupants. The court then granted said warrants. On the
same day, the NBI served the warrants at the respondent's premises in an orderly and
peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.
Page 277 of 1553

RIGC then moved to quash the warrant, which was then denied by the court. Upon
motion for reconsideration, it was only then where RIGC raised for the first time, the issue
of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when
the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-
Iriga City. They pointed out that it lacks the necessary imputation of compelling reasons,
as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Shell and
Petron opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late for
RIGC to raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing of the application for search
warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.
The RTC-Naga City granted the motion for reconsideration and moved for the the
warrants to be quashed. Upon appeal by Shell and Petron to the Court of Appeals, it
affirmed the former’s decision. Thus, the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether RIGC’s motion to quash is not subject to the omnibus motion rule?
Ruling:
No, such is subject to the omnibus motion rule.
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise,
said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v. People, that “the motion to
quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress.”
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only
take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was
not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the
issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue of the
Page 278 of 1553

defect in the application was available and existent at the time of filing of the motion to
quash.
MARYLOU CABRERA vs. FELIX NG

G.R. NO. 201601, MARCH 12, 2014
J. REYES
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive
and which the court has no authority to act upon. Nevertheless, the three-day notice
requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the
opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition
to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In
such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with.
Facts:
On February 14, 2004, Ng filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the
Cabrera nspouses alleging that the latter issued to him 3 Metrobank checks that were
dishonored upon presentment. However, they claimed that they paid the respondent the
amount represented by the said checks through the latter’s son Richard Ng. Further, they
deny having issued Metrobank Check No. 0244745 to the respondent, alleging that the said
check was forcibly taken from them by Richard Ng.
On August 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, which ordered the spouses Cabrera to
pay the respondent the total face value of the three checks plus interest and damages. On
August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera received a copy of the RTC Decision. On August 14,
2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, which they set
for hearing on August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of their
motion for reconsideration to the respondent thru registered mail; it was actually received
by the respondent on August 21, 2007. The said motion for reconsideration, however, was
not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the said court had just
assumed office.
On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The CA affirmed the RTC order. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007, which denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.
Page 279 of 1553
Held:
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by
the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10)
days after the filing of the motion
The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and
5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.
“The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the
benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter
and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments
interposed therein.”
“A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive
and which the court has no authority to act upon.” “Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions
to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or
pendency.”
Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the
adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard
through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day
notice requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due
process are substantially complied with.
It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera was reset by the R TC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October
26, 2007 that the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two
months had passed since the respondent received a copy of the said motion for
Page 280 of 1553
reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent was thus given sufficient time to study
the motion and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the
respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on September 20, 2007.
Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for
reconsideration four days after the date set by the spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof,
his right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to argue his
position. Thus, the R TC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration
based merely on their failure to comply with the three day notice requirement.
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. NO. 193494, MARCH 12, 2014
J. LEONEN
There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of
default. Even when a motion is filed within the required period, excusable negligence must be
properly alleged and proven.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed
to answer the complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside
order of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the complaint.
It failed to prove the excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing
to set aside the order of default.
Facts:
Lui Enterprises and Zuellig Pharma entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of
land located in Davao City. On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the
Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property,
the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for
interpleader. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s
alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on
behalf of the corporation. According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed
of dation in payment case pending with the RTC Davao barred the filing of the interpleader
case.
Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to
dismiss should be denied for having been filed late, they likewise moved that Lui
Page 281 of 1553

Enterprises be declared in default. The RTC denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and
declared it in default.
Lui manifested that the RTC Davao allegedly issued an order directing all of Lui Enterprises’
lessees to “observe status quo with regard to the rental payments” and continue remitting
their rental payments to Lui Enterprises while the nullification of deed of dation in payment
case was being resolved. The Regional Trial Court of Makati only noted the manifestation.
It was only one year after the issuance of the order of default, that Lui Enterprises filed a
motion to set aside order of default in the Makati trial court on the ground of excusable
negligence.
While the motion to set aside order of default was still pending for resolution, Lui
Enterprises filed the manifestation and motion to dismiss. It manifested that the Davao
court issued another order directing the Philippine Bank of Communications to inform
Zuellig Pharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the Davao trial court’s order dated April
1, 2004 was subsisting.
Without resolving the motion to set aside order of default, the Makati trial court denied
the manifestation with motion to dismiss on the ground that Lui Enterprises already lost
its standing in court. Lui Enterprises did not file any motion for reconsideration. The RTC
ruled that Lui Enterprises “was barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments”
since it was declared in default. The CA sustained the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal for lack of
subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited,
and the statement of issues in Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief;
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to
set aside order of default;
3. Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati; and
Held:
1. On Lui Enterprises’ failure to comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s
brief
Page 282 of 1553

Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of
Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the
appellant’s brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c),
(d), and (f). These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references
to the record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes
cited.
Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and
table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal.
There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants
substantially complied with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. Thus, this
court excused the appellants’ procedural lapses.
In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of
the appellant’s brief. It admitted that its appellant’s brief lacked the required subject index,
page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it
did not even correct its admitted “technical omissions” by filing an amended appellant’s
brief with the required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal.
2. On Lui Enterprises’ failure to show that its failure to answer the complaint within the
required period was due to excusable negligence
When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is
required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The
defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint “within the time for but before filing
the answer.”
Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either
presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was prevented
from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In either case, the court may declare the defendant in default on
plaintiff’s motion and notice to defendant. The court shall then try the case until judgment
without defendant’s participation and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her complaint
may warrant.
A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. However, the defendant
declared in default “does not waive all of his or her rights.” He or she still has the right to
“receive notice of subsequent proceedings.” Also, the plaintiff must still present evidence
supporting his or her allegations “despite the default of the defendant.”
Page 283 of 1553
After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the default judgment,
the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default. The defendant
must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Rule 9, Section
3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Default; declaration of. – x x x x
(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice
thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be
set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to the judgment
becoming final and executory, he or she may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37,
Section 1, paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. If he or she discovers his or
her default after the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be filed. Appeal
is also available to the defendant declared in default. He or she may appeal the judgment
for being contrary to the evidence or to the law under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. He or she may do so even if he or she did not file a petition to set aside
order of default.
The remedies of the motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, and petition
for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive, not alternative or cumulative. This is to
compel defendants to remedy their default at the earliest possible opportunity. Depending
on when the default was discovered and whether a default judgment was already rendered,
a defendant declared in default may avail of only one of the three remedies.
In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default,
raising the ground of excusable negligence.
Excusable negligence is “one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against.” The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved. In this case,
we find that Lui Enterprises’ failure to answer within the required period is inexcusable.
Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately
take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion
to set aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only
“conveniently blamed its x x x counsel for the late filing of the answer” without offering any
Page 284 of 1553

excuse for the late filing. This is not excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph
(b)127 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not
err in refusing to set aside the order of default.
Lui Enterprises argued that the Regional Trial Court of Makati should have been liberal in
setting aside its order of default. However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3,
paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must first be complied with131 The
defendant’s motion to set aside order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is the
time element. The defendant must challenge the default order before judgment. Second,
the defendant must have been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. Third, he must have a meritorious defense.
As discussed, Lui Enterprises never explained why its counsel failed to file the motion to
dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of
default. Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its representative and
counsel had to fly in from Davao to Makati to personally appear and manifest in court its
meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises did not do.
Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to compel Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their claims. Thus,
“declaring the other claimant in default would ironically defeat the very purpose of the
suit.” The Regional Trial Court of Makati should not have declared Lui Enterprises in
default.
Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may file a special
civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or her over a subject
matter in which he or she has no interest. The action is brought against the claimants to
compel them to litigate their conflicting claims among themselves.
An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting
claims over the rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect
him or her from “double vexation in respect of one liability.” He or she may file the
interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from
the adverse claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to litigate
among themselves.
In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay
rent. Its purpose in filing the interpleader case “was not defeated” when the Makati trial
court declared Lui Enterprises in default.
Page 285 of 1553

At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under
Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within
the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the default
is that the court may “render judgment barring the defaulted claimant from any claim in
respect to the subject matter.”
3. On whether the nullification of deed in dation in payment case bar the filing of the
interpleader case
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis pendentia:
Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds: x x x x (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; x x x x Litis pendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.” It exists when “another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action x x x.” The
subsequent action is “unnecessary and vexatious” and is instituted to “harass the
respondent [in the subsequent action].”
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the
same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and (3) The identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other. All of the requisites must be present. Absent one
requisite, there is no litis pendentia.
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification
of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig. There is also no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Thus, the pending nullification case did
not bar the filing of the interpleader case. All told, the trial court did not err in proceeding
with the interpleader case. The nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending
with the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not bar the filing of the interpleader case with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA vs. ISAAC Z. ZAULDA

G.R. NO. 201234, MARCH 17, 2014
The almost four months that lapsed before the records reached the ponente’s office
was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the CA. It
Page 286 of 1553

was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for
extension reached the ponente’s office beyond the last date prayed for.
The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was
received by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by
registered mail. They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the court on or
before the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its
motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable.
Facts:
Petitioners, as heirs of Amada Zaula, were co-owners of a parcel of land in Aklan. Sometime
in March 2000, respondent, through force and intimidation, forcibly entered the subject
property and, there and then, cut and took with him bamboos and other forest/agricultural
products. On March 29, 2000, respondent, together with two other unidentified persons,
forcibly entered the subject property and, with threat and intimidation, constructed and
built a house made of light material, and that petitioners demanded respondent to vacate
and turn over the subject property to them but the latter refused to do so.
The heirs of Zaulda then filed a complaint for recovery of possession and declaration of
ownership against respondent, before the MCTC, where the Court rendered judgment
declaring plaintiffs the lawful owners entitled to possession of the Lots 1, 3 and 6, and
declaring Lots A and B as co-owned by plaintiffs, defendant, and intervenors. The RTC,
partly modified the decision of the MCTC and declared respondent as the owner and
possessor of lots 1 and 3
Petitioner Eleseo Zaulda, the lone surviving heir of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, after his co-heir
Rodolfo Zaulda passed away, filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time
and for lack of competent evidence on affiant’s identity on the attached verification and
certification against forum shopping. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time despite
the motion for extension of time having been timely filed
Held:
Page 287 of 1553

Petition for review from the RTC to the CA is governed by Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
which provides: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from
a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to
the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x. Upon
proper motion x x x, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
In this case, the petitioners complied with the requirements laid down in the above quoted
provision. Records show that on March 10, 2010, petitioners timely filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial of the RTC decision (dated January 20, 2010, received by
petitioners on February 25, 2010), but the same was denied in the RTC Order, dated August
4, 2010, copy of which was received by petitioners on August 10, 2010. Thus, they had until
August 25, 2010 within which to file a petition for review pursuant to said Section 1, Rule
42.
On August 24, 2010, petitioners filed their Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review before the CA, paying the docket and other lawful fees and deposit for costs and
prayed for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from August 25, 2010 or until September
9, 2010, within which to file the said petition.
On September 9, 2010, they filed the Petition for Review.
As earlier stated, the Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review, which was
filed through registered mail on August 24, 2010, was filed on time. It was physically in the
appellate court’s possession long before the CA issued its Resolution on February 11, 2011,
dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. The record shows that the CA
received the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on September 13, 2010
but the CA Division received the motion on September 14, 2010, and the ponente’s office
received it on January 5, 2011.
Indeed, there was a delay, but it was a delay that cannot be attributed at all to the
petitioners. The almost four (4) months that lapsed before the records reached the
ponente’s office was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division
personnel at the CA. It was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just
because the motion for extension reached the ponente’s office beyond the last date prayed
for. Clearly, the petitioners were unreasonably deprived of their right to be heard on the
merits because of the CA’s unreasonable obsession to reduce its load. In allowing the
Page 288 of 1553

petitioners to be fatally prejudiced by the delay in the transmittal attributable to its inept
or irresponsible personnel, the CA committed an unfortunate injustice.
The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was received
by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by registered
mail. They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the court on or before
the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its motion
for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable.
Granting that the petition was filed late, substantial justice begs that it be allowed and be
given due course. Indeed, the merits of petitioners’ cause deserve to be passed upon
considering that the findings of the RTC were in complete contrast to the findings of the
MCTC which declared petitioners as the lawful owners entitled to possession of the lots in
question.
As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification,
records show that he proved his identity before the notary public through the presentation
of his senior citizen card.
The Rules on Notarial Practice provide that a senior citizen card is one of the competent
identification cards recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason,
there was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of the CA,
attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12
thereof, is silent on it. Thus, the CA’s dismissal of the petition for lack of competent
evidence on the affiant’s identity on the attached verification and certification against
forum shopping was without clear basis.
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required,
non-attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been
consistently held that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement,
affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not
render the pleading fatally defective.
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA vs. FRANCISCO LINDO AND

WELHILMINIA LINDO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014
J. VELASCO, JR.
Page 289 of 1553

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are
cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil
action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court
is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Facts:
Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, sold a free-patent land located in Davao Oriental to

herein respondents via a notarized deed of absolute sale. Two months later, TCTs were
issued in favor of the vendees.
Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents,
anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and
laches, as defenses. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was
substituted by petitioner Epifania. Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later
entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to
Epifania a 3,230 sq.m.-portion of the property as well as to waive all claims and
counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the RTC. Other
respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state
the value of the property sought to be recovered and that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the complaint question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the
jurisdictional ceiling. The RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
Held:
Page 290 of 1553
Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP

129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases..Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: 1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; 2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which
provides: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases..Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x 3) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land
not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action
incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In
this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that “in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs
would depend on the amount of the claim.” But where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and,
hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by
RTCs.
Page 291 of 1553

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, 1.

Actions for specific performance; 2. Actions for support which will require the
determination of the civil status; 3. The right to support of the plaintiff; 4. Those for the
annulment of decisions of lower courts; 5. Those for the rescission or reformation of
contracts; 6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation. The Court finds that the instant
cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free
patent. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is
subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date of
conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated
and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed
written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties, the
provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall
limit and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor
of Bautista which he may seek to enforce. That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint
to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear
that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or
analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest
therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as
the total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the
postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because
respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively
defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the
jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.
In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the
complaint, actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his
evidence, and invoking its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the court. Here, we note that aside from the belated
filing of the motion to dismiss––it having been filed nine (9) years from the filing of the
complaint––respondents actively participated in the proceedings through the following
acts: 1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction19 dated
September 29, 1994 whereby they even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000
for unpaid survey accounts, PhP 100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP 200,000 and PhP
3,000 per daily appearance by way of attorney’s fees, PhP 500,000 as moral damages, PhP
100,000 by way of exemplary damages, and costs of suit; 2. By participating in Pre-trial; 3.
By moving for the postponement of their presentation of evidence; 4. By presenting their
Page 292 of 1553
witness; and 5. By submitting the compromise agreement for approval. Having fully
participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC’s authority by asking for
affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court.
Simply put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should
be, considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of
the action.
ROASTERS PHILIPPINES, INC., doing business under the name of KENNY

ROGERS ROASTERS v. GEORGE GA VIOLA, KARLA HELENE GA VIOLA,
KASHMEER GEORGIA GA VIOLA, KLAIRE MARLEI GA VIOLA, and DR. MARIA
LEISA M. GA VIOLA
G.R. No. 191874, September 2, 2015, PEREZ, J.
Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable
disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit
of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the
counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the
amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised
on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now
unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the
dismissal of the complaint.
Facts:
Respondents Georgia Gaviola and Maria Leisa M. Gaviola (Maria Leisa), together with their
children Karla Helene, Kashmeer Georgia and Klaire Marlei, filed a Complaint for Damages
against Roasters Philippines before the RTC of Las Piñas City. The family was hospitalized
due to acute gastroenteritis and possible Food poisoning when dined at Kenny Rogers
Roasters restaurant Duty- Free Branch in Parañaque. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of failure of respondents to prosecute the pending case alleging that
respondents had not filed any pleading to revive or re-activate their case. The respondents
filed a Manifestation with Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial. The RTC denied the Motion
to Dismiss filed by petitioner and set the pre-trial. During the presentation of their
evidence-in-chief, respondents failed to attend the hearing. Consequently, the RTC issued
an Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17
of the Rules of Court. In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents explained that on
Page 293 of 1553

the day of the hearing, respondent Maria Leisa had a prior engagement in the United States
of America (USA), which nonetheless did not push through because the latter was
hospitalized due to profuse bleeding. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The
CA rendered the assailed the decision of the RTC annulling the orders of the trial court and
directing the reinstatement of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure of respondents to prosecute.
Ruling:
Yes. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. The
basis for such pronouncement lies on the first of three instances mentioned in the Rules,
i.e., that plaintiffs failed to appear at the time of trial. The excuse proffered by respondents
was not acceptable to the trial court that made the following observation when it denied
the motion for reconsideration by respondents: Significantly during the 19 May 2008
hearing, [respondents'] counsel Atty. John Patrick Lubaton, manifested that he filed a
motion for postponement as early as 15 May 2008 as [Maria Leisa], the complaining
[respondent] left to attend a conference in the United States of America from 14 May to 18
May 2008, together with her family. A careful scrutiny of the cancelled plane tickets
attached to the motion discloses, however, that [Maria Leisa] and her children were issued
tickets for a trip to Hong Kong on 15 May 2008 and their destination was not the United
States contrary to the claim by [respondent Maria Leisa] in the instant motion and by
counsel during the 19 May 2008 hearing. Also, co-[respondent] and the husband of [Maria
Leisa] George Gaviola was not among those issued with ticket for travel to Hong Kong.
Hence, counsel and [respondents] were not candid with this court when they sought
postponement of the hearing on 19 May 2008 as George Gaviola was not going to travel
either to Hong Kong or United States. As regards the certificates presented regarding the
medical condition of [Maria Leisa], the same could not likewise be given much credence
because it was not supported by an affidavit of the issuing officer regarding the veracity
thereof. All told, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for failure of respondents to
prosecute.
Page 294 of 1553

TERESITA S. LEE v. LUI MAN CHONG

G.R. No. 209535, June 15, 2015, Mendoz, J.
“Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all
other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on
the points and matters in issue in the first suit.”
Facts:
Conrado Romero died intestate. Among his properties were four (4) parcels of land in
Baguio City and shares of Pines Commercial Corporation (PCC). His nephew Lui Man
Chong executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of Romero’s estate being the sole and
exclusive heir the latter. Consequently, the titles over the said properties were transferred
to his name. Thereafter, Teresita Lee, claiming to be Romero’s common-law wife, filed a
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Romero which was dismissed.
Subsequently, claiming to own half of Romero’s estate during their cohabitation as
common-law spouses, Lee sought the nullification of Chong’s affidavit of self- adjudication
and a declaration that she is a co-owner of Romero’s properties before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) which was dismissed for lack of cause of action and legal personality.
The dismissal of the annulment case was affirmed by this Court and attained finality.
Lee filed another case for “Recovery of Ownership” against Chong before the RTC which
was likewise dismissed because the issues between the parties in the said case which were
already settled in the Annulment Case and need not be litigated anew. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the RTC on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata, more
specifically in the concept of bar by prior judgment, had set in. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment had set in.
Ruling:
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YES. Significantly, the elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a
“bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties
can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of
judgment” applies.
Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B. V.,

G.R No. 173783, June 17, 2015, J. Brion
Res Judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
or a thing or matter settled by judgment. Under this rule, a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits and all points and matters determined in the former suit
Facts:
Riviera Golf Club entered into a management contract with CCA Holdings B.V for a period
of five years whereby Riviera would pay a monthly base management fee. Riviera initially
paid the agreed fees but defaulted its payment afterwards which prompted CCA in filing its
first complaint for collection case against Riviera. During the pendency of the case, they
entered into a compromise agreement which the RTC approved such. However, Riviera has
failed to pay the agreed amount which again prompted CCA in filing of the second
complaint for collection case in the same RTC. Riviera thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of res judicata and violation of splitting of causes of action which was granted
by the RTC. On appeal, CA remanded the case to RTC reasoning that CCA did not violate
the rules on res judicata for the requisites are not present.
Issue:
Whether or not CCA violated the rule on res judicata
Ruling:
YES. The following are the requisites of res judicata: 1) the former judgment must be final;
2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties; 3) it must be a judgment on merits; and 4) there must be, between the first and
Page 296 of 1553
second actions as to identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.
Consequently, all of the elements are present in this case. The decision on the first case is
a final judgment on the merit rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the parties. Since a judicial compromise operates as an adjudication on the
merits, it has the force of law and the effect of res judicata. With respect to fourth element,
a careful examination of the allegations in the two complaints shows that the case involve
the same parties and same subject matter for both actions were filed on the basis of the
Management Agreement.
SAHAR INTERNATIONAL TRADING, INC. vs. WARNER LAMBERT CO., LLC and
PFIZER, INC.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no
actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Thus, if during the pendency of a petition in the Supreme
Court challenging the CA’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in a case for patent
infringement, the RTC dismissed the main case but the CA ruled that the respondent is guilty
of patent infringement, the issue before the Supreme Court is moot because the CA decision
makes permanent the assailed preliminary injunction. Further, the Supreme Court will not
tackle the merits of the case as it is premature.
Facts:
Respondent Warner Lambert, a foreign corporation, is a Philippine patent holder

for the pharmaceutical substances Altovastatin and Atorvastatin Calcium, and Lambert and
its worldwide affiliates sell products covered by the patent under the brand name Lipitor.
Respondent Pfizer, Inc. is the exclusive licensee of Warner to import, market, distribute
and sell products covered by the subject patents in the Philippines. It was issued several
Certificates of Product Registration by the now-Food and Drug Administration in order to
validly sell and promote such products in the Philippine market.
Pfizer discovered that petitioner Sahar International Trading, Inc. also applied for
and was issued a CPR by the FDA for Atorvastatin Calcium manufactured by Geofman
Pharmaceuticals of Pakistan, under the brand name Atopitar, and had been selling and
Page 297 of 1553
distributing Altopitar in several provinces in the Philippines. Pfizer sent numerous letters
to Sahar informing the latter of Lambert’s patents over Altovastatin Calcium and demanded
it to stop selling and distributing said pharmaceutical substance under the brand name
Altopitar. Sahar did not heed such demands and replied that the patent over Atorvastatin
Calcium had already expired in Pakistan and, therefore, it believed the same can already be
freely distributed and marketed in the Philippines by any entity.
Respondents filed a complaint for patent infringement with applications for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC against Sahar. The
RTC denied the application for the writ of preliminary injunction. The CA reversed the RTC
and held that the respondents have established their right to preliminary injunctive relief
against Sahar, and issued the said writ. Hence the petition.
During the pendency of the petition with the Supreme Court, the RTC dismissed the
case of patent infringement. On appeal the CA reversed and set aside the RTC and found
Sahar liable for patent infringement.
Issue:
Did the CA err in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction upon Sahar?
Ruling:
The petition is dismissed on the ground of mootness.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case
or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there
is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve
any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it
cannot be enforced.
Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA's supervening promulgation of
its decision which reversed the RTC's Judgment-dismissing the patent infringement case-
thereby made the writ of preliminary injunction permanent - rendered the present case
moot and academic. This is because the primordial issue raised in the instant petition is
precisely the propriety of the aforesaid issuance. Since the writ of preliminary injunction is
but an incident of the patent infringement case which had already been resolved by the
Page 298 of 1553

CA, ruling on its propriety would be merely an academic exercise carrying no practical
effect. Accordingly, the Court is constrained to dismiss the instant petition. In this relation,
it is relevant to point out that it would be premature for the Court to tackle the merits of
the CA's recent decision for the reason that it is not the matter herein appealed.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION and

ANTHONY R. DE LEON
G.R. No. 179571, July 2, 2014, J. Jose Portugal Perez
The Court previously ruled that an issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical
use or value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the plaintiff would
be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the complaint. However, a case
should not be dismissed simply because one of the issues raised therein had become moot and
academic by the onset of a supervening event, whether intended or incidental, if there are
other causes which need to be resolved after trial. When a case is dismissed without the other
substantive issues in the case having been resolved would be tantamount to a denial of the
right of the plaintiff to due process.
In this case, it reveals that Erlinda did not only pray that BCCC be enjoined from
denying her access to the cottage and be directed to provide water and electricity thereon, but
she also sought to be indemnified in actual, moral and exemplary damages because her
proprietary right was violated by the respondents when they denied her of beneficial use of
the property. In such a case, the Court should not have dismissed the complaint and should
have proceeded to trial in order to determine the propriety of the remaining claims.
Facts:
Spouses Potenciano and Erlinda Ilusorio (Spouses Ilusorio) are the owners of a
parcel of land and a cottage situated inside the recreational complex of respondent Baguio
Country Club Corporation (BCCC). It was agreed that since the subject property was
accessible only through the property of BCCC, basic facilities such as access to the main
road, electricity and water supply would be provided by the latter.
BCCC, thru its Manager, respondent Anthony R. De Leon (De Leon), without prior
notice to the Spouses Ilusorio, allegedly cut-off electric and water supply at the cottage,
rendering it unusable to the Spouses Ilusorios’ guests. This prompted Erlinda Ilusorio
(Erlinda) to initiate a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages against BCCC and
De Leon before the RTC alleging that respondents be directed to provide access from the
Page 299 of 1553

cottage to the main road, and, to supply water and electric services to the subject property.
Then, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. However, both motions were denied by RTC.
CA dismissed the petition of Erlinda for being moot and academic due to the
removal of the cottage stating that the prayer to provide access, water and electricity to the
cottage was rendered meaningless by its removal from the BCCC’s premises, and the prayer
for damages, which is merely ancillary to the main action for mandamus and injunction,
was likewise rendered illusory after the main case was mooted.
Issue:
Whether or not the cause of action by Erlinda was correctly dismissed for being
moot and academic.
Ruling:
No, the cause of action by Erlinda was not correctly dismissed for being moot and
academic.
An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable

controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the plaintiff would be entitled to and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the complaint. Courts will decline jurisdiction
over moot cases because there is no substantial relief to which petitioner will be entitled
and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the petition. The Court will therefore
abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.
There is no dispute that the action for mandamus and injunction filed by Erlinda
has been mooted by the removal of the cottage from the premises of BCCC. The staleness
of the claims becomes more manifest considering the reliefs sought by Erlinda, i.e.,to
provide access and to supply water and electricity to the property in dispute, are hinged on
the existence of the cottage. Collolarily, the eventual removal of the cottage rendered the
resolution of issues relating to the prayers for mandamus and injunction of no practical or
legal effect.
A perusal of the complaint, however, reveals that Erlinda did not only pray that
BCCC be enjoined from denying her access to the cottage and be directed to provide water
and electricity thereon, but she also sought to be indemnified in actual, moral and
exemplary damages because her proprietary right was violated by the respondents when
they denied her of beneficial use of the property. In such a case, the court should not have
Page 300 of 1553

dismissed the complaint and should have proceeded to trial in order to determine the
propriety of the remaining claims.
The Court previously ruled that an issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical use or value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the
plaintiff would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
complaint. However, a case should not be dismissed simply because one of the issues raised
therein had become moot and academic by the onset of a supervening event, whether
intended or incidental, if there are other causes which need to be resolved after trial. When
a case is dismissed without the other substantive issues in the case having been resolved
would be tantamount to a denial of the right of the plaintiff to due process.
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, NAMELY, ANITA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, SONIA J.

TOLENTINO AND RODERICK JULAO vs. SPOUSES ALEJANDRO AND MORENITA
DE JESUS
G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014, J. Del Castillo
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject
property must exceed PhP20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the
assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the complaint as petitioners
failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value of the
property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was
raised by respondents in their Appellant's Brief. And the fact that it was raised for the first
time on appeal is of no moment. Under Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for lack
of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription, which must be apparent from
the pleadings or the evidence on record. In other words, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on
appeal. In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists.
Facts:
Sometime in the 1960's, Telesforo Julao (Telesforo) filed before the DENR, two
Townsite Sales Applications (TSA), TSA No. V-2132 and TSA No. V-6667.
Page 301 of 1553

In April 1979, Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights, transferring
his hereditary share in the property covered by TSA No. V6667 to Respondent Spouses De
Jesus. In 1983, Spouses De Jesus constructed a house on the property they acquired from
Solito, who starting 1986 disappeared.
Following the favorable ruling of the DENR, in December 1998, OCT No. P-2446 was
issued in favor of the Heirs of Telesforo. In March 1999, herein petitioner-heirs of Telesforo,
filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property, wherein they asserted, among
others, that Spouses De Jesus’ house encroached their property, to which Spouses De Jesus
countered that they lawfully acquired the property thru Solito.
The trial court sustained herein petitioners, finding that Solito was indeed not a
lawful heir of Telesforo. The CA, however, reversed this ruling on two grounds: 1) failure
on the part of petitioners to identify the property sought to be recovered; and (2) lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ruling that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint.
Ruling:
NO, the CA’s ruling is proper in all respects.
The Court has enunciated in many cases that “[t]he assessed value must be alleged in
the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.” This in consonance
to the established principle that “[j]urisdiction… is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint…”
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject
property must exceed PhP20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint
the assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the complaint as
petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the
assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction

was raised by [Spouses De Jesus] in their Appellant's Brief. And the fact that it was raised
for the first time on appeal is of no moment. Under Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of
Page 302 of 1553

Court, defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription, which
must be apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In other words, the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint
at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of
jurisdiction exists.
RAMON CHING AND POWING PROPERTIES, INC. vs.

JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS
Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of
the plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
Facts:
Antonio Ching (Antonio) owned several businesses and properties, among which
was Po Wing Properties, Incorporated (Po Wing Properties). It is alleged that while he was
unmarried, he had children from two women. Ramon Ching (Ramon) alleged that he was
the only child of Antonio Ching with his common-law wife, Lucina Santos (Lucina). She,
however, disputed this. She maintained that even if Ramon’s birth certificate indicated that
he was Antonio Ching’s illegitimate child, she and Antonio merely adopted him and treated
him like their own. Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand, claim to be Antonio
Ching’s illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). While Ramon
disputed this, both Mercedes and Lucina have not.
Lucina alleged that when Antonio fell ill, he entrusted her with the distribution of
his estate to his heirs if something were to happen to him. She alleged that she handed all
the property titles and business documents to Ramon for safekeeping. Fortunately, Antonio
recovered from illness and allegedly demanded that Ramon return all the titles to the
properties and business documents.
On July 18, 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon allegedly induced Mercedes and
her children to sign an agreement and waiver to Antonio’s estate. Mercedes’ children
alleged that Ramon never paid them. Thereafter, Ramon allegedly executed an affidavit of
settlement of estate, naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon himself the
entirety of Antonio’s estate. Ramon, however, denied these allegations. Subsequently, the
Page 303 of 1553

police found Ramon to be its primary suspect. Hence, an Information was filed against him
and a warrant of arrest was issued.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the Chengs)
filed a complaint (the first case) for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, the complaint was amended, with leave of court,
to implead additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon was a
primary stockholder. The amended complaint was for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver,
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said
Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing Properties filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
Eventually, Branch 6 of the RTC of Manila, granted the said motion to dismiss. Upon
motion, however, the Chengs and Lucina were given fifteen (15) days to file the appropriate
pleading. Their counsel, however, failed do so.
On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina (respondents) filed a complaint (the
second case) for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and
the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties and raffled to Branch 20 of the RTC Manila. When Branch 20 was made aware
of the first case, it issued an order transferring the case to Branch 6, considering that the
case before it involved substantially the same parties and causes of action.
On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their
complaint in the second case, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. Eventually,
Branch 6 issued an order (November 22, 2002 Order) granting the same on the basis that
the summons had not yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they
had not yet filed any responsive pleading.
On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, arguing that the
dismissal should have been with prejudice under the "two dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section
1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case, filed
a motion for reconsideration of the said order.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs and Lucina
Santos filed a complaint (the third case) for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and
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Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties which was eventually raffled to Branch 6.
On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata, litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. A series of responsive pleadings were filed by both
parties.
On July 30, 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus order denying the motion for
reconsideration and the motion to dismiss, holding that the dismissal of the second case
was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the filing of the third case. On October 8,
2004, while their motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending, Ramon Ching
and Po Wing Properties filed a petition for certiorari (the first certiorari case) with the
Court of Appeals, assailing the November 22, 2002 Order and the portion of the omnibus
order which upheld the dismissal of the second case.
On December 28, 2004, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration in the third case. The denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or the issuance of a temporary restraining order (the second
certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals.
On March 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision in the first certiorari
case dismissing the petition. The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties’ reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was misplaced since the rule involves two
motions for dismissals filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the dismissal of
the first case was upon the motion of the defendants, while the dismissal of the second case
was at the instance of the plaintiffs.
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties filed this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court’s dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to
the filing of a third case, as per the "two-dismissal rule".
Ruling:
Page 305 of 1553

As the first case was dismissed upon the motion of the defendants, while the
dismissal of the second case was at the instance of the plaintiffs, the trial court’s dismissal
of second case does not operate as a bar to the filing of the third case as per the “two-
dismissal rule.”
Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal
of the case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done
through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. Moreover, its second section
which requires leave of court contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been
pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss. The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff, such as
the failure to prosecute, which is made upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu
propio. In all those situations, the dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise declared
by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the
defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule
16, which covers motions to dismiss. As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17
are without prejudice except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its
dismissal (“two-dismissal rule”). Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication
upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following
requisites must be present: 1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent
court; 2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim; 3) Both notices for dismissal
were filed by the plaintiff; and 4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was
consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims
of the former. Accordingly, the purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is to avoid vexatious
litigation. Clearly, when a complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred
from seeking relief on the same claim.
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to
include not only new defendants but new causes of action that should have been
adjudicated in a special proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the
defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the same ruling
that the incorporation of additional causes of action, i.e. extra-judicial settlement of the
intestate estate of Antonio and receivership, subject matters, which should be threshed out
in a special proceedings case. It held that such amendment is a clear departure from the
main cause of action in the original complaint which is for declaration of nullity of
certificate of titles with damages. It also emphasized that the rules of procedure which
govern special proceedings case are different and distinct from the rules of procedure
Page 306 of 1553

applicable in an ordinary civil action. However, on motion of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias,
counsel for the plaintiffs, a period of 15 days was given within which to file an appropriate
pleading. He, however, failed to file the same. Such failure was utilized by Ramon
contending that it amounts to violation of the order of the court which made the original
dismissal an adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e., a
dismissal through the default of the plaintiff. Hence, he argued that when respondents filed
the second case and then caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with
prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the
same claim. Unfortunately, his theory is erroneous. The trial court dismissed the first case
by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. When it allowed Atty. Mirardo
Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days to file an appropriate pleading, it was merely
acquiescing to a request made by the plaintiff’s counsel that had no bearing on the dismissal
of the case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff
defaults; it does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of
jurisdiction. Since there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiff’s default, the trial court’s
instruction to file the appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff
fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the
order dismissing the case still stands.
Clearly, the dismissal of the first case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was done
at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Section 5 of the same rule, a party may re-file the same action or claim subject to
certain exceptions. Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely re-
filing the same claim that had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
When they moved to dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as
the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s instance.
Clearly, when respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there
was already one prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at
the instance of the defendants. While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on
the same claim, it does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by
Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the appropriate pleading in the first
case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
dismissal in the second case is still considered as one without prejudice. In fact, the trial
court specifically ordered the said dismissal to be without prejudice. It is only when the
trial court’s order either is silent on the matter, or states otherwise, that the dismissal will
be considered an adjudication on the merits. However, while the dismissal of the second
Page 307 of 1553

case was without prejudice, respondents’ act of filing the third case while petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was still pending constituted forum shopping.
The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to wait until the final
disposition of the second case before filing the third case. As it stands, the dismissal of the
second case was without prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, in accordance with
the Rules of Civil Procedure. In their haste to file the third case, however, they
unfortunately transgressed certain procedural safeguards, among which are the rules on
litis pendentia and res judicata.
To reiterate, the dismissal of the first case became final and executory upon the
failure of respondents’ counsel to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the correct
pleading the second time around but eventually sought its dismissal as they "suspected that
their counsel is not amply protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost
three (3) years." The filing of the third case, therefore, was not precisely for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable result but only to get the case moving, in an attempt to protect their
rights. It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original controversy between the
parties has long been mired in numerous procedural entanglements. While it might be
more judicially expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and disallow the proceedings
in the third case to continue, it would not serve the ends of substantial justice.
The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since been dismissed
and is now the subject of a petition for certiorari. The third case filed apparently contains
the better cause of action for the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel they
are more comfortable with. Substantial justice will be better served if respondents do not
fall victim to the labyrinth in the procedures that their travails led them. Hence, the RTC
of Manila, Branch 6 is hereby ordered to proceed with the third case with due and
deliberate dispatch.
DIANA YAP-CO vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM T. UY AND ESTER GO-UY

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint filed by the respondents due to failure to prosecute. The petitioner contends that
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the said decision. The Supreme Court ruled that relief
is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence
and where the interest of justice so requires. The Court finds that respondents would be
deprived of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims if the RTC’s dismissal of
the case – on a procedural technicality at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable
negligence of their counsel – is sustained
Page 308 of 1553

Facts:
Respondents-spouses William T. Uy and Ester Go-Uy (respondents) had secured a

favorable Decision4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court or collection of sum of money
and damages against one Joseph Chung (Chung). Subsequently, respondents were the sole
bidders of Chung’s property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 267949, sold
at public auction in order to satisfy the judgment.
After the lapse of the allowable period for redemption, Spouses Uy were issued a
Final Deed of Sale, which they registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila on June 17,
2009. They, however, were unable to secure their new title after being informed that one
had already been issued11 in favor of herein petitioner Diana Yap-Co (petitioner) who
supposedly acquired the property through an execution sale conducted in implementation
of a judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 23-820 entitled “Spouses Henry Hatol and
Isabelita Hatol v. Joseph Chung.”
Spouses Uy filed a Complaint14for annulment of title and damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (subject
complaint) against petitioner Diana Yap-Co before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Because of the failure of Spouses Uy to appear, the RTC dismissed the complaint.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that the failure
of Spouses Uy’s counsel to attend the court hearings scheduled on March 1 and 22, 2012, as
well as to notify his clients of said hearing dates to enable them to travel all the way from
Aurora, Isabela to Manila in order to attend the same, should not bind Spouses Uy because
they appear to have legitimate grievances in the action for annulment of title filed with the
RTC. Hence, the current petition.
Issue:
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reinstating
Civil Case No. 09-122374 on considerations of equity, notwithstanding the rule on failure
to prosecute a case diligently under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
` The Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the dismissal of the RTC.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that “[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at
the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
Page 309 of 1553

comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.” However, the
application of the foregoing rule is not, to the Court’s mind, warranted in this case since,
as correctly found by the CA, respondents’ counsel acted negligently in failing to attend the
scheduled hearing dates and even notify respondents of the same so as to enable them to
travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said hearings. Verily, relief is
accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence
and where the interest of justice so requires.
The Court finds that respondents would be deprived of the opportunity to prove the
legitimacy of their claims if the RTC’s dismissal of the case – on a procedural technicality
at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable negligence of their counsel – is sustained.
Considering that respondents appear to have legal and factual bases for their grievance, it
would better serve the higher interest of substantial justice to allow the parties’ conflicting
claims to be resolved on the merits
PRE-TRIAL
CLODUALDA D. DAACO v. VALERIANA ROSALDO YU

G.R. No. 183398 June 22, 2015PERALTA J.
The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequence.
Facts:
Clodualda D. Daaco filed a complaint against Valeriana Rosaldo Yu, Faustina Daaco, and
the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City for Annulment of Title, Recovery of Property and
Damages. Pre- trial conference was set on October 4, 2007. However, upon motion, RTC
dismissed the case against Yu because of Daaco’s failure to appear thereat. Daaco filed a
MR alleging that she was not properly notified of the pre-trial conference as she received
notice only at 5:30 p.m. of October 3, 2007 and that there is still an unresolved Motion to
Consider the Answer of Respondent as Not Filed, which she had previously filed on October
4, 2006. The trial court denied the said motion. Thus, she filed the present petition raising
question of law.
Issue:
Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the case for Daaco’s failure to appear in the pre-trial
conference is contrary to law, rules, and existing jurisprudence.
Page 310 of 1553
Ruling:
NO. The issue in this case is the propriety of the trial court’s order dismissing the case for
petitioner’s failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. In relation to this, Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
Thus, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent
party is the plaintiff, then he may be declared non-suited and his case dismissed. If it is the
defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. In certain instances, however,
the non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid cause is shown. What constitutes
a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels at the pre-trial is subject to the sound
discretion of a judge. Unless and until a clear and manifest abuse of discretion is committed
by the judge, his appreciation of a party’s reasons for his nonappearance will not be
disturbed.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. FADCOR, INC., et. al.
Unfortunately, when respondents failed to appear during the pre-trial despite due
notice, they have already acquired the risk of not being able to dispute the evidence
presented ex parte by petitioner. In The Philippine American Life and General Insurance
Company v. Joseph Enario, the Supreme Court ruled that, "[t]he legal ramification of
defendant's failure to appear for pre-trial is still detrimental to him while beneficial to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.
FACTS:
Metrobank filed a Complaint against respondents for recovery of sum of money.

Respondents failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial. The RTC, therefore, issued an
Order directing Metrobank to present its evidence ex parte. Metrobank presented as lone
witness its Senior Assistant Manager, Ms. Irene Sih-Tan and, thereafter, filed its Formal
Offer of Evidence.
Page 311 of 1553

The RTC rendered a Decision in favour of Metrobank. On appeal,the Court of Appeals

reversed the RTC Decision and ruled that during the ex parte hearing held by the RTC, the
petitioner's lone witness identified and marked Exhibits "A" to "DD-4" only as shown in the
TSN, however, the RTC admitted Exhibits "A" to "MM," contrary to the Supreme Court's
resolution in Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 03-1-09-SC which provides that no evidence
shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of the party's
evidence-in-chief other than those that have been identified below and pre-marked during
the trial. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC did not follow the provisions of A.M. No. 03-
1-09-SC.
RULING:
YES.
The case involves an ex parte presentation of evidence allowed by the RTC after the
respondents herein failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference and submit a pre-
trial brief despite receipt of the Order of the same court. This is in accordance with Sections
4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.The RTC, therefore, did not commit an error in
allowing the petitioner herein to present its evidence ex parte and rendering a judgment
on the basis thereof.
The CA, however, found an error in the RTC's admission of the evidence presented or
offered by the petitioner. According to the CA, there is no showing in the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes (TSN) whatsoever that Exhibits "EE" to "MM" were presented and
identified by the petitioner's witness during the proceeding. By admitting those evidence
that were not identified or testified to by the petitioner's witness, the CA ruled that the
RTC did not follow the provisions of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC. This is a wrong interpretation.
The records show however that the documentary evidence being questioned by
respondents (Exhibits "EE" to "MM") were marked during the ex parte presentation of
evidence and were formally offered and admitted by the RTC before the latter rendered its
decision. Thus, the CA's ruling that Exhibits "EE" to "MM" should not have been considered
simply because the TSN does not reflect that those evidence were presented and identified
is mind-boggling because they could not have been marked had they not been presented
during the ex parte hearing where the lone witness for the petitioner was able to testify.
Page 312 of 1553

The fact that the questioned pieces of evidence were formally offered and admitted by the
RTC should be the foremost consideration.
Unfortunately, when respondents failed to appear during the pre-trial despite due notice,
they have already acquired the risk of not being able to dispute the evidence presented ex
parte by petitioner. In The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v.
Joseph Enario, the Supreme Court ruled that, "[t]he legal ramification of defendant's failure
to appear for pre-trial is still detrimental to him while beneficial to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant,
the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having
forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.
AUGUSTO C. SOLIMAN vs. JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

RECEIVER OF SMC PNEUMATICS (PHILS.), INC.
G.R. No. 176652, June 4, 2014, J. Perez
Contending that the RTC was correct in dismissing the case for failure of respondent to
prosecute his case, petitioner filed the instant petition praying that the decision of the CA be
set aside. The SC however ruled that respondent had the option to move for pre-trial and if he
fails to do so as he did, the branch clerk of court had the duty to have the case set for pre-
trial. The Court emphasizes that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition
of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part
of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield
their authority to dismiss.
Facts:
On March 10, 2003, SMC Pneumatics Philippines, Inc. filed a Motion for
Appointment of Management Committee before the RTC. The case was consolidated with
another two involuntary dissolution cases also filed by SMC Pneumatics. As a result, the
RTC issued an Order appointing respondent Fernandez as the Receiver pending the hearing
on the composition and appointment of the members of the Management Committee.
After all the assets, affairs and operations of SMC Pneumatics were placed under
receivership, Fernandez then discovered that two (2) of the vehicles owned by the SMC
Pneumatics are still in the possession of petitioner Soliman. Thereafter, Fernandez
demanded that Soliman return the vehicles. For failure of Soliman to surrender possession,
Fernandez filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Properties with Writ of
Replevin before the RTC.
Page 313 of 1553

In his Answer, Soliman maintained that Fernandez is not entitled to the possession
of the subject vehicles and as president of SMC Pneumatics he insisted that he is entitled
to the possession and use thereof.
The RTC, however, dismissed the case due to the alleged failure of Fernandez to
prosecute his case. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held that
the lower court need not immediately dismiss the case for failure of Fernandez to file a
motion to set the case for pre-trial because the Branch Clerk of Court should have issued a
Notice of Pre-Trial. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Soliman argued that the appellate court mistakenly concluded that the
trial court need not immediately dismiss the case for failure of Fernandez to file a motion
to set the case for pre-trial. He alleged that a closer reading of the Regional Trial Court
Order would reveal that the Order simply stated that Fernandez did not take any step for
the further prosecution of the case. He noted that "any step for the further prosecution of
the case" is not necessarily limited to the setting of the case for pre-trial. The phrase may
include an equally significant, available remedy and course of action such as a motion for
a judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. He maintained that the failure to
take any of the three (3) available courses of action prompted the trial court to conclude
that Fernandez has not taken any step for the further prosecution of the case and to dismiss
the same for failure to prosecute.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint of Fernandez
for failure to prosecute.
Ruling:
No, the trial court was wrong in dismissing the case.
Soliman’s contention is speculative. The Court cannot presume that Fernandez had
the intention of availing of the remedies of motion for judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment but failed to file the same. The fact remains that Fernandez had the
option to move for pre-trial and if he fails to do so as he did, the branch clerk of court had
the duty to have the case set for pre-trial. Moreover, the period of more than four (4)
months or from 21 September 2004 up to 31 January 2005 may not be considered an
unreasonable length of time to warrant the terminal consequence of dismissal of the case.
Page 314 of 1553

To be sure, the dismissal of the case cannot be for the failure of Fernandez to take
any step for further prosecution of this case" because the further step is not his, but for the
clerk of court, to take.
On a final note, the Court emphasizes that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to
delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement
of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense
with rather than wield their authority to dismiss. This is in line with the time-honoured
principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their
causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as
basis of decisions.
PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. CATALINA L. SANTOS, REPRESENTED

BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LUZ B. PROTACIO AND DAVID R. RAYMUNDO
G.R. No. 194638, July 2, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The pattern of delay the pre-trial of the instant case is quite evident from the foregoing.
Parañaque Kings clearly trifled with the mandatory character of a pre-trial, which is a
procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to
take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-
trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of
cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. It is,
thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize the
paramount objective of simplifying; abbreviating, and expediting trial.
Facts:
Respondent Santos entered into a Contract of Lease with Frederick Chua over eight
(8) parcels of land, specifically giving the latter the first option or priority to buy the same
in case of sale. Chua then caused the construction of a 6-door commercial complex on the
leased premises but, by reason of business reverses, he was constrained to assign his rights
thereon to Lee Ching Bing, who assumed all obligations under the lease contract. Lee, in
turn, executed a Deed of Assignment over the leased premises in favor of Petitioner
Parañaque Kings.
On March 19, 1991, Parañaque Kings instituted a complaint against Santos and Co-
respondent Raymundo to whom Santos allegedly sold the leased premises. Parañaque
Kings asserts that it was not given the opportunity to exercise its priority to buy and when
it objected to the sale Santos repurchased the subject property and offered the same to it
Page 315 of 1553

at a higher price than the consideration in the tune of PhP9,000,000.00 later paid by
Raymundo for the second sale.
Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by herein respondents, the trial court
dismissed the case for failure to state cause of action and which was affirmed by the CA.
However, upon the Court’s review, the complaint was reinstated as it was found to have
sufficiently alleged an actionable contractual breach and the crux of the controversy lies on
the failure of Santos to tender the second offer to Parañaque Kings.
Respondents then filed their Answer with Counterclaims to which Parañaque Kings
reacted by having certain allegations thereon be striked out particularly the assertion that
there was a tender of the second offer to it. However, the motion of Parañaque Kings was
found unmeritorious by the trial court which likewise denied the reconsideration thereof.
On July 2, 1998, Parañaque Kings filed a Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial, claiming that it
was preparing a petition for certiorari and prohibition which (a) was to be filed with the
CA before the scheduled pre-trial on July 7, 1998, and (b) was intended to challenge the
validity of the RTC’s Orders by raising alleged prejudicial questions that must be resolved
first before the pre-trial and trial on the merits of the case could proceed. Parenthetically,
the said petition was filed on the very same day the pre-trial sought to be postponed should
have taken place. Nonetheless, the CA resolved the petition in favor of Parañaque Kings
and to which respondent excepted via a petition for review on certiorari.
In the meantime, on July 7, 1998, the trial court issued an order denying the Motion
to Cancel Pre-Trial and directing the parties to proceed to pre-trial. Refusing to commence,
the pre-trial, the court issued another declaring Parañaque Kings nonsuited and dismissing
its complaint. Subsequently, Parañaque Kings filed a motion for reconsideration and upon
its denial, a Notice of Appeal. The trial court considered the motion pro forma and it did
not toll the running of the period to appeal. Undaunted, Parañaque Kings challenged the
orders issued by the trial court before the CA but ultimately its action merited denial from
the appellate court.
Issues:
1. Is the denial or affirmation of such denial of the Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial

correct?
2. Is the dismissal of the complaint for failure of Parañaque Kings to proceed to pre-
trial likewise proper?
Page 316 of 1553

Ruling:
1. YES, both the trial court and the CA are correct in rejecting the contentions of
Parañaque Kings relative to its Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial.
It is quite understood that the trial court is reposed with the discretion to grant or
deny any motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pre-trial conference. This is because
the court is in the position to know whether the same may proceed or there exists
meritorious grounds allowing its postponement. In the instant case, Parañaque Kings, thru
its counsels, raised certain open court motions or grounds in succession which deferred the
three (3) settings the trial court scheduled for the pre-trial.
The pattern of delay the pre-trial of the instant case is quite evident from the
foregoing. Parañaque Kings clearly trifled with the mandatory character of a pre-trial,
which is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the
parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More
significantly, a pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-
Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and
resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil
cases in order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying; abbreviating, and
expediting trial.
On this score, it relevant to take note that seven (7) years have lapsed from the filing
of the complaint in 1991 to the insistence of the trial court to conduct pre-trial in 1998, and
yet no pre-trial has been so conducted owing to the dilatory tactics of Parañaque Kings. For
one, the trial court had no basis to rule on its motion since it failed to present any petition
certiorari and prohibition which it committed to actually file to the CA before the
scheduled pre-trial on July 7, 1998. The Court has to agree with the CA that the mere
elevation of an interlocutory matter through a petition for certiorari does not by itself merit
a suspension of the proceedings before the trial court, unless a TRO or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued. Resultantly, the denial of the motion was justified.
2. YES, the dismissal of the complaint is proper.
It bears stressing that the rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of the
judicial system. By trifling with the rules and the court processes, and openly defying the
order of the trial court to proceed to pre-trial, Parañaque Kings has only itself to blame for
the dismissal of its complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Page 317 of 1553

Verily, as the Court sees it, Parañaque Kings had the opportunity to present its case,
yet chose to unduly forego the same. The CA in [its decision] pointed out the crucial fact
that Parañaque Kings had already submitted its pre-trial brief and its counsel was armed
with an SPA for the pre-trial. There was nothing that could have stopped petitioner from
proceeding to pre-trial when its motion for postponement was denied. The trial court
correctly opined that it would have been entirely different if Parañaque Kings simply
objected to the proceeding and made record its objection. But Parañaque Kings’ refusal to
even start with the statement of its cause is a “clear, firm and open defiance” of the directive
of the court, which justified the dismissal of its [c]omplaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17
of the Rules of Court [.]
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND

TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 190277, July 23, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.,
Counsel for Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company failed to produce written
authorization to represent her client during the pre-trial. The Trial Court rendered
Metropolitan in default. In affirming the decision of the Trial Court, the Supreme Court held
that where a party may not himself be present at the pretrial, and another person substitutes
for him, or his lawyer undertakes to appear not only as an attorney but in substitution of the
client’s person, it is imperative for that representative of the lawyer to have “special authority”
to make such substantive agreements as only the client otherwise has capacity to make.
Facts:
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation and Spouses Sandy Ang and
Arlene Ang filed a case for sum of money against private respondent Absolute Management
Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent filed its
answer and incorporated a third party complaint against petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company. On November 20, 2006, the trial court set the case for pretrial. When the
counsels of the parties were asked by the trial court to produce their respective
authorizations to appear at the said hearing, counsel for Metropolitan Bank manifested
that her authority to appear for petitioner was submitted by them at the first pretrial
hearing way back in 2004. Petitioner’s counsel was given the chance to go over the records
to look for the Secretary’s Certificate she allegedly submitted in 2004. Petitioner’s counsel,
however, failed to show any written authority.
As a result thereof, the trial court declared petitioner in default. Without waiting for
the written order of default, petitioner, on December 5, 2006, filed a Motion to Lift Order
of Default seeking reconsideration which was denied. Petitioner filed a motion for
Page 318 of 1553
reconsideration of the above quoted Order but the same was also denied by the trial court.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforestated Orders. In its assailed decision, the CA
reversed the trial court’s ruling that respondent’s counsel cannot validly represent
respondent due to “the failure on the part of the representative of respondent to present a
Secretary’s Certificate and Special Power of Attorney authorizing her to represent
respondent during the pretrial stage.” Absolute Management’s motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Resolution dated November 13, 2009. Hence, this .
Issue:
In the absence of the party during pre-trial, can the counsel represent him despite
lack of written authorization?
Ruling:
No. Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure , as amended, states:
SEC. 4. Appearance of parties.—It shall be the duty of the parties and their
counsel to appear at the pretrial. The nonappearance of a party may be excused only if a
valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized
in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear.—The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so

required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
The Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this
purpose before the Court, and when a party “fails to appear at a pretrial conference (he)
may be nonsuited or considered as in default.” The obligation “to appear” denotes not
simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of one’s self,
but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subject assigned by law
to a pretrial. And in those instances where a party may not himself be present at the pretrial,
and another person substitutes for him, or his lawyer undertakes to appear not only as an
attorney but in substitution of the client’s person, it is imperative for that representative of
the lawyer to have “special authority” to make such substantive agreements as only the
client otherwise has capacity to make. That “special authority” should ordinarily be in
writing or at the very least be “duly established by evidence other than the selfserving
Page 319 of 1553
assertion of counsel (or the proclaimed representative) him representative cannot be

deemed capacitated to appear in place of the party; hence, it will be considered that the
latter has failed to put in an appearance at all, and he [must] therefore “be nonsuited or
considered as in default,” notwithstanding his lawyer’s or delegate’s presence.
The facts in the case at bar do not warrant a liberal construction of the rules. To be
sure, the only explanation proffered by respondent’s counsel for not having the proper
authorization to represent respondent at pretrial was her manifestation in open court that
the written authority was submitted to the court a quo during the first pretrial hearing way
back in 2004. When respondent’s counsel was given the chance to go over the records of
the court a quo to look for the Secretary’s Certificate and the SPA that she allegedly
submitted in 2004, these documents could not be found from the records of the case.
Respondent had failed to substantiate its sole excuse for its representative’s
apparent lack of authority to be its representative, in addition to being its counsel, during
the pretrial conference. To be sure, if indeed there was such an authority previously
executed by respondent in favor of its counsel as early as the pretrial conferences that
respondent alleges to have taken place on February 27, 2004 and April 16, 2004, this fact
would have been easily proven by respondent. Such document conveying authority —
having originated from and issued by respondent itself — would have been produced with
relative facility. Respondent, however, failed to produce this document before the court a
quo, the appellate court and this Court. As fairly observed by petitioner, the SPA later
submitted by respondent’s counsel is dated December 5, 2006 or “after” the pretrial
conference on November 20, 2000.
NEIL B. AGUILAR AND RUBEN CALIMBAS vs. LIGHTBRINGERS CREDIT

COOPERATIVE
G.R. No. 209605, January 12, 2015, J. Mendoza
During pre-trial, if the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If
it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. In the case at bench, the
petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference. They did not even give any excuse for
their non-appearance. Thus, the MCTC properly allowed respondent to present evidence ex
parte. Thus, the Court can only consider the evidence on record offered by respondent. The
petitioners lost their right to present their evidence during the trial and, a fortiori, on appeal
due to their disregard of the mandatory attendance in the pre-trial conference.
Facts:
This case stemmed from the three (3) complaints for sum of money separately filed
by respondent Lightbringers Credit Cooperative against petitioners Aguilar and Calimbas,
Page 320 of 1553
and one Perlita Tantiangco. The complaints alleged that Tantiangco, Aguilar and
Calimbas were members of the cooperative who borrowed funds.
In their answers, Petitioners claimed that the discrepancy between the principal
amount of the loan evidenced by the cash disbursement voucher and the net amount of
loan reflected in the PNB checks showed that they never borrowed the amounts being
collected. They also asserted that no interest could be claimed because there was no written
agreement as to its imposition.
On the scheduled pre-trial conference, only Lightbringers Credit Cooperative and

its counsel appeared. The MCTC then allowed Lightbringers to present evidence ex parte.
It presented Fernando Manalili, its incumbent General Manager, as its sole witness. In his
testimony, Manalili explained that the discrepancy between the amounts of the loan
reflected in the checks and those in the cash disbursement vouchers were due to the
accumulated interests from previous outstanding obligations, withheld share capital, as
well as the service and miscellaneous fees.
Aguilar and Calimbas insisted that they should have the right to cross-examine the
witness of respondent, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were being heard ex parte.
In the interest of justice, the MCTC directed the counsels of the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the issue of whether or not a party who had been declared
“as in default” might still participate in the trial of the case. Only Lightbringers, however,
complied with the directive. The MCTC held that since the proceedings were being
heard ex parte, the petitioners who had been declared “as in default” had no right to
participate therein and to cross-examine the witnesses.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint against Tantiangco but found both Calimbas
and Aguilar liable to Lightbringers for their respective debts. On appeal, Aguilar and
Calimbas argued out that had they been allowed to present evidence, they would have
established that the loan documents were bogus. The RTC affirmed the MCTC decisions.
Aggrieved, Aguilar and Calimbas filed a petition for review before the CA. It was
dismissed on the ground that the petition was formally defective because the “verification
and disclaimer of forum shopping” and the “affidavit of service” had a defective jurat for
failure of the notary public to indicate his notarial commission number and office address.
Moreover, the entire records of the case, inclusive of the oral and documents evidence,
were not attached to the petition in contravention of Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.
Page 321 of 1553

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners which sought the leniency
of the CA. They attached a corrected verification and disclaimer of forum shopping and
affidavit of service. They asked the CA to simply order the RTC to elevate the records of the
case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioners could
not attach the records of the case because the flooding caused by “Habagat” in August 2012
soaked the said records in water. The CA denied the motion. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 2, Rule 42 require that the entire records of the case be
attached to the petition for review;
2. Whether or not the court should consider the Petitioners’ evidence even if they
failed to attend the pre-trial conference pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court
Ruling:
1. No. The Section 2, Rule 42 enumerates the required documents that must be attached to
a petition for review, to wit: (1) clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the
judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court; (2) the requisite number of plain copies thereof; and (3) of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition. Clearly, the Rules do not require that the entire records of the case be attached to
the petition for review. Only when these specified documents are not attached in the
petition will it suffer infirmities under Section 3, Rule 42, which states:
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner
to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition,
and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Recently, in Galvez, v. CA, it was held that attaching the other records of the MTC
and the RTC were not necessary based on the circumstances of the case. The petitioner
therein was not assailing the propriety of the findings of fact by the MTC and the RTC, but
only the conclusions reached by the said lower courts after their appreciation of the facts.
In dealing with the questions of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of
the MTC and the RTC.
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Thus, the Court rules that the petition was in substantial compliance with the
requirements. The assignment of error in the petition for review clearly raises questions of
fact as the petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the MCTC and the RTC. Thus,
aside from the decisions and orders of the MCTC and the RTC, the petitioners should attach
pertinent portions of the records such as the testimony of the sole witness of respondent,
the copies of the cash disbursement vouchers and the PNB checks presented by respondent
in the MCTC. In the petition for review, the petitioners attached Lightbringer’s complaints
before the MCTC which contained the photocopies of the cash disbursement vouchers and
PNB checks. These should be considered as ample compliance with Section 2, Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court.
No. The rule is that a court can only consider the evidence presented by respondent
in the MCTC because the petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference on August 25,
2009 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The Court, however, clarifies that
failure to attend the pre-trial does not result in the “default” of the defendant. Instead, the
failure of the defendant to attend shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence
ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Joseph
Enario discussed the difference between non-appearance of a defendant in a pre-trial
conference and the declaration of a defendant in default in the present Rules of Civil
Procedure. The decision states: Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
phrase "as in default" was initially included in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which read as
follows:
Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or

considered as in default.
It was however amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice
Regalado, in his book REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, explained the rationale for the
deletion of the phrase "as in default" in the amended provision, to wit:
This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former Rule 20 with the change
that, instead of defendant being declared "as in default" by reason of his non-
appearance, this section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the ex
parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis
thereof. While actually the procedure remains the same, the purpose is one of
semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as there were criticisms on the use
of the word "default" in the former provision since that term is identified with the
failure to file a required answer, not appearance in court.
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If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the
defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given
the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood
being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or present his own evidence.
In the case at bench, the petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on
August 25, 2009. They did not even give any excuse for their non-appearance, manifestly
ignoring the importance of the pre-trial stage. Thus, the MCTC properly issued the August
25, 2009 Order, allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.
Thus, as it stands, the Court can only consider the evidence on record offered by
respondent. The petitioners lost their right to present their evidence during the trial and, a
fortiori, on appeal due to their disregard of the mandatory attendance in the pre-trial
conference.
SPOUSES ROLANDO AND HERMINIA SALVADOR vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO AND

ELIZABETH RABAJA AND ROSARIO GONZALES,
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the
pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the
reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference,
the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and
their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper
notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel
as he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to
the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a
result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their
favor.
Facts:
Spouses Rabaja learned that Spouses Salvador were looking for a buyer of their
land where Spouses Rabaja also leases. Spouses Rabaja and Spouses Salvador then entered
into a contract of sale wherein Gonzales, administrator of the subject property, received
the considerations paid by Spouses Rabaja pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney issued
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by Spouses Salvador in favor of Gonzales. Sometime in June 1999, however, Spouses

Salvador complained to Spouses Rabaja that they did not receive any payment from
Gonzales. This prompted Spouses Rabaja to suspend further payment of the purchase price;
and as a consequence, they received a notice to vacate the subject property from Spouses
Salvador for non-payment of rentals. Spouses Rabaja filed an action for rescission of
contract against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales.
The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle the case were
unsuccessful. It was formally reset to February 4, 2005, but Spouses Salvador and their
counsel failed to attend. Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial order declaring Spouses
Salvador in default and allowing Spouses Rabaja to present their evidence ex parte against
Spouses Salvador and Gonzales to present evidence in her favor. A motion for
reconsideration, dated March 28, 2005, was filed by Spouses Salvador on the said pre-trial
order beseeching the liberality of the court. Such motion for reconsideration was denied
because Spouses Salvador provided a flimsy excuse for their non-appearance in the pre-
trial conference. Thereafter, trial proceeded and Spouses Rabaja and Gonzales presented
their respective testimonial and documentary evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial conference

warrants the presentation of evidence ex parte by Spouses Rabaja.
Ruling:
Yes.
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the
pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within
the reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial
conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte.
There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-
trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that
their non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his
calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It
simply cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their
inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor.
Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex
Page 325 of 1553

parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants. Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant

was able to attend the pre-trial conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The
RTC could only render judgment based on the evidence presented during the trial.
INTERVENTION
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAUBAN,

QUEZON, BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER (PHILIPPINES) LIMITED, CO.,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, and DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 157583, September 10, 2014, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the

existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the placid operation
of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain
right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could
assert or protect such right or interests. In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's
dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his
intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax
assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his intervention.
Facts:
Sometime in 1999, the Municipal Assessor of Mauban, Quezon issued 34 tax

declarations on the buildings and machinery comprising the Mauban Plant – a coal-fired
electric generation facility owned and operated by respondent Quezon Power (Philippines)
Limited, Co. (QPL) – and thereby assessed it with a total market value of 29,626,578,291.00
and, hence, 500 Million, more or less, in realty taxes per annum. The Municipal Assessor
maintained that the Mauban Plant was completed and already operational in October 1999.
Subsequently, or on May 18, 2000, QPL filed with the Municipal Assessor a sworn statement
declaring that the said properties had a value of only P15,055,951,378.00.
QPL tendered to the Municipal Assessor the amount of P60,223,805.51 as first

quarter installment of the realty taxes on the plant, which the latter rejected. Hence, QPL
filed a Complaint for Consignation and Damages before the RTC against the Province of
Quezon, the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Mauban, Quezon, and the
Provincial Assessor and Provincial Treasurer of Quezon (defendants), docketed as Civil
Case No. 0587-M, depositing to the RTC the above-stated amount in payment of the first
quarter realty tax for 2001. Albeit classified as a consignation and damages case, QPL
essentially protested the Municipal Assessor’s assessment for, among others, its lack of
Page 326 of 1553

legal authority to make such assessment and its supposed non-compliance with the
prescribed valuation process.
For their part, defendants averred, among others, that QPL was estopped from
denying the authority of the Municipal Assessor since it previously paid realty taxes for its
properties for the year 2001 based on the assessment of the latter.
Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention and Answer-in-

Intervention (motion for intervention), alleging, among others, that as a resident and
taxpayer of Quezon Province, he has an interest in the aggressive collection of realty taxes
against QPL. By way of counterclaim, he prayed for the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees, anchoring the same on the "mindless disturbance of the forest and marine
environment whereon the power plant of QPL stands." Pulgar’s motion was initially
granted and his Answer-in Intervention was admitted.
QPL and the Province of Quezon agreed to submit their dispute before the Secretary
of Finance, which resulted in a Resolution dated August 30, 2002 where the basic issues
between the principal parties were passed upon.
The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack of jurisdiction in the absence of
a payment of the tax assessed under protest, which requirement QPL attempted to skirt by
alleging in its complaint that it is the very authority of the Municipal Assessor to impose
the assessment and the treasurer to collect the tax that it was questioning. Declaring that
QPL’s complaint essentially challenged the amount of the taxes assessed, the RTC ruled
that it is the Local Board of Assessment Appeals that had jurisdiction over the complaint.
Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgar’s motion for intervention since with the dismissal
of the main case, the same had no leg to stand on.
Aggrieved, Pulgar filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgar’s motion for intervention as a
consequence of the dismissal of the main case.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
Page 327 of 1553

Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main

action. Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction.
In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M
for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a
review of the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court,
however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the main case
necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the
principal litigation - on jurisdictional grounds at that - means that Pulgar had, as a matter
of course, lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind that:
Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to

the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor x x x unnecessarily delay the placid
operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet
having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be
joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests.
Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the
original party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or
fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases.
MODES OF DISCOVERY
Ingrid Sala Santamaria and Astrid Sala Boza Vs. Thomas Cleary/Kathryn Go-Perez
Vs. Thomas Cleary
G.R. No. 197122/G.R. No. 197161. June 15, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner, an American and who lives in the US, filed a civil case against
respondents before the RTC of Cebu. moved for court authorization to take deposition. He
prayed that his deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in
Los Angeles and be used as his direct testimony. Respondents opposed5 the Motion
and argued that the right to take deposition is not absolute.16 They claimed that Cleary
chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he deprived the court and the parties
the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions on him
The trial court denied Cleary’s Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition
in the Order22 dated June 5, 2009. It held that depositions are not meant to be a substitute
for actual testimony in open court. As a rule, a deponent must be presented for oral
Page 328 of 1553

examination at trial as required under Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. “As the
supposed deponent is the plaintiff himself who is not suffering from any impairment,
physical or otherwise, it would be best for him to appear in court and testify under oath[.]”
The trial court also denied reconsideration. The CA reversed the trial court and allowed the
taking of the deposition.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in allowing the taking of the deposition
2. Whether there is ground for the issuance of pan protective order
Ruling:
1. Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the testimony of any person may be taken by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories at the instance of any
party. San Luis explained that this provision “does not make any distinction or
restriction as to who can avail of deposition.” Thus, this Court found it immaterial
that the plaintiff was a non-resident foreign corporation and that all its witnesses
were Americans residing in the United States. On the use of depositions taken, we
refer to Rule 23, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
It is of no moment that respondent was not suffering from any impairment. Rule
23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court, which was invoked by respondent, governs
the use of depositions taken. This allows the use of a deposition taken when a
witness is “out of the Philippines.” In any case, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court still
allows for objections to admissibility during trial. The difference between
admissibility of evidence and weight of evidence has long been laid down in
jurisprudence. These two are not to be equated. Admissibility considers factors
such as competence and relevance of submitted evidence. On the other hand,
weight is concerned with the persuasive tendency of admitted evidence
This Court has held that “depositions may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and
for certain limited purposes.” These exceptional cases are enumerated in Rule 23,
Section 4(c) as follows: SEC 4. Use of depositions. – At the trial or upon the hearing
of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof,
Page 329 of 1553
in accordance with any one of the following provisions: . . . . (c) The deposition of a
witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at distance
more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out
of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because
of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena;
or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to
make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition
to be used[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The difference between the taking of depositions and the use of depositions
taken is apparent in Rule 23, which provides separate sections to govern them.
Jurisprudence has also discussed the importance of this distinction and its
implications: The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not
constitute “good cause” to justify the court’s order that his deposition shall not be
taken.
There are two (2) requisites before a court may issue a protective order: (1) there must be
notice; and (2) the order must be for good cause shown. In Fortune Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, this Court discussed the concept of good cause as used in the rules: The
matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Good cause means a substantial reason—one that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not
substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for
determining the question as to what is meant by the term “for good cause shown.” The
requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden
on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. A
particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory
statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. What
constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is
sought.
EAGLE RIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and

CRISPIN I. OBEN vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014, J. Leonen
Page 330 of 1553

Cameron Granville filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 10, 2013
decision. Cameron Granville posited that the motion for production was filed out of time and
that the rule on parole evidence is applicable. However, the Court ruled that the availment of
a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage.
Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production
or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court "upon due
application and a showing of due cause."
Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court.
Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management (Cameron Granville), Inc. filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s April 10, 2013 decision, which reversed and set aside the
Court of Appeals' resolutions and ordered Cameron Granville to produce the Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA).
The facts stated herein are the corresponding arguments of both parties.
Cameron Granville in its motion for reconsideration poses the following arguments;
first, there was no "insistent refusal" on its part to present the LSPA, but that Eagle Ridge
Developments filed their motion for production way out of time, even beyond the
protracted pre-trial.
Second, that even assuming arguendo that Art. 1634 of the New Civil Code is
applicable, the Eagle Ridge Developments are still liable to pay because pursuant to Article
1634, they should have exercised their right of extinguishment within 30 days from the
substitution of Export and Industry Bank or EIB (the original creditor) by Cameron
Granville in December 2006. According to Cameron Granville, the trial court order
"granting the substitution constituted sufficient judicial demand as contemplated under
Article 1634." Also, maintaining that the LSPA is immaterial or irrelevant to the case,
Cameron Granville contends that the "[o]rder of substitution settled the issue of [Cameron
Granville’s] standing before the [c]ourt and its right to fill in the shoes of [EIB]." It argues
that the production of the LSPA will neither prevent Cameron Granville from pursuing its
claim of 10,232,998.00, exclusive of interests and penalties, from Eagle Ridge Development
EDC, nor write off Eagle Ridge Development EDC’s liability to Cameron Granville.
Cameron Granville also contends that: (1) the production of the LSPA will violate
the parol evidence rule under Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court; (2) the LSPA is a
privileged/confidential bank document; and (3) under the Special Purpose Vehicle Act.
Page 331 of 1553

On the other hand, Eagle Ridge Development posits the following arguments. They
argue that their motion for production was not filed out of time, and "[t]here is no
proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing motions for
production, beyond the pre-trial.
Moreover, Eagle Ridge Development argues that there was a valid transfer of the
loan obligation of Eagle Ridge Development EDC, Article 1634 is applicable and, therefore,
Eagle Ridge Developments must be informed of the actual transfer price, which
information may only be supplied by the LSPA. Eagle Ridge Developments next argue that
the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties to the deed
of assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the
complete terms of the Deed of Assignment." Besides, the deed of assignment made express
reference to the LSPA, hence, the latter cannot be considered as extrinsic to it.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the motion for production was filed out of time
2. Whether or not rule on parole evidence is applicable
3. Whether or not the LSPA is confidential and privileged in nature
Ruling:
1. The motion for production was not filed out of time.
The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not
limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the
discovery mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only
requires leave of court "upon due application and a showing of due cause."
In Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,40 this court held that since
the rules are silent asto the period within which modes of discovery (in that case, written
interrogatories) may still be requested, it is necessary to determine: (1) the purpose of
discovery; (2) whether, based on the stage of the proceedings and evidence presented thus
far, allowing it is proper and would facilitate the disposition of the case; and (3) whether
substantial rights of parties would be unduly prejudiced.41 This court further held that
"[t]he use of discovery is encouraged, for it operates with desirable flexibility under the
discretionary control of the trial court."
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The court have determined that the LSPA is relevant and material to the issue on
the validity of the deed of assignment raised by Eagle Ridge Developments in the court a
quo, and allowing its production and inspection by Eagle Ridge Developments would be
more in keeping with the objectives of the discovery rules. The court finds no great practical
difficulty, and Cameron Granville continuously fails to allege any, in presenting the
document for inspection and copying of Eagle Ridge Developments. On the other hand, to
deny Eagle Ridge Developments the opportunity to inquire into the LSPA would bar their
access to relevant evidence and impair their fundamental right to due process.
2. The Parole Evidence Rule is not applicable.
The parol evidence rule does not apply to Eagle Ridge Developments who are not
parties to the deed of assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be
prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment.
What is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or
extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "[D]ocuments
can be read together when one refers to the other." By the express terms of the deed of
assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was meant to be read in conjunction
with the LSPA.
3. The LSPA is not privileged and confidential in nature.
Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted

need to protect a trust relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of
assignment fall under any of the foregoing categories.
This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: "(a)
editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not
be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained
in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank deposits" (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act);
(e) national security matters and intelligence information;63 and (f) criminal matters.
Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover,
the privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable
for doing justice.
At any rate, Cameron Granville failed to discharge the burden of showing that the
LSPA is a privileged document. Cameron Granville did not present any law or regulation
that considers bank documents such as the LSPA as classified information. The Special
Page 333 of 1553

Purpose Vehicle Act does not explicitly declare these financial documents as privileged
matters. Further, as discussed, Eagle Ridge Developments are not precluded from inquiring
as to the true consideration of the assignment, precisely because the same law in relation
to Article 1634 allows the debtor to extinguish its debt by reimbursing the assignee-special
purpose vehicle of the actual price the latter paid for the assignment.
Litis Pendentia
PEBLIA ALFARO AND THE HEIRS OF PROSPEROUS ALFARO

vs. SPOUSES EDITHO AND HERA DUMALAGAN
G.R. NO. 186622, JANUARY 22, 2014
J. PEREZ
a. Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
on all points and matters determined in the former suit. The elements of res judicata are as
follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on
the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity
of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. The Bagano case has been settled by the
court having jurisdiction and was based on the merits. Nonetheless, the Bagano case and the
present controversy does not point to similarity of the parties or to the cause of action
presented, hence res judicata cannot be raised to bar determination of the issue.
b. An independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such
intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand
the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenor’s
case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original
parties; the proper course is for the would–be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate
suit. Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or
to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention
is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial
of the action. Hence, the issue of double sale as alleged cannot be injected into the Bagano
case, which is based on facts peculiar to the transaction between Bagano and petitioners.
Facts:
Bagano sold a lot, which is registered in his name, to petitioner Spouses Alfaro. Thereafter,
petitioners caused the immediate transfer of title in their name and at the same time paid
the real property tax thereon, and constructed a perimeter fence around it. However,
respondents filed their claim thereto, alleging that they are the real owners of a portion of
Page 334 of 1553

the property as evidenced by a Certificate of Completion and a Certificate of Occupancy as

well as electric bills. It was further alleged that right after the respondents bought the same
from Bagano, they immediately took possession of the property and constructed a nipa hut
therein, which was later on leased to Quiñineza, who then occupied the subject property
until end of 1997. Since then, several tenants have occupied the subject property, paying
monthly rentals to respondent. Since then, several tenants have occupied the subject
property, paying monthly rentals to respondent.
Meanwhile, Spouses Bagano filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sale with
Damages and Preliminary Injunction against petitioners, wherein the SC sustained the
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between petitioners and Spouses Bagano.
However, in the present case, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action, which decision the CA reversed explaining that the petitioners cannot claim good
faith as there were annotations written at the back of Bagano’s title. Motion for reconsider
was denied, hence, this petition wherein, Spouses Alfaro claimed that the SC decision in
the Bagano case constituted res judicata.
Issue:
a. Whether the decision made by the SC in the Bagano case constituted res judicata.
b. Whether non-intervention by respondents in the Bagano case bound him by the
judgment for bad faith and/or laches.
Ruling:
a. Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. The elements of res
judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or
order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the
second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
Our decision in the Bagano case on the merits has long been final. Also, the court a quo has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. However, on the issue on identity of
parties and cause of action, We rule in the negative.
In the Bagano case, the parties are herein petitioner Spouses Alfaro and the Spouses
Bagano, as privies to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 June 1995. In the case at bar, the
parties are petitioner Spouses Alfaro and respondent Spouses Dumalagan basing their
Page 335 of 1553

rights on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 December 1993. There is, thus, no identity of
parties.
In the Bagano case, the cause of action is the alleged forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale
by petitioners; the crux of the case being the validity of the sale between Bagano and
petitioners. In the case at bar, the cause of action is the violation of right of ownership of
respondent Spouses Dumalagan. Clearly, there is no identity of cause of action. Therefore,
the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in the case at bar. The appellate court did not
reverse a Supreme Court decision.
b. Petitioners’ claim must fail. In Mactan–Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of

Estanislao Miñoza, et. al., this Court clarified that:
xxx an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention,

hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in
the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are
certain facts giving the intervenor’s case an aspect peculiar to himself and
differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the
would–be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not
intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay
the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is not
proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the
trial of the action.
In line with this ruling, the issue on double sale, which concerns the present case cannot
be injected into the Bagano case, which is based on facts peculiar to the transaction
between Bagano and petitioners. For one, herein respondents claim ownership of only a
portion of the property litigated in the Bagano case, and the basis of respondents’ claim is
a prior sale to them by Bagano, whose authority as a seller was an unquestioned fact.
Neither of the parties in the second Bagano sale made any mention of the first sale of a part
of the property to respondents.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL vs. HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL

G.R. NO. 158916, MARCH 19, 2014
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
Page 336 of 1553
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The. For res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of parties and identity of issues.
As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd. 146880 is one of the properties donated by the
spouses Cornelio and Nieves to Angel and whether such donation was valid have been
necessarily settled in Civil Case No. 1185, they can no longer be relitigated in Civil Case No.
2735.
Facts:
Cornelio was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Puerto Princesa City. He had the
property subdivided into ten smaller lots which were designated as Lots A to J of Psd-
146880. Cornelio sold nine of the lots to his children, with Lot G going to his son Angel,
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents in this case. The remaining lot, Lot J, Cornelio
kept for himself and his wife, Nieves. In a deed of donation inter vivos, the spouses Cornelio
and Nieves donated two lots to Angel. Angel accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Subsequently, however, Cornelio filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of
donation on the alleged ground that one of the properties subject of the donation, Lot 2-J
of Psd-146879, was given the technical description of Lot J of Psd-146880. On Angel’s
motion, it was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Angel, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Registrar of Deeds to issue
a certificate of title in his favor. The petition was granted and TCT No. 11349 was issued in
the name of Angel over Lot J of Psd-146880. Angel later on caused the subdivision of Lot J
of Psd-146880 into four smaller lots which he correspondingly donated to each of his four
sons.
On July 7, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Angel’s TCT No.
11349 and its derivative titles, as well as of the respective deeds of donation Angel executed
in favor of his sons. The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for the nullification of
deeds of donation and reconveyance of property. The CA affirmed the Order of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the CA misapplied the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment
Ruling:
Page 337 of 1553
The following are the elements of res judicata: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior
judgment as enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment as explained in Section 47(c) of the same Rule. Should identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a
“bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties
can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of
judgment” applies.
Nabus v. Court of Appeals clarifies the concept of conclusiveness of judgment further: The
doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there
judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either
the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or
unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of the
judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties and identity of issues.
In this case, the Court of Appeals held the following as regards the issue of identity of
parties: As further held, conclusiveness of judgment calls for identity of parties, not causes
of action, and “there is identity of parties not only when the parties are the same but also
those on privity with them, as between their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action, litigation for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity, or when there is substantial identity of parties.” In the present
case, appellants were the successors in interest of petitioner Cornelio in Civil Case No. 1185
against respondent Angel, whereas in Civil Case No. 2735, appellees were the successors in
interest of Angel. Undeniably, there is substantial identity of parties in the said two cases.
And since the matter directly controverted and determined in Civil Case No. 1185 is the lot
which is also the bone of contention in Civil Case No. 2735, the judgment rendered in the
first case is conclusive in the second case.
The petitioners do not question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there is identity of
parties in Civil Case No. 1185 and Civil Case No. 2735. What the petitioners principally
Page 338 of 1553

contend is that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1185 cannot bar Civil Case No. 2735 as the
two cases involve different causes of action and different subject matters.
However, for res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of
cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
The claim of the petitioners that Civil Case No. 1185 was dismissed not because they have
no cause of action but because they failed to state such a cause of action is wrong. The
Order dated January 31, 1986 in Civil Case No. 1185 ruled that Cornelio and the petitioners
had no cause of action in connection with the reformation of the deed of donation executed
by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves in favor of Angel because the said deed of donation is
a simple donation and therefore not a proper subject of an action for reformation.
For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of issues means that the right, fact, or
matter in issue has previously been either “directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action” by a competent court. In this case, the issue of the transfer
pursuant to the deed of donation to Angel of Lot J of Psd. 146880 and, corollarily, his right
over the said property has been necessarily involved in Civil Case No. 1185.
The petitioners argued that none of the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1185 is also involved
in Civil Case No. 2735. The primary issue in Civil Case No. 1185 is whether the true intention
of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves as donors was to donate to Angel the property described
in the deed of donation, that is, Lot J of Psd. 146880. The issue in Civil Case No. 1185 is
therefore the identity of one of the properties donated by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves
for which Cornelio and the petitioners sought reformation of the deed of donation. On the
other hand, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2735 is the recovery of Lot J of Psd. 146880
on the petitioners’ claim that a clerical error prevented the deed of donation from
conforming to the true intention of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves as to the identity of
the property they intended to donate to Angel.
As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd. 146880 is one of the properties donated by the spouses
Cornelio and Nieves to Angel and whether such donation was valid have been necessarily
settled in Civil Case No. 1185, they can no longer be relitigated again in Civil Case No. 2735.
The Order dated January 31, 1986 effectively held that the said property had been donated
to Angel. It follows that he had properly sought its registration in his name under TCT No.
11349 and he had validly partitioned and donated it to his four children who acquired TCT
Nos. 20094, 20095, 20096, and 20097 in their respective names.
Page 339 of 1553

JUDGEMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS

Immutability of Final and Executory Judgments, Compromise Agreements,
Interlocutory Orders, Dispositive Portion of the Judgment, Judgment on the
Pleadings, Summary Judgments, Res Judicata
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR vs. JUANA GONZALES

G.R. NO. 185922, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. PEREZ
Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be
distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with
dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four
instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.
It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but
had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
Facts:
Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina
died Dr. Favis took Juana as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano.
Later, Dr. Favis and Juana got married and Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging
Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita, with whom he
has four children. Soon, Dr. Favis died intestate leaving residential lands, commercial
building, house, and an orchard. However, it is alleged that Dr. Favis executed a Deed of
Donation transferring and conveying the residential land and the building erected therein
in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. With this, petitioners being Dr. Favis’ children
with Capitolina, claimed that the donation prejudiced their legitime and filed for
annulment if the Deed of Donation before the RTC against respondents. Respondents,
however, asserted that the properties donated do not form part of the estate of the late Dr.
Favis because the donation was made inter vivos.
The RTC, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of donation and whether respondent
Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Thus, in its decision, RTC nullified
the Deed of Donantion finding Dr. Favis at age 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not
have jad full control of his metal capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation, and further
declared Juan and Mariano as legitimate heirs. As such, respondents appealed to the CA
Page 340 of 1553
challenging the RTC decision on ground of vitiated consent. The CA dismissed the same
not on the grounds invoked by respondents but for failure of petitioners to make an
averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by
Article 151 of the Family Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the case is not subject to compromise as it involves future legitime, which
the CA rejected, observing that while the action is between members of the same family it
does not involve a testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed
out that the subject properties cannot be considered as "future legitime" but are in fact,
legitime, as the instant complaint was filed after the death of the decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
Ruling:
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate
courts’ decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, which it correlated with Section
1, par (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The appellate court’s reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds
for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided
under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court
motu proprio.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss
the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c)
res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, cited in Katon
v. Palanca, Jr., the Court held:
The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court
clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected
to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any
motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised
Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical
change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears
from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
Page 341 of 1553

when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept
within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9. That a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion
to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a
motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed
"within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the
absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence
of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions
to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res
judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts
at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such
failure, the defense is deemed waived.
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in
a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a
defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint
of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been
filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of
the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any
defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial
court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought
before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is

wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and
did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence
of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court
unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint.
Page 342 of 1553

Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which provision
as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been given more
teeth"21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that the purpose of
making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise, has been served.
ENRIQUE G. DE LEON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPO3 PEDRITO L.

LEONARDO
Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him
and filed with the clerk of the court.
FACTS:
Petitioner De Leon was charged with Grave Oral Defamation. In its Decision, the MeTC
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. On appeal to
the RTC, petitioner argued, among others, that the MeTC decision lacked the necessary
constitutional and procedural requirements of a valid decision. The RTC and the CA
affirmed the MeTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the Decision of the MeTC failed to include the facts and the law upon which the
decision was based.
RULING:
YES.
The MeTC Decision clearly stated the facts and the law on which it was based.
Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by
Page 343 of 1553

the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed
by him and filed with the clerk of the court.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More
than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.
In this case, there was no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The CA correctly stated
that the MeTC clearly emphasized in its decision, the factual findings, as well as the
credibility and the probative weight of the evidence for the defense vis-à-vis the evidence
of the prosecution. The MeTC presented both the version of the prosecution and that of
the defense. De Leon was not left in the dark. He was fully aware of the alleged errors of
the MeTC. The RTC, as an appellate court, found no reason to reverse the decision of the
MeTC.
LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.PLANTERS

DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. NO. 187973, JANUARY 20, 2014
J. REYES
a. The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them." In the case,
the judgment rendered in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the CA under its jurisdiction and
was a judgment on the merits. Further, the parties involved in the previous case and the case
at bar were the same parties raising the same relief.
b. The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It
is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the
court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without
giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.
Page 344 of 1553

By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-
litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession
as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
Facts:
LZK Holdings obtained a loan from Planters Bank secured with a Real Estate Mortgage over
its lot located in La Union. Subsequently, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters
Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage due to failure of LZK Holdings to pay its loan,
wherein Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder. As such, LZK Holdings filed before
a complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory
note and damages, further praying for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank. Later, Planters
Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in the RTC-San
Fernando. 3 days before the expiration of LZK Holdings' redemption period, the RTC-
Makati issued a TRO enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating its title over the property.
In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the
property. However, the proceedings for its ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession was suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in view of the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati. This prompted Planters Bank to move
for reconsideration, which however, was denied. Then upon motion of LZK Holdings, the
RTC-Makati declared as null and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank, which ruling
was affirmed by the CA. When the matter reached the Supreme Court via G.R. No. 164563,
the SC sustained the CA's judgment.
Further, Planters Bank appealed the order of the RTC-San Fernando which held in
abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which
appeal was ruled in favour of Planters Bank. Aggrieved, LZK Holdings sought recourse with
the SC in a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 167998, wherein the SC affirmed the
CA's ruling and decreed that Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of
possession as the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale. Soon, Planters Bank
filed a motion to set ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of possession, which the
RTC-San Fernando granted and the CA affirmed.
Issue:
a. Whether doctrine of res judicata by conclusive of judgment is present.

b. Whether hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession.
Page 345 of 1553
Ruling:
a. The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right
or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them."
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No.
167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions
and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Banks's right to apply for
and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties
involved in the present case.
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of possession
over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of such particular issue.
b. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear from the
following disquisitions in Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils. which reiterates the
settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in

nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and
without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding
wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought
an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-
litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of
possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court,
by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession, the RTC did not err
in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting Planters Bank's motion
without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to participate.
Immutability of Final and Executory Judgments
Page 346 of 1553

MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS and ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO vs.

FORTUNATO CAJUCOM
G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015, Peralta, J.
And equally settled is the rule that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct
clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries, or when it is a void judgment. Outside of
these exceptions, the court which rendered judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue a
writ of execution. A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless
of any claim that it is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects
a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose. Thus, an order of execution which varies the tenor of the
judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.
Facts:
Fortunato Cajucom filed with the RTC a Complaint for mandamus and abatement of
nuisance against Mayor Marcial Vargas, Mun. Engr. Raymundo del Rosario and a number
of private persons Rodel Puno, et al. Cajucom alleged that he had intended to start a
gasoline station business on his lot but several illegal structures built on the road shoulder
by Puno, et al. were obstructing access to his site, thus, frustrating his plan. Demand was
made for Puno, et al. to remove their structures but to no avail. Cajucom tried to enlist the
help of Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario but they similarly did not act. Cajucom
ultimately prayed for the court to command the said municipal mayor and engineer to
cause the removal of all buildings and structures built on the concerned road. The RTC
ruled in favor of Cajucom. It granted the prayer for mandamus and ordered Mayor Vargas
and Engr. Del Rosario to comply with the same. No appeal was interposed from the
decision. Thus, it became final and executory. Cajucom filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Execution which the court granted. However, the judgment has not been executed.
Cajucom filed a Motion to Compel Defendants Mayor Marcial Vargas and Mun. Engr.
Raymundo Del Rosario to implement the Writ of Execution. In response, the latter filed
their own Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. The RTC denied the motion filed by Mayor
Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario to quash the writ of execution. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Page 347 of 1553

Whether or not the petitioners may assail the writ of execution by filing a Motion to Quash
the Writ of Execution.
Ruling:
NO. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the trial court's decision had become final
and executory, as petitioners themselves did not appeal the same. In the current petition,
neither is there an allegation that the judgment is a void one. Therefore, at this late stage,
nothing more may be done to disturb the said final judgment. The simple matter is that
petitioners herein may not do indirectly, by assailing the writ of execution, what they
cannot do directly, which is attacking the final, immutable and unalterable judgment of
the RTC. They may not raise in their opposition to the writ of execution issues that they
should have raised in the case during the trial proper or against the judgment via an appeal.
They may not object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under the
certain circumstances one of which are obtaining in the instant case.
Pinewood Marine (PHILS) Inc. v. EMCO Plywood Corporation, Ever Commercial

Co., LTD, Dalian Ocean Shipping Co, and Shenzhen Guangda Shipping, Co.
G.R. No. 179789, June 17, 2015, Reyes, J.
When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no

longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court.
The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. However,
admits of exceptions, to wit: SC has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Facts:
EMCO primarily engaged in business of manufacturing plywood and the subject matter of
its replevin action was its cargo of PNG round logs were withhold by Ever Commercial Co.
from releasing for it exercised a lien over the cargo logs for unpaid demurrage. Logs were
chartered to MV Tao Huang Ling then chartered the said vessel from Shenzhen, Pinewood
was the local ship agent of the latter. RTC ordered Ever, Shenzhen and Pinewood to
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answered but only Pinewood has failed to do so which the RTC declared it in default. RTC
granted replevin and ordered Ever, Shenzhen and Pinewood to pay damages against
EMCO. The decision was then appealed by the parties except Pinewood which the CA
affirmed the decision of RTC. Pinewood filed a motion for reconsideration and for
admission of its late appeal but CA ruled that the decision has already attained finality
Issue:
Whether or not Pinewood may still appeal though the decision already attained finality
Ruling:
NO. A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact
when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such
period. As a consequence, no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or
modify a decision that has became final. The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must
become final at some definite point in time.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose:
(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly
the discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk
of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. The rule on the finality of
judgments, however, admits of exceptions. Before the exception to the general rule can be
applied though, it is indispensable to prove that a party litigant did not (1) wantonly fail to
observe the mandatory requirements of the rules, and (2) exhibit "negligent, irresponsible,
contumacious, or dilatory" conduct as to provide substantial grounds for an appeal’s
dismissal.
The circumstances obtaining in the instant petition do not call for the exercise of the
Court’s equity jurisdiction and the application of the exception to the rule on finality of
judgments.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BERNABE

NOBLE ET, AL
G.R. No. 173802, April 7, 2014, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Page 349 of 1553

It is well- settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. In this case, the Court concurs with the CA’s
view that the Assailed Order had already become final and executory at the time when the
NHA sought to have it reconsidered before the court a quo. As evidenced by the registry return
receipt on record, the NHA however, moved for reconsideration therefrom only on March 11,
1999, or more than four (4) months from notice. As the motion was filed way beyond the 15-
day reglementary period prescribed therefor, the court a quo’s judgment had already lapsed
into finality.
Facts:
NHA filed a case against respondents Bernabe Noble (Noble), et al. for the
expropriation of their properties situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City (subject
property) pursuant to Letter of Instructions No. (LOI) 555, mandating a nationwide Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Program, and LOI 557, otherwise known as “Adopting
Slum Improvement.
Thereafter, the case was transferred to Branch 23 of the Misamis RTC (Branch 23),
which appointed commissioners who appraised the fair market value (FMV) of the subject
properties at P470.00 per square meter, as of 1984. Later on, the case was once more
transferred to the court a quo, which then issued an Order dated April 5, 1990, approving
the aforementioned amount as just compensation, and ordering the NHA to pay
respondents landowners the same. Dissatisfied, the NHA appealed the commissioners’
valuation of the subject properties before the CA thereafter rendered a decision remanding
the case to the court a quo for further proceedings on the issue of just compensation.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings,
during which a new set of commissioners was appointed to reappraise the FMV of the
subject properties. Eventually, the commissioners pegged the just compensation at P705.00
per square meter, taking into consideration the value of the subject properties in 1984 and
the accumulated improvements thereon since then.
On August 3, 1998, the court a quo issued an order, approving the commissioners’
valuation of the subject properties at P705.00 per square meter and, thus, ordering the NHA
to pay Noble, et al the amounts due to them. Claiming that it only received a copy of the
Assailed Order on March 3, 1999, the NHA filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration (motion) on March 11, 1999, arguing that the FMV of the subject properties
should have been determined at the time the expropriation proceeding was instituted.
Noble opposed the NHA’s motion on the ground that it was belatedly filed and thus, the
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said order already became final and executory. Finding Noble, et al’s opposition to be well-
taken, the court a quo denied the NHA’s motion. CA likewise dismissed the appeal.
Isuue:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the Assailed Order had already become
final and executory.
Ruling:
No. The petition is denied.
The petition is without merit. It is well- settled that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This
principle, commonly known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold
purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally,
to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and, (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it
fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere
technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be
faithfully complied.
In this case, the Court concurs with the CA’s view that the Assailed Order had
already become final and executory at the time when the NHA sought to have it
reconsidered before the court a quo. As evidenced by the registry return receipt on record,
the NHA however, moved for reconsideration therefrom only on March 11, 1999, or more
than four (4) months from notice. As the motion was filed way beyond the 15-day
reglementary period prescribed therefor, the court a quo’s judgment had already lapsed
into finality. Consequently, the Assailed Order cannot be made subject to further appellate
review and now constitutes res judicata as to every matter offered and received in the
proceedings below as well as to any other matter admissible therein and which might have
been offered for that purpose.
CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON

G.R. No. 183589, June 25, 2014, J. Villarama
For a judgment to constitute res judicata, the following requisites must concur: (a)
the former judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
Page 351 of 1553

matter and the parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; and (d) between the first
and the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of action.
In the case at bar, the present action arose from a case for quieting of title where the plaintiff
must show or prove legal or equitable title to or interest in the property which is the subject-
matter of the action. On the other hand, the administrative proceedings before the DENR and
now the OP, were instituted on behalf of the Director of Lands, in order to investigate any
allegation of irregularity in securing a patent and the corresponding title to a public land
under Section 91 of the Public Land Act. While there is identity of parties and subject matter
between the instant case and the matter before the DENR and later the OP, the causes of
action are not the same.
Facts:
Sometime in 1970, one Tomas Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application over a
parcel of land situated in Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa, Nasugbu, Batangas. After the death
of Tomas Fernandez, his son Felicisimo pursued the application and the survey plan under
Psu No. 04-008565 was approved by the Bureau of Lands. In 1985, the spouses Isaac and
Concepcion Ronulo asked the assistance of the Office of the President and requested
investigation of their claim that a parcel of land which they have been occupying since the
1950s was included in the approved survey plan PSU-04-008565 in the name of Tomas
Fernandez. Regional Director Antonio Prinsipe of DENR issued an Order in DENR Case
No. IV-5516 finding the protest of Spouses Ronulo to be meritorious and cancelling the plan
PSU-04-008565 approved in the name of Tomas Fernandez. The said order was appealed
by Felicisimo Fernandez to the Office of the DENR Secretary. The already widowed
Concepcion Ronulo and her children executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the
parcel of land subject of DENR Case No. IV-5516 in favor of herein defendant Lim who will
"file the appropriate public land application.”
In the meantime, herein plaintiffs Spouses Danilo Ligon and Generosa Vitug-Ligon
purchased the subject property from Felicisimo Fernandez and introduced improvements
thereon, including a beach houseTCT No. TP-1792 of the Registry of Deeds was issued in
the name of the spouses Ligon. Defendant Lim filed a complaint for forcible entry against
Spouses Ligon. The MTC ordered Spouses Ligon to vacate the subject land. The trial court
based its decision on the alleged finality of the Order issued by Regional Director Prinsipe.
The RTC and CA affirmed said decision. On 28 May 1999, the DENR Secretary rendered a
decision reversing the order of Regional Director Prinsipe, dismissing the protest of the
Ronulos, and ordering that TCT No. TP-1792 in the name of plaintiffs "shall remain
undisturbed." Ronulos filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. The Ronulos
filed a second motion for reconsideration of the decision of the DENR Secretary in DENR
Case No. 5102.
Page 352 of 1553

Meanwhile, as a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses
Ligon were evicted from the subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim
for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with prayer for a TRO and
Preliminary Injunction, to restore them to their possession of the subject property and to
enjoin herein defendant Lim from demolishing their beach house. The Court denied
plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief as a result of which plaintiffs’ beach house was
demolished by the Branch Sheriff on the motion of defendants. Spouses Ligon filed a
supplemental complaint for additional damages as a result of the demolition of their beach
house. Despite due notice, Lim and counsel were absent prompting this Honorable Court,
upon plaintiff’s motion to consider the cross-examination of plaintiff Danilo Ligon by
defendants as waived. The court ruled in favour of Spouses Ligon.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the present case should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata;
2 Whether or not defendant Lim was deprived of his property on the basis of
technicality
Ruling:
1. No. For a judgment to constitute res judicata, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; and (d)
between the first and the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject matters,
and causes of action.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. Bar by prior judgment exists "when, as between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action."
On the other hand, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment finds application

"when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and
adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction." This principle only needs
identity of parties and issues to apply.
Neither bar by prior judgment nor conclusiveness of judgment applies to the case at
bar. While there is identity of parties and subject matter between the instant case and the
matter before the DENR and later the OP, the causes of action are not the same. The
Page 353 of 1553

present case arose from a case for quieting of title where the plaintiff must show or prove
legal or equitable title to or interest in the property which is the subject-matter of the
action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership. Without proof of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to
be prevented or removed. The administrative proceedings before the DENR and now the
OP, on the other hand, were instituted on behalf of the Director of Lands, in order to
investigate any allegation of irregularity in securing a patent and the corresponding title to
a public land under Section 91 of the Public Land Act.
Given the lack of identity of the issue involved in the instant case vis-à-vis the issue
in the administrative proceedings before the DENR and the OP, there can also be no bar
by conclusiveness of judgment. To be sure, even if there was an identity of the issues
involved, there still would have been no bar by prior judgment or conclusiveness of
judgment since the March 24, 2004 Resolution of the OP has not reached finality – it being
the subject of an appeal by respondents Spouses Ligon under CA-G.R. SP No. 85011.
2. No. Petitioner Lim proffers the following excuses for his failure to comply with
the resolutions and other directives of the court a quo: that his counsel withdrew his
appearance while the case was pending before the RTC; that his representative, Salanguit,
had a sudden death, causing him to lose track and control of the proceedings; that he was
not aware of the ex-parte presentation of evidence by respondent Danilo Ligon; and, that
the court a quo waived for him his right to present evidence due to lack of interest. The
court holds that the RTC did not err when it ruled and based its decision on the ex-parte
evidence of respondent spouses. Petitioners were absent, despite due notice, during the ex-
parte presentation of evidence of respondents. Petitioners were likewise absent during
cross-examination despite proper notice. When respondents filed their Formal Offer of
Evidence and Memorandum, petitioners did not file any opposition or comment despite
receipt of the documents.
REMEDIOS M. MAULEON vs. LOLINA MORAN PORTER represented by ERVIN C.

MORAN
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for the immediate execution of
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed if the defendant
perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or other
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject premises during the
pendency of the appeal. These requirements are mandatory and concurrent, without which
execution will issue as a matter of right.
Page 354 of 1553

Facts:
On December 2, 2008, respondent Lolina Moran Porter (respondent), represented

by Ervin C. Moran, filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner and all persons
claiming rights from her, seeking to recover possession of the property located at 10th
Avenue, Caloocan City. Respondent alleged therein that she is the absolute owner of the
subject property which she purchased from petitioner and her husband, Renato M.
Mauleon, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on August 28, 2007. Despite the
sale, however, the petitioner continued to occupy the subject property through
respondent’s tolerance. But when she made demands to vacate — the last of which was
through a letter dated November 3, 2008 — petitioner refused to do so, and even failed to
pay rent at the rate of P10,000.00 per month, reckoned from September 2007. As the parties
failed to settle the matter before the barangay, respondent instituted a suit for unlawful
detainer before the MeTC of Caloocan City.
During the preliminary conference held on March 27, 2009, petitioner failed to
appear, despite notice. Thus, respondent moved for the rendition of judgment pursuant to
Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, which the MeTC
granted. Thereafter, the MeTC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to vacate the
subject property, and to pay respondent the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
the costs of suit.
Instead of appealing the aforesaid MeTC Decision, petitioner filed a “Most Very
Urgent Manifestation with Omnibus Motion to Reconsider the Order to Suspend the
Proceedings and/or to Dismiss the Case,” and another “Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve Pending Incidents, to Dismiss the case and/or Nullify the Proceedings as well as
the Precipitate Rendition of Decision” before the MeTC. On the other hand, respondent
filed a motion for execution of the MeTC Decision, which she claimed to have attained
finality. Petitioner’s motions were denied, while respondent’s motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution was granted.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the RTC, seeking the nullification of the MeTC Decision as well as the Order
granting its execution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the certiorari petition for lack of merit.
Unconvinced, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied,
prompting her to elevate the matter on appeal to the CA. The CA denied petitioner’s appeal
and affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of her certiorari petition. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Page 355 of 1553

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari

petition?
Ruling:
The Court perceives no reversible error on the part of the CA in upholding the RTC’s
finding that no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the MeTC Decision and
the August 18, 2009 Order directing its execution.
Records show that during the scheduled preliminary conference on March 27, 2009,
petitioner and her counsel failed to appear despite notice. Hence, the MeTC was justified
in granting respondent’s motion to render judgment in the ejectment case pursuant to
Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
It is undisputed that petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent motion to postpone the

March 27, 2009 hearing on the same date and only after the MeTC judge had already
granted respondent’s motion for rendition of judgment. As such, the MeTC properly
declared that the aforesaid motion deserves scant consideration and, in fact, should not
even be received considering the three (3)-day notice rule on motions, stated in Section 4,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner’s asseveration that her nonappearance in the March 27, 2009 hearing was
due to her counsel’s assurance that he had duly filed a motion for postponement, which
the MeTC should have purportedly granted, cannot be sustained since no party has the
right to assume that such motion would be approved by the courts. Consequently, absent
any justifiable reason for her and her counsel’s nonappearance at the said preliminary
conference, the Court concurs with the RTC’s finding that no grave abuse of discretion can
be ascribed against the MeTC in submitting the case for decision and, subsequently,
ordering petitioner’s ejectment from the subject property.
Similarly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against the MeTC in issuing
the August 18, 2009 Order directing the execution of its Decision. Section 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court provides for the immediate execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
ejectment cases, which can only be stayed if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a
supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or other reasonable compensation
for the use and occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency of the appeal. These
requirements are mandatory and concurrent, without which execution will issue as a
matter of right.
Page 356 of 1553

In this case, it is evident that petitioner failed to interpose an appeal from the MeTC
Decision rendering the same final and executory. Hence, the August 18, 2009 Order
granting its execution was properly issued.
It is settled that when a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable
and unalterable. By this principle of immutability of judgments, the Court is now precluded
from further examining the MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner’s perceived
errors therein, i.e., that her possession of the subject property was not by virtue of
respondent’s tolerance, hence, the ejectment complaint should have been dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction; and that the pending annulment of documents and reconveyance case
was prejudicial to the ejectment suit.
FEDERAL BUILDERS, INC. vs. FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC.

G.R. No. 194507, September 8, 2014, J. Peralta
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect
and considered conclusive between the parties, save for the following exceptional and
meritorious circumstances: (1) when the factual findings of the appellate court and the trial
court are contradictory; (2) when the findings of the trial court are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) when the lower court’s inference from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond
the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (6) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (7) when the
findings of fact are themselves conflicting; and (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence
of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.
In the instant case, there is an absence of any record to otherwise prove FSI’s neglect
in the fulfillment of its obligations under the contract, this Court shall refrain from reversing
the findings of the courts below, which are fully supported by and deducible from, the evidence
on record. Indeed, FBI failed to present any evidence to justify its refusal to pay FSI for the
works it was contracted to perform. As such, Supreme Court does not see any reason to
deviate from the assailed rulings.
Facts:
Federal Builders, Inc. (FBI) entered into an agreement with Foundation Specialists,
Inc. (FSI) whereby the latter, as subcontractor, undertook the construction of the
Page 357 of 1553

diaphragm wall, capping beam, and guide walls of the Trafalgar Plaza located at Salcedo
Village, Makati City (the Project), for a total contract price of P7,400,000.00. Under the
agreement, FBI was to pay a downpayment equivalent to 20% of the contract price and the
balance, through a progress billing every 15 days, payable not later than 1 week from
presentation of the billing.
FSI filed a complaint for Sum of Money against FBI before the RTC of Makati City
seeking to collect the amount of P1,635,278.91, representing Billings No. 3 and 4, with
accrued interest from August 1, 1991 plus moral and exemplary damages with attorney’s
fees. In its complaint, FSI alleged that FBI refused to pay said amount despite demand and
its completion of 97% of the contracted works.
FBI claimed that FSI completed only 85% of the contracted works, failing to finish
the diaphragm wall and component works in accordance with the plans and specifications
and abandoning the jobsite. FBI maintains that because of FSI’s inadequacy, its schedule in
finishing the Project has been delayed resulting in the Project owner’s deferment of its own
progress billings. It further interposed counterclaims for amounts it spent for the remedial
works on the alleged defects in FSI’s work.
After evaluating the evidence of both parties, the RTC ruled in favor of FSI.
Defendant’s counterclaim is denied for lack of factual and legal basis.
CA affirmed the Decision of the lower court, but deleted the sum of P279,585.00
representing the cost of undelivered cement and reduced the award of attorney’s fees
to P50,000.00. CA explained that FSI failed to substantiate how and in what manner it
incurred the cost of cement by stressing that its claim was not supported by actual receipts.
Also, it found that while the trial court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees, the same
should be reduced for being unconscionable and excessive. On FBI’s rejection of the 12%
annual interest rate on the amount of Billings 3 and 4.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed a clear, reversible error when it affirmed the trial
court’s judgment that Federal Builders, Inc. was liable to pay the balance of P1,024,600.00
less the amount of P33,354.40 notwithstanding that the diaphragm wall constructed by
Foundation Specialist, Inc. was concededly defective and out-of-specifications and that
petitioner had to redo it at its own expense.
Ruling:
Page 358 of 1553

No. The CA did not err.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect
and considered conclusive between the parties, save for the following exceptional and
meritorious circumstances: (1) when the factual findings of the appellate court and the trial
court are contradictory; (2) when the findings of the trial court are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) when the lower court’s inference from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (6) when there is a misappreciation of facts;
(7) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; and (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are
premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.
None of the aforementioned exceptions are present herein. In the assailed Decision,
the RTC meticulously discussed the obligations of each party, the degree of their
compliance therewith, as well as their respective shortcomings, all of which were properly
substantiated with the corresponding documentary and testimonial evidence.
Under the construction agreement, FSI’s scope of work consisted in (1) the
construction of the guide walls, diaphragm walls, and capping beam; and (2) the
installation of steel props. As the lower courts aptly observed from the records at hand, FSI
had, indeed, completed 97% of its contracted works and the non-completion of the
remaining 3%, as well as the alleged defects in the said works, are actually attributable to
FBI’s own fault such as, but not limited to, the failure to deliver the needed cement as
agreed upon in the contract,
Contrary to the allegations of FBI, FSI had indeed completed its assigned
obligations, with the exception of certain assigned tasks, which was due to the failure of
FBI to fulfill its end of the bargain.
It can similarly be deduced that the defects FBI complained of, such as the
misaligned diaphragm wall and the erroneous location of the rebar dowels, were not only
anticipated by the parties, having stipulated alternative plans to remedy the same, but more
importantly, are also attributable to the very actions of FBI. Accordingly, considering that
the alleged defects in FSI’s contracted works were not so much due to the fault or
negligence of the FSI, but were satisfactorily proven to be caused by FBI’s own acts. While
there is no evidence to show the scope of work for these billings, it is safe to assume that
Page 359 of 1553

these were also works in the construction of the diaphragm wall considering that as of May
16, 1991, plaintiff had only the installation of the steel props and welding works to complete.
Thus, in the absence of any record to otherwise prove FSI’s neglect in the fulfillment
of its obligations under the contract, this Court shall refrain from reversing the findings of
the courts below, which are fully supported by and deducible from, the evidence on record.
Indeed, FBI failed to present any evidence to justify its refusal to pay FSI for the works it
was contracted to perform. As such, Supreme Court does not see any reason to deviate from
the assailed rulings.
RENATO L. DELFINO, SR. (Deceased), Represented by his Heirs, namely: GRACIA

DELFINO, GREGORIO A. DELFINO; MA. ISABEL A. DELFINO, RENATO A.
DELFINO, JR., MA. REGINA DELFINO ROSELLA, MA. GRACIA A. DELFINO,
MARIANO A. DELFINO, MA. LUISA DELFINO GREGORIO and REV. FR. GABRIELA.
DELFINO vs. AVELINO K. ANASAO and ANGEL K. ANASAO (Deceased and
represented by his sole heir, SIXTO C. ANASAO)
G.R. No. 197486, September 10, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. There are, however, exceptions to the general rule, namely: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice
to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. In this case, the clarification
made by Secretary Pangandaman in his February 2, 2006 Order falls under the fourth
exception.
Facts:
In October 1975, Delfino sold the 20.8108-hectare coconut land covered by TCT No.
T-26381 (T-69595), leaving him with 14.6717 hectares of rice land. The tenanted portion
(9.8597 hectares) being tilled by respondents Avelino K. Anasao and Angel K. Anasao, and
another farmer, Rodriguez P. Dacumos was placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). After full payment to the Land Bank of the
Philippines of the amortizations, the farmer-beneficiaries were issued Emancipation
Patents (EPs). The remaining area of 3.2942 hectares covered by OLT was not issued with
EPs.
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On February 8, 1992, prior to the registration of the EPs in the Registry of Deeds,
Delfino filed an Application for Retention over the entire 14.6717-hectare rice land. Upon
the recommendation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Laguna Provincial
Office, the DAR Regional Office IV Director issued an Order dated June 22, 1993 denying
retention of the 9.8597 hectares but granting retention over the 4.8120 hectares which was
not covered by OLT.
Delfino appealed to then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao who issued an

Order dated February 28, 1995 setting aside the Order of the DAR Regional Director of
Region IV dated June 22, 1993, thus petitioner is hereby given the maximum of five (5)
hectares from the tenanted portion as his retained area.
A motion for reconsideration by way of motion for intervention was filed by

respondent. In his Order dated December 13, 1995, Secretary Garilao denied the motion for
utter lack of merit. Respondents appealed to the OP but later withdrew the appeal and
instead filed a petition for review in the CA (CAG.R. SP No. 39761). By Resolution dated
March 15, 1996, the CA’s Third Division dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form
and substance. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under
Resolution dated January 28, 1997. Entry of judgment was issued by the CA on said case.
Meanwhile, on August 24, 1995, Delfino sold two hectares of his tenanted riceland
covered by TCT Nos. T-26378 (T-69592) situated in Barangay Tagapo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, to
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. Though covered by OLT, no EP had been issued on this portion
under TCT No. T-26378 (T-69592). A new certificate of title (TCT No. T-389984) in the
name of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. was issued on February 25, 1997.
On September 13, 1995, Delfino filed before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) a petition for cancellation of the EPs previously issued to
respondents on the basis of the DAR Secretary’s Order dated December 13, 1995 granting
him five hectares as retention area (DCN- IV-La-0437-95).
On February 17, 1997, respondents filed before the Office of the DAR Secretary a
Motion for Clarificatory Judgment praying that an administrative determination be made
of the particular portion to be retained and whether such right of retention will result in
the cancellation of EPs already distributed to farmer-beneficiaries identified as of October
21, 1972.
Meanwhile, in a Joint dated February 19,1997, Provincial Adjudicator Barbara P. Tan

granted Delfino’s petition for cancellation of EPs. A writ of execution was issued on May
19, 1997 directing the DARAB Provincial Sheriff toretrieve the owner’s duplicate copies of
Page 361 of 1553

the subject EPs for purposes of cancellation and/or annotation. Respondents then filed a
petition for certiorari inthe CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 44285) to annul the said writ and enjoin
its implementation.
In their Supplemental Motion (to the Motion for Clarificatory Judgment),

respondents pointed out that Delfino acted in bad faith when he sold a portion of the OLT-
covered land in favor of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. without the required DAR clearance. They
also prayed that the DAR Secretary order the PARAD to stop the implementation of the
Joint Order in DARAB Case No. DCN-IV-La-0437-95. In his Order dated August 8, 1997,
Secretary Garilao denied respondents’ motion.
On September 20, 2001, respondents filed a Petition to Annul and/or Cancel the
DAR Secretary’s Orders dated February 28, 1995, December 13, 1995 and August 8, 1997. On
February 2, 2006, DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman issued an Order denying the
petition to annul/cancel the subject orders and clarifying the February 28, 1995 Order of
Secretary Garilao.
Delfino filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by Secretary

Pangandaman in his Order dated May 30, 2007.
Respondents appealed the Orders dated February 2, 2006 and May 30, 2007 to the
OP. On February 6, 2008, the OP rendered its Decision partly granting the appeal by
nullifying the portion of the May 30, 2007 Order of Secretary Pangandaman which clarified
Secretary Garilao’s February 28, 1995 Order. Said office ruled that the two hectares sold to
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. would not bring about any ambiguity in the execution of the Order
dated February 28, 1995, in relation to the December 13, 1995 and August 8, 1997 Orders,
and that whatever remains after deducting the 9.6717 hectares reserved for the farmer-
beneficiaries pertains to Delfino. As to the remaining portion of the May 30, 2007 Order of
Secretary Pangandaman, the same was upheld.
Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied under the OP’s Resolution
dated September 30, 2008.
The case was elevated by respondents to the CA via a petition for review under Rule
43. By Decision dated January 31, 2011, the CA reversed the OP’s ruling and reinstated the
Orders dated February 2, 2006 and May 30, 2007 of Secretary Pangandaman. According to
the CA, the ambiguity in the February 28, 1995 Order of Secretary Garilao lies in its failure
to specify as to which portion of the 14.617 hectares should the five hectares retention area
of Delfino be taken. Thus, even after the said order had become final and executory, the
DAR Secretary is not precluded from making the necessary amendments/clarifications
Page 362 of 1553

thereof so that the fallo would at least conform with the body of said order and so that the
same could readily be executed with dispatch. But since Delfino sold two hectares to SM
Prime Holdings, Inc. before the ambiguity could be properly addressed by DAR, the CA
found no reversible error in the February 2, 2006 Order clarifying the ambiguity and in the
May 30, 2007 Order stating the rationale for such clarification.
Delfino, represented by his surviving heirs (petitioners) filed a motion for

reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the February 2, 2006 Order of Secretary Pangandaman, insofar as it

clarified the February 28, 1995 Order of Secretary Garilao, violated the rule on immutability
of final judgments.
Ruling:
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court of the land. This doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments is
grounded on fundamental considerationsof public policy and sound practice to the effect
that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some
definite date set by law.
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule, namely: (1) the correction of
clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The exception to the doctrine
of immutability of judgment has been applied in several cases in order to serve substantial
justice.
In this case, the clarification made by Secretary Pangandaman in his February 2,

2006 Order falls under the fourth exception.
It is true that the February 28, 1995 Order of Secretary Garilao stated that the five
hectares shall be taken from the tenanted area, which pertains to the 9.8597 hectaresof
which 6.5671 hectares were already issued with EPs in favor of respondents. Subsequently,
however, without prior clearance from the DAR, Delfino sold two hectares of land covered
by OLT to SM Prime Holdings, Inc. The DAR Secretary thus found it fair and equitable to
Page 363 of 1553

include the said portion to Delfino’s retention area, which meant that Delfino is entitled
only to the balance of three hectares.
As explained by Secretary Pangandaman in his order denying Delfino’s motion for

reconsideration, this clarification was made in order not to circumvent the five-hectare
limitation as said landowner "cannot be allowed to simultaneously enjoy … the proceeds of
the sale and at the same time exercise the right of retention" to the maximum of five
hectares.
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON

vs. BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, et.al
Club Filipino, Inc. argued that the court prematurely issued the Entry of Judgment
because it still had to resolve the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and argued
that that the NLRC’s Resolution of the issue constituted res judicata. For the Court to
entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the second Motions must present
“extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained.” Once leave
to file is granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration is no longer prohibited.
Facts:
On May 26, 2001, CLUFEA staged a strike on the ground of bargaining

deadlock. Club Filipino, Inc. filed an action for declaration of illegal strike. According to
Club Filipino, Inc., CLUFEA failed to file a Notice of Strike and to conduct a strike vote, in
violation of the legal requirements for staging a strike. Club Filipino, Inc. prayed that all of
CLUFEA’s officers who participated in the strike be declared to have lost their employment
pursuant to Article 264(a) of the Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter’s found that Benjamin et.al conducted an illegal strike which
resulted in their dismissal. He found that CLUFEA’s Notice of Strike did not contain
CLUFEA’s written proposals and Club Filipino, Inc.’s counterproposals, in violation of then
Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code They were
ordered to receive separation pay “similar in terms with those offered to the employees
affected by the retrenchment program of the club.”
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his
discretion in declaring the strike illegal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the requirements
under Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code “[do] not
appear to be absolute.” Rule XXII, Section 4 only requires that the proposals and
Page 364 of 1553

counterproposals be attached to the Notice of Strike “as far as practicable.” Since CLUFEA
had already filed a Notice of Strike when Club Filipino, Inc. submitted its counterproposals,
it was not practicable for CLUFEA to attach Club Filipino, Inc.’s counterproposals to the
Notice of Strike. It then reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and awarded some of them
full backwages, benefits, and separation pay.
On June 23, 2005, Club Filipino, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
the Supreme Court but the Court sustained the Court of Appeals’ findings on its decision
on July 13, 2009.
On November 3, 2009, Club Filipino, Inc. filed its Motion for Leave to File and Admit
further Pleading/Motion, alleging that the court failed to consider its Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration in issuing its September 9, 2009 Resolution denying Club Filipino,
Inc.’s first Motion for Reconsideration. Club Filipino, Inc. prayed that this court resolve the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
Because of the Court's Resolution dated September 9, 2009, an Entry of

Judgment was issued on October 26, 2010, declaring that the case had become final and
executory as of October 26, 2009.
Issues:
(1) Whether Club Filipino, Inc.’s filing of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prevented the Resolution dated July 13, 2009 from becoming
final and executory;
(2) Whether the NLRC’s Decision on the illegal dismissal case was res judicata on
the illegal strike case
Ruling:
1. Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution dated July 13, 2009 is in the nature of a second Motion for
Reconsideration.
As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a judgment or

final resolution is prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Page 365 of 1553

Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
This prohibition is reiterated in Rule 15, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a
second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be
granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration “in the higher interest
of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise
patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable
injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation
of law or by the Court’s declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion
for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
For this court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the second Motions
must present “extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first
obtained.”Once leave to file is granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration is no longer
prohibited.
In the present case, this court granted leave to petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. to file the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in the Resolution dated January 11, 2010. The
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, therefore, is no longer prohibited.
The grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, however,
did not prevent this court’s July 13, 2009 Resolution from becoming final and executory. A
decision or resolution of this court is deemed final and executory after the lapse of 15 days
from the parties’ receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of leave to file
the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that
the Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should the second Motion for
Reconsideration be granted.
2. No
Res judicata “literally means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; [or] a thing or matter settled by judgment.’” Res judicata “lays the rule that an
Page 366 of 1553
existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the
first suit.”
Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first is bar by prior judgment that precludes
the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The
second aspect is conclusiveness of judgment, which states that “issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.”
The elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
2. the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.
The first three (3) elements of res judicata are present in this case.
The NLRC’s judgment on the illegal dismissal case is already final with respondents
not having appealed the Decision within the reglementary period.
The Labor Arbiter, who has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide
illegal dismissal cases, decided the case. The Labor Arbiter’s Decision was heard on appeal
by the NLRC, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.
The Labor Arbiter’s judgment was on the merits. Based on the facts presented by
the parties, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s retrenchment
program was valid.
The fourth element of res judicata, however, is absent. Although the cases have
substantially identical parties and subject matter of the dismissal of respondents, the cause
Page 367 of 1553

of action for declaration of illegal strike and the cause of action for illegal dismissal are
different.
In an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause of action is premised on a

union or a labor organization’s conduct of a strike without compliance with the statutory
requirements.
On the other hand, in an action for illegal dismissal, the cause of action is premised
on an employer’s alleged dismissal of an employee without a just or authorized cause as
provided under Articles 282, 283, and 284 of the Labor Code.
There is no res judicata in the present case. Club Filipino, Inc. filed the illegal strike
because members of CLUFEA allegedly disrupted petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s business
when they staged a strike without complying with the requirements of the law. For their
part, respondents filed the illegal dismissal case to question the validity of petitioner Club
Filipino, Inc.’s retrenchment program.
FAJ CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. SUSAN M. SAULOG

G.R. No. 200759, March 25, 2015, J. Del Castillo
FAJ Construction's claim that res judicata cannot apply has no merit. The Court has
repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual
adjudications on the merits. They are the result of thorough deliberation among the members
of the Court. When the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and
denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already
means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.
Facts:
FAJ Construction and Development Corporation and Susan M. Saulog entered into
an Agreement6(construction agreement) for the construction of a residential building in
San Lorenzo Village, Makati City for a contract price of P12,500,000.00. Construction of the
building commenced, and Susan made a corresponding total payment to petitioner in the
amount of P10,592,194.80. However, for the October 31 and November 6, 2000 progress
billing statements sent by FAJ in the total amount of P851,601.58, Susan refused to pay.
FAJ filed with the RTC of Quezon City a civil case for collection of a sum of money
with damages against Susan. Susan filed a counterclaim claiming that she stopped
paying for the reason that the construction work of FAJ Construction was not only delayed,
but defective; and that it abandoned the construction work, incomplete and with many
Page 368 of 1553

defects. She had to finish the work abandoned by plaintiff, incurring substantial additional
expenses therefor.
The trial court rendered its Decision in favor Susan. It dismissed FAJ's complaint for
failure to prosecute. The CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the decision of the
trial court.
Issues:
Whether or not res judicata applies in the instant case
Ruling:
Yes.
FAJ Construction's claim that res judicata cannot apply has no merit. This Court, in
G.R. No. 166336, found nothing wrong in the judgment of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 82239
affirming the dismissal of FAJ's Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-45865 for failure to
prosecute. This finding of lack of any reversible error is now final with the entry of
judgment in G.R. No. 166336. Thus, petitioner could no longer prove its case, other than to
present controverting evidence on respondent’s counterclaim.
The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed
before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits. They are the result of thorough
deliberation among the members of the Court. When the Court does not find any reversible
error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to
fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings
and conclusions of the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. It
would be an exercise in redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute
resolution denying the petition the conclusions that the CA reached.
COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS
NESTOR T. GADRINAB vs. NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA

LOPEZ
G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014, J. Leonen
Respondents entered into compromise agreement with the petitioner. It attained

finality. However, petitioner questioned its validity. The court ruled that a judgment on
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is
Page 369 of 1553

immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The
doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already
attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.
Facts:
Respondents, together with Adoracion Gadrinab and Arsenia Talao, are siblings and
heirs of the late Spouses Talao, Nicolas and Aurelia. The Spouses Talao died intestate,
leaving a parcel of land in Sta. Ana, Manila. The five Talao children divided the property
among themselves through an extrajudicial settlement. Subsequently, Arsenia Talao
waived her share over the property in favor of her siblings.
Respondent Salamanca filed a complaint for partition against her siblings, Antonio,
Elena (deceased, now represented by her husband, Jose Lopez), and Adoracion (deceased,
now represented by heirs, petitioner Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab) before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.All parties claimed their respective shares in the property. They also
claimed shares in the rentals collected from one of the units of a duplex apartment on the
property.The total amount of rental collection in the possession of Jose Lopez was
528,623.00.The amount, according to Jose’s counsel, was ready for distribution.
Upon being referred to mediation, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
and stipulated the following:1) That the subject property (land with all the improvements)
situated at 2370 Nacar Street, San Andres, Sta. Ana, Manila will be subject for sale and the
amount will be divided among the four (plaintiff and defendants);2) That the subject
property will be appraised by independent appraiser and the appraised value will be divided
into four. Mr. Antonio Talao will pay in advance the share of Francisco Gadrinab
immediately after the report of the said appraisal;3) That Cuervo Appraiser will be the one
who appraised [sic] the property on or before March 21, 2003 and any appraised value shall
binding [sic] on all parties;4) That the rental collection in its total amount of Five Hundred
Twenty Eight Thousand and Six Hundred Twenty Three Pesos (528,623.00) and the
uncollected amount up to February 2003 once collected will be divided among the
parties;5) That the amount of 528,623.00 divided by four be distributed among the parties
will be given to all parties on or before March 12, 2003 by Mr. Antonio Talao;6) That upon
payment of the appraised value to Francisco Gadrinab, Mr. Nestor Gadrinab is given forty-
five (45) days within which to leave the premises in question;7) That the parties agreed to
waive all their claims and counter-claims arising from this case; and8) That the parties
agreed to request this Honorable Court that a decision be issued base [sic] on this
Compromise Agreement or this Compromise Agreement be submitted before this
Honorable Court for approval.
Page 370 of 1553

On April 10, 2003, the Regional Trial Court approved the compromise
agreement.Based on the entry of judgment, the case became final and executory on April
10, 2003.Nestor Gadrinab filed a motion for execution of the compromise agreement. He
demanded his one-fourth share in the accumulated rentals.During the hearing on the
motion for execution, the parties agreed that the rentals shall be divided only into three
since Nestor had already been occupying one of the duplex units. The parties also agreed
that Antonio Talao would shoulder Nestor’s share, equivalent to one-fourth of the rental
amount.Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Cuervo Appraiser appraised the
property. Unsatisfied with the appraisal, Antonio Talao moved for the property’s
reappraisal. This was denied by the Regional Trial Court.The portion of the duplex that
Nestor refused to vacate, remained unsold.
Because of the attitude of her co-heirs, respondent Salamanca moved for the
physical partition of the property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.She prayed for
the physical partition of the property instead of having it sold.
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab opposed the motion.They contended that the
judgment on the compromise agreement had already become final and executory and had
the effect of res judicata.Antonio Talao and Jose Lopez did not object to the motion for
physical partition.RTC and CA granted physical partition of the property
Issues
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court’s
order granting respondent Salamanca’s motion for physical partition.
2. Whether or not the Respondents have remedies if parties to the compromise

agreement refuse to abide by its terms
Ruling
1. Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial court’s decision
allowing the
physical partition of the property
In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. "[A] judgment
based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits"52 of the case. It has the
effect of res judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and
jurisprudence.Thus, Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides:
Page 371 of 1553

Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
In Spouses Romero v. Tan, this court said:
It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is
immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the compromise
agreement]There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule
refers to "bar by prior judgment,"which means that actions on the same claim or cause of
action cannot be relitigated. The second rule refers to "conclusiveness of judgment."This
means that facts already tried and determined in another action involving a different claim
or cause of action cannot anymore be relitigated.
This case involves "bar by prior judgment." Respondents cannot file another action
for partition after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous
action for partition involving the same parties and property.
This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court the
doctrine of finality of judgment:
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:
1. "The correction of clerical errors;2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party;3. void judgments; and4. whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable."
Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether

judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a
compromise agreement duly approved by the court.Because a judicial compromise
agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the parties and a judgment on
the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code provisions on contracts. It can be avoided on
grounds that may avoid an ordinary contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the law; lack of
consent by a party; and existence of fraud or duress. Further, the pertinent Civil Code
provisions on compromise agreements provide:
Page 372 of 1553

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation,

undue influence, or falsity of documents is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of this
Code.
Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action,
parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and
immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained
through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.
In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the
compromise agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of
the parties simply do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement’s terms. This court
does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final judgment
on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves.
Likewise, respondents’ argument that a supervening event, i.e. disagreement among

the parties, was present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on compromise fails to
persuade. A supervening event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on
compromise if it "brought about a material change in [the] situation" between the parties.
The material change contemplated must render the execution of the final judgment unjust
and inequitable. Otherwise, a party to the compromise agreement has a "right to have the
compromise agreement executed, according to its terms."
The subsequent disagreement among the parties did not cause any material change
in the situation or in the relations among the parties. The situation and relations among
the parties remained the same as the situation and their relations prior to the compromise
agreement. They remained co-owners of the property, which they desired to partition.
Moreover, the parties voluntarily agreed to the compromise agreement, which was already
stamped with judicial approval. The agreement’s execution would bring about the effects
desired by all parties and the most just and equitable situation for all.
2. Yes, Respondents have remedies if parties to the compromise agreement refuse to

abide by its terms
A party may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right
on final judgments. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution
may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or
orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
Page 373 of 1553

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. If a party refuses to comply
with the terms of the judgment or resists the enforcement of a lawful writ issued, an action
for indirect contempt may be filed in accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a judgment on the case,

proper remedies against ordinary judgments may be used against judgments on a
compromise agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds
exist, remedies may include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b) motion for new
trial; c) appeal; d) petition for relief from judgment; e) petition for certiorari; and f) petition
for annulment of judgment.
METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP., SHOEMART, INC., SM PRIME

HOLDINGS, INC., STAR APPLIANCES CENTER, SUPER VALUE, INC., ACE
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEAL TH AND BEAUTY, INC., JOLLIMART
PHILS. CORP., and SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION, vs MS. LIBERTY M.
TOLEDO
G.R. No. 190818, November 10, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It contemplates
mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when litigation
has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result. Its validity is dependent
upon the fulfillment of the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law; and its terms
and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, and public
order. When given judicial approval, a compromise agreement becomes more than a contract
binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a
determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately
executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its
terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance,
execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
Facts:
On June 5, 2013 the Supreme Court rendered a decision denying petitioners Metro
Manila Shopping Mecca Corp., Shoemart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances
Center, Super Value, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Health and Beauty, Inc., Jollimart
Phils. Corp., and Surplus Marketing Corporation (petitioners) claim for tax refund/credit
of their local business taxes paid to respondent city of Manila.
Page 374 of 1553

It appears however that on June 1, 2012, parties have executed a Universal

Compromise Agreement (UCA) in lieu of the court’s decision dated June 5, 2013.
This case resolves the Manifestation and Motion dated August 2, 2013, seeking the
approval of the terms and conditions of the parties' Universal Compromise Agreement
dated June 1, 2012 (UCA) in lieu of the Court's Decision dated June 5, 2013 (subject Decision)
which denied petitioners' claim for tax refund/credit of their local business taxes paid to
respondent City of Manila..
In their Manifestation and Motion, petitioners alleged that pursuant to the UCA,
the parties agreed to amicably settle all cases between them involving claims for tax
refund/credit, including the instant case.
Issue:
Whether or not the UCA can be validly approved.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court adopts the terms and conditions of the UCA pertinent to this case.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It contemplates
mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when litigation
has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result. Its validity is
dependent upon the fulfillment of the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by
law; and its terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy, and public order. When given judicial approval, a compromise agreement becomes
more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is
entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It
is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The
nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in
such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
A review of the whereas clauses of the UCA reveals the various court cases filed by
petitioners, including this case, for the refund and/or issuance of tax credit covering the
local business taxes payments they paid to respondent City of Manila pursuant to Section
21 of the latter’s Revenue Code.13 Thus, contrary to the submission of respondents, the local
Page 375 of 1553

business taxes subject of the instant case is clearly covered by the UCA since they were also
paid in accordance with the same provision of the Revenue Code of Manila.
In this relation, it is observed that the present case would have been rendered moot
and academic had the parties informed the Court of the UCA’s supervening execution. Be
that as it may, and considering that: (a) the UCA appears to have been executed in
accordance with the requirements of a valid compromise agreement; (b) the UCA was
executed more than a year prior to the promulgation of the subject Decision; and (c) the
result of both the UCA and the subject Decision are practically identical, i.e., that
petitioners are not entitled to any tax refund/credit, the Court herein resolves to approve
and adopt the pertinent terms and conditions of the UCA insofar as they govern the
settlement of the present dispute.
Wherefore the petitioners’ Manifestation and Motion dated August 2, 2013 is granted.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER vs. FINAL ORDER OR JUDGMENT
HEIRS OF TIMBANG DAROMIMBANG DIMAAMPAO, namely: CABIB D. ALA WI,

ACMAD D. ALA WI, KALIKO D. ALA WI, ABU ALI D. ALAWI, MOKHAYMA D.
ABAB, and MARIAM ABAB, represented by CABIB D. ALA WI vs. ATTY.
ABDULLAH ALUG, HADJI BOGABONG BALT and HEIRS OF HADJI ALI PETE
PANGARUNGAN, namely: HADJA SITTIE SALIMA PANGARUNGAN, AMINA P.
ALANGADI, JAMELA P. SANI, ANSARY S. PANGARUNGAN, RAMLA P. PANGCAT,
JACKLYN P. BANTO, ACMAD T. PANGARUNGAN, ACMELA P. MAMAROBA,
AMERA P. LALANTO, ACLI T. PANGARUNGAN, ASMIA P. BANOCAG, AB DARI T.
PANGARUNGAN, ASLIA T. PANGARUNGAN, HANIPA T. PANGARUNGAN, CALILI
T. PANGARUNGAN, and ANSANTO T. PANGARUNGAN, represented by HADJA
SITTIE SALIMA PANGARUNGAN,
An order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
“interlocutory,” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x
Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable, an “interlocutory” order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in the case. The RTC Order denying respondents' special and
affirmative defenses contained in their answer is no doubt interlocutory since it did not finally
dispose of the case but will proceed for the reception of the parties' respective evidence to
determine the rights and obligations of each other.
Page 376 of 1553

Facts:
On February 15, 2005, petitioners Heirs of Timbang Daromimbang Dimaampao

represented by Cabib D. Alawi, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur, Marawi City, a
Complaint for declaration of deed of sale as a nullity, quieting of title and damages against
respondents Abdullah Alug, Hadji Bogabong Balt and Heirs of Hadji Ali Pete Pangarungan,
represented by Hadja Sittie Salima Pangarungan.
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land; that they acquired
ownership of the subject land by way of inheritance from their deceased grandmother,
Timbang Daromimbang Dimaampao (Timbang), who was the true owner of the lot; that
Cota Dimaampao (Cota) and Timbang got married in accordance with the Muslim rites
and the lot was among the dowries given by the former to the latter; that during the
existence of their marriage, the spouses applied for titling of the land and their homestead
application was approved and was issued in their names; that after the issuance of the said
title, Cota and Timbang were divorced from each other, hence, Timbang and their two
daughters continued possession and ownership of the land, while Cota contracted another
marriage; that when Timbang died, her daughters succeeded her on the ownership and
possession of the land until their deaths and were survived by herein petitioners.
Petitioners claimed that on April 10, 1978, without their knowledge, Cota executed
a deed of sale in favor of respondents involving the land; that respondents were in bad faith
since at the time of purchase, petitioners by themselves were in actual possession of the
land in the concept of owners; that the deed of sale was invalid because Cota had no right
to sell any portion of the subject land as he was not the owner thereof.
Petitioners stated that the subject land was allegedly sold by Cota to deceased Sheik
Pangandaman Daromimbang (Timbang's brother) who then donated the same to his
daughter and son-in-law which deeds of sale and donation were annulled by the RTC Lanao
del Sur, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. 2410; that they were not impleaded as parties in that
case even if they were in possession of the land; that the RTC decision was affirmed by the
CA and became final which cast a cloud of doubt on their title and ownership of the land.
Petitioners prayed that the Deed of Sale dated April 10, 1978 between Cota and
respondents be declared null and void, and for them to be declared as the rightful owners
and lawful possessors of the land.
Respondents filed their Answer denying petitioners' claim of ownership of the land
as they owned and possessed the same since 1978; that the validity of the Deed of Sale dated
April 10, 1978 involving the land was already upheld by the RTC Lanao del Sur, Branch 9,
Page 377 of 1553

in Civil Case No. 2410, entitled “Cota Dimaampao, et al. v. Sheik Pangandaman
Daromimbang, et al.,” a case that had already attained finality.
In their Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondents claimed that petitioners have
no cause of action against them because the latter's claim of dowry or donation by reason
of marriage was not supported by any written agreement and now barred under the Statute
of frauds; that the action is barred by prescription or estoppel or laches; and, that the
complaint violates the rule on judicial stability or rule on non-interference.
On March 6, 2006, the RTC issued its Order with the following dispositive portion,
to wit:
The allegations contained in the Special and Affirmative Defenses are matters of
evidence that can be properly ventilated in the trial of the case. The same is denied for lack
of merit. The parties are directed to submit their pre-trial brief at least 3 days before the
scheduled pre-trial conference on April 6, 2006.
On May 2, 2006, respondents filed a Manifestation stating that they just received
the RTC Order on April 17, 2006 and moved for time to file a motion for reconsideration
and to defer the submission of pre-trial brief and the scheduled pre-trial conference. A
motion for reconsideration was filed on May 17, 2006. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the RTC in its Order dated February 29, 2008.
On June 6, 2008, respondents filed with the CA, a petition for certiorari with prayer
for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The CA rendered its decision granting the writ of
certiorari. The CA ruled that the RTC's decisions dated March 6, 2006 and February 29,
2008, are SET ASIDE, and another Order will be entered in Civil Case No. 2046-05
dismissing the Complaint.
The CA found that the RTC had disregarded the decision in Civil Case No. 2410
which had already attained finality; that it was already determined that the subject land
was the very same land in Civil Case No. 2410 which was declared to be owned and
possessed by Cota and to grant petitioners' demand would result to an unending litigation
of the case. The CA found that res judicata applied in this case. The CA also found that the
action had already prescribed as it took petitioners more than 26 years to institute the
instant case.
Issues:
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Whether or not a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
is allowed or a prohibited pleading.
Ruling:
Petitioners claim that respondents' counsel received the RTC Order dated March 6,
2006 denying their special and affirmative defenses on April 17, 2006, they had until May
2, 2006 to file a motion for reconsideration.
Respondents, filed a Manifestation with motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration which is not allowed under the Rules of Court. Hence, the RTC Order
dated March 6, 2006 had already become final and executory and could no longer be the
subject of a petition for certiorari with the CA. Consequently, the CA erred in granting the
petition and reversing the RTC Orders.
The court finds no merit in the arguments.
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared
by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties
or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an
appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
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In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
In Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the court expounded on the
differences between a “final judgment” and an “interlocutory order,” to wit:
x x x A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits
which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties' next move x x x and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the
judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive
term, “final and executory.”
xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain
to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory,” e.g., an order denying a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which
is appealable, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only
as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered
in the case.
Given the differences between a final judgment and an interlocutory order, the RTC
Order dated March 6, 2006 denying respondents' special and affirmative defenses
contained in their answer is no doubt interlocutory since it did not finally dispose of the
case but will proceed for the reception of the parties' respective evidence to determine the
rights and obligations of each other. As such, the RTC Order dated March 6, 2006 may
not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The court finds no merit to petitioners’ claim that the Order dated March 6, 2006
had already become final and could not be the subject of a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA. The RTC Order
dated February 29, 2008 denying respondents' motion for reconsideration was received by
the latter on April 9, 2008. They had 60 days from receipt thereof to file the petition for
Page 380 of 1553

certiorari with the CA. The last day to file the petition fell on June 8, 2008, a Sunday, while
June 9 was declared a holiday, hence, the filing of the petition on the next working day
which was June 10, 2008 was still on time.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS,

INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. Nos. 208828-29, August 13, 2014, J. Villarama
A look at the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us
to reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still good and valid. The October
31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate court in so far as it authorizes the sale of the three
properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, as null and void. It is
axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights upon the
parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties
or obligations.
This Court agree with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said
decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the order upholding the grant of
letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by Silverio, Jr., as
otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus
Order allowing the sale of the subject properties.
Facts:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was
survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. her husband, Edmundo S.
Silverio, Edgardo S. Silverio, Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Nelia S.Silverio-Dee, and Ligaya S.
Silverio. Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate was filed by
Silverio Sr. In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal
challenging several orders of the intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme
Court.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was Edgardo but by virtue of a Joint
Manifestation filed by the heirs of Beatriz, the motion to withdraw as administrator filed
by Edgardo was approved by the intestate court and in his stead, Silverio Sr. was appointed
as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and
appoint a new administrator ensued between Silverio Sr. and Silverio Jr. A motion for
reconsideration was separately filed by Silverio Sr. and Nelia Silverio-Dee, the intestate
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court granted the motion of Silverio Jr. to take his oath as administrator effective upon
receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report filed by Silverio Sr. On 12 December
2005 the intestate court acting on the motion filed by Silverio sr. recalled the Order
granting letters of administration to Silverio Jr. and reinstated Silverio Sr. as administrator.
Then again, the intestate court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the
Order filed by Silverio Jr. issued an Omnibus Order upholding the grant of Letters of
Administration to Silverio Jr. and removed Silverio Sr., as administrator for gross violation
of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. Silverio Sr. moved
for reconsideration of the above Order whereas Silverio-Dee on the other hand, filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a
decision reinstating Silverio, Sr. as administrator.
Silverio Jr. filed a Petition for review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 11
February 2009, the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the petition Silverio Jr.’s
motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court denied the motion with finality. Silverio Sr.
filed before the intestate court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as administrator of the
estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued the now challenged Order. On 15
March 2011, heirs Silverio Jr., Edmundo and Ligaya moved for the disqualification and/or
inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr. which Judge Guanlao denied. The movants filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order, ordered among others, the sale of certain
properties belonging to the estate. By virtue of the aforesaid Order, Silverio, Jr. executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Citrine Holdings, Inc. over the property located at No. 3
Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. Citrine became the registered owner thereof. A Deed
of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo for the lot located at
No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. The latter subsequently sold said
property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. and TCT was issued under its name.
On 04 February 2011 Silverio Sr. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction praying among others,
that a TRO be issued restraining and/or preventing Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo, Citrine
Holdings, Inc. and their successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect
the titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, Silverio Sr. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null
and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz
S. Silverio.
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On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a TRO. The
consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. before the CA. On March
8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision denying the petition. In this case, the sale of the
subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by
the said court on motion by Silverio Sr.
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties,
the CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed
at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case
making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment
of Silverio Sr. as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of
whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
were in effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the authority to sell the properties in question granted under the
October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP No. 97196.
Ruling:
No, the authority to sell the properties is not nullified.
A look at the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead
us to reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still good and valid. The
October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate court in so far as it authorizes the sale of
the three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, as null and void.
It is axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties or obligations.
This Court declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate
court when it ordered the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL and
VOID citing as justification the decision of the Court of Appeals, in CAG.R. SP No. 97196.
To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court of Appeals was
declared to be limited only to the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of
Page 383 of 1553

letters of administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as

administrator and nothing else. Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate
court and challenged by Silverio Jr., this Court find that it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion as it was directed against acts which were already fait accompli.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was issued by the
intestate court acting upon pending motions filed by Silverio Sr. and Silverio, Jr., father and
son, respectively, who are the central figures in the now decade-old controversy over the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing
as administrator of the estate petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts
becoming more evident to the intestate court as the proceedings suffered delays. At the
hearing of the urgent motion filed by Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject properties and
partially settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity came when the heirs represented
by their respective counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that Silverio Sr. was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant
to the August 28, 2008 decision, this Court agree with the CA that the permanent
injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to
the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as
otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus
Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained
finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with finality respondent Silverio,
Jr.’s motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009 Resolution denying his petition for
review.
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate
court annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued
in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced
by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in
good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under
its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as
it allowed the aforesaid sale.
UPSI PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.vs. DIESEL CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.

G.R. No. 200250, August 06, 2014, J. Mendoza
The rule is that in case of ambiguity or uncertainty in the dispositive portion of a decision,
the body of the decision may be scanned for guidance in construing the judgment. The Court’s
silence as to the payment of the legal interests in the dispositive portion of the decision is not
Page 384 of 1553

tantamount to its deletion or reversal. If such was the intention, it should have also expressly
declared its deletion together with its express mandate to remove the award of liquidated
damages to UPSI.
Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by Diesel Construction Co.,
Inc. (Diesel) against UPSI before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
for collection of unpaid balance of the contract price and retention money under their
construction agreement.
An arbitral award was rendered by the CIAC in favor of Diesel. Such award was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in its decision promulgated on March 24, 2008 which has become
Eventually, Diesel filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the CIAC.
Despite numerous pleadings filed by UPSI opposing the execution of the Court’s
decision, the CIAC granted the execution sought by Diesel. Furthermore Diesel sought the
amendment of the writ of execution before the CIAC so that the payment of legal interest
be included in the writ. The claim for legal interest was granted by CIAC.
UPSI questioned the CIAC order via a petition for certiorari with the CA, arguing that
the CIAC gravely abused its discretion when it substantially modified the writ of execution
by holding that Diesel was entitled to legal interest. The CA, however, denied the petition
ruling that: the court disagrees with UPSI’s contention that the Supreme Court deleted the
legal interest by its silence on that matter. If such was its intention, it should have also
expressly declared its deletion together with its express mandate to remove the award of
liquidated damages to herein petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the legal interest is deemed included in the writ of execution despite the
“silence” of the Court in the dispositive portion of its judgment which has become final and
executory
Ruling:
Yes.
The rule is that in case of ambiguity or uncertainty in the dispositive portion of a
decision, the body of the decision may be scanned for guidance in construing the judgment.
After scrutiny of the subject decision, nowhere can it be found that the Court intended to
delete the award of legal interest especially that, as Diesel argues, it was never raised. In
Page 385 of 1553
fact, what the Court carefully reviewed was the principal amount awarded as well as the
liquidated damages because they were specifically questioned. Recall that the CA modified
the awards granted by the CIAC, but not the legal interest. In finally resolving the
controversy, the Court affirmed the amount of unpaid balance of the contract price in
favor of Diesel but expressly deleted the award of liquidated damages. There being no
issue as to the legal interest, the Court did not find it necessary anymore to disturb the
imposition of such.
Thus, contrary to UPSI’s argument, there is no substantial variance between the March
24, 2008 final and executory decision of the Court and the writ of execution issued by the
CIAC to enforce it. The Court’s silence as to the payment of the legal interests in the
dispositive portion of the decision is not tantamount to its deletion or reversal. The CA was
correct in holding that if such was the Court’s intention, it should have also expressly
declared its deletion together with its express mandate to remove the award of liquidated
damages to UPSI.
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AQUILA GLASS v. SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015, Reyes, J.
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based

exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes.
Facts:
A lease contract for five years was entered into between respondent Santos Car Check
Center Corporation, as lessor and petitioner Comglasco Corporation, as lessee. Comglasco,
however, informed Santos that it was pre-terminating their lease contract. However, Santos
refused to accede to the pre-termination, reminding that their contract was for five years.
Comglasco vacated the leased premises and stopped paying rentals. Santos sent several
demand letters, which were all ignored by Comglasco. Hence, Santos filed suit for breach
of contract. Comglasco moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service. The RTC
dismissed the motion and ordered the summons served anew. Comglasco subsequently
filed its Answer. Santos moved for a judgment on the pleadings, which the RTC granted.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Santos. Santos moved for execution pending
Comglasco’s appeal, which the trial court granted. The CA affirmed the judgment of the
Page 386 of 1553

RTC but modified the award of damages. Comglasco maintains that the RTC was wrong to
rule that its answer to Santos’ complaint tendered no issue, or admitted the material
allegations therein; that the court should have heard it out on the reason it invoked to
justify its action to pre-terminate the parties’ lease; that therefore a summary judgment
would have been the proper recourse, after a hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was properly invoked by the trial court as basis
for rendering its decision.
Ruling:
Yes. A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based
accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion
for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case
after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. Come to think
of it, under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, Comglasco had recourse to move for summary
judgment, wherein it could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the
parties' lease, but it did not do so.
As found by the CA, Comglasco’s Answer admitted the material allegations in the
complaint, to wit: a) that Santos holds absolute title to a showroom space; b) that
Comglasco leased the said showroom from Santos; c) that after a little over a year,
Comglasco pre-terminated the lease; d) that, disregarding Santos’ rejection of the pre-
termination of their lease, Comglasco vacated the leased premises on January 15, 2002; e)
that Comglasco never denied the existence and validity of the parties’ lease contract.
Specifically, the CA noted that Paragraph 2 of the Answer admitted the allegations in
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the complaint that the lease was for five years, starting on August
16, 2000 and to expire on August 15, 2005, at a monthly rental of P60,000.00 on the first
year, P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00 on the third up to the fifth year. The
RTC acted correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the Pleadings, to
cut short a needless trial. The Court agrees with the CA that Comglasco cannot cite Article
1267 of the Civil Code, and that it must be deemed to have admitted the material allegations
in the complaint.
Page 387 of 1553

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 207970, January 20, 2016 [Bersamin, J.]
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming
party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of
the parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for
judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another case supposedly
tendered an issue of fact.
It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly

known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been known
by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.
In order to resolve petitioner’s Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial
court could rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether
the complaint’s material allegations were admitted or properly denied.
FACTS:
Petitioner Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of
money against Wesleyan University Philippines. The respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support
of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint for the
rescission, the resolution of which would be determinative of the petitioner’s action for
collection. After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss, respondent filed its answer (ad
cautelam), averring thusly:
xxxx
3. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint are

DENIED for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions were
undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant
Wesleyan University-Philippines. At any rate, these allegations are subject
to the special and affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;
Page 388 of 1553

xxxx
Petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent
had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as
to such allegations. The RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on
the Pleadings of the petitioner. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judgment
on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the petitioner
remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for
rescission (another case). Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA should have confined itself to the respondent’s Answer in the action in
order to resolve the petitioner’s motion for judgment based on the pleadings.
RULING:
YES.
The rule on judgment based on the pleadings is Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. The
essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there
are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not
depends on how the defending party’s answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in
the complaint. The defending party’s answer either admits or denies the allegations of
ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts
the answer admit, being undisputed, will not require evidence to establish the truth of such
facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being disputed, will
require evidence. The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the
adverse party’s pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations
but also when it omits to deal with them at all. The controversion of the ultimate facts must
only be by specific denial.
In Civil Case No. 09-122116, respondent expressly admitted paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and
10 of the complaint. The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint "for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof,
inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past
officers of respondent.
To be sure, paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the Complaint averred matters that the respondent
ought to know or could have easily known. However, the answer did not specifically deny
Page 389 of 1553

such material averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or

information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could
have easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.
That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special
and affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis
pendentia and forum shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative defenses, by
their nature, involved matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner’s claim, and thus did
not negate the material averments of the complaint.
In order to resolve petitioner’s Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court
could rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining
whether the complaint’s material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such,
the respondent’s averment of payment to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission
had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The
CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained
to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the
respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment, if the
payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission
exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. SANNAEDLE

CO., LTD.
G.R. No. 181676, June 11, 2014, J. Peralta
The issue in this case is whether or not judgment on the pleading is proper. The court
ruled that Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails to
tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in
Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission of
the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.
Facts:
Asian Construction and Development Corporation and Sannaedle Co. LTD executed
a Memorandum of Agreement wherein Sannaedle Co. LTD was engaged to supply and erect
insulated panel systems at various pavilions at the Philippine Centennial Exposition Theme
Park, specifically for the Phase I Project, for an agreed amount of US$3,745,287.94. Pursuant
to the Memorandum of Agreement, Asian Construction and Development Corporation
made various payments amounting to US$3,129,667.32 leaving a balance of US$615,620.33.
Respondent Sannaedle Co. LTD claims that it made several written demands for Asian
Page 390 of 1553
Construction and Development Corporation to pay the said balance, but the latter
continuously refused to heed its plea. Asian Construction and Development Corporation
filed its Answer with Counterclaim. Sannaedle Co. LTD then moved for judgment on the
pleadings on the ground that the Answer admitted all material allegations of the Complaint
and, therefore, failed to tender an issue. Thus, Sannaedle Co. LTD deems that Asian
Construction and Development Corporation’s Answer, in effect, admitted the existence of
the Memorandum of Agreement and its failure to pay the balance despite repeated
demands.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City rendered judgment in favor of Sannaedle
Co. LTD that the Answer of the Asian Construction and Development Corporation failed
to tender an issue, Sannaedle Co. LTD argued that the present action is for collection of the
amount of US$615,620.33 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, which amount
represents the balance of the payment under the Memorandum of Agreement, Annex B of
the Complaint entered into between Sannaedle Co. LTD and Asian Construction and
Development Corporation which was not denied in the Answer. The Court notes that in
the Answer with Counterclaim of the Asian Construction and Development Corporation,
the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement did not deny specifically the claim of the
Sannaedle Co. LTD of being entitled to collect the said amount of US$615,620.33.
Issue:
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper
Ruling:
Yes. Judgment on the pleading is proper
Judgment on the pleadings is governed by Section 1, Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which reads:
Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails
to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out
Page 391 of 1553

in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission
of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.
This rule is supported by the Court’s ruling in Mongao v. Pryce Properties

Corporation wherein it was held that "judgment on the pleadings is governed by Section 1,
Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, essentially a restatement of Section 1, Rule 19
of the 1964 Rules of Court then applicable to the proceedings before the trial court. Section
1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. The answer would fail to tender
an issue, of course, if it does not comply with the requirements for a specific denial set out
in Section 10 (or Section 8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but
also if it omits to deal with them at all." Further, in First Leverage and Services Group, Inc.
v. Solid Builders, Inc., this Court held that where a motion for judgment on the pleadings
is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a
proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the
failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. The answer would fail to tender an
issue, of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof
and/or omitting to deal with them at all.
Here, it is irrefutable that petitioner acknowledged having entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement with respondent and that it still has an unpaid balance of
US$615,620.33.
While petitioner allegedly raised affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification
of non-forum shopping, no legal capacity to sue and fortuitous event, the same cannot still
bar respondent from seeking the collection of the unpaid balance. Other than these
affirmative defenses, petitioner’s denial neither made a specific denial that a Memorandum
of Agreement was perfected nor did it contest the genuineness and due execution of said
agreement.
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE T. ADOLFO

Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer would
“fail to tender an issue” if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits
said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness
thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically
Page 392 of 1553
deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations
of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or
impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the
pleadings would naturally be improper.
Facts:
On April 14, 2004, petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition
for judicial separation of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo.
Docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-4821, the petition alleged that the parties were married
on November 26, 1966; that the union bore one child; that during the marriage, they
acquired through conjugal funds Lot 1087-A-2-E covered by TCT 18368 (subject property);
that respondent denied petitioner’s co-ownership of the subject property, claiming the
same as her paraphernal property; and that a judicial separation of property is proper under
the circumstances and pursuant to Article 135(6) of the Family Code. Petitioner thus prayed
that judgment be rendered decreeing a separation of the conjugal property and the
subdivision or sale thereof, to the end of dividing the same or the proceeds thereof. In her
Answer, respondent contended that while she remained married to petitioner, she is the
sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal property which she
inherited from her mother. Respondent argued that she is the sole owner of the subject
property, the same being her paraphernal property which she alone redeemed from the
Garcias; and that under Article 13511 of the Civil Code, all property brought by the wife to
the marriage as well as all property she acquires during the marriage in accordance with
Article 14812 of the same Code constitutes paraphernal property.
In 1996, respondent’s sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon
(the Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with damages against respondent. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2683. The Complaint therein alleged that respondent
executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons over a 300-square meter portion of the
subject property. For her defense, respondent claimed that when the sale was made, the
subject property constituted conjugal property of her marriage with petitioner; that as early
as 1983, or when the Garcias executed the deed of sale in her favor, the subject property
became a conjugal asset; since petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor of the
Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was
null and void. The trial court rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, declaring
that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. It thus nullified
the 1988 deed of sale executed by respondent in favor of the Gingoyons for lack of consent
on the part of petitioner, citing Article 124 of the Family Code.
Page 393 of 1553

Meanwhile, during the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, petitioner
submitted as part of his evidence and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons’
Complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, respondent’s Answer thereto, and the trial court’s
in said case. Petitioner filed a Request for Admission of 1) the genuineness of the duly
marked certified true copies of the Complaint, Answer, and Decision in Civil Case No.
MAN-2683; 2) respondent’s declaration in said Answer that the subject property
constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial court’s pronouncement in
said case that the subject property forms part of the conjugal estate. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that since respondent failed to answer
his request for admission, the matters contained in the request are deemed admitted.
Respondent filed an Opposition, respondent argued among others that the request for
admission was premature considering that the decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 was
the subject of an appeal under CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, and thus not yet final. The RTC
granted the petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings. Respondent instituted an
appeal with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 01783.
The CA, in the CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, reversed the decision in Civil Case No. MAN-
2683. It declared, among others, that the subject property was respondent’s paraphernal
property. That decision became final and executory. In CA-G.R. CV No. 01783, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision in Civil Case No. MAN-4821. The CA held that the
trial court cannot treat petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for
summary judgment. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner insists that
respondent’s failure to reply to his written request for admission resulted in her admitting
that the subject property is a conjugal asset. Respondent counters that petitioner elected
the wrong remedy in filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings when he should have
moved for summary judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was
proper.
Ruling:
The Court denies the Petition.
In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent’s failure to

reply to petitioner’s request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as
well its decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial
notice of the proceedings in said case. While there is nothing irregular with this – as courts
Page 394 of 1553

may take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the
same court if (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other
party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so – the trial court however
disregarded the fact that its decision was then the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78971. It should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court,
it would be premature to render judgment on petitioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings; that it would be presumptuous to assume that its own decision would be
affirmed on appeal. One of the issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether the subject
property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of resolving
petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should have denied it
or held it in abeyance. It should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in
the hasty resolution of his case.
Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioner’s

request for admission by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court should have considered
the pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It cannot take judicial notice solely of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, and ignore the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971.
After all, CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. MAN-2683; an
appeal is deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the lower court. On the
part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear that under Rules
34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment as a result of the consequent admission by respondent that the subject property
is conjugal, this is not actually the case. Quite the contrary, by invoking the proceedings
and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment
while the appeal in said case is pending, because the result thereof determines whether the
subject property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal. He may not pre-empt the appeal in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78971. While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties
to the action, petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683
to secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief,
be allowed to repudiate or question the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. The principle
of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate court,
which became final and executory, that the subject property is respondent’s paraphernal
property.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS vs. SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015, J. Reyes
Page 395 of 1553


evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. Under Rule 35, on
Summary Judgments, the petitioner had recourse to move for summary judgment, wherein it
could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties’ lease, but it did
not do so.
Facts:
Santos Car Check Center Corporation (Santos), owner of a showroom located at 75

Delgado Street, in Iloilo City, leased out the said space to Comglasco Corporation
(Comglasco), an entity engaged in the sale, replacement and repair of automobile
windshields, for a period of five years at a monthly rental of P60,000.00 for the first year,
P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00 on the third through fifth years.
Subsequently, Comglasco advised Santos through a letter that it was pre-terminating their
lease contract effective December 1, 2001. Santos refused to accede to the pre-termination,
reminding Comglasco that their contract was for five years. On January 15, 2002,
Comglasco vacated the leased premises and stopped paying any further rentals. Santos
sent several demand letters, which Comglasco completely ignored. Hence, Santos filed suit
for breach of contract.
Summons and a copy of the complaint, along with the annexes, were served on
Comglasco on January 21, 2004, but it moved to dismiss the complaint for improper
service. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, dismissed the motion and ordered
the summons served anew. On June 28, 2004, Comglasco filed its Answer. Santos moved
for a judgment on the pleadings, which the RTC granted. Thereafter, the trial court
rendered its judgment in favor of Santos ordering Comglasco to comply with its obligation
under the Contract of Lease and to pay Santos attorney’s fees, expenses and damages.
Santos moved for execution pending Comglasco’s appeal, which the trial court
granted. On appeal, CA affirmed the judgement of the RTC but reduced the award of
attorney’s fees to P100,000.00 and deleted the award of litigation expenses and exemplary
damages. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether summary judgement by the RTC was proper.
Page 396 of 1553

Ruling: The petition is denied.
The RTC acted correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the
Pleadings, to cut short a needless trial. This Court agrees with the CA that Comglasco
cannot cite Article 1267 of the Civil Code, and that it must be deemed to have admitted the
material allegations in the complaint. Section 1, Rule 34 reads:
Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in
actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. Come to think
of it, under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, Comglasco had recourse to move for summary
judgment, wherein it could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the
parties’ lease, but it did not do so. Section 2 of Rule 35 provides:
Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Concerning, now, whether Comglasco’s alleged rental deposit and advance rentals
of P309,000.00 should be credited to Comglasco’s account, let it suffice to state that it never
raised this matter in its answer to the complaint, nor in its appeal to the CA. Certainly, it
cannot do so now.
Finally, as to whether attorney’s fees may be recovered by Santos, Article 2208(2) of

the Civil Code justifies the award thereof, in the absence of stipulation, where the
defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his
interest. The pre-termination of the lease by Comglasco was not due to any fault of Santos,
and Comglasco completely ignored all four demands of Santos to pay the rentals due from
January 16, 2002 to August 15, 2003, thereby compelling Santos to sue to obtain relief. It is
true that the policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to
Page 397 of 1553

litigate,21 but it is also true that attorney’s fees are in the nature of actual damages, the
reason being that litigation costs money. But the Court agrees with the CA that the lesser
amount of P100,000.00 it awarded to Santos instead of P200,000.00 adjudged by the RTC,
is more reasonable.
YKR CORPORATION, MA. TERESA J. YULO-GOMEZ, JOSE ENRIQUE J. YULO, MA.

ANTONIAJ. YULO-LOYZAGA, JOSE MANUEL J. YULO, MA. CARMEN J. YULO and
JOSE MARIAJ. YULO vs. PHILIPPINE AGRI-BUSINESS CENTER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191838
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIPPINE AGRI-BUSINESS CENTER

CORPORATION
GR. No. 191863, October 20, 2014, J, VIllarama, Jr.
When a party moves for summary judgment, this is premised on the assumption that
a scrutiny of the facts will disclose that the issues presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent
fact. A judgment on the motion must be “rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A prudent examination of the evidence on record yields to no other conclusion that there
exists a genuine issue of fact as raised in both petitions. Hence, the Sandiganbayan erred in
granting the motion for summary judgment.
Facts:
This case is for the nullification of the assailed decision rendered by the
Sandiganbayan on June 30, 2009 wherein it granted the respondent PABC’s motion for
summary judgment and decided that the case in Civil Case No. 0024 posed only pure
questions of law. Petitioners (YKR Corporation and the Republic) both moved for
reconsideration and prayed that the June 30, 2009 Resolution be set aside and a new one
be issued denying respondent PABC’s Motion for Summary Judgment for lack of merit.
Both motions were denied. Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court raising similar
grounds for review. In a Resolution issued by the Court on August 11, 2010, the petitions at
bar were consolidated “to avoid conflicting rulings in similar cases brought before this
Court for resolution considering that the petitions in both cases involve the same parties
and similar facts and assail the same Sandiganbayan resolutions in Civil Case No. 0024
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in law when it granted PABC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Page 398 of 1553
Ruling:

When a party moves for summary judgment, this is premised on the assumption
that a scrutiny of the facts will disclose that the issues presented need not be tried either
because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any
pertinent fact. A judgment on the motion must be “rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
The case of Viajar v. Judge Estenzo incisively explains the rationale for this
sanctioned, albeit expedited, procedure:
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases
where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact
joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment
cannot take the place of a trial.
To determine whether summary judgment was properly rendered by the court a
quo, the court shall examine if the following requisites under Rule 35 of the Rules obtain in
the case at bar, viz.:
1. there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of
damages; and
2. the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
A “genuine issue of fact” is an issue “which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to
the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that
the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine
issue for trial. x x x When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.”
Page 399 of 1553

A prudent examination of the evidence on record yields to no other conclusion that

there exists a genuine issue of fact as raised in both petitions. Hence, the Sandiganbayan
erred in granting the motion for summary judgment.
OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION and DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ vs. BENJAMIN

CASTILLO
Trial is the judicial examination and determination of the issues between the parties
to the action. During trial, parties present their respective evidence of their claims and
defenses. Parties to an action have the right "to a plenary trial of the case" to ensure that they
were given a right to fully present evidence on their respective claims. However, there are
instances when trial may be dispensed with. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a trial court may dispense with trial and proceed to decide a case if from the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. In such a case, the judgment issued is called a summary judgment.
Facts:
Benjamin Castillo was the registered owner of parcel of land located in Laurel,
Batangas. The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) allegedly claimed ownership of the
same parcel of land. On April 5, 2000, Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented
by Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez, (herein petitioners) entered into a contract of conditional sale
over the property.
Eventually, on September 2, 2004, Castillo filed a complaint against Olivarez Realty

Corporation and Dr. Olivarez with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan City, Batangas. He
alleged that petitioners committed substantial breach of the contract of conditional sale
and that the deed of conditional sale was a contract of adhesion. Hence, he prayed for
rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thereafter,
Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings.
The trial court ruled that Olivarez Realty Corporation breached the contract of
conditional sale. As such, it ordered that the said deed be rescinded and the amount of
P2,500,000.00 paid by petitioners as downpayment be forfeited in favor of Castillo "as
damages under Article 1191 of the Civil Code." The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
trial court’s decision. According to the appellate court, the trial court "did not err in its
finding that there is no genuine controversy as to the facts involved in this case," therefore,
the trial court correctly rendered summary judgment. Undaunted, petitioners sought for a
Page 400 of 1553

motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issues:
1) Whether the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment.

2) Whether proper docket fees were paid in this case.
Ruling:
1) The trial court correctly rendered summary judgment, as there were no genuine
issues of material fact in this case.
Trial is the judicial examination and determination of the issues between the parties
to the action. During trial, parties present their respective evidence of their claims and
defenses. Parties to an action have the right "to a plenary trial of the case" to ensure that
they were given a right to fully present evidence on their respective claims. However, there
are instances when trial may be dispensed with. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a trial court may dispense with trial and proceed to decide a case if from the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact. In such a case, the judgment issued is called a summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment is filed either by the claimant or the defending
party. The trial court then hears the motion for summary judgment. If indeed there are no
genuine issues of material fact, the trial court shall issue summary judgment.
An issue of material fact exists if the answer or responsive pleading filed specifically
denies the material allegations of fact set forth in the complaint or pleading. If the issue of
fact requires the presentation of evidence, it is a genuine issue of fact. However, if the issue
could be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and the trial court may resolve the
action through summary judgment.
A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer filed fails to tender any issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations in the complaint. On the other hand, in a
summary judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as specific denials and affirmative
defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are sham, fictitious, or otherwise not genuine.
Page 401 of 1553

In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did not fully pay the
purchase price as agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. As to why it withheld
payments from Castillo, it set up the following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not
file a case to void the PTA’s title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the land of
the tenants; third, Castillo allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent
sale is currently being litigated before a Quezon City court.
Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer tendered
an issue, Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. However,
the issues tendered by their answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These are issues
that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
other papers on file; otherwise, these issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.
Petitioner corporation refused to fully pay the purchase price because no court case
was filed to void the PTA’s title on the property. However, paragraph C of the deed of
conditional sale is clear that petitioner Olivarez Realty Corporation is responsible for
initiating court action against the Philippine Tourism Authority. Hence, Castillo’s alleged
failure to "fully assist" the corporation in filing the case is not a defense. As the trial court
said, "how can he assist the corporation when the latter did not file the action in the first
place?"
Neither can Olivarez Realty Corporation argue that it refused to fully pay the
purchase price due to the PTA’s adverse claim on the property. The corporation knew of
this adverse claim when it entered into a contract of conditional sale. It even obligated itself
under the said paragraph to sue PTA. This defense, therefore, is sham.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim, there is no "obvious ambiguity" as to which should

occur first — the payment of the disturbance compensation or the clearing of the land
within six months from the signing of the deed of conditional sale. The obligations must
be performed simultaneously. In this case, the parties should have coordinated to ensure
that tenants on the property were paid disturbance compensation and were made to vacate
the property six months after the signing of the deed of conditional sale.
Olivarez Realty Corporation’s obligation to pay disturbance compensation is a pure

obligation as the performance of which did not depend on any condition. Moreover, the
deed of conditional sale did not give the corporation a period to perform the obligation. As
such, the obligation to pay disturbance compensation was demandable at once. Olivarez
Realty Corporation should have paid the tenants disturbance compensation upon
execution of the deed of conditional sale.
Page 402 of 1553

With respect to Castillo’s obligation to clear the land of the tenants within six
months from the signing of the contract, his obligation was an obligation with a resolutory
period. Olivarez Realty Corporation, therefore, had no right to withhold payments of the
purchase price. As the trial court ruled, Olivarez Realty Corporation "can only claim non-
compliance of the obligation to clear the land of the tenants within the period agreed
upon.”
Furthermore, the claim that Castillo sold the property to another is fictitious and
was made in bad faith to prevent the trial court from rendering summary judgment.
Petitioners did not elaborate on this defense and insisted on revealing the identity of the
buyer only during trial. Even in their petition for review on certiorari, petitioners never
disclosed the name of this alleged buyer. Thus, as the trial court ruled, this defense did not
tender a genuine issue of fact, with the defense "bereft of details."
Castillo’s alleged prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of rescission of contract and
reformation of instrument is not a ground to dismiss his complaint. A plaintiff may allege
two or more claims in the complaint alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of
action or in separate causes of action. It is the filing of two separate cases for each of the
causes of action that is prohibited since the subsequently filed case may be dismissed on
the ground of splitting causes of action.
The court notes, however, that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment
on the amount of damages. Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment may be rendered, except as to the amount of damages.
2) The trial court acquired jurisdiction over Castillo’s action as he paid the correct
docket fees.
An action for rescission of contract of sale of real property is an action incapable of

pecuniary estimation. Though the action involved a real property, nevertheless, it is the
nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. Consequently,
the docket fees to be paid shall be for actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, regardless
if the claimant may eventually recover the real property.
RES JUDICATA
EMILIANO S. SAMSON vs. SPOUSES JOSE and GUILLERMINA GABOR, TANAY

RURAL BANK, INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MORONG, RIZAL
Page 403 of 1553

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section
47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c).
Jurisprudence taught us well that res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the
prosecution of a second action exists when there is identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action in the first and second actions. The judgment in the first action is final as to
the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. The case at hand
satisfies the essential requisites of res judicata under the first concept. The RTC is therefore
correct in dismissing the case on the ground of res judicata.
Facts:
On October 22, 1987, petitioner Samson executed a Deed of Assignment transferring
the same undivided portion in favor of Ma. Remedios P. Ramos. Upon learning of the sale,
respondent spouses filed an action for legal redemption with the RTC of Tanay, Rizal.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner Samson and Ramos executed an Agreement of
Rescission revoking the transfer of the undivided portion. On July 25, 1989, the RTC
dismissed the suit for legal redemption. On appeal, however, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No.
25530, reversed the decision of the RTC and upheld the Spouses Gabor’s right of legal
redemption. No further appeals were pursued.
Instead, during the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 25530, petitioner Samson filed an
action for Partition of Real Property and Damages against respondent spouses with the
RTC of Morong, Rizal, which dismissed the same on the ground that the finality of CA-G.R.
CV No. 25530 effectively barred the action for partition. CA upheld the decision of the RTC.
Samson appeals with the Supreme Court but the same was dismissed in a minute resolution
for failure to submit an affidavit of service.
and the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal. On August 18, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Samson filed an appeal with the CA,
which likewise dismissed the same for having been improperly brought before it. Hence,
this petition.
Page 404 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the complaint filed by Samson for Recovery of Property or its Value
against respondent spouses is already barred by res judicata
Ruling:
In order for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter,
causes of action as are present in the civil cases below.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c).
Jurisprudence taught us well that res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the
prosecution of a second action exists when there is identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action in the first and second actions. The judgment in the first action is final as
to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them,
not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim
or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In contrast, res
judicata under the second concept or estoppel by judgment exists when there is identity of
parties and subject matter but the causes of action are completely distinct. The first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved herein.
The case at hand satisfies the essential requisites of res judicata under the first
concept. With respect to the first three (3) requisites, the judgment sought to bar the
instant case was a judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, which properly obtained its finality. As the records reveal, the
decision to dismiss petitioner’s earlier complaint for Partition of Real Property and
Damages was rendered by the RTC of Morong, Rizal, having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by
the parties at the trial of the case. Said judgment was rendered based on the evidence and
witnesses presented by the parties who were given ample opportunity to be heard as well
as a valid judgment by the CA, in the separate legal redemption case upholding spouses
Gabor’s right of legal redemption, which became final and executory upon the expiration
of the period of appealing the same, the parties pursuing no further appeal.
In the same way, petitioner’s complaint for partition likewise obtained finality when
it was dismissed by this Court of last resort. Anent the fourth and final requisite, it is
Page 405 of 1553
undisputed that there exists an identity of the parties and subject matter between the prior
action for partition and the instant subsequent action for recovery of property, the same
being filed by herein petitioner against the same spouses Gabor over the same portion of
land in Tanay, Rizal. The fact that respondents Bank and Register of Deeds were only
impleaded in the subsequent case is of no moment since absolute identity of parties is not
required; mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between the
party in the first case and the party in the subsequent case, shall suffice.
While the two cases are captioned differently, petitioner cannot claim that there is
no res judicata by simply changing the title of the action from “Complaint for Partition of
Real Property and Damages” to a “Complaint for Recovery of Property or its Value.” The
records clearly reveal that the evidence submitted by the parties in both cases are identical.
Petitioner, in claiming that he had either the right to partition or to recover the subject
property, submitted the same Deed of Assignment transferring in his favor the subject
property as payment for his legal services as well as the same Agreement of Rescission of
his earlier transfer of the subject property to Ms. Ramos. As previously mentioned, all of
his claims in both actions are actually anchored on his claim of ownership over the one-
third (1/3) portion of the subject property. If it be proven that he is not a co-owner of the
subject portion, he will neither have the right to partition in the prior action nor will he
have the right to recover the subject property or its value in the subsequent action. Hence,
the ultimate question which the trial court had to resolve in both cases was whether or not
petitioner is a co-owner of the subject property.
Contrary to petitioner’s allegation that an action of partition is merely a possessory
action which could not bar a subsequent action, the issue of ownership or co-ownership is
necessarily resolved before the trial court may issue an order of partition
SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO vs. HEIRS OF

BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO, represented by ARTEMIO SJ. DIONISIO
G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014, J. Reyes
MTC rendered a decision, which dismissed the complaint for forcible entry filed by the
Dionisios. Thereafter, the complaint for recovery of possession filed by them on the ground
of res judicata. The Court ruled that a judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for
forcible entry and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Such
determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause
of action involving possession.
Page 406 of 1553

Facts:
Dionisio filed a complaint for forcible entry with MTC against Mario and Felix
Ocampo. Dionisio sought to recover the possession of a portion of his property, covered by
an original certificate of title, situated in Dalig, Cardona, Rizal. Mario denied Dionisio’s
allegation, claiming that the disputed parcel of land is owned by his wife, Carmelita, who
inherited the same from her father. Mario further claimed that they have been in possession
of the said parcel of land since 1969.
On September 12, 1997, the MTC rendered a decision, which dismissed the
complaint for forcible entry filed by Dionisio. Dionisio died on September 27, 1997.
Consequently, on July 3, 1998, the heirs of Dionisio filed a complaint for recovery of
possession with the MTC. On February 18, 2008, the MTC rendered a decision dismissing
the complaint for recovery of possession filed by the respondents on the ground of res
judicata.
The RTC ruled that the MTC erred in dismissing the Dionisios' complaint for
recovery of possession of the subject property solely on the ground of res judicata. CA
affirmed the decision of RTC and held that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied
in this case since there is no identity of cause of action as between the forcible entry case
and the recovery of possession case.
Issue:
Whether the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case constitutes res
judicata.
Ruling:
No.
The doctrine of res judicata is laid down under Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which pertinently provides that: Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The
effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent
Page 407 of 1553

to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the
following requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court
which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated September 12,
1997 in the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court which has jurisdiction over the
subject property and the parties, had long become final. The said MTC decision is an
adjudication on the merits. However, the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is
identity of parties and subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery of
possession case, there is no identity of causes of action.
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion
reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Such determination does not bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein
found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.
The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s
determination that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the respondents
failed to prove their prior physical possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership of
the subject property. Besides, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides
that a “judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive
with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land.”
CECILIA PAGADUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al

G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014, J. Mendoza
Page 408 of 1553

The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of "bar by prior judgment" or
by "conclusiveness of judgment." Here, Salvador's defense was res judicata by conclusiveness
of judgment. Contrary to Salvador's contention ,however, there appears to be no identity of
issues and facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to
resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one involved facts
necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the first case, while it was no longer an
issue in the second case. The only fact to consider in the second administrative complaint is
the fact of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both
administrative complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and
distinct from each other and entailed different sets of facts.
Facts:
Cecilia Pagaduan (Pagaduan) filed a notarized complaint with the Civil Service
Commission-Regional Office No. 2 (CSC-RO II) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, against
respondent Rema Martin Salvador (Salvador), newly appointed Municipal Budget Officer
at that time, charging her with the administrative offenses of falsification and
misrepresentation. Pagaduan alleged that Salvador did not actually possess the necessary
budgeting experience required by her position; and that although she indicated in her
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that she performed book keeping and accounting functions for
Veteran's Woodworks, Inc. (VWI) from August 1, 1990 to February 15, 1992, she was never
in fact employed by the said entity.
Subsequently, Pagaduan filed with the MTCC, a criminal charge against Salvador for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(4) of the Revised
Penal Code in making false statements in her PDS. On May 22, 2000, a decision on the
administrative complaint was rendered by the CSC-RO II, holding Salvador liable only for
Simple Misconduct and imposing the penalty of one (1) month suspension, after ruling that
her act was a mere error of judgment.
Pagaduan appealed to the (CSC), which found the appeal to be without merit. The
CSC also approved Salvador's qualification as Municipal Budget Officer because her
experience in VWI was a "related field." Pagaduan ceased her pursuit and did not move for
a reconsideration or appeal. Thus, on January 21, 2002, the CSC-RO II issued the order,
stating that its May 22, 2000 decision had attained finality. Salvador then served the penalty
of one (1) month suspension.
Later, on October 22, 2008, the MTCC rendered a decision in Criminal Case No.
15842, finding Salvador guilty of falsification of public documents. Salvador did not appeal
Page 409 of 1553

and then applied for probation. Her application was granted and she was placed under
probation for a period of one (1) year.
Thereafter, Pagaduan filed a second administrative complaint against Salvador, this

time for the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Salvador submitted
the required counter affidavit, raising the defenses of res judicata, forum shopping, and
double jeopardy on account of the finality of the decision in the first administrative
complaint for falsification.
On January 12, 2010, the CSC-RO II rendered a decision, finding Salvador guilty of
the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude because of
her conviction for falsification before the MTCC, and imposing the penalty of dismissal
from the service with all its accessory penalties.
Salvador appealed to the CSC, which rendered a decision on March 1, 2011 reversing
and setting aside the decision of the CSC-RO II and exonerating her of the charge. The CA
agreed with the findings of the CSC that the act of falsification committed by Salvador did
not involve moral turpitude as it was a mere error of judgment on her part. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not res judicata exists in the present case
Ruling:
No, there appears to be no identity of issues and facts in the two administrative
cases.
The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of "bar by prior judgment"
or by "conclusiveness of judgment." Here, Salvador's defense was res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment.
Contrary to Salvador's contention, however, there appears to be no identity of issues

and facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to resolve
the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one involved facts
necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the first case, while it was no longer an
issue in the second case. The only fact to consider in the second administrative complaint
is the fact of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. It must be borne in mind that
Page 410 of 1553

both administrative complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were
separate and distinct from each other and entailed different sets of facts.
Corollarily, Pagaduan cannot be liable for forum shopping. The established rule is
that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same
essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter,
and issues. It exists where the elements of litis pendentiaare present, namely: (a) there is
identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other. Since no res judicata exists, no forum shopping either
exists in this case.
ROBERT AND NENITA DE LEON vs. GILBERT AND ANALYN DELA LLANA
The respondent filed two separate complaints of unlawful detainer against the
petitioner. The first case was dismissed by MCTC Compostela Valley Branch upon a finding
that the contract oflease was simulated. The respondent against filed another unlawful
detainer case this time with MCTC Davao. The petitioner contends that the case filed is
already barred by prior judgment. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a bar by prior
judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the
first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred.
There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where there is identity of parties in
the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action. Tested against the foregoing,
the Court rules that res judicata, in the concept of bar by prior judgment, applies in this case.
Facts:
This case arose from two unlawful detainer cases filed by the respondents Gilbert
Llana. The first unlawful detainer case was filed before the MCTC Compostela Valley
Branch. Gilbert alleged therein that the petitioner Robert failed to pay the rentals due. The
complaint, however, was dismissed because the venue was improperly laid and it was found
that the lease contract was simulated. Because of this, Gilbert filed another unlawful
detainer case, this time before MCTC Davao Branch based on the same allegations. Robert
then alleges that the case must be dismissed because it is already barred by prior judgment
because of the ruling made by MCTC Compostela Valley Branch.
Page 411 of 1553

The MCTC Davao Branch ruled in favor of Gilbert and ordered Robert to vacate the
premise and pay the rentals in arrears. On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the
decision of MCTC Davao. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
reinstated the decision of the MCTC. Hence, the current petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata applies – that is, whether or not the
second ejectment complaint was barred by prior judgment.
Ruling:
The principle of res judicata applies in this case and the complaint must therefore
be dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Res judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which

precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and
final judgment. It means that “a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.”
Notably, res judicata has two (2) concepts. The first is “bar by prior judgment” in
which the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal, while
the second concept is “conclusiveness of judgment” in which any right, fact or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before
a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.
There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case that is sought to be barred. There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other
hand, where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action. Tested against the foregoing, the Court rules that res judicata, in the
concept of bar by prior judgment, applies in this case.
Page 412 of 1553

By resolving the substantive issue therein – that is, the right of Gilbert to recover the
de facto possession of the subject property arising from Robert’s breach of the undated
lease contract – the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab’s January 24, 2006 Decision should be
properly considered as a judgment on the merits. In Allied Banking Corporation v. CA,
citing Escarte v. Office of the President, the Court defined “judgment on the merits” as
follows:
As a technical legal term, ‘merits’ has been defined in law dictionaries as a matter of
substance in law, as distinguished from matter of form, and as the real or substantial
grounds of action or defense, in contradistinction to some technical or collateral
matter raised in the course of the suit. A judgment is upon the merits when it
amounts to a declaration of the law to the respective rights and duties of the parties,
based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and
evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.
Simply stated, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal

determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of
action and the subject matter, such as the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab’s January 24, 2006
Decision which had resolved the substantive issue in Civil Case No. 821 as above-explained.
Contrary to respondents’ stance, said Decision was not premised on a mere technical
ground, particularly, on improper venue. This is evinced by the qualifier “granting
arguendo” which opens the discussion thereof, to show that the first ejectment complaint
would, according to the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab, have been dismissed on improper
venue notwithstanding the undated lease contract’s simulated character.
The Court must, however, clarify that res judicata only applies in reference to the
cause of action raised by Gilbert in both ejectment complaints – that is, his entitlement to
the de facto possession of the subject property based on breach of contract (due to non-
payment of rent), which was resolved to be simulated and, hence, non-binding.
Accordingly, any subsequent ejectment complaint raising a different cause of action – say
for instance, recovery of de facto possession grounded on tolerance (which was, by the way,
not duly raised by the respondents in this case and, therefore, improperly taken cognizance
of the MTCC-Davao City in its ruling) – is not barred by the Court’s current disposition. In
effect, the dismissal of the second ejectment complaint, by virtue of this Decision, is
without prejudice to the filing of another ejectment complaint grounded on a different
cause of action, albeit involving the same parties and subject matter.
ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDERS
Page 413 of 1553

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES/

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 189505 & G.R. NO. 189434, MARCH 12, 2014
C.J. SERENO
Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are

actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power
of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court. There is potential custody when,
from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly
recognized by law. While the subject properties are in the US, the the Republic’s interest over
the Arelma assets has already been recognized in an earlier decision rendered by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court.
Facts:
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft
court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was
manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials, and
that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill gotten wealth,
pursuant to Section 2 of RA 1379.
Issue:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
because a) the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate forfeiture action
regarding the assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated; and
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the
Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States.
Held:
1. On the granting of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Page 414 of 1553

It is clear from our 25 April 2012 Decision that the said Petition for Forfeiture described
among others, a corporate entity by the name “Arelma, Inc.,” which maintained an account
and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the
purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth. The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 152154 affirmed
the partial summary judgment only over the Swiss deposits which the Sandiganbayan
declared as forfeited in favor of the State.
This cannot be construed as a bar to a subsequent judgment over numerous other assets
and properties expressly sought to be forfeited in Civil Case No. 0141. Respondent
Republic’s success in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does not mean
its preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a different subject matter
covered by the same petition for forfeiture.
The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment as to
the five Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7
March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the Arelma
account. To subscribe to the view of petitioners is to forever bar the State from recovering
the assets listed above, including the properties involved in Civil Case No. 0141, including
the properties it had specifically identified in its petition for forfeiture. As we have
discussed in our Decision, the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a
separate judgment, and allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:
Separate judgments.—When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the
court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and
all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall
terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed
as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may
stay its enforcement until the rendition of subsequent judgment or judgments and may
prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in
whose favor the judgment is rendered.
Petitioners further insist that “Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account
because the respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture petition
concerning it.” However, petitioners failed to prove that such a reservation was made, and
never even substantiated how such reservation could operate to deprive the State of its
right to file for separate judgment. There is nothing in Republic Act 13793 or in the Rules
which prohibits the graft court from taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment only because of statements allegedly made by one party. This Court cannot
countenance the view advanced by petitioners defeating the jurisdiction of the
Page 415 of 1553

Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379,4 where the laws themselves do
not provide for such limitations.
2. On Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over over the Arelma account
It is basic that the execution of a Court’s judgment is merely a ministerial phase of

adjudication. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets
as ill-gotten cannot be conflated with petitioner’s concerns as to how the ruling may be
effectively enforced. More importantly, petitioner should be reminded of his earlier
insistence that R.A. 1379 is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are
actions in personam, not in rem.
Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are

actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential
power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.
The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all
new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held:
“In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court
should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There
is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court
over the property is impliedly recognized by law.”
Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
the foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma
assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It
reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in
light of its assertion of sovereign immunity: (The Republic's) national interests would be
severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has asserted a claim of ownership
regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that
predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted
public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the
Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related
assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the
Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma
brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate
Page 416 of 1553

of Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the
Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets. xx xx
The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition
because it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over
property that may have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York
through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and
Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control
over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity
and reciprocal diplomatic self-interests.
These statements made by the foreign court; based on principles of comity and reciprocity,
are highlighted if only to assuage petitioner's concerns on the effective enforcement of the
Decision and this Resolution.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION

vs. EDGARDO GUEVARA
G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts

of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to
certain conditions that vary in different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final
order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or order
merely creates a right of action, and its non- satisfaction is the cause of action by which a
suit can be brought upon for its enforcement.
Facts:
One of Edgardo Guevara’s functions as the Philippine Investment Corporation’s (PHILSEC)

president was to resolve the outstanding loans of Ventura Ducat, which the latter obtained
from Ayala International Finance Limited (AIFL). Ducat proposed to settle his debts by an
exchange of assets as he owned several real properties in Houston, Texas in partnership
with 1488, Inc.
In agreement executed in Makati, Philippines, the total amount of Ducat’s debts was
reduced and ATHONA Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA), a company wholly owned by PHILSEC
and AIFL would buy the property. However, after acquiring the same, ATHONA had
difficulty selling the same. Despite repeated demands by the original owner, 1488, Inc.,
ATHONA failed to pay its promissory note for the balance of the purchase price of the said
Page 417 of 1553
property. As a result, PHILSEC and AIFL refused to release the remainder of Ducat’s stock
portfolio. 1488, Inc. instituted a suit against PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA before the US
District Court.
The foreign court dropped Guevara as counter-defendant and the latter moved in open
court to sanction Bank of the Philippine Islands Securities Corporation (BPISC), formerly
PHILSEC, AIFL and ATHONA based on Rule 11 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The verdict was in favor of 1488, Inc. and Guevara’s motion for sanction. BPISC’s failure to
pay Guevara the award despite order and demand, prompted the latter to file a complaint
for enforcement of the US District Court Order before the RTC of Makati. Guevara obtained
a favorable decision and the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
Issue:
Whether the foreign decision should be recognized and enforced in the Philippine
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
YES. Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order requires only proof
of fact of the said judgment or final order. In an action in personam, as in the case at bar,
the foreign judgment or final order enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is the
party attacking the foreign judgment or final order that is tasked with the burden of
overcoming its presumptive validity. A foreign judgment or final order may only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, particularly, want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The fact of a foreign final order in
this case is not disputed. It was duly established by evidence submitted to the RTC that the
US District Court issued an order ordering BPISC, AIFL, and ATHONA, to pay Guevara as
sanction for filing a frivolous suit against the latter, in violation of Rule 11 of the US Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The said order became final when it was no longer appealed.
DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land Inc.

against Court of Appeals Associate Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon.
Sesinanbo E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosari
A.M. OCA IPI NO. 12-204-CA-J. MARCH 11, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Page 418 of 1553
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial
office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant
may be held liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and
reputation of the judges and the Judiciary. In the instant case, AMALI fell short of the
requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against
respondent Justices. Hence, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative to show
cause in writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice.
Facts:
AMALI brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser,
Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members
of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation of the
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The
Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA
Land, Inc.
AMALI brought this administrative complaint alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated
that the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and
deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross
misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations
of the complaint by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the
complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official
of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence. But when the charge
equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions
Page 419 of 1553
of dismissal from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer
should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge
is penal in character.
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204,
Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who “knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment
in any case submitted to him for decision” is punished with prision mayor and perpetual
absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is
adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed
an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. The
complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate
intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of
rendering an unjust decision. The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to
properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable. Only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or
supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make determine and declare
that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered or issued was
unjust.
Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA
through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious
practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges
against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official
functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies,
nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these
remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the
judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts’ dockets.
Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and
abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights.
Page 420 of 1553

Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its
Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who
had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they
should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless
charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of
unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may
constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any
unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to
be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to
obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings. (3a)
AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS

vs. ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS
A.C. NO. 8644, JANUARY 22, 2014
J. REYES
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers
are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of
the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Page 421 of 1553

Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution.
Facts:
Eliseo and Aida were married and 2 children –Alistair and Charmaine – were born
therefrom. Eliseo soon purchased a lot and thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in
his son’s name, to which an Original Certificate of Title covering the property was issued
in the son’s name. Subsequently, Eliseo filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. Thereafter he executed an Affidavit of Loss wherein he represented himself as
the owner of the property covered by the OCT and further declared that he unknowingly
lost the owner’s certificate of title. Later, he caused the annotation of the said affidavit in
the copy of OCT. As such, Alistair filed a complaint for perjury against Eliseo, stating that
the owner’s copy of OCT was in his possession and Eliseo was aware of such fact. Eliseo,
however, insisted that he is the owner of the property covered by OCT as he never intended
to give it to Alistair. Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed for
lack of probable cause Alistair’s complaint for perjury against Eliseo.
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the OCA an administrative complaint for serious
misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo, and a formal investigation was
thereafter conducted. Pending the resolution of the administrative complaint, Eliseo
resigned from his judicial post. Subsequently, after the conclusion of a hearing on the
Annulment case, Judge Casalas called the parties for a conference in his chambers,
however, a scuffle ensued inside the chamber. As such, a police blotter was filed indicating
that Eliseo choked his daughter and attempted to box his son.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for disbarment against Eliseo, alleging that Eliseo
committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in causing the issuance
of OCT in Alistair’s name; misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot; falsely
declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss that the owner’s copy of OCT is missing despite
his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair; stating in his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he has an
intimate relation with another woman; and choking and boxing his children. This, the
Court referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Page 422 of 1553

During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of immorality and
psychological incapacity in having extra-marital affairs; and serious misconduct in the
execution of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved anymore in the instant disbarment
complaint since they are already the subjects of other pending cases. CBD recommended
to the IBP Board of Governors the dismissal of the disbarment complaint against Eliseo for
lack of evidence. The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of CBD.
Issue:
Whether there is automatic conversion of administrative cases against judges to

disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers.
Ruling:
In Samson v. Caballero, the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of

administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them
as lawyers" means, viz:
This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary

proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.
This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them
Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:
"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. x x x. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision
or resolution." x x x x
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an order to comment
on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held
Page 423 of 1553
administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar.
This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will
also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary
replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the
bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the
rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the
filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals
and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court.
The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint against
a lawyer when an administrative case had been previously filed against him or her as a
magistrate. Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should have been
consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note that Samson v.
Caballero was promulgated by the Court on August 5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the
instant disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009. Further, while all the allegations in A.M.
No. MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the instant disbarment complaint, the last issue of
engagement in the scuffle is an addition to the latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve
the said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings.
GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO) vs.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA) AND GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ
WATER DISTRICT (GMAWD)
Via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner
questions the transfer of the management of the water work system to GMAWD done by the
NHA. The Supreme Court ruled that well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisprudence that
administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered
with by the courts. Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under its
special and technical training and knowledge, for the exercise of administrative discretion is
a policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the concerned government agency
and not by the courts.
Facts:
On May 9, 1979, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works (BPW) turned over to
the National Housing Authority (NHA) a completed water works system in San Gabriel,
Carmona, Cavite (now General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite). The NHA must, thereafter, turn
Page 424 of 1553

over the same water works system to a cooperative water company. Accordingly, in a
Memorandum of Agreement dated July 17, 1979, the NHA turned over the water works
system to San Gabriel Water Services Cooperative (SAGAWESECO), now GEMASCO.
In 1983, GEMASCO experienced internal problems. Two (2) Boards of Directors, the
Gabumpa group and the Catangay group, were simultaneously administering its affairs. On
September 18, 1986, as the management of the water system was characterized with
instability and continued conflict, the NHA temporarily intervened and took over through
its Interim Water Services Management. On March 16, 1988, the Gabumpa group again
took over the management.
On January 10, 1992, the NHA entered into a Deed of Transfer and Acceptance with
GMAWD and transferred to the latter the operations and management of the water system
in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite from GEMASCO, which comprised of six (6) artesian
deep wells with pumping facilities, five (5) water tanks, pipe mainline and distribution
system. On February 17, 1992, GEMASCO filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and TRO against the NHA, GMAWD, and the Local Water Utility
Administration before the Quezon City RTC, assailing the Deed of Transfer and Acceptance
executed between the NHA and GMAWD. On June 15, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the contested Deed of Transfer and Acceptance. GEMASCO thus
brought the case to the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64237. Thereafter, the
CA dismissed GEMASCO’s appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. A subsequent motion
for reconsideration having been denied, GEMASCO filed the instant petition before the
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175417.
Issue:
Whether or not GEMASCO can question the validity of the transfer of

administration of the water system to GMWAD.
Ruling:
GEMASCO cannot question the validity of the transfer to GMWAD.
The NHA turned over said water system to SAGAWESECO, now GEMASCO, by
virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement providing, among others, that at the end of six (6)
months, if the cooperative’s management proves unsatisfactory as evaluated by the Bureau
of Cooperative Development (BCOD)/Ministry of Local Government and Community
Development, it would again be under the direct supervision and guidance of the NHA, in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the BCOD.
Page 425 of 1553

When the operation and management of GEMASCO suffered conflicts, the NHA
properly intervened and took over, and subsequently, replaced GEMASCO with GMAWD.
GEMASCO failed to comply with the requirements and conditions imposed upon it when
it failed to satisfactorily manage and maintain the water works system entrusted to it.
Being the government agency with the authority to award water system management and
administration, verily, the NHA also has the power to revoke such award and look for
another qualified entity to operate the system. GEMASCO cannot now assail the legality
of the transfer of administration and management of the water works system to GMAWD,
the latter being a legitimate and qualified water system cooperative.
Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisprudence that administrative decisions are

entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts. Courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government
agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under its special and technical
training and knowledge, for the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision
and a matter that is best discharged by the concerned government agency and not by the
courts. More so where, as in the present case, the prime consideration is the interest of the
public at large on the issue of basic water need. Certainly, the Deed of Transfer and
Acceptance entered into by the NHA and GMAWD was the result of a valid exercise of the
NHA’s management prerogative.
In any case, GEMASCO raises issues that are factual in nature. As a general rule, the
Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law.
Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions of fact because the Court is
not a trier of facts. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test in determining
whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can resolve the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law. Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as well as their relation
to each other and to the whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45
petition.
POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Motion for Reconsideration, Appeals, Relief from Judgment, Annulment of
Judgment, Execution
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Page 426 of 1553

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP
G.R. NO. 171496, MARCH 3, 2014
J. LEONEN
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A
motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if it puts
an end to a particular matter, leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the
decision. An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself. It is an appeal
from a final decision or order.
Facts:
Ortigas is the owner of a parcel of land in Pasig City. Upon the request of the Department
of Public Works and Highways, respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property
into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. The
title was then inscribed with an encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of
the 1,445-square-meter allotment for the project. Consequently, respondent Ortigas further
subdivided the portion actually used for road widening and the unutilized portion.
On February 14, 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a
petition for authority to sell to the government the unutilized portion. Respondent Ortigas
alleged that the Department of Public Works and Highways requested the conveyance of
the property for road widening purposes. Despite due notice, no one appeared to oppose
respondent Ortigas’ petition. The RTC issued an order, authorizing the sale of to petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
On June 27, 2001, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition, alleging that
respondent Ortigas' property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government,
citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. On June 29, 2001, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order. The same was denied;
this prompted the Republic to file a notice of appeal with the CA. The CA dismissed the
appeal. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioner Republic of the
Philippines’ appeal based on technicalities
Page 427 of 1553
Held:
Appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 must raise
both questions of fact and law Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that
appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure
questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall
not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law
must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the
appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law shall be applied
on a given set of facts. Questions of law do “not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented.” Its resolution rests solely on the application of a law given
the circumstances. There is a question of fact when the court is required to examine the
truth or falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact “invites a review of the evidence.”
The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is
whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in
accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves the
interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to
examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the
evidence. The issue raised before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of
law. The proper mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the
Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.
Nevertheless, we take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules
of Court, which provides that “[n]o appeal may be taken from [a]n order denying a x x x
motion for reconsideration,” is based on the implied premise in the same section that the
judgment or order does not completely dispose of the case. In other words, what Section 1
of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory order.
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion
for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if “it puts an
end to a particular matter,” leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the
decision. The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for
reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its
Page 428 of 1553
property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it completely disposed
of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the administration of
justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was
properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode of appeal.
RIVELISA REALTY, INC. vs. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 189618, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. PERLAS-BERNABE
While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for
review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion
seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other
courts. The 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible.
Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not
toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory.
Facts:
Rivelisa Realty entered into an agreement with First Sta. Clara for the construction and
development of a residential subdivision. During the course of the project respondent hired
a subcontractor to perform a part of the work, however respondent ran out of funds after
only two months of construction, forcing petitioner to shoulder a part of the payment due
to the subcontractor. Further, respondent manifested an intention to back out from the
agreement and discontinue the operations when petitioner refused to advance additional
funds until 60% of the project had been completed. With this, petitioner agreed to release
respondent from the agreement and made an estimate of the actual accomplishment that
included the payment made to the subcontractor. Nonetheless, respondent insisted on a
different valuation of the accomplished works, to which petitioner agreed but emphasized
that the amount is over its obligation in the agreement. Despite such and several demands
made, the agreed amount remained unpaid, prompting respondent to file a complaint for
rescission of the agreement with damages. As such, petitioner claimed that it was obliged
to pay respondent any amount as the respondent failed to comply with its obligation.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and an appeal was made before the CA. The CA, however,
found petitioner still liable for respondent’s actual accomplishments in the project, and
explained that respondent is no longer obligated to comply with the terms and conditions
of the agreement, after petitioner agreed on its dissolution. Later, petitioner received a copy
of the CA decision, but moved for a 15-day extension within which to file its motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration. Nonetheless,
Page 429 of 1553

the CA denied petitioner’s motion for extension as the 15-day period for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended, and merely noted without action the subsequently
filed motion for reconsideration, but eventually the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration, hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether a 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration can
be extended.
Ruling:
While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for
review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion
seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other
courts. This rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v.
Japzon25 wherein it was held that:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
Restating the rule in Rolloque v. CA, the Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing
a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period
before a judgment becomes final and executory.
In this case, Rivelisa Realty only had until March 18, 2009 within which to file either a
motion for reconsideration before the CA or a petition for review of the CA Decision to the
Court. But it committed the fatal error of filing instead a Motion for Extension of Time to
File a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA which – as expressed in Rolloque – did not
toll the running of the period for the finality of the latter’s decision. Verily, a party who fails
to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period
prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the decision, as to him, becomes final and
binding. Since the CA Decision had already become final and executory due to the lapse of
the reglementary period, not only did the CA properly deny Rivelisa Realty’s belatedly-filed
motion for reconsideration but also the remedy of review before the Court had already been
lost. The Court has repeatedly held that the failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and
Page 430 of 1553
within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final, with the
result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. Considering
that the CA Decision had long become final and unalterable by the time Rivelisa Realty
elevated the same, the Court must hereby deny the instant petition.
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. ST. FRANCIS SQUARE REALTY

CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 198916-17, January 11, 2016 [Peralta, J.]
Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also
finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. In particular, factual findings of construction
arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
FACTS:
The Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission (CIAC) rendered an

Arbitral Award in an arbitration case between petitioner and respondent. Dissatisfied with
the CIAC Award, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with
modifications the CIAC Award. Aggrieved by the CA decision, both parties filed their
respective motions for reconsideration, both of which were denied. Hence, the present
petitions of both parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not factual findings of the CIAC may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
RULING:
As exceptions, however, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed

by the Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of
the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators
Page 431 of 1553
were disqualified to act as such under Section Nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully
refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted to them was not made; (6) when there is a very clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was
deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when
an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators; (7) when the findings
of the CA are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (8) when a party is deprived of
administrative due process.
In this case, apart from conflicting findings of fact of the CA and the CIAC as to the
propriety of some arbitral awards, mathematical computations, and entitlement to claim
certain costs as part of the amount necessary to complete the project, none of the other
exceptions above was shown to obtain in this case. Hence, the Court will not disturb those
findings where the CA and the CIAC are consistent with each other, but will review their
findings which are inconsistent and cannot be reconciled.
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)

PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP
LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015, Bersamin, J.
Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the reglementary period to file a petition for
certiorari is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. Upon filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and should the same be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not
be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. Hence, the Fresh Period
Rule under Neypes v. CA does not apply.
Facts:
The Provincial Government of Antique and Fortune Life Insurance entered into an
agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of barangay workers. The former was
obliged to pay for the premium payment and submitted its disbursement voucher to COA
for pre-audit. COA disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis. Consequently, the
Fortune Life filed its petition for money claim in the COA. COA denied the petition,
holding that under the Local Government Code, only municipal or city governments are
Page 432 of 1553
expressly vested with the power to secure insurance coverage for barangay workers.
Fortune Life received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion
for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial
being received by Fortune Life on July 14, 2014. Hence, the Fortune Life filed the petition
for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed for late filing
of the petition. In its motion for reconsideration, Fortune Life submits that it filed the
petition for certitorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule in
Neypes v. CA and that Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Fortune the fresh period rule applies to the petition for certiorari under
Ruling:
NO. The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in
any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
In this case, Fortune Life filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was
31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Under Rule
64, it had only 5 days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the
petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only
until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which
was 25 days too late.
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR
VIOLAGO v. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG
Page 433 of 1553
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals. Administrative appeals are governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87,
Series of 1990 which provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant
shall perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt
of the resolution of denial; whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh
15-day period to perfect his appeal.
Facts:
Petitioner Bayang filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against SLR
Builders before the HLURB Arbiter which ruled in her favor. SLR Builders appealed to the
HLURB Board of Commissioners which dismissed the same. On July 27, 2005, petitioner
received the HLURB decision. 14 days thereafter, petitioner filed an MR. On April 17, 2006,
it received the Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. After 10 days, it filed
its appeal before the OP which dismissed the appeal for having been filed 9 days late. The
OP reasoned that on July 27, 2005, the 15- day prescriptive period within which to file an
appeal began to run. Though the filing of MR interrupted the said period, 14 days had
already elapsed. Thus, petitioner only had 1 day left, or until April 18, 2006, within which
to file its notice of appeal to the OP, but it failed to do so. Consequently, petitioner moved
to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" should be applied to their case.
Issue:
Whether the fresh period rule applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed
from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.
Ruling:
NO. The "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals. In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature;
thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply. An administrative appeal is governed
by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990 which provides that if the motion
for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remainder of
the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial; whereas if the
decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal.
Page 434 of 1553

MILAGROSA JOCSON v. NELSON SAN MIGUEL

G.R. No. 206941, March 09, 2016 [REYES, J.]
FACTS:
This case resolves the issue of whether the "fresh period rule" laid down in Neypes is
applicable in administrative proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" laid down in Neypes is applicable in administrative
proceedings.
RULING:
NO.
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA]; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]; and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule"
shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA] or Supreme Court);
Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA]); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the [CA]); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Page 435 of 1553

In the present case, the appeal from a decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB
as provided for under Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is not
judicial but administrative in nature. As such, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes finds no
application therein.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, et al.
G.R. No. 187836, March 10, 2015, G.R. No. 187916
The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon have
been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to
warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It means not only that the grounds
relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is deemed waived and
may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion or application to overturn the judgment; and
this is true, whatever may be the title given to such motion or application, whether it
be “second motion for reconsideration” or “motion for clarification” or “plea for due process”
or “prayer for a second look,” or “motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgment,”
Facts:
In the Decision promulgated on 25 November 2014, this Court declared Ordinance

No. 8187 unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan
Oil Terminals. The following timelines were set for the relocation and transfer of the
terminals.
Now before us are the following submissions of the intervenor oil companies, to wit:
(1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 November 2014 filed by intervenor
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell); (2) Motion for Clarification filed by
intervenor Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron); and (3) Manifestation of Understanding of
the Dispositive Portion of the Decision of 15 December 2014 (the correct date of
promulgation is 25 November 2014) filed by intervenor Petron Corporation (Petron).
Issue:
Whether or not the submissions made by the intervenor oil companies should be
granted.
Ruling:
The Court hereby resolves to:
Page 436 of 1553

1. DENY Shell’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 November 2014.
It bears stressing that these cases were called in session several times to give the
members of the Court time to study and present their respective positions. Before the
Decision was finally promulgated, the Court had thoroughly deliberated on the arguments
of the parties, including the basic issues herein raised – the rationale for upholding the
position of the Court in G.R. No. 156052, on one hand, and the safety measures adopted by
the intervenors, including the alleged “imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures
interposed by the petitioners,” on the other; the argument of whether or not the petition
should have been filed with the trial court or at least referred to the Court of Appeals to
receive evidence; and the issue on whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 8283
has rendered the instant petitions moot and academic.
2. DENY the prayers in the Motion for Clarification of Chevron that: a) the wordings
“the very nature of the depots where millions of liter[s] of highly flammable and highly
volatile products x x x [have] no place in a densely populated area” be removed from the
Decision dated 25 November 2014; and b) the submission of an updated comprehensive
plan and relocation schedule, including the period for relocation, be deferred until after
the Motion is resolved with finality.
There are overwhelming reasons stated in the Decision to support the Court’s
pronouncement that the very nature of depots has no place in a densely populated area,
among others, the very history of the Pandacan terminals where flames spread over the
entire City of Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in December 1941 and the
other incident of explosion, which were both considered in G.R. No. 156052.
Indeed, the bases of the assailed paragraph were confined to the lis mota of these
cases, and no other depots were considered. But would the situation be different if, given
the same composition of flammable and volatile products, the depots are placed in another
densely populated area? The answer was well explained in the Decision. Thus:
Given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no
matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the court cannot allow the right to
life to be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability
have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of residents of
big neighborhoods is at stake.
Moreover, the Decision should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety.
The Decision is clear – it is the City’s Ordinance No. 8187 that has been declared
Page 437 of 1553

unconstitutional and invalid insofar as the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals
is concerned.
3. CLARIFY that the relocation and transfer necessarily include the complete
removal of the facilities from the Pandacan terminals and should be made part of the
required comprehensive plan and relocation schedule.
To recall, the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not
impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119. It explained:
The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the
legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including
Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record
of the discussions in the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the
provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.
To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent than real.
The two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area
particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No. 8119 is applicable to the entire City
of Manila.
At first blush, the clause “cease and desist” appears to specifically refer only to the
operations, considering that Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 8027 provides for a period of six (6)
months from the date of its effectivity “within which to cease and desist from the operations
of businesses.”
These cases being a mere sequel to the earlier petition, the court so holds that the
relocation and transfer contemplated therein include the removal of the facilities,
especially so when the city plans on building commercial establishments to replace the
Pandacan terminals and provide a source of employment for displaced employees.
Accordingly, the comprehensive plan to be submitted within forty-five (45) days from
receipt of the Decision shall also include the removal of the facilities.
4. REMIND Petron that the Court did not, by noting its “Manifestation” dated 30
November 2010, consent to consider January 2016 as a separate deadline for compliance
with our Decision, which, to repeat, includes the removal of facilities after cessation of
operations. The timelines prescribed in the assailed Decision shall be observed to the letter.
In anticipation of further attempts to delay the enforcement of this Court’s Decision

dated 25 November 2014, the parties to these cases are hereby reminded of the
Page 438 of 1553

pronouncements in Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco on the import of the
denial of a motion for reconsideration. Thus:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon
have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient
weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It means not only that the
grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is deemed
waived and may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion or application to overturn the
judgment; and this is true, whatever may be the title given to such motion or application,
whether it be “second motion for reconsideration” or “motion for clarification” or “plea for
due process” or “prayer for a second look,” or “motion to defer, or set aside, entry of
judgment,”
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Heirs of Catalina Decanal, et al. Vs. Juan Sian, Jr., et al.

G.R. 185169. June 15, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners claim to be the descendants and heirs of Esperanza Espiritu via. de

Apostil, who was allegedly the original owner of a parcel of land in Pangasinan. The OCT
of the property was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2027658 was
issued to Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Siapno). This TCT was likewise cancelled and a new one was
issued to Spouses Jose Sy Tan and Leticia Dy Tan (Sps. Tan). Petitioners allege that they are
the heirs of Espiritu. According to petitioners, the transfer of title from the heirs of
Esperanza Espiritu to Siapno was made possible by a forged Affidavit of Declaration of
Heirs allegedly executed by Feliciana's son, Catalino, on 16 December 1994. In the
document, Catalino was represented as single and the only heir and nephew of Espiritu.
Espiritu appeared to have sold the subject parcel of land to Siapno through a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Siapno sold the subject parcel of land to Sps. Tan.
Thereafter, respondent Mario Rillon (Rillon), claiming to be the tenant of one of

Espiritu’s heirs, filed a Complaint before the DARAB. He alleged that because he had not
been notified of the sale between Siapno and Sps. Tan, he failed to exercise his right of
redemption provided under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389.
The DARAB found him to be him to be a bona fide tenant of the subject property, hence,
entitled to redeem it.
Page 439 of 1553

Meanwhile, petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC assailing the series of
transfers of ownership over the subject parcel of land. The RTC dismissed the Complaint
on the ground that the Decision in the DARAB case had become final and executory, and
the Decision operates as a ground for dismissal on ground of res judicata.
Issue:
Whether the trial court committed an error of law when it dismissed the Complaint
on the ground of res judicata
Ruling:
Yes, the trial court committed an error of law when it dismissed the Complaint on
the ground of res judicata. For the principle to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1) There is a final judgment or order. 2) The court rendering the judgment has jurisdiction
over the parties and subject matter. 3) The former judgment is ajudgment on the merits. 4)
There is between the first and the second actions an identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.
The fourth requisite is absent in this case. There is no identity of parties. It is

undisputed that petitioners were not parties to the DARAB case; it was between Rillon and
Sps. Tan. In Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Cabral, the petitioner therein was also not made
party to the DARAB case. The Court ruled that in conformity with the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law, no one shall be affected by any proceeding to which one
is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.
For the same reason, DARAB Case No. 9631 should not bind petitioners in this case. There
is no identity of cause of action. DARAB Case No. 9631 involved a tenant's right to redeem
the land, while the instant case involves the validity of the transfer documents.
There is merit in petitioners' argument that the DARAB cannot be deemed to have
invalidated the sale, as it did not even touch upon the validity of the documents. The
DARAB Decision merely lifted a portion of the Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, which mentioned the Deeds of Sale between Catalino and Siapno and then
Siapno and Sps. Tan only in connection with the land description. Indeed, it was a bit of a
stretch for the trial court to have concluded that when the DARAB adjudicated the parcel
Page 440 of 1553

of land to Rillon, it "in effect" declared the sale between Catalino and Siapno and later
between Siapno and Sps. Tan to be inefficacious. The DARAB Decision only settled the
preferential right of a tenant to redeem the land and not the validity of the documents.
Republic of the Philippines, et al. Vs. Devon Maurice C. Harp

G.R. No. 188829. June 13, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners seek the reinstatement of the DOJ Resolution 4 dated 18 October 2004
revoking the Order of Recognition and Identity Certificate issued to respondent; and the
BI Summary Deportation Order dated 26 October 20046 issued after the revocation.
Petitioners emphasize that there is substantial evidence to support the finding that
respondent is not a Philippine citizen and, therefore, his summary deportation was
warranted.
The Senate committees, however, found reason to doubt the Philippine citizenship
of respondent. After a scrutiny of the documents he had submitted and its own field
investigation of his purported background, they concluded that he had used spurious
documents in support of his Petition for Recognition. DOJ Secretary Gonzalez issued a
Resolution dated 18 October 2004 24 revoking the recognition accorded to respondent and
five other PBA players. Secretary Gonzalez also directed the BI to undertake summary
deportation proceedings against them.
Issue:
1. Whether the one-day delay in the filing of the Petition is excusable.
2. Whether res judicata has set in
Ruling:
1. Yes, the one-day delay in the filing of the Petition is excusable. The limited period
of appeal was instituted to prevent parties from intentionally and unreasonably
causing a delay in the administration of justice. The dismissal of a petition is
unwarranted if the element of intent to delay is clearly absent from a case. Here, it
is apparent that the delay in the filing of the Petition was for a valid reason, i.e.
respondent had to wait for the RTC Order allowing him to withdraw his then
pending Petition. It is likewise clear that he did not intend to delay the
Page 441 of 1553

administration of justice, as he in fact filed the appeal with the CA on the very same
day the RTC issued the awaited Order.
2. As the agency tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory

services" and "implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay
of aliens," the DOJ has the power to authorize the recognition of citizens of the
Philippines. In this case, respondent was accorded recognition as a citizen on 24
February 2000. On 24 October 2000, he was issued Identification Certificate No.
018488, which confirmed his status and affirmed his entitlement to all the rights and
privileges of citizenship. ] Petitioners, however, are correct in saying that the
recognition granted to respondent has not attained finality. This Court has
consistently ruled that the issue of citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion
demands. Res judicata only applies once a finding of citizenship is affirmed by the
Court in a proceeding in which: (a) the person whose citizenship is questioned is a
(b) the person's citizenship is raised as a material issue; and ( c) the Solicitor General
or an authorized representative is able to take an active part.
Heirs of the Late Gerry Ecarma Vs. Court of Appeals and Renato A. Ecarma
G.R. No. 193374. June 8, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners sought to appeal the two (2) Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 220, Quezon which approved the Project of Partition involving an estate. Counsel
of petitioner Ecanna filed a Notice of Death of Ecarma before the appellate court and was
subsequently required by the latter to submit a certified true copy of Gerry Ecarma' s death
certificate within a prescribed period. Meanwhile, herein petitioners, presumably in
substitution of the deceased Ecarma, filed their Appellants' Brief pursuant to the order of
the appellate court. The Petitioners’ appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA) was dismissed
outright for a number of procedural defects since it does not contain a subject index, table
of cases and authorities, statement of case, statement of facts and page references to the
record in violation of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
1. Whether a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy
Page 442 of 1553

2. Whether the CA correctly dismissed herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief for failure
to comply with the content requirement specified under Section 13 of Rule 44.
Held:
1. No. A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not a substitute
for lost appeal.
Petitioners simple allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the CA' s dismissal of

their appeal cannot substitute for the correct remedy of a lost appeal. We see through
petitioners' obvious ploy to avoid the necessary consequence of their failure to file, within
the required fifteen-day period, the correct remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, from the assailed ruling of the CA. On this score alone, the present
petition should have been dismissed outright.
An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is different from a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. A special civil action for certiorari may be
availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Simply imputing in a petition that the ruling sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion does not magically transform a petition into a special civil action for
certiorari.
The CA’s outright dismissal of therein appellants' appeal was a final order which
left it with nothing more to do to resolve the case. That disposition is a final and executory
order, appealable to, and may be questioned before, this Court by persons aggrieved
thereby, such as herein petitioners, via Rule 45. Moreover, the dismissal of therein
appellants', herein petitioners', appeal before the CA is expressly allowed by Section l(f),17
The appellate court, therefore, cannot be charged with grave abuse of discretion as
there is no showing that, in the exercise of its judgment, it acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Absent grave abuse of
discretion, petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The soundness of the ruling dismissing
petitioners' appeal before the appellate court is a matter of judgment with respect to which
Page 443 of 1553
the remedy of the party aggrieved is a Rule 45 petition. An error of judgment committed
by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of
discretion. Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are
correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are correctible by petition for certiorari.
Even if we were to take a liberal stance and consider this present petition as that
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising grave error in the appellate courts' ruling,
such cannot cure the unavoidable consequence of dismissal for failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary fifteen-day period provided under Section 2 of Rule 45.
Yes. CA correctly dismissed herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief for failure to comply
with the content requirement specified under Section 13 of Rule 44. The Supplemental
Appellants' Brief could only cite Section 1, Rule 7 4 of the Rules of Court as its sole legal
authority in questioning the RTC, Branch 220's Order of Partition. They cannot simply cite
one section of one rule without expounding thereon. Faithful adherence to the rules on the
specific contents of an Appellant's Brief as provided in Section 14, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court is required.
Sps. Abelardo Valarao and Francisca Valarao Vs. MSC and Company
G.R. No. 185331. June 8, 2016
Facts:
The case stems from a civil case for sum of money, damages and rescission instituted
by MSC and Company (respondent) against the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of the City of Malolos. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which however denied the appeal in its
Decision. The CA later issued a Resolution declaring that its Decision had attained finality
on March 19, 2008, considering that "no motion for reconsideration or Supreme Court
petition has been filed by [the respondent] and that no Supreme Court petition has been
filed by the [petitioners]." In a Motion, petitioners claimed to have filed a Motion for
Reconsideration against the CA Decision, and that the motion remained unacted upon,
until the CA issued an entry of judgment in the case
Issue:
Whether the CA Decision has become final and executory
Page 444 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. The CA was correct in ruling that its Decision had already become final and
executory.
The Court underscores the fact that the CA had issued on October 15, 2008 a
Resolution declaring the Decision dated February 21, 2008 to have become final, citing the
report of its Judicial Records Division that no party filed a petition with this Court. In
impugning the foregoing issuances of the CA, the petitioners repeatedly referred to a
motion for reconsideration which they allegedly filed, through counsel, with the appellate
court. However, petitioners failed to sufficiently establish before the Court the fact of a
timely filing of the motion in due form, as the copy of the motion attached to the petition
lacked material portions, including the end of its prayer and the required signature of
counsel.
Corollary to this comes the applicability of the doctrine of finality or immutability

of judgment explained by the Court in a line of cases, to wit: Under the doctrine of finality
of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which
violates this principle must immediately be struck down. The doctrine admits of certain
exceptions, which are usually applied to serve substantial justice, particularly in the
following instances: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tune
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision, rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. None of these circumstances attends the present case exists and that their
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credence.
The petitioners then erred in filing the present petition, as the remedy has become
unavailable to it following the finality of the appellate court's decision.
REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. ANTONIO DELA CRUZ

The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed with
Page 445 of 1553

the MTC. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due under
the lease contracts, and not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.Thus, the CA
erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment case
when it directed the levy of the respondent’s property.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the MTC a complaint for ejectment against respondent. The
MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the
premises, and pay the rentals due until the respondent actually complies. Pending appeal
to the RTC, respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s
refusal to receive the rentals. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto.In a
Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and
dismissed the ejectment case. The dismissal of the case became final and executory.
The petitioner filed a motion praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by
the respondent with the RTC. In an order dated July 25, 2003, the RTC granted the
petitioner’s motion. The RTC explained that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would
mean that there was no complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the
amount of rentals for the use and occupation of the subject units, as provided in the
executed contracts of lease and on the basis of justice and equity.
The court denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration in an order dated
November 28, 2003. On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution on
December 18, 2003, to cause the enforcement of its order dated July 25, 2003.
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to assail
the RTC Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 (RTC orders), which granted
the petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds. The CA dismissed the petition and held that the
assailed RTC Orders were issued pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 39, and Rules 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the
RTC Orders.
The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
to allow it to proceed against the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing
rentals for the leased properties, and to withdraw the lease payments deposited by
respondent. The RTC granted the motion.
Page 446 of 1553

The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and
payments directly made by the respondent to the petitioner, were insufficient to cover
rentals due. Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying that the RTC
levy upon the respondent’s property to satisfy the judgment credit. The RTC granted the
petitioner’s motion in an order dated June 30, 2008.
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify and set aside
the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s real property. Respondent filed
a manifestation and motion before the CA to withdraw the petition for the reason that the
redemption of the property and release of the price paid rendered the petition moot and
academic. Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision which reversed and set aside
the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The CA held that
while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw the consigned rentals and the
posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no jurisdiction to
levy on the respondent’s real property.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether the CA Petition should have been dismissed for failure of the notary public
failed to affix his seal on the attached Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping.
NO. A defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served. On the ther hand, noncompliance or
a defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless the covering Rule
is relaxed on the ground of "substantial compliance" or based on the presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons." Although the submission of a certificate against
forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not however jurisdictional.
In the present case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping were
in fact submitted. An examination of these documents shows that the notary public’s
signature and stamp were duly affixed. Except for the notarial seal, all the requirements for
the verification and certification documents were complied with.
Page 447 of 1553

The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not
really impair the proper administration of justice. The higher objective of procedural rules
is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant
must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free
from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.
Thus, the CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead gave due course to the petition
as it substantially complied with the requirements on the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping.
2. Whether the CA petition should have been dismissed for being case moot and
academic.
controversy because of supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the
resolution of the issue without any practical use or value. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness except when, among
others, the case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.
Here, the CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the orders directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The issue on jurisdiction is
a justiciable controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition from becoming moot and
academic. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot
be conferred or waived by the parties. "Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did
not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case." Even assuming that the case has been
rendered moot, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation
capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
3. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.
The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed
Page 448 of 1553

with the MTC. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due
under the lease contracts, and not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.Thus,
the CA erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the
ejectment case when it directed the levy of the respondent’s property.
Furthermore, it is settled that execution shall be applied for in the court of origin,
in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The court of origin with respect
to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with
jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders. Hence, the petitioner correctly
moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondent's real property
before the RTC as the court of origin.
CAGAYAN ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY vs. MERIDIEN VISTA GAMING

CORPORATION
The notices sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or
failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular on its face. This
is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or
implied authority is regarded as an act of the client. In highly meritorious cases, however, the
Court may depart from the application of this rule such as when the negligence of the counsel
is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable that the client is deprived of due process of law when
adherence to the general rule would result in the outright deprivation of the clients’
property; or when the interests of justice so require.
FACTS:
Respondent Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation (MVGC) filed a petition for mandamus
and damages against petitioner CEZA praying that it be allowed to continue with its gaming
operations. The case was referred by CEZA to the OGCC, which assigned Atty. Edgardo
Baniaga (Atty. Baniaga) to handle the case.
On October 30, 2009, after the parties had filed their Joint Manifestation with Motion to
Render Judgment based on the Pleadings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of MVGC.
On the same date, a copy of the decision was obtained by Atty. Baniaga, who was
coincidentally then in the premises of the court building.
Page 449 of 1553

On November 26, 2009, the OGCC filed a Manifestation informing the court that they
received information that a decision had been rendered but they have not received a copy
thereof. Thus, it requested from the RTC that an official copy of the decision be given to its
representative, Monico Manuel (Manuel). The request was granted and a copy of the said
decision was given to Manuel on December 3, 2009.
On December 9, 2009, CEZA filed its Notice of Appeal stating that it officially received a
copy of the decision only on December 3, 2009. On the same date, December 9, 2009, the
RTC issued an Order denying the notice of appeal on the ground that the 15-day
reglementary period within which to appeal had already lapsed.
On January 25, 2010, CEZA, with the assistance of a new government corporate counsel
appointed by the OGCC, filed a Petition for Relief (Petition for Relief from Judgment under
Rule 38) before the RTC alleging honest mistake or excusable neglect on the part of Atty.
Baniaga. The RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. CA
affirmed the denial.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC/CA erred in denying CEZA’s petition for relief.
RULING:
YES.
Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a decision
or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. This remedy
is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available
or adequate remedy provided by law or the rules. Generally, relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at
law was due to the negligence of his counsel because of the time-honored principle that
clients are bound by the mistakes and negligence of their counsel.
The notices sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or
failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular on its face. This
is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or
implied authority is regarded as an act of the client. In highly meritorious cases, however,
the Court may depart from the application of this rule such as when the negligence of the
counsel is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable that the client is deprived of due process of
Page 450 of 1553

law when adherence to the general rule would result in the outright deprivation of the
clients’ property; or when the interests of justice so require.
Here, the negligence of the petitioner’s counsel was evidently so gross as to call for the
exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction. Clearly, the negligence of Atty. Baniaga
was unconscionable and inexcusable. It was highly suspicious, if not outright deliberate.
Obviously, he fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform
to safeguard the rights of his clients. At the inception, CEZA was already deprived of its
right to present evidence during the trial of the case when Atty. Baniaga filed a joint
manifestation submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings without informing
CEZA. In violation of his sworn duty to protect his client’s interest, Atty. Baniaga agreed to
submit the case for decision without fully substantiating their defense. Worse, after he
received a copy of the decision, he did not even bother to inform his client and the OGCC
of the adverse judgment. He did not even take steps to protect the interests of his client by
filing an appeal. Instead, he allowed the judgment to lapse into finality. Such reckless and
gross negligence deprived CEZA not only of the chance to seek reconsideration thereof but
also the opportunity to elevate its case to the CA.
Under the circumstances, CEZA should not be made to suffer the consequences of its
counsel’s gross negligence. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that
is allowed in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. In the
interest of justice and equity, the Court deems it just and equitable to grant the petition
and enable CEZA to appeal its case.
CITY OF DAGUPAN vs. ESTER F. MARAMBA, represented by her ATTORNEY-IN-

FACT JOHNNY FERRER
The city government thru its handling attorney filed its motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by Maramba on the ground that the motion for reconsideration was not
set for hearing. The Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is
rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a
notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
Facts:
Maramba was a grantee of a DENR miscellaneous lease contract for a period of 25

years in Poblacion, Dagupan City. She constructed a commercial fish centre on the
Page 451 of 1553
property. On December, 2003, Dagupan City caused the demolition of the commercial fish
centre allegedly without giving notice to Maramba. Maramba thru her Atty. Ferrer then
filed a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO against the city government, alleging therein that the acts of the
city caused her damages in the amount of “Five Million (P10,000,000.00)” The word “ten”
was handwritten over the word “five”. In the complaint’s prayer, the complaint asked for
judgment ordering the city to pay “Ten Thousand (P10,000.00). This time, the word
“million” was handwritten over the word “thousand”, and an additional zero was added to
the numerical figure.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment ordering the city to pay Maramba P10 Million
in damages. The city government thru its handling attorney filed its motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by Maramba on the ground that the motion for
reconsideration was not set for hearing. The court denied the motion for reconsideration,
citing that the lack of the notice of hearing made the motion for reconsideration filed by
the city a mere scrap of paper. It also granted Maramba’s prayer for issuance of a writ of
execution.
The city government then filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
with an affidavit of merit stating that were it not for the City Legal Officer’s mistake, gross
incompetence and negligence the judgment would not have amounted to P11 million. The
trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment, but on reconsideration, the trial
court granted the petition for relief and modified the amount of damages awarded to Ester
from P10 Million to P75, 000.00.
Ester’s motion for reconsideration of the order having been denied, she filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which granted it and reinstated the
original decision granting her P10 Million as damages.
Issues:
Whether the lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is excusable

negligence that allows the filing of a petition for relief of judgment
Ruling:
Yes.
Page 452 of 1553

This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered
defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice
of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required

by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for
the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be
given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court.
Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without
giving it anopportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to
study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is
based. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that the requirements
of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that the compliance
justified a departure from a literal application of the rule on notice of hearing. This court
held that "when the adverse party has actually had the opportunity to be heard, and has
indeed been heard through pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind
the rule is deemed duly served."
Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be
strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the
client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
As applied in this case, the Court finds that the procedural consequence of the
above-discussed one-day delay in the filing of the subject motion – which, as a matter of
course, should render the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision already final and executory and
hence, bar the instant petition – is incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may suffer.
This is in line with the Court’s observation that the amount of just compensation, the rate
of legal interest, as well as the time of its accrual, were incorrectly adjudged by both the
Page 453 of 1553

RTC and the CA, contrary to existing jurisprudence. In this respect, the Court deems it
proper to relax the rules of procedure and thus, proceed to resolve these substantive issues.
In this case, the City received a copy of the trial court’s July 30, 2004 decision on
August 11, 2004.74 Its motion for reconsideration filed on August 26, 2004 was filed within
the 15-day period. The purposes behind the required notice of hearing — provide the time
to study the motion for reconsideration and give an opportunity to be heard — were
satisfied when Maramba filed an opposition to the motion.
Excusable negligence as a ground for a petition for relief requires that the negligence
be so gross “that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it.” This
excusable negligence must also be imputable to the party-litigant and not to his or her
counsel whose negligence binds his or her client. The binding effect of counsel’s negligence
ensures against the resulting uncertainty and tentativeness of proceedings if clients were
allowed to merely disown their counsels’ conduct.
Nevertheless, this court has relaxed this rule on several occasions such as: “(1) where
[the] reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2)
when [the rule’s] application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.” Certainly, excusable negligence
must be proven.
On the other hand, mistake as used in Rule 38 means mistake of fact and not mistake
of law. A wrong choice in legal strategy or mode of procedure will not be considered a
mistake for purposes of granting a petition for relief from judgment. Mistake as a ground
also “does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court
might have committed in the trial [since] such error may be corrected by means of an
appeal.”
Mistake can be of such nature as to cause substantial injustice to one of the parties.
It may be so palpable that it borders on extrinsic fraud.” Applying the above-mentioned
principles, the Court considered the City Legal Officer’s “mistakes” enumerated on the
affidavit of merit attached to the petition for relief from judgment as mistake bordering on
extrinsic fraud which effectively prevented the city government from presenting its case,
warranting the granting of the petition for relief from judgment.
Page 454 of 1553

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC.

vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY
G.R. NO. 159926 , JANUARY 20, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature

that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment,
final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set
aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to
prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction,
the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in
the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion
for new trial had been granted therein.
Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of
judgment or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the
following statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner
can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to
either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on
extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and
if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege
with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting
the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
Facts:
Bonier, then President of Pinausukan executed four real estate mortgages involving the
petitioner’s parcel of land situated in Pasay City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust
Page 455 of 1553
Company (now Bank of Philippine Islands). When the unpaid obligation had ballooned the
Bank commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages.
Thereafter, the sheriff issued the notice of sheriff’s sale and public auction was set. Upon
learning of the impending sale, Pinausukan brought against the Bank and the sheriff an
action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC, averring that Bonier had
obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages on the
corporate asset without Pinausukan’s consent.
The RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, thereafter the order attained finality.
Later, the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale, which was received by Pinausukan a
week later. Pinausukan claimed surprise over the turn of events, thus, it inquired from the
RTC and learned that its cousel had not informed it about the order of dismissal.
Pinausukan brought a petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the
dismissal order, stating that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in
failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of
the developments on the case. However, the CA dismissed the petition citing the failure to
attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud
supporting the cause of action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether judgment may be annulled.
Ruling:
The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final
order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, viz:
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it

may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final
order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction
or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed
to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the
annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule
47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any
of the safeguards cannot prosper.
Page 456 of 1553

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final
resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation
of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold
purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally,
to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside
the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute
his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the
entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the
proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely
motion for new trial had been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal
whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is
not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court.
Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment
or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following
statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can
no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy,
although seen as "a last remedy," is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed
to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part.
But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of
jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because
the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or
by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by
laches.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to
either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud
does. Fraud is extrinsic, where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
Page 457 of 1553
away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases
which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment
and open the case for a new and fair hearing.
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in
court. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on
extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud;
and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or
estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege
with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances
constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the
rules of pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with
sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential
submissions, specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or
resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and
indicated as such by the petitioner; (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting
the cause of action or defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such
other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes
to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days
therefrom.
The purpose of these requirements of the sworn verification and the particularization of
the allegations of the extrinsic fraud in the petition, of the submission of the certified true
copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, and of the attachment of the affidavits of
witnesses and documents supporting the cause of action or defense is to forthwith bring
all the relevant facts to the CA’s cognizance in order to enable the CA to determine whether
Page 458 of 1553
or not the petition has substantial merit. Should it find prima facie merit in the petition,
the CA shall give the petition due course and direct the service of summons on the
respondent; otherwise, the CA has the discretion to outrightly dismiss the petition for
annulment.
APPEALS
Modes of Appeal. Period to Appeal. and Death Pending Appeal
Judgments and Final Orders Subject to Appeal
NOEL L. ONG, ET. AL V. NICOLASA O. IMPERIAL, ET. AL

G.R. No. 197127, July 15, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Although the Court has declared many exceptions to the said rule, and the CA
painstakingly enumerated some of these exceptions, the CA omitted to discuss to which
exception this alleged error belongs, and exactly how this error falls under such exception.
Facts:
Ong, et. al, are registered owners of a parcel of land. However, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer notified the petitioners that the subject property was covered by CARL.
Petitioners then filed an application for exemption clearance with the DAR, which was
however denied. The petitioners appealed the orders before the Office of the President,
which reversed the decision of DAR. On appeal, the CA however reversed OP’s decision
and agreed with DAR. Hence, the petition. According to petitioners, the CA expressly
admitted that the issue regarding the alleged lack of proof of approval of the 1980 Zoning
Ordinance was not raised as an error in the appealed case, but the CA was able to justify its
action by enumerating the instances when an appellate court is clothed with ample
authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, and
claiming that the present case fell squarely under the exceptions. Petitioners submit that
the instant case does not fall under any of the mentioned exceptions.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition filed by respondents before the CA is exempted from the rule
that errors not assigned on appeal cannot be passed upon.
Page 459 of 1553

Ruling:
NO. The CA committed a reversible error when it decided the case based on a ground
neither found in the assignment of errors submitted by respondents nor in the arguments
propounded in the appellants' brief. The applicable rule is Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the
court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.” Although the Court has declared
many exceptions to the said rule, and the CA painstakingly enumerated some of these
exceptions, the CA omitted to discuss to which exception this alleged error belongs, and
exactly how this error falls under such exception. To the court’s mind, flexibility in applying
the rules must be balanced with sufficient reason and justification, clearly arrived at and
explained by the CA, so as not to "contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.”
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SERVICES, INC. and WALLEM SHIP MANAGEMENT, LTD.

v. HEIRS OF THE LATE PEDRO PADRONES
G.R. No. 183212, 16 March 2015, J. Peralta
Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Facts:
Pedro Padrones was employed as a motorman on board the vessel M/V Spirit. He finished
his contract and was repatriated to the Philippines after completion thereof. Almost two
years after, he died of cardio-respiratory arrest brought about by complications of lung
cancer. Thereafter, herein respondents filed with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of
death benefits, exemplary and moral damages, child allowance, burial expenses, and
attorney’s fees arising from Pedro’s death. LA rendered judgment favorable to the
respondents. Petitioners appealed the decision to the NLRC arguing that Pedro’s death is
not compensable because he did not die during the effectivity of his contract to which the
NLRC agreed. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a special civil action before the CA wherein
they argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of
the LA which granted death benefits in their favor. The CA then awarded disability benefits
to Pedro Padrones’ heirs.
Page 460 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals may award disability benefits in a case for death
benefits.
Held:
NO. Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the CA and the NLRC that herein respondents are
not entitled to death benefits. It is settled that the terms and conditions of a seafarer's
employment, including claims for death and disability benefits, is a matter governed, not
only by medical findings, but by the contract he entered into with his employer and the
law which is deemed integrated therein. Based on the provisions of POEA Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which governs Pedro’s employment contract – it is
clear that for death to be compensable, the same must occur during the term of his contract
of employment. If the seaman dies after the termination of his contract, his beneficiaries
are not entitled to death benefits.
Not being entitled to death benefits, the question that follows now is whether respondents
are, instead, entitled to the disability benefits awarded by the CA. The answer is no. The
resolution of this issue requires the admission and calibration of evidence and since
respondents did not specifically raise this matter in the proceedings before the LA and the
NLRC, these tribunals were not given a chance to pass upon it in their assailed decisions.
Hence, the issue of whether or not Padrones or his beneficiaries are entitled to disability
benefits cannot be passed upon on appeal because it was not raised in the tribunals a quo.
Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Catherine Hiponia- Mayuga v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., and its Branch
Head, Thelma T. Maurico and Belle U. Avelino
G.R. No. 211499, June 22, 2015, J. Mendoza
Under Section 8 Rule 51 of the Rules of Court states that as a general rule, the CA
cannot consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellant’s
brief. As an exception, however, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors,
the same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is
closely related or dependent to an assigned error.
Page 461 of 1553

Facts:
Catherine was married to late Fernando and they owned the subject parcel of land.
Fernando with the consent of Catherine obtained a loan from Metrobank and as security
thereof, he executed real estate mortgage over the subject property. Catherine however
claimed that the proceeds of the loan went directly to Belle. Upon the death of Fernando,
she inquired from Metrobank if the subject property could be released because it was
covered by the mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) that paid off the obligation upon the
mortgagor’s death. Metrobank replied however that Belle was the principal borrower. Belle
failed to pay the loan which thereby led to the foreclosure of the mortgage property.
Catherine instituted a complaint for cancellation of the real estate mortgage and the
release of the subject lot with damages against Belle, Metrobank and Thelma Mauricio the
branch head of Metrobank who allowed the loan. She contended that there was collusion
between Belle and Thelma in conspiring to execute documents with legal import of with
Catherine and Fernando were unaware which was denied by them. RTC ruled that the
mortgage contract was valid and dismissed the complaint against Metrobank and Thelma
because the execution was not proven. It however ordered Belle to pay damages to
Catherine. Catherine raised on appeal two issues that RTC erred in holding that there was
no connivance between Belle and Thelma in the execution of REM and RTC erred when it
held that Metrobank was not negligent. CA affirmed the decision of RTC but deleted the
award of damages against Belle though Belle did not appeal to such decision.
Issue:
Whether or not CA has the right to modify the decision of RTC with regard to award of
damages against Belle though she did not appeal to such decision
Ruling:
NO. Under Section 8 Rule 51 of the Rules of Courtstates that as a general rule, the CA cannot
consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief.
As an exception, however, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the
same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is
closely related or dependent to an assigned error.
Consequently, the CA erred in modifying the decision of the RTC with regard to the award
damages against Belle. Reliance on Section 8 Rule 51 is misplaced it cannot be applied in
Page 462 of 1553

this case. One of the issues raised refers to an alleged fraudulent acts of Bell and Thelma,
which would have entitled Catherine to the award of damages. Clearly such issue is separate
and distinct failure to pay the loan which resulted in the foreclosure of the security. The
other issue is the negligence of Metrobank is not related either on Belle’s failure to pay the
loan. The liability of Metrobank is capable of being addressed separately.
HADJA RAWIYA SUIB v. EMONG EBBAH AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, 22ND DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
G.R. No. 182375, December 02, 2015, Perez J.
A litigant, before filing a pleading to the courts, must first prepare all the necessary
attachments to his/her pleading. As it stands, suitors do not have the luxury of filing a
pleading without the necessary attachments; otherwise, the court shall consider the same as
a mere scrap of paper and may dismiss the same outright.
Facts:
HadjaRawiyaSuib (Suib) herein petitioner, filed a case for qualified theft against Emong
Ebbah (Ebbah), herein private respondent, for the latter’s act of allegedly illegally
harvesting coconuts from Suib’s property. In his defense, Ebbah avers that he is a tenant of
the land where the coconut was planted and therefore had the right to harvest the same.
The criminal case was thereafter dismissed. Subsequently, Ebbah filed with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) a complaint for Immediate Reinstatement
and Damages praying that he be recognized as a tenant of the land of Suib. The PARAB
dismissed the case. On appeal with the DARAB, the DARAB reversed the decision of the
PARAB, it opined that there is a valid tenancy relationship between Suib and Ebbah making
the harvesting of coconuts by the latter legal. After eight (8) years, Suib appealed to the CA
assailing the decision of the DARAB. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
Suib failed to file a copy of the decision of the DARAB in its pleading with the CA. Hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of Suib to attach a copy of the decision of the DARAB in its
pleading to the CA is a ground for dismissal of the same
Ruling:
Page 463 of 1553

Yes, it is a ground for dismissal. The requirement in Section 1, Rule 50 in relation to Section
7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and jurisdictional. Thus, Suib's failure to
attach the required copy of the appealed DARAB Decision is a sufficient ground for the
dismissal of her appeal. One glaring fact that cannot escape the Court is that the petition
for review filed before the Court of Appeals, which assailed the Decision and Resolution of
the DARAB, was filed beyond the reglementary period. As borne by the records, Suib
received a copy of the DARAB Decision and Resolution on 5 June 1998 and 21 December
1998, respectively, and it was only after eight (8) long years since the assailed DARAB
Decision and Resolution were received when Suib filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
on 7 April 2006. Without doubt, eight (8) years is beyond the reglementary period within
which to file an appeal from a decision of the DARAB to the Court of Appeals as provided
in Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that appeals should be filed
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. Evidently, the Court of Appeals acted
within the bounds of law as the dismissal of the appeal was based on Section 1(g), Rule 50
in relation to Section 7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Although the decision of the Court
of Appeals, which dismissed the petition, did not mention Suib's failure to file the present
petition within the reglementary period pursuant to Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, still, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the same based on Section 1(g),
Rule 50 in relation to Section 7, Rule 43 of the same Rule. Far from it, the dismissal of Suib's
appeal was neither arbitrary nor despotic.
BEAMS PHILIPPINE EXPORT CORPORATION v. MARIANITA CASTILLO AND

NIDA QUIRANTE
G.R. No. 188372, November 25, 2015, Reyes J.
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability
of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish
him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the
accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Consequently, the
sole authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the SC is vested only on the OSG.
Facts:
A criminal case for estafa was filed by Beams Philippine Export Corp. (Beams) herein
petitioner, against Marianita Castillo and Nida Quirante (Castillo et al), herein respondents
for allegedly misappropriating certain checks belonging to Beams. The RTC dismissed the
complaint of Beams, thus acquitting Castillo et al. This prompted Beams to file a petition
Page 464 of 1553
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion against the RTC
for rendering the aforementioned decision. Beams also sought the reconsideration of the
criminal aspect of the case. The CA dismissed the petition. Now, Beams comes before the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Beams has the authority to appeal the criminal aspect of the criminal case
for estafa.
Ruling:
None, it has no authority. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers
and functions of the OSG was to "represent the Government in the [SC| and the [CA] in all
criminal proceedings x xx." This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Clearly, the OSG
is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. Verily, it is
apparent that the petitioner's only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case
against the respondents. Since estafa, however, is a criminal offense, only the OSG has the
power to prosecute the case on appeal. Therefore, the petitioner lacked the personality or
legal standing to question the RTC decision.
Baldomera Foculan-Fudalan v. Sps Danilo Ocial et al.

Although the authority of the CA to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s
brief is a matter of judicial discretion, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory
nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind
the background and web of circumstances of the case
Facts:
Sps. Ocial claimed that the heirs of Juana executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Deed
of sale in their favor and that Fudernan unlawfully occupied the lot. Fudernan contended
that they bought the property to heirs of Juana and Sps. Ocial were the one to invade the
lot. However Baldomera contended that though the disputed lot was in the name of Juana,
the possessed the property in the concept of an owner and that he was the real owner of
the property. RTC ruled that the Extrajudicial Settlement was valid and Sps. Ocial were the
real owners of the subject property. On appeal, CA issued a resolution ordering the parties
to file their respective briefs within the non- extendible period of forty five (45) days. Sps.
Page 465 of 1553
Ocial filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal due to failure of the appellants to file the
required briefs within the said period which CA granted the motion and dismissed the
appeal. Appellants thereby did not explain such failure and Baldomera filed an omnibus
motion for reconsideration to admit appellants brief.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of appeal due to failure of appellants to file the required briefs within
the non-extendible period of 45 days is valid.
Ruling:
YES. Under Section 1 Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for dismissal of
appeal is failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief
or memorandum within the time provide by these Rules.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved.
Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of
the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
explain his failure to abide by the rules.
Heirs of Felino M. Timbol, Jr., et al. vs. Philippine National Bank

G.R. No. 207408, April 18, 2016
Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules on Civil Procedure states that within the period for
taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or
final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting
the substantial rights of said party. The use of the term may in the provision means that the
same is permissive and not mandatory. As such, a party aggrieved by the trial court’s decision
may either move for reconsideration or appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Page 466 of 1553

FACTS:
KHL, owned by Felino M. Timbol, Jr. [“Timbol”] applied with Philippine National Bank
[“PNB”]’s wholly-owned Hong Kong-based subsidiary for credit facilities. KAE, also owned
by Timbol, acted as co-borrower. As security, Timbol executed real estate mortgages on his
behalf and on behalf of Emmanuela Laguardia [“Laguardia”], over nine (9) different parcels
of real estate registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Felino M. Timbol, Jr. After Timbol
defaulted, PNB caused the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. PNB was allegedly the
highest bidder at the public auction sale and was issued a corresponding Certificate of Sale.
Timbol and Laguardia filed suit against PNB and the Register of Deeds of Makati City for
annulment of the real estate mortgage, of the foreclosure and auction sale, for accounting
and damages, and for a temporary restraining order and/or injunction. They furthermore
assailed the foreclosure proceedings as highly irregular, invalid, and illegal. The RTC
rendered a Decision nullifying the mortgages. Without filing a motion for reconsideration
of the RTC decision, PNB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC’s decision, and dismissing the Complaint.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court praying for the reversal of the Court of
Appeals’ decision, arguing that the CA should have dismissed the appeal outright because
PNB did not even bother filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in failing to dismiss the appeal outright because PNB did not
file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s decision.
2. Whether the Court is bound by its earlier pronouncements in PNB v. Timbol
RULING:
1. No. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules on Civil Procedure states that within the period
for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes
materially affecting the substantial rights of said party. The use of the term may in
the provision means that the same is permissive and not mandatory. As such, a party
aggrieved by the trial court’s decision may either move for reconsideration or appeal
to the Court of Appeals. Moreover, appeal is a matter of discretion. The Court has
the “prerogative under the law to determine whether or not it shall consent to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction in any given case.” In this case, the Court of
Appeals exercised its prerogative and accepted the appeal.
Page 467 of 1553

2. Yes. Under the “law of the case” doctrine, whatever is once irrevocably established
as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the case before the court. The doctrine applies when (1) a question is passed upon
by an appellate court, and (2) the appellate court remands the case to the lower
court for further proceedings; the lower court and even the appellate courts on
subsequent appeal of the case are, thus, bound by how such question had been
previously settled. Thus, the Court is bound by its earlier ruling in PNB v. Timbol
finding the extrajudicial foreclosure to be proper. The Court therein thoroughly and
thoughtfully examined the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure in order to
determine whether the writ of preliminary injunction was proper. To allow a
reexamination of this conclusion will disturb what has already been settled and only
create confusion if the Court now makes a contrary finding.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR.

The RTC’s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive death, being a

judgment rendered in a summary proceeding under the Family Code, is immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
FACTS:
Respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife. The RTC granted the Petition. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the
RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA essentially ruled that a writ
of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court''s evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are
correctible by an appeal.
Page 468 of 1553

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Republic's Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 65 on the ground that the proper remedy should have been to appeal the RTC
decision.
RULING:
YES.
The RTC’s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive death, being a judgment
rendered in a summary proceeding under the Family Code, is immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the
ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTCs
Decision.
MODES OF APPEALS
REVELINA LIMSON vs. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ

G.R. NO. 162205, MARCH 31, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
The petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to undo the
findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents
submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and
weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition for
review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason.
Page 469 of 1553

Facts:
Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification. The charge is based on
Limson’s assertion that EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ pretends to be the architect
‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ registered with the PRC.
The Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed
EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALES is the architect registered in the PRC. The Secretary of
Justice affirmed the findings of the Prosecutor.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Limson filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez, with
the Secretary of Justice. She alleged the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, but adding
the accusation that because Gonzalez used various combinations of his name, in different
signature, on different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the
Anti-Alias Law). The Prosecutor dismissed the new complaint. The Secretary affirmed the
findings of the Prosecutor. Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice in the CA. On July 31, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Secretary of Justice
Ruling:
To start with, the petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to
undo the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the
documents submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot
analyze and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires
the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly
set forth. Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this
reason.
Secondly, Limson appears to stress that the CA erred in concluding that the Secretary of
Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence
submitted to the OCP. She would now have us reverse the CA.
We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about the Secretary of
Justice not committing grave abuse of discretion was fully warranted. Based on the
Page 470 of 1553

antecedents earlier rendered here, Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how
the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of
her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the
charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have
shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the
error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse
of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised by the
Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of
Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Thirdly, the discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and in 1996 of
respondent did not support Limson’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Secretary of Justice. It is really absurd to expect respondent, the individual depicted on
the photographs, to look the same after 55 long years.
And, fourthly, on the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that
respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J.
Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained
his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a
misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or
second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence
left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names
were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names
were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used
the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of
the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO

G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014
J. PERALTA
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting
bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions
Page 471 of 1553

seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.
Facts:
The SC in in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) nullified
the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to PIATCO for the construction, operation
and maintenance of the Ninoy NAIA IPT III. Subsequent to the above Decision, Pesayco
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged
violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Among those charged was
herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Enrile in entering into a contract which
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among
others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise
a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he
died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. An information charging
Go of the said offense was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him.
On June 2, 2005, the SB quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the SB erred in dismissing the case on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over
respondent Go
Held:
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of
the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling
doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving
herein private respondent.
Page 472 of 1553

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however,
that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their
alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it
remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must,
in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public
officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in
the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because
in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches
by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the
actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be
drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral
ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out
the conspiracy.
Respondent claims that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for
conspiracy with Secretary Enrile for allegedly entering into another agreement which is
separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The SB granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB
Resolution before this Court. In a minute resolution, this Court affirmed the SB ruling.
Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in
the instant case.
Page 473 of 1553

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling
in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a
Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that
the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs
to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. x x x x
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other
matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not
be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090
only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly,
the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in
P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as
co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case,
respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with
then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should
have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of
the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already
discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the
power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its
jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Page 474 of 1553
HEIRS OF TERESITA MONTOYA, ET AL.

vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET AL
G.R. NO. 181055, MARCH 19, 2014
J. BRION
The petitioners essentially assail in this petition the validity of the NHA’s acquisition
of the property, in view of the prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under
E.O. No. 228, in relation to P.D. No. 27 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this
petition’s core issue requires the proper interpretation and application of the laws and the
rules governing the government’s agrarian reform program, as well as the laws governing the
powers and functions of the NHA as the property’s acquiring entity. As presented, therefore,
this petition’s core issue is a question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses.
This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petition’s core issue necessitates the prior
determination of two essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the property’s conversion
and the petitioners’ claimed ownership of the property. As questions of fact, they are
proscribed in a Rule 45 petition—The settled rule is that the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition
for review on certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of law.
Facts:
In 1992, the Gonzaleses donated a portion of their landholding in Pampanga as a

resettlement site for the displaced victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. The Gonzaleses
gave the landholding’s tenants one-half share of their respective tillage with the
corresponding title at no cost to the latter. The Gonzaleses retained the property (pursuant
to their retention rights) and registered it in Dorita Gonzales-Villar’s name.
Still needing additional resettlement sites, the NHA purchased the property on February
20, 1996. An application filed by the NHA to convert the property to residential form was
later approved by the DAR.
In their complaint filed before the PARAD, the petitioners claimed that the sale between
the NHA and the Gonzaleses were intended to circumvent the provisions of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The PARAD denied the Complaint for Injunction and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale filed by the Heirs of Teresita Montoya, et al. The PARAD decision was
affirmed by both the DARAB and the CA.
Page 475 of 1553

Issue:
Whether a Rule 45 petition is proper in this case
Ruling:
The petition’s arguments present proscribed factual issues. The petitioners essentially
assail in this petition the validity of the NHA’s acquisition of the property, in view of the
prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under E.O. No. 228, in relation to
P.D. No. 27 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this petition’s core issue requires
the proper interpretation and application of the laws and the rules governing the
government’s agrarian reform program, as well as the laws governing the powers and
functions of the NHA as the property’s acquiring entity. As presented, therefore, this
petition’s core issue is a question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses.
This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petition’s core issue necessitates the prior
determination of two essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the property’s conversion
and the petitioners’ claimed ownership of the property. As questions of fact, they are
proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
The settled rule is that the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is
limited to resolving only questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt exists
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Under these significations, we
clearly cannot resolve this petition’s issues without conducting a re-examination and
reevaluation of the lower tribunals’ unanimous findings on the factual matters (of the
property’s conversion and of the petitioners’ ownership of the property), including the
presented evidence, which the Court’s limited Rule 45 jurisdiction does not allow.
Moreover, this Court generally accords respect, even finality to the factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies, i.e., the PARAD and the DARAB, when these findings are supported by
substantial evidence. The PARAD and the DARAB, by reason of their official position have
acquired expertise in specific matters within their jurisdiction, and their findings deserve
full respect; without justifiable reason, these factual findings ought not to be altered,
modified, or reversed.
To be sure, this Rule 45 proscription is not iron-clad and jurisprudence may admit of
exceptions. A careful review of this case’s records, however, justifies the application of the
general proscriptive rule rather than the exception. Viewed in this light, we are constrained
Page 476 of 1553

to deny the petition for raising proscribed factual issues and because we find no reason to
depart from the assailed rulings.
Even if we were to disregard this procedural lapse and decide the case on its merits, we are
inclined to deny the petition and affirm as valid the NHA’s acquisition of the property on
three main points, which we will discuss in detail below.
The property was validly converted to residential from agricultural uses
In declaring the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale valid, all three tribunals found that the
property has already been removed from the agrarian reform’s coverage as a result of its
valid conversion from agricultural to residential uses.
We find no reason to disturb their findings and conclusion on this matter.
MINDA S. GAERLAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 192717., MARCH 12, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended, only questions of law may be raised. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the
question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. In
the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented
before us calls for a review of the CA’s conclusion that the documents and evidence presented
by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title. Hence, the
petition is properly filed.
Facts:
On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land known as Lot 18793, Cad-237 of Cagayan Cadastre, with an area of 1,061 square
meters.
On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an Opposition
to petitioner’s application for registration. On November 20, 2001, the trial court rendered
Judgment granting petitioner’s application for registration of title. The CA reversed and set
aside the Judgment of the RTC and dismissed the application for registration of title filed
by petitioner. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in denying her application for registration of title
Page 477 of 1553

Held:
Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by respondent that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Indeed, the principle is well established that
this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. The
distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is settled. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, and the question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a “question of fact”
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply
put, when there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. In Republic v. Vega, the Court held that
when petitioner asks for a review of the decision made by a lower court based on the
evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their
sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented
before us calls for a review of the CA’s conclusion that the documents and evidence
presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title.
Hence, the petition is properly filed.
Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land subject of her application has been
declared alienable and disposable in 1925 and that her possession through her
predecessors-in-interest started in 1929. However, after a careful examination of the
evidence adduced by petitioner, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing
petitioner’s application for registration of title for the failure of petitioner to prove
satisfactorily the requirements for registration provided under the law.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The burden
of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable and disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Page 478 of 1553

Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a
certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable,
but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a
copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by
the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
as follows: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills
and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein. Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR
Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 23. Public documents
as evidence.–Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within
the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
The certifications do not reflect “entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer,” x x x. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a government office.
The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x
Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to her petition deserves scant
consideration since it was not presented during the proceedings before the trial court or
while the case was pending before the appellate court. Petitioner only presented the said
certification for the first time before this Court. The genuineness and due execution of the
said document had not been duly proven in the manner required by law. Also, generally,
additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted
Page 479 of 1553
through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct

evidence previously offered. In the present case, petitioner did not offer any explanation
why the CENRO certification was not presented and submitted during the proceedings
before the trial court to justify its belated submission to this Court.
As to the second and third requisites, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner
failed to establish that she and her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land on or before June 12,
1945.
In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of
the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, her
application for registration of title of the subject property under P.D. No. 1529 should be
denied.
ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 188191. MARCH 12, 2014
C.J. SERENO
In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.
While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the
conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing,
he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
Facts:
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to
institute a separate action for damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, the MTC found
petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Petitioner filed an Application for Probation. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his
application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the RTC.
While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation,
he filed a Supplemental Petition, which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of the
8 January 2007 judgment; and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome,
Page 480 of 1553
Clarita P. Matias, Rosendo P. Matias and Antonio P. Matias. The RTC found that the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment without first ruling on his
Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also
ruled that the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, because petitioner was not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court.
The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation, and
that inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the
denial thereof cannot be considered grave abuse.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that private complainants have personality to appeal the
28 January 2008 Decision of the RTC
2. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying petitioner’s
judgment of conviction.
3. Whether the CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
probation
Held:
1. On private complainants’ personality to appeal
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, sec. 6, par. 3 and 4 states: “The proper clerk of court shall
give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel,
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served
at his last known address.
“In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or through his counsel.”
While the present petition originated from a criminal proceeding, what petitioner filed
with the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself impleaded private respondents.
He cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private respondents, who
Page 481 of 1553

would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any case,
this Court has consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient
personality if the facts show that the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and
if the issues in the action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive
manner.
In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court ruled:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the
State in criminal proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be determined
in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an
offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against Judge Adao’s order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private
petitioner’s) father.
2. and. 3. On the petitioner’s conviction and the denial of his petition for probation
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the
State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for
the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Aside
from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on
diametrically opposed legal positions.
An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The
application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime
which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was
amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction
– even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and
applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to
appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the
validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of
probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990,
which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
Page 482 of 1553

The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed
positions taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed
by the trial court during the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the
judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite
the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for probation – precisely the
unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.
CO SAY COCO PRODUCTS PHILS, INC., ET AL.

vs. BENJAMIN BALTASAR, ET AL.
G.R. NO.188828, MARCH 5, 2014
J. PEREZ
It is entrenched in our jurisprudence that perfection of an appeal in a manner and

within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of making judgment final and executory. While dismissal of
an appeal on technical grounds is frowned upon, Article 223 of the Labor Code which
prescribes the appeal bond requirement, however, is a rule of jurisdiction and not of
procedure. Hence, there is a little leeway for condoning a liberal interpretation thereof, and
certainly none premised on the ground that its requirements are mere technicalities.
The finding of the Labor Arbiter holding the petitioners liable for illegal dismissal is
binding on them. Not having been timely appealed, this issue is already beyond our
jurisdiction to resolve, and the finding of the Labor Arbiter can no longer be disturbed.
Facts:
Co Say, thru its President, entered into a Contract for Cargo Handling Services with
petitioner. To jumpstart the operation of its cargo handling services, Tanawan Port
employed respondents as Crane Operators, as Crane Helper, and as Fork Lift Operator. Due
to lack of clientele, the business venture of Tanawan Port failed to gain momentum causing
serious alarm to the company. Not long after respondents were hired, Tanawan Port
decided to cease operation. As a result, respondents were terminated from employment
but were accordingly given their corresponding separation pay and 13th month pay.
Barely a month after they received their separation pay, respondents filed complaints for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of labor standard benefits against petitioners. The LA
held that petitioners are liable for illegal dismissal for failure to comply with the procedural
and substantive requirements of terminating employment due to closure of business
operations. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The Court of Appeals reversed the
NLRC Decision. Hence, this petition.
Page 483 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in reversing the NLRC decision on the ground that petitioners failed
to perfect their appeal
Held:
Time and again we reiterate the established rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case considering that the findings of facts of labor officials who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not
only respect, but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, when supported by
substantial evidence.
The NLRC ruled that petitioners were able to post the surety bond and timely perfect their
appeal before the expiration of the 10-day reglementary period, while the Court of Appeals
oppositely ruled although both findings are based on the same pieces of evidence available
on record. The crucial issue in the resolution of the instant petition concerns the timely
posting of the appeal bond. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article 223 of the Labor
Code. The Labor Code and its IRR explicitly provide that an appeal from the Labor Arbiter
to the NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the
appeal shall be perfected only upon; (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2)
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a
memorandum of appeal.
The conclusion that the First Certification necessarily leads to is the lateness of the
perfection of the appeal to the NLRC. Ostensibly, the Second Certification puts the appeal
within the required perfection period of ten days from receipt of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. However, the fact behind what seems to be is that both certifications state, directly
by the first while distortedly by the second, that the appeal by petitioners to the NLRC was
perfected beyond the provided period. In a seeming attempt to avoid the direct fact of
untimeliness in the First Certificate, the Second Certificate mentions two dates, one which
is within the 10-day period and the other, the late date of 28 October 2003 which is even
beyond the 2 October 2003 issuance of the First Certificate. The first date, 24 September
2003 was depicted in the Second Certificate as the date of posting while the date 28 October
2003 was described as the date of receipt by the DOLE-RAB. Apart from saying that the
appeal bond was timely “posted” on 24 September 2003, the Second Certification would
also justify why on the date of the First Certification, 2 October 2003, there was yet no
Page 484 of 1553

posted appeal bond on record, the reason, although unstated being that the “posted” bond
was “received” only on 28 October 2003.
The Second Certificate is not a document of timeliness of petitioners’ appeal bond. It is
even confirmatory of the fact of tardiness that the First Certification stated doubtlessly. The
NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it considered as correct the statement in the
Second Certificate that “x x x respondent in re: RAB-V Case No. 10-004860-02 x x x posted
Surety Bond x x x dated on September 24, 2003.”
Without a straight statement, the Second Certification seems to consider posting as
mailing such that the date 24 September 2003 should be the reckoning date that determines
timeliness and not the date 28 October 2003 which was the date of receipt of the surety
bond. Even such insinuation, strained and all, is unacceptable considering the absence of
proof of mailing, it being the fact that there was no mention at all in any of the pleadings
below that the surety bond was mailed.
The Court of Appeals therefore, correctly ruled that petitioners failed to perfect their appeal
on time. In holding so, the appellate court only applied the appeal bond requirement as
already well explained in our previous pronouncements that there is legislative and
administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should
give utmost regard to this intention. The clear intent of both statutory and procedural law
is to require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the
monetary award within the ten 10-day reglementary period.
Rules on perfection of an appeal, particularly in labor cases, must be strictly construed
because to extend the period of the appeal is to delay the case, a circumstance which would
give the employer a chance to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the worker to
the point that the latter is constrained to give up for less than what is due him. This is to
assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case the monetary award will be given
to them both upon dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It is further meant to discourage
employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the
employees. The appeal bond requirement precisely aims to prevent empty or
inconsequential victories secured by laborers in consonance with the protection of labor
clause ensconced and zealously guarded by our Constitution.
All considered then, the finding of the Labor Arbiter holding the petitioners liable for illegal
dismissal is binding on them. Not having been timely appealed, this issue is already beyond
our jurisdiction to resolve, and the finding of the Labor Arbiter can no longer be disturbed
without violating the fundamental principle that final judgment is immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusion of fact and law.
Page 485 of 1553

FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ

vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. NO. 197307, FEBRUARY 26, 2014
J. VELASCO
The Ombudsman-imposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases are

immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when it ruled
that the penalties imposed by the Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately
executory. Immediate execution argues against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman
can only recommend disciplinary sanctions.
Facts:
In June 2003, PNP-CIDG conducted an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged
nefarious activities of certain personnel of the Bureau of Customs, among them Aguilar,
then Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and Hernandez.
Aguilar’s SALNs do not reflect any income source other than her employment. The spaces
for her spouse’s name and business interest were left in blank. Following weeks of
surveillance and lifestyle probe, the PNP-CIDG investigating team executed a Joint-
Affidavit depicting as owning properties not declared or properly identified in her SALNs.
It was also discovered that Aguilar took 13 unofficial trips abroad, accompanied most of the
time by daughter Josephine. During the same period, her two other daughters also
collectively made nine travels abroad.
In view of what it deemed to be a wide variance between Aguilar’s acquired assets and what
she spent for her four-year overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on the other, the
PNP-CIDG, on a finding that she has violated R.A. 1379 in relation to R.A. 3019 and 6713
charged her with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the
same offenses. Upon evaluation of the complaint and of the evidence presented, the
Ombudsman created an investigating panel which then conducted administrative
proceedings on the complaint.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty and dismissed them from the service. The CA affirmed the ruling of the
Ombudsman. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Page 486 of 1553
Whether a Rule 43 petition to assail the findings or decisions of the Ombudsman in an

administrative case is proper
Held:
The petition, on its procedural and substantial aspects, is partly meritorious.
Petitioners properly appealed to the CA. The Ombudsman has defined prosecutorial
powers and possesses adjudicative competence over administrative disciplinary cases filed
against public officers. What presently concerns the Court relates to the grievance
mechanism available to challenge the OMB’s decisions in the exercise of that disciplinary
jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction had, after due investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct
and dishonesty and meted the corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43
petition is the proper mode of appeal. Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
This brings us to the issue on the nature of the Ombudsman’s decisions in administrative
disciplinary suits. Administrative disciplinary authority of the OMB does not end with a
recommendation to punish. This court held in Ombudsman v. De Leon that, as early as
2000, rules were already enforced by the OMB that provide for the immediate execution of
judgments pending appeal. As pointed out in De Leon, Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 prescribes the rules on the effectivity and finality of the OMB’s decisions:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. x x x x
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The then Sec. 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07) or the Rules of Procedure
of the OMB, in turn, stated:
Sec. 7. Finality of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
Page 487 of 1553

more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of
ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration
or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA
6770. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, has interpreted the above-quoted provision to
mean that the sanctions imposed by the Ombudsman other than public censure,
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month or a fine equivalent to one month
salary are not immediately executory and can be stayed by an appeal timely filed. The
pertinent ruling in Lapid has, however, been superseded. On August 17, 2000, AO 14-A was
issued amending Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the OMB. The rule, as thus
amended, pertinently reads:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where x x x the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed x x x.
Then came AO 17 dated September 15, 2003 further amending Sec. 7 of Rule III. Thus, the
section now provides:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals x x x.
Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14-A was issued, the OMB-imposed
penalties in administrative disciplinary cases were already immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. In this case, it must be noted that the complaint
dated July 28, 2003 was filed on August 20, 2003 or after the AO 14-A has come into effect.
Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when it ruled that the penalties imposed by the
Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately executory. Immediate execution argues
against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only recommend disciplinary
sanctions.
The charge for Grave Misconduct against Flor Gupilan-Aguilar is DISMISSED, while the
appellate court's finding of her liability for Dishonesty and the corresponding penalty
imposed are AFFIRMED. The CA Decision, however, insofar as it finds Honore Hernandez
Page 488 of 1553

guilty of the offenses charged against him, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint against him for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty is accordingly DISMISSED.
CORAZON MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 193217, February 26, 2014
J. Peralta
The disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s
decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying
her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The
Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing
or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special
civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under
Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright
dismissal.
Facts:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which
is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision
on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an
Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She
supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal7 on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June
29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing RTC
Decision convicting Macapagal of the crime of Estafa; the Order denying her Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial; and the Order dated denying her Notice of Appeal.
Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in issuing the assailed orders
Held:
Page 489 of 1553

Petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the
rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law,
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the
appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal
of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the
questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which
an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be
taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can
elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the
wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of
Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.
Even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken
as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special,
important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which
are not present in this case.
Even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the
trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal
Page 490 of 1553
procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to

this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting
her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of
the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order
denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying
her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed
decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation
of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions,
pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to
the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court.
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules
and the Court’s lawful orders.
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice. It is the duty of the counsel to
make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has
appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal. Any error in compliance may
be fatal to the client's cause. It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.
The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are
clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity
in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
UNITED TOURIST PROMOTIONS vs. HARLAND B. KEMPLIN

G.R. No. 205453, February 5, 2014
J. REYES
It is settled that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised
against the assailed CA decision. The Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings,
except only in some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those
of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the
action originated.
Page 491 of 1553
The steps on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific
causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees
are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable
period.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing
or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and
clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of
their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.
During the hearing or
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and
(2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.
Although letters were sent to Kemplin, such letters were lame attempt to comply with
the notice requirement, for the charges against Kemplin were not specified. Further, it merely
made a declaration on the expiration of the employment, without however, specifying the
criminal suits filed against Kemplin.
Facts:
In 1995, Jersey, with the help of two American expatriates, Kemplin and the late Mike
Dunne, formed UTP. UTP employed Kemplin to be its President for a period of five years
"renewable for the same period, subject to new terms and conditions". Howeverm Kemplin
continued to render his services to UTP even after his fixed term contract of employment
expired. Further, Kemplin, signing as President of UTP, entered into advertisement
agreements with Pizza Hut and M. Lhuillier. Thus, UTP’s legal counsel sent Kemplin a
letter, informing Kemplin that his Employment Contract had been expired. As such,
Kemplin filed before the NLRC a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries,
13th month and separation pay against UTP and its officers. Kemplin claimed that even
after the expiration of his employment contract he rendered his services as President and
General Manager of UTP. UTP, on its part, argued that the termination letter sent to
Kemplin was based on the expiration of the fixed term employment contract and an
employer’s prerogative to terminate an employee, who commits criminal and illegal acts
prejudicial to business.
The Labor Arbiter found that Kemplin was illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s
decision explaining that after the expiration of Kemplin’s term of employment, his
employment until separation is classified as regular. The CA affirmed the LA and NLRC
Page 492 of 1553
decision, ruling that the the validity of an employer’s dismissal from service hinges on the
satisfaction of the two substantive requirements for a lawful termination.
In support of their petition, UTP and Jersey reiterate their averments that Kemplin is a
fugitive from justice since warrants of arrest for grave oral defamation and grave
coercion had been issued against him by the MTC of Pasay City, and for qualified theft by
the RTC of Angeles City.
Issue:
Whether there is substantial evidence to the decision.
Ruling:
It is settled that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the
assailed CA decision. The Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings, except only
in some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those of the trial
court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action
originated.
In the case before us now, the LA, NLRC and CA uniformly ruled that Kemplin was
dismissed sans substantive and procedural due process. While we need not belabor the first
two factual issues presented herein, it bears stressing that we find the rulings of the
appellate court and the labor tribunals as amply supported by substantial evidence.
Specifically, we note the advertisement agreements with Pizza Hut and M. Lhuillier
entered into by Kemplin, who signed the documents as President of UTP on May 12, 2009,
or more than two years after the supposed expiration of his employment contract. They
validate Kemplin’s claim that he, indeed, continued to render his services as President of
UTP well beyond March 2, 2007.
Moreover, in the letter dated July 30, 2009, Kemplin was ordered to cease and desist from
entering the premises of UTP.
In Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera,37 the Court laid down in detail the
steps on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee, viz:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes
or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management
Page 493 of 1553
must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This
should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice
to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union
official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts
and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention
which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282
is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify
their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses;
and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing
or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with
the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or
hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve
the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances
involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have
been established to justify the severance of their employment.
Prescinding from the above, UTP’s letter sent to Kemplin on July 30, 2009 is a lame attempt
to comply with the twin notice requirement provided for in Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V
of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The charges against Kemplin were not clearly
specified. While the letter stated that Kemplin’s employment contract had expired, it
likewise made general references to alleged criminal suits filed against him. Corollarily, in
the absence of a hearing and investigation, the existence of just cause to terminate Kemplin
could not have been sufficiently established.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES

G.R. NO.172551, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. BRION
a. As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of
pure questions of law. The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is
"whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law." Any question that invites calibration of
Page 494 of 1553

the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a question of
fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
b. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the
purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to
proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court
or before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts
prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence,
absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do
so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Respondent Yatco was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land covered by
transfer certificate of title, which property the government placed under the coverage of
CARP. Pursuant to EO 405, the LBP valued the property, but Yatco did not find the
valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the DAR- PARAD, which then
conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just
compensation. The PARAD computed the value of the property at P16,543,800.00 by using
the property’s current market value as shown by the tax declaration Yatco submitted, and
applied the formula "MV x 2." Further, PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any
verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the
LBP’s valuation. On the other hand, LBP did not move to reconsider PARAD’s ruling, and
instead filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation.
The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200.00 per square meter,
thus arriving at a valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC Calamba City, Branch
35 in a civil case, which in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC Calamba City, Branch
36 arrived at in a civil case. Also, the RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP’s evidence in
justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the
prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in
Section 17 of the CARL. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence LBP appealed to the
CA, which dismissed LBP’s appeal and reconsideration thereto.
Issue:
a. Whether the factual-issue-bar rule applies.

b. Whether the court may take judicial notice of certain facts prevailing in another case.
Page 495 of 1553
Ruling:
a. As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review
of pure questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the review
of questions of fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law." Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a question of fact and thus
proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
We find the presented issue clearly one of law. Resolution of this question can be made by
mere inquiry into the law and jurisprudence on the matter, and does not require a review
of the parties’ evidence. We, therefore, disagree with Yatco on this point as we find the
present petition compliant with the Rule 45 requirement.
b. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the
purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to
proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or
the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them
in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion,
resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer
the LBP opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the
April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s
opposition to it) constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s
previous ruling – to be legally erroneous.
After considering these factors and formula, we are convinced that the RTC-SAC
completely disregarded them and simply relied on Branch 36’s valuation. For one, the RTC-
SAC did not point to any specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving
at the P200.00 per square meter valuation. It did not even consider the property’s market
value based on the current tax declaration that Yatco insists the RTC-SAC considered in
Page 496 of 1553
addition to Branch 36’s valuation. Assuming that the RTC-SAC considered the property’s
market value (which, again, we find that it did not), this alone will not suffice as basis,
unless justified under Item II.A.3 of DAR AO 5-98 (as provided above). Then too, it did not
indicate the formula that it used in arriving at its valuation or which led it to believe that
Branch 36’s valuation was applicable to this case. Lastly, the RTC-SAC did not conduct an
independent assessment and computation using the considerations required by the law
and the rules.
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL vs. CONSUELO C. ALIGA

G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014
J. PERALTA
a. A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such
case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in
contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions
based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not
errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
b. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The fundamental
philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when
brought in unequal contest with the State. This interest encompasses his right to have his
guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him,
for society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate
goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial
proceeding. Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment,
the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where
there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2)
Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. In the
Page 497 of 1553
case, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial committed against petitioner, and
that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA, hence the rule against double
jeopardy operates making the judgment of acquittal final and no longer appealable.
Facts:
In an information for the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial

Document filed against Aliga, it was alleged that Aliga, then acoountant of Dentrade Inc.,
stole a UCPB check and thereafter falsified the amount indicated therein to be encashed
and further misappropriating the amount for personal use and benefit. Upon arraignment,
Aliga pleaded not guilty hence trial ensued. The prosecution presented its witnesses and
documentary evidence to support the charge against Aliga. The RTC found Aliga guilty of
the crime charged but absolved her from civil liability. As such, Aliga appealed to the CA,
which reversed the RTC decision, explaining that Aliga’s admission or confession before
the NBI, having been a custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because Aliga
was not informed of her rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of her own choice. Further, the CA declared that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence of the Aliga. Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 was filed.
Issues:
a. Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in assailing judgment
of acquittal.
b. Whether double jeopardy arises when judgment of acquittal is assailed.
Ruling:
a. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of
herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of
acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition,
regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the
court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be
violated.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition
under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. A
Page 498 of 1553
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Under Section
1 of the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan may
file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. However, the provision must be read
in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any
party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed
in double jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged
in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State
is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The rule is that a judgment acquitting the
accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly,
the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such
acquittal is final and un-appealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens
at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the
judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such
case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. No grave
abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication
of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will
issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and
conclusions of the trial court.
b. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is
final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The fundamental
philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when
brought in unequal contest with the State. Thus, Green expressed the concern that "the
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
Page 499 of 1553

of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent,
he may be found guilty."
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or
innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for
society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The
ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality
of the initial proceeding. Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a
final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where
there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2)
Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances. Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these exceptions do not exist in
this case.
First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make
any allegation to that effect. What the records show is that during the trial, both parties
had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is
true during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not deprived
of a fair opportunity to prove its case.
And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be said
that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only
by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the
trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored
on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be
attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.
Upon perusal of the records, it is Our considered view that the conclusions arrived at by
the CA cannot, by any measure, be characterized as capricious, whimsical or arbitrary.
While it may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation of facts
might have resulted from possible lapses in the evaluation of the evidence, nothing herein
Page 500 of 1553
detracts from the fact that relevant and material evidence was scrutinized, considered and
evaluated as proven by the CA’s lengthy discussion of its opinion. We note that the petition
basically raises issues pertaining to alleged errors of judgment not errors of jurisdiction
which is tantamount to an appeal contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution
the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence. Conformably then we need not embark
upon review of the factual and evidentiary issues raised by petitioner as these are obviously
not within the realm of Our jurisdiction.
NIGHTOWL WATCHMAN & SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. NESTOR LUMAHAN

G.R. No. 212096, October 14, 2015, J. Brion
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, unlike a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, does not require that the court a quo be impleaded. This distinction proceeds from
the nature of these proceedings: a Rule 45 petition involves an appeal from the ruling a quo;
a Rule 65 petition is an original special civil action that must implead the lower tribunal
alleged to have acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. (Nightowl) hired Nestor Lumahan as a
security guard. The latter’s last assignment was at the Steelworld Manufacturing
Corporation (Steelworld). Lumahan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with other
prayers against Nightowl before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Lumahan admitted in his pleadings
that he did not report to work for a time because he had to go to Iloilo to attend to his
dying grandfather. Steelworld permitted him to do so but Nightowl refused. The LA
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lumahan abandoned his work. When the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case to another LA, the latter
decided in Lumahan’s favor. On appeal to the NLRC, Lumahan’s complaint was dismissed.
The CA ruled in favor of Lumahan, opining that Nightowl failed to discharge its burden of
proving that Lumahan unjustly refused to return to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari requires the attachment of all the
pleadings the parties filed before the lower tribunals.
RULING:
Page 501 of 1553

No. Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides: "The petition shall be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order
or resolution certified by the clerk of court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies
thereof, and such material portions of the records as would support the petition…”
Thus, a petition for review on certiorari does not require the attachment of all the
pleadings the parties filed before the lower tribunals. Only the judgment or final order must
be attached plus supporting material records.
Additionally, Section 4, Rule 45 states: "The petition shall state the full name of the
appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party, as respondent, without impleading
the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents." From the foregoing,
Lumahan cannot rely on Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and insist on an outright
dismissal of the petition. We find that Nightowl duly complied with the requirements for
filing a petition for review on certiorari .
MA. CORAZON M. OLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 195547, December 02, 2015, Peralta J.
If the Order or Resolution issued by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy
of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Facts:
One Ma Corazon Ola, Manuel Hurtada and Aida Ricarse (Accused) herein accused-
appellants, were charged with committing the crime of estafa with the RTC. The RTC
convicted both accused. This prompted accused-appellants to appeal to the CA. However,
the CA dismissed their appeal. The CA opined that accused-appellants’ brief were filed out
of time prompting the dismissal of their motion to file an amended appellant’s brief. Now,
accused-appellants come before the Supreme Court assailing the CA’s denial of their
motion to file an amended appellant’s brief. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not it was proper for the CA to deny accused-appellants’ motion to file an
amended appellant’s brief.
Page 502 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes, the denial is proper. In the present case, the Court agrees with the contention of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are
interlocutory orders, as they do not dispose of the case completely but leave something to
be decided upon. What has been denied by the CA was a mere motion to amend petitioner's
appeal brief and the appellate court has yet to finally dispose of petitioner's appeal by
determining the main issue of whether or not she is indeed guilty of estafa. As such,
petitioner's resort to the present petition for review on certiorari is erroneous. Thus, on this
ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible as the Court finds no cogent reason not to
apply the rule on dismissal of appeals under Section 5, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
SPOUSES AMADOR C. CAYAGO, JR. AND ERMALINDA B. CAYAGO v. SPOUSES

EVELITO CANTARA AND SOLEDAD CANTARA
G.R. No. 203918, December 02, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe J.
In giving due course to the petition for review and considering it to have been timely
filed, the Court ruled that it was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just
because the motion for extension reached the ponente's office beyond the last date prayed for.
It found that the delay cannot be attributed to petitioners, who were unreasonably deprived
of their right to be heard on the merits and were fatally prejudiced by the delay in the
transmittal of records attributable to the court's inept or irresponsible personnel.
Facts:
Spouses Cantara (Sps. Cantara) herein respondents, filed a case for forcible entry against
Spouses Cayago (Sps. Cayago) herein petitioners. The MTC dismissed the complaint. On
appeal with the RTC, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. Sps. Cayago filed an MR
with the RTC. Subsequently, the RTC denied the MR on July 6, 2010. Sps. Cayago received
such denial on July 15, 2010. On July 29, 2010 or a day before the expiration of the period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari with the CA, Sps. Cayago filed a
motion for extension of time, praying for an addition period of fifteen (15) days, or until
August 14, 2010 within which to file their petition for review. Since August 14, 2010 fell on a
Saturday, Sps. Cayago filed their petition for review with the CA on August 16, 2010. The
CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time. Hence this petition.
Page 503 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for review was filed on time by Sps. Cayago
Ruling:
Yes, it has been filed on time. As a general rule, appeals are perfected when it is filed within
the period prescribed under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court provides that appeals to the CA taken from a decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction should be filed and served within fifteen (15) days,
counted from notice of the judgment appealed from or from the denial of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. The original 15-day period to appeal is extendible for an
additional 15 days upon the filing of a proper motion and the payment of docket fees within
the reglementary period of appeal. Failure to successfully comply with the aforementioned
procedure, especially in filing the appeal within the prescribed period, renders the petition
for review dismissible.
It bears stressing that Sps. Cayago's motion for extension of time, as well as their petition
for review, was physically in the CA's possession long before the issuance of its Decision on
April 14, 2011, but for reasons completely beyond their control, the motion for extension of
time to file their petition belatedly reached the ponente's office and was therefore not
timely acted upon. As a result, the same was unceremoniously dismissed on procedural
grounds. As in the Zaulda case, it is a travesty of justice to dismiss outright a petition for
review which complied with the rules only because of reasons not attributable to the
petitioners - Sps. Cayago in this case - such as delay on the part of the personnel of the CA
in transmitting case records to their respective ponentes. Accordingly, in the interest of
substantial justice, the Court holds that Sps. Cayago's petition for review should be resolved
on the merits, taking into consideration that the findings of fact and conclusions of law by
the RTC were in complete contrast to those of the MTC.
ROGELIO ROQUE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 193169, April 6, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The petition for review by the accused thereby violates the limitation of the issues to
only legal questions, and, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual
findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin.
Page 504 of 1553

Facts:
While brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo Marquez were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos
in Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz and shouted to him to join them. Believing
that the shout was directed at him, Rogelio Roque (accused) stopped the tricycle he and
his wife were in and cursed Rodolfo. Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding but
the accused was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers that
something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him. Bothered, Rodolfo
went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to ask for assistance in
settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was
fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. Since Tayao was then no longer
around, Reynaldo just proceeded to the accused’s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who
had already gone ahead.
Upon arriving at the accused’s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the
latter did not reply. Instead, the accused entered the house, was already holding a gun when
he came out, and suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. He still shot
Reynaldo when the latter hit the ground. Unsatisfied, he kicked the victim on the face and
back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help to no avail, since the accused warned those around
not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital
for emergency medical treatment. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a
medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo's skull and exited at
the back of his right ear. The RTC found the accused guilty. The CA affirmed the ruling.
The accused contends that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence presented.
Issue:
Whether factual errors which are within the province of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Ruling:
NO. The errors the accused imputes upon the CA all pertain to "appreciation of evidence"
or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. The Court had already explained in Batistis v. People that: “Pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 122, and
Page 505 of 1553

Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal
case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari. A petition for review on certiorari
raises only questions of law.”
The accused’s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and reexamination of

the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature. The Petition must therefore be denied
on this basis because "one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the
issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb
the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting,
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of
origin,"which was not shown to be the case here.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said
findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA, as in
this case. After all, the RTC "had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and
detect if they were telling the truth." "To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of
finality and bindingness of the trial court's findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb
[the] findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA"as petitioner
was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a
departure from the said doctrine.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION v. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 192024, 01 July 2015, J. Mendoza
The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below
Facts:
Petitioner claims that it overpaid excise taxes and that considering that the CTA found
Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 to be contrary to law, there should be no obstacle to the
refund of the total amount excess excise taxes it had paid. The CTA division and CTA en
Page 506 of 1553

banc denied the claim for tax refund on the ground that petitioner failed to provide
sufficient evidence to prove its claim.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of petitioner’s claim for tax
refund.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner seeks that the Court re-examine the probative value of its evidence and
determine whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly
overpaid. This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not this Court's function to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, the
Court's jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect.
Verily, the sufficiency of a claimant's evidence and the determination of the amount of
refund, as called for in this case, are questions of fact, which are for the judicious
determination by the CTA of the evidence on record.
The CTA committed no reversible error in denying petitioner's claim for tax refund for
insufficient evidence. Petitioner relied heavily on photocopied documents to prove its
claim, it did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason as to why the originals could
not be produced. Moreover, petitioner’s evidence, even if considered, fails to prove that it
is entitled to its claim for refund. It failed to discharge the burden of proving the allegations
made in its claim for refund.
ROMEO T. CALUZOR v. DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE

LORENZO LLANILLO and MOLDEX REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 155580, 01 July 2015, J. Bersamin
The remedies of appeal and certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the special civil
action for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is no appeal, or
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Page 507 of 1553

Facts:
Petitioner instituted this case against Deogracias in the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication (PARAD) demanding the payment of disturbance compensation. He
amended his complaint to implead Moldex Realty Corporation (Moldex) as an additional
defendant upon discovering that the latter had entered the land to develop it into a
residential subdivision. He prayed for the restoration of his possession of the tilled
land, and the payment of disturbance compensation. PARAD dismissed petitioner’s
complaint. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) which
reversed PARAD’s decision. On appeal by Moldex and Deogracias, the CA reversed
DARAB’s ruling. Hence this special civil action for certiorari commenced by petitioner on
the ground that CA gravely abused its discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should have appealed via a petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling:
YES. Respondents were correct in their position that the petitioner should have appealed
in due course by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of bringing the special civil
action for certiorari.
It is clear that the CA promulgated the assailed decision in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction to review and pass upon the DARAB’s adjudication by of the petitioner’s appeal
of the PARAD’s ruling. As such, his only proper recourse from such decision of the CA was
to further appeal to the Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Despite his allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the CA, he could not
come to the Court by special civil action for certiorari.
ACS Development & Property Managers, Inc. vs. Montaire Realty and
Development Corporation
G.R. No. 195552, April 18, 2016
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review
under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Page 508 of 1553

FACTS:
ADPROM instituted with the CIAC a case for sum of money against MARDC, which in turn
filed its own counterclaim against AD PROM. On August 17, 1998, the CIAC rendered its
Decision granting P4,384,987.03 to ADPROM.
ARDC appealed the CIAC decision to the CA via a petition for review. The CA rendered its
Decision deleting the award of interest on unpaid billings, and holding ADPROM liable to
MARDC for liquidated damages. After its Motion for Reconsideration had been denied,
DPROM filed the Petition for Certiorari before this Court arguing that the CA gravely
abused its discretion in deleting the award of interest on unpaid billings and in ordering it
to pay liquidated damages.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for certiorari to question the CA decision that reviewed the CIAC's
ruling is the proper remedy
RULING:
No, DPROM availed of the wrong remedy when it filed with the Court a petition
for certiorari to question the CA decision that reviewed the CIAC's rulings. Instead of filing
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, AD PROM should have filed a
petition for review under Rule 45. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of
the [CA] is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court~ decisions, final orders, or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for
review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
A special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds
therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party
adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.
MARK REYNALD MARASIGAN y DEGUZMAN vs. REGINALD FUENTES, et. al.

G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016 [Leonen, J.]
In Rule 45 petitions, which are appeals from petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, the
appealed ruling may be reversed and its factual moorings rejected if it can be shown that, in
Page 509 of 1553

rendering the act originally subject of the Rule 65 petition, "the tribunal acted capriciously
and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy”.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marasigan filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder against respondents.
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding probable cause for charging Fuentes and Calilan with less serious
physical injuries and clearing Lindo of any liability. He reasoned that there were no
qualifying circumstances to support a charge for murder.
Aggrieved, Marasigan filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. DOJ
Undersecretary partially granted Marasigan’s Petition for Review and ordered the
provincial prosecutor of Laguna to file informations for attempted murder against Fuentes,
Calilan, and Lindo.
Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The DOJ Secretary then
issued a Resolution absolving Fuentes and Lindo of liability, while finding that Calilan
could only be charged with less serious physical injuries. Aggrieved, Marasigan filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The
CA dismissed Marasigan’s Petition for Certiorari. Thus, Marasigan filed a Petition for
Review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
in a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari.
RULING:
YES.
It is basic that petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise pure questions
of law and that findings of fact are generally binding and conclusive on this court.
Nevertheless, there are recognized exceptions that will allow this court to overturn the
factual findings confronting it. These exceptions are the following:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
Page 510 of 1553

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Moreover, in Rule 45 petitions, which are appeals from petitions for certiorari under Rule
65, the appealed ruling may be reversed and its factual moorings rejected if it can be shown
that, in rendering the act originally subject of the Rule 65 petition, "the tribunal acted
capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the
controversy[.]"
A careful review of this case and of the evidence that were available for the prosecutors’
and the Department of Justice’s appreciation will reveal that there was a gross
misapprehension of facts on the part of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the DOJ
Secretary. It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion for the DOJ Secretary to conclude
that respondent Calilan may only be prosecuted for the crime of less serious physical
injuries while his co-respondents, Fuentes and Lindo, may not be prosecuted at all.
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. ST. FRANCIS SQUARE REALTY

CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 198916-17, January 11, 2016 [Peralta, J.]
FACTS:
The Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission (CIAC) rendered an Arbitral

Award in an arbitration case between petitioner and respondent. Dissatisfied with the CIAC
Page 511 of 1553

Award, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with
modifications the CIAC Award. Aggrieved by the CA decision, both parties filed their
respective motions for reconsideration, both of which were denied. Hence, the present
petitions of both parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not factual findings of the CIAC may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
RULING:
As exceptions, however, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by the

Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of
the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators
were disqualified to act as such under Section Nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully
refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted to them was not made; (6) when there is a very clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was
deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when
an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators; (7) when the findings
of the CA are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (8) when a party is deprived of
administrative due process.
In this case, apart from conflicting findings of fact of the CA and the CIAC as to the
propriety of some arbitral awards, mathematical computations, and entitlement to claim
certain costs as part of the amount necessary to complete the project, none of the other
exceptions above was shown to obtain in this case. Hence, the Court will not disturb those
findings where the CA and the CIAC are consistent with each other, but will review their
findings which are inconsistent and cannot be reconciled.
Page 512 of 1553

REMEDIOS PASCUAL vs. BENITO BURGOS, ET AL

G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016, [Leonen, J.]
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed
under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the
factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and
upon this [c]ourt"when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate
courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.
FACTS:
This case involves the redemption of property by petitioners Spouses Pascual. The trial
court gave credence to the evidence presented by petitioner and allowed them to redeem
the property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the factual findings of the trial
court, and directed it to disallow redemption of the property. Aggrieved, petitioners filed
before the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to assail the CA Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not factual findings of the lower courts may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
in a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
RULING:
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual
findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon
this [c]ourt"when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts
will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.
However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have
expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v.
Mayor Asistio, Jr.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
Page 513 of 1553

contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.
Here, petitioner claims that this case presents two (2) exceptions to the rule against a
review of factual findings by this court. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion. Further, she states that the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are contrary to each other.
Petitioner, however, fails to convince the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the trial court’s factual findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties. Other than saying that the Court of
Appeals allegedly failed to apply doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court, petitioner has
not presented the Court with cogent reasons why the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion when it re-evaluated the evidence presented by the parties and reached different
factual findings.
Grave abuse of discretion, to be an exception to the rule, must have attended the evaluation
of the facts and evidence presented by the parties. Here, the Court of Appeals’ reversal or
modification of the factual findings of the trial court does not automatically mean that it
gravely abused its discretion. The Court of Appeals, acting as an appellate court, is still a
trier of facts. Parties can raise questions of fact before the Court of Appeals and it will have
jurisdiction to rule on these matters.
Further, while the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court, this alone does not automatically warrant a review of factual findings by this court.
Petitioner must show why the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are without any
basis. This, the petitioner failed to do.
PEDRO LADINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and EDWIN DE RAMON

G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016 [ Bersamin, J.]
The concept of newly-discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a

new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on
appeal, particularly one before the Supreme Court.
Page 514 of 1553

The Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with crimes
to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the
public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on
the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only
such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. Here, the proposed evidence of the petitioner was
not newly-discovered because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his
exercise of reasonable diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the
proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that
contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and
testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Ladines, together with Herman Licup, was charged with the crime of
Homicide. The RTC convicted petitioner of the crime but acquitted Licup for insufficiency
of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 insisting that the
CA committed reversible error in affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup
immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim; and that the res
gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable
doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
The State countered that the insistence by petitioner raised factual questions that were
improper for consideration in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45;
that the CA did not err in affirming the conviction; and that the evidence to be adduced by
the petitioner was not in the nature of newly-discovered evidence.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not factual questions may be considered in an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
NO.
Page 515 of 1553

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A
question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts. In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised,
because the Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, does not normally undertake
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are
received with respect and are binding on the Court subject to certain exceptions,
including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (j) when in making
its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Here, none of the foregoing exceptions applies in order to warrant the review of the
unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the
CA's affirmance of the conviction of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the concept of newly discovered evidence may be appropriately

considered on appeal to the Supreme Court.
NO.
The res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that
created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. The concept of newly-discovered
evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in
the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the
Supreme Court.
Page 516 of 1553

The absence of a specific rule on the introduction of newly-discovered evidence at this late
stage of the proceedings is not without reason. The Court would be compelled, despite its
not being a trier of facts, to receive and consider the evidence for purposes of its appellate
adjudication. Of necessity, the Court would remand the case to the lower courts for that
purpose. But the propriety of remanding for the purpose of enabling the lower court to
receive the newly-discovered evidence would inflict some degree of inefficiency on the
administration of justice, because doing so would effectively undo or reopen the decision
that is already on appeal.
The Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with
crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one
hand, and the public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of
criminal justice, on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-
discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of
such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
Here, the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because the first
two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence,
could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial
by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res
gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key
witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et. al. vs. ERNESTO V. YU and
MANUEL C. YUHICO
In general, procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing a
petition for review are inviolable considering that appeal is not a constitutional right but
merely a statutory privilege and that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. However, procedural rules
may be waived or dispensed with in order to serve and achieve substantial justice. Relaxation
of the rules may be had when the appeal, on its face, appears to be absolutely meritorious or
when there are persuasive or compelling reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.
Page 517 of 1553

FACTS:
Respondents Yu and Yuhico were members of petitioner Orchard Golf and Country Club.
Inc. Their membership was suspended by the latter, prompting them to file a Petition for
Injunction to assail the validity of their suspension.
On December 4, 2008, the Imus RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Upon receiving a copy
of the Imus RTC Decision on December 22, 2008, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on
January 5, 2009. Respondents then filed an Opposition to Notice of Appeal with Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, arguing that the December 4, 2008 Decision already became
final and executory since no petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules was filed before
the CA.
Realizing the mistake, petitioners filed on January 13, 2009 an Urgent Motion for Extension
of Time to File a Petition. Before the Imus RTC, they also filed a Motion to Withdraw the
Notice of Appeal. On January 15, 2009, the CA resolved to give petitioners a 15-day period
within which to file the petition, but "[s]ubject to the timeliness of the filing of petitioners’
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File ‘Petition for Review’ under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court dated January 13, 2009." Afterwards, on January 21, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition
for Review.
On September 16, 2009, the CA set aside its January 15, 2009 Resolution which granted
petitioners an additional 15-day period within which to file their Petition for Review. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing its previous Resolution which granted petitioners
an additional 15-day period within which to file their Petition for Review.
RULING:
YES.
In general, procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition
for review are inviolable considering that appeal is not a constitutional right but merely a
statutory privilege and that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. However, procedural rules may
be waived or dispensed with in order to serve and achieve substantial justice. Relaxation of
Page 518 of 1553

the rules may be had when the appeal, on its face, appears to be absolutely meritorious or
when there are persuasive or compelling reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.
Notably, under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC (Re: Mode of Appeal in Cases Formerly Cognizable by
the Securities and Exchange Commission), while the petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order
of the RTC, the CA may actually grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which
to file the petition and a further extension of time not exceeding fifteen (15) days for the
most compelling reasons. This implies that the reglementary period is neither an
impregnable nor an unyielding rule.
In this case, petitioners committed an excusable delay of merely seven (7) days. When they
received a copy of the Imus RTC Decision on December 22, 2008, they filed before the CA
an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition on January 13, 2009. Meantime,
they exhibited their desire to appeal the case by filing a Notice of Appeal before the Imus
RTC. Upon realizing their procedural faux pax, petitioners exerted honest and earnest
effort to file the proper pleading despite the expiration of the reglementary period. In their
urgent motion, they candidly admitted that a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a
notice of appeal under Rule 41 ought to have been filed. The material dates were also
indicated. Hence, the CA was fully aware that the 15-day reglementary period already
elapsed when it granted the time to file the petition.
There is also no material prejudice to respondents had the CA allowed the filing of a
petition for review. When the Imus RTC declared as permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction, the injunction became immediately executory. Respondents’ suspension as
Club members was effectively lifted; in effect, it restored their rights and privileges unless
curtailed by a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
Levi Strauss & Co. vs. Atty. Ricardo R. Blancaflor, in his officical capacity as the
Director General of the Intellectual Property Office
G.R. No. 206779, April 20, 2016
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs the appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, such
as the IPO, to the CA. The rule is clear that an appeal to the CA must be filed within a period
of fifteen (15) days. While an extension of fifteen (15) days and a further extension of another
fifteen (15) days may be requested, the second extension may be granted at the CA’s discretion
and only for the most compelling reason. Motions for extensions are not granted as a matter
of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their
Page 519 of 1553

motions for extensions or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length
of time they pray for. Here, Levi’s failed to present a compelling reason to grant the second
motion for extension.
FACTS:
Levi’s filed an application before the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) to register the mark
TAB DEVICE covering various goods.The trademark examiner rejected8 Levi’s trademark
application because there is nothing in the subject mark that serves to distinguish Levi’s
goods; hence, the tab itself does not function as a trademark. The Director issued a decision
that affirmed the trademark examiner’s findings, and later on denied Levi’s motion for
reconsideration. Levi’s appealed before the IPO Director-General, which dismissed the
same.
Levi’s only recourse was to file a Petition for Review with the CA within 15 days from receipt
of the IPO Director-General ruling, or until March 29, 2012, under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court to assail the IPO Director-General’s ruling. On March 28, 2012, Levi’s filed a Motion
for Extension of Time (first motion for extension) to file a verified petition for review with
the CA until April 13, 2012. On April 13, 2012, Levi’s filed a Second Motion for Extension of
Time for an additional 15 days, or until April 28, 2012, to file the petition for review. Levi’s
claimed that while the draft of the petition was almost complete, and there was yet again
pressure from other equally urgent professional work. On April 27, 2012, Levi’s filed its
petition for review. The CA granted the first motion for extension, but held that Levi’s failed
to present a compelling reason for the CA to grant the second motion for extension. The
CA ordered the dismissal of the petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in dismissing Levi’s CA petition for review on the
ground that Levi’s filed the CA petition beyond the extended reglementary period.
RULING:
No. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs the appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, such as
the IPO, to the CA. The rule is clear that an appeal to the CA must be filed within a period
of fifteen (15) days. While an extension of fifteen (15) days and a further extension of another
fifteen (15) days may be requested, the second extension may be granted at the CA’s
discretion and only for the most compelling reason. Motions for extensions are not granted
as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never
presume that their motions for extensions or postponement will be granted or that they
Page 520 of 1553

will be granted the length of time they pray for. Here, Levi’s failed to present a compelling
reason to grant the second motion for extension.
SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and EMERLINA MOLETA
G.R. Nos. 175750-51, April 2, 2014, J. Perez
Moleta filed a case against Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna,
Surigao del Norte, for the violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices and Estafa before the
Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty, hence, she filed a petition for review
under Rule 45. The Supreme Court ruled that the petition was timely filed, because it was filed
within 15 days from notice of judgement. However, the grounds raised by the petitioner were
jurisdictional errors purportedly committed by the Sandiganbayan i.e., whether or not the
court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion, is the proper subject of a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65.
Facts:
Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against Consigna,
in her capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of
General Luna, Surigao del Norte, for violations of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known
as AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and Art. 315 of the RPC, otherwise known as Estafa.
These charges arose for the issuance of Moleta of three Land Bank of the Philippines checks,
which were signed by Rusillon, and were returned because municipality’s account was
already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the Philippines.
As defense, petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction because

Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo because the
offense as charged can stand independently of public office and public office is not an
element of the crime.
Based on the allegations of deceit and misrepresentation, the Sandiganbayan

allowed the prosecution to indict petitioner and Rusillon under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan, on 12 December 2006, found petitioner guilty, but
exonerated Rusillon. Consigna thereafter filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 with the
Supreme Court.
Noticeably, the petitioner formulated its arguments, thus:
a. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in making its finding of
facts which amounts to lack of jurisdiction. x x x x b. The court a quo committed grave
Page 521 of 1553
abuse of discretion when it convicted the accused on “false pretense, fraudulent act or
means” made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. x x x x
c. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it made a conclusion that
the petitioner acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence to
justify its conclusion that all the elements of violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are
present.”
Issue:
Whether Rule 45 was correctly filed
Ruling:
As ruled by the court, the differences between Rule 45 and Rule 65 are the following:
With regard to the period to file a petition, in Rule 45, the period within which to
file is fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed
from. In contrast to Rule 65, the petition should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. Regarding the subject matter, a review on
certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited to the review of legal issues; the Court only
resolves questions of law which have been properly raised by the parties during the appeal
and in the petition. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the
determination of the propriety of the trial court’s jurisdiction — whether it has jurisdiction
over the case and if so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended
by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise stated,
errors of judgment are the proper subjects of a Rule 45 petition; errors of jurisdiction are
addressed in a Rule 65 petition. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. So when appeal, or a petition for review is available, certiorari
cannot be resorted to; certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. A Rule 65
certiorari petition cannot be a substitute for a Rule 45 petition so as to excuse the
belatedness in filing the correct petition. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
means “such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion means “such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
Page 522 of 1553
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and

it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Petitioner was correct when she filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45. However,
instead of raising errors of judgment as a proper subject of a petition for review under Rule
45, the petition formulated jurisdictional errors purportedly committed by the court a quo,
i.e., whether or not the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion, which is the
proper subject of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Noticeably, the petition does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith by the court
a quo in its proceedings; and the petition does not raise a denial of due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Importantly, however, the petition followed the
period specified in Rule 45. It was timely filed. For that reason, the court excused the
repeated referral to the supposed grave abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan and treat
the petition as, nonetheless, one for review of the questioned decision.
EUGENE S. ARABIT, EDGARDO C. SADSAD, LOWELL C. FUNTANOZ, GERARDO F.

PUNZALAN, FREDDIE M. MENDOZA, EMILIO B. BELEN, VIOLETA C. DIUMANO
and MB FINANCE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION FFW CHAPTER (FEDERATION OF
FREE WORKERS)
vs. JARDINE PACIFIC FINANCE, INC. (FORMERLY MB FINANCE)
In ruling for legal correctness, the court has to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the court has to
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether
the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, the court has to be
keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC
decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of
a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly
determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
Facts:
Petitioners were former regular employees of respondent Jardine Pacific Finance,

Inc. (formerly MB Finance) (Jardine). The petitioners were also officers and members of
MB Finance Employees Association-FFW Chapter (the Union), a legitimate labor union
and the sole exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of Jardine. The petitioners’ total
length of service with Jardine before their dismissal from employment would range variably
Page 523 of 1553
from 3- 20 years. On the claim of financial losses, Jardine decided to reorganize and
implement a redundancy program among its employees. The petitioners were among those
affected by the redundancy program. Jardine thereafter hired contractual employees to
undertake the functions these employees used to perform.
The Union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB), questioning the termination of employment of the petitioners who were
also union officers. The Union alleged unfair labor practice on the part of Jardine, as well
as discrimination in the dismissal of its officers and members. Subsequently, the petitioners
and the Union filed a complaint against Jardine with the NLRC for illegal dismissal.
LA, NLRC- Petitioners are illegally dismissed.
Jardine thereafter sought recourse with the CA via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
CA- reversed the LA’s and the NLRC’s rulings, and granted Jardine’s petition for
certiorari.
The CA denied the petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. The

petitioners are now before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Issue:
Whether or not Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy before the SC.
Ruling:
Yes.
The court emphasizes at the outset that the current petition was brought under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised on appeal under this
remedy. This is in contrast with a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65 where the
review centers on the jurisdictional errors the lower court or tribunal may have committed.
The court thus limits our review to errors of law which the CA might have
committed. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
Page 524 of 1553

examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them.
"In ruling for legal correctness, the court has to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the court has to
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of
whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, the court
has to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of
the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule
45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the
CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling
on the case?"
In this context, the primary question the court confronts is: did the CA correctly rule
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it found that Jardine validly
terminated the petitioners’ employment because of redundancy?
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO BIHAG, NAMELY: ALEJANDRA BIHAG, NICOMEDES B.

BIHAG, VERONICA B. ACOSTA, SUSANA B. MINOZA, PAULINO B. BIHAG, DANILO
B. BIHAG, TIMOTEO B. BIHAG JR., EDILBERTO B. BIHAG, JOSEPHINE B.
MINOZA, and MA. FEB. ARDITA vs. HEIRS OF NICASIO BATHAN, NAMELY:
PRIMITIVA BATHAN and DUMININA B. GAMALIER
The RTC denied the notice of appeal filed the petitioners. The CA affirmed. Petitioners’
sole contention is that the RTC’s denial of their Notice of Appeal contravenes the ruling in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, which grants an aggrieved party a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration within which to
file the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of finality of judgment
dictates that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments or orders must become final at some
point in time. In Neypes, the Supreme Court, in order to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, declared
that an aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC.
Facts:
Page 525 of 1553

The petitioners, heirs of Francisco Bihag, filed a petition for quieting of title and
damages with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court
against respondent PrimitivaBathan. They alleged that the petitioner approached Francisco
Bihag to borrow money. Since at that time Francisco did not have any money, she told
Francisco to mortgage his land to a bank with a promise that she would return all the
documents to him once the mortgage obligation has already been settled and she would
also pay the real property tax on the land during the subsistence of the mortgage. The
petitioners then found out that the mortgage has long been cancelled yet the documents
were not returned to Francisco. They also found out that Primitiva has been hauling
materials from their land to the prejudice of the petitioners.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondents. It gave credence to the
contention of Primitiva that Francisco sold the land to her and that the petitioners,
including Francisco, are already estopped from claiming ownership of the land since it was
found that Primitiva has already been in possession of the land for more than 30 years.
From this adverse decision of the RTC, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
after the lapse of 8 days from the receipt of the decision. The motion was, however, denied.
From the receipt of the decision denying the motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
filed a notice of appeal before the RTC after the lapse of 10 days. This being the case, the
RTC denied the notice of appeal being filed out of time. The RTC rationated that the
petitioners only have a period of 7 days to file their notice of appeal from the denial of their
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review on
certiorari filed by the petitioners. Hence, the current petition.
Petitioners’ sole contention is that the RTC’s denial of their Notice of Appeal
contravenes the ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, which grants an aggrieved party a
fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration within which to file the notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of the petitioner’s notice of appeal is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. In Neypes, the Supreme Court, in order to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, declared
that an aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC.
Page 526 of 1553

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, the court agrees with petitioners that their
Notice of Appeal was timely filed as they had a fresh 15-day period from the time they
received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration within which to file their
Notice of Appeal.
But while the court agrees with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was
erroneously denied by the RTC, it is nevertheless constrained to deny the instant Petition
as the January 5, 2007 Order, denying petitioners’ Notice of Appeal, has attained finality. It
is a settled rule that a decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party
fails to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of the court’s
decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding. Once it becomes final and
executory, the decision or order may no longer be amended or modified, not even by an
appellate court.
In this case, petitioners, through their counsel, received a copy of the assailed
January 5, 2007 Order, under Registry Receipt No. E-0280, on January 22, 2007, as evidenced
by the Certification of the assistant postmaster. As such, petitioners should have filed their
motion for reconsideration within 15 days, or on or before February 6, 2007, but they did
not. Instead, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 10,
2007. At this time, the RTC’s January 5, 2007 Order denying the Notice to Appeal had long
become final and executory. Petitioners’ mere denial of the receipt of the assailed Order
cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster as the court has
consistently declared that "[t]he best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a
certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or
sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made."
Considering that the January 5, 2007 Order has attained finality, it may no longer be
modified, altered, or disturbed, even if the modification seeks to correct an erroneous
conclusion by the court that rendered it.
In view of the foregoing, the court finds no error on the part of the CA in denying
the Petition for Certiorari.
GREGORIO DE LEON, DOING BUSINESS AS G.D.L. MARKETING vs. HERCULES

AGRO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION AND/OR JESUS CHUA AND RUMI RUNGIS
MILK
Page 527 of 1553

The CA correctly ordered that De Leon's appellant's brief be stricken off the records.
De Leon’s motion for time praying for an additional 10 days to file his motion for partial
reconsideration is validly denied by the RTC, since such motion is a transgression of the
mandatory prohibition on the filing of a motion for extension to file a motion for
reconsideration. Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and
the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The perfection of
appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional
as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory.
Facts:
Gregorio De Leon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila an action for breach
of contract with damages and a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
Hercules Agro Industrial Corporation, represented by Jesus Chua, and Rumi Rungis Milk.
Trial thereafter ensued. The RTC promulgated its Decision finding defendant Rumi Rungis
liable to De Leon. On October 19, 2005, De Leon, through counsel, filed a Motion for Time,
asking for an additional period of 10 days to file a motion for reconsideration. In an Order,
the RTC denied the Motion for Time, as the period for filing a motion for reconsideration
is non-extendible. On November 2, 2005, respondent Rumi Rungis Milk filed its Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision and to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the defendant foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines. The RTC issued
its Order denying respondent Rumi Rungis Milk's motion for reconsideration.
De Leon filed a Notice of Partial Appeal. The RTC issued an Order which stated that
De Leon's notice of partial appeal cannot be given due course as the same had been filed
beyond the reglementary period to appeal. Earlier, on February 13, 2006, De Leon also
moved for partial execution of the RTC Decision. The RTC denied the motion, since the
case against respondent Rumi Rungis Milk was not yet final and executory as its notice of
appeal had been timely filed. De Leon’s partial reconsideration was denied in an Order for
failure of petitioner or counsel to appear on the date the motion was set for hearing. De
Leon had also filed a Notice of Appeal.
On November 16, 2006, De Leon received a notice from the CA requiring him to file
appellant's brief which he did on December 28, 2006. On the other hand, Rumi Rungis Milk
filed a motion for extension of time to file its appellant’s brief, which the CA denied.
Hercules Agro Industrial Corporation filed a Motion to strike out or dismiss petitioner's
appeal and motion for leave of court to lift the amended order of attachment and release
the properties in custodia legis. De Leon filed his Opposition thereto with motion for
refund of overpayment of fees. On January 7, 2008, the CA issued its first assailed
Resolution, which ordered petitioner’s brief stricken off the records and dismissing the
Page 528 of 1553

appeal. Rumi Rungis’ Motion to Lift the Amended Order of Attachment and release the
properties in custodia legis should be filed before the trial court. The CA also ordered the
Appellant's Brief, filed by Rumi Rungis Milk, expunged from the records taking into
account the Resolution promulgated on March 15, 2007 denying respondent Rumi Rungis
Milk's motion for extension of time to file appellant's brief and dismissing its appeal. Both
petitioner and respondent Rumi Rungis Milk’s motions for reconsideration, was denied by
the CA. Hence, this petition filed by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ordered De Leon's appellant's brief filed with
it be stricken off the records.
Ruling:
No, the CA did not err in the order stated.
The records show that the RTC Decision was received by De Leon on October 4,
2005; thus, he had until October 19, 2005 within which to file an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration. De Leon filed a motion for time praying for an additional 10 days or until
October 29, 2005 to file his motion for partial reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion
to which the court agrees, since such motion is a transgression of the mandatory
prohibition on the filing of a motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration.
As stated in Section 2, Rule 40 and Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that in appeals from municipal trial courts or regional trial courts, no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. As the period to
file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, petitioner's motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period to appeal;
thus, petitioner had already lost his right to appeal the September 23, 2005 decision. As
such, the RTC decision became final as to petitioner when no appeal was perfected after
the lapse of the prescribed period.
Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one
who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. The
perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory.
Page 529 of 1553

The CA correctly ordered that De Leon's appellant's brief be stricken off the records.
As the CA said, the parties who have not appealed in due time cannot legally ask for the
modification of the judgment or obtain affirmative relief from the appellate court. A party
who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period
prescribed by law loses his right to do so. As De Leon failed to perfect his appeal within the
period for doing so, the September 23, 2005 decision has become final as against him. The
Order dated January 9, 2006 denying respondent Rumi Rungis Milk's motion for
reconsideration of the Decision dated September 23, 2005 could not be relied upon by
petitioner to make it appear that he can still appeal the said decision. Petitioner had already
lost his right to appeal the September 23, 2005 decision as early as October 19, 2005 when
he failed to file his motion for partial reconsideration of such decision within the
reglementary period.
Petitioner's insistence that the RTC Order dated February 15, 2006 denying due
course to his notice of partial appeal had not attained finality, because of the RTC's failure
to rule on his motion of reconsideration therefrom, is not meritorious. It has already been
established that as early as October 19, 2005, the reglementary period within which
petitioner could appeal the September 23, 2005 decision had already lapsed. Petitioner,
therefore, has no more right to file a notice of partial appeal from the January 9, 2006 Order
which denied respondent Rumi Rungi Milk's motion for reconsideration of the September
23, 2005 decision.
EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA vs. DAN JOEL LIM and RICHARD TAN

G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014, CJ. Sereno
It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Civil Service
Commission are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court and the Supreme
Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific
matters under their consideration. In order to overcome the validity of these Resolutions,
Barcelona must present evidence to prove that the evidence relied on by the CSC was
unsubstantial. In this case, this Court rule that the findings of fact and conclusions of the
CSC have passed the test of substantiality.
Barcelona claims that only the issues raised by the parties may be resolved by the
Court. Barcelona is mistaken. An appeal throws the entire case open for review. An appeal,
once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that this Court has
the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
Page 530 of 1553

Facts:
On 14 August 2000, businessman Dan Joel Lim, the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay with the Criminal Intelligence Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation. Lim claimed that: (1) his employees, Arnel E. Ditan and Pilipino Ubante, were
influenced by Barcelona to file a labor complaint against Lim; and (2) Barcelona, then an
NLRC officer, demanded 20,000 for the settlement of the labor case filed against Lim. The
NBI organized an entrapment operation against petitioner.
Lim informed the NBI that Barcelona would drop by Top Gun Billiards around seven
o’clock in the evening, expecting to receive the 20,000 Barcelona was demanding from him.
After Lim handed him the marked bills, Barcelona began counting them. The latter was
arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the money in his bag. Barcelona was
brought to the NBI office, thereafter, he underwent ultraviolet light examination and it
showed the presence of Yellow Fluorescent Specks and Smudges. The City Prosecutor filed
with the RTC of Manila an information against Barcelona for the crime of robbery.
It was further discovered that while the inquest papers were being prepared by the
NBI, Richard Tan, owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, had filed a similar extortion Complaint
against Barcelona who supposedly asked him to pay P15,000 in exchange for the settlement
of a fabricated case. Reports of the circumstances leading to the arrest and filing of the
Complaints against Barcelona were submitted by Tan and Lim to Chairperson Señeres.
Chairperson Señeres issued Administrative Order No. 9-02 formally charging him with
dishonesty and grave misconduct. The Order created a Board to look into the present case.
The Order also placed petitioner under a 90-day preventive suspension upon receipt
thereof. The Board issued a Summons directing Barcelona to answer the charges against
him but he refused to receive them. He never filed an Answer. The Board conducted a
hearing attended by Barcelona, he manifested therein that he was not subjecting himself
to its jurisdiction. The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. It found that
Barcelona is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Thus, NLRC Chairperson Señeres
dismissed Barcelona from service.
Barcelona appealed to the CSC. Barcelona asked the CSC to nullify the Order of
Chairperson Señeres. The Order barred Barcelona from entering the NLRC premises a
month before the hearing conducted by the Board. Six years after Barcelona had filed his
Appeal Memorandum, the CSC dismissed it. Barcelona’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the CSC. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed by the CA.
In spite of his voluntary inhibition, Justice Veloso still signed the herein questioned
Resolution to signify his concurrence. Hence, this Petition praying for the reversal of the
Decision.
Page 531 of 1553

Issue:
1. Whether or not the factual findings of the CSC are supported by evidence.
2. Whether or not the CA had the authority to review matters not assigned by the
parties as issues.
Ruling:
1. Yes, it is supported by evidence.
It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Civil

Service Commission are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court and the
Supreme Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on
the specific matters under their consideration. Except for his accusations, Barcelona
presents no proof that the CSC "blindly" affirmed the NLRC’s ruling just to get rid of the
case. A reading of the Resolutions of the CSC reveals otherwise. In order to overcome the
validity of these Resolutions, Barcelona must present evidence to prove that the evidence
relied on by the CSC was unsubstantial. In attempting to prove that the evidence presented
was insufficient to prove his guilt, Barcelona asks this Court to focus on the inadequacy of
Lim’s Sinumpaang Salaysay. Contrary to these assertions, the other pieces of evidence—in
addition to Lim’s sworn statement—were considered by the CSC in resolving Barcelona’s
appeal.
In this case, the court ruled that the findings of fact and conclusions of the CSC have
passed the test of substantiality. It is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are
supported by the evidence on record; or, stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of
fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. All the pieces of evidence presented
before the CSC point to the guilt of Barcelona. Several persons, both private individuals
and law enforcers, came forward to testify and present evidence to prove the allegations
against him. In fact, each testimony corroborated the testimonies of the others, effectively
allowing the CSC to form a complete picture of the incidents that led to the ultimate act of
extortion. In the absence of credible evidence, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties prevails over his unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions.
This rule holds true for the present case. Not only do the NBI agents have in their favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties; their statements are credible
and corroborated as well. After being caught red-handed, Barcelona needs extrinsic
evidence to back up his allegations to prove that the NBI agents had an ulterior motive to
falsely impute the crime to him.
Page 532 of 1553

2. The appellate court has the authority to review matters that the parties have not
specifically raised
While petitioner does not deny that his appeal to the CSC was filed beyond the
reglementary period, he argues that the timeliness of his appeal has never been an issue.
He thus claims that only the issues raised by the parties may be resolved by the Court.
Barcelona is mistaken. An appeal throws the entire case open for review. An appeal, once
accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that this Court has the
authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
The court agrees with Barcelona’s claim that rules of procedure are established to
secure substantial justice, and that technical requirements may be dispensed with in
meritorious cases. However, the court does not see how the CA, in deciding the case at bar,
could have overlooked this policy. Although it took notice of the failure of petitioner to file
his appeal with the CSC on time, and perhaps used this failure as a supporting argument,
it did not dismiss the Petition on that sole ground. In fact, a perusal of the CA Decision
now in question will reveal that the appellate court took cognizance of the case and
adequately discussed the pertinent issues raised by Barcelona.
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL.

G.R. No. 180147, 180149, 180150, 180319 & 180685 June 4, 2014, J. Perez
Sara Lee Philippines wanted to appeal an adverse ruling of the Labor Arbiter. However,
due to the large amount of the appeal bond, it requested that the same be reduced. The
laborers opposed the said motion. On review, the Supreme Court held that the Court did relax
the rule respecting the bond requirement to perfect appeal in cases where: (1) there was
substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute
meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an
appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4)
the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a
partial bond during the reglementary period. Clearly therefore, the Rules only allow the filing
of a motion to reduce bond on two (2) conditions: (1) that there is meritorious ground and (2)
a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. Compliance with the two conditions stops the
running of the period to perfect an appeal provided that they are complied within the 10-day
Facts:
Page 533 of 1553

SLPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of

personal care products and is a subsidiary of SLC.
Aris is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of producing gloves and other
apparel.
FAPI is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of knitted products.
SLC, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the United States
of America, is a stockholder of Aris. It exercised control over Aris, FAPI, and SLPI which
were all its subsidiaries or affiliates.
Cruz was the external counsel of Aris at the time of its closure. When Aris filed for
its dissolution, Cruz became the Vice-President and Director of Aris.
The petition docketed as G.R. No. 180685 is filed by Emilinda D. Macatlang and 5,983
other former employees of Aris. Emilinda D. Macatlang allegedly represents the employees
whose employment was terminated upon the closure of Aris.
A Notice of Permanent Closure filed by with the Department of Labor and

Employment stating that it will permanently cease its operations effective 9 October 1995.
All employees of Aris were duly informed. Aris Philippines Workers Confederation of
Filipino Workers (Union), which represents 5,9846 rank-and-file employees of Aris, staged
a strike for violation of duty to bargain collectively, union busting and illegal closure.
After conciliation, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Aris undertook to
pay its employees the benefits which accrued by virtue of the company’s closure, which
settlement amounted to P419 Million and an additional P15 Million Benevolent Fund to the
Union.
FAPI was incorporated. When said incorporation came to the knowledge of the
affected employees, they all filed 63 separate complaints against Aris for illegal dismissal.
The complaints were consolidated before the labor arbiter. Essentially, the complainants
insisted that FAPI was organized by the management of Aris to continue the same business
of Aris, thereby intending to defeat their right to security of tenure. They likewise
impleaded in their subsequent pleadings that SLC and SLP are the major stockholders of
FAPI, and Cruz as Vice-President and Director of Aris.
Aris countered that it had complied with all the legal requirements for a valid
closure of business operations; that it is not, in any way, connected with FAPI, which is a
Page 534 of 1553

separate and distinct corporation; that the contracts of Aris with its contractors were
already terminated; and that there is no truth to the claim that its export quota with
Garments and Textile Export Board was transferred to FAPI because the export quota is
non-transferable.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding the dismissal of 5,984 complainants
as illegal and awarding them separation pay and other monetary benefits amounting to
P3,453,664,710.86. Upon receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision, the Corporations filed
their Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond and To Admit Reduced Amount
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Emilinda D. Macatlang, et al.,
opposed the motion by asserting that failure to comply with the bond requirement is a
jurisdictional defect since an appeal may only be perfected upon posting of a cash bond
equivalent to the monetary award.
The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond. The NLRC issued an Order
directing the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond, bringing the total
posted bond to P9 Million. Emilinda D. Macatlang, et al., filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. They charged the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the appeal of petitioners despite the gross insufficiency of the cash
bond. The Corporations filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition filed by Macatlang
While the case was pending, the NLRC issued a Resolution on 19 December 2006
setting aside the Decision of the labor arbiter and remanding the case to the "forum of
origin for further proceedings. However, Court of Appeals proceeded to reverse and set
aside the 31 March 2006 NLRC Resolution and deemed it reasonable under the
circumstances of the case to order the posting of an additional appeal bond of P1 Billion.
All the parties filed their respective petitions for certiorari assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. Whether the filing of two (2) petitions for certiorari, namely: the Macatlang
petition and the Abelardo petition constitutes forum shopping.
2. Whether Emilinda D. Macatlang was duly authorized to sign the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the Macatlang petition.
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failure to state the material dates.
4. Whether the appeal bond may be reduced.
Page 535 of 1553

Ruling:
1. Yes, the Abelardo petition constitutes forum shopping. However, it shall not
prejudice the Macatlang petition.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and on the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another.
What is pivotal in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related cases and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different courts and/or administrative agencies upon the same
issues.
At first glance, it appears that there is also identity of parties in both petitions which
is indicative of forum-shopping. Evidently, petitioners in Abelardo have foreknowledge of
an existing petition but nevertheless proceeded to file another petition and omitting to
mention it in their certification on non-forum shopping, either intentionally or not. Clearly,
the petitioners in the Abelardo petition committed forum shopping.
Now, should the act of these 411 employees prejudice the rights of the 5,573 other
complainants in the Macatlang petition? The answer is no. Forum shopping happens when
there is identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions. The court does not agree that the 411 petitioners of the Abelardo petition are
representative of the interest of all petitioners in Macatlang petition. In the absence of
substantial similarity between the parties in Macatlang and Abelardo petitions, the court
finds that the petitioners in Macatlang petition did not commit forum shopping.
2. Macatlang is duly authorized to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum

shopping.
From the foregoing document, it can easily be gleaned that Macatlang was assigned
by the complainants as their attorney-in-fact to perform the following acts: 1) to represent
them in the case/cases filed against Aris, FAPI, SLC, and SLPI; sign any complaint,
pleadings, or any other documents pertinent or related to the instant case brought before
Page 536 of 1553

the NLRC, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court; 2) to enter into any compromise
agreement or settlement; and 3) to receive the full payment as a consequence of any
settlement. The first act necessarily encompasses the authority to sign any document
related to NLRC NCR No. 00-04-03677-98. The petition for review on certiorari is one of
these documents. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 28-91 and 04-94 require a Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping in any initiatory pleading filed before the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals while Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
petition for review on certiorari to be verified, thereby making the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping essential elements of a petition for review on
certiorari, which Macatlang herself was authorized under the Resolusyon to sign.
3. No, the petition should not be dismissed based on the failure to state material
dates.
The court also agrees with the petitioner that failure to state the material dates is
not fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of his receipt, i.e., 9 May 2006, of the RTC
Resolution dated 18 April 2006 denying his Motion for Reconsideration is duly alleged in
his Petition. In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña,
the court held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in
the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more
material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the
trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration. The other material dates may be
gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident.
4. The appeal bond may be reduced based on meritorious grounds.
Well-settled is the doctrine that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere
statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the
statutes or rules allowing it.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may

be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from. The requisites for perfection of appeal as embodied
in Article 223, as amended, are: 1) payment of appeal fees; 2) filing of the memorandum of
appeal; and 3) payment of the required cash or surety bond. These requisites must be
satisfied within 10days from receipt of the decision or order appealed from. It is presumed
that an appeal bond is only necessary in cases where the labor arbiter’s decision or order
contains a monetary award. Conversely, when the labor arbiter does not state the judgment
award, posting of bond may be excused.
Page 537 of 1553

In sum, the NLRC may dispense of the posting of the bond when the judgment
award is: (1) not stated or (2) based on a patently erroneous computation. Sans these two
(2) instances, the appellant is generally required to post a bond to perfect his appeal.
Upon the other hand, the Court did relax the rule respecting the bond requirement
to perfect appeal in cases where: (1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2)
surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond,
(3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired
objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very least,
exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the
reglementary period. Clearly therefore, the Rules only allow the filing of a motion to reduce
bond on two (2) conditions: (1) that there is meritorious ground and (2) a bond in a
reasonable amount is posted. Compliance with the two conditions stops the running of the
period to perfect an appeal provided that they are complied within the 10-day reglementary
period.
The court sustains the Court of Appeals in so far as it increases the amount of the
required appeal bond. But the court deems it reasonable to reduce the amount of the appeal
bond to P725 Million. This directive already considers that the award if not illegal, is
extraordinarily huge and that no insurance company would be willing to issue a bond for
such big money. The amount of P725 Million is approximately 25% of the basis above
calculated. It is a balancing of the constitutional obligation of the state to afford protection
to labor which, specific to this case, is assurance that in case of affirmance of the award,
recovery is not negated; and on the other end of the spectrum, the opportunity of the
employer to appeal.
By reducing the amount of the appeal bond in this case, the employees would still be
assured of at least substantial compensation, in case a judgment award is affirmed. On the
other hand, management will not be effectively denied of its statutory privilege of appeal
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator

MELQUIADES A. ROBLES vs. AURORA A. SALVAÑA
G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014, J. LEONEN
The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for purposes
of appeal provided that the government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or
agency prosecuting the case. The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not
new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals "by the
Page 538 of 1553
respondent" were allowed on "the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in
an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees." Thus,
LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
Facts:
Then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued
an order which revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña’s designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)
of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "directed her instead to handle special projects
and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her" by the
Administrator.
Atty. Salvaña was directed to comply with this office order through a memorandum
issued by Atty. Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the administrative
department. Instead of complying, Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of the
President.
In the interim, Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from
May 15 to May 31, 2006. In support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate.
LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco
also denied having seen or treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical
certificate. Administrator Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice
directed Salvaña to explain in writing within 72 hours from her receipt of the notice "why
no disciplinary action should be taken against her" for not complying with Office Order
No. 119 and for submitting a falsified medical certificate.
The LRTA’s Fact-finding Committee issued a formal charge against her for
Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvaña guilty of all the
charges against her and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal from . . . service with all
the accessory penalties." The LRTA Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-
finding Committee.
Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission
modified the decision. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator Robles had no
standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission because
that right only belonged to respondent in an administrative case.
Page 539 of 1553

LRTA moved for reconsideration but this was denied. LRTA then filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed. LRTA moved for reconsideration of
this decision but was denied. Hence, LRTA filed this present petition. LRTA argues that it
has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission before the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal
the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
Ruling:
The parties may appeal in administrative cases involving members of the civil
service
The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act
No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals "by the respondent" were allowed on "the
decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in an administrative case involving
discipline of subordinate officers and employees."
This court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can
only be availed of by the party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will
only be made in decisions prescribing a penalty, this court concluded that the only parties
that will be adversely affected are the respondents that are charged with administrative
offenses. Since the right to appeal is a remedial right that may only be granted by statute,
a government party cannot by implication assert that right as incidental to its power, since
the right to appeal does not form part of due process.
In effect, this court equated exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in

criminal cases wherein the State or the complainant would have no right to appeal. When
the Civil Service Commission enacted the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, or the URACCS, on September 27, 1999, it applied this court’s definition. Thus,
Section 2, paragraph (l), Rule I, and Section 38, Rule III of the URACCS defined "party
adversely affected" as referring to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary
case has been rendered.
The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for
purposes of appeal provided that the government party that has a right to appeal must be
the office or agency prosecuting the case.
Page 540 of 1553

Indeed, recent decisions showed that this court has allowed appeals by government
parties. Notably, the government parties’ right to appeal in these cases was not brought up
as an issue by either of the parties.
LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of
its decision.
The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees." When the
government office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law,
it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that
"public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives." This is a principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the
government office employing the public officer.
IMMACULATE CONCEPCION ACADEMY/DR. JOSE PAULO E. CAMPOS

vs. EVELYN E. CAMILON
G.R. No. 188035, July 2, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
It is axiomatic that a party who does not appeal or file a petition for certiorari is not
entitled to any affirmative relief. An appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his
brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment but he cannot seek modification or
reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. Thus, for
failure of respondent to assail the validity of her dismissal, such ruling is no longer in issue.
Facts:
Prompted by a complaint of a parent, Ms. Javier, Internal Auditor of Petitioner

Imma-culate Concepcion Academy (ICA), conducted an audit which mainly showed that
there were more or less 186 students whose unaccounted payments in the tune of
PhP1,167,181.45 and that the cashier, Ms. Loba, committed breaches in procedure and
manipulated entries or records in order to hide these accounts. Resultantly, ICA President
Dr. Jose Paulo Campos placed under suspension pending further investigation herein
Respondent Ms. Camilon, ICA Chief Accountant and Administrator, who was responsible
for pre-auditing the school cashier’s report and exercising supervision over the cashier, Ms.
Loba.
Camilon denied any involvement in the illicit activities of Ms. Loba. Nevertheless,
ICA Management terminated her services in view of her direct supervisory role over the
Page 541 of 1553

erring cashier. Camilon then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims
against ICA. The Labor Arbiter granted the reliefs sought by Camilon while the NLRC found
that ICA presented justifiable reasons and sufficient evidence to cause the dismissal of
Camilon but sustained the award of unpaid half-month salary, 13th month pay and service
incentive leave.
Camilon appealed this decision to the CA which affirmed the same with
modification as to the award of separation pay. The appellate court ruled that Camilon did
not commit serious misconduct or the imputed acts do not reflect moral obliquity and so
considering her long employment of 12 years with ICA the payment of separation pay is but
proper.
ICA filed the instant petition, arguing that Camilon is not entitled to separation pay
since the evidence proffered shows that she exhibited gross and habitual negligence at
work. Interes-tingly, Camilon interposes that even though she might have been validly
dismissed the award of separation pay is appropriate consonant to the principle of social
justice.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Camilon can obtain any other affirmative relief from
the judgment rendered by the CA in spite not being able to file her own petition for review.
Ruling:
NO, Camilon failed to cause a review of the judgment.
The Court takes not that Camilon did not appeal or file a petition for certiorari to
assail the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the NLRC finding her grossly and
habitually negligent in her duties for failing to regularly pre-audit the school cashier’s
report, check the entries therein and keep custody of the petty cash fund which negligence
resulted in the school cashier’s misappropriation of school funds and tuition fees.
It is axiomatic that a party who does not appeal or file a petition for certiorari is not
entitled to any affirmative relief. An appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in
his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment but he cannot seek modification
or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. Thus, for
failure of respondent to assail the validity of her dismissal, such ruling is no longer in issue.
Page 542 of 1553

MARIANO JOSE, FELICISIMO JOSE, DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN

MARIANO JOSE, CAMILO JOSE, TIBURCIA JOSE, FERMINA JOSE, AND VICTORIA
JOSE vs. ERNESTO M. NOVIDA, RODOLFO PALAYPAY, JR., ALEX M. BELARMINO,
RODRIGO LIBED, LEONARDO L. LIBED, BERNARDO B. BELARMINO, BENJAMIN
G. ACOSTA, MODESTO A. ORLANDA, WARLITO B. MEJIA, MAMERTO B.
BELARMINO, MARCELO O. DELFIN AND HEIRS OF LUCINO A. ESTEBAN,
REPRESENTED BY CRESENCIA M. VDA. ESTEBAN
[A]s correctly pointed out by the respondents, a review of the instant petition under
Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefor. Moreover, a petition for review under Rule
45 covers questions of law only. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before
it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing
errors of law. [The] Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function
to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.
[The] Court finds that no special and important reasons exist to warrant a thorough
review of the assailed CA Decision. Quite the contrary, the Court is satisfied with and can
simply rely on the findings of the DARAB Urdaneta, DARAB Quezon City and the CA – as
well as the very admission of the petitioners themselves – to the effect that respondents
fulfilled all the requirements under the agrarian laws in order to become entitled to their EPs;
that Felicisimo voluntarily surrendered and abandoned the subject property in favor of his
creditors, who took over the land and tilled the same until 1987; that Felicisimo migrated to
the U.S.A. and became a naturalized American citizen; that in 1991, respondents were illegally
dispossessed of their landholdings through force and intimidation by the petitioners after
Felicisimo returned from abroad; and that as between petitioners and respondents, the latter
are legally entitled to the subject property. These identical findings are not only entitled to
great respect, but even finality. For petitioners to question these identical findings is to raise
a question of fact.
Facts:
In 1990, respondents were each granted, as farmer beneficiaries, Emancipation

Patents (EPs) and Certificates of Title over portions of land forming part of a 16.4 hectare
agricultural estate in Pangasinan, which was placed within the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer (OLT). On the other hand, in January 1991, petitioners filed with the Region I
Office of the DAR a petition seeking reinvestigation of the issuance of certain emancipation
patents in favor of respondents and claiming therein that they are the bona fide and actual
Page 543 of 1553

tenant-tillers of the subject agricultural estate. The DAR Region I Director immediately
issued an order upholding the rights of petitioner over the said estate.
In December 1991, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession,

accounting, liquidation and damages against petitioners with the Region I Office of the
DARAB. In their suit, they assert that Felicisimo Jose was the original tenant of the subject
property and he obtained loans from one Benigno Siobal and one Rogelio Cerezo, which
were secured by a mortgage over the subject estate. Furthermore, according to
respondents, Felicisimo Jose failed to redeem the property from the lenders and he
abandoned the same when he migrated to the USA and became a naturalized citizen
thereof. Thus, with the sanction of the DAR, the owners subdivided the land and sold
portion thereof to respondents who were unlawfully dispossessed therefrom by Felicisimo
Jose when he returned from the USA. On the contrary, petitioners alleged that in addition
to Felicisimo, Mariano and Virgilio, the subject property was being cultivated by their other
siblings and the loans obtained from Siobal and Cerezo were properly settled.
Subsequently, the DARAB issued a decision which held, among others, that there
was abandonment on the part of Felicisimo Jose of his possession and cultivation of the
landholding or estate in question and so the respondents should be the rightful
beneficiaries thereof. In the meantime, the DAR Secretary issued an order affirming the
decision reached by the DAR Region I Director but upon motion for reconsideration the
former conceded jurisdiction over the case with the DARAB.
Petitioners then interposed an appeal with DARAB Quezon City and later with the
CA. Both appellate bodies affirmed the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and thus
sustaining the rights of respondents as tenant-beneficiaries of the subject estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court’s judicial power of review is proper in this case.
Ruling:
NO, the Court finds no special or important reasons to conduct a thorough review
of the case at bar.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, a review of the instant petition under
Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor. Moreover, a petition for review
under Rule 45 covers questions of law only. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases
Page 544 of 1553

brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally
limited to reviewing errors of law. The Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its
power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently,
it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.
The Court finds that no special and important reasons exist to warrant a thorough
review of the assailed CA Decision. Quite the contrary, the Court is satisfied with and can
simply rely on the findings of the DARAB Urdaneta, DARAB Quezon City and the CA – as
well as the very admission of the petitioners themselves – to the effect that respondents
fulfilled all the requirements under the agrarian laws in order to become entitled to their
EPs; that Felicisimo voluntarily surrendered and abandoned the subject property in favor
of his creditors, who took over the land and tilled the same until 1987; that Felicisimo
migrated to the U.S.A. and became a naturalized American citizen; that in 1991,
respondents were illegally dispossessed of their landholdings through force and
intimidation by the petitioners after Felicisimo returned from abroad; and that as between
petitioners and respondents, the latter are legally entitled to the subject property. These
identical findings are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality. For petitioners to
question these identical findings is to raise a question of fact.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ALEX M. VALENCERINA

Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of removal shall be executed as a matter

of course and shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto. An appeal shall not stop the decision
from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins
such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension
or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course.
Facts:
In a Decision dated January 27, 2005, the Ombudsman (OMB) Preliminary

Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-B (PIAB-B) found Alex Valencerina
guilty of gross neglect of duty, and inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, and ordered his dismissal from service.
In an Order dated June 8, 2005, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo modified the PIAB-
B decision, finding Valencerina guilty, instead, of grave misconduct, but imposing the same
penalties. Valencerina moved for reconsideration but was, however, denied.
Page 545 of 1553

Dissatisfied, he filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction against the execution of the June 8, 2005 Order. On November
22, 2005, the CA issued a 60-day TRO which expired on January 21, 2006. Subsequently,
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez directed GSIS President and General Manager
Winston F. Garcia to execute the June 8, 2005 Order. Thus, the GSIS informed Valencerina
that he is “deemed dismissed from the service as of the close of office hours” that day.
Aggrieved, Valencerina filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction with the CA, which, finding the necessity to preserve the status quo
between the parties, granted the same (June 15, 2006 Resolution). Consequently, the
corresponding writ of preliminary injunction was issued on June 20, 2006, and in a
Memorandum dated June 21, 2006, the GSIS directed Valencerina to return to work.
At odds with the return directive, the OMB filed a motion for reconsideration of the
June 15, 2006 Resolution which was denied. The CA pointed out that “under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, an appeal shall not stay the judgment to be reviewed unless the CA shall
direct otherwise,” and that it has resolved to stay the assailed judgment and orders during
the pendency of the case.
Unperturbed, the OMB filed petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction?
Ruling:
There is merit in the petition.
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Section 7, Rule III), as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003,
provides that the office’s decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be
executed as a matter of course and shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto, viz.:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.—Where the respondent is absolved of

the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
Page 546 of 1553

salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under
the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause
to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
Based on the aforequoted provision, it is clear that the OMB’s June 8, 2005 Order
imposing the penalty of removal on Valencerina was immediately executory,
notwithstanding the pendency of his appeal. The general rule on appeals from quasi-
judicial bodies stated under Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules — which provides that “the
appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed
unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just” —
would not apply in this case for the following reasons:
First, Section 3, Rule V of the OMB Rules of Procedure provides that the Rules may
apply suppletorily or by analogy only when the procedural matter is not governed by any
specific provision in the said rules. Here, and as earlier conveyed, Section 7, Rule III
categorically provides that an appeal shall not stop the office’s decision imposing the
penalty of removal, among others, from being executory.
Second, it is a fundamental legal principle that when two rules apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
Evidently, the aforesaid Section 7, Rule III is a special rule applicable to administrative
complaints cognizable by the OMB while Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules applies to appeals
from quasi-judicial bodies in general, including the OMB. Thus, as between the two rules,
Section 7, Rule III should prevail over the application of Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules in
appeals from a decision of the OMB in an administrative case.
Third, the OMB is constitutionally authorized to promulgate its own rules of

procedure. This is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770,
Page 547 of 1553

otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989,” which empower the OMB to
“promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers,
functions, and duties” and to accordingly amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice
may require. As such, the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions rendered by the said
office when the rules the latter so promulgates categorically and specifically warrant their
enforcement, else the OMB’s rule-making authority be unduly encroached and the
constitutional and statutory provisions providing the same be disregarded.
Fourth, the previous ruling in Lapid v. CA wherein the Court, relying on the old
OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e., Administrative Order No. 7 dated April 10, 1990, had opined
that “the fact that the [Ombudsman Act] gives parties the right to appeal from [the OMB’s]
decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal,” cannot
be successfully invoked by Valencerina in this case for the reason that the said
pronouncement had already been superseded by the more recent ruling in Buencamino v.
CA. In Buencamino, the Court applied the current OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e.,
Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, which were already in effect at the
time the CA assailed Resolutions dated June 15, 2006 and April 24, 2007 were issued, and,
hence, governing.
Lastly, it must be emphasized that the OMB Rules of Procedure are only procedural.
Hence, Valencerina had no vested right that would be violated with the execution of the
OMB’s removal order pending appeal. In fact, the rules themselves obviate any substantial
prejudice to the employee as he would merely be considered under preventive suspension,
and entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in the event he wins his
appeal.
ESTRELLA D. S. BAÑEZ vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and DE LA SALLE

UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. 189574, July 18, 2014, J. Perez
It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere

statutes or rules allowing it. The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period will make the judgment final and executory by operation of law. Filing
of an appeal beyond the reglementary period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the
barring of the appeal would be inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances
therein.
Facts:
Page 548 of 1553

Baylon R. Bañez (Baylon), the husband of Estrella D. S. Bañez (Estrella), was

employed by De La Salle University (DLSU) on 19 July 1967. From 25 January 1991 to 26
August 2006, Baylon worked as a Laboratory Technician at the Chemistry Department of
DLSU. Some of his duties and responsibilities were, among others, preparing reagents and
other laboratory materials; checking and monitoring the continuous supply of fuel;
facilitating the movement of gas order cylinders during installation; and handling the
inventory of laboratory stocks (e.g., chemicals, glassware, apparatus, laboratory
consumables, laboratory fixtures and furniture).
On 9 June 2006, Baylon was admitted at the Medical Center Manila on complaints
of vomiting and weakness. He was diagnosed to be suffering from Systemic Lupus
Erythematosus (SLE).
Dr. Erle S. Castillo (Dr. Castillo) prepared a clinical abstract/toxicologic assessment

on Baylon and she stated that “based on the occupational history of the patient, x x x the
probability of a chemically induced disease [cannot be discounted].
On 9 August 2006, Baylon was again admitted at the Medical Center Manila before
he succumbed to the complications of his disease on 27 August 2006. He died of SLE with
Auto-Immune Hemolytic Anemia, SLE Nephritis, SLE Vasculitis and Thrombocytopenia
Secondary to SLE.
Baylon’s attending physician, Dr. Dennis Torres (Dr. Torres), issued a Medical
Certificate stating that Baylon “who was confined and expired in Medical Center Manila for
Systemic Lupus Erythematosus may have been precipitated by the chronic exposure to
chemicals which is an occupational hazard in his performance of being a laboratory
technician.”
Based on medical opinions of Dr. Castillo and Dr. Torres, Estrella filed a claim for
death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Law before the Social Security System
(SSS).
SSS denied Estrella’s claim on two grounds: 1) the cause of death, cardiac
complication of
SLE, is not considered workrelated; and 2) SLE is not included in the list of occupational
diseases.
Estrella appealed SSS’s denial of her claim with the ECC. The ECC affirmed the
denial of death benefits by the SSS.
Page 549 of 1553

Estrella impugned the findings of the ECC in a Petition for Review before the Court
of Appeals. Estrella initially moved for a 30-day extension to file a petition for review due
to absence of counsel and pending acceptance of her case by the UP Office of Legal Aid.
The CA granted a 15-day extension so Estrella had until 15 June 2008 to file her petition for
review. She filed the same on 4 July 2008. The CA dismissed the petition for review because
it was filed out of time.
Estrella explains that the petition for review before the CA was filed beyond the
15-day extension period because she was in the process of obtaining free legal assistance in
the preparation of her appeal and she only received the Resolution of the CA giving her
only 15 days or until 15 June 2008 to file her petition on 26 June 2008. Estrella urges the
Court to relax the rules and dispose the case on the merits.
Issue:
Whether or not Estrella’s belated filing of an appeal may be excused on the ground
that she was in the process of obtaining free legal assistance when the period of extension
to file the same had lapsed
Ruling:
No. Estrella’s belated filing could not be excused on said ground.
Estrella had until 15 June 2008 to file her petition. Estrella filed the petition only 4
July 2008. Even if the reckoning point is the extended period, the petition was filed out of
time. The Court of Appeals simply applied the rule.
It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere

statutes or rules allowing it. The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period will make the judgment final and executory by operation of law.
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned decision/resolution final
and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the
decision/resolution, much less to entertain the appeal. Filing of an appeal beyond the
reglementary period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the barring of the appeal
would be inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances therein.
While there are instances when the Court has relaxed the governing periods of
appeal in order to serve substantial justice, this was done only in exceptional cases. The
Page 550 of 1553

Court finds no compelling reason to justify the filing of the petition for review before the
CA beyond the reglementary period.
ROSE HANA ANGELES, doing business under the name and style of LAS MARIAS
GRILL AND RESTAURANT, and ZENAIDA ANGELES, doing business under the
name and style of
CAFÉ TERIA BAR AND RESTAURANT
vs. FERDINAND M. BUCAD, CHARLESTON A. REYNANTE, BERNADINE B.
ROAQUIN, MARLON A. OMPOY, RUBEN N. LAROZA, EVANGELINE B. BUMACOD,
WILMA CAINGLES, BRIAN OGARIO, EVELYN A. BASTAN, ANACLITO A. BASTAN,
MA. GINA BENITEZ, HERMINIO AGSAOAY, NORBERTO BALLASTEROS,
DEMETRIO L. BERDIN, JR., JOEL DUCUSIN, JOVY R. BALATA and MARIBEL
ROAQUIN
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) in cases brought before it from the Court
of Appeals (CA) via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law. This principle applies with greater force in labor cases, where this
Court has consistently held that findings of fact of the NLRC are accorded great respect and
even finality, especially if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and are supported by
substantial evidence. Judicial review by the SC does not extend to a reevaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.
Factual issues are beyond the scope of the SC’s authority to review on certiorari.
Facts:
Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal and money claims against
petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. Respondents bewailed that they were underpaid
workers. The employees hurled, inter alia, a litany of charges against petitioners, namely:
1) payment of salaries below the minimum wage and which were oftentimes paid after
much delay; 2) noncoverage under the Social Security System (SSS); 3) termination from
employment without giving just benefits despite long service; 4) signing of blank payroll
without indicating the amount; and, 5) non-payment of night differential, holiday pay,
COLA, commutation pay for sick leave and annual leave, 13th month pay and service
charges. On the other hand, only private respondents Joel Ducusin (Ducusin), Ma. Gina
Benitez (Benitez) and Demetrio Berdin, Jr. (Berdin) sued for illegal dismissal.
Petitioners offered not a tinge of explanation as they failed to submit their Position
Paper. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision plowing solely through the submissions of
Page 551 of 1553

respondents. It found petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal with respect to Ducusin, Benitez
and Berdin, and ordered to pay their backwages and separation pay.
Petitioners seasonably appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission

(“NLRC”) flatly denying the charges against them. Petitioners proffered documentary
evidence against each of the respondents.
As for respondents Bernadine Roaquin (Roaquin) and Albert Agsaoay (Agsaoay),

petitioners insisted they voluntarily resigned from their posts. Roaquin signed a Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim while Agsaoay signed a Certification to confirm that he received his
salary and benefits and had no complaints against petitioners. Along the same strain,
petitioners presented the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay of one Melba Pacheca and Nida
Bahe. They were the employees who averred that Berdin likewise resigned when he was
caught surreptitiously taking food out of the kitchen for his girlfriend.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of a certain Lando Villanueva, another employee, affirmed that
Benitez was caught sleeping with respondent Charleston Reynante (Reynante) at the
workers’ quarters, in violation of management rules. The couple immediately left their jobs,
but returned a year later beseeching petitioners to accept them back. Petitioners took pity
on them giving Reynante a job albeit there was no vacancy at that time, and allowing the
couple to live in the workers’ quarters. When Reynante’s employment was terminated on
31 January 2000, Benitez went with him voluntarily and left her job.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal. In doing so, the NLRC held that petitioners failed
to submit sufficient evidence to compel it to reverse the findings of the Labor Arbiter. There
is no substantial proof presented that the money claims were paid to respondents. The best
evidence of such payment is the payroll, whereas in this case, petitioners merely allege
payment.
Respondents went up to the CA questioning the above pronouncements of the

NLRC. The CA issued the assailed Decision affirming with modification the NLRC decision
in that the ruling that (1) Benitez and Berdin were illegally dismissed is vacated; and (2) the
awards of backwages and separation pay to them are deleted.
The CA held that contrary to petitioners’ submission in their Petition, there is no

proof that herein respondent Joel Ducusin (Ducusin) — who petitioners claimed hatched
the plan to harass them through the filing of labor complaints — abandoned his
employment. On the contrary, Ducusin’s immediate filing of the labor complaint indicated
that he did not abandon his employment; it characterizes him as one who deeply felt
wronged by his employer.
Page 552 of 1553

On the issue of money claims, the CA ruled that apart from bare allegations of
payment, petitioners have not satisfactorily shown — by adequate documentary evidence
which should be in its custody and possession — that the salaries, benefits and other claims
due to the respondents have been accordingly paid; that petitioners failed to discharge the
burden of proving payment; that their defense that the relevant payroll and daily time
records were stolen constitutes a lame excuse which cannot excuse them from proving that
they have paid what they owed respondents.
Issues:
Whether or not the Supreme Court could resolve questions as to the illegal dismissal
of respondent Joel Ducusin, and as to petitioners’ failure to overcome the burden of
payment of the money claims of respondents.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court could not resolve questions as to the illegal dismissal of
Ducusin and payment of the money claims of respondents.
The petitioners would have this Court resolve issues which require a reevaluation of
the evidence; issues of fact relating to the dismissal of their employees — respondent
Ducusin particularly — and the computation of monetary claims, which have been passed
upon by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA.
What must be realized, however, is that this Court is not a trier of facts. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is
not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again. This principle applies with greater force in labor cases, where this
Court has consistently held that findings of fact of the NLRC are accorded great respect
and even finality, especially if they coincide with those of the Labor
Arbiter and are supported by substantial evidence. Judicial review by this Court does not
extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor
tribunal has based its determination. Factual issues are beyond the scope of this Court’s
authority to review on certiorari.
Moreover, factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field
of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial
showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence
Page 553 of 1553

presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed.
ROSEMARIE ESMARIALINO vs. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION,

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and JIMENEZ PROTECTIVE and SECURITY AGENCY
G.R. No. 192352, July 23, 2014, J. Reyes
Rosemarie Esmarialino filed an application for the Employees’ Compensation Death

Benefits before the SSS. She contends there is a causal connection between Leukemia to her
late husband’s job as a security guard. SSS denied her claim. Such denial was affirmed by ECC
and CA. Hence, Rosemarie filed petition for review under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.
In ruling that the case does not fall within the ambit of Rule 45 the Court held that Rule 45
limits merely to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In this
case, the issues are beyond the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
since they are factual in nature, essentially revolving on the alleged increased risk for Edwin
to contract leukemia as a result of hardships incidental to his employment as a security
guard.
Facts:
Rosemarie’s husband, Edwin C. Esmarialino (Edwin), with SS No. 331555504, worked
as a Security Guard for Jimenez Protective and Security Agency since May, 1993. For the
years 2002, 2003 and 2004, Edwin was assigned at the Mercury Drug Store Gagalangin
Branch. In May, 2004, Edwin was diagnosed through biopsy with Acute Myelogenous
Leukemia at the Chinese General Hospital. On March 20, 2005, he died.
Rosemarie filed an application for EC death benefits which was denied by the SSS
on the ground that “there is no causal relationship between Acute Myelogenous Leukemia
to the member’s job as a security guard.” Rosemarie appealed the SSS decision to the ECC.
The ECC likewise dismissed the claim.
To challenge the ECC’s denial of her claims, Rosemarie filed before the CA a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rosemarie ascribed grave error on the part
of the ECC when it concluded that leukemia, which significantly contributed to Edwin
Esmarialino’s (Edwin) death, had no causal relation with the work of a security guard.
Rosemarie argued that Edwin’s employment regularly required him to take either straight
12 or 24 hours of duty, with only a 24hour rest period on the last day of each month. Edwin
was thus constantly sleepdeprived and his immune system became weak. Eventually, he
succumbed to leukemia. The Social Security System (SSS) and the ECC, on the other,
averred that Rosemarie failed to offer substantial evidence to prove that Edwin’s working
conditions increased the risk of contracting leukemia. On November 10, 2009, the CA
Page 554 of 1553

rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming the ECC’s ruling. Hence, Esmerialino filed
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether the case is within the ambit of Rule 45
Ruling:
No. It is settled that Rule 45 limits merely to the review of questions of law raised
against the assailed CA decision. The Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings,
except only in some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those
of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasijudicial functions from which the
action originated. In this case, the issues are beyond the ambit of a petition filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court since they are factual in nature, essentially revolving on the alleged
increased risk for Edwin to contract leukemia as a result of hardships incidental to his
employment as a security guard. The CA, ECC and SSS uniformly found that Rosemarie
cannot be granted death benefits as she had failed to offer substantial evidence to prove
her claims. Besides, even if the Court were to exercise leniency and resort to reevaluating
the factual findings below, still, the instant petition is susceptible to denial. The SSS, ECC
and CA decisions are amply supported, hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to
order their reversal.
EMILIANO S. SAMSON vs. SPOUSES JOSE and GUILLERMINA GABOR,
TANAY RURAL BANK, INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MORONG, RIZAL
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the
resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
In the instant case, petitioner appealed the Order of the trial court which dismissed his
complaint for improper venue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. Dismissals based on
these grounds do not involve a review of the facts of the case but merely the application of the
law, specifically in this case, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Considering,
therefore, that the subject appeal raised only questions of law, the CA committed no error in
dismissing the same.
Facts:
Page 555 of 1553


and the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, claiming that he had been paying his one-third
(1/3) share of realty taxes covering the subject portion of land for the years 2002 to 2004.
In 2005, however, his payment was rejected by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanay, Rizal, at
such time he discovered that respondent spouses had already mortgaged the entire
property in favor of respondent Bank back in November 2002.
On August 18, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City dismissed the complaint on the grounds
of improper venue, res judicata, and that the complaint states no cause of action. Samson
filed an appeal with the CA, which likewise dismissed the same for having been improperly
brought before it. The appellate court ruled in its Decision dated May 9, 2008 that since
petitioner’s appeal raised only issues purely of law, it should be dismissed outright. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the appeal brought before the Court of Appeals raised only issues purely
of law, thereby justifying its outright dismissal.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Court affirmed the CA’s decision to dismiss petitioner’s appeal, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates the dismissal of an
appeal that raises only questions of law. The appeal of petitioner, as correctly held by the
CA, essentially raised issues purely of law.
Time and again, the Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions of law
from those of pure questions of fact in the following manner:
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity
of alleged facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the
issue in that query is factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call
for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In
a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an
appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the
Page 556 of 1553

appellate court. All doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court
will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
In the instant case, petitioner appealed the Order of the trial court which dismissed
his complaint for improper venue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. Dismissals based
on these grounds do not involve a review of the facts of the case but merely the application
of the law, specifically in this case, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue
to be resolved is limited to whether or not said rule was properly applied, which will only
involve a review of the complaint, the motions to dismiss, and the trial court’s order of
dismissal, but not the probative value of the evidence submitted nor the truthfulness or
falsity of the facts. Considering, therefore, that the subject appeal raised only questions of
law, the CA committed no error in dismissing the same.
OLONGAPO CITY vs. SUBIC WATER AND SEWERAGE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 171626, August 6, 2014, J. Brion
Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The petition should have been brought
under Rule 45 in a petition for review on certiorari. Appeals from judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the CA should be made through a verified petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. In this case, Olongapo City questioned the July 6, 2005 decision and the January 3,
2006 resolution of the CA which declared as null and void the writ of execution issued by the
trial court. Since the CA’s pronouncement completely disposed of the case and the issues
raised by the parties, it was the proper subject of a Rule 45 petition. It was already a final
order that resolved the subject matter in its entirety, leaving nothing else to be done.
Facts:
The Olongapo City filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
Olongapo City Water District (OCWD) and alleged that OCWD failed to pay its electricity
bills to Olongapo City. In the interim, pursuant to a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), Subic
Water– a new corporate entity – was incorporated. Subic Water took over OCWD’s water
operations in Olongapo City. To finally settle their money claims against each other,
Olongapo City and OCWD entered into a compromise agreement.
The compromise agreement also contained a provision regarding the parties’

request that Subic Water, Philippines, which took over the operations of the defendant
Olongapo City Water District be made the co-maker for OCWD’s obligations. Mr. Noli
Aldip, then chairman of Subic Water, acted as its representative and signed the agreement
on behalf of Subic Water.
Page 557 of 1553

To enforce the compromise agreement, Olongapo City filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC. It granted the motion, but did not issue the
corresponding writ of execution. Almost four years later, the Olongapo City, prayed again
for the issuance of a writ of execution against OCWD. OCWD’s former counsel, filed a
manifestation alleging that OCWD had already been dissolved and that Subic Water is now
the former OCWD.
The RTC granted the motion for execution and directed its issuance against OCWD
and/or Subic Water. The CA granted Subic Water’s petition for certiorari and reversed the
trial court’s rulings. The Olongapo City then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Olongapo City is the proper remedy
Ruling:
No, the SC declared that the present petition, brought under Rule 65, merits
outright dismissal for having availed an improper remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for
a lost appeal.
The instant petition should have been brought under Rule 45 in a petition for review
on certiorari. Appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA should be
made through a verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In this case,
Olongapo City questioned the July 6, 2005 decision and the January 3, 2006 resolution of
the CA which declared as null and void the writ of execution issued by the trial court. Since
the CA’s pronouncement completely disposed of the case and the issues raised by the
parties, it was the proper subject of a Rule 45 petition. It was already a final order that
resolved the subject matter in its entirety, leaving nothing else to be done.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate only if there is no appeal, or

any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the
aggrieved party. The Olongapo City received the CA’s assailed resolution denying its
motion for reconsideration on January 9, 2006. Following Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, the Olongapo City had until January 24, 2006 to file its petition for review. It could
have even filed a motion for a 30-day extension of time, a motion that this Court grants for
justifiable reasons. But all of these, it failed to do. Thus, the assailed CA rulings became
final and executory and could no longer be the subject of an appeal.
Page 558 of 1553

Apparently, to revive its lost appeal, Olongapo City filed the present petition for
certiorari that – under Rule 65 – may be filed within sixty days from the promulgation of
the assailed CA resolution (on January 3, 2006). A Rule 65 petition for certiorari, however,
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. With the lapse of the prescribed period for appeal
without an action from the petitioner, the present petition for certiorari– a mere
replacement –must be dismissed.
But even without the procedural infirmity, the present recourse to us has no basis
on the merits and must be denied. Execution by motion is only available within the five-
year period from entry of judgment. Under Rule 39, Section 6, a judgment creditor has two
modes in enforcing the court’s judgment. Execution may be either through motion or an
independent action.
These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the
judgment creditor invoked its right to enforce the court’s judgment. Execution by motion
is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from
the date of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if
the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed.51 However,
for execution by independent action to prosper – the Rules impose another limitation – the
action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil
Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment.
On May 7, 1999, within the five-year period from the trial court’s judgment,
petitioner filed its motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. However, despite the
grant of the motion, the court did not issue an actual writ. It was only on May 30, 2003 that
Olongapo City filed a second motion to ask again for the writ’s issuance. By this time, the
allowed five-year period for execution by motion had already lapsed. Since the second
motion was filed beyond the five-year prescriptive period set by the Rules, then the writ of
execution issued by the trial court on July 31, 2003 was null and void for having been issued
by a court already ousted of its jurisdiction.
For execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the
accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive period. These are:
a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and
b) the court’s actual issuance of the writ.
In the instances when the Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse
of five years, the court only recognized one exception, i.e., when the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
Page 559 of 1553

advantage. However, Olongapo City failed to show or cite circumstances showing how
OCWD or Subic Water caused it to belatedly file its second motion for execution.
Strictly speaking, the issuance of the writ should have been a ministerial duty on the
part of the trial court after it gave its July 23, 1999 order, approving the first motion and
directing the issuance of such writ. The Olongapo City could have easily compelled the
court to actually issue the writ by filing a manifestation on the existence of the July 23, 1999
order. However, Olongapo City idly sat and waited for the five-year period to lapse before
it filed its second motion. Having slept on its rights, petitioner had no one to blame but
itself.
A writ of execution cannot affect a non- party to a case. Strangers to a case are not
bound by the judgment rendered in it. Thus, a writ of execution can only be issued against
a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Subic Water never
participated in the proceedings in the Civil Case, where OCWD and Olongapo City were
the contending parties. Subic Water only came into the picture when one Atty. Segundo
Mangohig, claiming to beOCWD’s former counsel, manifested before the trial court that
OCWD had already been judicially dissolved and thatSubic Water assumed OCWD’s
personality.
MEYR ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. ROLANDO CORDERO

The question of existence of bad faith is a factual issue, and the same may not be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, where only questions of law may be
entertained. Thus, a corporation who instituted a suit for damages which the trial court and
the CA dismissed cannot question such dismissal before the Supreme Court under Rule 45
when the factual findings of the lower courts point out that the suit had all the marks of
malicious prosecution.
Facts:
Petitioner Meyr Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint for damages and

attorney’s fees before the RTC against respondent Rolando Cordero. Meyr alleged that
Cordero constructed a dike in front of his land, which disrupted the flow of the waves of
the sea, causing damage to Meyr’s land.
Cordero averred that Meyr had no personality to sue as the area in controversy is
foreshore land and is thus owned by the State. In addition, Meyr was caught by the DENR
quarrying finger gravel. Thus, Cordero sought to restore Mother Nature without engaging
Page 560 of 1553

Meyr in court battle by constructing the dike/sea wall, which was authorized by the local
government. Cordero further asserted that Meyr filed the baseless suit against him because
Meyr wanted to acquire Cordero’s land.
The RTC dismissed the complaint based on Cordero’s affirmative defenses. The
dismissal became final and executory when Cordero’s counterclaims were heard. The RTC
ruled that Meyr had no basis in filing the complaint, and all of Meyr’s acts has all the
hallmarks of malicious prosecution, and was thus liable to pay Cordero moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Meyr filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court,
alleging that the CA and the RTC erred when they ruled that Meyr filed the complaint for
damages with the intent to vex, humiliate and annoy Cordero which amounted to malicious
prosecution.
Issue:
May Meyr raise the issue that it had the right to institute the case for damages
against Cordero as he was not guilty of malice and bad faith?
Ruling:
The resolution of the case hinges on the question of whether Meyr is guilty of malice
and bad faith in instituting Civil Case No. CEB-28040; if it is not so, then there is no ground
to hold it liable for malicious prosecution.
However, the existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary; it requires
that the reviewing court look into the evidence to find if indeed there is proof that is
substantial enough to show such bad faith. However, this Court is not a trier of facts; it is
not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by
the tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. This
being the case, the instant Petition must fail because a question of fact cannot properly be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. An appeal by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 shall raise only questions of law.
Indeed, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:
Page 561 of 1553

a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or

conjectures.
b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those [of] the trial court;
h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; [and]
k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion
However, these exceptions do not obtain in the instant case. On the contrary, both
the trial and appellate courts arrived at identical findings, and took a common and
undivided view of the case – that is, that Meyr is guilty of malicious prosecution. “In the
absence of compelling reasons, the Court will not disturb the rule that factual findings of
the lower tribunals are final and binding on this Court.
It will suffice for this Court to rely on the judgment of the trial and appellate courts;
prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. Their singular
judgment will not be disturbed. Thus, both tribunals unanimously held that in the first
instance, Meyr had no probable cause to complain, since it had no personality to sue, given
that the affected portion is foreshore or public land; that Meyr did not deny that it
conducted quarrying of sand and gravel which could have caused the erosion of its own
beach; that it offered to buy Cordero’s land; that Meyr cannot deny and in fact
constructively knew that Cordero was authorized by Resolution No. 38 to construct the
dike; that a previous case filed by Meyr against Cordero, based on the same facts, was
dismissed; and that as a whole, Meyr’s baseless accusations were particularly intended to
vex and humiliate the Cordero, who openly objected to Meyr’s quarrying of sand and gravel
precisely because it caused the erosion of his beach as well. Although it may have been a
bit extreme for the CA to declare that Meyr had an “axe to grind” against Cordero, this
characterization is merely semantic; there is no capriciousness or arbitrariness in the
description, because the circumstances leading to the conclusion that Meyr is guilty of
Page 562 of 1553

malicious prosecution are already present, as far as the tribunals below are concerned. This
conclusion can no longer be questioned, given the limitations Meyr is confronted with in a
recourse of this nature.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY

TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES
When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.
Facts:
On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation was filed before the charging siblings
Reynaldo Torres Jay Torres, Ronnie Torres and appellant Roberto Torres with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Jaime M. Espino.
According to the prosecution, at around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was
driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly
blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to
grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-
bag but the latter’s brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant Roberto, and an unidentified companion
suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his
brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified
companion held him by the neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they
took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelries and immediately fled.
Roberto denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00 p.m.
of September 21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario. They proceeded to the
house of their friend, Marilou Garcia, in Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila where they had a
drinking session, which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not leave their friend’s house
until the following morning when they went home. Thereupon, he was told that policemen
were looking for him because his brothers got involved in an altercation that resulted in
the death of someone. Merlita and Marilou corroborated appellant’s alibi in their respective
testimonies.
The RTC acquitted them of robbery but convicted them of murder, while the CA
modified the decision of the RTC and convicted the them of Robbery with homicide.
Page 563 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire
case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for murder.
Ruling:
No, it did not.
In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double jeopardy.

An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one
not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. In
other words, when Roberto appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he is
deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed
judgment. Thus, he could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified
the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the
Information instead of murder.
To reiterate, Roberto is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. It is clear that
the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Had they
primarily intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to death.
However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-
bag clearly shows that the central aim was to commit robbery against Espino.This intention
was confirmed by the accused’s taking of Espino’s belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and
jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The killing was therefore merely incidental,
resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR. vs. JOHN S. UMALE, IN SUBSTITUTION OF

HERNANDO F. BALMORES
G.R. No. 172843, September 24, 2014, J. Leonen
RODIVAL E. REYES, HANS M. PALMA AND DOROTEO M. PANGILINAN vs.
HERNANDO F. BALMORES
G.R. No. 172881, September 24, 2014, J. Leonen
[P]etitioners ask (1) whether Balmores’ failure to implead PPC in his action with the
[RTC] was fatal; (2) whether the [CA] correctly characterized respondent Balmores’ action as
Page 564 of 1553

a derivative suit; (3) whether the [CAs’] appointment of a management committee was
proper; and (4) whether the CA may exercise the power to appoint a management committee.
These are questions of law that may be determined without looking into the evidence
presented. The question of whether the conclusion drawn by the [CA] from a set of facts is
correct is a question of law, cognizable by this court. Petitioners, therefore, properly filed a
petition for review under Rule 45.
Facts:
Respondent Balmores is a stockholder and director of Pasig Printing Corporation

(PPC). In March 2004, PPC obtained an option to lease portions of a prime property in
Pasig owned by Mid-Pasig Development Corporation (MPDC). In November of the same
year, PPC's Board of Directors issued a resolution waiving all its rights, interests, and
participation in the option to lease contract in favor of the law firm of herein Petitioner
Villamor, Jr. PPC received no consideration for this waiver in favor of Villamor, Jr.
Consequently, PPC, represented by Villamor, entered into a MOA with MC Home

Depot whereby the latter shall continue to occupy the subject property as PPC's sublessee
for four (4) years, renewable for another four (4) years, at a monthly rental of PhP4.5 million
plus goodwill of PhP18 million. MC Home Depot issued 20 post-dated checks representing
the rental fees for one (1) year and the goodwill, which were given to Villmor, Jr. who did
not turn over the value of the checks to PPC.
Despite his notice and/or protest with the PPC Board of Directors, no action was
taken against Villamor, Jr. and which prompted him to file a case with the RTC for an intra-
corporate controversy and appointment of a receiver. Balmores anchored his case on Rule
1, Section 1(a)(1) of the Interim Rules for Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules)
against herein petitioners for their alleged devices or schemes amounting to fraud or
misrepresentation “detrimental to the interest of the corporation and its stockholders.”
In dismissing the complaint, the RTC ruled, among others, that the disputed
resolution of PPC Board of Directors stating the waiver in favor of Villamor, Jr. should be
accorded prima facie validity and that the failure to implead PPC itself in the suit was fatal.
On appeal, the CA resolved “that the case filed by respondent Balmores with the trial court
[was] a derivative suit because there were allegations of fraud or ultra vires acts . . . by [PPC’s
directors].” Further, the CA held that the assailed order of the RTC removed from the
stockholders their right to be allowed the remedy of appointment of a receiver during the
pendency of a derivative suit, leaving the corporation under the control of an outsider and
its assets prone to dissipation.
Page 565 of 1553

Petitioners filed separate petitions for review under Rule 45. In his comment,
Balmores asserts that the petitions raise questions of fact, which cannot be allowed in a
petition for review under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant petition involves questions of fact which may not be
enter-tained in a review under Rule 45.
Ruling:
NO, the petitions raise legal questions that may be squarely addressed in a review
under Rule 45.
There is a question of law “when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is
on a certain [set] of facts.” The test is “whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.”
Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there is “doubt . . . as to the truth or

falsehood of facts.” The question must involve the examination of probative value of the
evidence presented. In this case, petitioners raise issues on the correctness of the [CAs’]
conclusions.
Specifically, petitioners ask (1) whether Balmores’ failure to implead PPC in his
action with the [RTC] was fatal; (2) whether the [CA] correctly characterized respondent
Balmores’ action as a derivative suit; (3) whether the [CAs’] appointment of a management
committee was proper; and (4) whether the CA may exercise the power to appoint a
management committee.
These are questions of law that may be determined without looking into the
evidence presented. The question of whether the conclusion drawn by the [CA] from a set
of facts is correct is a question of law, cognizable by this court. Petitioners, therefore,
properly filed a petition for review under Rule 45.
EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR. (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIDOW,

CONCORDIA V. MORAN vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AS REPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ERMITA AND PGA CARS, INC.
G.R. No. 192957, September 29, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
Page 566 of 1553

In this case, a special law, R.A. No. 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate
judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the
“proper court.” Hence, PGA should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a
petition for certiorari.
In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA, raising the issue of the OP’s lack of
jurisdiction, Moran, Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy.
Facts:
In February 2004, Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a
verified complaint against Private Respondent PGA Cars, Inc. (PGA) pursuant to the
relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7394 or the Consumer Act of the Philippines. Moran, Jr.
alleged that PGA should be held liable for the imperfections of a BMW vehicle he bought
from it. CAO resolved this case in favor of Moran Jr. ordering PGA to refund the purchase
price of the subject vehicle.
Later, the DTI rejected the appeal of PGA while the Office of the President (OP)
reversed this ruling asserting, among others, that product defects were not alleged by
Moran, Jr. in his com-plaint and PGA cannot be faulted for this because it is merely a seller
of the BMW cars.
Before the CA, the petition for certiorari filed by Moran, Jr. was denied for the
reasons that he elected the wrong mode of appeal and there was failure to state material
dates relevant to the case. But in both the CA and now the Court, Moran Jr. contends that
the OP had no appel-late jurisdiction over controversies involving R.A. 7394 which provides
in Art. 166 thereof that ensuing petition for certiorari from the DTI decision should be
addressed by the proper court.
Issue:
Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that Moran,
Jr. resorted to a wrong mode of appeal?
Ruling:
NO, the CA erred in its appreciation of the pertinent law applicable in the instant
case.
Page 567 of 1553

Under [R.A. No. 7394], the DTI has the authority and the mandate to act upon
complaints filed by consumers pursuant to the State policy of protecting the consumer
against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales, acts or practices. [This] law provided
for an arbitration proce-dure whereby consumer complaints are heard and investigated by
[CAO] [the decisions of which] are appealable to the DTI Secretary. [The pertinent
provision provides:]
ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. – The Secretary shall decide the appeal within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof. The decision becomes final after fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof unless a petition for certiorari is filed with the proper court.
The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by A.O. No. 18, Series of 1987. Sec.
1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of

the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved
party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from…
In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation vs. The Board of Investments, [the

Court] interpreted the above provision and declared that “a decision or order issued by a
department or agency need not be appealed to the [OP] when there is a special law that
provides for a different mode of appeal.” xxx.
In the same case, the Court further held that:
“Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an

exception to the remedy of appeal to the [OP] from the decisions of executive
departments and agencies. Under Sec. 1 thereof, a decision or order issued by a
department or agency need not be appealed to the [OP] when there is a special law
that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law
of Respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief
from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioner’s application for an ITH.
E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18.”
In this case, a special law, R.A. No. 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate
judi-cial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the
“proper court.” Hence, [PGA] should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a
Page 568 of 1553

In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA[,] raising the issue of the OP’s lack of
jurisdiction, [Moran, Jr.] thus availed of the proper remedy.
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, represented by

Hon. Anselmo G. Adriano, Acting Regional Director, Revenue Region No. 8,
Makati City
G.R. No. 197228, October 8, 2014, CJ. SERENO
An appeal directly filed to the Supreme Court from the Court of Tax Appeals division
must be dismissed for failure to comply with the procedure on appeal. It must be emphasized
that an appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but is merely statutory. The
implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal must always
comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals; or else, the right of appeal may be
lost or squandered. Neither is the right to appeal a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of law.
Facts:
Duty Free Philippines (Duty Free) is a merchandising system established by the then
Ministry of Tourism (now Department of Tourism) through the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 46. Later on, Duty Free sought a
clarification of its exemption from the expanded withholding tax under Revenue
Regulation (R.R.) No. 6-94. It argued that as a tax-exempt establishment under E.O. No.
46, it should not be subjected to the 1.1/2% expanded withholding taxes on certain income
payments that were withheld by credit card companies in compliance with R.R. No. 6-94.
In relation thereto, Duty Free also inquired on the procedure for the refund of accumulated
taxes withheld by credit card companies amounting to P1.8 million as of 31 December 1994.
In response, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in Ruling No. 136-95 opined that E.O.
No. 93 dated 17 December 1986 withdrew all the tax and duty incentives granted to
government and public entities, including Duty Free. Hence, respondent denied the
request of petitioner for a refund of the withholding tax on certain payments made by credit
card companies and remitted to the BIR. On reconsideration, BIR denied the request of
Duty Free and ruled that as a division of PTA, was now subject to income tax. This ruling
prompted Duty Free to file an appeal with the Department of Finance (DOF). The DOF,
through then Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho, affirmed BIR Ruling No. 38-2002. Subsequent
requests for reconsideration were likewise denied by the DOF.
Page 569 of 1553

Meanwhile, several assessment notices were sent by BIR to Duty Free for deficiency
income tax and VAT covering taxable years 1999 to 2002. Duty Free filed its protest letters,
but the protest was eventually denied by BIR. Thus, a Petition for Review was filed with the
CTA questioning the aforesaid assessments. The DOT, represented by then Secretary
Joseph H. Durano, intervened and maintained that Duty Free was exempt from income tax
and VAT.
After trial, the CTA Special First Division ruled that the DOT itself had established
that petitioner was a separate and autonomous sector of the PTA. The CTA Division
likewise found that petitioner was not a tax-exempt entity in the absence of an express
grant of tax exemption. Even prior to E.O. No. 46, the franchise of petitioner under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1193 required payment of 7% of its annual sales in lieu of all
other taxes. The CTA Division held that P.D. Nos. 11777 and 1931 effectively withdrew PTA’s
exemptions under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1400. The Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB)
restored some tax incentives to petitioner, but limited these incentives only to "taxes and
duties arising out of merchandise imported/purchased by Duty Free Philippines and
subsequently sold by it through authorized tax and duty-free shops.” The tax court further
held that Duty Free is liable to pay the income tax and VAT deficiencies.
Duty Free directly appealed to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing the aforesaid Decision and Resolution of the CTA Division.
Issue:
Whether the mode of appeal by Duty Free, directly to the Supreme Court from CTA
Division, was proper.
Ruling:
The Petition is flawed with procedural infirmity.
This Court has had a long-standing rule that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute. In this regard, the
court finds that petitioner’s direct appeal to this Court is fatal to its claim.
The enactment of R.A. No. 9282, which took effect on 23 April 2004, elevated the
rank of the CTA to the level of a collegiate court, making it a co-equal body of the Court of
Appeals. The appeal of a CTA decision under Section 18 of R.A. No. 1125 was also amended
by R.A. No. 9282. Section 19 was added, and it reads as follows:
Page 570 of 1553

Section 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows:

SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No civil proceeding involving
matter arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs
Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except asherein provided,
until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for
reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc.
SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of

the CTA enbanc may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA reiterates the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA en banc relative to the review of the court
divisions’ decisions or resolutions on motion for reconsideration or new trial in cases
arising from administrative agencies such as the BIR.
Clearly, this Court is without jurisdiction to review decisions rendered by a division

of the CTA, exclusive appellate jurisdiction over which is vested in the CTA en banc.
In this case, petitioner filed with this Court the instant Petition from the denial of
its Motion for Reconsideration by the Special First Division of the CTA. At that time, R.A.
9282 was already in effect, and it evidently provides that the CTA en banc shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the decision of its divisions. A party adversely
affected by the resolution of the CTA division may, on motion for reconsideration, file a
petition for review with the CTA en banc. Thereafter, the decision or ruling of the CTA en
banc may be elevated to this Court. Simply stated, no decision of the CTA division may be
elevated to this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure without passing
through the CTA en banc.
In sum, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the Decision and Resolution
rendered by the Special First Division of the CTA. Thus, the instant Petition must fail.
It is worth emphasizing that an appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right,

but is merely statutory. The implication of its statutory character is that the party who
intends to appeal must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals; or
else, the right of appeal may be lost or squandered. Neither is the right to appeal a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.
Page 571 of 1553

GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ

vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 193650, October 8, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The service and filing of pleadings by courier service, as made by the respondent to the
petitioners, is a mode not provided in the Rules. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-
sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the
circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired. PDB’s Notice of Appeal,
which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only up to August 1, 2006 within
which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in denying PDB’s notice of
appeal.
Facts:
In a June 15, 2006, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City rendered, in an
action for specific performance/sum of money with damages entitled "George Philip P.
Palileo and Jose Dela Cruz, Plaintiffs, versus, Planters Development Bank, Engr. Edgardo
R. Torcende, Arturo R. delos Reyes, Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad and Emmanuel
Tesalonia, Defendants," against Planter’s Development Bank (PDB). PDB received a copy
of the RTC Decision on July 17, 2006.
On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service – specifically LBC – an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial. Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service
through LBC, but in their address of record – Tupi, South Cotabato – there was no LBC
service at the time. On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy
thereof was simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.
Meanwhile, petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal.
Subsequently, the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
New Trial, while it granted petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal, which it
treated as a motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment. PDB received a
copy of the above August 30, 2006 Order on September 14, 2006.
On August 31, 2006, a Writ of Execution was issued. PDB filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution, arguing that it was prematurely issued as the June 15, 2006
Decision was not yet final and executory; that its counsel has not received a copy of the
Page 572 of 1553

writ; and that no entry of judgment has been made with respect to the trial court’s Decision.
Later on, it filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, claiming that the writ
was addressed to its General Santos branch, which had no authority to accept the writ.
PDB filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied the motion to quash the writ of
execution and, subsequently, issued a second Writ of Execution. On appeal CA dismissed
PDB’s petition for lack of merit. However, on a motion for reconsideration, CA granted said
motion. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues:
Whether PDB’s Notice of Appeal was filed on time.
Ruling:
The Court grants the Petition.
Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot
be trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in
the Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address
or area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake,
PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode
of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.
PDB’s Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it
had only up to August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted
regularly in denying PDB’s notice of appeal.
Since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late
and the 15-day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite
notice of appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer
question the trial court’s Decision in any other manner. "Settled is the rule that a party is
barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him." The
"presumption that a party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication
made by the lower court" applies to it. There being no appeal taken by PDB from the
adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision has become final and can no longer be
reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. "Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact
upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is
conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter which the parties might
have litigated and have x x x decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject
Page 573 of 1553

matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the
original action both in respect to matters of claim and of defense." And "[i]n this
jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the
judgment;" "execution will issue as a matter of right x x x (a) when the judgment has
become final and executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his
right of appeal; [or] (c) when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having
been filed x x x."
Neither can the Court lend a helping hand to extricate PDB from the effects of its
mistake; indeed, PDB erred more than once during the course of the proceedings. For one,
it did not attempt to set right its failure to appear during pre-trial, which prompted the
court to allow petitioners to present evidence ex parte and obtain a favorable default
judgment. Second, assuming for the sake of argument that it timely filed its Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, it nonetheless violated the ten-day
requirement on the notice of hearing under Section 5 of Rule 15. Third, even before it could
be notified of the trial court’s resolution of its omnibus motion on September 14, 2006 –
assuming it was timely filed, it filed a notice of appeal on September 7, 2006 – which thus
implies that it abandoned its bid for reconsideration and new trial, and instead opted to
have the issues resolved by the CA through the remedy of appeal. If so, then there is no
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial that the trial court must rule upon;
its August 30, 2006 Order thus became moot and academic and irrelevant. "[W]here [an
action] or issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

vs. LEOVIGILDO DELOS REYES, JR.
Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the Office of the

Ombudsman should be taken to the CA by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Rule 43 which prescribes the manner of appeal from
quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Ombudsman, was formulated precisely to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, certiorari under Rule
65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Facts:
PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Delos Reyes
and Driz were criminally charged with malversation of public funds or property under
Page 574 of 1553

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and administratively charged with dishonesty and
gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)(1) and (3) of Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered the decision finding Delos Reyes and Driz
guilty of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty, and ordering their dismissal from
service. Delos Reyes’ partial motion for reconsideration was denied He then filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals granted the petition and reversed and set aside the Office of the Ombudsman’s
decision and resolution
The Office of the Ombudsman and PCSO filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. These were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argued that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
was the wrong remedy to assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision before the Court
of Appeals. The proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In any case, the petition was already filed out of time. A petition for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court despite availability of the remedy under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in

administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s
decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
involves a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction." It must be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its power "in
an arbitrary or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention."
The prevailing view is that the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman is available only in the following situations: a)
in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable where respondent is
Page 575 of 1553

exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month
salary; and b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of
probable cause during preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and is only granted

when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. . . ."
In Balbastro v. Junio, this court held that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Verily, a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was already
proscribed for being filed beyond the reglementary period, thus:
Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the Office of the

Ombudsman should be taken to the CA by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Rule 43 which prescribes the manner of appeal
from quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Ombudsman, was formulated precisely to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, certiorari under
Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
Petitioner failed to file an appeal with the CA within fifteen days from notice of the
assailed decision. As noted by the CA, she filed her petition for certiorari only after 52 days
from receiving the denial of her motion for reconsideration by the Ombudsman. Such
remedy cannot prosper as certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be resorted to as a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive.
In this case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was available
to respondent; however, he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in complete disregard
of the rules. The rules and jurisprudence necessitated the dismissal of the petition before
the Court of Appeals. In addition, the petition for certiorari was filed 60 days from the
receipt of the copy of the denial of respondent’s motion for reconsideration, which was
beyond the 15-day period to file an appeal provided in the rules. Liberal application of the
rules cannot be invoked to justify a flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure.
The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in granting respondent’s petition for certiorari.
Page 576 of 1553

DANILO ALMERO, TERESITA ALAGON, CELIA BULASO, LUDY RAMADA, REGINA

GEGREMOSA, ISIDRO LAZARTE, THELMA EMBARQUE, FELIPE LAZARTE,
GUILERMA LAZARTE, DULCESIMA BENIMELE vs. HEIRS OF MIGUEL
PACQUING, as represented by LINDA PACQUING FADRILAN
Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from the awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions, authorized by any quasi-judicial agency such as the Office of the
President, in the exercise of its quasi judicial functions shall be filed to the CA within a period
of fifteen (15) days from notice of, publication or denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The appeal may involve questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law. A direct resort to this Court, however, may be allowed in cases where only questions
of law are raised. In the present petition, the petitioners raised valid questions of law that
warranted the direct recourse to this Court.
Facts:
Miguel Pacquing acquired agricultural lands (23.6272 hectares) in Cuambogan,

Tagum City through Homestead Patent. These lands were registered on January 6, 1955
with the Register of Deeds.
On August 5, 1991, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent Miguel a
Notice of Coverage placing the Pacquing Estate under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Miguel failed to reply, instead he filed a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Miguel, however, died during the
pendency of the VOS proceedings. Miguel’s wife had died five years earlier.
In January 1992, respondent Linda Pacquing-Fadrilan, sole heir of the spouses

Pacquing, executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself ownership of the property. She filed
an application for retention with the DAR, who denied Linda’s application. The order
denying Linda’s application for retention later became final and executory.
On June 25, 1994, certain individuals, including the present petitioners who were
identified as farmer-beneficiaries of the land, were issued CLOAs over their respective
cultivated portions of the property.
Linda, through her attorney-in-fact, Samuel Osias, filed with the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator a petition to cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs. The Provincial
Adjudicator later dismissed the petition due to Linda’s failure to file her position paper. She
appealed the dismissal with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
Page 577 of 1553

(DARAB). It appears that, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) of the property were issued
to Napoleon Villa Sr., et al. who had been contracted by Linda, under an agricultural
leasehold agreement, to cultivate the lands.
The DARAB nullified the TCTs issued to Napoleon Villa Sr. et. al. and reinstated
Linda’s title. Also, the DARAB ordered the issuance of titles of the land to the petitioners.
Linda again sought to recall and cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs by filing a petition
with the DAR. Linda argued that the DARAB erred in distributing portions of the land to
the petitioners because the property was supposed to be exempt from CARP coverage. The
petitioners opposed Linda’s petition.
The DAR Regional Director ruled that the Pacquing Estate was subject to CARP and
that the CLOAs issued to the petitioners were valid. Linda filed an appeal to the DAR
Secretary, who also denied Linda’s appeal. Linda appealed the DAR Secretary’s order to the
Office of the President (OP).
The OP, through Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., reversed the DAR
Secretary’s Order and recalled and cancelled the petitioners’ CLOAs. The OP held that:
"xxx, the fact that respondent Linda, since the beginning, have always protested the
issuance of the CLOAs to the petitioners is a clear demonstration of their willingness to
continue with the cultivation of the subject landholdings, or to start anew with the
cultivation or even to direct the management of the farm.
Respondent Linda should be given the chance to exercise their rights as heirs of the
homestead grantee to continue to cultivate the homestead lots either personally or directly
managing the farm pursuant to the pronouncement in the Paris case. They still own the
original homestead issued to their predecessor-in-interest and have manifested their
intention to continue with the cultivation of the homestead lots."
With no appeal or petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals within the 15
day appeal period, the resolution of the OP became final and executory. The petitioners,
contest the finality of the OP’s decision, since the copy of the OP's resolution was received
late by their counsel denying their motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petitioners directly filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the subject OP’s decision and resolution.
Page 578 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can directly filed in the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the OP's decision.
Ruling:
We see MERIT in the present petition.
Linda counter-argues that the present petition should be denied outright for being
an improper mode of appeal: the appeal from the OP’s assailed decision and resolution
should have been filed with the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 and not directly
with this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from the awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency such as the Office of the
President, in the exercise of its quasi judicial functions shall be filed to the CA within a
period of fifteen (15) days from notice of, publication or denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The appeal may involve questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law.
A direct resort to this Court, however, may be allowed in cases where only questions
of law are raised. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted.
In the present petition, the petitioners raised valid questions of law that warranted
the direct recourse to this Court. They question the OP’s application of the law and
jurisprudence on the issue of whether the Pacquing Estate should be exempt from CARP
coverage. In this case, no examination of the truth or falsity of the facts is required. Our
review of the case is limited to the determination of whether the OP has correctly applied
the law and jurisprudence based on the facts on record.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANGEL LIWAGON AND FRANCESA DUMALAGAN, et al. vs.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES DEMETRIO LIWAGON AND REGINA LIWAGON
G.R. No. 193117, November 26, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
Parties cannot raise before the Supreme Court factual issues which they did not raise
before the trial court as it is the latter which has jurisdiction to hear evidence to support the
Page 579 of 1553

petitioners’ claim. Thus, if the validity of a notarized deed of sale was assailed by the heirs of
the seller on the ground that the seller’s signature was forged, they cannot allege before the
Supreme Court that that when Angel sold the subject land to Regina, he was not yet the owner
of the land and had no right to transfer or convey the property.
Facts:
Petitioners and respondents are all children and grandchildren of the late spouses
Angel and Francisca Liwagon. One of Angel’s sons named Demetrio, together with his wife
Regina, stayed with the former and administered the a portion of the Y. Furukawa
plantation that Angel bought from the plantation. The respondents – who are all
Demetrio’s children – helped with the cultivation and took care of the family’s copra-
making business.
Upon Angel’s demise, Demetrio’s siblings demanded the partition of the land, but
the same was delayed. When both Demetrio and Regina died, the siblings demanded the
partition anew from one of Demetrio’s sons named Rodrigo. Rodrigo ignored the demand,
contending that they now owned the property as inheritance from Demetrio and Regina,
who had earlier lawfully acquired the land by purchase from their grandfather, as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale which was executed before a notary public dated 24 July 1972. As heirs of
Angel and Francisca, the petitioners sought for annulment of the sale, partition, accounting
and damages against the defendants-heirs of Spouses Demetrio and Regina.
Petitioners presented the testimony of Josefina Liwagon-Escauso before the RTC,

who testified that she is the attorney-in-fact of petitioners and respondents are her
nephews from her brother Demetrio. She testified, among others, that the signature
appearing on the assailed Deed of Sale is not the signature of her father, and that his father’s
true signature is the one found on the Application for the sales patent.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of merit, finding that that
petitioners failed to disprove the genuineness of the signature of Angel in the purported
Deed of Sale which was duly executed before a notary public. Thus, the RTC held that the
authenticity of the document must be upheld under the doctrine of presumption of
regularity. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
May the petitioners argue before the Supreme Court that when Angel sold the
subject land to Regina, he was not yet the owner of the land and had no right to transfer or
convey the property, thus the conveyance was invalid?
Page 580 of 1553

Ruling:
All the more, the Court cannot be called on to decide on an issue of fact which was
never raised in the Amended Complaint before the RTC which could have had the
opportunity to hear and to rule on the evidence presented to support petitioners’ claim. It
is one of the instant arguments of petitioners that the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
subject property was issued in the name of Angel only in 1974. Hence, when Angel sold the
subject land to Regina in 1972, he was not yet the owner of the land – making the
conveyance devoid of any force and effect under the law.
To be sure, the stated cause of action of petitioners for the annulment of the subject
Deed of Sale in their Amended Complaint was anchored on forgery. Hence, testimonial and
documentary evidence were presented and offered to the trial court to prove the existence
of such forgery. Petitioners cannot now allege a new cause of action - in this petition for
review – for invalidating the subject Deed of Sale by arguing that when Angel sold the
subject land to Regina, he was not yet the owner of the land and had no right to transfer or
convey the property. Consequently, the conveyance had no force and effect. It is the trial
court which has the jurisdiction to hear and to try evidence that should have been adduced
by the parties as to whether Angel neither had ownership nor authority to convey the
subject property to Regina. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing
court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic consideration of due
process impels this rule.`
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)

PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP
LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015, J. Bersamin
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari under Rule
64 of the Rules of Court. The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different.
In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt
of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. Fortune filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of
the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from
receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it
Page 581 of 1553

received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the
petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
Facts:
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and FORTUNE LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (Fortune) executed a memorandum of agreement
concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and
tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently
submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit.4 The
latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, Fortune filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November
15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition, holding that under Section 447
and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are
expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers;
and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).
Fortune received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its
motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the
denial being received by Fortune on July 14, 2014.
Hence, Fortune filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals is
applicable under Rule 64.
2. Whether or not the affidavit of service in the petition for certiorari is sufficient
compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
1. No. Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Page 582 of 1553

Fortune posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin
to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably
with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from
the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.
Fortune’s position cannot be sustained.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or
final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is
given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed
an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment
or final order. In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed
to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Questions of fact cannot be
raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former,
the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in
any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
Fortune filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days
after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section
3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration
to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it
had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13,
2014, which was 25 days too late.
Page 583 of 1553

2. No. Affidavit of service is not sufficient compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court.
Fortune claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari
complied with the requirement on proof of service. The claim is unwarranted. Fortune
obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof
of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt.
Section 13 requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall
consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of
which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is
mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one
Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by
registered mail The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be
the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves.
The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the
cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court
held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that Fortune did not comply with the requirement
of proof of service.
NARCISO ZAPANTA, EDILBERTO CAPULONG AND CLARITA CAPULONG, vs. CO

KING KI AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT WILLIAM CO
G.R. No. 191694, December 03, 2014, J. Villarama Jr.
The main issue in this case is whether or not CA committed a serious reversible error
in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the basis of a strict application of Section 3, Rule
46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the attachment of clearly legible
duplicate original/certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject
thereof. The court ruled that While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a
notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of the court or tribunal which rendered the decision, it
is required, however, that said appeal must have been filed on time. It bears reiterating that
appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to
avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it
Facts:
On September 7, 2000, Co King Ki (respondent), through his Attorney-in-Fact

William Co, filed a Complaint for Ejectment against petitioners, before the Provincial
Page 584 of 1553

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent alleged

that he is the owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-501
(90470)6 and located at Barangay San Francisco, Lubao, Pampanga, with an area of 68,483
square meters more or less (subject property). The defendants filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, averring, among others, that they are qualified farmer
beneficiaries of the subject property and that respondent was no longer the owner thereof
as early as August 15, 1983 as the same was already foreclosed by the Philippine Veterans
Bank. On December 27, 2007, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD)
rendered a Decision8 in favor of respondent, declaring defendants as illegal occupants and
not tenants of the subject property, and directing them to vacate the same. The said
decision was received by the defendants’ former counsel, Atty. Rolando Miranda (Atty.
Miranda) on February 15, 2008.
Petitioners together with Ernesto and Marciano, filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA on January 9, 2009. On November 20, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution, dismissing
the petition for certiorari because petitioners failed to append a clearly legible duplicate
original/certified true copy of the assailed PARAD Order dated September 18, 2008 and
PARAD Joint Order dated November 17, 2008 in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Likewise, the CA held that petitioners should have
elevated their case before the DARAB on appeal as provided by Section 1, Rule XIV of
the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Issue:
Whether the CA committed a serious reversible error in dismissing the petition

for certiorari on the basis of a strict application of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, on the attachment of clearly legible duplicate
original/certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject thereof
Ruling:
No. CA did not commit serious irreversible error.
The complaint in this case was filed on September 7, 2000, during the effectivity of
the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure which is applicable in this case. It bears noting
that the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was effective at the time when petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal, expressly provides in Section 1,
Rule XXIV (Miscellaneous Provisions) thereof that “[a]ll cases pending with the Board and
the Adjudicators, prior to the date of effectivity of these Rules, shall be governed by the
DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing.”
Page 585 of 1553

In this case, petitioners received a copy of the December 27, 2007 Decision on
February 15, 2008. They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on February 29, 2008
or 14 days from their receipt of a copy of the Decision. On June 18, 2008, they received the
Order/Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners only had
one more day or until June 19, 2008 within which to file their Notice of Appeal before the
PARAD. However, it is evident that their new counsel Atty. Perez belatedly filed said Notice
of Appeal on June 30, 2008. Clearly, petitioners’ Notice of Appeal in this case was filed out
of time.
While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a notice of appeal is a
ministerial duty of the court or tribunal which rendered the decision, it is required,
however, that said appeal must have been filed on time. It bears reiterating that appeal is
not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail
themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such
requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are
necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege
to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the decision.
NEIL B. AGUILAR AND RUBEN CALIMBAS vs. LIGHTBRINGERS CREDIT

COOPERATIVE
G.R. No. 209605, January 12, 2015, J. Mendoza
Thus, the question in the case at bench is whether or not the petitioners attached the
sufficient pleadings and material portions of the records in their petition for review. The Court
rules that the petition was in substantial compliance with the requirements.
The assignment of error in the petition for review clearly raises questions of fact as the
petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the MCTC and the RTC. Thus, aside from
the decisions and orders of the [courts a quo], the petitioners should attach pertinent portions
of the records such as the testimony of the sole witness of [Lightbringers], the copies of the
cash disbursement vouchers and the PNB checks presented by [Lightbringers] in the [trial
court]. In the petition for review, the petitioners attached [Lightbringers’] complaints before
the [trial court] which contained the photocopies of the cash disbursement vouchers and PNB
checks. These should be considered as ample compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.
Page 586 of 1553

Facts:
The present case stemmed from the three (3) complaints for sum of money
separately filed by Respondent Lightbringers against Petitioners Aguilar and Calimbas, and
a certain Tantiangco which were consolidated before the trial court. The complaints alleged
that the petitioners were members of the cooperative, who separately borrowed money.
The petitioners were able to file their respective answers, contesting the sums of money
being collected by Lightbringers, however, on the scheduled pre-trial conference, they were
not represented and so the trial court allowed Lightbringers to present its evidence ex-
parte.
The trial court resolved the consolidated cases in three separate decisions. It
dismissed the complaint against Tantiangco while those involving the petitioenrs were
upheld as Light-bringers was able to sufficiently proved that the loan transactions were
indeed incurred by the petitioners. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decisions rendered by
the trial court and likewise the CA found no merit on the petition instituted due to its being
formally defective, with respect to the verification, certification of non-forum shopping,
and the notarial seal, and for failing to attach the pertinent oral and documentary evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition is formally defective for failing to attach the entire
records of the case.
Ruling:
NO, based on the attachments of the petition, there was ample compliance with Sec.
2, Rule 42.
[T]he Court agrees with the petitioners that Sec. 2, Rule 42 does not require that the
entire records of the case be attached to the petition for review. The provision states:
“Sec. 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be xxxx accompanied by clearly
legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both
lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the
requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.”
The above-quoted provision enumerates the required documents that must be

attached to a petition for review, to wit: (1) clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies
Page 587 of 1553

of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court
of the Regional Trial Court; (2) the requisite number of plain copies thereof; and (3) of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition. Clearly, the Rules do not require that the entire records of the case be attached to
the petition for review. Only when these specified documents are not attached in the
petition will it suffer infirmities under Sec. 3, Rule 42, which states that “… failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding… the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.”
In Canton vs. City of Cebu, the Court discussed the importance of attaching the
pleadings or material portions of the records to the petition for review. “[P]etitioner’s
discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not unbridled.
The CA has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the submission
of supporting docu-ments is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to
enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in
the petition.” In that case, the petition was denied because the petitioner failed to attach
the complaint, answer and appeal memorandum to support their allegation.
In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz, a case where the petitioner did not attach to her petition
for review a copy of the contract to sell that was at the center of controversy, the Court
nonetheless found that there was a substantial compliance with the rule, considering that
the petitioner had appended to the petition for review a certified copy of the decision of
the MTC that contained a verbatim reproduction of the omitted contract.
Recently, in Galvez, vs. CA, it was held that attaching the other records of the MTC
and the RTC were not necessary based on the circumstances of the case. The petitioner
therein was not assailing the propriety of the findings of fact by the MTC and the RTC, but
only the conclu-sions reached by the said lower courts after their appreciation of the facts.
In dealing with the questions of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of
the MTC and the RTC.
Thus, the question in the case at bench is whether or not the petitioners attached
the sufficient pleadings and material portions of the records in their petition for review.
The Court rules that the petition was in substantial compliance with the requirements.
The assignment of error in the petition for review clearly raises questions of fact as
the petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the MCTC and the RTC. Thus, aside
from the decisions and orders of the [courts a quo], the petitioners should attach pertinent
portions of the records such as the testimony of the sole witness of [Lightbringers], the
Page 588 of 1553

copies of the cash disbursement vouchers and the PNB checks presented by [Lightbringers]
in the [trial court]. In the petition for review, the petitioners attached [Lightbringers’]
complaints before the [trial court] which contained the photocopies of the cash
disbursement vouchers and PNB checks. These should be considered as ample compliance
with Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO vs. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND/OR REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND JUANITO G.
ESPINO, JR. IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONER,
RESPECTIVELY
In this case, Laguesma received the decision of the COA on October 16, 2007. It filed a
motion for reconsideration on November 6, 2007, or after 21 days. It received notice of the
denial of its motion on November 20, 2008. The receipt of this notice gave Laguesma nine (9)
days, or until November 29, 2008, to file a petition for certiorari. Since November 29, 2008 fell
on a Saturday, Laguesma could still have filed on the next working day, or on December 1,
2008. It, however, filed the petition on December 19, 2008, which was well beyond the
This petition could have been dismissed outright for being filed out of time. This court,
however, recognizes that there are certain exceptions that allow a relaxation of the
procedural rules. xxx.
Considering that the issues in this case involve the right of Laguesma to receive due
compensation on the one hand and respondents’ duty to prevent the unauthorized
disbursement of public funds on the other, a relaxation of the technical rules is in order.
Facts:
In 2001, officers of Clark Development Corporation (CDC), a GOCC, approached the

law firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo for its possible assistance in
handling of CDC’s labor cases. CDC sought from the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) its approval for the engagement of the Laguesma Firm as external counsel.
Initially, the OGCC denied this request but later on it approved the same. In the meantime,
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo commenced rendering legal services to CDC.
CDC assured Laguesma that it was undertaking the authorization and clearance from the
OGCC or the concurrence of the COA of the retainership contract.
Page 589 of 1553

In July 2005, CDC requested COA for concurrence of the retainership contract it
exe-cuted with Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. State Auditor IV Punzalan
informed CDC that its request for clearance could not be acted upon until the OGCC
approves the retainership contract with finality. In December 2006, OGCC sent an
indorsement categorically denying the retention of Laguesma as external counsel of CDC.
For its part, COA issued the assailed decision that states that CDC Audit Circular No. 98-
002 and OP Memorandum Circular No. 9 when it engaged the legal services of Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo without the final appro-val and written concurrence of
the COA.
After the filing of motions for reconsideration, Laguesma raised the foregoing
matter thru this instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari against COA was filed on time.
Ruling:
NO, there are valid reasons availing in this case to allow the relaxation of the rules.
Petitioner Laguesma states that it filed this petition under Rule XI, Section 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA. xxx.
Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a
reglementary period of 60 days from receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The Constitution, however, specifies that the reglementary period for assailing the
decisions, orders, or rulings of the constitutional commissions is thirty (30) days from
receipt of the decision, order, or ruling. For this reason, a separate rule was enacted in the
Rules of Court.
Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the guidelines for filing a petition
for certiorari under this rule. Sec. 2 of the rule specifies that “a judgment or final order or
resolution of the COMELEC and the COA may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.”
The phrase, “except as hereinafter provided,” specifies that any petition for certiorari
filed under this rule follows the same requisites as those of Rule 65 except for certain
provisions found only in Rule 64. One of these provisions concerns the time given to file
the petition.
Page 590 of 1553

The difference between Rule 64 and Rule 65 has already been exhaustively discussed
by this court in Pates vs. COMELEC:
“Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers
to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed
below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the
exception that Sec. 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Sec. 3 which provides for a special period
for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC
en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the
60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of
any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days
(instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
In this case, Laguesma received the decision of the [COA] on October 16, 2007. It
filed a motion for reconsideration on November 6, 2007, or after 21 days. It received notice
of the denial of its motion on November 20, 2008. The receipt of this notice gave Laguesma
nine (9) days, or until November 29, 2008, to file a petition for certiorari. Since November
29, 2008 fell on a Saturday, Laguesma could still have filed on the next working day, or on
December 1, 2008. It, however, filed the petition on December 19, 2008, which was well
beyond the reglementary period.
This petition could have been dismissed outright for being filed out of time. This
court, however, recognizes that there are certain exceptions that allow a relaxation of the
procedural rules. In Barranco vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems:
“The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply
disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy adminis-
tration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game
of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful
of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the
parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.
“In Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons which may
provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules,
such as:
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,

(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case,
Page 591 of 1553

(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules,
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Considering that the issues in this case involve the right of Laguesma to receive due
compensation on the one hand and respondents’ duty to prevent the unauthorized
disburse-ment of public funds on the other, a relaxation of the technical rules is in order.
SWIRE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. JAYNE YU

G.R. No. 207133, March 09, 2015, J. PERALTA
The period to appeal decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners is fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof pursuant to Section 15 of PD No. 957 and Section 2 of PD No. 1344
which are special laws that provide an exception to Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18.
Concomitantly, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18 provides that the time during which
a motion for reconsideration has been pending with the ministry or agency concerned shall
be deducted from the period for appeal. Swire received the HLURB Board Resolution denying
its Motion for Reconsideration on July 23, 2007 and filed its appeal only on August 7, 2007.
Consequently therefore, Swire had only four days from July 23, 2007, or until July 27, 2007,
within which to file its appeal to the OP as the filing of the motion for reconsideration merely
suspended the running of the 15-day period. Thus, while there may be exceptions for the
relaxation of technical rules principally geared to attain the ends of justice, Swire’s fatuous
belief that it had a fresh 15-day period to elevate an appeal with the OP is not the kind of
exceptional circumstance that merits relaxation.
Facts:
On September 24, 1997, respondent Jane Yu (Yu) paid the full purchase price of
P7,519,371.80 for the unit while making a down payment of P20,000.00 for the parking lot.
However, notwithstanding full payment of the contract price, Petitioner Swire Realty
Development Corporation (Swire) failed to complete and deliver the subject unit on time.
This prompted Yu to file a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Expanded National Capital Region Field
Office (ENCRFO).
On October 19, 2004, the HLURB ENCRFO rendered a Decision dismissing Yu’s
complaint. All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Yu
then elevated the matter to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The HLURB Board of
Commissioners reversed and set aside the ruling of the HLURB ENCRFO and ordered the
Page 592 of 1553

rescission of the Contract to Sell. Swire moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied
by the HLURB Board of Commissioners in a Resolution dated June 14, 2007. Unfazed, Swire
appealed to the Office of the President (OP) on August 7, 2007.
The OP, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite, dismissed Swire’s
appeal on the ground that it failed to promptly file its appeal before the OP.
Records show that Swire received its copy of the 30 March 2006 HLURB Decision
on 17 April 2006 and instead of filing an appeal, it opted first to file a Motion for
Reconsideration on 28 April 2006 or eleven (11) days thereafter. The said motion
interrupted the 15-day period to appeal. On 23 July 2007, Swire received the HLURB
Resolution dated 14 June 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The OP, granted Swire’s motion and set aside Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s
decision. It held that after a careful and thorough evaluation and study of the records of
the case, the OP was more inclined to agree with the earlier decision of the HLURB
ENCRFO as it was more in accord with facts, law and jurisprudence relevant to the case.
Yu sought reconsideration of said resolution, however, the same was denied by the
OP in a Resolution dated August 18, 2011. Consequently, Yu filed an appeal to the CA. The
CA granted Yu’s appeal and reversed and set aside the Order of the OP. Swire moved for
reconsideration, however, the CA denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Swire’s appeal was timely filed before the OP.
Ruling:
The period to appeal decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners is fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof pursuant to Section 15 of PD No. 957 and Section 2 of PD No. 1344
which are special laws that provide an exception to Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
18.
The court notes that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of
fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the National Housing Authority
(NHA) shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that
decisions of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the
Page 593 of 1553

lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that the
decisions of the NHA is appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, the court
notes that the regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and land development has
been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB.
Records show that Swire received a copy of the HLURB Board of Commissioners’
decision on April 17, 2006. Correspondingly, it had fifteen days from April 17, 2006 within
which to file its appeal or until May 2, 2006. However, on April 28, 2006, or eleven days
after receipt of the HLURB Board of Commissioner’s decision, it filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, instead of an appeal.
Concomitantly, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18 provides that the time

during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending with the ministry or agency
concerned shall be deducted from the period for appeal. Swire received the HLURB Board
Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration on July 23, 2007 and filed its appeal only
on August 7, 2007. Consequently therefore, Swire had only four days from July 23, 2007, or
until July 27, 2007, within which to file its appeal to the OP as the filing of the motion for
reconsideration merely suspended the running of the 15-day period. However, records
reveal that Swire only appealed to the OP on August 7, 2007, or eleven days late. Ergo, the
HLURB Board of Commissioners’ decision had become final and executory on account of
the fact that Swire did not promptly appeal with the OP. In like manner, the court finds no
cogent reason to exempt Swire from the effects of its failure to comply with the rules.
Thus, while there may be exceptions for the relaxation of technical rules principally
geared to attain the ends of justice, Swire’s fatuous belief that it had a fresh 15-day period
to elevate an appeal with the OP is not the kind of exceptional circumstance that merits
relaxation.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,

AND VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO vs. ALFREDO S. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA; JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M.
ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M. ISIP-GARCIA, RAFAEL P. BORROMEO JOCELYN
DAWIS-ASUNCION, MINORS MARIAN REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B.
TARAN, RICHARD KENNETH B. TARAN, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR
PARENTS RICHARD AND MARITES TARAN, MINORS CZARINA ALYSANDRA C.
RAMOS, CEZARAH ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, AND CRISTEN AIDAN C. RAMOS
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER DONNA C. RAMOS, MINORS
JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA AND ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV, REPRESENTED AND JOINED
BY THEIR MOTHER MAUREEN C. TOLENTINO vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE
MAYOR FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES T.
Page 594 of 1553

LIM, JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA, VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN

MARVIN C. NIETO, ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO,
EDWARD VP MACEDA, RODERICK D. VALBUENA, JOSEFINA M. SISCAR,
SALVADOR PHILLIP H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M. VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ,
ERNESTO F. RIVERA, DANILO VICTOR H. LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY
H. LACUNA-PANGAN, ERNESTO M. DIONISO, JR. AND ERICK IAN O. NIEVA
G.R. No. 187836, March 10, 2015, G.R. No. 187916
The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon have
been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to
warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It means not only that the grounds
relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is deemed waived and
may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion or application to overturn the judgment; and
this is true, whatever may be the title given to such motion or application, whether it
be “second motion for reconsideration” or “motion for clarification” or “plea for due process”
or “prayer for a second look,” or “motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgment,”
Facts:
In the Decision promulgated on 25 November 2014, this Court declared Ordinance

No. 8187 unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan
Oil Terminals. The following timelines were set for the relocation and transfer of the
terminals.
Now before us are the following submissions of the intervenor oil companies, to wit:
(1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 November 2014 filed by intervenor
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell); (2) Motion for Clarification filed by
intervenor Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron); and (3) Manifestation of Understanding of
the Dispositive Portion of the Decision of 15 December 2014 (the correct date of
promulgation is 25 November 2014) filed by intervenor Petron Corporation (Petron).
Issue:
Whether or not the submissions made by the intervenor oil companies should be
granted.
Ruling:
The Court hereby resolves to:
Page 595 of 1553

1. DENY Shell’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 November 2014.
It bears stressing that these cases were called in session several times to give the
members of the Court time to study and present their respective positions. Before the
Decision was finally promulgated, the Court had thoroughly deliberated on the arguments
of the parties, including the basic issues herein raised – the rationale for upholding the
position of the Court in G.R. No. 156052, on one hand, and the safety measures adopted by
the intervenors, including the alleged “imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures
interposed by the petitioners,” on the other; the argument of whether or not the petition
should have been filed with the trial court or at least referred to the Court of Appeals to
receive evidence; and the issue on whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 8283
has rendered the instant petitions moot and academic.
2. DENY the prayers in the Motion for Clarification of Chevron that: a) the wordings
“the very nature of the depots where millions of liter[s] of highly flammable and highly
volatile products x x x [have] no place in a densely populated area” be removed from the
Decision dated 25 November 2014; and b) the submission of an updated comprehensive
plan and relocation schedule, including the period for relocation, be deferred until after
the Motion is resolved with finality.
There are overwhelming reasons stated in the Decision to support the Court’s
pronouncement that the very nature of depots has no place in a densely populated area,
among others, the very history of the Pandacan terminals where flames spread over the
entire City of Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in December 1941 and the
other incident of explosion, which were both considered in G.R. No. 156052.
Indeed, the bases of the assailed paragraph were confined to the lis mota of these
cases, and no other depots were considered. But would the situation be different if, given
the same composition of flammable and volatile products, the depots are placed in another
densely populated area? The answer was well explained in the Decision. Thus:
Given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no
matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the court cannot allow the right to
life to be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability
have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of residents of
big neighborhoods is at stake.
Moreover, the Decision should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety.
The Decision is clear – it is the City’s Ordinance No. 8187 that has been declared
Page 596 of 1553

unconstitutional and invalid insofar as the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals
is concerned.
3. CLARIFY that the relocation and transfer necessarily include the complete
removal of the facilities from the Pandacan terminals and should be made part of the
required comprehensive plan and relocation schedule.
To recall, the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not
impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119. It explained:
The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the
legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including
Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record
of the discussions in the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the
provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.
To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent than real.
The two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area
particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No. 8119 is applicable to the entire City
of Manila.
At first blush, the clause “cease and desist” appears to specifically refer only to the
operations, considering that Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 8027 provides for a period of six (6)
months from the date of its effectivity “within which to cease and desist from the operations
of businesses.”
These cases being a mere sequel to the earlier petition, the court so holds that the
relocation and transfer contemplated therein include the removal of the facilities,
especially so when the city plans on building commercial establishments to replace the
Pandacan terminals and provide a source of employment for displaced employees.
Accordingly, the comprehensive plan to be submitted within forty-five (45) days from
receipt of the Decision shall also include the removal of the facilities.
4. REMIND Petron that the Court did not, by noting its “Manifestation” dated 30
November 2010, consent to consider January 2016 as a separate deadline for compliance
with our Decision, which, to repeat, includes the removal of facilities after cessation of
operations. The timelines prescribed in the assailed Decision shall be observed to the letter.
In anticipation of further attempts to delay the enforcement of this Court’s Decision

dated 25 November 2014, the parties to these cases are hereby reminded of the
Page 597 of 1553

pronouncements in Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco on the import of the
denial of a motion for reconsideration. Thus:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon
have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient
weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It means not only that the
grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is deemed
waived and may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion or application to overturn the
judgment; and this is true, whatever may be the title given to such motion or application,
whether it be “second motion for reconsideration” or “motion for clarification” or “plea for
due process” or “prayer for a second look,” or “motion to defer, or set aside, entry of
judgment,”
WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL, INC. and MARCO PROTACIO

vs. ILDEBRANDO LEDESMA
G.R. No. 197556, March 25, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
Ledesma filed an amended petition and contended that his receipt on March 24,
2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010 by Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of the
60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition. When a party to a suit appears
by counsel, service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel.
This is so because notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client, while notice to the
client and not his counsel is not notice in law. Receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the
reckoning point of the reglementary period.
Facts:
Ledesma was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront located at Salinas Drive,
Cebu City. A certain Christe and Rosanna filed a complaint before Waterfromt stating
that Ledesma kissed and mashed the breasts of Christe Mandal inside the hotel’s elevator,
and exhibited his penis and asked Rosanna Lofranco to masturbate him at the conference
room of the hotel. On the basis of their affidavits, Waterfront dismissed Ledesma from
employment.
Ledesma filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that the
allegations leveled against Ledesma are mere concoctions, and concluded that Ledesma
was illegally dismissed. On appeal to the NLRC, the latter reversed the ruling of the LA. The
NLRC denied Ledesma’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated February 22,
2010. A copy of the said Resolution was received by Atty. Gines Abellana (Atty. Abellana),
Ledesma’s counsel of record, on March 15, 2010.
Page 598 of 1553

On May 17, 2010, or sixty-three (63) days after Atty. Abellana received a copy of the
NLRC’s Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, said counsel filed before the
CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In its Comment, Waterfront
prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that it was belatedly filed.
Ledesma filed an amended petition and contended that his receipt on March 24,
2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010 by Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of the
60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA.
Ruling:
No. The unjustified failure of Ledesma to file his petition for certiorari before the
CA within the 60-day period is a ground for the outright dismissal of said petition.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07- 7-12-SC, reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from
the notice of the denial of the motion.
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically ruled that
the present rule now mandatorily requires compliance with the reglementary period. The
period can no longer be extended as previously allowed before the amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions
under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been
preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-
day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to
prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even
defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on
compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands,
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Abellana, Ledesma’s counsel, admittedly received a copy of the NLRC
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration on March 15, 2010 while Ledesma
Page 599 of 1553

received his copy on March 24, 2010. Ledesma erroneously asserted in his petition for
certiorari filed before the CA, that the 60th day is May 15, 2010, counted from March 15,
2010. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included; hence,
the last day to file his petition for certiorari is on May 14, 2010, a Friday. Ledesma therefore
belatedly filed his petition on May 17, 2010.
Realizing his procedural faux pas, Ledesma filed an amended petition where he
contended that he timely filed his petition for certiorari on May 17, 2010 counted from his
receipt of the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on March 24,
2010. This stance is bereft of any legal basis. When a party to a suit appears by counsel,
service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. This is so
because notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and
not his counsel is not notice in law. Receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the
reckoning point of the reglementary period. With the expiration of the 60-day period to
file a petition for certiorari, a review of the Resolution of the NLRC will be beyond the
jurisdiction of any court. No longer assailable, the NLRC Resolution could not be altered
or modified.
The relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional
circumstances to justify the same. There should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules. Moreover, those who seek exemption from the application of a
procedural rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious
reason warranting such departure.
Both in his petition and amended petition, Ledesma never invoked the liberality of
the CA nor endeavored to justify the belated filing of his petition. On the contrary, Ledesma
remained firm that his petition was filed with the CA within the reglementary
period. Absent valid and compelling reasons for the procedural lapse, the desired leniency
cannot be accorded to Ledesma.
PERIOD TO APPEAL
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF TEODULO EBESA

G.R. No. 186102, February 24, 2016 [Reyes, J.]
There are three requirements in order to perfect an appeal: (1) the filing of a notice of
appeal; (2) the payment of docket and other legal fees; and (3) in some cases, the filing of a
record on appeal, all of which must be done within the period allowed for filing an appeal.
Failure to observe any of these requirements is fatal to one's appeal.
Page 600 of 1553

FACTS:
NTC filed An expropriation case against respondents. RTC issued an order of expropriation,
declaring that the NTC has a lawful right to take the subject property. Subsequently, the
RTC rendered a Decision, fixing the just compensation which the NTC must pay for the
land in the amount of P35,179,984.88.
The NTC appealed with the CA. The CA directed the NTC to submit official receipt or proof
of payment of the appeal fees within 10 days from notice. The NTC filed a Manifestation,
alleging that it cannot comply with the order of the CA as it did not pay appeal docket fees.
It asseverated that the receiving clerk of the RTC did not accept its payment for the appeal
fees on the ground that it is exempted from doing so, being a GOCC.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the RTC's Decision has become final
and executory since the payment of docket fees is mandatory and jurisdictional and non-
payment thereof will not toll the running of the appeal period. The respondents further
pointed out the NTC's failure to file the record on appeal which is required under Section
2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The granted the Motion and dismissed NTC’s
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing NTC’s appeal.
RULING:
NO.
There are three requirements in order to perfect an appeal: (1) the filing of a notice of
appeal; (2) the payment of docket and other legal fees; and (3) in some cases, the filing of a
record on appeal, all of which must be done within the period allowed for filing an appeal.
Failure to observe any of these requirements is fatal to one's appeal.
Verily, the payment of appeal docket fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is
mandatory as it is required in all appealed cases, otherwise, the Court does not acquire the
authority to hear and decide the appeal. The failure to pay or even the partial payment of
the appeal fees does not toll the running of the prescriptive period, hence, will not prevent
the judgment from becoming final and executory. Such was the circumstance in the instant
appeal. The NTC failed to pay the appeal fees without justifiable excuse. That its counsel or
his representative was misled by the advice of the receiving clerk of the RTC is unacceptable
as the exercise of ordinary diligence could have avoided such a blunder. It is apparent from
the records that the NTC had ample time to rectify the error or clarify its reservation
regarding the propriety of its supposed exemption from the appeal fees.
Page 601 of 1553

Indeed, there are instances when the Court relaxed the rule and allowed the appeal to run
its full course. In this case, however, NTC failed to present any justifiable excuse for its
failure to pay the docket fees. NTC did not pay at all and solely attributed the blame on the
supposed advice of the receiving clerk of the RTC about its exemption from the payment
of docket fees notwithstanding circumstances that would have expectedly stirred second
thoughts. Its unthinking reliance on the alleged advice of the receiving clerk is utterly
irresponsible and inexcusable.
Apart from failure to pay the docket fees, the NTC likewise failed to file a record on appeal.
Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NTC should
have filed a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the trial court's decision. ThE
CA's dismissal of its appeal was thus in order.
SPOUSES EDMOND LEE AND HELEN HUANG v. LAND BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 218867, February 17, 2016 [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
Respondent failed to perfect its appeal before the RTC by not paying the full amount
of the prescribed appellate docket fees. Consequently, the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over
the case and, as a matter of discretion, properly dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation against
respondents. The RTC rendered a Decision setting an amount as just compensation. Several
years later, petitioners filed a motion for execution of the RTC's Decision, alleging that
while they received a copy of respondent's Notice of Appeal, upon verification, no such
appeal was actually filed before the RTC.
The RTC gave due course to respondent's appeal and directed that the entire records
thereof be transmitted to the CA. It clarified that respondent was able to file its Notice of
Appeal within the prescribed period and that a postal money order in the amount of
P520.00 had been issued by respondent in favor of the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
Almost five (5) years later, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of respondent
for failure to prosecute, asseverating that from the time the RTC gave due course to its
appeal, respondent had not made any further action on its appeal, particularly with regard
to the payment of the prescribed appeal fees. In its defense, respondent argued that the
Page 602 of 1553

RTC no longer had jurisdiction to entertain petitioners' motion after its Notice of Appeal
had been given due course.
The RTC granted petitioners' motion and accordingly, dismissed respondent's appeal for
failure to prosecute. Upon a meticulous inspection of the records, the RTC found that
respondent failed to pay the prescribed appeal fees. The CA reversed and found grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC when it dismissed respondent's appeal for failure to prosecute.
RULING:
YES.
Respondent failed to perfect its appeal before the RTC by not paying the full amount of the
prescribed appellate docket fees. Consequently, the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the
case and, as a matter of discretion, properly dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute.
While respondent had indeed issued a postal money order in favor of the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the RTC, the amount pertaining thereto was never remitted or received by the
court. There being no proof of payment of the required appellate fees, the case records
cannot be transmitted to the CA and therefore, remained with the RTC. This fact sheds
light and lends credibility to petitioners' allegation that they originally attempted to file
their motion to dismiss appeal before the CA, which was unsurprisingly rejected, there
being no case docket and court records pertaining to respondent's appeal.
Further militating against respondent's cause is the fact that almost five (5) years had
already lapsed from the time its Notice of Appeal had been originally given due course by
the RTC up to the time the petitioners moved for its dismissal. And yet, respondent failed
to pursue its case. In fact, had petitioners not taken any action, the instant case would have
continued to languish in the RTC dockets. Besides, even if it were true that respondent had
paid the required appellate docket fees in this case, it still failed to exercise diligence and
prudence in ascertaining that the records of the case had been transmitted to the CA and
that its appeal had been given due course. As it is, respondent miserably neglected its case
and may, thus, be considered to have abandoned its appeal. Clearly, the RTC cannot be
faulted for dismissing the appeal for failure to prosecute.
That the RTC retained jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal is beyond cavil, as provided under
Section 9, Rule 41 above-quoted. As a result of respondent's failure to perfect an appeal
Page 603 of 1553

within the period fixed by law, no court could exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the
RTC decision. While it is true that the RTC previously gave due course to respondent's
Notice of Appeal and declared that the latter had issued a postal money order in payment
of the required appellate docket fees, the RTC, however, is not precluded from perusing the
records a second or a third time, if only to ensure that all the requirements for perfecting
an appeal have been complied with. Indubitably, the dismissal of respondent's appeal was
in order, and the RTC's Decision, as a result, had attained finality.
SPOUSES TEODORICO and PACITA ROSETE vs. FELIX and/or MARIETTA

BRIONES, SPOUSES JOSE and REMEDIOS ROSETE, AND NEORIMSE and
FELICITAS CORPUZ
In appeals cognized by the Office of the President, the time during which a motion for
reconsideration has been pending with the Ministry/agency concerned shall be deducted from
the period for appeal.
Facts:
The subject lot is a 152-square meter lot located at 1014 Estrada Street, Malate, Manila
which is owned by the National Housing Authority. On July 30, 1987, the NHA conducted
a census survey of the subject lot gathering certain informations.
The NHA awarded the subject lot to petitioner Teodorico P. Rosete. Herein
respondents, Jose and Remedios Rosete, Neorimse and Felicitas Corpuz, and Felix and
Marietta Briones objected to the award claiming that the award of the entire lot to
Teodorico was erroneous. In 1990, Teodorico made a full payment of the value of the lot.
In an August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision, the NHA informed Teodorico that after

consideration of the objections raised by the Rosetes, the Corpuzes and the Brioneses, the
original award of 152 square meters in his favor has been cancelled and instead, the subject
lot will be subdivided and awarded in a different manner. In the same Letter-Decision,
NHA likewise informed Teodorico that his payments shall be adjusted accordingly, but his
excess payments will not be refunded; instead, they will be applied to his co-awardees’
amortizations. His coawardees shall in turn pay him, under pain of cancellation of their
respective awards. In his November 23, 1999 letter, Teodorico requested to subdivide the
subject lot on an "as is, where is" basis and to be reimbursed by his co-awardees for his
overpayments, with interest. Due to taking erroneous and belated courses however, his
decries were not given due course.
Page 604 of 1553

Issue:
Whether Teodorico’s motion was filed out of time
Ruling:
Yes, it was. On August 5, 1994, the NHA rendered its Letter-Decision, which
Teodorico received on September 24, 1994. In an October 18, 1994 letter to the NHA,
Teodorico sought a reconsideration ofthe said decision. This was followed by a July 28, 1999
letter to the NHA, where Teodorico, the Rosetes, and the Corpuzes sought approval of their
request to subdivide the subject lot on an "as is, where is" basis. In a November 12, 1999
Letter-Reply, the NHA informed the parties that the original awards/allocations were being
retained, and advised them to hire a surveyor for the purpose of subdividing the subject lot
in accordance with such awards.
It can be said that the NHA’s November 12, 1999 Letter-Reply constituted not only a
written response to the July 28, 1999 letter of Teodorico, the Rosetes, and the Corpuzes,
buta denial as well of Teodorico’s October 18, 1994 letter cum motion for reconsideration
of the agency’s August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision. As such, Teodorico should have thereafter
filed an appeal with the OP within the prescribed period.
However,instead of doing so, he sent another letter to the NHA dated November 23,
1999 reiterating his request to subdivide the subject lot on an "as is, where is" basis and to
be reimbursed by his co-awardees for his overpayments, with interest. He likewise filed in
O.P. Case No. 5902 a May 7, 2003 letter, in which he sought a reconsideration of the
November 19, 1997 Decision rendered in said case.
With his failure to timely appeal the NHA’s August 5, 1994 LetterDecision and its
November 12, 1999 Letter-Reply denying his motion for reconsideration, and instead taking
various erroneous courses of action which did not properly direct his grievances at the right
forum and within the prescribed period, the NHA’s August 5,1994 Letter-Decision became
final and executory as against Teodorico – and the petitioners for that matter. In
contemplation of law, petitioners did not at all file an appeal of the NHA’s August 5, 1994
Letter Decision.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim, the Court cannot consider Teodorico’s October 18,
1994 letter to the NHA as his appeal to the OP; it is properly a motion for reconsideration
of the agency’s August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision. Indeed, OP AO 18 does not preclude the
filing of a motion for reconsideration with the agency which rendered the questioned
decision; in reference to such motions for reconsideration, OP AO 18 specifically states that
Page 605 of 1553

the time during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending with the
Ministry/agency concerned shall be deducted from the period for appeal.
K&GMINING CORPORATION vs. ACOJE MINING COMPANY,

INCORPORATED and ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY,
INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 188364, February 11, 2015, J. Reyes
A counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is simple

negligence. It is not one as gross, palpable, and reckless as to deprive a party of its day in
court. Hence, the court will not override the finality and immutability of a judgment based
only on the simple negligence of a party’s counsel.
Facts:
KGMC and respondents Acoje Mining Company Incorporated (AMCI) and Zambales
Chromite Mining Company Incorporated (ZCMCI) are mining corporations organized and
existing by virtue of Philippine laws.
ZCMCI, AMCI and the government, represented by the DENR Secretary, executed an
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) covering ZCMCI’s 60 mining claims. The
MPSA was approved by the Office of the President (OP).
Claiming that the issuance and approval of the above MPSA was highly irregular,
KGMC filed a letter-protest with the OP. KGMC’s letter-protest was eventually forwarded
to the DENR Panel of Arbitrators.
The Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) ruled in favor
of KGMC. On appeal, however, the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) reversed the ruling
of the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB. The Panel of Arbitrators was held to have gravely
abused its discretion in recommending the cancellation of the subject MPSA because such
power is vested only on the Secretary being the one who has the authority to grant an
MPSA.
KGMC, through its previous counsel, filed before the CA a Petition for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Certiorari. In a Resolution, the CA denied extension for the reason
that decisions of the MAB are appealable via a petition for review under Rule 43 and not by
way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
KGMC faults its previous counsel in failing to timely file the correct mode of appeal
from the MAB resolutions and submits that it should be excused from the repercussions of
his ensuing omissions as they amounted to gross negligence.
Issue:
Page 606 of 1553
Whether the failure of KGMC’s counsel to timely file the correct mode of appeal
amounted to gross negligence that it would result in grave injustice of depriving his client
of due process of law
Ruling:
No.
First, a counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is simple
negligence. It is not one as gross, palpable, and reckless as to deprive a party of its day in
court.
Second, in cases where the counsel’s negligence consisted of his failure to timely file an
appeal, any alleged deprivation of due process is negated by the fact that the client had the
opportunity to be heard or was actually heard in the lower tribunal.
KGMC was not deprived of due process. So long as a party is given the opportunity to
advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was
denial of due process. “The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending its
rights and interests, but simply, whether it had the opportunity to present its side of the
controversy.” Records show that the case took its regular course in lower tribunals. KGMC
had the opportunity to be heard, was so heard and actively participated, in the proceedings
before the Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB.
Moreover, it is an established doctrine that the perfection of an appeal within the
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such
legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.
The Court will not override the finality and immutability of a judgment based only on
the simple negligence of a party’s counsel.
DEATH PENDING APPEAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM

G.R. No. 206832, January 21, 2015, J. Perez
Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts. However, a violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. Hence, no civil liability needs
extinguishment.
Facts:
Page 607 of 1553

Alfredo Morales y Lam (Morales), herein respondent, was charged with illegal sale
and illegal possession of shabu. Eventually, the RTC convicted him of the said crimes. Upon
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court.
On 29 August 2012, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Morales through counsel before
the Supreme Court. While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and
Processing Division Officer-in-Charge Emerenciana M. Divina informed the Court that
accused-appellant Morales died while committed at the Bureau of Corrections on 2
November 2013 as evidenced by a copy of Death Report signed by New Bilibid Prison
Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas.
Issue:
What is the effect of the death of Morales pending his appeal to his liabilities?
Ruling:
The death of accused-appellant Morales pending appeal of his conviction,

extinguishes his civil and criminal liabilities.
Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code:
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.
However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No
civil liability needs extinguishment.
WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 2 November 2013, the appeal of accused-

appellant Alfredo Morales y Lam from the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC.
Page 608 of 1553

EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECTS OF JUDGEMENTS
LEONORA A. PASCUAL vs. JOSEFINO L. DAQUIOAG, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 162063, MARCH 31, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the
judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may
it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if it is in
excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. However, a writ of execution issued
upon a final judgment adjudicating the ownership of land to a party may authorize putting
her in possession although the judgment does not specifically direct such act.
Facts:
On January 24, 1984, petitioner filed a Free Patent Application over Lot No. 13194, Lot No.
13212 and Lot No. 13214. Respondent Catalina Almazan-Villamor presented a protest,
claiming that Pascual had no right to apply for title over the properties. The Regional
Executive Director of the DENR gave due course to the protest of Almazan-Villamor, and
rejected the free patent application of Pascual. The same decision was affirmed by The
Secretary of DENR, the Office of the President and the CA.
On July 3, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR issued the writ of execution
directing the CENRO to execute the decision of the OP. Accordingly, CENRO Daquioag
issued a memorandum directing respondents to execute the Decision of the OP by placing
the winning party, Catalina Almazan-Villamor in the premises of the land in question.
Assailing the issuance of the memorandum and the execution proceedings, Pascual
brought a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of writ of injunction in
the RTC. The same petition was dismissed by the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the decision of the RTC to dismiss the petition for
certiorari
Held:
As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the
judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor
Page 609 of 1553
may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if
it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award.
Admittedly, the phrase “placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan Villamor in the
premises of the land in question” was not expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the
decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. But the absence of that phrase
did not render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was in full consonance
with the decision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to what appears on
the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The denial of Pascual’s free patent application was based on the recognition of Almazan
Villamor’s ownership of the subject properties. The consequence of the denial was the
directive for Pascual to refrain from entering the property, and from possessing the subject
property declared to be owned by Almazan Villamor. Upon the final finding of the
ownership in the judgment in favor of Almazan Villamor, the delivery of the possession of
the property was deemed included in the decision, considering that the claim itself of
Pascual to the possession had been based also on ownership.
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Whoever owns the property has the right
to possess it. Adjudication of ownership includes the delivery of possession if the defeated
party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of her rejected claim of
ownership. In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the writ of execution
awarding possession of land, notwithstanding that the decision sought to be executed did
not direct the delivery of the possession of the land to the winning parties.
Accordingly, Daquioag’s memorandum placing Almazan-Villamor in possession of the

properties was not inconsistent with the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR, as affirmed by the OP. With the clear recognition of Almazan-Villamor’s ownership,
and in default of any credible showing by Pascual of any valid justification for her to
continue in possession of the properties despite the denial of her free patent application,
possession must be restored to Almazan-Villamor as the rightful owner and possessor of
the properties.
Finally, we also conclude that the CA rightly sustained the RTC’s dismissal of Pascual’s
petition for certiorari because of the impropriety of her chosen remedy. A special civil
action for certiorari is the proper action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
Page 610 of 1553
exercise of judicial function consists in the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The
term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative
officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or to ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, the issuance by Daquioag of the assailed
memorandum implementing the writ of execution did not derive from the performance of
a judicial or quasi-judicial function. He was not thereby called upon to adjudicate the rights
of the contending parties or to exercise any discretion of a judicial nature, but only
performing an administrative duty of enforcing and implementing the writ.
HERMINIA ACBANG vs. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON

G.R. No. 164246, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but

the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede
s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the
appeal. Since the Acbangs perfected an appeal but failed to file the required superseadeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment suit cannot be stayed. The
filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the
immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of
the accruing rentals.
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner, her son
Benjamin and his wife Jean in the MTC of Alcala, Cagayan. The defendants did not file their
answer. Thus, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Lopez. The petitioner
appealed to the RTC.
In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision pending
appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay
the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion, insisting that the failure of the Spouses
Lopez to move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the
immediate execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of
the supersedeas bond unnecessary. The motion for execution pending appeal was granted
there being no Motion to Fix Supersedeas bond filed by the Acbangs as of the date of the
filing of the Motion.
Page 611 of 1553

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Later, petitioner brought the
petition for prohibition directly in the Supreme Court submitting that Judge Luczon
committed grave error in granting the motion for immediate execution of the Spouses
Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond. Later, the RTC rendered decision on the
appealed case, finding that the petitioner had not received the summons, and that the
sheriff’s return did not show the steps taken by the server to insure the petitioner’s receipt
of the summons, hence, the non-service of the summons resulted in the MTC not acquiring
jurisdiction over petitioner; and that the MTC’s decision was void as far as petitioner was
concerned.
In the petition, the petitioner insists that Spouses Lopez’s motion for execution pending
appeal should be filed before she posted a supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the
MTC’s decision was immediately executory, it did not mean that a motion for execution
was dispensable; and that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the immediate execution
when they did not file a motion for execution in the MTC.
Issue:
Whether immediate execution of judgment can be stayed.
Ruling:
The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:
Page 612 of 1553

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of
the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the
appeal is pending the foregoing provision (Section 19, Rule 70) requires that the following
requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas
bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency
of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a
ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being "ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal
but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would
automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas
bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory,

but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a
supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the
pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez
should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for
the immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing
out that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the
Acbangs failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the
immediate execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did
not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas
bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.
NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. Nos. 153745-46, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza LOURDES PASCUAL, et al.vs.
NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT
G.R. No. 166573, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza
Any action on a motion for execution pending appeal is only provisional in nature. The
grant or denial (as the case may be) of such a motion is always without prejudice to the court's
final disposition of the case and the issues raised therein.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1982, San Juan Macias Memorial Park, Inc. (SJMMPI), through Lourdes
Pascual, et al., sold the San Juan Memorial Park for P1.5M to NemecioPulumbarit, with the
Page 613 of 1553
latter issuing eighteen (18) checks in the name of SJMMPI’s secretary-treasurer. Pulumbarit
and/or his lawyer took charge of reducing the agreement into writing and Pascual, et al.
requested for a copy of the same through a letter. In another letter, they also asked
Pulumbarit to reissue new checks to replace the previous ones. Failing to get a favorable
response, Pascual, et al. filed a complaint for rescission of contract, damages and
accounting with prayer for preliminary injunction or receivership against Pulumbarit. The
trial court rendered a default judgment in Pascual, et al.’s favor. This judgment was reversed
by the CA and remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence of Pulumbarit.
Durings its pendency, the application for appointment of receivership of Pascual, et al. was
denied. The remanded case was decided in Pascual, et al.’s favor. Pulumbarit filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA to nullify the writs of execution and injunction issued by the
trial court, as sought for by Pascual, et al. The CA, in CA G.R. SP No. 61873 (first CA case),
issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, while in CA-G.R. SP No. 69931 (second
CA case), Pascual, et al. filed a motion for the execution of the trial court’s decision pending
Pulumbarit’s appeal. Meanwhile, the two cases were consolidated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the motion for execution pending appeal in the second CA case
rendered the first CA case moot and academic.
RULING:
No. To reiterate, Pascualet al.'s motion in the second CA case seeks the CA's approval to
execute the trial court’s decision pending final disposition of Pulumbarit's appeal. The first
CA case, on the other hand, is an action to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the trial court when it allowed execution pending appeal. The subjects
of Pascual,et al.'s motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 and Pulumbarit's petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 61873 concern two (2) different, albeit closely related, issues. Furthermore, any action
on a motion for execution pending appeal is only provisional in nature. The grant or denial
(as the case may be) of such a motion is always without prejudice to the court's final
disposition of the caseand the issues raised therein. In fact, Section 3, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court allows the party against whom the execution of a decision pending appeal is
directed to stay the execution by posting a supersedeas bond. Section 5 of the same rule
also provides that where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled,
on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or
reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.
Page 614 of 1553

For these reasons, the grant by the CA of a motion for execution pending appeal, being
provisional in nature, could therefore not have rendered CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 moot and
academic. In the same way, if not arguably more so, much less can the mere filing of such
a motion warrant the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 on the ground of mootness. Thus,
the CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 61873.
ROGELIO BARONDA
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO., INC.
G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015, J. Bersamin
As the Court has said in Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission: In
authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a Labor
Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a
compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the working-man.
FACTS:
Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (HIDECO) employed Rogelio Baronda as a mud press truck
driver. While operating the same, Baronda hit transmission lines, causing a total factory
blackout (9 pm – 2 am) the next day. The restoration cost totaled P26, 481.11 and as such,
HIDECO terminated the employment of Baronda. Baronda filed in the Office of Voluntary
Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a complaint for
illegal dismissal. The Voluntary Arbitrator found his dismissal illegal and ordered his
reinstatement. After HIDECO’s motion for reconsideration was denied, Baronda prayed for
the execution of the decision. The Voluntary Arbitrator initially denied the motion for
execution of Baronda on the ground that the decision did not award any backwages, but
allowed the same on the latter’s second motion. HIDECO’s petition for certiorari before the
CA was treated as a petition for review and granted the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision was
executory pending appeal.
RULING:
Page 615 of 1553

Yes. Although the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the
finality of the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the reinstatement aspect of
the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory regardless of the filing of
such motion for reconsideration or appeal The immediate reinstatement of the employee
pending the appeal has been introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which
amended Article 223 of the Labor Code. The normal consequences of a finding that an
employee was illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights; and, secondly, the
payment of wages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to the time of
actual reinstatement. These two consequences give meaning and substance to the
constitutional right of labor to security of tenure. Reinstatement pending appeal thus
affirms the constitutional mandate to protect labor and to enhance social justice.
KAREN GO v. LAMBERTO ECHAVEZ

G.R. No. 174542, August 3, 2015, Brion, J.
The general rule is that a judgment which has become final and executory has become
immutable, and hence could no longer be changed, revised, amended, or reversed. The
exceptions are when there is (1) correction of clerical errors; (2) making of nunc pro tunc
entries which causes no prejudice to any party; (3) an attack against a void judgment; and (4)
supervening events that render execution unjust and inequitable.
Facts:
Kargo Enterprises, owned and operated by Go, and Nick Carandang, Kargo’s Manager in
one of its branches, entered into a lease contract over a truck. They stipulated that a dead
of absolute sale would be executed upon full payment of the purchase price. For failure to
do so, Carandang should return back the truck and forfeit his payments as rentals. The
contract also prohibited Carandang from assigning his rights to third persons. When
Carandang failed to pay, Go demanded the return of the truck. Carandang, instead of
returning the truck, sold it to Echavez without Go’s knowledge. Go learned about the sale
but did not know to whom the truck was sold. She then filed a complaint against Carandang
and Echavez as an unidentified buyer. Echavez filed his answer with cross-claim and
counterclaim, denying knowledge of the lease contract and claimed that he is buyer in good
faith and for value. RTC held Go and Carandangsolidarily liable to Echavez for actual
damages. However, in a motion for reconsideration, the RTC still maintained that Echavez
is entitled to damages, but held Carandang liable to Go. Go appealed before the CA but the
same was dismissed, and further denied her motion for reconsideration. When Echavez
Page 616 of 1553
then moved for execution of the RTC’s decision, Go filed a motion for clarification and
claimed that the modified RTC decision is unenforceable as it contains materially
conflicting rulings. However, such motion was denied. Go filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari but the same was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the actual damages awarded to Echavez can still be modified.
Ruling:
NO. Once a judgment became final and executory, the judgment had become immutable,
and hence could no longer be changed, revised, amended, or reversed. This rule, however,
admits exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the making of nunc pro tunc
entries which causes no prejudice to any party; (3) an attack against a void judgment; and
(4) supervening events that render execution unjust and inequitable. In this case, the award
can no longer be modified because it is not covered by any of the exceptions.
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. Vs.

Pamana Island Resort Hotel and Marina Club, Inc.
G.R. No. 174838, June 1, 2016
Time and again, courts have emphasized that a writ of execution must conform
substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. An execution that is
not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity.
FACTS:
The case stems from an action for sum of money filed by Pamana Island Resort Hotel and
Marina Club, Inc. (Pamana) and Flowtech Construction Corporation (Flowtech) against
Stronghold on the basis of a Contractor's All Risk Bond. A fire in the project burned down
cottages being built by Flowtech, resulting in losses to Pamana. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135 declared Stronghold liable for the claim. Besides the award
of insurance proceeds, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, the trial court ordered the
payment of interest at double the applicable rate, following Section 243 of the Insurance
Code.
Page 617 of 1553

Stronghold's appeal seeking the reversal of the RTC judgment was denied by the CA and
thereafter, by the SC. Flowtech filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which was
granted.
Stronghold filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Execution and to Rationalize Enforcement

of the Decision, 10 dated August 16, 2005, contending that the interest penalty being
demanded from it through the Sheriff was unconscionable and iniquitous. On November
22, 2005, the RTC rendered its Order granting Stronghold's motion. Interest was
substantially reduced following the court's pronouncement that its computation should be
reckoned from the date of promulgation of judgment until its finality and not from the date
of demand until full payment as enunciated in the Decision dated October 14, 1999.
On appeal, the CA rendered reversed the RTC’s R TC Decision dated October 14, 1999 had
become final and executory, and thus immutable and unalterable.
On July 20, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision reversing the Order granting Stronghold's
motion, explaining that the RTC Decision dated October 14, 1999 had become final and
executory, and thus immutable and unalterable.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in reducing the interests as imposed in the Decision dated October
14, 1999
RULING:
Yes, The RTC's order to implement carried substantial changes in a judgment that had
become final and executory. These variations pertained to "(1) the date from which the
double rate of interest on the principal amount of the claim shall be computed; (2) up to
when such interest shall run; and (3) the applicable rate of interest." Instead of "double the
rate of interest [on the proceeds of insurance] from the date of demand until fully paid,"17
the RTC's computation for purposes of execution was limited to an interest rate of 6% per
annum, resulting in a double rate of only 12% per annum, to be reckoned from the date of
the trial court's judgment until it became final and executory. Clearly, the RTC's issuances
contravened a settled principle affecting execution of judgments. Time and again, courts
have emphasized that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential
particular of the judgment promulgated. An execution that is not in harmony with the
judgment is bereft of validity. This applies because "once a judgment becomes final and
executory, all that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The
Page 618 of 1553

prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court's
ministerial duty.
Spouses Jorge Navarra and Carmelita Navarra vs. Yolanda Liongson

G.R. No. 217930, April 18, 2016
FACTS:
The deceased husband of respondent Yolanda, Jose, filed a complaint for damages based on
malicious prosecution against Spouses Navarra and Spouses Bernardo before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City (RTC). After the presentation and formal offer of
their respective evidence, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda.
Atty. Aguas, counsel for Jose, filed a Motion for Time to Submit Motion for Substitution of
Plaintiff with Motion For Suspension/Commencement of Counting of Period in Filing
Pleadings informing the RTC of the death of Jose and praying for time to submit a motion
for substitution pending receipt of the death certificate.
A Decision was rendered in favor of Jose ordering defendant spouses to pay damages.
Defendant spouses filed their Motion for Declaration of Nullity of the Decision and/or
Notice of Appeal based on the absence of a valid substitution of Jose. Consequently, Atty.
Aguas filed the Motion for Substitution, praying that Jose be substituted by his surviving
wife, Yolanda. The RTC denied the motion for declaration of nullity of the decision.
Defendant spouses then elevated the matter before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74988 (first CA case). which was dismissed for want of appellant’s brief. An entry of
judgment.
Thereafter, Yolanda moved for resolution of the pending Motion for Subsitution, which the
RTC denied. Thereafter, after being appointed administratix of the estate of Jose, Yolanda
filed a motion for execution, which was denied on the ground that no proper substitution
had been made yet. Yolanda filed a new Motion to Subsitute, which was granted.
Defendant spouses then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 104667 (the second CA case), insisting that the issue of substitution had been laid to
rest by the RTC on three (3) occasions and Yolanda did not question the propriety of its
denial. Hence, she was forever barred from effecting the substitution.
Meanwhile, Yolanda was issued a writ of execution. Defendant spouses filed another
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 105568 (the third CA case). The CA recalled and set aside the entry of judgment
and reversed its December 8, 2011 decision in the interest of substantial justice.
Page 619 of 1553

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred and violated the principle of immunity of judgment
when it amended its December 8, 2011 decision.
2. Whether the the October 28, 2009 decision of the second CA case constituted res
judicata with respect to the latter case in the third CA case
RULING:
1. No. While as a general rule, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land,
this doctrine may be relaxed in order to serve substantial justice in case compelling
circumstances that clearly warrant the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction are
extant. It has exceptions, such as: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
The issue posed before the Court is not of first impression. It involves three
conflicting final and executory judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA. The first
is the May 2, 2001 RTC decision which granted the complaint for damages. The
second is the October 28, 2009 CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667 which granted
the motion for substitution and the motion for execution. The third, which is
obviously in conflict with the first and second judgment, is the December 8, 2011 CA
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568 which not only reversed and set aside the motion
for execution but also declared the May 2, 2001 RTC decision a void judgment.
Where a certain case comprises two or more conflicting judgments which are final
and executory, the Court, in the case of Collantes v. Court of Appeals
(Collantes), offered three (3) options in resolving the same. First, the court may opt
to require the parties to assert their claims anew; second, to determine which
judgment came first; and third, to determine which of the judgments had been
rendered by a court of last resort. However, it would be more equitable to make use
of the second option mentioned in Collantes and sustain the finality of the earlier
decisions rendered by the RTC and the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667.
Page 620 of 1553

2. Yes, the Decision in the second CA case constituted res judicata with respect to the
third CA case. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment is final; (b) it was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c)
it is a judgment on the merits; and, (d) there is, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. In the present case, there
is no quibble that all the elements adverted to above obtain in this case.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit can never again be raised in any future case
between the same parties even involving a different cause of action. The CA decision
in the second CA case concerning the validity of plaintiffs substitution became
conclusive on the parties. Thus, petitioners cannot again seek refuge by filing their
second petition (the third CA case) in the guise of questioning the order of execution
but actually invoking the alleged nullity of the substitution of plaintiff. Petitioners
cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by· simply varying· the form of
his action or adopting a different method of presenting their case.
REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. ANTONIO DELA CRUZ

The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed with
the MTC. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due under
erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment case
when it directed the levy of the respondent’s property.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the MTC a complaint for ejectment against respondent. The MTC
resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the
premises, and pay the rentals due until the respondent actually complies. Pending appeal
to the RTC, respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s
refusal to receive the rentals. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto.In a
Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and
dismissed the ejectment case. The dismissal of the case became final and executory.
Page 621 of 1553

The petitioner filed a motion praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by the
respondent with the RTC. In an order dated July 25, 2003, the RTC granted the petitioner’s
motion. The RTC explained that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would mean that
there was no complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of
rentals for the use and occupation of the subject units, as provided in the executed
contracts of lease and on the basis of justice and equity.
The court denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration in an order dated November
28, 2003. On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution on December 18,
2003, to cause the enforcement of its order dated July 25, 2003.
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to assail the RTC
Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 (RTC orders), which granted the
petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds. The CA dismissed the petition and held that the
assailed RTC Orders were issued pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 39, and Rules 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the
RTC Orders.
The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to
allow it to proceed against the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing
rentals for the leased properties, and to withdraw the lease payments deposited by
respondent. The RTC granted the motion.
The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments
directly made by the respondent to the petitioner, were insufficient to cover rentals due.
Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying that the RTC levy upon the
respondent’s property to satisfy the judgment credit. The RTC granted the petitioner’s
motion in an order dated June 30, 2008.
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify and set aside the
orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s real property. Respondent filed a
manifestation and motion before the CA to withdraw the petition for the reason that the
redemption of the property and release of the price paid rendered the petition moot and
academic. Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision which reversed and set aside
the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The CA held that
while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw the consigned rentals and the
posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no jurisdiction to
levy on the respondent’s real property.
Page 622 of 1553

ISSUE/RULING:
4. Whether the CA Petition should have been dismissed for failure of the notary public
failed to affix his seal on the attached Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping.
NO.
A defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The
court may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served. On the ther hand, noncompliance or a defect in a
certification against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless the covering Rule is relaxed on
the ground of "substantial compliance" or based on the presence of "special circumstances
or compelling reasons." Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is
deemed obligatory, it is not however jurisdictional.
In the present case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping were in fact
submitted. An examination of these documents shows that the notary public’s signature
and stamp were duly affixed. Except for the notarial seal, all the requirements for the
verification and certification documents were complied with.
The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. The higher objective of procedural rules is to
ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much
as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must
be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from
the unacceptable plea of technicalities.
Thus, the CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead gave due course to the petition as it
substantially complied with the requirements on the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping.
5. Whether the CA petition should have been dismissed for being case moot and
academic.
controversy because of supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the
resolution of the issue without any practical use or value. Courts generally decline
Page 623 of 1553

jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness except when, among
others, the case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.
Here, the CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the
orders directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The issue on jurisdiction is a
justiciable controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition from becoming moot and
academic. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot
be conferred or waived by the parties. "Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did
not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case." Even assuming that the case has been
rendered moot, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation
capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
6. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.
The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed with the
MTC. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due under
erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment
case when it directed the levy of the respondent’s property.
Furthermore, it is settled that execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The court of origin with respect
to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with
jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders. Hence, the petitioner correctly
moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondent's real property
before the RTC as the court of origin.
HEIRS OF JOSE MA. GEPUELA vs. BERNITA MENEZ-ANDRES, ET AL.

G.R. No. 173770, January 13, 2016 [Jardeleza, J.]
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits, and on all points and matters determined in the former suit. There are two distinct
concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment:
Page 624 of 1553

The former concept of res judicata, that is, bar by prior judgment, applies in this case. The
following requisites must concur in order that a prior judgment may bar a subsequent
action, viz: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order
on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations
submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
FACTS:
Gepuela filed an action to consolidate his ownership over the 36/72 pro indiviso share he
acquired by way of redemption from the estate of Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz (Basilia). The
trial court granted Gepuela’s petition, declared him the owner of Basilia’s 36/72 pro
indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 95524 and ordered the issuance of
a new certificate of title to reflect this change in ownership. Aggrieved, oppositors Isagani,
Perfecto, Jr., Pedrito, Vito and Alberto appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25605. The CA affirmed the trial court’s findings. The CA’s
Decision in CA G.R. CV No. 25605 was not appealed and became final and executory
on February 26, 1992. TCT No. 5033-R was issued that same year, reflecting Gepuela’s
ownership of the 36/72 pro indiviso share previously owned by Basilia.
On October 10, 1995, Basilia’s grandchildren Hernita and Nelia filed a Complaint for
Redemption and Consignation with Damages and a subsequent Amended Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Redemption, Cancellation of Notation in Title, and Consignation
with Damages against Gepuela. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 65327. In his Answer,
Gepuela alleged that his redemption had already been adjudicated by the trial court in LRC
Case No. R-3855 and affirmed by the CA in CA G.R. CV No. 25605. No further appeal having
been made, Gepuela asserts that the CA’s Decision became final and executory on February
26, 1992.
The trial court upheld Gepuela’s redemption of Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share. It,
however, ruled that because Gepuela failed to formally notify Hernita, Nelia and Rosemarie
of the redemption, the same was null and void insofar as it affected the latter’s six percent
(6%) share in the property.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s Decision, with certain modifications. At the outset, the
CA noted that the validity of Gepuela’s redemption has already been settled in LRC
Case No. R-3855 and affirmed by the CA in CA G.R. CV No. 25605. Since the Decision in
said case had already become final and executory per entry of judgment dated February 26,
Page 625 of 1553

1992, the CA declared that Hernita, et al. are barred from assailing it again under the
principle of res judicata.
Despite this, the CA still proceeded to resolve the case on the merits. Rejecting Hernita, et
al.’s claim that Gepuela had no personality to redeem Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share, the
appellate court held that Gepuela was not a stranger to, but rather a co-owner of, the entire
communal property. Since redemption inures to the benefit of the other co-owners, the CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision insofar as it nullified the redemption in proportion to
Hernita, et al.’s respective shares. The CA, however, modified the RTC ruling with respect
to the computation of Hernita, et al.’s shares in Basilia’s estate.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not the CA erred when it modified the terms of the case after declaring
that the Decision in LRC Case No. R-3855 had become final, executory and
unappealable,
YES.
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits, and on all points and matters determined in the former suit. There are two distinct
concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment:
The former concept of res judicata, that is, bar by prior judgment, applies in this case. The
following requisites must concur in order that a prior judgment may bar a subsequent
action, viz: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or
order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action.
All of the foregoing elements are present in this case.
First, the Decision rendered in LRC Case No. R-3855 and affirmed by the CA in CA G.R. CV
No. 25605 had already become final for failure of the parties to appeal the same. Second, it
was a judgment on the merits, with the trial court rejecting the claims of the oppositors
and declaring Gepuela as the owner of the disputed one-half portion of the property
covered by TCT No. 95524. Third, the Decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court
Page 626 of 1553

which had jurisdiction over the action (for consolidation of ownership filed by Gepuela)
and the parties thereto. Fourth, as between LRC Case No. R-3855 and Civil Case No. 65327
(the action for nullity of the redemption filed by Hernita, et al.), there is identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action
Subject Matter - It is not disputed that both LRC Case No. R-3855 and Civil Case No. 65327
involved the same subject matter, that is, the 36/72 pro indiviso share of Basilia in the land
covered by TCT No. 95524.
Parties - LRC Case No. R-3855, on the one hand, was filed by Gepuela to consolidate his
ownership over Basilia’s one-half portion of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 95524.
Isagani, Perfecto, Jr., Pedrito, and Vito, all registered co-owners of the whole property,
appeared as oppositors. In Civil Case No. 65327, on the other hand, Hernita, et al. sought to
nullify the earlier redemption made by Gepuela over Basilia’s portion and redeem the
same for their own account as Basilia’s instituted heirs.
While there appears to be a lack of identity between the concerned parties and the causes
of action involved in the two actions, it must be recalled that absolute identity is not
required for res judicata to apply; substantial identity of parties and causes of actions is
sufficient. In this case, Hernita, et al., though not a party to LRC Case No. R-3855, share an
identity of interest with Isagani, et al., in that they (1) are heirs of Basilia, the owner of the
disputed 36/72 portion of the land covered by TCT No. 95524, and (2) both sought to
challenge the redemption made by Gepuela of the said portion of property. Based on
jurisprudence, both Hernita, et al. and Isagani, et al. can be considered to share "an identity
of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought," that is, to be eventually declared
owners of the portion being contested.
Cause of Action - There is likewise identity in the causes of action involved in LRC Case No.
R-3855 and Civil Case No. 65327. To reiterate, for the doctrine of res judicata to apply,
identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily
escape the operation of the doctrine by simply changing the form of the action or the relief
sought.
The allegations in Civil Case No. 65327 show that Hernita, et al. are seeking exactly the
same relief sought by the oppositors in LRC Case No. R-3855, that is, the denial of the
consolidation of Gepuela’s ownership over Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share. In fact, the
issues presented against Gepuela’s redemption over the disputed portion had already been
thoroughly ventilated in LRC Case No. R-3855. Thus, although ostensibly styled in different
Page 627 of 1553

forms, the complaints in Civil Case No. 65327 and LRC Case No. R-3855 are really litigating
for the same thing and seeking the same relief, that is, to remove from Gepuela ownership
over the disputed 36/72 portion.
In fact, Civil Case No. 65327 was filed specifically seeking to declare the nullity of Gepuela’s
redemption of the one-half share previously owned by Basilia. This issue, however, has
already been conclusively settled in LRC Case No. R-3855, where the trial court upheld
Gepuela’s redemption of the share and declared him absolute owner of the same.
2. Whether Hernita, et al. are indispensable parties to LRC Case No. R-3855.
NO.
Hernita, et al. contend that the doctrine of res judicata "does not at all attach, because the
judgment in LRC Case No. [R-3855] is not valid for lack of due process and in the absence
of indispensable parties." As indispensable parties who were not made part of the
proceedings, Hernita, et al. claim that they cannot be bound by the decision in LRC Case
No. R-3855 or the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 25605. The Supreme Court rejected this
contention.
An indispensable party is defined as a party in interest without whom no final

determination can be had of an action. Hernita, et al. are voluntary heirs to ten percent of
the free portion of Basilia’s estate. Given their limited participation in the estate, this
Court is at a loss as to how Hernita, et al. can be considered indispensable parties for
purposes of LRC Case No. R-3855, an action to consolidate Gepuela’s title over the property
covered by TCT No. 95524. The claim all the more fails to persuade especially when one
considers that the estate itself, through its Administratrix, and all the other registered co-
owners of aliquot portions of the property appear to have been properly notified of and, in
fact, actively participated in, the proceedings in LRC Case No. R-3855.
NILO S. RODRIGUEZ, et. al., vs.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., AND NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 178501, January 11, 2016 [Leonardo-De Castro, J.]
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former
judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
Page 628 of 1553

competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to
that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court
of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties
or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in
issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of
cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
FACTS:
In 1997, the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALP AP) filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike, on the grounds of unfair
labor practice and union-busting by PAL (Strike Case). By virtue of the authority vested
upon him under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Labor Code), the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over
the Strike Case, and issued an Order prohibiting all actual and impending strikes and
lockouts. The DOLE Secretary issued another Order reiterating the prohibition against
strikes and lockouts.
Despite the abovementioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary, ALPAP filed a second Notice
of Strike and staged a strike. The DOLE Secretary immediately called PAL and ALP AP for
conciliation conferences to amicably settle the dispute between them. After his efforts
failed, the DOLE Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order. The members of ALP AP
reported for work but PAL did not accept them on the ground that the 24-hour period for
the strikers to return set by the DOLE Secretary in his Return-to-Work Order had already
lapsed, resulting in the forfeiture of their employment.
Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC a Complaint for illegal lockout against PAL
(Illegal Lockout Case). The Acting Executive Labor Arbiter ordered the consolidation of the
Illegal Lockout Case with the Strike Case pending before the DOLE Secretary. The DOLE
Secretary issued a Resolution in the consolidated Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases declaring
the strike illegal and dismissing the Illegal Lockout case. ALP AP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by the DOLE Secretary. ALP AP assailed the Resolutions
of the DOLE Secretary in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed said Petition. ALP AP elevated
Page 629 of 1553

the case to the Supreme Court which dismissed the Petition in a minute Resolution dated
April 10, 2002 for failure of ALPAP to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
appellate court. Said Resolution dismissing the 1st ALPAP case became final and executory
on August 29, 2002.
Meanwhile, 32 ALP AP members, consisting of Rodriguez, et al., filed with the NLRC on
June 7, 1999 a Complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL (Illegal Dismissal Case). The
Labor Arbiter found that Rodriguez et al were illegally dismissed by PAL. PAL appealed
before the NLRC which reversed Labor Arbiter Robles' Decision. Aggrieved, Rodriguez, et
al. filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which reversed the NLRC
Decision and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter which held PAL liable for the
illegal dismissal of Rodriguez, et al. Hence, Rodriguez, et al. assailed before the Supreme
Court the Decision of the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In the meantime, during the pendency of the instant Petition, the Court decided on June
6, 2011 Airline Pilots Association ·of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc, (2nd ALPAP
case). The 2nd ALP AP case arose from events that took place following the finality on
August 29, 2002 of the Resolution dated April 10, 2002 which dismissed the 1st ALP AP case.
The 2nd ALP AP case was dismissed by the Supreme Court in due deference to the final
and immutable judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the 1st ALPAP case. This
Decision of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case became final and executory on September 9,
2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case is barred by the final and executory judgments in
the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.
RULING:
YES.
Bearing in mind the final and executory judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, the
Court denied the Petition of Rodriguez, et al.
The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final and executory on August 29, 2002 and
September 9, 2011, respectively, constitute res judicata on the issue of who participated in
the illegal strike in June 1998 and whose services were validly terminated.
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former
judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
Page 630 of 1553

The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties
to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated
in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend
on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
The elements for res judicata in the second concept, i.e., conclusiveness of judgment, are
extant in these cases.
There is identity of parties in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, on one hand, and the Petition
at bar. While the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases concerned ALP AP and the present Petition
involved several individual members of ALPAP, the union acted in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP
cases in representation of its members. In fact, in the 2nd ALPAP case, the Court explicitly
recognized that the complaint for illegal lockout was filed by ALP AP on behalf of all its
members who were returning to work. Also in the said case, ALPAP raised, albeit belatedly,
exactly the same arguments as Rodriguez, et al. herein. Granting that there is no absolute
identity of parties, what is required, however, for the application of the principle of res
judicata is not absolute, but only substantial identity of parties. ALP AP and Rodriguez, et
al. share an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought, namely, the
reinstatement of the terminated ALP AP members to their former positions. Such identity
of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, one to the other, and meets the requisite
of substantial identity of parties.
There is likewise an identity of issues between the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases and these
cases. Rodriguez, et al., insist that they did not participate in the June 1998 strike, being on
official leave or scheduled off-duty. Nonetheless, on the matter of determining the
identities of the ALPAP members who lost their employment status because of their
participation in the illegal strike in June 1998, the Court is now conclusively bound by its
factual and legal findings in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.
Page 631 of 1553

SPS. DAVID ESERJOSE and ZENAIDA ESERJOSEvs.ALLIED BANKING

CORPORATION and PACITA UY
G.R. No. 180105, April 23, 2014, J. Abad
Spouses Eserjose instituted a complaint for the release of mortgage and payment for
moral and exemplary damages against Allied Banking Corporation . The Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment in their favor. The spouses then became the highest bidder of the property
levied by the sheriff. However, by way of certiorari, Allied Banking Corporation was able to
secure a favorable judgment with the Supreme Court. The Court reduced the amount of
damages awarded to the spouses from Php 8M to Php 4M. This being the case ABC filed a
motion to nullify the sale and. However, the RTC denied the motion. The Supreme Court ruled
that pursuant to Sec. 5 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, where the executed judgment is
reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on
motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may
warrant under the circumstances.
Facts:
Spouses Eserjose instituted a complaint for the release of mortgage and payment for
moral and exemplary damages against Allied Banking Corporation when they found out
that the property they have mortgaged and the lot they subsequently acquired were
subjected to two other mortgages.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in their favor and awarded the spouses
damages amounting to Php 8M for moral and exemplary damages. The judgement was then
executed and a public auction was held in order to satisfy the judgment in favor of the
spouses. The spouses then became the highest bidder of the property levied by the sheriff.
However, by way of certiorari, Allied Banking Corporation was able to secure a favorable
judgment with the Supreme Court. The Court reduced the amount of damages awarded to
the spouses from Php 8M to Php 4M. This being the case ABC filed a motion to nullify the
sale and. However, the RTC denied the motion. By way of certitorari to the Court of
Appeals, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the nullification of the sale
by virtue of a decision rendered by the Supreme Court modifying the executed decision of
the Regional Trial Court.
Page 632 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that
when the Supreme Court rendered the decision that reduced the award of damages in favor
of the spouses it in effect partially reversed and modified the decision of the trial court.
Pursuant to Sec. 5 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, where the executed judgment is reversed
totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion,
issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant
under the circumstances.
Here, the RTC executed on a judgment debt of P8,050,000 when what was later
determined to be due was only P4,050,000. Clearly, the trial court had the discretion to
order restitution and reparation of damages. Its exercise of that discretion must, however,
be fair to all the parties concerned.
The CA was right in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
not allowing for the restitution of the properties improperly auctioned for substantially
wrong amounts considering that the registration of titles in the names of the Eserjoses and
the turnover of possession of such properties to them had not yet taken place. There is no
legal impediment to ABC and Uy being allowed to pay the judgment debt in cash, the
preferred mode of satisfaction of money judgment.
JOSELITO MA. P. JACINTO (FORMERLY PRESIDENT OFF. JACINTO GROUP, INC.)

vs. EDGARDO GUMARU, JR.
G.R. No. 191906, June 02, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Gumaru informed the SC that the judgment award has been satisfied in full. Jacinto
does not dispute this claim, in which case, the labor case is now deemed ended. “It is axiomatic
that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all.
And when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last
act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby
established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who
acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal
therefrom. With the development in the case, the instant Petition is rendered moot and
academic. The satisfaction of the judgment in full has placed the case beyond the Court’s
review.
Facts:
On December 6, 2004, a Decision was rendered in favor of respondent Eduardo

Gumaru, Jr. and against petitioner Joselito Ma. P. Jacinto and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. in the
Page 633 of 1553
labor case. Jacinto and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. filed an appeal with the NLRC. However, the
appeal was not perfected for failure to post the proper cash or surety bond; this was the
finding of the NLRC in its Resolution dated September 30, 2005. Thus, the December 6,
2004 Decision became final and executory. Entry of judgment was issued by the NLRC on
November 23, 2005.
On February 6, 2006, a Writ of Execution was issued in the labor case. A Second
Alias Writ of Execution was issued and returned when the first one expired. By virtue of
such alias writ, real property belonging to petitioner – located in Baguio City was levied
upon, and was scheduled to be sold at auction on June 27, 2008 or July 4, 2008.
On June 20, 2008, Jacinto filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul Levy
on Execution praying, among others, that the scheduled June 27, 2008 auction sale be
restrained, and that the execution process covered by the Second Alias Writ of Execution
be invalidated.
The Labor Arbiter denied Jacinto’s Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul Levy
on Execution. Jacinto appealed the Labor Arbiter’s June 26, 2008 Order to the NLRC, which,
set aside the same. Jacinto went up to the CA on certiorari but the court denied the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant Petition is rendered moot and academic

Ruling:
Yes, the SC finds that the Petition has become moot and academic.
It is true, as Jacinto asserts, that if for reasonable or justifiable reasons he is unable

to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition, he may
execute a special power of attorney designating his counsel of record to sign the Petition
on his behalf.
However, while the Court takes the Jacinto’s side with regard to the procedural issue
dealing with verification and the certification against forum shopping, it nonetheless
appears that the Petition has been overtaken by events. In a May 24, 2011 Manifestation,
Gumaru informed this Court that the judgment award has been satisfied in full. Jacinto
does not dispute this claim, in which case, the labor case is now deemed ended. “It is
axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once
and for all.” And “when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction
Page 634 of 1553

being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the
obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a
judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is
estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.”
With the above development in the case, the instant Petition is rendered moot and
academic. The satisfaction of the judgment in full has placed the case beyond the Court’s
review. Indeed, there are no more proceedings to speak of inasmuch as these were
terminated by the satisfaction of the judgment.
GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR AND RODEL A. MESA vs. OMBUDSMAN AND HON.

HERBERT BAUTISTA, City Mayor, Quezon City
Villasenor and others were charged for violations of the Code of Conduct of Public
Officials. Pending the resolution of their motions filed in court, the City Mayor of Quezon
City enforced the decision of the Ombudsman. Villasenor contested the execution of the
decision even though a motion is still pending. The Court herein ruled that decisions of the
Ombudsman are executory pending appeal. Moreover, since there is no vested right in a
public office, the retroactive application of the AO does not prejudice the rights of the
accused.
Facts:
Gerardo Villasenor and Rodel Mesa, along with several others, were administratively
charged in connection with the Manor Hotel fire tragedy that took place on August 18, 2001,
killing 74 people and causing injury to others. Petitioner Villaseñor was an electrical
inspector from the Electrical Division, and petitioner Mesa was an inspector from the
Electrical Engineering Office, both of Quezon City.
Villaseñor was charged with grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and gross negligence. In OMB-ADM-00390, both petitioners were charged with
violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). In its Joint Decision dated June 17, 2003, the
Investigating Panel of the Office of the Ombudsman, Villaseñor was found guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and gross neglect of duty and Mesa
was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint Decision as regards the
petitioners. Villaseñor and Mesa filed their separate motions for reconsideration. The
Page 635 of 1553

Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. Mesa appealed to the CA, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 93891. Villaseñor made no appeal, his motion for reconsideration
before the Ombudsman being yet unresolved.
Pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman directed the Mayor of Quezon City and the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government to enforce the Joint Decision immediately upon receipt of
the order. Villaseñor and Mesa filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. They
prayed that the said order be annulled and an injunction be issued to restrain its
implementation. The CA dismissed the petition for utter lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of
one year can be implemented pending resolution of petitioner Villaseñor’s motion for
reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and petitioner Mesa’s appeal before the CA
Ruling:
Yes. An order of the Ombudsman is executory pending appeal.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
Article 4 of the Civil Code does indeed provide that laws shall have no retroactive
effect. Rules regulating the procedure of courts, however, are retroactive in nature, and are,
thus, applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. As a general
rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules, hence,
retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature
and therefore, may be applied retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were pending and
unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17. It is important to note that there is no
such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
Page 636 of 1553

The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was, in fact, settled in

Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where it was held that such are immediately executory pending
appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive
writ.
Thus, petitioner Villaseñor’s filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay the
immediate implementation of the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal, considering that "a
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course" under Section 7. As already explained, no vested right of Villaseñor would
be violated as he would be considered under preventive suspension, and entitled to the
salary and emoluments he did not receive in the event that he wins his eventual appeal.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

(NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G. MIAQUE
G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014, J. De Castro
Section 21, Rule 70 provides that the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases appealed
to it shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal
to a higher court. To avoid such immediate execution, the defendant may appeal said
judgment to the CA and therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. In this case, the
decisions of the MTCC, of the RTC, and of the CA, unanimously recognized the right of the
ATO to possession of the property and the corresponding obligation of Miaque to
immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court
of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to continue in possession of the said
premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction with the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear
legal right to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when
he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be
issued by the MTCC.
Facts:
The Air Transportation Office filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City. The MTCC rendered a judgment
finding Miaque to be unlawfully detaining the involved premises. The RTC affirmed the
MTCC Decision in its entirety. Miaque questioned the RTC Decision in the Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79439. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC Decision. Miaque brought the case to
this Court in a petition for review, which petition was denied as no reversible error in the
Court of Appeals Decision.
Page 637 of 1553

As an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the Court of Appeals issued on February 27,
2004 a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective for a period of 60 days and required
Miaque to post a bond. After the lapse of the TRO, the ATO filed an urgent motion for the
execution of the RTC Decision pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This
was opposed by Miaque. The RTC granted the ATO’s motion. However, the Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution dated August 18, 2004 ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and enjoining the ATO and all persons acting in its behalf from
enforcing the respective Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439
is pending. Thus, after the dismissal of Miaque’s petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the ATO filed another urgent motion for execution of the RTC Decision. The RTC
granted the ATO’s urgent motion for execution. Miaque filed a motion in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439 praying that the Court of Appeals order the RTC judge and the concerned sheriffs to
desist from implementing the writ of execution Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution dated June 14, 2005 ordering the sheriffs to desist from executing the Decisions
of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 is still pending.
On February 9, 2006, after the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution dated January
5, 2006 denying Miaque’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 29, 2005
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO filed with the RTC a motion for the revival of the writs
of execution. The RTC issued an Order dated March 20, 2006 granting the ATO’s motion
and revived the writs of execution.
On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition for certiorari (with prayer for issuance
of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, where he assailed the RTC’s Order dated March 20, 2006. The CA
issued a resolution dated March 29, 2006 issuing a TRO effective for 60 days, and
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June2, 2005.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006
which granted petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603
Page 638 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that question: Sec.
21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment
of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases
governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and
Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which respectively provide:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for injunction,

receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may
hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their
rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise
ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion
may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction,
receivership, accounting, or award of support. The stay of execution shall be upon
such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or
protection of the rights of the adverse party.
The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant
characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately

executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom; and
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the appellate court’s discretion, suspended or
modified.
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory -- is

emphasized by the fact that no resolutory condition has been imposed that will prevent or
Page 639 of 1553

stay the execution of the RTC’s judgment. The significance of this may be better
appreciated by comparing Section 21 of Rule 70 with its precursor, Section 10, Rule 70 of
the 1964 Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – Where
defendant appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, execution of said
judgment, with respect to the restoration of possession, shall not be stayed unless
the appellant deposits the same amounts and within the periods referred to in
section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same manner as therein provided.
Under the old provisions where the defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could
prevent the immediate execution of the judgment by taking an appeal and making a
periodic deposit of monthly rentals during the pendency of the appeal thereby preventing
the plaintiff from taking possession of the premises in the meantime, the present wording
of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly provides that the judgment of the regional trial court in
ejectment cases appealed to it shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite
the perfection of an appeal to a higher court. The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution
under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus. Section 21
of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is
unsatisfied with the RTC’s judgment and appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC
to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due
course
The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal
taken therefrom – reinforces the first. The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is
enforceable upon its rendition and, upon motion, immediately executory notwithstanding
an appeal taken therefrom.
This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is without recourse
to avoid immediate execution of the RTC decision. The defendant may x x x appeal said
judgment to the Court of Appeals and therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction.
In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 02-27292, and of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 unanimously
recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the property and the corresponding
obligation of Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that the
MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to
continue in possession of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of
Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction with the sweeping
statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the premises leased
Page 640 of 1553

by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom
by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which is
the court of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439."
FLORA P. HOLASCA, vs.

ANSELMO P. PAGUNSAN, JR., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite,
x-----------------------x
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OCA), vs.
FRANCISCO J. CALIBUSO, JR., Clerk of Court III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, Cavite City,
A.M. No. P-14-3198 & A.M. No. P-14-3199, July 23, 2014, J. Brion
Following duties of a sheriff: first, to give notice of the writ and demand that the
judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate the property within three (3)
days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and all persons claiming
under the latter; third, to remove the latter’s personal belongings in the property as well as
destroy, demolish or remove the improvements constructed thereon upon special court order;
and fourth, to execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ
and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires.
In the present case, the Court finds that Sheriff Pagunsan was remiss in performing
his mandated duties. To recall, the Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC on February 4,
2009. Sheriff Pagunsan served the Writ on February 11, 2009, giving the defendants three (3)
days or until February 14, 2009 within which to voluntary vacate the premises. However, there
was no showing that the writ had been fully implemented or the property delivered to the
complainant on February 14, 2009. In fact, the records would show that Sheriff Pagunsan did
not return to the premises on the said date or any date thereafter; nor made any personal
follow-ups from the defendants. In short, no other action was undertaken by Sheriff Pagunsan
to implement the writ of execution.
Court employees should be wary when assisting persons dealing with the courts and
their cases. While they are not totally prohibited from rendering aid to others, they should
see to it that the assistance, albeit involving acts unrelated to their official functions, does
not in any way compromise the public’s trust in the justice system.
In the present case, by getting personally involved in the writ’s implementation,

Calibuso transgressed the strict norm of conduct prescribed for court employees, that is, to
avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance
of his duty but also in conducting himself outside or beyond his duties.
Page 641 of 1553

Facts:
Holasca was the plaintiff in the ejectment case. After obtaining a favorable
judgment, she sought the execution of the decision through Sheriff Pagunsan. Latter and
Francisco J. Calibuso, Jr. went to the occupied property to serve a copy of a Writ of
Execution. There, Sheriff Pagunsan allegedly told Spouses Nestor and Vilma Moya
(defendants), not to talk to anybody regarding the payment of damages in the ejectment
case. Holasca further alleged that Sheriff Pagunsan did not conduct an inventory of all the
chattels found inside the house of the defendants, or evict the latter from its premises.
According to Holasca, Calibuso, in the presence of the male companion, handed

over to Sheriff Pagunsan the amount of P1,500.00, which the latter accepted without issuing
any official receipt. When Holasca inspected the property, she discovered that the
defendants had vacated the premises, leaving the place in total disarray and littered with
debris. When she reported the incident to Sheriff Pagunsan, the latter allegedly did not do
anything.
In the answer of Sheriff Pagunsan, he claimed that he served a Notice to Vacate on

the defendants. He was accompanied by their branch processer and by Calibuso who was
allegedly financing the ejectment case from the start of the case. Sheriff Pagunsan admitted
that he did not make an inventory of the properties because the defendants did not let
them enter the gate. He likewise admitted that he did not evict the defendants because the
Notice to Vacate gave the latter three (3) days to voluntarily vacate the premises. He
claimed that he should not be blamed for the condition of the property after it was
ransacked by the defendants. He also claimed that he exerted efforts to locate the
defendants but Holasca had been uncooperative.
In Calibuso’s affidavit, he denied taking advantage of his position in court and

claimed that he only financed the initial expenses of the ejectment case out of extreme
gratitude to Holasca. He maintained that Sheriff Pagunsan only dragged him into the
controversy because the latter wanted to get even with him for siding with Holasca.
Calibuso further claimed that the cause of the delay in the writ’s implementation was solely
attributable to Sheriff Pagunsan.
The Investigating Judge found Sheriff Pagunsan guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and
recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground that Calibuso did not commit any
wrongful act. Court referred the Investigating Judge's report and recommendation to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Page 642 of 1553

The OCA agreed with the findings of fact of the Investigating Judge, but found
Sheriff Pagunsan guilty of Gross Inefficiency and that Calibuso should be held liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under R.A. No. 6713.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sherriff Pangusan is liable for Gross Inefficiency.
2. Whether or not Calibuso is liable for violations of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel.
Ruling:
1. Sherriff Pangusan is liable for Gross Inefficiency.
The duties of the sheriff in implementing writs of execution are explicitly laid down
in the Rules of Court (Rules). Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Section 10, Rule 39 of the
Rules provide for the manner a writ for the delivery or the restitution of real property shall
be enforced by the sheriff. Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules, on the other hand, requires
sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ ofexecution after its implementation.
The above provisions enumerate the following duties of a sheriff: first, to give notice
of the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him
vacate the property within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the
judgment obligor and all persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the latter’s
personal belongings in the property as well asdestroy, demolish or remove the
improvements constructed thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to execute and
make a return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days
thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires.
These provisions leave no room for any exercise of discretion on the part of the
sheriff on how to perform his or her duties in implementing the writ. A sheriff’s compliance
with the Rules is not merely directory but mandatory.
In the present case, Court finds that Sheriff Pagunsan was remiss in performing his
mandated duties. To recall, the Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC on February 4,
2009. Sheriff Pagunsan served the Writ on February 11, 2009, giving the defendants three
(3) days or until February 14, 2009 within which to voluntary vacate the premises. However,
there was no showing that the writ had been fully implemented or the property delivered
to the complainant on February 14, 2009. In fact, the records would show that Sheriff
Page 643 of 1553

Pagunsan did not return to the premises on the said date or any date thereafter; nor made
any personal follow-ups from the defendants. In short, no other action was undertaken by
Sheriff Pagunsan to implement the writ of execution.
In addition to Sheriff Pagunsan’s delay and reluctance to implement the writ, he also
failed to collect the money judgment in favor of Holasca. Despite the opportunity to collect,
Sheriff Pagunsan did not do anything. In his answer, he even admitted that he did not
conduct an inventory of the defendants’ personal properties. Such failure to carry out what
is purely a ministerial duty, together with his delay in the implementation of the writ,
demonstrates his incompetence and gross inefficiency in the performance of his official
duties.
2) Yes, Calibuso is liable for violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
Calibuso’s participation in the ejectment case is clearly not connected with his
judicial duties as court personnel. Nonetheless, the Court stresses that Calibuso, as an
employee of the judiciary, must maintain a neutral hands-off attitude in dealing with party-
litigants, in this case, in the execution of a decision.
All court personnel should be reminded that they have no business getting
personally involved in matters directly emanating from court proceedings, unless expressly
so provided by law. Evidence on record reveals that Calibuso admitted giving Sheriff
Pagunsan the amount of P1,500.00 for the implementation of the writ of execution.
Calibuso likewise admitted that he personally accompanied Sheriff Pagunsan to the
residence of the defendants to serve the writ. While he may have been motivated solely by
anearnest desire to help Holasca, his action however, does not exculpate him from liability.
Court employees should be wary when assisting persons dealing with the courts and
their cases. While they are not totally prohibited from rendering aid to others, they should
see to it that the assistance, albeit involving acts unrelated to their official functions, does
not in any way compromise the public’s trust in the justice system.
In the present case, by getting personally involved in the writ’s implementation,

Calibuso transgressed the strict norm of conduct prescribed for court employees, that is, to
avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance
of his duty but also in conducting himself outside or beyond his duties. Thus, Court finds,
as the OCA did, that Calibuso has clearly demonstrated conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Page 644 of 1553

SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-TABINO vs. LAZARO

M. TABINO
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing
before the regional trial court (R TC) of another action raising ownership of the property as
an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on
appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would
result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. In the case
at bar, if the ejectment case is allowed to proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR
Protests, then a situation might arise where the existing structures thereon would have to be
demolished. On the other hand, if Spouses Labino’s position, as to be affirmed by the DENR,
is further upheld with finality by the courts, then it would mean that Lazaro had no right to
occupy or take possession of the subject lots, which thus negates his right to institute and
maintain the ejectment case.
Facts:
Proclamation No. 518 excluded from the operation of Proc. 423- which established
the military reservation known as Fort Bonifacio- certain portions in said reservation and
declared the same open for disposition in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 274, and
RA 730 in relation to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Among others, Proc.
518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition to any bona fide
occupants/residents of said certain portions who have resided in or occupied such areas on
or before January 7, 1986.
In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a technical sergeant in the

military – and his brother, respondent Lazaro M. Tabino – a colonel in the military –
occupied a 353-square meter lot in Pembo, Makati City. Mauricio established residence
within the lot, while Lazaro continued to reside in Novaliches, Quezon City. The lot was
later subdivided into two portions, denominated as Lots 2 and 3. Lot 2 – containing an area
of 184 squaremeters – was applied for coverage under Proc. 518 by Mauricio, while Lot 3 –
containing an area of 169 square meters – was applied for by Lazaro. Lazaro was later on
issued by the Fort Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable Permit to occupy his lot, but the
permit authorized him to occupy an area of only 150 square meters. In 1988, Lot 3 was
awarded to Lazaro and a Certificate to such effect was issued by the Bureau of Lands (now
Land Management Bureau).
On May 11, 2004, Lazaro filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter’s
wife, Leonila dela Cruz (petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (MeTC).
The ejectment case is based on the theory that Lazaro is the true and sole owner of the 353-
Page 645 of 1553
square meter lot and that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of circumventing the 300-
square meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the latter to apply for the purchase of a portion
of the lot after subdividing the same into two smaller lots. Spouses Labino countered that
Lazaro had no right to eject them; that the parties’ true agreement was that Spouses Labino
would act as caretakers of Lazaro’s Lot 3 and that relative to Lot 2 and 3, there were pending
Protests filed with the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR)National Capital Region.
The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Labino but CA reversed their decision
and ordered the Spouses Labino to vacate the lots subject of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Labino should vacate the subject lots.
Ruling:
No.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering Spouses Labino to vacate
the premises. With the pendency of the DENR Protests – Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939
– Lazaro’s claim of possession and his right to recover the premises is seriously placed in
issue. If the ejectment case – Civil Case No. 85043 – is allowed to proceed without awaiting
the result of the DENR Protests, then a situation might arise where the existing structures
thereon would have to be demolished. If Spouses Labino’s position, as to be affirmed by the
DENR, is further upheld with finality by the courts, then it would mean that Lazaro had no
right to occupy or take possession of the subject lots, which thus negates his right to
institute and maintain the ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a
consequence of the demolition of Spouses Labino’s residence and other permanent
improvements on the disputed lots following the decision in the ejectment case in favor of
Lazaro.
Indeed, the DENR protests by the parties have found their way to the CA, and the
pronouncements of the latter do not exactly favor Lazaro. On this point, it is worth
stressing that the courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of
administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters
falling under their jurisdiction. Under the Public Land Act, the Director of Lands primarily
and the DENR Secretary ultimately have the authority to dispose of and manage public
lands. And while the DENR’s jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority
of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession, the DENR’s decision would prevail
with regard to the respective rights of public land claimants. Regular courts would have no
Page 646 of 1553
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the award of the public land. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust
of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions
and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence.
Indeed, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions,

but none of these apply in this case. Consequently, Lazaro and Rafael should have first
appealed to the Office ofthe President, which has the power to review the orders or acts of
the DENR Secretary, being his subordinate, before coming to us through a petition for
review.
Finally, as a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the

mere filing before the regional trial court (R TC) of another action raising ownership of the
property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be
suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of
petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court
(MCTC) judgrnent. In light of the developments in the DENR Protests, the Court cannot
in good conscience order the Spouses Labino to vacate the premises at this point. The
better alternative would be to await the outcome of these Protests, before any action is
taken in the ejectment case.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. FELICISIMO TARCELO and HEIRS OF

COMIA SANTOS
The only portion of the decision that may be the subject of execution is that which is
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. Whatever may be found in the body of the
decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and serve
only as guides to determine the ratio decidendi. Thus, when the decretal portion of the RTC’s
2005 Decision particularly stating that NPC shall have the lawful right to enter, take
possession and acquire easement of right-of way over the affected portions of respondents’
properties upon the payment of just compensation, any order executing the trial court’s
Decision should be based on such dispositive portion.
Facts:
Petitioner National Power Corporation filed in 2000 a case seeking to expropriate

the land owned by the respondents Tarcelo and Heirs of Santos because portions of their
lands totaling 1,595.91 square meters (m2) will be traversed by the pipelines of NPC’s Ilijan
Natural Gas Pipeline Project. The RTC issued an order of expropriation, authorizing NPC
Page 647 of 1553
to take possession of the lots. The RTC later appointed three commissioners who submitted
their respective recommendations on the amount of just compensation. In 2005 the RTC
fixed just compensation at P1,000/m2.
The NPC appealed to the CA, which held in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 that the
respondents are entitled to the full market value of their property, not just 10% of the value
thereof. Upon finality of the CA decision, respondents moved for execution, which the RTC
granted in March 2009. The Land Bank account of NPC was garnished for the satisfaction
of the amount of P5,594,462.50 representing just compensation for the whole of
respondents’ 4,404- and 2,611- m2 lots – or 7,015 m2 – and not merely the supposedly
affected portions thereof totaling 1,595.91 m2 as NPC originally sought to acquire.
NPC moved to quash the writ of execution and notice of garnishment, stating that
the RTC and CA-GR CV No. 86712’s declarations on just compensation was only for the
affected area of 1,591 m2 or just the 10% easement fee therefor, and the CA did not decide
whether NPC should pay for the entire 7,015 m2.
In October 2009, the RTC denied NPC’s motion, holding that the construction of
underground pipeline would render the whole properties useless for the respondents. NPC
appealed anew to the CA, but the appeal was denied. The CA held that that there was
nothing in the 2005 RTC decision to indicate that NPC was being ordered to pay just
compensation only for the 1,595.91-square meter portion of respondents properties; on the
contrary, the trial court held that the just compensation is fixed at P1,000/m2, which meant
that in the fixing of the amount of just compensation, the trial court did not confine itself
to the 1,595.91-square meter portion but rather to the subject properties in their entirety
and without qualification.
Issue:
Was the issue of paying for the just compensation for the entire 7,015 m 2 of the
respondents’ properties not raised in the RTC and the CA, rendering the writ of execution
and garnishment null and void?
Ruling:
The Commissioners’ Reports indicate that only the affected areas were intended to
be acquired and compensated. The trial court itself particularly decreed in its November 7,
Page 648 of 1553

2005 Decision that only the affected portions of respondents’ properties were to be
acquired and compensated for.
The CA therefore patently erred in declaring in its assailed Decision that there is
nothing in the November 7, 2005 Decision of the Batangas City RTC to indicate that NPC
was being ordered to pay just compensation only for the 1,595.91-square meter portion of
respondents’ properties. On the contrary, the evidence is quite clear that NPC has been
made liable precisely to such extent only, and not more.
The Court likewise observes that contrary to the CA’s appreciation, the June 26, 2007
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 did not particularly declare that NPC should pay for the
entire area of respondents’ properties. It merely stated that respondents should be
compensated for the full and fair market value of their property and not merely paid a 10%
easement fee therefor; it did not resolve the issue of whether NPC should pay just
compensation for the entire area of 7,015 square meters. It simply said that NPC should pay
for the full per-square meter value of the affected portions, and not just a fraction thereof
(or 10%).
NPC is thus correct in its observation that the issue of whether it should be made to
pay for the whole 7,015-square meter area was not at all raised. Besides, in arriving at its
judgment, the CA took into full consideration the Commissioners’ Reports, which
recommended the payment of just compensation only for the affected portions of
respondents’ properties; if it believed otherwise, the appellate court would have so
indicated, and it would have taken exception to the said reports and arrived at its own
independent consideration of the case.
It has always been the rule that the only portion of the decision that may be the
subject of execution is that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion.
Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be considered as part of the
reasons or conclusions of the court and serve only as guides to determine the ratio
decidendi. Where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the
body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of
the decision. While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some
ambiguity in the manner of the court’s reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive
portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise
of those rights, and imposes corresponding duties or obligation. Thus, with the decretal
portion of the trial court’s November 7, 2005 Decision particularly stating that NPC shall
have the lawful right to enter, take possession and acquire easement of right-of way over
the affected portions of respondents’ properties upon the payment of just compensation,
Page 649 of 1553

any order executing the trial court’s Decision should be based on such dispositive portion.
An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision.
Execution must therefore conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive

part of the decision. Since there is a disparity between the dispositive portion of the RTC’s
2005 Decision as affirmed with modification by the final and executory Decision of the CA
in CA- G.R. CV No. 86712 – which decreed that respondents be paid just compensation only
for the affected portions of their properties, totaling 1,595.91 square meters – and the Notice
of Garnishment – for the satisfaction of the amount of P5,594,462.50 representing just
compensation for the whole 7,015 square meters – the latter must be declared null and void.
In the same manner, the Batangas City RTC’s September 24, 2009 and October 23,
2009 Orders are hereby declared null and void in regard only to the Notice of Garnishment,
as it countermands the decretal portion of the November 7, 2005 Decision and completely
changes the tenor thereof by holding NPC liable to pay for the value of the whole of
respondents’ properties; all proceedings held for the purpose of amending or altering the
dispositive portion of the trial court’s November 7, 2005 Decision, as affirmed with
modification by the CA’s final and executory June 26, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
86712, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
JUANITO G. CAMPIT vs. ISIDRA B. GRIPA, PEDRO BARDIAGA, AND SEVERINO

BARDIAGA, REPRESENTED BY HIS SON, ROLANDO BARDIAGA
A judgment unenforced within 10 years after its finality shall be barred. However an
exception is when a registered owner of land cannot invoke the protection accorded by the
Statute of Limitations when he derived his right from misrepresentation.
Facts:
The subject of the case was a 2-hectare land covered by Torrens title issued in the
name of Juanito Campit but under the possession of respondents Gripa et al. Both parties
claim to be the rightful owners of the land. Campit alleged that he derived his title from his
father by virtue of a deed of sale in 1977 while the respondents contended that they were
declared as owners in 2 previously decided cases in 1961 and 1978, respectively.
Campit refused to turn over the title to the respondents. This prompted the
respondents to file an action for annulment of title against Campit in 2003. In his defense,
Campit asseverated that the action is barred as the respondents failed to enforce the
previous judgments within 10 years after they had reached finality.
Page 650 of 1553

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by the CA. Hence,
the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action is barred by Statute of Limitations after respondents

failed to enforce the judgment within 10 years after the finality
Ruling:
No, the action is not barred.
It appears that no motion or action to revive judgment was ever filed by the
respondents - the prevailing party in Civil Case No. 15357, to execute and enforce the August
8, 1978 decision. The title to the subject property, therefore, remained registered under the
petitioner’s name. As the petitioner argued, his title had already become incontrovertible
since the Torrens system of land registration provides for the indefeasibility of the decree
of registration and the certificate of title issued upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of entry of the registration decree.
The Court cannot, however, allow the petitioner to maintain his title and benefit
from the fruit of his and his predecessors’ fraudulent acts at the expense of the respondents
who are the rightful owners of the subject property. The Torrens system of registration
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for
the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others.
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can
still be compelled under the law to reconvey the property registered to the rightful owner16
under the principle that the property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real
owner by the person in whose name it is registered. The party seeking to recover title to
property wrongfully registered in another person’s name must file an action for
reconveyance within the allowed period of time. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such
action does not prescribe, i.e. when the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the
action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.
In the present case, the respondents, who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 18421
have always been in possession of the subject property.
Page 651 of 1553

CENTENNIAL GUARANTEE ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. UNIVERSAL MOTORS

CORPORATION, RODRIGO T. JANEO, JR., GERARDO GELLE, NISSAN CAGAYAN
DE ORO DISTRIBUTORS, INC., JEFFERSON U. ROLIDA, and PETER YAP
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that
only a final judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), the existence of "good reasons" for the immediate execution of a judgment is an
indispensable requirement as this is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances
justifying immediate execution, lest judgment becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing party’s
chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are altogether nullified. The
"good reason" yardstick imports a superior circumstance demanding urgency that will
outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party and one such "good reason" that has been
held to justify discretionary execution is the imminent danger of insolvency of the defeated
party.
The factual findings that NSSC is under a state of rehabilitation and had ceased
business operations, taken together with the information that NSSC President and General
Manager Orimaco had permanently left the country with his family, constitute such superior
circumstances that demand urgency in the execution of the October 31, 2007 Decision
because respondents now run the risk of its non-satisfaction by the time the appeal is decided
with finality.
Facts:
The instant petition originated from a Complaint for Breach of Contract with
Damages and Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraning Order filed by
Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC) and its President and General Manager,
Reynaldo A. Orimaco (Orimaco), against herein respondents Universal Motors
Corporation (UMC), Rodrigo T. Janeo, Jr. (Janeo, Jr.), Gerardo Gelle (Gelle), Nissan Cagayan
de Oro Distributors, Inc. (NCOD), Jefferson U. Rolida (Rolida), and Peter Yap (Yap). The
temporary restraining order (TRO) prayed for was eventually issued by the RTC upon the
posting by NSSC and Orimaco of a Php1,000,000.00 injunction bond issued by their surety,
Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corporation (CGAC). The TRO enjoined respondents
UMC, Rolida, Gelle, Janeo, Jr., NCOD, and Yap (respondents) from selling, dealing, and
marketing all models of motor vehicles and spare parts of Nissan, and from terminating the
dealer agreement between UMC and NSSC. It likewise restrained UMC from supplying and
doing trading transactions with NCOD, which, in turn, was enjoined from entering and
doing business on Nissan Products within the dealership territory of NSSC as defined in
Page 652 of 1553

the Dealer Agreement. The TRO was converted to a writ of preliminary injunction on April
2, 2002.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail
the issuance of the aforesaid injunctive writ. On July 24, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision
holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ absent a clear
legal right thereto on the part of NSSC and Orimaco. Consequently, the April 2, 2002 Writ
of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC was ordered dissolved.
Hence, respondents filed an application for damages against the injunction bond
issued by CGAC in the amount of Php1,000,000.00. After hearing, RTC rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint for breach of contract with damages for lack of merit. It
further ruled that respondents were entitled to recover damages against the injunction
bond following the CA’s pronouncement that NSSC and Orimaco had no clear legal right
to justify the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, warranting its dissolution. Upon
respondents’ motion, the RTC granted Execution Pending Appeal of its decision through
an order and ruled that there exists good reasons to justify the immediate execution. CGAC
assailed the RTC’s order of execution before the CA through a petition for certiorari,
questioning the existence of good reasons to warrant the grant of execution pending appeal
and the propriety of enforcing it against one which is not the losing party in the case but a
mere bondsman whose liability is limited to the surety bond it issued. On appeal, CA
affirmed the order of RTC allowing the execution pending appeal. Aggrieved, CGAC filed a
motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied, hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether good reasons exist to justify execution pending appeal against

CGAC which is a mere surety; and
2. Whether CGAC’s liability on the bond should be limited to Php500,000.00.
Ruling:
The petition is unmeritorious.
1. Yes, there exist good reasons to justify the execution of judgement pending appeal.
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that
only a final judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), the existence of "good reasons" for the immediate execution of a judgment
is an indispensable requirement as this is what confers discretionary power on a court to
Page 653 of 1553

issue a writ of execution pending appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances
justifying immediate execution, lest judgment becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing
party’s chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are altogether
nullified. The "good reason" yardstick imports a superior circumstance demanding urgency
that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party and one such "good reason" that
has been held to justify discretionary execution is the imminent danger of insolvency of the
defeated party.
The factual findings that NSSC is under a state of rehabilitation and had ceased
business operations, taken together with the information that NSSC President and General
Manager Orimaco had permanently left the country with his family, constitute such
superior circumstances that demand urgency in the execution of the October 31, 2007
Decision because respondents now run the risk of its non-satisfaction by the time the
appeal is decided with finality. Notably, as early as April 22, 2008, the rehabilitation receiver
had manifested before the rehabilitation court the futility of rehabilitating NSSC because
of the latter’s insincerity in the implementation of the rehabilitation process. Clearly,
respondents’ diminishing chances of recovery from the favorable Decision is a good reason
to justify immediate execution; hence, it would be improper to set aside the order granting
execution pending appeal.
That CGAC’s financial standing differs from that of NSSC does not negate the order
of execution pending appeal. As the latter’s surety, CGAC is considered by law as being the
same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the
latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. Verily, in a contract of
suretyship, one lends his credit by joining in the principal debtor’s obligation so as to
render himself directly and primarily responsible with him, and without reference to the
solvency of the principal. Thus, execution pending appeal against NSSC means that the
same course of action is warranted against its surety, CGAC. The same reason stands for
CGAC’s other principal, Orimaco, who was determined to have permanently left the
country with his family to evade execution of any judgment against him.
2. No, CGAC liability is not limited to Php500,000.00
Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules provides that the injunction bond is answerable
for all damages that may be occasioned by the improper issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.31 The Court has held in Paramount Insurance Corp. v. CA that:
The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no
ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved.
Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account to the defendant in
Page 654 of 1553

the injunction suit for all: (1) such damages; (2) costs and damages; (3) costs,
damages and reasonable attorney's fees as shall be incurred or sustained by the
person enjoined in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued.
In this case, the RTC, in view of the improvident issuance of the April 2, 2002 Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, adjudged CGAC's principals, NSSC and Orimaco, liable not only
for damages as against NCOD, Rolida, and Yap but also as against UMC. As may be gleaned
from the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision, the amount adjudged to the former group
was P500,000.00, while it was found - this time, contained in the body of the same decision
- that damages in the amount P4,199,355.00 due to loss of sales was incurred by UMC in
the year 2002, or the year in which the latter was prevented from selling their products
pursuant to the April 2, 2002 Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Since CGAC is answerable
jointly and severally with NSSC and Orimaco for their liabilities to the above-mentioned
parties for all damages caused by the improvident issuance of the said injunctive writ, and
considering that the total amount of damages as above-stated evidently exhausts the full
Phpl,000,000.00 amount of the injunction bond, there is perforce no reason to reverse the
assailed CA Decision even on this score.
ATTY. RICO PAOLO R. QUICHO, representing Bank of Commerce

vs. BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff IV,
Branch 98, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
A.M. No. P-14-3246, October 15, 2014, J. Mendoza
The sheriff should demand from the judgment obligor the immediate payment in cash,
certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the
judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can exercise his
option to choose which of his property can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option
immediately or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff
can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
Facts:
The present case stemmed from the Alias Writ of Execution by Branch 98 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC), the validity of which was then pending
determination in the Court of Appeals (CA).. Pending its resolution, Atty. Quicho sought
the relief of Reyes as Sheriff of RTC, whom he claimed exceeded his authority in the
enforcement of the Alias Writ of Execution on December 9, 2010 at the main office of BOC
and on December 17, 2010 in another BOC branch in Lipa City, Batangas.
Page 655 of 1553

In his sworn Letter-Complaint, Atty. Quicho alleged that the procedure observed by
Reyes in implementing the alias writ violated the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court
(Manual). He cited the Manual which provides that "[i]f the judgment obligor cannot pay
all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value
and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately
choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment."
He asserted that as the holder of the assets and properties of Traders Royal Bank
(TRB), which was the judgment obligor and whose assets were the subject of the alias writ,
BOC was given the option to choose which property to be surrendered to satisfy the
judgment. It was only when BOC was unable to exercise the option that Reyes was allowed
to levy on other properties. He added that BOC was forced to surrender under protest a
real estate property situated in Barangay Manggahan, Paranaque City, to satisfy the
judgment and preserve its other properties from being wrongfully levied by Reyes. He
argued that Reyes did not give BOC a chance to exercise that option. Instead of accepting
the said property, Reyes blow-torched the locked grill door of BOC’s cash vault in Lipa City
and forcibly took the money deposits of its clients as well as its computers. Atty. Quicho
further claimed that Reyes sowed terror by bringing with him agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), who were in full-battle gear and carrying high-powered firearms,
with members of the Philippine National Police (PNP); and that Reyes ignored the pleas of
the BOC officers who asked him to spare the computers as taking them would cripple the
bank’s operations. Atty. Quicho concluded that these illegal acts of Reyes warranted his
relief as sheriff of the RTC.
The OCA found sufficient grounds to hold Reyes administratively liable for his
overzealousness in implementing the alias writ of execution. The OCA concluded that
Reyes clearly exceeded his authority when he resolved on his own the legal issue that arose
in the course of his implementation of the writ and pursued his own course of action
without referring the matter to the issuing court
Issue:
Whether or not respondent sheriff is guilty of grave abuse of authority for

implementing a writ outside his area of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Page 656 of 1553

The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Time and again, the Court has declared that the highest standard of professionalism
in the performance of judicial tasks is demanded from every court personnel. The Court
expects every court personnel to perform his/her duties promptly, with great care and
diligence, having in mind the important role he/she plays in the administration of justice.
Reyes, in his Comment, had admitted that he refused to accept the real estate
property offered by the BOC to settle the judgment award because he believed that it was
not allowed under the law and also because it was offered late.
Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure as to how
execution of judgments for money is enforced.
Under this rule, the duties of a sheriff are: (1) to first make a demand from the obligor
for the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and of all
lawful fees; (2) to receive payment in the form of cash, certified bank check payable to the
obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter; (3) to levy upon the
properties of the obligor, not exempt from execution, if the latter cannot pay all or part of
the obligation; (4) give the obligor the opportunity to exercise the option to choose which
property may be levied upon; (5) in case the option is not exercised, to first levy on the
personal properties of the obligor, including the garnishment of debts due the obligor and
other credits, i.e., bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other
personal properties not capable of manual delivery or in the possession or control of third
parties; and (6) to levy on real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to
answer for the judgment.
From the aforecited provisions, it is clear that the sheriff shall demand from the
judgment obligor the immediate payment in cash, certified bank check or any other mode
of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these
methods immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his property
can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or
cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal
properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to
answer for the judgment. In this case, BOC exercised its option, although belatedly, by
offering a parcel of land located in Paranaque City. The Court notes that a second petition
for certiorari questioning the subject writ of execution was filed by BOC with the CA on
November 8, 2010. The said petition was dismissed in the CA Resolution promulgated on
November 26, 2010. On December 9, 2010, BOC filed its motion for reconsideration.
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration or on December 17, 2010, the notice
Page 657 of 1553

of levy was served with BOC at its Lipa City Branch. BOC offered under protest its real
property in Paranaque City to settle the judgment sum. The motion for reconsideration
was, however, denied by the CA on February 9, 2011.
Yet, Reyes ignored BOC’s option to surrender the said property.1âwphi1 He insisted
and pursued to levy on cash and other personal properties of the BOC despite the said offer.
Such act indeed constituted a clear violation of the Rules.
Even on the assumption that BOC waived its right to exercise the option by belatedly
offering its real estate property as satisfaction for its obligation, still, it would not exonerate
Reyes from liability.
Considering that BOC’s offer was not exercised immediately as strictly required by
the prescribed procedure under the Rules, Reyes was confronted with a crucial issue that
should have been threshed out. The nature of his function as sheriff being ministerial, he
had no discretion or authority to decide the legal question involved. As aptly ruled by the
OCA, Reyes was duty-bound to seek clarification from the judge who issued the writ to
determine whether the offer was acceptable under the circumstances. Instead of consulting
Judge Cabochan who was in the best position to resolve the matter, Reyes acted on his own
and rejected the offer outright.
As an officer of the court, he should have known the proper action to take when
questions relating to the writ require clarification. Regrettably, he failed in this regard.
Moreover, Reyes’ act of taking the bank’s computers cannot be justified. As held in
Equitable PCI Bank v. Bellones, the sheriff cannot arbitrarily levy on property essential to
the work or business of the judgment obligor. He should have heeded the repeated pleas
of BOC’s officers to spare the computers so as not to hamper its banking operations.
It is observed, however, that Reyes’ act of rejecting BOC’s offer cannot be considered
as one brought about by his ignorance of the law, but is apparently due to his
overzealousness in implementing the alias writ of execution. The Court, thus, agrees with
the OCA that Reyes’ actuation only amounted to grave abuse of authority.
Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer,

who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.
Page 658 of 1553

Evidently, the liability of Reyes was proven by substantial evidence, which is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, such being the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION vs. GOYU & SONS, INC., GO SONG HIAP, BETTY
CHIU SUK YING, NG CHING KWOK, YEUNG SHUK HING, AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE SPOUSES, AND MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
G.R. No. 142983, November 26, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The garnishment of property operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property
a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It
is brought into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. When the proceeds of fire
insurance policy numbers F-114-07402 and F-114-07525 were placed under custodia legis of
Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-65442, they were placed under the sole
control of such court beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate courts. The court has
held that property attached or garnished by a court falls into the custodia legis of that court
for the purposes of that civil case only. Any relief against such attachment and the execution
and issuance of a writ of possession that ensued subsequently could be disposed of only in
that case. In the case at bar, therefore, the order to deposit the proceeds of fire insurance
policy numbers F-114-07402 and F-114-07525 brought the amount garnished into the custodia
legis of the court issuing said order, that is, the RTC of Manila, Branch 3, beyond the
interference of all other co-ordinate courts, such as the RTC of Manila, Branch 14.
Facts:
Respondent Goyu & Sons, Inc. (GOYU), with individual respondents Go Song Hiap,
Betty Chiu Suk Ying, Ng Ching Kwok, and Yeung Shuk Hing as guarantors (INDIVIDUAL
GUARANTORS), incurred various obligations to SOLIDBANK in connection with the
financing of GOYU’s business as exporter of solid doors.
As additional security, GOYU obtained several fire insurance policies issued by

respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (MICO). On January 10, 1992 and February
11, 1992, respectively, GOYU endorsed two of these policies in favor of SOLIDBANK to
answer for all the obligations incurred by GOYU to SOLIDBANK. The endorsements of the
policies bear the conformity of MICO’s agent.
On April 27, 1992, fire gutted one of the buildings of GOYU. GOYU filed a claim for
indemnity with MICO, which was, however, denied by the latter on the ground that the
insurance policies were the subject of writs of attachment issued by various courts or
otherwise claimed by other creditors of GOYU. Respondent-Intervenor Rizal Commercial
Page 659 of 1553

Banking Corporation (RCBC), one of GOYU’s creditors, also filed with MICO a claim for
the proceeds of GOYU’s insurance policies, including fire insurance policy numbers F-114-
07402 and F-114-07525. RCBC claims that the insurance policies in question were
purchased by GOYU pursuant to the terms and conditions of the mortgage executed by
GOYU to ensure the payment of its obligations with RCBC. MICO likewise denied RCBC’s
claims on the same ground.
On April 6, 1993, GOYU filed against MICO, RCBC, and two RCBC officers
a complaint for specific performance and damages in the RTC of Manila. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65442 and raffled to Branch 3 of said court. The
complaint prayed, among other things, that MICO be ordered to pay GOYU the total
amount of P74,040,518.50 representing ten insurance policies it secured from MICO
including fire insurance policy numbers F-114-07402 and F-114-07525.
In the meantime, SOLIDBANK filed an action for collection of sum of money with
prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, also with the RTC of Manila, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 92-62749, and raffled to Branch 14 of said court, against GOYU,
the INDIVIDUAL GUARANTORS with their spouses, and MICO.
With regard to Civil Case No. 93-65442(complaint for specific performance and
damages filed by GOYU against MICO, RCBC and RCBC officers): On June 29, 1994, the
RTC rendered judgment in a favor of GOYU and ordered its clerk of court “to release
immediately to [GOYU] the amount of P50,000,000.00 deposited with the Court by
[MICO], together with all the interests earned thereon.” GOYU, MICO, and RCBC filed
separate appeals which were consolidated with the Court of Appeals. MICO and RCBC
contested their liability to GOYU, while GOYU was unsatisfied by the amounts
awarded. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated December 18, 1996, increased the
amounts awarded to GOYU. On April 20, 1998, this Court rendered its Decision in the
consolidated cases, reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals by ordering, among
other things, the Clerk of Court to release the amount of P50,505,594.60 including the
interests earned to RCBC instead of GOYU.
With regard to Civil Case No. 92-62749 (action for collection of sum of money with
prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment filed bySOLIDBANK against GOYU,
INDIVIDUAL GUARANTORS and their spouses, and MICO): On November 16, 1993, RCBC
filed a Motion for Intervention, claiming that the two insurance policies in question were
purchased by GOYU pursuant to the terms and conditions of the mortgage executed by
GOYU to ensure the payment of its obligations with RCBC. The RTC denied the motion in
an Order dated March 15, 1995 on the ground that RCBC’s rights may be fully protected in
a separate proceeding, in particular, Civil Case No. 93-65442.
Page 660 of 1553

On November 28, 1995, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of SOLIDBANK. On
December 28, 1995, SOLIDBANK filed a Motion for Execution against all defendants except
MICO. On November 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Resolution on various
motions filed by the parties.
According to the appellate court, SOLIDBANK had the legal authority to withdraw
the amount by virtue of the final and executory judgment rendered in its favor by Branch
14 of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 92-62749. RCBC cannot complain about said
withdrawal, not only because it was not a party to said case, but also because its motion to
intervene was denied by the RTC.
RCBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 6, 1996 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals. On June 23, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution
setting aside its November 6, 1996 Resolution and ordering SOLIDBANK to restitute the
amount withdrawn by it with interest. SOLIDBANK filed an Omnibus Motion seeking
reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. On April 28, 2000,
the Court of Appeals, taking judicial notice of the Decision of this Court dated April 20,
1998, issued the second assailed Resolution,
SOLIDBANK filed the present petition assailing the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51894 dated June 23, 1997 and April 28, 2000.
Issue:
Whether or not SOLIDBANK has the right to withdraw from the amount in custodia
legis in Civil Case No. 93-65442.
Ruling:
SOLIDBANK has no right to withdraw from the amount in custodia legis in Civil
Case No. 93-65442, not because SOLIDBANK is bound by the judgment therein,
but precisely because it is not a party in said case.
When the proceeds of fire insurance policy numbers F-114-07402 and F-114-07525
were placed under custodia legis of Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-
65442, they were placed under the sole control of such court beyond the interference of all
other co-ordinate courts. The court has held that property attached or garnished by a court
falls into the custodia legis of that court for the purposes of that civil case only. Any relief
against such attachment and the execution and issuance of a writ of possession that ensued
subsequently could be disposed of only in that case.
Page 661 of 1553

In the case at bar, therefore, the order to deposit the proceeds of fire insurance
policy numbers F-114-07402 and F-114-07525 brought the amount garnished into
the custodia legis of the court issuing said order, that is, the RTC of Manila, Branch 3,
beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate courts, such as the RTC of Manila, Branch
14. Accordingly, just as the sheriff in Yau was found to have improperly levied on the
garnished share in Manila Golf, the act of the sheriff in Civil Case No. 92-62749 in the case
at bar in levying on the deposited insurance proceeds was likewise a patent nullity.
The Court further notes that the October 12, 1993 Order of Branch 3 directing MICO
to deposit with the court the proceeds of the 10 fire insurance policies even explicitly
provided withdrawal of which shall not be allowed except upon order of this court .
In what appears to be an attempt to mislead this Court, SOLIDBANK furthermore

argues that the Court of Appeals completely disregarded the certification issued by MICO
which stated that “[s]aid amount of Php 23,070,730.83 forms part of the above-listed sums
deposited in custodia legis x x x awaiting final judgment in Civil Case No. 92-62749, RTC-
Manila Br. 14.”
There is no question that the funds were deposited in court pursuant to the Order
of Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-65442. SOLIDBANK does not dispute
this fact, nor even claim that the funds were deposited pursuant to an order of Branch 14
in Civil Case No. 92-62749.
Far from making SOLIDBANK bound by the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-65442
(CA-G.R. CV No. 46162 in the Court of Appeals; G.R. Nos. 128833, 128834 and 128866 in this
Court), the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51894 (Civil Case No. 92-62749 in the trial
court) actually strictly enforced the delineation of the two cases when it found the levy in
Civil Case No. 92-62749 of the garnished insurance proceeds in Civil Case No. 93-65442 to
be improper and ordered the restitution of the amount withdrawn by SOLIDBANK. As
discussed above, SOLIDBANK has no right to withdraw from the amount in custodia
legis in Civil Case No. 93-65442, not because SOLIDBANK is bound by the judgment
therein (which it is not), but precisely because it is not a party in said case. The property
garnished is under the sole control of the court in Civil Case No. 93-65442 for the purposes
of that civil case only. This is true as long as the property remains in custodia legis in Civil
Case No. 93-65442, regardless of even whether this Court has rendered a Decision in the
appeal of said case.
In view of all the foregoing, the court finds that the Court of Appeals was not in
error, much less in grave abuse of discretion, when it found the levy in Civil Case No. 92-
Page 662 of 1553

62749 of the garnished insurance proceeds in Civil Case No. 93-65442 to be improper and
ordered the restitution of the amount withdrawn by SOLIDBANK. Accordingly, the
present petition should be denied.
CONRADO B. NICART JR., as PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF LGU-EASTERN SAMAR

vs. MA. JOSEFINA C. TITONG and JOSELITO M. ABRUGAR SR.
G.R. No. 207682, December 10, 2014, J. Velasco Jr.
Generally, the filing and pendency of a petition for review with the CA or certiorari
with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission
unless the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction. However, judicial courtesy
dictates that Commission should suspend its proceedings and await the CA’s resolution of
the petition for review.
Facts:
A few days prior to the end of his term, then Governor of Eastern Samar Ben P.
Evardone issued ninety-three appointments between May 11, 2010 and June 29, 2010,
including that of herein respondents Ma. Josefina Titong and Joselito Abrugar, Sr., which
appointments were later confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Consequently, the
appointees immediately assumed their respective positions. Upon submission, however of
the appointments to the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VIII, all 93
appointments were disapproved for having been made in violation of Section 2.1 of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 16, series of 2007. Meanwhile, on August 10, 2010, Titong and
Abrugar requested the assistance of the CSC with their claim for payment of their first
salary which was denied by the Commission on Audit Provincial Office and by Nicart, who
at that time was already the incumbent Governor.
The CSC rendered Decision No. 10-0242 dated December 13, 2010, granting the
petition, modifying the CSCRO’s ruling, and declaring the appointment of Titong and
Abrugar valid on the ground that the two are qualified for the positions to which they were
appointed. Undaunted, Nicart filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
above CSC Decision and Resolution.
Pending resolution thereof by the CA, the CSC, upon respondents’ motion, issued a
writ of execution ordering petitioner and the Provincial Government to pay the salaries and
other emoluments due to respondents from the time of their assumption of office on June
21, 2010 up to the present.
Page 663 of 1553

In view of Nicart’s continued refusal to pay their salaries, among others, despite the
service of the writ of execution upon him, respondents filed before the RTC a Petition for
Mandamus. On July 3, 2012, with the Civil Case still pending, the CA rendered a Decision
granting the petition and ruling that respondents’ appointments are not valid.
Prior to the RTC’s resolution of the petition for mandamus, the Court denied the
petition for review of the CA Decision, ruling that there is no reversible error in the
challenged decision to warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary appellate
jurisdiction, thereby affirming the CA’s finding that respondents’ appointments are invalid.
Aggrieved, respondents sought reconsideration thereof. Pending the Court’s action on
respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC, on April 11, 2013, rendered the assailed
Decision in Civil Case No. 4236 in favor of Titong and Abrugar.
Issue:
Whether or not the enforcement of the Decision of the CSC upholding the legality
of respondents’ appointment remains to be proper considering the Court’s affirmation of
the invalidity thereof.
Ruling:
No, it is not.
The filing and pendency of a petition for review with the CA or certiorari with the
Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless
the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction. Ordinarily, the non-issuance by the
CA of an injunction or restraining order would make the CSC Resolution executory pending
appeal making it a proper subject of a petition for mandamus.
However, what the RTC failed to take into account is the fact that the propriety of
the very directives under the writ of mandamus sought is wholly reliant on the CA’s
resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 and that judicial courtesy dictates that it suspend its
proceedings and await the CA’s resolution of the petition for review.
EDMUND SIA
vs. WILFREDO ARCENAS, FERNANDO LOPEZ, AND PABLO RAFANAN
G.R. Nos. 209672-74, January 14, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
“The judgment in the mandamus petition sought to be enforced in the case at bar only
declared valid the auction sale where Sia bought the subject lots, and accordingly ordered the
Page 664 of 1553

City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale to Sia. Since the said judgment did not order that
the possession of the subject lots be vested unto Sia, the trial court substantially varied the
terms of the aforesaid judgment – and thus, exceeded its authority in enforcing the same –
when it issued the corresponding writs of possession and demolition to vest unto Sia the
possession of the subject lots. It is well-settled that orders pertaining to execution of
judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be
executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.
Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it,
it has no validity. Had the Sia pursued an action for ejectment or reconveyance, the issuance
of writs of possession and demolition would have been proper; but not in a special civil action
for mandamus, as in this case.”
Facts:
Due to the RPT delinquencies of Panay Railways, Inc. (PRI) over the subject lots
covering the years 1992 to 1996, the City Treasurer of Roxas City (City Treasurer) auctioned
the subject lots, with Petitioner Sia as the highest bidder and to whom a Certificate of Sale
was issued. This notwithstanding, Sia was not able to take possession thereof in view of the
refusal of the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale despite the lapse of the redemption
period. Worse, then Mayor Juliano Alba (Mayor Alba) of Roxas City issued EO No. 08-97,
nullifying the auction sale.
Hence, Sia was constrained to file a petition for the annulment of EO 08-97,
mandamus, and damages against the City Treasurer, Mayor Alba, the members of the City
Council of Roxas City, the Roxas City Government, and the PRI before the RTC of Roxas
City, seeking that a Final Bill of Sale be issued to him. The trial court resolved this petition
in favor of Sia. Nonetheless, despite Sia moving of the execution of the judgment, the City
Treasurer refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale, positing that Sia still had to settle the
delinquent RTs over the subject lots in the amount of PhP 2,394,526.44 which accrued
during the pendency of the case. Instead of paying said delinquent taxes, Sia filed a motion
for an order divesting PRI title and vesting the same to herein Petitioner Sia, which the
lower court granted.
Eventually, Sia was able to enfore his right to possession over the property, which,
how-ever, entailed the demolition of the present occupants, herein respondents, who, at
that time, were the lessees of PRI. They moved for the quashal of the orders of the trial
court to which Sia opposed. The trial court denied the motion of the respondents, holding
that the proceedings for tax delinquency sale at a public auction takes the nature of, or is
akin to, an extrajudicial fore-closure, thus necessitating the issuance of the corresponding
writs of possession and demoli-tion. In this relation, it agreed with Sia’s posture that his
Page 665 of 1553

entitlement to the aforesaid writs arose from the ruling in the earlier special civil action
(SCA) for mandamus, as well as the orders directing the issuance of the Final Bill of Sale,
thereby vesting unto Sia title over the subject lots.
The CA, on the other hand, set aside the orders of the trial court with respect to the
writ of possession and demolition. It argued that these actions exceeded the ambit of the
order in the mandamus petition since it only contemplated the issuance of a Certificate of
Final Bill of Sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly declared the writs of possession and demolition
null and void, and accordingly directed the trial court to enforce the writ of execution on
the petition of mandamus.
Ruling:
YES, the proper remedy should have been a petition under Rule 43.
At the outset, it is essential to note that the petition before the lower court is
primarily that of mandamus, seeking that the court… compel the City Treasurer to issue a
Final Bill of Sale covering the subject lots in [Sia’s] favor pursuant to its mandate under
[Sec. 262 of R.A. No. 7160]… In fact, the lower court granted such petition when it declared
valid the auction sale where [Sia] purchased the subject lots in supersession of EO 08-97,
and accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue the sought for Final Bill of Sale[.] xxx.
As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a “command issuing from a court of law
of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.”
In this case, the judgment in the mandamus petition primarily compels the City
Treasu-rer to issue the Final Bill of Sale covering the subject lots in favor of [Sia] pursuant
to Sec. 262 of the LGC, a ministerial duty, which said officer unduly refused to perform.
Page 666 of 1553

Thus, it may be pro-perly deemed as a judgment ordering the issuance of a writ of

mandamus against the City Trea-surer.
Given that [this] judgment… ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling
the performance of a ministerial duty, and not the payment of money or the sale or delivery
of real or personal property, the same is in the nature of a special judgment – that is which
a judgment directs the performance of a specific act requiring the party or person to
personally do because of his personal qualifications and circumstances. As such, execution
of the said judgment should be governed by Sec. 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
“Sec. 11. Execution of special judgments. – When a judgment requires the

performance of any act other than those mentioned in [Sections 9 and 10, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court], a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the
writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom
the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey
the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys
such judgment.”
This is in consonance with the rule on service and enforcement of orders or

judgments concerning, among others, the special civil action of mandamus under Sec. 9,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which states:
“Sec. 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. – A certified copy of the

judg-ment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served
upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience
thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages
or costs awarded in accordance with Sec. 1 of Rule 39.”
The rule therefore is that the service and execution of a special judgment, such as a
favorable judgment in mandamus – as in this case – should be deemed to be limited to
directing compliance with the judgment, and in case of disobedience, to have the
disobedient person required by law to obey such judgment punished with contempt.
In this case, it is undisputed that the City Treasurer obstinately refused to issue the
Final Bill of Sale in Sia’s favor, despite the finality of the judgment… as well as the issuance
and service of the Writ of Execution… commanding him to do so. In view of such refusal,
the [trial court] should have cited the City Treasurer in contempt in order to enforce
Page 667 of 1553

obedience to the said judgment. However, instead of simply doing so, it granted Sia’s
numerous motions, resulting in, among others, the issuance of a writ of possession.
To recapitulate, “the judgment in the mandamus petition sought to be enforced in the

case at bar only declared valid the auction sale where Sia bought the subject lots, and accor-
dingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale to Sia. Since the said judgment
did not order that the possession of the subject lots be vested unto Sia, the trial court
substantially varied the terms of the aforesaid judgment – and thus, exceeded its authority in
enforcing the same – when it issued the corresponding writs of possession and demolition to
vest unto Sia the possession of the subject lots. It is well-settled that orders pertaining to
execution of judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision
sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it
seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life
and exceeds it, it has no validity. Had the Sia pursued an action for ejectment or
reconveyance, the issuance of writs of possession and demolition would have been proper; but
not in a special civil action for mandamus, as in this case.”
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION

vs. EDGARDO V. GUEVARA
G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro
In an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, the Court has limited review over
the decision rendered by the foreign tribunal. The Philippine courts cannot pass upon the
merits of the case pursuant to the incorporation clause of the Constitution, unless there is
proof of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
Facts:
Philsec Investment Corporation (PHILSEC) is a domestic stock brokerage firm and

BPI International Finance Limited (BPI-IFL) (previously called AIFL), both formerly owned
by Ayala Corp but was subsequently bought by BPI. PHILSEC was a member of the Makati
Stock Exchange and the rules of the said organization required that a stockbroker maintain
an amount of security equal to at least 50% of a client’s outstanding debt.
Guevara was the President of PHILSEC and one of his obligations was to resolve the
outstanding loans of a certain Ventura O. Ducat (Ducat), which the latter obtained
separately from PHILSEC and AIFL. Although Ducat constituted a pledge of his stock
portfolio valued at approximately US$1.4 million, Ducat’s loans already amounted to US$3.1
Page 668 of 1553

million. Because the security for Ducat’s debts fell below the 50% requirement of the
Makati Stock Exchange, the trading privileges of PHILSEC was in peril of being suspended.
Ducat proposed to settle his debts by an exchange of assets and offered his property
in Harris County Texas in the US in partnership with 1488 Inc., a US-based corporation. It
was accepted by Ayala Corp through Enrique Zobel, its CEO. Before the reaching finality of
the agreement, Zobel had the property appraised by sending an employee. The employee
of Ayala communicated to Zobel his estimate which was US$2.9 million. However, Guevara
was also tasked by Ayala Corp to have the property appraised and according to William
Craig, the former owner of the property, the fair market value of the land was US$3,365,000.
An agreement was then perfected where ATHONA, which was also owned by Ayala
Corp, should buy the property for US$2,807,209.02 from 1488, the part of the purchase price
of which (US$2.5million) was loaned from Philsec and AIFL and shall execute a promissory
note for the balance. Also in the agreement was that upon receipt of US$2.5million, 1488
shall fully pay the obligations of Ducat in Philsec and AIFL and shall become the new owner
of Ducat’s pledged stock portfolio.
After acquiring the Harris County property, ATHONA had difficulty selling the
same. As a result, ATHONA failed to pay its promissory note for the balance of the
purchase price property, and PHILSEC and AIFL refused to release the remainder of Ducat’s
stock portfolio, claiming that they were defrauded into believing that the said property had
a fair market value higher than it actually had.
1488 instituted a suit against PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA for (a) misrepresenting
that an active market existed for two shares of stock included in Ducat’s portfolio when, in
fact, said shares were to be withdrawn from the trading list; (b) conversion of the stock
portfolio; (c) fraud, as ATHONA had never intended to abide by the provisions of its
promissory note when they signed it; and (d) acting in concert as a common enterprise or
in the alternative, that ATHONA was the alter ego of PHILSEC and AIFL.
PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA filed counterclaims against 1488, Inc., Daic, Craig,
Ducat, and Guevara, for the recovery of damages and excess payment or, in the alternative,
the rescission of the sale of the property, alleging fraud, negligence, and conspiracy on the
part of counter-defendants who knew or should have known that the value of said property
was less than the appraisal value assigned to it by Craig.
The U.S. District Court dropped Guevara as counter-defendant for lack of evidence
to support the allegations against him. The Court concluded that the counterclaims
against Edgardo V. Guevara are frivolous and brought against him simply to humiliate and
Page 669 of 1553

embarrass him and ordered Philsec (aka BPI) and AIFL to pay Guevara $49,450 as
reasonable punishment. BPI appealed to the US Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the district court.
Guevara then filed with the RTC an action for the enforcement of foreign judgment
which was opposed by BPI on the grounds that it was rendered upon a clear mistake of law
or fact and/or in violation of its right to due process. The RTC acted in favor of Guevara
which was affirmed by the CA. In its Motion for Reconsideration, BPI asked that the case
be re-raffled which was granted by the CA. It was denied for the second time in another
division of the CA. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not passing upon the merits of the case on
the ground of clear mistake of law or fact and in violation of due process
Ruling:
No. The Court finds the Petition bereft of merit.
In Mijares v. Rañada, the Court extensively discussed the underlying principles for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Philippine jurisdiction:
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires

the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those
customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or
jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is
evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its
Page 670 of 1553

current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago
accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for
enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as
derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the
rules adopted by each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there is
a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status
of opinio juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and

requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the
procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of
procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court, and could very well be abrogated or
revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State
components, to obey the laws of the land, including generally accepted principles of
international law which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. (Citations omitted.)
An action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order in this

jurisdiction is governed by Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a

want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a
review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud,
or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review [are] in consonance with a strong and
pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
Page 671 of 1553

issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to
insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599
stated to be the goal of all law: “rest and quietness.” If every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause
of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted.)
As the foregoing jurisprudence had established, recognition and enforcement of a

foreign judgment or final order requires only proof of fact of the said judgment or final
order. In an action in personam, as in the case at bar, the foreign judgment or final order
enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is the party attacking the foreign
judgment or final order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive
validity. A foreign judgment or final order may only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, particularly, want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Contrary to the claims of BPI, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals carefully
considered the allegations, arguments, and evidence presented by petitioner to repel the
Order dated March 13, 1990 of the U.S. District Court in Civil Action No. H-86-440. Worthy
of reproducing herein are the following portions of the RTC judgment:
[Petitioner’s] contention that the judgment sought to be enforced herein is

violative of its right to due process and contrary to public policy because the
Houston Court relied upon Exhibit 91 (which is [petitioner BPI Securities’]
Exh. “1” in this case) and the US Court disregarded the evidence on record in
the Houston Action is unavailing. Whether or not said Exhibit 91
(petitioner’s Exh. “1”) is inadmissible or is not entitled to any weight is a
question which should have been addressed to the US of Court of Appeals by
[petitioner]. To ask a Philippine court to pass upon the admissibility or
weight of Exh. 91 is violative of our public policy not to substitute our
judgment for that of a competent court of another jurisdiction.
Certainly, under these circumstances, the claim of violation of due process

cannot be sustained since [petitioner] was given reasonable opportunity to
present its side before the imposition of sanctions.
Page 672 of 1553

The Court is unmoved by petitioner’s allegations of denial of due process because of

its U.S. counsel’s exorbitant fees and negligence. As aptly pointed out by respondent in his
Memorandum:
On the specific claim that petitioner has been denied legal representation in
the United States in view of the exorbitant legal fees of US counsel, petitioner
is now estopped from asserting that the costs of litigation resulted in a denial
of due process because it was petitioner which impleaded Guevara. If
petitioner cannot prosecute a case to its final stages, then it should not have
filed a counterclaim against Guevara in the first place. Moreover, there is no
showing that petitioner could not find a less expensive counsel. Surely,
petitioner could have secured the services of another counsel whose fees were
more “affordable.”
Moreover, petitioner is bound by the negligence of its counsel. The declarations of

the Court in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Moral is applicable to petitioner:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an
act performed by counsel within the scope of a “general or implied authority”
is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule
certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there
are exceptions recognized by this Court: “(1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.”
The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of
Appeals,the Court held that “to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x,
it must be shown that the negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived
of his day in court. Thus, “where a party was given the opportunity to defend [its] interests
in due course, [it] cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.” To properly claim gross
negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty
of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause. (Citations omitted.
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Page 673 of 1553

JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his

attorneys-in-fact and acting in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY
BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N. MORALES
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014, J. Leonen
A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns
of the judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment
or final order. The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should
be strictly complied with. A petition for relief of judgment filed beyond the reglementary
period is dismissed outright.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from
judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A
motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court
which rendered the assailed judgment or order an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case.
In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that
their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on
August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out
of time. Even if the court would assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from
judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former
counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence.
Facts:
On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales (Spouses

Morales) filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house
and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City. They alleged that Spouses Nicanor and
Luciana Bartolome (Spouss Bartolome) loaned P500,000.00 from them. To secure their
loan, the Spouses Bartolome mortgaged the Bago Bantay property to the Spouses Morales.
Spouses Bartolome failed to pay their loan on time and it is only after demand that
they only paid part of the loaned amount. In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. A
complaint for judicial foreclosure of Bago Bantay property against Juliet Vitug Madarang,
Romeo Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome was filed by Spouses
Morales. Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate heirs of
the Spouses Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo Bartolome’s wife.
Page 674 of 1553

The trial court ordered defendants to pay the Spouses Morales P500,000.00 plus 7%
interest per month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than 120 days from entry
of judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property shall be sold at public
auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants received a copy of the trial court’s decision on January 29, 2010. They
filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision and thereafter amended
it. According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its amendment were
pro forma as defendants failed to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that
were not supported by the evidence or contrary to law.
Thus, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, its amendment.
Defendants received a copy of the said order on June 24, 2010.
On August 11, 2010, defendants filed a notice of appeal. The trial court denied due
course the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. According to the trial court,
defendants, through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon, received a copy of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2010. This is evidenced by the registry
return receipt on file with the court. Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or
until July 9, 2010, to appeal the trial court’s decision. However, they filed their notice of
appeal only on August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.
On September 24, 2010, defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming
their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary
period. They argued that Atty. Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the reglementary period
was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer’s old age
The trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment and held that the
petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision,
contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome (Petitioners) filed the
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). CA denied outright the petition for
certiorari and found that petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for
certiorari.
CA also denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. A petition for review
on certiorari was also filed by them with this court. Petitioners add that the trial court erred
Page 675 of 1553

in denying their notice of appeal. They personally received a copy of the decision only on
August 11, 2011. They argue that the period to file on appeal must be counted from August
11, 2011, not on the day their "ailing counsel" received a copy of the decision.
Respondents contend that CA did not err in denying the petition for certiorari since
petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for
relief from judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal
within the reglementary period is excusable negligence; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright petitioners’

petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for relief from judgment.
Ruling:
1. No. Failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within
the reglementary period is not excusable negligence.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief
from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence:
Section 1.Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is

thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same
case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in
exceptional cases. It is not available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for new
trial or appeal. To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the negligence must
be so gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against." This
is to prevent parties from "reviving the right to appeal already lost through inexcusable
negligence."
Page 676 of 1553

Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period was "a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their
former counsel’s age." This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens. It asks
this court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence. This
cannot be done.
2. No. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the petition for certiorari for
petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
the petition for relief from judgment
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to a
party before a petition for certiorari is filed. A petition for relief from judgment must be
filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or proceeding
and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order
The Court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time.
However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief
from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns
of the judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final
order is the six-month period.
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should
be strictly complied with. A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the
reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from
judgment is an exception to the public policy of immutability of final judgments.
PHILIPPINE AMANAH BANK (NOW AL-AMANAH ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK

OF THE PHILIPPINES, ALSO KNOWN AS ISLAMIC BANK) vs. EVANGELISTA
CONTRERAS
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
regle-mentary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge
of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period
of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding.
Page 677 of 1553

Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from judg-
ment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to
erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at
some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.
In the present case, [Contreras’] counsel received a copy of the RTC’s decision dated
September 13, 1993 on September 15, 1993. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment should
have been filed on or before November 14, 1993. However, the records showed that the petition
was filed only on December 15, 1993, or ninety-one (91) days later.
Facts:
In July 1981, Respondent Contreras filed a complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance, recovery of possession
and damages before the RTC against Spouses Calinico and Elnora Ilogon and Petitioner
Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB). Prior to the escalation of the issue to a civil suit, Contreras
approached Spouses Ilogon to ask for help in obtaining a loan from PAB. Thereafter,
Contreras and Calinico executed documents to the effect that the property owned by the
former is open for mortgage as security for a loan and that Calinico was going to facilitate
this transaction with PAB.
Eventually, a loan was due for release by PAB but Contreras forthwith requested that
the same should not be released to Calinico. To his dismay, however, PAB released a total
of PhP 100,000.00 to Calinico. Consequently, when he failed to settle the loan, PAB was
forced to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage and ultimately it consolidated its
ownership over the same. Hence, Contreras had to file the complaint before the RTC.
The trial court ruled in favor of PAB, pointing out that the bank had no knowledge
about the internal agreements between Contreras and Calinico. Contreras moved for
reconsideration but it was denied for having been filed out of time and then later a petition
for relief from judg-ment which was likewise denied. The CA reversed this decision by the
trial court. It found that there is sufficient evidence showing that PAB knew of certain
conflicting claims over the land and that it ignored the Contreras’ representations that
Calinoco’s title was defective.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment filed by Contreras was timely
and duly filed.
Page 678 of 1553

Ruling:
NO, the petition for relief from judgment may no longer be given due course.
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
regle-mentary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from
knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within
a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding.
Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from
judg-ment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be
allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or
proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.
In the present case, [Contreras’] counsel received a copy of the RTC’s decision dated
September 13, 1993 on September 15, 1993. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment
should have been filed on or before November 14, 1993. However, the records showed that
the petition was filed only on December 15, 1993, or ninety-one (91) days later.
Furthermore, “[t]he [Contreras’] cited circumstances are not the proper subject of a
petition for relief from the judgment…”
Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a
decision or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. It is
a remedy, equitable in character, that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no
other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him,
which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence from
filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail of the remedy of petition for relief.
In the present case, [Contreras] alleged that he had been prevented from moving for
the timely reconsideration of the trial court’s decision or to appeal this decision on time
due to the death of his wife on September 13, 1993. He explained that his counsel, Atty.
Valmorida, was the brother of his deceased wife, and could not bear to tell him that he had
lost his case in the RTC given the circumstances. Atty. Valmorida only informed him of the
court’s adverse decision thirty-seven (37) days after [the former’s] receipt of the adverse
decision. This circumstance, according to [Contreras], was a clear case of excusable
negligence on the part of his counsel, warranting relief from judgment.
Page 679 of 1553

Negligence to be excusable must be one that ordinary diligence and prudence could
not have guarded against. Atty. Valmorida’s oversight in the present case can hardly be
character-rized as excusable, much less unavoidable.
[The Court notes] that the one who died was [Contreras’] wife, and not [him];
nothing prevented Atty. Valmorida from filing an appeal to challenge the RTC ruling. That
Atty. Valmorida took into account the emotions vis-à-vis the medical condition of
[Contreras], was beside the point. As a lawyer, he knew or ought to have known that failure
to appeal the RTC decision would render it final. To be sure, [Contreras] could have easily
prevented the RTC deci-sion from becoming final and executory had he only exerted
ordinary diligence by filing a timely motion for reconsideration or filing a notice of appeal.
It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their
counsel. While, exceptionally, the client may be excused from the failure of counsel, the
circumstances obtaining in the present case do not convince [the Court] to recognize the
excep-tion.
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
TUNG HUI CHUNG

and TONG HONG CHUNG vs. SHIH CHIU HUANG a.k.a. JAMES SHIH
G.R. No. 170679, FIRST DIVISION, March 9, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.
A compromise agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata between the
parties, and is immediately final and executory, unless rescinded upon grounds that vitiate
consent. Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it is more than a mere contract between the
parties. Any effort to annul the judgment based on compromise on the ground of extrinsic
fraud must proceed in accordance with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari seeks the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on September 30, 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled and set
aside the judicially-approved compromise agreement of August 19, 2003.
On September 6, 2001, the petitioners, both Australian citizens, filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 49, in Manila an amended complaint to recover from the respondent
a sum of money and damages (with prayer for a writ of attachment). The suit, docketed as
Civil Case No. 01-101260, involved the contract to sell dated October 30, 2000, whereby the
respondent, as the vendor, undertook to deliver to the petitioners, as the vendees, shares
Page 680 of 1553

of stock worth P10,606,266.00 in Island Information and Technology, Inc. (the

corporation), a publicly listed corporation.
The petitioners alleged that under the provisions of the contract to sell, the equivalent shares
of stock in the corporation should be their value as of February 22, 2001, the date
corresponding to the five-day period prior to the end of the fourth month after October 30,
2000, the date of the signing of the contract to sell; that according to the Philippine Stock
Exchange, Inc. (PSEI), the shares of the corporation, which stood at P0.05 for the open,
high, low and closing prices on February 22, 2001, had the equivalent of 177,925,320 shares
of stock; and that the respondent failed to deliver the shares of stock corresponding to the
agreed amount on the date fixed by the contract.
On October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an amended order granting the petitioners'
application for the writ of preliminary attachment. On December 27, 2001, the respondent
submitted his answer with counterclaim.
Later on, the parties filed their Joint Motion for Approval of a Compromise Agreement dated
August 19, 2003. The compromise agreement, which was signed by the respondent and by
Eduard Alcordo, as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, with the assistance of their
respective counsels, stipulated that the parties agreed to settle their respective claims and
counterclaims, and the respondent acknowledged therein his obligation to the petitioners
in the amount of $250,000.00, which he promised to pay in US$ currency. The RTC
approved the compromise agreement on October 20, 2003.
But the respondent did not pay the second installment pursuant to the compromise
agreement despite demand. Instead, he filed in the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment dated November 25, 2004 (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 87768), thereby seeking to nullify
the amended order dated October 10, 2001 granting the application for the writ of attachment,
and the order dated October 20, 2003 approving the compromise agreement.
Meanwhile, the petitioners sought the execution of the judgment upon the compromise
agreement through their motion for execution dated December 2, 2004 on the ground of
the respondent's failure to pay the second installment. The RTC granted their motion for
execution on December 14, 2004, and issued the writ of execution, commanding the sheriff
to demand from the respondent the immediate payment of the full amount of $230,000.00
as indicated in the compromise agreement.
Through its resolution promulgated on December 29, 2004, the CA dismissed C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 87768 for having no substantial merit.
Page 681 of 1553

During the pendency of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 87768, the respondent filed a Motion to Quash
Writ of Execution dated December 20, 2004, which the RTC denied on January 13, 2005. The
RTC later denied the motion for reconsideration with finality.
The RTC's denial of the motion for reconsideration with finality impelled the respondent
to go to the CA on certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 88804) on March 7, 2005, alleging that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing: (1)
the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 01-101260; (2) the order dated January 13, 2005
denying the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution; and (3) the order dated February 28, 2005
denying the motion for reconsideration. He claimed that the compromise agreement was
patently unjust, one-sided, unfair, fraudulent and unconscionable; hence, the RTC should
not have issued the writ of execution.
On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed decision. The CA opined that
based on the huge difference between the obligation of $250,000.00 as stated in the
compromise agreement and the relief prayed for in the amended complaint worth
P10,606,266.00, there could be no other conclusion than that the respondent had been
deceived into entering into the compromise agreement; and that, in addition, the writ of
execution was void for varying the terms of the judgment by directing the payment of the
entire $230,000.00 obligation, thereby including sums that were not yet due and
demandable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in nullifying and setting aside the judgment based on
the compromise agreement dated August 19, 2003.
RULING:
The annulment by the CA was legally and factually unwarranted.
To start with, a compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal
concessions to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. It is an
accepted, nay, even highly encouraged practice in the courts of law of this jurisdiction. It
attains the authority and effect of res judicata upon the parties upon its execution, and
becomes immediately final and executory, unless rescinded by grounds which vitiate
consent. Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it ceases to be a mere contract between
the parties, and becomes a judgment of the court, to be enforced through writ of execution.
Page 682 of 1553

The CA did not recognize that what it was asked to annul and set aside in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
88804 was no longer the compromise agreement of the parties but already the judgment
based on the compromise agreement. The failure to recognize led the CA into granting the
unprecedented relief of annulling the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud and
lack of consent. In so doing, the CA acted without jurisdiction. First of all, the action before
the CA was a special civil action for certiorari that had been brought on March 7, 2005,
which was way beyond the period of 60 days from the rendition of the judgment based on
the compromise agreement on October 20, 2003. The long delay grossly violated Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which allowed the petition for certiorari to be filed not later
than 60 days from notice of the judgment being assailed. Moreover, the grounds relied
upon by the respondent in his petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 88804 - that the
RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction
for issuing the writ of execution that was patently unjust, one-side, unfair, fraudulent and
unconscionable compromise agreement; and for issuing the writ of execution of the
compromise agreement that lacked consideration - were not proper grounds for assailing
the judgment based on the compromise agreement. Even assuming that such grounds for
the petition for certiorari were true, which they were not, the judgment based on the
compromise agreement could not be assailed on that basis. As the foregoing excerpt of the
assailed decision bears out, the annulment of the judgment based on the compromise
agreement was premised on fraud and lack of consent on the part of the respondent as
a contracting party, which were far from the jurisdictional error on which the petition
for certiorari should have rested.
The impropriety of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 87768 to demand the
annulment of the compromise agreement was blatant and unquestionable. The RTC, after
finding the August 19, 2003 compromise agreement to be in order and not contrary to law,
morals, good customs and public policy, issued the October 20, 2003 order approving the
compromise agreement. With this stamp of judicial approval, the compromise agreement
became more than a mere contract of the parties. The judicially approved agreement was
thereby turned into a final judgment, immutable and unalterable, regardless of whether or
not it rested on erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and regardless of whether the change
would be by the court that rendered it or the highest court of the land. This doctrine of
immutability is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice, for, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of the courts must become final at
some definite date set by law.
And, secondly, if the ground of the respondent to assail the judgment based on the
compromise agreement was extrinsic fraud, his action should be brought under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the original action for annulment may be
based only on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, but extrinsic fraud, to be valid ground,
Page 683 of 1553

should not have been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief. If the ground relied up is extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed
within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; if the ground is lack of
jurisdiction, the action must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppels.
Regardless of the ground for the action, the remedy under Rule 47 is to be availed of only
if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Ostensibly, the
respondent could have availed himself of the petition for relief from judgment under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court. Hence, his failure to resort to such remedy precluded him from
availing himself of the remedy to annul the judgment based on the compromise agreement.
SPOUSES ALFREDO TEAÑO*

AND VERONICA TEAÑO v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAVOTAS
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature

that it may be availed of only when, other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment,
final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
As there was no clear indication that the Petition for annulment of judgment was
based on the ground of either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the CA correctly dismissed
the petition.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Complaint against the Municipality of Navotas, represented by its Mayor
and Municipal Treasurer (respondents) for quashal of warrants of levy with application for
preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to restrain respondents
from enforcing the Warrants of Levy through a public auction. Since the RTC did not issue
a TRO, the Municipality pushed through with the public auction. The RTC rendered a
Summary Judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
Four years after, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition denominated as one "for
Annulment of Summary [Judgment] with Prayer for [Preliminary] Mandatory Injunction
[and/or] Temporary Restraining Order." Notably, the Petition is bereft of any particulars as
to the judgment, resolution or order of the RTC which it seeks to annul and the ground
upon which it is anchored. The CA dismissed the Petition.
Page 684 of 1553

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition outright.
RULING:
NO.
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of judgments or final
orders, and resolutions covers civil actions of the RTCs where the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief and other remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
nature that it may be availed of only when, other remedies are wanting, and only if the
judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
Here, the CA Petition does not specify any ground relied upon for its filing. In other words,
there is no clear indication that the Petition was based on the ground of either extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction are the sole and exclusive grounds for an annulment
of judgment. Extrinsic fraud is "that which prevented the aggrieved party from having a
trial or presenting his case to the court, or used to procure the judgment without fair
submission of the controversy." On the other hand, lack of jurisdiction involves the want
of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the case.
In insisting that they properly filed a petition for annulment, petitioners belatedly state in
the present Petition that the RTC tried to validate an illegal auction; and thus, it acted
without jurisdiction, which necessitates the annulment of said Resolution under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court. The belated claim of petitioners that the RTC acted without jurisdiction
because of its alleged validation of an illegal auction does not qualify as lack of jurisdiction
contemplated as ground for annulment of judgment. Verily, the RTC duly acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioners when they filed the complaint. It also has
jurisdiction over its subject matter as the same is cognizable by the RTC.
CAMILO SIBAL vs. PEDRO BUQUEL, et. al.

The Court has instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for annulment to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
Page 685 of 1553

that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available without fault on the part of the
petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot
prosper.
FACTS:
Respondents Buquel, et. al. filed a complaint before the Tuguegarao RTC for recovery 0f
possession of property and damages against petitioner Camilo Sibal. The RTC ruled in favor
of the Buquels. The RTC Decision became final and executory; hence, the trial court issued
a writ of execution.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision before the CA,
where he raised lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud as grounds. The CA denied his
Petition. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court alleging that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the Buquels were guilty of extrinsic
fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
RULING:
NO.
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it

may be availed of only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled
was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud, and only when
other remedies are wanting. In the present case, Sibal was able to avail of other remedies
when he filed before the RTC a motion to quash the writ of execution and a motion to
annul judgment.
Moreover, parties aggrieved by final judgments, orders or resolutions cannot be allowed to

easily and readily abuse a petition for annulment of judgment. Thus, the Court has
instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for annulment to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available without fault on the part of the petitioner.
A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
Page 686 of 1553

Further, it must be emphasized that not every kind of fraud justifies the action of
annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. As a ground for annulment of judgment,
extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse party, and the fraud must be of such
nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the
act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.
In this case, Sibal asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense
during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6429 resulted in violation of his right to due
process. He claims that his counsel's inexcusable negligence denied him of his day in court.
However, he admitted that he attended only one stage of the proceedings below, which
was the preliminary conference. He was not aware of the subsequent proceedings as he was
totally dependent on his former counsel and would merely wait for the latter to notify him
if his attendance would be required. There was likewise no indication that his counsel was
in fact in cahoots with the Buquels to obtain the assailed judgment. Sibal must therefore
bear the unfortunate consequences of his actions. As a litigant, he should not have entirely
left the case in his counsel's hands, for he had the continuing duty to keep himself abreast
of the developments, if only to protect his own interest in the litigation. He could have
discharged said duty by keeping in regular touch with his counsel, but he failed to do so.
VERGEL PAULINO AND CIREMIA PAULINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ADMINISTRATOR of the
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 205065, June 4, 2014
SPOUSES DR. VERGEL L. PAULINO & DR. CIREMIA G. PAULINO vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ADMINISTRATOR of the LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 207533, J. Mendoza
The Court agrees with the CA that LRA was not estopped from assailing the RTC
Decision because it never attained finality for being null and void, having been rendered by a
court without jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings.
Facts:
The late Celso Fernandez purchased, in a public auction conducted by the Quezon
City government, a real property owned and registered in the name of Lolita G. Javier
(Javier) as evidenced by a certificate of sale of delinquent property. The subject property
appeared to be covered by an owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 301617 of the QCRD.
Page 687 of 1553

After his death, the surviving heirs executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
with Absolute Sale covering the property, selling it in favor of the petitioners, spouses
Vergel L. Paulino and Ciremia Paulino (Spouses Paulino).
On June 11, 1988, a fire broke out in the Quezon City Hall which burned a portion
thereof which included the office of the QCRD.
On March 9, 2010, Spouses Paulino filed a petition for reconstitution of the original
copy of TCT No. 301617 with the RTC, alleging that its original copy was among those titles
that were razed during the fire.
The RTC directed the LRA to submit a report within five (5) days from notice.
Without awaiting the LRA Report, the RTC rendered the assailed July Decision, granting
the petition for reconstitution and ordering the Registrar of Deeds of the QCRD to
reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. 301617. The RTC issued the Certificate of Finality,
there being no motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by any of the interested parties.
The RTC received the LRA Report, stating that TCT No. 301617 was registered in the
name of a certain Emma B. Florendo (Florendo) and that it was previously the subject of
an application for administrative reconstitution; that the original copy of the title on file in
the Registry of Deeds was among those saved titles from the fire that gutted the office of
QCRD. When the technical description of the property was plotted, it was identical with
Lot 939,Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532), in the name of Magnolia W.
Antonino (Antonino).
Spouses Paulino filed with the QCRD an application for registration of the judicial
reconstitution of TCT No. 301617 based on the RTC decision. The Registrar of Deeds refused
to reconstitute the original copy of the TCT.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Administrator of the

LRA, filed its Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the RTC
decision granting the petition for reconstitution of the original title.
The CA issued the assailed resolution, granting the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
The CA ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of the
original copy of TCT No. 301617, there being no lost or destroyed title.
Page 688 of 1553

Issue:
Can the court overturn the decision of the RTC granting the petition for
reconstitution even if it lacked jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Yes, the Court can overturn the decision of the RTC granting the petition for
reconstitution since it is considered null and void.
Spouses Paulino argue that under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is
crystal clear that annulment of judgments may only be availed of when the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. They insist on the dismissal of the petition for
annulment on the ground that the LRA is already in estoppel and not entitled to the relief
prayed for because the RTC decisions became final and executory through their fault as
they failed to resort to other remedies despite opportunities to do so.
The Court finds the petitions devoid of merit.
Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of
judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over
the subject matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack of jurisdiction, a court should
not take cognizance of the case.
In these cases, the petition for annulment was based on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter,
the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by
which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor
bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is
not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata.
The Court agrees with the CA that LRA was not estopped from assailing the RTC
Decision because it never attained finality for being null and void, having been rendered
by a court without jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings.
Page 689 of 1553

As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA, the Court has held that when the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is, in fact, in the possession of
another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered
the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of
the original certificate.
The Court agrees that the public respondent correctly availed of the remedy of
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 without need of exhausting other
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies
because the RTC judgment was null and void.
Needless to state, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction.
PEDRO G. RESURRECCION, JOSEPH COMETA and CRISEFORO LITERA TO, JR. vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192866, July 9, 2014, J. Brion
It is settled that the negligence and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client.
It is only in cases involving gross or palpable negligence of the counsel or where the interests
of justice so require, when relief is accorded to a client who has suffered thereby.
Furthermore, for a claim of a counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of

clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown and it should not be accompanied by
the client's own negligence or malice. It is a correlative duty of clients to be in contact with
their counsel from time to time to inform themselves of the status of their case especially,
when what is at stake is their liberty. Hence, diligence is required not only from lawyers but
also from their clients. As such, the failure of the lawyer to communicate with his clients for
nearly three years and to inform them about the status of their case, does not amount to
abandonment that qualifies as gross negligence. If at all, the omission is only an act of simple
negligence, and not gross negligence that would warrant the annulment of the proceedings
below.
The Rules of Court require that every written motion be set for hearing by the movant,
except those motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed and served to all parties at least three
days before the hearing and must specify the time and date of the hearing of the motion.
Hence, a motion which does not meet the aforesaid requirements is considered pro forma; it
is nothing but a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court
Page 690 of 1553

has no authority to act upon. As such, the failure of the movant to comply renders his motion
fatally defective and hence, properly dismissible.
Facts:
Herein petitioners occupied respective positions in the local government unit of the
Municipality of Pilar, Surigao del Norte: Resurreccion was the Municipal Mayor; Cometa
was the Municipal Budget Officer; and Literato was the Municipal Engineer. The other
accused, Wilfredo B. Consigo and Orejas, were the Municipal Treasurer and Municipal
Accountant, respectively.
In his COA Special Audit Report (COA Report), Romeo Corral Uy reported that
several disbursements of money for the payment of construction materials intended for the
improvement of the Municipal Building, and the purchase of one (1) unit of typewriter
amounting to P83 l ,420. l7, P23,000.00, P158,394.00 and P163,000.00, were awarded to Kent
Marketing, Samuel Trigo and Domingo Tesioma without public bidding, in violation of
Sections 362 of Republic Act No. 7160. Auditor Uy also found that the basic procedures for
the disbursement of public funds under Section 362 and 367 of Republic Act No. 7160,
Section 4(6) of Presidential Decree No. 1445 and Section 9 of COA Circular No. 92-382 dated
July 3, 1992 were not followed. As a result, Auditor Uy characterized the disbursements as
irregular expenditures for not adhering to the aforementioned rules and regulations.
As such, the petitioners, together with their co-accused Consigo and Orejas, were
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.
Resurreccion was also charged with malversation of public funds.
Eventually, the Sandiganbayan found the prosecution's evidence more persuasive.

The petitioners sought, but failed, to obtain a reconsideration. Hence, this present petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether the negligence of the former counsel of the petitioners in allegedly not
informing them about the status of their case, resulting in their failure to present evidence
and, consequently, to the waiver of their right to present evidence, is a valid ground to set
aside the judgment for conviction.
(2) Whether the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan correctly denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the motion did not contain a notice of
hearing.
Page 691 of 1553

Ruling:
This Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
1) The court notes, at the outset, that the petitioners do not question the correctness
of the Sandiganbayan's finding of guilt based on the merits of the case. In fact, the
petitioners never denied their non-compliance of the government auditing rules and
regulations, specifically the lack of public bidding and supporting documents. In their
petition, the petitioners simply make the belated claim that the Sandiganbayan gravely
erred in convicting them based solely on the evidence presented by the prosecution. They
blame the alleged negligence of Atty. Corpuz for their failure to present evidence and,
ultimately, in the waiver of their right to present the same. They contend that Atty.
Corpuz's failure to communicate with them for nearly three years constitutes gross
negligence resulting to deprivation of their right to due process of law.
It is settled that the negligence and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client.
The rationale behind this rule is that a counsel, once retained, is said to have the authority,
albeit impliedly, to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution of the
case in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of his
authority is treated by law as the act or omission of the client himself. It is only in cases
involving gross or palpable negligence of the counsel, or when the application of the
general rule amounts to an outright deprivation of one's property or liberty through
technicality, or where the interests of justice so require, when relief is accorded to a client
who has suffered thereby. After a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records, this Court has
found out that Atty. Corpuz was not guilty of gross negligence. As can be gleaned from the
records, hearings were scheduled by the Sandiganbayan for the parties' presentation of
evidence. However, due to the repeated absences of the accused and the prosecution
witnesses; as well as the motions for cancellation filed both by the prosecution and the
defense counsels, the hearings had been postponed several times. Although the
postponements were not solely attributable to the petitioners, Atty. Corpuz cannot also be
entirely faulted.
Records also reveal that the petitioners have all executed their respective written
waivers of appearance during the prosecution's presentation of evidence which the court
approved. When it was the defense's turn to present its witnesses, despite notices given to
the petitioners and a stern warning from the court that their absence would warrant the
termination of the presentation of their evidence, the petitioners repeatedly failed to
appear. Verily, Atty. Corpuz cannot be faulted for the waiver of the petitioners' defense.
Page 692 of 1553

For a claim of a counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear

abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. The gross negligence, too, should not
be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice. Here, Atty. Corpuz was present
all throughout the presentation of the prosecution's evidence. While he allegedly failed to
communicate with the petitioners for nearly three years and to inform them about the
status of their case, this omission, however, does not amount to abandonment that qualifies
as gross negligence. If at all, the omission is only an act of simple negligence, and not gross
negligence that would warrant the annulment of the proceedings below.
Besides, as far as the court is concerned, the petitioners were already duly notified,
through their counsel, of the entire proceedings in the case. If they failed to inquire from
their counsel as to the status and developments of their case, they alone should be blamed.
As clients, it is the petitioners' correlative duty to be in contact with Atty. Corpuz from time
to time to inform themselves of the status of their case. Considering that what is at stake is
their liberty, they should have exercised the standard of care which an ordinarily prudent
man devotes to his business. The petitioners cannot simply leave the fate of their case
entirely to their counsel and later on pass the blame to the latter. Clearly, diligence is
required not only from lawyers but also from their clients.
2) The Rules of Court require that every written motion be set for hearing by the
movant, except those motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights
of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed and served to all parties at
least three days before the hearing and must specify the time and date of the hearing of the
motion. Hence, a motion which does not meet the aforesaid requirements is considered
pro forma; it is nothing but a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive
and the court has no authority to act upon. As such, the failure of the movant to comply
renders his motion fatally defective.
In the present case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners only prays
for the submission of the motion for reconsideration and approval of the court, without
stating the time, date and place of the hearing of the motion. It was, therefore, not the
notice of hearing contemplated by the rules as the same has not been set for hearing.
Indeed, such a motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper. The reason is obvious: unless
the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court would have no way to determine
whether the other party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file
his reply or opposition. It also does not toll the running of the period of appeal. Hence,
premises considered, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners is properly
dismissible by the Sandiganbayan.
Page 693 of 1553

GENATO INVESTMENTS, INC., vs. HON. JUDGE OSCAR P. BARRIE~TOS et al.

The general rule is that a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed,
altered, or modified in any respect, and that nothing further can be done but to execute it. A
final and executory decision may, however, be invalidated via a Petition for Relief or a Petition
to Annul the same under Rules 38 or 47, respectively, of the Rules of Court.
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional

circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. The same
petition is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own
neglect in promptly availing of the same. There is here no attempted substitution; annulment
of judgment is the only remedy available to petitioner. Requisite elements for the filing of a
petition for annulment of judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and
want of due process, are present in this case
All the requisite elements for the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and want of due process, are present in this
case. It should be stressed that Genato instituted the case before the CA precisely to seek relief
from the declaration of nullity of TCT No. 33341, which had been issued without first giving
Genato an opportunity to be heard.
The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the
allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it was
based. The allegations in the petition filed with the CA sufficiently identify the ground upon
which the petition was based - extrinsic fraud. The allegations clearly charged the RTC and
respondent with depriving Genato of the opportunity to oppose the auction sale and the
cancellation of her title and ventilate her side. This allegation, if true, constitutes extrinsic
fraud.
Facts:
TCT No. 33341 is registered under the name of Genato Investments and covers two
(2) adjacent parcels of land, Lots Nos. 1-A and 13-B-1. Due to alleged deficiency in real
property taxes due on Lot No. 13-B-1, the Office of the City Treasurer of Caloocan City sold
at public auction Lot No. 13-B-1, in which private respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
Page 694 of 1553

The Office of the City Treasurer, through the City Treasurer of Caloocan issued a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser and a Final Deed of
Conveyance over Lot 13-B-1 in favor of private respondent.
Genato was not made aware of any of the proceedings before the Office of the City
Treasurer, as the Notice of Levy and Warrant of Levy issued by the Office of the City
Treasurer, through respondent Garma, were sent to Genato at an inexistent office in Tondo,
Manila and were, thus, returned unserved.
By virtue of the above-mentioned final deed of conveyance, private respondent filed

a case with the RTC praying for the consolidation of the ownership of the property covered
by the TCT No. 33341, the cancellation of the same TCT in the name of Genato, and the
issuance of a new title in the name of private respondent, notwithstanding the fact that the
delinquency sale involved only Lot No. 13-B-1.
The RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of
private respondent Genato learned of the auction sale only when the Sheriff of the RTC
Caloocan, respondent Renebert B. Baloloy (respondent Baloloy), left a Notice to Vacate in
the subject premises. Genato claimed that it was very much surprised at the auction sale of
Lot 13-B-1 because it had been religiously paying its real property taxes.
Genato filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment praying, among
others, for the annulment and setting aside of the Orders and the Writ of Possession issued
by the RTC Caloocan. However, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing it on the ground
that the Petition for Annulment of Judgment that Genato filed is not the proper remedy, as
it had other available remedies to question the Orders of the RTC Caloocan
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for annulment of judgment is the only and appropriate
remedy of Genato to question the Orders of the RTC Caloocan.
Ruling:
Yes, petition for annulment of judgment is the only and appropriate remedy of
Genato to question the Orders of the RTC Caloocan
The general rule is that a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed,
altered, or modified in any respect, and that nothing further can be done but to execute it.
Page 695 of 1553

A final and executory decision may, however, be invalidated via a Petition for Relief or a
Petition to Annul the same under Rules 38 or 47, respectively, of the Rules of Court.
Under Rule 38, when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding
is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that
the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
The verified petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the Genato learns of
the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order was entered. However, it is uncontested that
Genato learned about the proceedings in LRC case more than six (6) months after
becoming final and executory. Thus, this remedy under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was
clearly unavailing. Thus, the only remedy leftto petitioner in this case is a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47, which it, in fact, filed.
The Court has repeatedly ruled that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances
where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. The same petition is not
available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in
promptly availing of the same. There is here no attempted substitution; annulment of
judgment is the only remedy available to petitioner.
All the requisite elements for the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and want of due process, are present in
this case.
It should be stressed that Genato instituted the case before the CA precisely to seek
relief from the declaration of nullity of TCT No. 33341, which had been issued without first
giving Genato an opportunity to be heard.
The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the
allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it
was based. The allegations in the petition filed with the CA sufficiently identify the ground
upon which the petition was based - extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
Page 696 of 1553

The allegations clearly charged the RTC and respondent with depriving Genato of the
opportunity to oppose the auction sale and the cancellation of her title and ventilate her
side. This allegation, if true, constitutes extrinsic fraud.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO

and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M: CASTRO, A.KA.: "MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO" and "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," vs. JOSE, MARIA, JED, LEMUEL, GREGORIO,
and ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing
of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances
where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and
other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons.
It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
Facts:
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio
(Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the
estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta
Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, “Maria Socorro M.
Castro” and her nickname, “Jayrose.”
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their
marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963,
but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly
left Jose after a
couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them.
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a
year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived
in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends.
Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual
tendencies. She insisted, however, that they “remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite
their separation.
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court
of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
Page 697 of 1553

children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged was his
erstwhile housekeeper. At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, having ruled that “no
opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the government
which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.” A certificate of finality was
issued on February 9, 2006.
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. On October 18, 2007,
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision
of the trial court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption. In their petition, Rosario and Joanne
allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005. They allege that Rosario’s
affidavit of consent, was fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates
showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time
she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and
in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose’s
driver and alleged lover. It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth.
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. While admittedly, no
notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate
court ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate
child of the adopter should be personally notified of the hearing.” The appellate court
“abhorred the mind baffling scheme employed by Jose in obtaining an adoption decree in
favor of his illegitimate children to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs” but
stated that its hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained
“finality and immutability.”
When Rosario and Joanne’s motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10, 2009,
they filed this petition.
Issue:
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to show that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction.
Page 698 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment of judgment.
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by
which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought
four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is
barred by estoppel or laches.
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the
other hand, is “that which prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or that which operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured.”
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained
through extrinsic fraud.
It is settled that “the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action.” As Jose filed the petition for adoption on
August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The law on
adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse. In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment,
Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be
eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption.
Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the
law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was
not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
Page 699 of 1553

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10
years old or older. The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on
notice that they will have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future
legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was
over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore,
was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he
and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the
proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

vs. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., ET AL.
G.R. NO. 197942-43/G.R. NO. 199528, MARCH 26, 2014
J. REYES
Subject to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 the, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-
sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but he shall
immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-
two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing
to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application
for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72)
hours provided herein.
The Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or
malicious motive when he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It
would have been irregular and unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72-hour
TRO on June 6, 2011 when the cases were first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he
had 24 hours to act thereon.
Page 700 of 1553

Moreover, PAGCOR is not justified in failing to file a requisite motion for

reconsideration, and to observe the hierarchy of courts. While the question of whether to give
due course to the petitions is addressed to the discretion of the Court, it behooves PAGCOR
to observe the applicable rules and keep in mind that the Court will not take lightly any non-
observance of our settled rules as if they are mere technicalities. A motion for reconsideration
is a condition sine qua non for the special civil action of certiorari.
Facts:
Respondents entered into a MOA with PAGCOR whereby Thunderbird committed to

invest in their gaming and leisure operations in Fiesta Hotel and Casino (FHC) in Eastbay
Arts Recreational and Tourism Zone, Binangonan, Rizal. With the passage of R.A. No. 9487,
which extended PAGCOR’s franchise to for another 25 years, respondents sought the
formal extension of their authority to operate (ATOs) to be made co-terminus with
PAGCOR’s new franchise, as well as extension of their development and investment
schedules.
On May 30, 2011, insisting that the respondents’ ATOs had expired without a renewal,
PAGCOR served notice upon the respondents to cease their casino operations, as well as
gave them until June 3, 2011 to signify their unconditional acceptance of its new terms of
reference for their new licenses, or “PAGCOR will have no choice but to initiate cessation
proceedings.”
Believing that they are entitled to a new franchise co-terminus with that of PAGCOR,
Thunderbird Pilipinas and ERI each filed separate complaints against PAGCOR with the
RTC for specific performance and damages, with application for TRO and writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction. RTC Executive Judge Reyes issued an ex-parte 72-hour
TRO, later extended to 20 days by Presiding Jurado, who later on also issued a Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. Without seeking a reconsideration of the said order,
PAGCOR filed directly with this Court two certiorari petitions, G.R. Nos. 197942 and 197943.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Supplemental Complaint for actual damages of P35 Million
with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, where the RTC ordered
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in favor of Thunderbird
Pilipinas. PAGCOR filed its third petition, G.R. No. 199528, to set aside the aforesaid order.
Issue:
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed orders
Held:
The petitions are denied.

Page 701 of 1553
With the parties agreeing to end their differences before trial proper, the instant petitions
have ceased to present a justiciable controversy for us to resolve. However, as PAGCOR
itself has importuned, there are procedural as well as substantive issues of such importance
which it hopes this Court would help clarify for the guidance of future litigants. So shall
We proceed.
On one particular point of controversy, PAGCOR has been insistent that the court a quo
has no power to extend an “already” expired 72-hour ex-parte TRO. But the facts will clarify
the matter. Civil Case Nos. 11-125832-33 were filed on June 3, 2011, a Friday, and at 4:30 that
same afternoon, Judge Reyes issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO to hold off any cessation
proceedings threatened by PAGCOR against the respondents. The next two days being a
weekend, it was only on June 6, 2011, Monday, that the cases were raffled to Judge Jurado.
On June 7, 2011, Tuesday, Judge Jurado conducted a summary hearing on the respondents’
TRO application, and when he granted the same, PAGCOR verbally moved for
reconsideration on the ground that Judge Reyes’ 72-hour TRO had already expired and
could no longer be extended. Judge Jurado denied the motion, saying that his TRO was
based on his summary hearing wherein testimonies and documents were presented by the
parties, whereas the 72-hour TRO issued by Judge Reyes was based merely on the
respondents’ initiatory pleadings.
On June 13 and 16, 2011, the trial court heard the respondents’ applications for writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction against PAGCOR’s cessation order. On June 23, 2011, the
20th and last day of the TRO, Judge Jurado issued the writ. As already noted, without
moving for reconsideration, PAGCOR went up directly to this Court on certiorari.
Concerning the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO, the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court are found in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58, viz:
SEC. 4. x x x (c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary

restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a
multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse
party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons, together with a copy of the
complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse
party in the Philippines. However, where the summons could not be served personally or
by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a non-resident thereof, the requirement of
prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply. (d) The application for a
temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard
in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
Page 702 of 1553

sheriff’s return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle
and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary

injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard
on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at
a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The Court shall also
determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte
a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but
he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service
of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid
seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended
until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total
period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including
the original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein.
The Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or malicious
motive when he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It would
have been irregular and unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72-hour TRO
on June 6, 2011 when the cases were first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he had
24 hours to act thereon. On the other hand, PAGCOR should have refrained, but
deliberately did not, from serving its closure orders on the respondents on June 7, 2011,
knowing very well that a summary hearing was to be held that same morning on their TRO
application. Indeed, seen in light of the preceding acts of PAGCOR, it can hardly be said
that it acted with fairness toward the respondents so as to be permitted now to blithely
take issue with the extension of the 72-hour TRO. For truly, what is of compelling
consideration here is that PAGCOR was accorded notice and a chance to be heard, and
when the trial court later resolved to grant the writ of preliminary injunction, it did so after
hearing it out, within the 20-day TRO.
Page 703 of 1553

Moreover, PAGCOR is not justified in failing to file a requisite motion for reconsideration,
and to observe the hierarchy of courts. While the question of whether to give due course
to the petitions is addressed to the discretion of the Court, it behooves PAGCOR to observe
the applicable rules and keep in mind that the Court will not take lightly any non-
observance of our settled rules as if they are mere technicalities. A motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the special civil action of certiorari. The
settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct
any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order
is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or
in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.
As will become more evident in our latter discussion, there is no justification for PAGCOR
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration, since an earlier case, PAGCOR v. Fontana
Development Corporation, has delved into the same points it raised here.
At their roots, these petitions deal with the manner PAGCOR has exercised its licensing
and regulatory powers over the respondent casino operators. The Court sees no novel issues
of transcendental importance to justify its action of skipping the hierarchy of the courts
and coming directly to us via certiorari petition. As explained in Emmanuel A. De Castro v.
Emerson S. Carlos, although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is not exclusive but concurrent with that of the CA and RTC. The petitioner has no
unrestricted freedom of choice of forum, but must strictly observe the hierarchy of the
courts.
Page 704 of 1553

Settled is the rule that “the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it
is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a
rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale
behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the
time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed
his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause
the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil
service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct
recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial
discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the
hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Preliminary Injunction, Attachment, Status Quo Order
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
PEDRO LUKANG
vs. PAGBILAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. NO. 195374. MARCH 10, 2014
J. MENDOZA
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following
essential requisites, to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. While a clear
showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. Hence,
to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that he has an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
Page 705 of 1553

In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. There
is no question that when the Pagbilao Development Corporation bought the properties from
the vendors, it had full knowledge that there were questions involving ownership of the parcels
of land it bought. Likewise there is no question that Pagbilao Development Corporation did
not take any step to have the annotation or encumbrance in each title cancelled. Inevitably,
PDC is deemed to have obtained the properties subject to the outcome of the litigation among
the heirs of Arsenio.
Facts:
Arsenio, and Mercedes lived as husband and wife in Calamba, Laguna, from 1922 to 1934
and begot three (3) children, namely, Domingo, Rosalina and Olympia. In 1935, he started
cohabiting with Leoncia, with whom he had ten (10) children, namely, Elpidio, Socorro,
Manuel, Pedro, Teresita, Simeon, Eugenio, Hilaria, Concepcion, and Carlos. During their
cohabitation in Lucena, Quezon, they acquired 4 real properties located in Pagbilao,
Quezon (Pagbilao properties). The said properties were then registered in the name of
“ARSENIO LUKANG, married to Mercedes Dee, ½ share and Leoncia Martinez, single, ½
share.” Arsenio and Leoncia later acquired four (4) more parcels of land (later acquired
poperties). It was allegedly agreed that the said properties should be registered in the name
of Simeon, one of their children, in trust for the other heirs and should be owned in
common by their family.
When Arsenio died in 1976, his 13 children and Mercedes, executed the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, in which they agreed to adjudicate and transfer among themselves
the rights, interest and ownership of the Pagbilao properties. There was, however, no
agreement to partition the properties. Years after, Mercedes, together with her three (3)
children, Rosalina, Domingo, and Olympia, executed another document wherein the
parties declared that they were the only heirs of Arsenio and partitioned the half portion
of the Pagbilao properties among themselves, with Mercedes waiving her supposed share
in favor of her three (3) children.
In 1988, Simeon, alleging that the certificates of title of the later acquired properties were
lost, filed a petition for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate copy. As a result, new owner’s
duplicate copies of the allegedly lost titles were issued in his favor. Thereafter, Simeon, in
a deed of donation, transferred the said properties in favor of his children, Benedict, Heile
and Madeleine. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-103094, T125348 and T-125349 were cancelled,
and TCT No. T-241034 was issued in the name of Benedict; TCT No. 241035 in the name of
Heile; and TCT No. 241036 in the name of Madeleine. Furthermore, Simeon purportedly
sold the land covered by TCT No. 101425 in favor of Mercedes, Rosalina, Leoncia, and
Elpidio.
Page 706 of 1553

In the meantime, on February 15, 1989, Mercedes, through Rosalinda, filed the Petition for
the Issuance of the Owner’s Duplicate of TCTs covering the Pagbilao properties. The RTC
granted the petition and new titles were issued in favor of Mercedes. Unknown to Leoncia,
Rosalina caused the segregation of the one-half portion of the said properties in her
(Leoncia’s) favor and the division of the remaining half among her and her siblings,
Domingo and Olympia.
On September 26, 1990, Leoncia and her children, claiming that the titles of the Pagbilao
property were not lost but in her (Leoncia’s) possession, filed a complaint for annulment
of extrajudicial partition, affidavit of segregation and annulment of the new certificates of
title. The said case was consolidated with a case for recovery of four (4) owner’s duplicate
copy of TCTs filed by Simeon against his brother Pedro. Subsequently, Leoncia, through
Pedro, registered her adverse claim on February 3, 1989 on TCTs covering the later acquired
properties. He further caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCTs coverin the
subject properties.
During the pendency of the cases, respondent PDC purchased from Simeon, Mercedes and
Rosalina the six (6) properties which were the subject of the two cases. Thus, TCTs were
issued in favor of PDC. Accordingly, the annotations were carried over to PDC’s titles.
When Pedro and the other heirs learned of the sale of the subject properties to PDC, they
filed a motion to require Simeon and Rosalina to explain why they sold the properties
without permission from the RTC. On April 23, 2008, they also filed an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction with ex-parte prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO).
The RTC granted the issuance of the TRO effective for a period of twenty (20) days. On
May 13, 2008, the RTC likewise granted the petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The CA nullified and set aside the order of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction
Held:
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as

well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the
action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of
injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status
Page 707 of 1553
quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the following
grounds are established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance
of the act or acts complained of during the would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
The well-entrenched rule is that the grant or denial of the writ of preliminary injunction
rests upon the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is given a wide latitude in this
regard. Thus, in the absence of a manifest abuse, such discretion must not be interfered
with. “Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.”
In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. There is no
question that when the Pagbilao Development Corporation bought the properties from the
vendors, it had full knowledge that there were questions involving ownership of the parcels
of land it bought. Likewise there is no question that Pagbilao Development Corporation
did not take any step to have the annotation or encumbrance in each title cancelled.
Inevitably, PDC is deemed to have obtained the properties subject to the outcome of the
litigation among the heirs of Arsenio.
With regard to the issue of the injunctive bond, the Court has time and again ruled that
the posting of the bond is a condition sine qua non before a writ of preliminary injunction
may issue. Its purpose is to secure the person enjoined against any damage that he may
sustain in case the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
The rule, does not mean, however, that the injunction maybe disregarded since it becomes
effective only after the bond is actually filed in court.
In fine, it is erroneous for the CA to rule that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
simply because it failed to fix the amount of the bond. This error caused "no substantial
prejudice" that would warrant the quashal of the writ of injunction. (As a matter of fact,
Pedro posted a bond in the amount of One Million Pesos, the sufficiency or insufficiency
of which was never questioned by PDC before the RTC. Hence, the Court will not discuss
Page 708 of 1553
the sufficiency of the bond not only because the issue was not raised before the RTC but
also it involves a question of fact.
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA
vs. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON
GOLOSENO
G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014
J. BRION
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of,

and subject to the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of
the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Upon the dismissal of the main case
by the RTC, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot
and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it.
Facts:
On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, Barbara was the owner of
the subject agricultural land. The decision became final and executory and Barbara's
successors, have continued occupying the property.
On September 14, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages,
Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan.
In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the
land taxes and were in fact not aware that their property had been offered for public
auction. Moreover, the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a
government employee disqualified in accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. The petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the contrary, they were
in bad faith for having falsified the tax declaration they redeemed the property with. For
these irregularities, the petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order prayed for against them.
The RTC reconsidered its earlier order, denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation of the land be returned to the
respondents. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence this petition. Meanwhile, on August
8, 2013, the RTC dismissed the main.
Page 709 of 1553

Issue:
Whether petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Held:
The petitioners maintain that they did not falsify the tax declaration they reimbursed the
property with. These factual contests are not appropriate for a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of facts. The Court will not revisit, re-
examine, and re-evaluate the evidence and the factual conclusions arrived at by the lower
courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, the Court will not disturb the rule that factual
findings of the lower tribunals are final and binding on this Court.
Moreover, the petitioners may not invoke Section 18118 of the Local Government Code of
1991 to validate their alleged title. The law authorizes the local government unit to purchase
the auctioned property only in instances where “there is no bidder” or “the highest bid is
xxx insufficient.” A disqualified bidder is not among the authorized grounds. The local
government also never undertook steps to purchase the property under Section 181 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, presumably because it knew the invoked provision does
not apply.
Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners’ stance that the respondents’ defense —
the petitioners’ defective title — must fail for want of deposit to the court the amount
required by Section 267 of the Local Government Code. Clearly, the deposit precondition
is an ingenious legal device to guarantee the satisfaction of the tax delinquency, with the
local government unit keeping the payment on the bid price no matter the final outcome
of the suit to nullify the tax sale. This renders inapplicable the petitioners’ insistence that
the respondents should have made a deposit to the court. The suit filed by the petitioners
was an action for injunction and damages; the issue of nullity of the auction was raised by
the respondents themselves merely as a defense and in no way converted the action to an
action for annulment of a tax sale.
The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ.
Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the latter’s reimbursement
of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. “To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected
during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s right or title is
doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
injunctive relief is not proper.”
Page 710 of 1553
Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. A case becomes moot and
academic when there is no more issue between the parties or object that can be served in
deciding the merits of the case. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the
non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it.
Also, the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping based on litis pendentia. Not only were
the parties in both cases the same insofar as the City Government of Butuan is concerned,
there was also identity of rights asserted and identity of facts alleged. The cause of action
in the specific performance case had already been ruled upon in the present case, although
it was still pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the prayer sought in the specific
performance case-for the City Government of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of
the petitioners -had been indirectly ruled upon in the present case when the R TC declared
that no certificate of sale could be issued because there had been no valid sale.
Philippine Savings Bank Vs. Manuel P. Barrera

G.R. No. 197393. June 15, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner has employed respondent in various capacities over several years. It was
discovered that respondent had committed several infractions, including disclosing his ID
and Password for petitioner’s software to outsiders, and issuing unauthorized bank
certifications. After an administrative hearing, petitioner terminated respondent.
Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. The labor arbiter ruled
in favor of respondent and ordered his immediate reinstatement, as well as the payment of
P476,137.39 representing back wages, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's quarterly bonus, and refund for travel expenses and other benefits. The labor
arbiter found that the alleged infractions were never fully substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
authority to file appeal memorandum and non-perfection thereof. He pointed out that the
supersedeas bond was irregular, because the Certification of Accreditation and Authority
issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the Philippine Charter
Insurance Corporation (PCIC) was only authorized to issue bonds for civil cases.
Page 711 of 1553

Nevertheless, the NLRC gave due course to the appeal and reversed the Decision of
the labor arbiter. The NLRC Decision, however, did not address the argument raised in the
Motion to Dismiss regarding the irregularity of the appeal bond. Respondent therefore filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
The CA ruled that the NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter gave due course to the bank's appeal even if it
was apparent that the appeal had not been perfected owing to a defective and irregular
appeal bond. The CA observed that the certification and accreditation issued by the OCA
did not state that the PCIC was allowed to issue bonds relative to labor cases filed before
the NLRC.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the supersedeas bond was ineffective for lack
of accreditation issued by the Supreme Court in favour of the bonding company
2. Whether the factual issues in the case may be revisited by the Supreme Court in
deciding whether respondent was validly dismissed
Ruling:
1. The CA overlooked the fact that it is within the province of the NLRC to accredit
surety companies for cases it hears. The Supreme Court only accredits surety
companies for judicial courts. This fact explains why labor cases were not
enumerated in the Certification of Accreditation and Authority issued to the PCIC.
This is not to say that the certification issued by, the OCA is worthless before the
NLRC. On the contrary, the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly
provided that bonds issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Supreme Court are acceptable.
In addition, the Court has relaxed the requirement of posting a supersedeas

bond for the perfection of an appeal when there has been substantial compliance
with the rule. For example, in Del Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., the Court
allowed the appeal to proceed despite the subsequent revocation of the authority of
a bonding company, because "technical rules of procedure should not hamper the
quest for justice and truth." We find that the purpose of the appeal bond -to ensure,
during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish
Page 712 of 1553
recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed -

has been met.
Generally, only errors of law are reviewed by this Court in petitions for review. However,
there are well-recognized exceptions to this rule, as in this case, when the factual findings
of the NLRC contradict those of the labor arbiter. In the interest of judicial economy and
efficiency, and given that the records are sufficient to make a determination of the validity
of respondent's dismissal, the Court has decided to re-evaluate and review the factual
findings.
SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS AND MONINA P. LAUS, AND SPOUSES ANTONIO O.

KOH AND ELISA T. KOH v. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against
that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal
action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear
legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily,
preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and
control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being
disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the
last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint denominated as one for "Damages with Application for
a Temporary Restraining Order [(TRO)] and [WPI]” against respondent, among others.
Petitioners alleged that on three (3) separate occasions, they were prevented by armed
security guards working for respondent from entering the eight (8) parcels of land in
Mabalacat, Pampanga belonging to them. Opposing petitioners' application for TRO and
WPI, respondent and Marivalles countered that petitioners are not entitled to the TRO and
WPI prayed for because they do not own the subject properties.
The RTC granted the application for WPI based on its finding that petitioners had
presented sufficient evidence to establish that they are the registered owners of the subject
properties and thereby, have the right to possess the same. The CA reversed the RTC ruling
and thereby, lifted the WPI and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint.
Page 713 of 1553

ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether the CA erred in lifting the WPI issued by the RTC.
NO. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation
against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon
clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the
principal action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.
Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the
possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such
right is being disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the
status quo or the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy. While it is a general rule that a trial court's discretion in issuing injunctive
writs should not be interfered with, the Court finds the CA's lifting of the WPI issued by
the RTC in this case to be proper, considering that the foregoing parameters were not
observed. As aptly pointed out by the CA, although petitioners appear to be the registered
owners of the subject properties, they nonetheless failed to establish that they were in
actual physical possession of the same at the time the incidents transpired. In fact, a cursory
perusal of the complaint readily shows that petitioners never alleged that they were in prior
possession of the subject properties. Hence, for these reasons, the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the WPI involved herein.
Besides, the WPI issued by the RTC no longer serves any purpose, considering that
respondent already vacated the subject properties. When the act sought to be enjoined has
become fait accompli, the prayer for preliminary injunction should be denied. Indeed, when
the events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition had already happened,
nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. An injunction will not issue to restrain the
performance of an act already done.
2. Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint.
YES. While the CA was correct in lifting the WPI, it, however, erred in ordering the
dismissal of the complaint. The error springs from the CA's misconception that the alleged
real owners of the subject properties, while real parties in interest, are indispensable parties
to the case. The distinction between the two and the operational parameters as to each are
well-settled in jurisprudence.
Page 714 of 1553

While the alleged real owners of the subject properties may be considered as real
parties in interest for the reason that their supposed rights over these properties stand to
be prejudiced, they are not indispensable parties to the instant suit. Despite its
denomination as an action for "damages' in the complaint's caption, the action, as may be
gleaned from the pleading's allegations, is really one for injunction as it ultimately seeks to
permanently enjoin respondent and the other defendants, from restricting petitioners'
access to the subject properties. The crux of the main case, therefore, is whether or not
respondent and said defendants were justified in preventing petitioners from conducting
the relocation survey on the subject properties. Damages are also sought as ancillary relief
for the acts complained of. These issues can be resolved independent of the participation
of the alleged real owners of the subject properties. Hence, they are not indispensable
parties, without whom no final determination can be had.
In any event, even on the assumption that they are indispensable parties, the non-
joinder of indispensable parties is still not a ground for the dismissal of the suit. The proper
course of action is for the court to order that they be impleaded. Only upon refusal of or
non-compliance with such directive, may the complaint be dismissed.
In view of the nature of the case, respondent and the other defendants are real
parties in interest. Clearly, they stand to be directly injured by an adverse judgment. They
are the parties against whom the prayed for injunction is directed and are also alleged to
be liable for the resultant damage.
THE CITY OF ILOILO, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑASv.HON.

JUDGE RENE B. HONRADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 29, ILOILO CITY, AND JPV MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSION TESTING & CAR
CARE CENTER, CO., REPRESENTED BY JIM P. VELEZ
G.R. No. 160399 December 09, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.
The preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of the case, or decide
controverted facts, but should still look to a future final hearing.
FACTS:
DOTC issued Department Order No. 2002-13 authorizing one Private Emission Testing
Center (PETC) lane for every 15,000 registered vehicles in an LTO Registering District. JPV,
a partnership authorized to operate a PETC in Iloilo City, was granted a capacity of four
lanes that could cater to 15,000 motor vehicles per lane. It filed a complaint before the RTC
Page 715 of 1553
to prevent the City of Iloilo from acting on the pending application for the operation of
another PETC in the City. Grahar, another PETC operator with a pending application for a
business/mayor's permit to operate, sought leave of court to intervene. Although RTC
allowed the intervention of Grahar, it nonetheless issued an order granting the application
of JPV for the writ of preliminary injunction. City of Iloilo filed MR butit was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING:
Yes. Although the RTC had the broad discretion in dealing with JPV's application for the
writ of preliminary injunction, it was bound by the Court's exhortation against thereby
prejudging the merits of the case in Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals: The
prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which
would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. In the case at bar, if the lower court
issued the desired writ to enjoin the sale of the properties premised on the aforementioned
justification of the petitioners, the issuance of the writ would be a virtual acceptance of
their claim that the foreclosure sale is null and void. There would in effect be a prejudgment
of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the
proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.
If it was plain from the pleadings that the main relief being sought in Civil Case No. 03-
27648 was to enjoin the petitioner from exercising its legal power as a local government
unit to consider and pass upon applications for business permits for the operation of
businesses like the PETC, and to issue business permits within its territory, the Court found
it appalling how the RTC casually contravened the foregoing guidelines and easily ignored
the exhortation by granting JPV's application for injunction on June 24, 2003 in the initial
stage of the case. Such granting of JPV's application already amounted to the virtual
acceptance of JPV's alleged entitlement to preventing the petitioner from considering and
passing upon the applications of other parties like Grahar to operate their own PETC in
Iloilo City based on JPV's still controversial capability to serve all the registered motor
vehicles in Iloilo City pursuant to Department Order No. 2002-31. The granting amounted
to the prejudgment of the merits of the case, something the RTC could not validly do. It
apparently forgot that the function of the writ of preliminary injunction was not to
Page 716 of 1553

determine the merits of the case,or to decide controverted facts,because an interlocutory

injunction was but a preliminary and preparatory order that still looked to a future final
hearing, and, although contemplating what the result of that hearing would be, it should
not settle what the result should be. Hence, the petition was granted.
WESTMONT BANK (NOW UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS.) v. FUNAI

PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, et al. CARMELO V. CACHERO v. UNITED
OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. AND/OR WESTMONT BANK
G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, July 8, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction clearly
informing him from what he must abstain, he is "legally bound from that time to desist from
what he is restrained and inhibited from doing.
Facts:
Respondents Funai Philippines Corporation and Spouses Antonio and Sylvia Yutingco
(original defendants) obtained loans from Westmont Bank, secured by several promissory
notes. For failure to pay the loans, Westmont filed a complaint for sum of money, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC. A Writ of
Preliminary Attachment was issued ordering the attachment of the properties of the
original defendants and the properties under the control of the original defendants,
including the Sta. Lucia East Grand Mall. Pepito Ong Ngo filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim over the properties seized in Sta. Lucia, claiming that Panamax Corporation is the
true and lawful owner thereof. Westmont amended the Complaint twice impleading as
additional defendants, Panamax, Ngo, Aimee R. Alba, Richard N. Yu, Annabelle Baesa,
Nenita Resane, and Maria Ortiz, as they were allegedly mere alter egos, conduits, dummies,
or nominees of Sps. Yutingco to defraud their creditors, including Westmont.
The additional defendants moved to dismiss the complaints. The RTC ruled that the
original defendants are jointly and severally liable to Westmont but dismissed the amended
complaints for failure to state a cause of action against the additional defendants and
ordered the return of the items wrongfully seized, to the premises of Panamax in Sta. Lucia.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. The additional defendants filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal, which was granted. Westmont filed a petition for certiorari with
very urgent motion/prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the CA.
Due to Westmont's continued refusal to release the seized items, the RTC issued a Break-
Open Order to enforce the writ. However, the following day, the CA issued a TRO enjoining
Page 717 of 1553
the enforcement of the writ of execution. Despite being informed of the issuance of the
TRO, Sheriff Cachero proceeded with the implementation of the writ of execution. A case
for indirect contempt was filed by Westmont against Sheriffs Cachero and Duncan, and
Ngo.
The CA nullified the Execution Orders, granting the additional defendants' Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal, and enjoining Westmont to comply with the Execution Orders;
and adjudged Sheriff Cachero guilty of indirect contempt and ordered him to pay a fine.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Cachero is guilty of indirect contempt in implementing the writ of
execution and the Break-Open Order since there was a proper and timely notice of the
TRO.
Ruling:
YES. It is well-settled that a sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice.
He is duty-bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and
be vigilant in the exercise of that authority. While sheriffs have the ministerial duty to
implement writs of execution promptly, they are bound to discharge their duties with
prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of
their affairs. Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon whom the execution of a judgment
depends, must be circumspect and proper in their behavior. Anything less is unacceptable
because in serving the court's writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the
court, sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the process of the
In the present case, Sheriff Cachero failed to exercise circumspection in the enforcement
of the writ of execution, given the information that a TRO had already been issued by the
CA enjoining him from implementing the same. This clearly evinces an intention to defy
the TRO. Settled is the rule that where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired,
of an injunction clearly informing him from what he must abstain, he is "legally bound from
that time to desist from what he is restrained and inhibited from doing, and will be
punished for a violation thereof, even though it may not have served, or may have been
served on him defectively."
Page 718 of 1553

SPOUSES ESPIRITU v. SPOUSES. SAZON

G.R. No. 204965, March 02, 2016 [Perlas-Bernabe,J.]
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties
in order to protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order
to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting
of the proper relief after the trial on the merits. In a sense, it is a regulatory process
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
FACTS:
Respondents-Spouses Sazon filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Sales,
Cancellation of Titles, Recovery of Possession and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Sps.
Espiritu, Spouses Modesto and Leticia Diaz (Sps. Diaz), Marilyn M. Peco (Peco). Sps. Sazon
alleged that the titles over the subject property of Peco and Sps. Espiritu are invalid,
ineffective, null, void, and unenforceable. Sps. Sazon claimed to be the lawful owners of the
property, having purchased the same from Sps. Diaz. After the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (December 27, 1996 Deed of Sale), Sps. Diaz surrendered the physical
possession of the land and the corresponding owner's duplicate copy of the title to Sps.
Sazon. However, sometime in August 2003, Sps. Espiritu occupied and fenced the subject
land and claimed ownership thereof.
The RTC granted the application for WPI, thereby enjoining Sps. Espiritu from committing
acts of possession and constructing a factory, warehouse or other building over the subject
land. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
granted the writ of preliminary injunction in Sps. Sazon's favor.
RULING:
NO.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior

to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain
Page 719 of 1553

from a particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties in
order to protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order
to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting
of the proper relief after the trial on the merits. In a sense, it is a regulatory process
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
In the present case, the CA found that the RTC correctly appreciated the evidence
presented during the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction. At this
point, it bears to stress that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on
initial or incomplete evidence as the plaintiff is only required to show that he has an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. As such, the evidence need
only be a sampling intended merely to give the trial court an evidence of justification for a
preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case.
Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary
injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall
not be disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction, which does not obtain in this case. Accordingly, the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in the instant case must be upheld, and the status quo - or
the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual
controversy, which is existing at the time of the filing of the case - must be preserved
until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the RTC is presumed to have been guided by
the dictum that it cannot make use of its injunctive power to alter the status quo ante litem.
Hence, it could not have contemplated the eviction of Sps. Espiritu from the subject land
and the transfer of its possession to Sps. Sazon because it will defeat its rationale for issuing
the injunctive writ in the first place, i.e., in order not to preempt it from properly
adjudicating on the merits and the various issues between the parties that would otherwise
be rendered moot and academic.
SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS AND MONINA P. LAUS, AND SPOUSES ANTONIO O.

KOH AND ELISA T. KOH v. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against
that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
Page 720 of 1553

action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear
legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily,
disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the
last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint denominated as one for "Damages with Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order [(TRO)] and [WPI]” against respondent, among others.
Petitioners alleged that on three (3) separate occasions, they were prevented by armed
security guards working for respondent from entering the eight (8) parcels of land in
Mabalacat, Pampanga belonging to them. Opposing petitioners' application for TRO and
WPI, respondent and Marivalles countered that petitioners are not entitled to the TRO and
WPI prayed for because they do not own the subject properties.
The RTC granted the application for WPI based on its finding that petitioners had
presented sufficient evidence to establish that they are the registered owners of the subject
properties and thereby, have the right to possess the same. The CA reversed the RTC ruling
and thereby, lifted the WPI and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint.
ISSUE/RULING:
3. Whether the CA erred in lifting the WPI issued by the RTC.
NO.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that
right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a
clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily,
disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or
the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
While it is a general rule that a trial court's discretion in issuing injunctive writs should not
be interfered with, the Court finds the CA's lifting of the WPI issued by the RTC in this case
Page 721 of 1553

to be proper, considering that the foregoing parameters were not observed. As aptly
pointed out by the CA, although petitioners appear to be the registered owners of the
subject properties, they nonetheless failed to establish that they were in actual physical
possession of the same at the time the incidents transpired. In fact, a cursory perusal of the
complaint readily shows that petitioners never alleged that they were in prior possession
of the subject properties. Hence, for these reasons, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the WPI involved herein.
Besides, the WPI issued by the RTC no longer serves any purpose, considering that
respondent already vacated the subject properties. When the act sought to be enjoined has
become fait accompli, the prayer for preliminary injunction should be denied. Indeed, when
the events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition had already happened,
nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. An injunction will not issue to restrain the
performance of an act already done.
4. Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint.
YES.
While the CA was correct in lifting the WPI, it, however, erred in ordering the dismissal of
the complaint. The error springs from the CA's misconception that the alleged real owners
of the subject properties, while real parties in interest, are indispensable parties to the case.
The distinction between the two and the operational parameters as to each are well-settled
in jurisprudence.
While the alleged real owners of the subject properties may be considered as real parties in
interest for the reason that their supposed rights over these properties stand to be
prejudiced, they are not indispensable parties to the instant suit. Despite its denomination
as an action for "damages' in the complaint's caption, the action, as may be gleaned from
the pleading's allegations, is really one for injunction as it ultimately seeks to permanently
enjoin respondent and the other defendants, from restricting petitioners' access to the
subject properties. The crux of the main case, therefore, is whether or not respondent and
said defendants were justified in preventing petitioners from conducting the relocation
survey on the subject properties. Damages are also sought as ancillary relief for the acts
complained of. These issues can be resolved independent of the participation of the alleged
real owners of the subject properties. Hence, they are not indispensable parties, without
whom no final determination can be had.
In any event, even on the assumption that they are indispensable parties, the non-joinder
of indispensable parties is still not a ground for the dismissal of the suit. The proper course
Page 722 of 1553

of action is for the court to order that they be impleaded. Only upon refusal of or non-
compliance with such directive, may the complaint be dismissed.
In view of the nature of the case, respondent and the other defendants are real parties in
interest. Clearly, they stand to be directly injured by an adverse judgment. They are the
parties against whom the prayed for injunction is directed and are also alleged to be liable
for the resultant damage.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY vs. JADEWELL PARKING

SYSTEMS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160025, April 23, 2014, CJ. Sereno
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction
which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard.
A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction. The, SC therefore, ruled that the CA did not
commit any error in treating Jadewell’s Petition for Certiorari as an original action for
injunction.
Facts:
The officials of the City Government of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems
Corporation (Jadewell) executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 26 June 2000,
whereby the City of Baguio authorized Jadewell to regulate and collect parking fees for on-
street parking in the city, as well as to implement the installation of modern parking
meters.
The legal disputes embodied in the nine Petitions began when the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Baguio City (Sanggunian) revoked the MOA through City Resolution No.
037, Series of 2002 (Resolution 37), alleging substantial breach of the MOA on the part of
Jadewell. Then Mayor Alfredo Vergara vetoed the Resolution. The Sanggunian Panlungsod
overrode the veto through an unnumbered Resolution dated 17 April 2002. These twin
Resolutions constitute what the court calsl here as the first act of Rescission1 of the MOA
by the city officials of Baguio. Jadewell denied the breach and commenced an action before
Page 723 of 1553

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio, questioning the validity of the MOA’s revocation
and the Sanggunian’s capacity to pass a resolution revoking the MOA.
The RTC promulgated its Decision finding the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA
unlawful. The Sanggunian then filed an appeal assailing the RTC’s decision with the Court
of Appeals.
On 7 July 2003, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC which declared as
invalid the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA. The Sanggunian filed a Rule 45 Petition
for Review on Certiorari with the SC. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 160025, the
first of the consolidated petitions herein.
On 23 August 2006, while the consolidated cases were pending resolution before the
SC, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006. The
Resolution directed the City Legal Officer to notify Jadewell of the Baguio City
Government’s intention to rescind the MOA, and to inform Jadewell to stop its operations
under the MOA 60 days after receipt of the Notice.
On 28 August 2006, the legal counsel for Jadewell wrote to Baguio City Vice-Mayor
Bautista, Jr., informing him that the OP had denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
Mayor Yaranon assailing the OP resolution ordering the latter’s suspension as City Mayor
of Baguio City. The counsel for Jadewell likewise stated in his letter that they were aware
that the Sanggunian was planning to issue a resolution to repeal Ordinance No. 003-2000
and rescind the MOA. The letter requested the Vice-Mayor to veto the measure in light of
the pending petitions with the Supreme Court. The said counsel likewise sent a similar
letter to the Sanggunian, urging it to desist from implementing the repeal of Ordinance
No. 003-2000 and the rescission of the MOA pending the resolution of the cases with the
Supreme Court.
On 22 September 2006, City Legal Officer Rabanes wrote a letter to Jadewell,

through its President, Mr. Rogelio Tan, informing Jadewell of Resolution No. 204, Series of
2006, which rescinded the MOA, and ordering it to stop operations within 60 days from
notice. This letter was received on the same day it was issued; hence, the 60-day period
lapsed on 22 November 2006. This notice, together with the resolution, constitute the
second act of rescission of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the MOA between the City of Baguio and Jadewell has ceased to
legally exist as of 22 November 2006
Page 724 of 1553

2. Whether or not the CA erred in treating Jadewell’s Petition for Certiorari as an

original action for injunction
3. Was Jadewell deprived of procedural due process?
4. Should damages be awarded to Jadewell?
5. Whether or not the public respondents who were then officials of the City of
Baguio are liable for indirect contempt
6. Whether or not Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan should be liable for contempt in
G.R. No. 172216.
Ruling:
1. Yes, since the legal efficacy of the rescission in 2006 has not been contested by
Jadewell in any of the petitions before the SC, it considered the notice of rescission
to have taken legal effect and therefore, at the latest, the MOA between the City of
Baguio and Jadewell has ceased to legally exist as of 22 November 2006.
The SC note at the outset that on 22 November 2006, 60 days had lapsed from
receipt of the letter dated 22 September 2006, informing Jadewell of the decision of the City
of Baguio to rescind the MOA under Section 12 thereof. It may be recalled that Section 12
requires that notice of the intention to rescind be given 60 days prior to the effectivity of
the rescission. Jadewell has not questioned the legal efficacy of this notice. It has brought
this matter of a second rescission to the Court’s attention only as a matter of contumacious
behavior on the part of the respondents in G.R. No. 174879, in the same way that it brought
various actions of the public respondents before the Court in its other contempt petitions.
Since the legal efficacy of the rescission in 2006 has not been contested by Jadewell
in any of the petitions before the SC, it considered the notice of rescission to have taken
legal effect and therefore, at the latest, the MOA between the City of Baguio and Jadewell
has ceased to legally exist as of 22 November 2006.
Inasmuch as there is no longer any existing MOA, no order of this Court can have
the effect of directing the City of Baguio to enforce any of the terms of the MOA, which
brings us to the matter of G.R. No. 160025. In whatever direction the court rules on the
question of the validity of the first act of rescission, such ruling will only have the effect of
either providing Jadewell a basis to seek damages from the City of Baguio for the wrongful
Page 725 of 1553

termination of the MOA, should the court find wrongful termination to have taken place,
or, deny Jadewell that right. The possible susceptibility of the City of Baguio and its officials
to an action for damages on a finding of wrongful termination is why we do not consider
G.R. No. 160025 as having been rendered moot by the lawful rescission of the MOA on 22
November 2006. Thus, the court will proceed to rule on the issues in G.R. No. 160025.
In its Petition before the RTC, Jadewell argues that the rescission of the MOA was
not valid, on due process grounds, and also because there was no substantial breach on its
part to justify a rescission of the MOA. It also asserts that the Sanggunian had no authority
to rescind the MOA, because the latter was not a party thereto.
Jadewell sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of

the questioned Resolution, and prayed that after hearing, the preliminary injunction be
made permanent. It further prayed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to nullify the
assailed Resolution; and for a mandatory injunction to compel the City Government to
perform the latter’s obligations under the MOA. Jadewell alternatively invoked the
provisions of Section 18 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the BOT Law,
in the event the RTC would uphold the validity of the questioned Resolution.
The trial court ruled that the rescission violated the due process clause of the
Constitution and failed to meet the requirements for rescission under the Civil Code and
the MOA itself. In the Sanggunian’s Memorandum, on appeal before the CA, the
Sanggunian assigned three errors to the Decision of the trial court: (1) the RTC ignored the
evidence on record and the requirements of Rule 65 when it declared the subject Resolution
void; (2) Jadewell was not denied due process when the MOA was rescinded; and (3) by
ruling that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no right of rescission for the first 5 years of
the MOA – an issue not raised in the pleadings – the trial court improperly took up the
cudgels for Jadewell in the case. The CA upheld the RTC’s Decision in toto.
2. No, the SC sustained the ruling of the appellate court treating Jadewell’s original
action for certiorari as one for injunction based on the allegations in the latter’s
pleadings.
In the original action filed by Jadewell before the RTC of Baguio City, although the
action was clearly denominated as a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
against the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the allegations actually supported an action for
injunction under Rule 58 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. As can be gleaned from
its allegations and especially in its prayers, Jadewell filed the case with the trial court with
the ultimate end of restraining the implementation of Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002.
Page 726 of 1553

The SC agree with the CA when it ruled that Jadewell sought permanent injunction aside
from the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy
of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final
injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy
of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the
merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
The, SC therefore, ruled that the CA did not commit any error in treating Jadewell’s
Petition for Certiorari as an original action for injunction.
3. No, the SC disagree with the rulings of the RTC and the CA that Jadewell was
deprived of due process.
In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian Panlungsod in rescinding the
MOA – be it first or second act of rescission – was clearly in the exercise of its legislative or
administrative functions and was not an exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
The Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The
preamble of the MOA lends support to this view. Evidently, the foremost reason why the
agreement was entered into by the parties was to provide order, given Baguio City’s parking
problems in identified areas, as well as to generate income.
The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as its intention to rescind the
MOA; because it deems to no longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are clearly an
exercise of its legislative or administrative function. However, it is another matter as to
whether the City of Baguio was able to clearly establish the grounds as basis for the exercise
of its right to rescind.
4. No, the SC did not award any damages to Jadewell.
While Jadewell prays for damages against the public respondent, and while ordinarily
the court could grant the same, the context of this case prevents us from giving any form
of recompense to Jadewell even if the rescission of the MOA did not follow the required
legal procedure. This is because it would be appalling to grant Jadewell any award of
Page 727 of 1553

damages, considering (1) it installed only 14 out of the apparently 100 contemplated parking
meters; (2) its employees, private citizens who did not possess any authority from the LTO,
were manually collecting parking fees from the public, and (3) it did not, apparently
properly remit any significant amount of money to the City of Baguio. These three facts are
uncontested, these omissions are offensive to the concept of public service that the
residents of Baguio were promised through Jadewell. From its ambiguous responses extant
in the records, it is clear that Jadewell does not appear to be an investor who has lost in its
investments in the Baguio City project.
5. No, the SC do not find any of the public respondents who were then officials of the
City of Baguio, liable for indirect contempt
Jadewell, in G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043, and 174879, bases its charges
of indirect contempt against public respondents on a claim that any action that tends to
stop the implementation of the MOA is contumacious. Such actions include desistance
orders to desist against Jadewell itself, the second act of unilateral rescission of the MOA;
orders to other public officers to prevent Jadewell from exercising its authority under the
MOA; and the official encouragement for motorists to resist attempts of Jadewell to collect
parking fees or clamp/tow vehicles that do not observe the parking regulations. Public
respondents never asked anyone to employ pressure or influence on this Court for the
former’s benefit.
Instead, the acts that have been allegedly committed by public respondents are acts
done pursuant to their belief that: (a) the MOA has been validly voided, and more
importantly, (b) that Jadewell’s personnel do not have the legal authority to perform the
governmental function of administering the regulation of on-street and off-street parking,
of towing or clamping vehicles that violate such regulation, and of collecting parking fees
from motorists.
In G.R. 174879, the court has already pronounced that the Sanggunian was within
its full right to perform the second act of rescission, and thus, it is even with more reason,
that its members and the City Legal Officer cannot be held in contempt therefor. The Court
denies the prayer in the petitions to disbar the respondents therein who are lawyers.
6. No, the SC does not find Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan liable for contempt in G.R.
No. 172216.
Jadewell wants this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt for issuing a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction ordering Jadewell to stop collecting parking fees; to
refrain from supervising the parking in Baguio City; as well as to hold in abeyance the
Page 728 of 1553

implementation of the MOA and its enabling ordinance. It was only on 5 June 2006 that
this Court, in G.R. No. 172215, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)165 directing
the trial court to discontinue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R. Upon receipt by
Judge Pamintuan of the TRO, he immediately ordered the cancellation of the 29 June 2006
hearing.
The SC do not consider the promulgation of the assailed writ of preliminary

prohibitory injunction against Jadewell as a defiance of our writ issued on 9 February 2005,
considering, it was directed against Mayor Yaranon only. The court has held in Leonidas v.
Supnet that "a party cannot be held in indirect contempt for disobeying a court order which
is not addressed to him." The SC note that Judge Pamintuan observed deference to the
Orders of this Court when he immediately suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No.
6089-R upon receipt of the TRO.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS,

JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON,
SPOUSES XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD &
G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014, J. Bersamin
The conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right;
and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. Under the circumstances averred in the complaint, the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction upon the application of the spouses Borbon was improper. They had
admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of
their loan obligation to the BPI, and, as such, they were fully aware of the consequences on
their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid.
Facts:
Respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda
Facultad, and XM Facultad and Development Corporation commenced Civil Case No. CEB-
26468 to seek the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes, real estate and chattel
mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner.
They further sought damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on
the mortgages against their properties.
Page 729 of 1553

The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from BPI, and had
executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the sum
borrowed; that as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted real estate
mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made
to sign a continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero.
It appears that the respondents’ obligation to the petitioner had

reached P17,983,191.49, but they had only been able to pay P13 Million because they had
been adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia in 1997. The petitioner required
them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under threat of foreclosing on the
mortgages. Thus, the complaint sought a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to stay
the threatened foreclosure. RTC denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss for being
unmeritorious, but granted the respondents’ application for preliminary injunction. The
CA affirmed such decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue;
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction
Ruling:
1. No. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares
all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the
recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of
damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to
the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondents seek the nullification of
the promissory notes, continuing surety agreement, checks and mortgage agreements for
being executed against their will and vitiated by irregularities, not the recovery of the
possession or title to the properties burdened by the mortgages. There was no allegation
Page 730 of 1553

that the possession of the properties under the mortgages had already been transferred to
the petitioner in the meantime.
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory
real estate mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contractor the recovery of damages. In
contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated
in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title
to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
2. No. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a
party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief
demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation
of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of
a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the
injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue
to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or
to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration
of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right
clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
Page 731 of 1553

Under the circumstances averred in the complaint, the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper. They had
admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of
their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the
consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured
be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the
mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner’s allegations that
they had not fully paid their obligation, and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely
brought by them in order to stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on
their claim that they had been compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and
mortgage agreements.
LCMC CEBU MINING CORP ET AL. vs. CEBU PORT AUTHORITY ET AL.
G.R. No. 201284, November 19, 2014, J. Reyes
Talo-ot Port, where LCMC operate their facility, is a national infrastructure project.
The Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate granted by the CPA is premised on a
contract for a national infrastructure project contemplated by R.A. No. 6957, as amended by
R.A. No. 7718, the termination or rescission of which cannot be validly enjoined by an
injunctive writ issued by a lower court pursuant to R.A. No. 8975.
Facts:
In October 1997, a Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate was issued by

the Cebu Port Authority (CPA) to Luvimin Cebu Mining Corp. (LCMC) authorizing them
to operate a private port facility at Barangay Talo-ot, Argao, Cebu until December 31, 2022.
In March 2006, CPA rescinded the foregoing registration/permit on the following

grounds: 1) a Foreshore Lease Agreement (FLA) is a prerequisite in the approval of a port
license but the foreshore lease application was still pending with the DENR during the
approval of said license; 2) said foreshore lease application was denied per DENR letter
dated 04 November 1999 for the reason that the area cannot be subjected for foreshore
lease but instead for a special land use application which is the Other Lawful Purposes
(OLP); and 3) LCMC submitted their application for OLP sometime in the year 2000 but
until now no permit is granted.
CPA declared the registration/permit defective, forthwith took possession of the

port facility, and started to fence the premises. These events prompted LCMC to file a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ
Page 732 of 1553

of Preliminary Injunc-tion before the RTC against CPA, its Port Manager, Angelo Verdan,
and several others.
The RTC granted the LCMC’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction. The CA ratiocinated that an injunctive writ cannot be issued to
enjoin the respondents from taking over the port facility because the repair of the RORO
ramp, asphalting of back-up area, construction of office, passenger terminal and covered
walk are considered as national government projects as defined in Sec. 2(a) of R.A. No. 8975
against which no injunctive writ can lie pursuant to Sec. 3 of the same law.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion
when it issued the subject writ of preliminary injunction in contravention to the express
provisions of Sec. 3 and Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 8975
Ruling:
Yes, this Court upholds the assailed judgment of the CA. The injunctive writ issued
by the RTC in its Orders were void for being contrary to R.A. No. 8975.
Sec. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary

Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any
person or entity, whether public or private acting under the government direction,
to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or

location of any national government project;
b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined
under Sec. 2 hereof;
c) Commencement prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any
such contract or project;
d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for
such contract/project.
Page 733 of 1553

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a

private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have
rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not
apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that
unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond
shall accrue in favorof the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant
was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void,
the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified
and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that
the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
“Section 4.Nullity of Writs and Orders. – Any temporary restraining order,

preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of
Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
“The prohibition covers national government projects defined in Section 2 of the

same law, to wit: Section 2. Definition of Terms. –
“(a) "National government projects" shall refer to all current and future national
government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including
projects undertaken by government-owned and -controlled corporations, all
projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718,
otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and
necessary activities such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of
equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of
funding.
“The term infrastructure projects means "construction, improvement and

rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication
facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage
systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings,
hospital buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the
government capital investment.”
The contractual arrangement between the government or its instrumentality and a

private entity are of various kinds and nomenclatures. They, however, share a common
Page 734 of 1553

system whereby the private entity undertakes the construction, financing, operation
and/or maintenance of a given infrastructure facility subject to its eventual transferto the
concerned government entity upon completion, after a fixed number of period or after the
private entity has recouped its investments. This system permeates the arrangement
between CPA and the petitioners as revealed in the following provisoof the latter’s
Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate, viz:
“2. This Certificate shall expire on 31 December 2022 provided that upon expiration
of the period herein stipulated, said port facility shall become the property of the
Cebu Port Authority, free from any liens and encumbrances, without any
obligation on the part of the Cebu Port Authority to make reimbursement of the
value thereof to the owner/operator.”
Clearly, Talo-ot Port, where LCMC operate their facility, is a national infrastructure
project. The Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate granted by the CPA is
premised on a contract for a national infrastructure project contemplated by R.A. No. 6957,
as amended by R.A. No. 7718, the termination or rescission of which cannot be validly
enjoined by an injunctive writ issued by a lower court pursuant to R.A. No. 8975.
LCMC cannot claim exception from the application of the prohibition on issuance
of an injunctive writ. No constitutional issue of due process is involved because LCMC were
not deprived of any property or property right when their Certificate of Registration and
Permit to Operate was cancelled. LCMC were given a mere privilege to operate a private
facility in Talo-ot Port; they were not given any property right on the port, its wharf and/or
appurtenances. They had no vested right to operate a private port facility in Talo-ot Port
and their certificate/permit can be withdrawn anytime as stated in the condition imposed
by CPA.
Any issue of due process concerns only procedural matters in cancellations of permit
by the CPA for purposes of determining whether it properly rescinded the privilege granted
to the LCMC. It involves evidentiary issues which can only be fully threshed out in the main
case still pending before the RTC. The other issues raised by LCMC are likewise evidentiary
and/or factual innature that cannot be judiciously addressed in the present case which
relates only to the application for a provisional writ.
SATURNINO NOVECIO, GAVINO NOVECIO, ANASTACIO GOLEZ, ABUNDIO

SOMBILON, HERTING RODRIGUEZ, MELITON CATALAN vs. HON. RODRIGO F.
LIM, JR. CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA AS PONENTE AND AS
MEMBER AND HON. ANGELITA A. GACUTAN AS MEMBER, FORMER TWENTY-
THIRD DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, MINDANAO STATION, HON. JUDGE
Page 735 of 1553

BENJAMIN ESTRADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 9,

RTC, MALAYBALAY, BUKIDNON, MARIA CARMEN J. TUAZON, REP. BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LOPE DUROTAN
G.R. No. 193809, March 23, 2015, J. Brion
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive
and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed land.
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary
injunction. First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision
ordering their ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land from
which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally,
the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners,
tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.
Facts:
Respondents Tuazon and Nieto, represented by their AIF, Lope Durotan filed
complaints for forcible entry with damages against Petitioners Satumino, Gavino,
Anastacio Golez, et al. The respondents alleged that petitioners unlawfully squatted and
took possession of their property. The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they
have already been in possession of the land for more than two years when the complaints
were filed. Also, the petitioners maintained that respondents had previous landholding in
the area but the same was covered by the CARP and so it was subdivided in favor of the
tenants.
The MTC, ruling in favor of petitioners, found that the respondents anchored their
alleged prior possession on the fact that they have applied title for the land as shown by a
certi-fication authorizing land survey. Other than this, the respondents had no evidence of
their actual and physical possession of the land. To the trial court, this scant evidence
cannot stand against the countervailing evidence offered by the petitioners showing that
they have been in possession of the disputed property in the past.
The RTC, however, reversed this decision on the ground that there exists a valid
certifi-cation from the DENR-CENRO revealing that the land in litigation is the subject of
an application for title and claim by the respondents and likewise a standing request for
authority to conduct survey for the bona fide occupant, Respondent Nieto. Thus,
respondents were the actual occu-pants of the property in litigation.
Page 736 of 1553

When the respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment, the petitioners
filed a petition for review to the CA seeking the issuance of a TRO and for preliminary
injunction. The appellate court, however, only denied the request for injunction and did
not resolve the petition on the merits.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it denied the petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
YES, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the request for
preli-minary injunction.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
A review of the records, however, shows that the CA ignored relevant facts that
would have justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Contrary to established
jurisprudence, the CA also denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without giving the
factual and legal bases for such denial.
Sec. 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may be
granted when the following have been established:
a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consist in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Page 737 of 1553

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete

evi-dence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an
evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of
the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit

conclusive and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed land.
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a

preliminary injunction. First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of
the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment
from the land from which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the
petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights
of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases
ineffectual.
Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary

injunction based on the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must state
in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to
enable the appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other,
the plea for injunctive relief.
Thus, [the Court does] not understand why the CA denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction without citing any legal or factual basis for the denial.
The MTC found that the petitioners have been in actual and physical possession of
the land for more than two (2) years prior to the institution of the complaints for forcible
entry. The MTC also found that the respondents were not even sure how the petitioners
entered the land. In their complaints, they alleged that petitioners entered the land by
means of “force, intimi-dation, threat, stealth and strategy,” a shotgun allegation which
shows that respondents' lack knowledge of how the petitioners entered the disputed
property.
The RTC, on the other hand, relied on a mere request for authority to conduct a
land survey, allegedly showing that respondent Manuel V. Nieto was the occupant and tiller
of the land.
Page 738 of 1553

However, this document does not prove prior possession of the subject land. It only
points to the fact that there was an application for a land title in the name of one of the
respon-dents, which application was not even shown to have been granted. This document
merely authorized the survey of the land; the declaration regarding possession was just
incidental to the application for land survey.
Between the clear findings of the MTC, which conducted the trial of the forcible
entry cases, and the RTC acting as an appellate court, which relied on documentary
evidence but with-out sufficiently explaining how such evidence would prove prior
possession, [the Court is] inclined to give weight to the MTC' s ruling.
ATTACHMENT
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, TOMAS CLEMENTE, JR., and OSCAR RAMIREZ,

Petitioners, vs. ERLINDA KRISHNAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203530, April 13, 2015, Peralta, J.
Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy in lifting the same is
through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond.
Facts:
Herein petitioners are the respondents in the complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages filed by herein respondent Erlinda Khrishnan who claimed to be a client of the
bank. When she presented her time deposit certificates for payment, the bank refused to
honor them because they were fraudulent. Erlinda applied for a Preliminary Writ of
Attachment which was granted. Thus, the bank’s accounts in BPI and Central Bank were
garnished. Petitioners then filed a motion to lift attachment which was opposed by Erlinda.
RTC issued an order lifting the attachment. Erlinda filed a petition for certiorari and the
bank was ordered to file a counter bond in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 57, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure within 10 days from finality of the decision. Then, the judge issued an order
directing Erlinda to file a new attachment bond to which she complied and also the
petitioners to file a counterbond. On January 28, 2010, petitioners filed a motion to admit
bank property in lieu of counter bond which was opposed by respondent Erlinda. RTC
denied the motion which was affirmed by CA. Petitioners contend that it has the option to
deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to secure any contingent lien on its
property in the event respondent wins the case. They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57 only
mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash.
Page 739 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond.
Ruling:
NO. Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in
lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court
holds that petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of
depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the
implementation thereof is unmeritorious. In Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v.
Tria-Infante, the court stated that one of the ways to secure the discharge of an attachment
is for the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his behalf, to
post a counter bond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed by
the court in the order of attachment. The trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the
word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash, a broader
interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking
a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal
to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to
be attached.
NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC. vs. SPOUSES DENNIS AND CHERYLIN GARCIA
G.R. No. 203240, March 18, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse

party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time
thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the
plaintiff or any proper party. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment
must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be
justified. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the
principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action. In this case,
with the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Civil Case No. Q-05-53699 necessarily comes its
loss of jurisdiction over all matters merely ancillary thereto.
Facts:
Northern Islands Co., Inc. filed a Complaint with application for a writ of
preliminary attachment, before the RTC against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No.
Page 740 of 1553
Q-05-53699. It alleged that: (a) from March to July 2004, petitioner caused the delivery to
respondents of various appliances in the aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17; b) the goods
were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good
order and condition by respondents’ representatives; (c) the parties agreed that the goods
delivered were payable within 120 days, and that the unpaid amounts would earn interest
at a rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum; (d) however, the value of the goods were not
paid by respondents despite repeated demands; and (e) respondents fraudulently asserted
that petitioner had no proof that they had indeed received the quantity of the subject
goods.
In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary attachment which was
subsequently issued. Instead of filing an answer, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Proper Pleading and Motion for Discovery, asking the RTC to
allow them to photocopy and personally examine the original invoices, delivery cargo
receipts, and bills of lading attached to the Complaint, claiming that they could not “come
up with an intelligent answer”. Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Excess
Attachment, alleging that the attachment previously ordered by the RTC exceeded by
P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated value of the attached properties, including the
garnished bank accounts amounted to P17,273,409.73, while the attachment bond is only
in the amount of P8,040,825.17.
The RTC denied the Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, and, instead, directed
respondents to file their answer, which the latter complied with. Despite this, respondents
again filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for Discovery. The RTC denied the
Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment. On the other hand, the RTC granted the Motion
for Discovery in accordance with Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, despite petitioner’s claim
that it did not have the originals of the documents being sought.
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order, specifically

assailing the denial of their Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment. In this relation, they
prayed that the RTC refer to a commissioner, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, the
factual determination of the total aggregate amount of respondents’ attached properties so
as to ascertain if the attachment was excessive. Also, they prayed that the order for
production and inspection be modified and that petitioner be ordered to produce the
original documents anew for their inspection and copying. It was however denied for lack
of merit. Respondents elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari and
mandamus. In the interim, the RTC dismissed the Civil Case No. Q-05-53699 due to the
absence of any evidence to prove that respondents had agreed to the pricing of the subject
goods which was later on appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal seasonably filed. The
RTC ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA. The CA partly granted
Page 741 of 1553

the certiorari petition of respondents, ordering the RTC to appoint a commissioner as

provided under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, and, on the other hand, denying respondents’
Motion for Discovery. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
Whether the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary
attachment after petitioner appealed the decision in the Civil Case No. Q-05-53699, and
thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA; and whether the CA erred in
ordering the appointment of a commissioner and the subsequent discharge of any excess
attachment found by said commissioner.
Ruling:
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal,
the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC decision resolving
the Civil Case No. Q-05-53699 through the timely filing of its Notice of Appeal. RTC even
ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA. Meanwhile, records do not show that
respondents filed any appeal, resulting in the lapse of its own period to appeal therefrom.
Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted that the RTC had already
lost jurisdiction over the Civil Case No. Q-05-53699.
With the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Civil Case No. Q-05-53699 necessarily
comes its loss of jurisdiction over all matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety
of conducting a trial by commissioners in order to determine the excessiveness of the
subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter to the Civil Case No. Q-05-
53699, is now mooted by its supervening appeal.
STATUS QUO ORDER
BRO. BERNARD OCA, et al., vs. LAURITA CUSTODIO

G.R. No. 174996, December 03, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and
uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy, not to provide mandatory or
injunctive relief. In this case, it cannot be applied when the respondent was already removed
prior to the filing of the case. The directive to reinstate respondent to her former position as
Page 742 of 1553

school director and curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an act
already consummated which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive
relief and not of a status quo order.
Facts:
St. Francis School of General Trias Cavite, Inc. was organized and established as a
non-stock and non-profit educational institution. Its organization and establishment was
through the assistance of the La Salle Brothers without any formal agreement with the
School. The incorporators of the School were: respondent Custodio, petitioner Mojica,
petitioner Pascual, Rev. Msgr. Feliz Perez, Bro. Vernon Poore, FSC. The five original
incorporators served as the School’s Members and Board of Trustees until the deaths of
Bro. Poore and Msgr. Perez.
To formalize the relationship, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed,

permitting DLSG to exercise supervisory powers over the School’s academic affairs. DLSG
appointed supervisors who sit in the meetings of the Board of Trustees without any voting
rights. Bro. Magbanua, Bro. Franco and Bro. Oca were the ones appointed. Petitioners
declare that the membership of the DLSG Brothers in the Board of Trustees as its officers
was valid since an election was conducted to that effect.
Custodio challenged the validity of the membership of the DLSG Brothers and their
purported election as officers of the School. Custodio alleged that clearly the composition
of the membership of the School had no basis there being no formal admission as members
or election as officers. This was following a disagreement regarding a proposed MOA that
would replace the existing MOA with the DLSG Brothers and her removal as Curriculum
Administrator through the Board of Trustees.
Under the proposed MOA, DLSG will supervise and control not only the academic
affairs of the School but also the matters of the finance, administration and operations of
the latter. Unable to convince Custodio and the academic populace to accept the MOA, the
DLSG brothers withdrew their academic support from the School. Thereafter, Mojica and
Pascual retired and stopped reporting for work.
Custodio averred that being the only remaining Administrator, she served as the
Over-all Director of the School. She made appointments to fill in Pascual and Mojica. Then
a special meeting was called by Bro. Oca in which the petitioners alleged that the prior
organizational structure was restored, and the retirement of Pascual and Mojica
disapproved by proper corporate action.
Page 743 of 1553

In the same meeting, petitioners alleged that Custodio admitted to having opened
an account with the Luzon Development Bank in her own name for the alleged purpose of
depositing funds for and in behalf of the School. A directive was issued for the immediate
closing of this account. Still, Custodio refused to close such account. Subsequently, Mojica
and Pascual formally resigned from their administrative posts.
According to petitioners, due to the repeated refusal of Custodio to close the

account she opened, the Board of Trustees approved a resolution to file a case against the
latter. Consequently, the Board of Trustees also approved resolutions to the effect that
Custodio be stopped from performing functions in the School.
Thereafter, the Board of Trustees resolved to remove Custodio as a member of the

Board of Trustees and as a member of the Corporation pursuant to Sections 28 and 91 of
the Corporation Code. Subsequently, she was issued a Memorandum and signed by Bro.
Bernard Oca, as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, wherein she was informed of her
immediate removal as Curriculum Administrator on the grounds of willful breach of trust
and loss of confidence and for failure to explain the charges against her despite notice.
Custodio filed with the trial court a Complaint with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Preliminary Injunction against petitioners again assailing the legality of the membership of
the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School.
The trial court acted in favor of Custodio. A status quo order was issued wherein the
plaintiff is hereby allowed to continue discharging her functions as school director and
curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and actually discharging
functions as school officer to continue performing their duties until the application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order is resolved.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to nullify the order was
filed in the Court of Appeals. It was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order
Ruling:
Yes, the Court set aside the order for non-compliance with the Rules.
Page 744 of 1553

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It
must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The trial court has failed to comply with the pertinent procedural rules regarding
the issuance of a status quo order. A status quo order is merely intended to maintain the
last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy.
It further states that, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary

injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it
neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory
injunctive relief. Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quo order in an intra-
corporate suit is governed by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-
Corporate Controversies which reads: A party may apply for any of the provisional remedies
provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for the purposes. However, no temporary
restraining order or status quo order shall be issued save in exceptional cases and only after
hearing the parties and the posting of a bond.
The trial court’s Status Quo Order conflicted with the rules and jurisprudence in the
following manner: First, the directive to reinstate Custodio to her former position as school
director and curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an act
already consummated which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory
injunctive relief and not of a status quo order. Custodio was already removed months prior
to her filing of the present case in the trial court.
Second, the trial court’s omission of not requiring respondent to file a bond before
the issuance of the Status Quo Order is in contravention with the express instruction of
Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which
in fact seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court: the
application must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite bond. In the present
case, the Manifestation and Motion, through which respondent applied for injunctive relief
or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely signed by her counsel and was
unverified.
Page 745 of 1553

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Bases Conversion Development Authority v. DMCI Project Developers Inc.

GR. No. 173137, December 7, 2015, J. Leonen
An arbitration clause in a document of contract may extend to subsequent documents

of contract executed for the same purpose. Nominees of a party to and beneficiaries of a
contract containing an arbitration clause may become parties to a proceeding initiated based
on that arbitration clause.
Facts:
BCDA entered into a joint venture with PNR and other foreign corporations for north
railway system purposes. The contract stated that in case of disagreement, the dispute shall
be referred to arbitration. Later on, the joint venture agreement was amended and included
DMCI as a nominal party and they executed a memorandum of Agreement. During the
course of transaction, conflict arose between the party. Hence DMCI submitted the dispute
to arbitration but BCDA did not show up. Thus, DMC filed a petition to compel for
arbitration but BCDA filed a motion to dismiss since it DMCI was not a party to the original
joint venture agreement hence it shall be dismissed. arbitration clause in the Joint Venture
Agreement should cover all subsequent documents including the amended Joint Venture
Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement. The three (3) documents constituted one
contract for the formation and funding of Northrail
Issue:
Whether or not the arbitration clause in the original Joint ventures covers the subsequent
documents since they only have one purpose which is for the formation of Northrail
Ruling:
Yes, arbitration clause covers all of the agreements. An arbitration clause in a document of
contract may extend to subsequent documents of contract executed for the same purpose.
Nominees of a party to and beneficiaries of a contract containing an arbitration clause may
become parties to a proceeding initiated based on that arbitration clause. To determine the
coverage of the arbitration clause, the relation among the three documents and DMCI-
PDI’s involvement in the execution of these documents must first be understood. The
documents entered into by the parties are for the purpose of formation and funding of
Page 746 of 1553
Northrail, it thus settled that the arbitration clause shall be binding to subsequent
agreements entered by the parties.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. SPOUSES RUNE and LEA STROEM

G.R. No. 204689. January 21, 2015. Second Division. Leonen, J.
The Performance Bond is significantly and substantially connected to the

construction contract that there can be no doubt it is the CIAC, under Section 4 of EO No.
1008, which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or connected with it.
Facts:
Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem (Spouses Stroem) entered into a contract with Asis-Leif &
Company, Inc. (Asis-Leif) whereby the later undertook to build a house for Spouses Stroem.
The contract includes a performance bond issued by Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc.
(Stronghold) securing the obligation thereby binding itself solidarily liable with Asis-Leif
in case the later failed to perform its obligation. Due to the failure of Asis-Leif to finish the
project despite demands, Spouses Stroem rescinded the agreement. Later, Spouses Stroem
filed a complaint for breach of contract and for sum of money with a claim for damages
against Asis-Leif, Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif, and Stronghold.
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the Spouses Stroem and ordered Stronghold to
pay the spouses. Both parties appeal to the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the amount of attorney’s fees. Hence this petition. Before the SC,
Stronghold contends that RTC never acquired jurisdiction of the case in view of the
arbitration clause in the agreement and the lower court should have ordered the parties to
proceed with the arbitration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the dispute involves a construction contract
2. Whether or not the CIAC has exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy between
the parties
Ruling:
1. YES. When a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive
and original jurisdiction. Construction has been defined as referring to "all on-site works
on buildings or altering structures, from land clearance through completion including
Page 747 of 1553
excavation, erection and assembly and installation of components and equipment." In this
case, there is no dispute as to whether the Owners-Contractor Agreement between Asis-
Leif and respondents is a construction contract. Petitioner and respondents recognize that
CIAC has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the agreement.
2. YES. A performance bond, which is meant "to guarantee the supply of labor,
materials, tools, equipment, and necessary supervision to complete the project," is
significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract and, therefore, falls
under the jurisdiction of the CIAC. Although not the construction contract itself, the
performance bond is deemed as an associate of the main construction contract that it
cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The Performance Bond is significantly
and substantially connected to the construction contract that there can be no doubt it is
the CIAC, under Section 4 of EO No. 1008, which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising
from or connected with it.
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Foundation Specialists Inc.

G.R. No. 191591, June 17, 2015, J. Reyes
Under Section 19, of Executive Order No. 1008 as amended states that “the arbitral
award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and unappealable except on questions
of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court. Thus CIAC, possess the required
expertise in the field of construction arbitration and the factual findings of its construction
arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by the CA.
Facts:
FSI is an international company that was awarded for the construction project of a long
tunnel connecting Pioneer Street and Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong City to be completed
in 120 days a DPWH project. However due to delays it extended the period for completion
which thereby FSI incurred expenses. FSI upon completion claimed the expenses due to
delay from DPWH but it did not hid to such demand which prompted FSI in bringing the
matter to CIAC. DPWH contended that the delayed was caused by FSI. CIAC ruled in favor
of FSI and required DPWH to pay for the expenses incurred by FSI but did not grant the
award for Extended Rental Costs for Various Equipments for failure to present credible
computation. On appeal, CA affirmed with modification in favour of FSI and granted the
award for Extended Rental Costs for Various Equipments.
Page 748 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the CA can modify the award granted by CIAC
Ruling:
NO. Under Section 19, of Executive Order No. 1008 as amended states that “the arbitral
award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and unappealable except on
questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court. Thus CIAC, possess the
required expertise in the field of construction arbitration and the factual findings of its
construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by the CA. However
the rule admits exception which are as follows:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was
evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
(4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of
Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5)
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made which any of
these are not present in the case. Therefore, CA cannot modify the award of CIAC
Andrew D. Fyfe, et al. Vs. Philippines Airlines, Inc.

G.R. No. 160071, June 1, 2016
Petitioners should have filed the petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 considering that Section 29 of the Arbitration Law has limited the ground of
review to "questions of law." Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed the appeal of the
petitioners because pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court an appeal of questions
of law arising in the courts in the first instance is by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
It is noted, however, that since the promulgation of the assailed decision by the CA on
May 30, 2003, the law on the matter underwent changes. On February 4, 2004. Republic Act
No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) was passed by Congress, and was
approved by the President on April 2, 2004. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9285, the Court
promulgated on September 1, 2009 in A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC the Special Rules of Court on
Page 749 of 1553
Alternative Dispute Resolution, which are now the present rules of procedure governing
arbitration. Among others, the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution requires an appeal by petition for review to the CA of the final order of the
RTC confirming, vacating, correcting or modifying a domestic arbitral award.
FACTS:
Respondent underwent rehabilitation proceedings before the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC). The respondent and Regent Star entered into a Technical Services
Agreement (TSA) for the delivery of technical and advisory or management services.
Due to disputes arising fom the status of the TSA, the petitioners initiated arbitration
proceedings in the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI) pursuant to the
TSA.
After due proceedings, the PDRCI rendered its decision ordering the respondent to pay
termination penalties. with the outcome, the respondent filed its Application to Vacate
Arbitral Award in the Regional Trial Court, in Makati City (RTC), docketed as SP Proc. M-
5147 and assigned to Branch 57,24 arguing that the arbitration decision should be vacated
in view of the July 1, 1998 order of the SEC placing the respondent under a state of
suspension of payment pursuant to Section 6( c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended by P.D. No. 1799. the RTC granted the respondent's Application to Vacate Arbitral
Award. The petitioners appealed to the CA by notice of appeal. The respondent moved to
dismiss the appeal, arguing against the propriety of the petitioners' remedy, and positing
that Section 29 of the Arbitration Law limited appeals from an order issued in a proceeding
under the Arbitration Law to a review on certiorari upon questions of law. On May 30,
2003, the CA promulgated the now assailed resolution granting the respondent's Motion to
Dismiss Appeal. It declared that the appropriate remedy against the order of the R TC
vacating the award was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition for review on certiorari should be denied due course because
of the defective verification/certification signed by the petitioners' counsel
2. Whether the term certiorari used in Section 29 of the Arbitration Law refers to a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
3. Whether petitioners' claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC should fail
Page 750 of 1553

RULING:
1. No. There was sufficient compliance with the rule on verification and certification
against forum shopping. The SPAs individually signed by the petitioners vested in
their counsel the authority, among others, "to do and perform on my behalf any act
and deed relating to the case, which it could legally do and perform, including any
appeals or further legal proceedings." The authority was sufficiently broad to
expressly and specially authorize their counsel, Atty. Ida Maureen V. Chao-Kho, to
sign the verification/certification on their behalf.
2. No. However, since the promulgation of the assailed decision by the CA on May 30,
2003, the law on the matter underwent changes. On February 4, 2004. Republic Act
No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) was passed by Congress, and
was approved by the President on April 2, 2004. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9285,
the Court promulgated on September 1, 2009 in A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC the Special
Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which are now the present rules
of procedure governing arbitration. Among others, the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution requires an appeal by petition for review to the CA
of the final order of the R TC confirming, vacating, correcting or modifying a
domestic arbitral award.
3. No. The Panel of Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitioners'
claim. The petitioners' appeal is dismissible also because the arbitration panel had
no jurisdiction to hear their claim. The RTC correctly opined that the SEC's
suspension order effective July 1, 1998 deprived the arbitration panel of the
jurisdiction to hear any claims against the respondent. The Court has clarified in
Castillo v. Uniwide Warehouse Club, Inc. why the claim for payment brought
against a distressed corporation like the respondent should not prosper following
the issuance of the suspension order by the SEC, regardless of when the action was
filed.
The petitioners' challenge against the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground of the
absence of the service of the summons on them also fails. Under Section 2256 of the
Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding, by virtue of which any
application should be made in the manner provided for the making and hearing of
motions, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Arbitration Law. The RTC
observed that the respondent's Application to Vacate Arbitral Award was duly
served personally on the petitioners, who then appeared by counsel and filed
pleadings. The petitioners countered with their Motion to Dismiss vis-a-vis the
respondent's application, specifying therein the various grounds earlier mentioned,
Page 751 of 1553

including the lack of jurisdiction over their persons due to the improper service of
summons. Under the circumstances, the requirement of notice was fully complied
with, for Section 2657 of the Arbitration Law required the application to be served
upon the adverse party or his counsel within 30 days after the award was filed or
delivered "as prescribed by law for the service upon an attorney in an action
ABOITIZ TRANSPORT SYSTEM CORPORATION and ABOITIZ SHIPPING

CORPORATION vs. CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC. and VICTOR S.
CHIONGBIAN
G.R. No. 198226, July 18, 2014.
ABOITIZ TRANSPORT SYSTEM CORPORATION vs. CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES,

INC. and VICTOR S. CHIONGBIAN
Disputes do not go to arbitration unless and until the parties have agreed to abide by
the arbitrator’s decision. Necessarily, a contract is required for arbitration to take place and
to be binding. The provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the
relationship of the parties is part of that contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the
law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between them, their assigns and
heirs. Only those parties who have agreed to submit a controversy to arbitration who, as
against each other, may be compelled to submit to arbitration.
Facts:
ASC, CAGLI, and William Lines, Inc. (WLI), principally owned by the Aboitiz,
Gothong, and Chiongbian families, respectively, entered into an Agreement dated January
8, 1996, which was signed by Jon Ramon Aboitiz for ASC, Benjamin D. Gothong (Gothong)
for CAGLI, and respondent Chiongbian for WLI. In the said Agreement, ASC and CAGLI
agreed to transfer their shipping assets to WLI in exchange for the latter’s shares of capital
stock. The parties likewise agreed that WLI would run the merged shipping business and
be renamed “WG&A, Inc.” Pertinently, Section 11.06 of the Agreement provides that all
disputes arising out of or in connection with the Agreement shall be finally settled by
arbitration in accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 876, otherwise known as “The
Arbitration Law,” and that each of the parties shall appoint one arbitrator, and the three
arbitrators would then appoint the fourth arbitrator who shall act as Chairman.
Among the attachments to the Agreement was a letter dated January 8, 1996 written
by respondent Chiongbian and addressed to Gothong, stating that WLI committed to
Page 752 of 1553

acquire from CAGLI’s inventory certain spare parts and materials not exceeding P400
Million. In this relation, a valuation of CAGLI’s inventory was conducted wherein it was
shown that the same amounted to P514 Million. Thereafter, WLI received inventory valued
at P558.89 Million, but only paid CAGLI the amount of P400 Million as agreed upon in the
Agreement. Dissatisfied, CAGLI sent to WLI various letters in 2001, demanding that the
latter pay or return the inventory that it received in excess of P400 Million.
Sometime in 2002, the Chiongbian and Gothong families decided to sell their
respective interests in WLI/WG&A to the Aboitiz family. This resulted in the execution of
a Share Purchase Agreement whereby Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) agreed to purchase
and acquire the WLI/WG&A shares of the Chiongbian and Gothong families. Thereafter,
the corporate name of WLI/WG&A was changed to ATSC.
Six (6) years later, or in 2008, CAGLI sent a letter dated February 14, 2008 to ATSC
demanding that the latter pay the excess inventory it delivered to WLI amounting to
P158,399,700.00. CAGLI likewise demanded AEV and respondent Chiongbian that they
refer their dispute to arbitration. In response, AEV countered that the excess inventory had
already been returned to CAGLI and that it should not be included in the dispute,
considering that it is an entity separate and distinct from ATSC. Thus, CAGLI was
constrained to file a complaint before the RTC against Chiongbian, ATSC, ASC, and AEV
to compel them to submit to arbitration.
The RTC dismissed the complaint only with respect to AEV for lack of cause of
action, but not as to the other defendants. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order directing
CAGLI, respondent Chiongbian, ATSC, and ASC to proceed to arbitration, and accordingly,
the parties appointed their respective arbitrators, with ATSC and ASC.
Meanwhile, ATSC filed a Motion for Reconsideration/To Exclude dated March 25,
2010 praying that respondent Chiongbian be excluded from the arbitration proceedings
since the latter was not a party to the Agreement. Pending resolution of the said motion,
CAGLI filed a Notice of Dismissal dated July 8, 2010, averring that it has decided to
withdraw its complaint in view of the fact that the opposing parties had not filed their
respective responsive pleadings. The RTC found CAGLI’s Notice of Dismissal meritorious,
and, thus, confirmed the same and ordered the case dismissed without prejudice.
Dissatisfied, ATSC and ASC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied. The
RTC denied ATSC’s Motion for Reconsideration/To Exclude, holding that the issue raised
in the said motion has been rendered moot and academic in view of the confirmation of
CAGLI’s notice of dismissal. Hence, the instant petitions.
Page 753 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Chiongbian should be excluded from the arbitration

proceedings.
Ruling:
In Gonzales, the Court explained that “disputes do not go to arbitration unless and
until the parties have agreed to abide by the arbitrator’s decision. Necessarily, a contract is
required for arbitration to take place and to be binding.” Furthermore, in Del Monte
Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that “the provision to submit to
arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that
contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties and
produce effect as between them, their assigns and heirs.” Succinctly put, only those parties
who have agreed to submit a controversy to arbitration who, as against each other, may be
compelled to submit to arbitration.
In the present case, Section 11.06 of the Agreement, which embodies the Arbitration
Agreement among the parties, provides:
All disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement including any issue
as to this Agreement’s validity or enforceability, which cannot be settled amicably among
the parties, shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Law
(Republic Act No. 876) by an arbitration tribunal composed of four (4) arbitrators. Each of
the parties shall appoint one (1) arbitrator, the three (3) to appoint the fourth arbitrator
who shall act as Chairman. Any award by the arbitration tribunal shall be final and binding
upon the parties and shall be enforced by judgment of the Courts of Cebu or Metro Manila.
The three parties to the Agreement and necessarily to the arbitration agreement
embodied therein are: (a) ASC, (b) CAGLI, and (c) WLI/WG&A/ATSC. Contracts, like the
subject arbitration agreement, take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs.
Respondent Chiongbian, having merely physically signed the Agreement as a
representative of WLI, is not a party thereto and to the arbitration agreement contained
therein. Neither is he an assignee or an heir of any of the parties to the arbitration
agreement. Hence, respondent Chiongbian cannot be included in the arbitration
proceedings.
Page 754 of 1553

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. ALPHAOMEGA INTEGRATED

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184295, July 30, 2014, J. Perlas- Bernabe
While there is jurisprudential authority stating that "a clerical error in the judgment
appealed from may be corrected by the appellate court," the application of that rule cannot
be made in this case considering that the CIAC Rules provides for a specific procedure to deal
with particular errors involving "an evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or
arithmetical error. While the CA correctly affirmed in full the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s factual
determinations, it improperly modified the amount of the award in favor of AIC, which
modification did not observe the proper procedure for the correction of an evident
miscalculation of figures in the arbitral award. Section 17.1 of the CIAC Rules mandates the
filing of a motion for the foregoing purpose within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
Failure to file said motion would consequently render the award final and executory under
Section 18. 1 of the same rules.
Facts:
Alphaomega Integrated Corporation (AIC) participated in the public biddings

conducted by TRANSCO and was awarded six (6) government construction projects. In the
course of the performance of the contracts, AIC encountered difficulties and incurred losses
allegedly due to TRANSCO’s breach of their contracts, prompting it to surrender the
projects to TRANSCO under protest. In accordance with an express stipulation in the
contracts that disagreements shall be settled by the parties through arbitration before the
CIAC, AIC submitted a request for arbitration before the CIAC and thereafter filed an
Amended Complaint against TRANSCO alleging that the latter breached the contracts by
its failure to furnish the required Detailed Engineering, arrange a well-established right-
of-way to the project areas, secure the necessary permits and clearances from the
concerned local government units (LGUs), ensure a continuous supply of construction
materials and carry out AIC’s requests for power shut down.
The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal later on rendered its Final Award ordering the payment
of actual and compensatory damages to AIC. Unconvinced, TRANSCO instituted a petition
for review with the CA. But before filing its comment to the petition, AIC moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution, not for the amount of 17,495,117.44 awarded in the Final
Award, but for the increased amount of 18,967,318.49. It sought correction of the
discrepancies between the amount of the award appearing in the dispositive portion and
the body of the Final Award. The Arbitral Tribunal, however, denied AIC’s motion, holding
that while the CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC
Rules) would have allowed the correction of the Final Award for evident miscalculation of
Page 755 of 1553

figures, typographical or arithmetical errors, AIC failed to file its the purpose within the
time limitation of 15 days from its receipt of the Final Award.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the Arbitral Tribunal’s factual findings that
TRANSCO failed to exercise due diligence in its obligations with AIC. It also upheld the
Arbitral Tribunal’s Final Award as having been sufficiently established by evidence but
modified the total amount of the award after noting a supposed mathematical error in the
computation. It ruled that when a case is brought to a superior court on appeal every aspect
of the case is thrown open for review, hence, the subject error could be rectified. The CA
held that the correct amount of the award should be P18,896,673.31, and not P17,495,117.44
as stated in the Arbitral Tribunal’s Final Award.
Issue:
1. Whether or not AIC is entitled to its claims for damages as a result of project delays.
2. Whether or not there is error in increasing the total amount of compensation

awarded in favor of AIC despite the latter’s failure to raise the allegedly erroneous
computation of the award before the CIAC in a timely manner, that is, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the Final Award as provided under Section 17.1 of the CIAC
Rules.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
In any case, the Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal on the matter of AIC’s entitlement to damages which the CA affirmed as
being well supported by evidence and properly referred to in the record. It is well-settled
that findings of fact of quasijudicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. The CIAC possesses that required expertise in
the field of construction arbitration and the factual findings of its construction arbitrators
are final and conclusive, not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
2. Yes.
While the CA correctly affirmed in full the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s factual
determinations, it improperly modified the amount of the award in favor of AIC, which
modification did not observe the proper procedure for the correction of an evident
miscalculation of figures, including typographical or arithmetical errors, in the arbitral
Page 756 of 1553
award. Section 17.1 of the CIAC Rules mandates the filing of a motion for the foregoing
purpose within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Failure to file said motion would
consequently render the award final and executory under Section 18. 1 of the same rules.
AIC admitted that it had ample time to file a motion for correction of the Final Award but
claimed to have purposely sat on its right to seek correction supposedly as a strategic move
against TRANSCO and, instead, filed with the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on June 13, 2007 a
"Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for the Total Amount of 18,967,318.49 as
Embodied in the Final Award." The Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied AIC’s aforesaid
motion for execution because, despite its merit, the Arbitral Tribunal could not disregard
the time-limitation under the CIAC Rules. Clearly, having failed to move for the correction
of the Final Award and, thereafter, having opted to file instead a motion for execution of
the arbitral tribunal’s unopposed and uncorrected Final Award, AIC cannot now question
against the correctness of the CIAC’s disposition. Notably, while there is jurisprudential
authority stating that "a clerical error in the judgment appealed from may be corrected by
the appellate court," the application of that rule cannot be made in this case considering
that the CIAC Rules provides for a specific procedure to deal with particular errors
involving "an evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical error."
Indeed, the rule is well entrenched: Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to a
particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the
other.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) vs.

UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS, INC. (UPCI)
While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the
execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’
procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a
confirmed award’s execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states
that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege.
As the Court sees it, execution is but a necessary incident to the Court’s confirmation
of an arbitral award. To construe it otherwise would result in an absurd situation whereby
the confirming court previously applying the Special ADR Rules in its confirmation of the
arbitral award would later shift to the regular Rules of Procedure come execution.
Irrefragably, a court’s power to confirm a judgment award under the Special ADR Rules
should be deemed to include the power to order its execution for such is but a collateral and
Page 757 of 1553

subsidiary consequence that may be fairly and logically inferred from the statutory grant to
regional trial courts of the power to confirm domestic arbitral awards.
Facts:
On July 26, 1993, DENR, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB), entered into
an Agreement for Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with United Planners
Consultants, Inc. in connection with the LMB's Land Resource Management Master Plan
Project (LRMMP). Under the Consultancy Agreement, DENR committed to pay a total
contract price of P4,337,141.00. In December 1994, UPCI completed the work required,
which DENR formally accepted on December 27, 1994.6 However, DENR was able to pay
only 47% of the total contract price in the amount of 2,038,456.30.
On October 25, 1994, the Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical
Services Office Report (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14%
excessive. This notwithstanding, DENR acknowledged its liability to UPCI. For failure to
pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated demands, UPCI
instituted a Complaint. Upon motion of UPCI, the case was subsequently referred to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Consultancy Agreement, which DENR
did not oppose.
During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to adopt the CIAC Revised
Rules Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC Rules) to govern the arbitration
proceedings. On the due date for submission of the draft decisions, however, only UPCI
complied with the given deadline, while DENR moved for the deferment of the deadline.
In an Order dated April 30, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal denied DENR’s motions and deemed
its non-submission as a waiver.
The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in favor of
UPCI, directing DENR to pay the latter the amount of 2,285,089.89 representing the unpaid
progress billings.
Consequently, DENR filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration alleging
that it was denied an opportunity to be heard during the arbitration proceedings. The RTC
merely noted the motion and confirmed the Arbitral Award. Thus, on June 15, 2011, UPCI
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. DENR moved to quash the writ of execution,
positing that UPCI was not entitled to its monetary claims. The RTC denied DENR’s motion
to quash. On appeal, the CA dismissed the certiorari petition. Hence, this petition.
Page 758 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules,
resulting in the dismissal of DENR’s special civil action for certiorari
Ruling:
The petition is covered by ADR rules.
Notably, the Special ADR Rules do not automatically govern the arbitration
proceedings itself. A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute
resolution is that it is a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to make
their own arrangements to resolve their own disputes. Thus, Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR
Rules explicitly provides that “parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed in
the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may
conduct arbitration in the manner it considers appropriate.”
In the case at bar, the Consultancy Agreement contained an arbitration clause.

Hence, UPCI, after it filed its complaint, moved for its referral to arbitration which was not
objected to by DENR. By its referral to arbitration, the case fell within the coverage of the
Special ADR Rules. However, with respect to the arbitration proceedings itself, the parties
had agreed to adopt the CIAC Rules before the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with Rule
2.3 of the Special ADR Rules.
In this case, DENR asserts that its petition is not covered by the Special ADR Rules
(particularly, Rule 19 on the 15-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari) but
by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (particularly, Section 4 thereof on the 60-day reglementary
period to file a petition for certiorari), which it claimed to have suppletory application in
arbitration proceedings since the Special ADR Rules do not explicitly provide for a
procedure on execution.
While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the
execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’
procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a
confirmed award’s execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states
that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege.
As the Court sees it, execution is but a necessary incident to the Court’s confirmation
of an arbitral award. To construe it otherwise would result in an absurd situation whereby
Page 759 of 1553

the confirming court previously applying the Special ADR Rules in its confirmation of the
arbitral award would later shift to the regular Rules of Procedure come execution.
Irrefragably, a court’s power to confirm a judgment award under the Special ADR Rules
should be deemed to include the power to order its execution for such is but a collateral
and subsidiary consequence that may be fairly and logically inferred from the statutory
grant to regional trial courts of the power to confirm domestic arbitral awards.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
DECLARATORY RELIEF
THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD and GAIL U. FULE, and BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS
v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will,

contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
Facts:
Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati City. In response,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the petition for declaratory relief cannot
prosper due to respondent’s prior breach of Section 54 of RA No. 8791. The RTC dismissed
respondent’s petition for declaratory relief and held that an ordinary civil action and not
the present action for declaratory relief, is the proper remedy. A year later, respondent filed
a Motion to Admit its Motion for Reconsideration and the RTC of Makati City granted
respondent’s petition for declaratory relief.
Petitioners claimed that the court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory
relief despite the finality of the BSP MB resolution: (a) declaring respondent veterans bank’s
scheme as violative of section 54 of RA 8791; and (b) directing respondent to return the
illegal proceeds thereof to its borrowers; and (ii) the blatant impropriety of resorting to
such petition for declaratory relief, considering respondent veterans bank’s prior breach of
the monetary board resolution subject thereof.
Page 760 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling:
NO. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development
Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, held that in the same manner that court
decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi
judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason
that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail
of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject
matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.
THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD AND GAIL U. FULE, DIRECTOR,

SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION DEPARTMENT II, AND BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015, J. Peralta

regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue
that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions
in an instrument or statute. As such, in the same manner that court decisions cannot be the
proper subjects of such petition, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot also be its subject
for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law
or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court. In view of the
foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers
or functions, cannot be a proper subject matter for such petition.
Facts:
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) established a pension loan product for bona fide
Page 761 of 1553
veterans or their surviving spouses, as well as salary loan product for teachers and low-
salaried employees pursuant to its mandate under Republic Act (RA) Nos. 3518 and 7169 to
provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers. As its clientele usually do not have
real estate or security to cover their pension or salary loan, other than their continuing
good health and/or employment, PVB devised a program by charging a premium in the
form of a higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from said borrowers.
Resultantly, Special Trust Funds were established by it for the pension loans of the veteran-
borrowers, salary loans of teachers and low-salaried employees. These trust funds were, in
turn, managed by its Trust and Investment Department, with PVB as beneficiary. The fees
charged against the borrowers were credited to the respective trust funds, which would be
used to fully pay the outstanding obligation of the borrowers in case of death.
On April 30, 2002, an examination was conducted by the Supervision and

Examination Department II of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. It found that PVB’s
collection of premiums from the proceeds of various salary and pension loans of borrowers
to guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated Section 54 of RA No. 8791 which states
that banks shall not directly engage in insurance business as insurer.
Despite justifying the existence of the CRF, the BSP by way of a letter notified PVB
about the Insurance Commission’s opinion that the CRF is a form of insurance. Thus, it was
requested to discontinue the collection of said fees. PVB complied with the same.
Thereafter, petitioners issued Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 1139 directing PVB’s
Trust and Investment Department to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF
and to preserve the records of borrowers who were deducted CRFs from their loan proceeds
pending resolution or ruling of the Office of the General Counsel of the BSP. As its request
for reconsideration was denied, PVB filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of
Makati City.
In response, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the petition for
declaratory relief cannot prosper due to respondent’s prior breach of Section 54 of RA No.
8791.
Eventually, the RTC dismissed PVB’s petition and declared that the issue of whether
or not it violated the foregoing law can only be fittingly resolved thru an ordinary action.
Almost a year later, PVB filed a Motion to Admit its Motion for Reconsideration against
said order alleging that it did not receive a copy thereof until September 3, 2008. Despite
petitioners’ opposition to the said motion on the ground that per Certification of the
Philippine Postal Office, an official copy of the RTC’s Order was duly served and received
by PVB on October 17, 2007, the RTC still allowed the same and required petitioners to file
their answer.
Page 762 of 1553

Therafter, the RTC of Makati City granted the said petition and declared that PVB,
when it collected additional fees known as “CRF” from its loan borrowers was not directly
engaged in insurance business as insurer; hence, it did not violate Sec. 54, R.A. 8791,
otherwise known as the “General Banking Law of 2000.” Thus, the Monetary Board
Resolution No. 1139 is null and void.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration against said decision, but the same
was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling:
The petition for declaratory relief is not proper.

regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only
issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute.
Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development Corporation vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue,
held that in the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a
decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided
by the Rules of Court. In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board
cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by
the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.
The authority of the petitioners to issue the questioned MB Resolution emanated

from its powers under Section 37 of RA No. 7653 and Section 66 of RA No. 8791 to impose,
at its discretion, administrative sanctions, upon any bank for violation of any banking law.
Furthermore, the nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the
character of its determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may be imposed
upon erring banks, as an exercise of quasi-judicial function, have already been recognized
by this Court.
Page 763 of 1553

Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-

judicial powers or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary
Board is an independent central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and
administrative autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of money,
banking, and credit. It has the power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing
to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel
presentation of books, records and others, needed in its examination, to impose fines and
other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in
particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in
determining whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-
banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of
investigation or hearing regarding the same.
A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot
be the proper subject of declaratory relief.
Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the court a quo’s Order dated September
24, 2007, which dismissed respondent’s petition for declaratory relief, had long become
It was error for the trial court to entertain it for the second time despite the lapse of
almost a year before respondent filed its motion for reconsideration against said Order.
EMINENT DOMAIN
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TETRO ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED

G.R. NO. 183015, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. PERALTA
Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by
the CA was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and
enjoyment of the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case
was remanded to the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not
considered a new case where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it
is merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the purpose
of receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as alleged in the
original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and passed upon when
the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the Section 2 and 3, Rule 10, Rules
of Civil Procedure on amendments of pleading find no applicability in this case.
Page 764 of 1553

Facts:
On February 10, 1992, respondent Tetro Enterprises filed a Complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner Republic represented by DPWH, wherein it is
alleged that Tetro is the registered owner of a piece of land that has been expropriated for
construction of road by petitioner without undergoing the legal process. Also, respondent
alleged that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to return the lot and pay rent
thereto, thus respondent prayed for the lots return in its original state and payment of
damages thereto. On the other hand, petitioner contended that respondent has no cause
of action as the State has not given its consent to be sued, and that petitioner was was
willing to pay the fair market value of the lot at the time of taking, plus interest.
As the return of the subject lot was no longer feasible, the RTC, with the parties' conformity,
converted the action for recovery of possession to eminent domain and expropriation.
Upon agreement of the parties, the RTC issued an order creating a Board of Commissioners
to determine the actual value of the lot which shall be the basis for an amicable settlement
or the decision to be rendered. Later, the Board submitted its report recommending the
just and reasonable price to be paid to respondent. The RTC took into consideration the
report submitted by the Board and rendered a decision fixing the price of the lot. Motion
for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but was denied, prompting petitioner to appeal,
which the RTC denied since the decision had become final and executory. With this,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but was dismissed. Motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the SC, which reversed the CA decision and ordered RTC to approve petitioner's notice of
appeal. Consequently, petitioner's appeal was taken up in the CA, which modified the
earlier appealed decision and ordered for the case to be remanded to the RTC.
Respondent filed a petition for review with SC, which was denied. The case was then
remanded to the RTC for computation of damages, and was scheduled for mediation
proceedings, which failed, thus, the case was set for a pre-trial conference. At the pre-trial,
when petitioner presented the proposed issue, respondent moved for the amendment of
its original complaint, which the presiding Judge granted. As such, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but was denied for being premature. Later, respondent filed a Motion to
Admit Amended Complaint, attaching the amended complaint; this the RTC admitted.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, thus, petition for certiorari was filed
with the CA, which affirmed the RTC order.
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended
complaint.
Page 765 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended
complaint.
Ruling:
The CA found that the amendment of the original complaint filed in 1992 is sanctioned by
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, which provide:
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply,
at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. — Except as provided in the next preceding

section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave
may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion
filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, the original case which respondent filed in 1992 was for recovery of
possession, which the RTC, with the parties' conformity, converted into an expropriation
case as recovery of the subject lot was no longer possible. Thus, the pre-trial of the case had
long taken place in 1994. The expropriation case was then decided by the RTC on March
29, 1996, fixing the value of the subject lot in the total amount of P75,858,000.00 as just
compensation. Such decision was modified by the CA's Former Third Division in a Decision
dated May 24, 2001, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60492, reducing the amount of just
compensation to P252,869.00 plus 6% interest from 1974 until full payment thereof and
ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further determination of other damages
respondent suffered for the loss of use and enjoyment of its property. The CA decision was
brought to us in a petition for review on certiorari which, in a Resolution dated October 2,
2002, denied the same and affirmed the CA decision.
Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the
CA was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and
enjoyment of the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the
case was remanded to the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not
considered a new case where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather,
it is merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the
Page 766 of 1553
purpose of receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as
alleged in the original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and
passed upon when the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the above-
quoted provisions (Section 2 and 3, Rule 10, Rules of Civil Procedure) on amendments of
pleading find no applicability in this case.
While we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
amendment of the complaint filed in 1992, such finding does not necessarily establish that
Presiding Judge Simbulan had exhibited bias or partiality in favor of respondent, as
petitioner claims, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR

When the National Power Corporation filed an expropriation case and the same was
subsequently dismissed due to failure to prosecute, it is as if no complaint for expropriation
was filed. As a result the NPC is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and
hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation. Thus, the RTC should have fixed the value of
the property for the purposes of just compensation at the time NPC took possession of the
same in 1990, and not at the time of the filing of the complaint for compensation and damages
in 1994 or its fair market value in 1995
Facts:
Petitioner National Power Corporation filed in 1990 a case which sought to

expropriate the land owned by the respondents Spouses Samar for the construction of its
transmission line. The RTC issued a writ of condemnation in favor of NPC, and the latter
entered the lot and constructed a transmission line. However, the RTC later dismissed
NPC’s case for failure to prosecute. In 1994 the Spouses Samar filed with the RTC a
complaint for compensation and damages against NPC. As agreed by the parties during
pre-trial, a panel of commissioners –composed of one representative each from the parties,
and a third from the RTC –was constituted for the purpose of determining the value of the
subject lot.
After conducting their appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual

reports. Atty. Wenifredo Pornillos, commissioner for the Spouses Samar, recommended a
valuation within the range of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense,
commissioner for NPC, did not set an amount, although he stated that the lot should be
valued at the prevailing market prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the
Page 767 of 1553

area. The court representative, Esteban D. Colarina, proposed a P1,100.00 per square meter
valuation.
The RTC pegged the value of the lot at P 1,000 per square meter. The NPC appealed
to the CA and argued that pursuant to Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court, just
compensation for the lot should have been computed based on its value at the time of the
taking or the filing of the expropriation case in 1990. The CA dismissed NPC’s appeal.
Issue:
Should just compensation be computed based on the lot’s value at the time of the
filing of the expropriation case in 1990?
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was
taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government
takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be
fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The
value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of
the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the
order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ However, Rule 67 presupposes a prior
filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If
no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural
requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.
Considering the dismissal of the expropriation case for failure of the NPC to
prosecute, it is as if no expropriation suit was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted
ruling, NPC is deemed “to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the
usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to
ascertain just compensation.” Nevertheless, just compensation for the property must be
Page 768 of 1553

based on its value at the time of the taking of said property, not at the time of the filing of
the complaint. Consequently, the RTC should have fixed the value of the property at the
time NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the time of the filing of the
complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair market value in 1995.
In this case, the RTC formed a panel of commissioners in determining the just
compensation of the property. Although this is not required considering the Court’s
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals, nonetheless, its constitution is not
improper. “The appointment was done mainly to aid the trial court in determining just
compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court is not bound
by the commissioner’s recommended valuation of the subject property. The court has the
discretion on whether to adopt the commissioners’ valuation or to substitute its own
estimate of the value as gathered from the records.
The values recommended by the commissioners were those values prevailing in 1994
and 1995, or during the time the complaint for compensation and damages was filed.
Considering that these are not the relevant values at the time NPC took possession of the
property in 1990, it was incumbent upon the RTC to have disregarded the same.
Unfortunately, it adopted these values. On this score alone, the Court finds a need to
remand this case to the RTC for further proceedings. Moreover, the Court notes that the
RTC simply adopted the above values without citing its basis therefor.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF JESUS ALSUA, REPRESENTED BY

BIBIANO C. SABINO
G.R. No. 211351, February 04, 2015, J. Perlas- Bernabe
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be

unduly restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of their
judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and
arriving at the valuation. While the courts should be mindful of the different formulae created
by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere thereto if
the situations before them do not warrant it. Thus, the RTC is advised that while it should be
mindful of the different formulae created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, it is
not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application
Facts:
Jesus Alsua owned a 62.1108 has. parcel of unregistered agricultural land.

Subsequently, respondents Heirs of Jesus Alsua and their representative Bibiano C. Sabino
voluntarily offered to sell the entire parcel of land to the government under RA 6657
Page 769 of 1553

otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,” but only 47.4535
has. thereof, consisting of 43.7158 has. of cocoland and 3.7377 has. of unirrigated riceland
(subject lands), were acquired. Upon receipt from the DAR of the Claim Folder (CF), albeit
containing incomplete documents, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued
the subject lands atP1,369,708.02 using the formula stated in DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.
The DAR then offered to respondents the LBP’s valuation as just compensation for
the lands, but the latter rejected the valuation. Thus, the LBP was prompted to deposit the
said amount in cash and in Agrarian Reform Bonds in respondents’ name. After summary
administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) fixed the value of the subject lands at P5,479,744.15.
The LBP moved for reconsideration but was denied. In the interim, the Register of Deeds
of Albay issued Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. C-27721 and 27722 in the names of
the agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Dissatisfied with the PARAD’s valuation, the LBP filed a petition for determination
of just compensation before the RTC averring that the PARAD’s valuation was excessively
high. In its decision, the RTC rejected the valuation of both the LBP and the PARAD and
fixed the just compensation for the subject lands at P4,245,820.53. The CA in turn affirmed
the applicability of the provisions of DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998 in the computation of
the just compensation for the subject lands but declared that the RTC erred in fixing the
date of taking on June 30, 2009 (i.e., the presumptive date of taking pursuant to DAR AO
No. 1, series of 2010). It pointed out that the taking of lands under the agrarian reform
program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding; thus, just compensation
should be pegged at the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the
owner and not its value at the time of rendition of judgment or the filing of the complaint
if the government takes possession of the land before the institution of expropriation
proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed erred in fixing the just compensation for the
subject lands.
Ruling:
No.
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an

expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or
Page 770 of 1553

the “time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property,” such as
when title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries, as in this case. In addition, the
factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657,i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b)
the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the
income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property,
and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the just compensation for the subject lands
should be computed based on the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended.
However, the Court has pored over the records and observed that the only factors
considered by both courts in determining the just compensation were (a) the nature and
actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, as well as (b) the market value of the
subject lands, without a showing that the other factors under the said section were even
taken into account or, otherwise, found to be inapplicable, contrary to what the law
requires.
Similarly, the Court has gone over the LBP’s findings and computation, as contained
in the Claims and Valuation and Processing Form, and is likewise unable to adopt the same
since it was partly based on the field investigation report which admittedly did not consider
(a) the economic and social benefits of the subject lands, and (b) the current value of like
properties within the vicinity. To reiterate, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA
6657 must be considered in computing just compensation. Accordingly, the Court finds a
need to remand Agrarian Case No. 04-02 to the RTC for the determination of just
compensation in accordance with these factors. Relative thereto, the RTC is further
directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the “time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, upon the
issuance of OCT Nos. C-27721 and 27722 in the names of the agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation
of the subject lands must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like
agricultural lands.
2. The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its

amendment by RA 9700.
Page 771 of 1553

3. The RTC may impose interest on the just compensation as may be warranted by
the circumstances of the case.
4. Finally, the RTC is advised that while it should be mindful of the different
formulae created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, it is not strictly bound to
adhere thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. As held in LBP v.
Heirs of Maximo Puyat:
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot

be unduly restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of
their judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data
and arriving at the valuation. While the courts should be mindful of the different formulae
created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere
thereto if the situations before them do not warrant it.
EXPROPRIATION
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATORv.ROGER D. COREA, SHERIFF IV,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, POLOMOLOK, SOUTH COTOBATO
A.M. No. P-11-2992 (Formerly A.M. No. 11-8-156-RTC), November 09, 2015, J.
Leonardo-De Castro
Only the Clerk of Court is authorized to collect filing fees for the conduct of
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate or chattel mortgage under the direction of the sheriff.
The sheriff is devoid of any authority to bill and collect payment for such fees.
Facts:
The instant administrative complaint arose from a Letterof Elsie D. Lansang (Elsie),
General Manager of the Rural Bank of Polomolok, bringing to the attention of the Supreme
Court that Sheriff Corea issued to the Bank a Billing Statement. The billing charges the
Bank with sheriff service fee and other incidental expenses in connection with the bank’s
application for foreclosure. Elsie inquired whether the said charges were proper, legal, and
in accordance with law.
Issue:
Whether a sheriff is authorized to collect filing fees for the conduct of extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage.
Page 772 of 1553
Ruling:
NO. Section 2 of Circular No. 7-2002 authorizes the Clerk of Court to collect filing fees for
the conduct of extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate or chattel mortgage under the
direction of the sheriff. Under the said guidelines, it is clear that only the Clerk of Court is
authorized to collect payment for such fees. Accordingly, Sheriff Coreais devoid of any
authority to bill and collect from the Bank service fees and incidental expenses for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages conducted by him.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF
APPEALS
In the present case, NAPOCOR admits that the expropriation of the land in question
is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the
case should have been dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by resolution of
[NAPOCOR], that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be
dismissed even without a motion... The moment it appears in whatever stage of the
proceedings that the expro-priation is not for a public use the complaint should be dismissed
and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation.
Facts:
NAPOCOR is a GOCC vested with authority under R.A. No. 6395 to create means to
pro-duce electricity and maintain installations for such public purpose. Consonant to this,
in 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property in Batangas City in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines for a power transmission project. Respondent-heirs of Saturnino Q.
Borbon owned the pro-perty.
Consequently, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC seeking

the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property, alleging that
it had negotiated with the respondent-heirs but no agreement came out. The respondents
countered that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them and it rashly carried out the
transmission project without regard to their immovables. Nevertheless, they did not object
the payment of just com-pensation; however, the same should cover the entire property
not just a portion thereof.
After due trial, the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondent-heirs just
compensa-tion for the entire property at the rate of PhP 550.00 per square meters, as
Page 773 of 1553
recommended by two out of three commissioners tasked with the appraisal of the subject
property. On appeal, the CA ruled that only the affected portion of the property should be
paid by NAPOCOR.
During the pendency of the appeal to the Court, NAPOCOR sought to defer the
procee-dings stating that negotiations between the parties were going on with a view to
the amicable settlement of the case. Later, it urged the Court to discontinue the
expropriation in view of the retirement of the transmission lines installed on respondent-
heirs’ property.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed

pending appeal.
Ruling:
YES, it may be discontinued conformably with Rule 67.
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is

proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discon-tinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable.
It is noteworthy to state that in the exercise of the power of eminent domain “the
taking must be for public use”. The meaning of the term “public use” has evolved over time
in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally
understood as strictly limited to actual “use by the public” has already been abandoned.
“Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,”
and “public convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained

throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public
purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Lozada, Sr., to
wit:
“More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the

expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expro-priation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition... If not, it is then incumbent upon the
Page 774 of 1553

expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the

latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the pro-perty
will be devoted.”
A review reveals that Metropolitan Water District vs. De los Angeles is an appropriate
precedent herein. There, the Metropolitan Water District passed a board resolution
requesting the Attorney-General to file a petition in the [CFI] of the Province of Rizal
praying that it be permitted to discontinue the condemnation proceedings it had initiated
for the expropriation of a parcel of land in Montalban, Rizal to be used in the construction
of the Angat Waterworks System. It claimed that the land was no longer indispensably
necessary in the maintenance and operation of its waterworks system, and that the
expropriation complaint should then be dismissed.
In the present case, [NAPOCOR] admits that the expropriation of the land in
question is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial
court the case should have been dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by resolution
of [NAPOCOR], that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be
dismissed even without a motion... The moment it appears in whatever stage of the
proceedings that the expro-priation is not for a public use the complaint should be
dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or
litigation.
It is notable that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings in Metropolitan

Water District vs. De los Angeles was made subject to several conditions in order to address
the dispossession of the defendants of their land, and the inconvenience, annoyance and
damages suffered by the defendants on account of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court
remanded the case to the trial court for the issuance of a writ of possession… to immediately
return possession of the land to the defendants, and for the determination of damages...
Unlike in Metropolitan Water District vs. De los Angeles where the request to
discontinue the expropriation proceedings was made upon the authority appearing in the
board resolu-tion[,]… counsel for NAPOCOR has not presented herein any document to
show that NAPOCOR had decided, as a corporate body, to discontinue the expropriation
proceedings. Nonetheless, the Court points to the Memorandum… and the Certificate of
Inspection/Accomplishment… attached to NAPOCOR’s motion attesting to the retirement
of the transmission lines. Also, Metropolitan Water District vs. De los Angeles emphasized
that it became the duty and the obligation of the court, regardless of the stage of the
Page 775 of 1553

proceedings, to dismiss the action “if it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
court that the expropriation is not for some public use.” Despite the lack of the board
resolution, therefore, the Court now considers the documents attached to NAPOCOR’s
Manifestation and Motion… to be sufficient to establish that the expropriation sought is no
longer for some public purpose.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings subject to
the conditions to be shortly mentioned hereunder, and requires the return of the property
to the respondents.
Having said that, [the Court] must point out that NAPOCOR entered the property
without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to [them]. Neither did
it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry… Considering that in the process
of installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without
payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land
as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property
inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the
time of restoration…
There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the
property prior to the expropriation suit, as in this case although, to repeat, the case at bar
is quite extraordinary in that possession was taken by the expropriator more than 40 years
prior to suit. In these instances, [the] Court has ruled that the just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent
domain.
In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a “taking”
when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a
practical des-truction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is
deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator
enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent
duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after
all, “is nothing without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the
owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being
diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense.” xxx.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because
Page 776 of 1553

their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the
property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of
their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of
the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.
FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC., ET AL.

vs. PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC. ET AL
G.R. NO. 154390, MARCH 17, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being
acknowledged before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the
presumption of regularity. Hence, it was admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To rebut its authenticity
and genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be upheld.
Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the
genuineness and authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that
their transaction with respondents had been regular and at arms-length, thereby belying the
intervention of fraud.
Facts:
In July 1984, MFI sought from PCRI a loan in the amount of P3.5 million with 24% interest
per annum and a term of ten years. MFI allegedly entrusted to PCRI 7 titles, with an
aggregate area of 3.3 hectares and left it to defendants to choose from among the 7 titles
those which would be sufficient to secure the loan.
On September 4, 1986, MFI received a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale announcing the auction of
the seven lots due to unpaid indebtedness of P10.5 million. MFI protested the foreclosure,
and the auction was reset to October 27, 1986. At the auction sale, PCRI was the sole bidder
for P6.5 million.
On January 16, 1990 and again on March 5, 1990, PCRI sent the plaintiffs a letter demanding
that they vacate the four remaining lots. On March 19, 1990, PCRI executed an affidavit of
non-redemption of TCT Nos. 317699, 317702, 317703 and 317704. On June 7, 1990, S.G. del
Rosario, PCRI’s vice-president, wrote MFI reiterating their demand to vacate the premises
Page 777 of 1553

and remove pieces of machinery, equipment and persons therein, which MFI eventually
heeded.
On October 9, 1991, MFI filed a case for nullification of the mortgage contract and of the
foreclosure with damages on the ground of fraud. The RTC rendered a decision declaring
the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure by respondents null and void, and ordering
the reconveyance of the foreclosed properties to petitioners. The CA reversed and set aside
the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the mortgage and foreclosure of the subject four (4) parcels of land should be
declared null and void
Held:
It is settled that the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court
unless there is a showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of
the case. Indeed, the trial court’s findings are always presumed correct. Nonetheless, the
CA is not precluded from making its own determination and appreciation of facts if it
considers the conclusions arrived at by the trial court not borne out by the evidence, or if
substantial facts bearing upon the result of the case were overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied. As an appellate court, the CA is not necessarily bound by the conclusions of
the trial court, but holds the exclusive authority to review the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence.
In view of the conflicting findings and appreciation of facts by the RTC and the CA, we have
to revisit the evidence of the parties.
Petitioners insist that respondents committed fraud when the officers of MFIwere made to
sign the deed of real estate mortgage in blank.
According to Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when one of the contracting
parties, through insidious words or machinations, induces the other to enter into the
contract that, without the inducement, he would not have agreed to. Yet, fraud, to vitiate
consent, must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente),
inducement to the making of the contract. Causal fraud is defined as “a deception employed
by one party prior to or simultaneous to the contract in order to secure the consent of the
other.” Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Page 778 of 1553
Whoever alleges fraud affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, because a
person is always presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns, and private transactions
are similarly presumed to have been fair and regular. To be remembered is that mere
allegation is definitely not evidence; hence, it must be proved by sufficient evidence.
The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being
acknowledged before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor
the presumption of regularity. Hence, it was admissible in evidence without further proof
of its authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To rebut its
authenticity and genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be upheld.
Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the
genuineness and authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that
their transaction with respondents had been regular and at arms-length, thereby belying
the intervention of fraud.
The totality of the evidence presented tended to indicate that fraud was not attendant
during the transactions between the parties. Verily, as between the duly executed real
estate mortgage and the unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, the Court affords greater
weight to the former.
Moreover, the Action to assail the mortgage already prescribed.
It appears that the original stance of petitioners was that the deed of real estate mortgage
was voidable. In their complaint, they averred that the deed, albeit in printed form, was
incomplete in essential details, and that MFI, through its president, signed it in good faith
and in absolute confidence. Yet, petitioners now claim that the CA committed a reversible
error in not holding that the absence of consent made the deed of real estate mortgage
void, not merely voidable. In effect, they are now advancing that their consent was not
merely vitiated by means of fraud, but that there was complete absence of consent.
Although they should be estopped from raising this issue for the first time on appeal, the
Court nonetheless opts to consider it because its resolution is necessary to arrive at a just
and complete resolution of the case.
As the records show, petitioners really agreed to mortgage their properties as security for
their loan, and signed the deed of mortgage for the purpose. Thereafter, they delivered the
TCTs of the properties subject of the mortgage to respondents.
Consequently, petitioners' contention of absence of consent had no firm moorings. It
remained unproved. With the contract being voidable, petitioners' action to annul the real
Page 779 of 1553

estate mortgage already prescribed. Article 1390, in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code,
provides that if the consent of the contracting parties was obtained through fraud, the
contract is considered voidable and may be annulled within four years from the time of the
discovery of the fraud. The discovery of fraud is reckoned from the time the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds in view of the rule that registration was notice to the
whole world. Thus, because the mortgage involving the seven lots was registered on
September 5, 1984, they had until September 5, 1988 within which to assail the validity of
the mortgage. But their complaint was instituted in the RTC only on October 10, 1991.
Hence, the action, being by then already prescribed, should be dismissed.
SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ vs. SPOUSES CARLITO

ALINDOG and CARMEN ALINDOG
G.R. NO. 184045, JANUARY 22, 2014
J. PERLAS-BERNABE
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is

entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of
the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption
period therefor.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the
property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration
of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at
any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a
new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even
during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7
of Act No. 3135, as amended.
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial

act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem
the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in
an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no
discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is
misplaced.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-

judicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to
a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the
property by adverse title or right. The issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps.
Page 780 of 1553

Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed
property, is merely ministerial in nature.
Facts:
Petitioner Anita extended a loan to Gutierrez secured by a real estate mortgage over a land
registered under the name of Sps. Gutierrez. The mortgage was annotated at the back of
the certificate of title and was verified by Sps. Marquez as clean prior to the mortgage. Sps.
Gutierrez defaulted, hence, Anita sought for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property,
upon which a public auction was held wherein Anita emerged as the highest bidder.
Gutierrez failed to redeem the property, leading to the consolidation of title in the name of
Anita Marquez, married to Nicasio Marquez. However, it bore an annotation of adverse
claim in the names of respondents, as the annotation was copied from an earlier annotation
made after the property was mortgaged to Sps. Marquez.
Subsequently, respondents filed a civil case for the annulment of the real estate mortgage
and certificate of sale, alleging that the respondents purchased the property from Gutierrez
prior to the property’s being mortaged to Sps. Marquez, but respondents were unable to
secure a certificate of title in their names as Gonzales – to whom they have entrusted said
task – had deceived them. Separately, respondent’s averred that when the mortgage was
executed in favor of Sps. Marquez, Gutierrez was already dead. In their defense, Sps.
Marquez disputed respindent’s ownership over the property, arguing that the purported
sale in the latter’s favor was never registered and therefore, not binding upon them.
Further, they insisted that their certificate of title was already indefeasible, and cannot be
attacked collaterally.
Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before
the RTC, claiming that it is ministerial on the court’s part following the consolidation of
her and her husband’s title over the property. Impleaded in petition are Sps. Gutierrez,
including all persons claiming rights under them. With this, the RTC granted the ex-parte
petition, to which the respondents sought a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction that
was granted in their favour. However, under the Sheriff’s return, the writ of possession was
implemented.
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the property until after the
controversy has been fully resolved on the merits. Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration
and respondents filed a Motion for Approval of Cash Bond and to Regain Possession of the
property. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration but granted respondent’s motion.
The CA denied Sps. Marquez’s petition.
Page 781 of 1553

Issue:
Whether writ of possession may be issued.
Ruling:
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to

the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same
either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period
therefor.
Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the purchaser
seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month period for redemption.
Upon the purchaser’s filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond,
the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in the
purchaser’s favour.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the
property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration
of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it
at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him
of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land
even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period
if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of
the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance
of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act.

After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem
the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser
in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no
discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is
misplaced.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial

foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the
property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo),
Inc. v. Centeno, citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court illumined that "the
Page 782 of 1553
phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right,
such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor
or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the
third party adversely to the judgment obligor."
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez,
who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is
merely ministerial in nature. The general rule as herein stated – and not the exception
found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules – should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their
claim over the subject property on their purported purchase of the same from its previous
owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor). Accordingly, it
cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez)
successors-in-interest who do not have a right superior to them.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI vs. FILOMENO GARCIA

G.R. NO. 190106, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. PEREZ
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the
property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to
any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such
person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under
the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail
himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or
wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an
independent "separate action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the
foreclosed property.
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The right of a third-
party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto,
before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property
mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first
unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses
Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to
present credible evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their
Page 783 of 1553

postulation as title holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements
built thereon; whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of
ownership.
Facts:
Petitioner Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI)
to construct a seven-storey condominium building. However, Villasi failed to fully pay the
contract price despite several demands, thus, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of
money before the RTC, wherein FGCI prayed, for the payment of the unpaid
accomplishment billings. With this, Villasi denied the allegations, contending that FGCI
has no cause of action against her, further averring that she delivered the total amount to
FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the project. Pre-trial conference termninated
without amicable settlement being reached, thus trial ensued.
The RTC decided in favour of FGCO brushing aside Villasi’s allegations of excess payment.
The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that an overpayment was made by Villasi and
thus FGCI was ordered to return the excess payment. Thereafter, FGCI filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the SC, which however, was denied for being filed out of time.
The resolution became final and executory, to which Villasi filed a motion for execution
that was favourably acted upon by the RTC and a writ of execution was issued. Later, the
sheriff levied on a building covered by a tax declaration in the name of FGCI and built in
the lots registered under the names of Spouses Garcia. Mandatory posting and publication
of notice of sale was made, and a public auction was scheduled.
On the other hand, to forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit
of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that
they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff.
Moreover, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly
assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. Nonetheless, Villasi opposed the motion
and insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to Spouses Garcia as shown by the
tax declaration. Thus, the RTC issued an Order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance
the conduct of the sale on execution. Villasi’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence
Villasi filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed and reconsideration
thereof refused, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the remedy of terceria is applicable.
Ruling:
Page 784 of 1553
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any
third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such
person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for
under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may
avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly
or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or
an independent "separate action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession
over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor who
claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal
remedies to prosecute his claim.
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the
sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the
saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.
The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of
possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct
the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful
owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession
thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya, we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria
to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the property:
A third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the
judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such
execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court
may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the
rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited
to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance
of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of
property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon
the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter
only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can
require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the
evidence. However, if the claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his
title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.
Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses Garcia
failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their
Page 785 of 1553
postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the
improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence
to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily
establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her
opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias’. While it is true that
tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute credible proof of claim of title over the property.
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON

vs. ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY vs. JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000, June 16, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The spouses mortgaged their property to PNB as security for their loan. Since they
were unable to pay, it was foreclosed and PNB was the highest bidder. PNB filed for writ of
possession which was held in abeyance by Judge Venadas, Sr. The Court ruled that the judge
committed grave abuse of discretion. Once the one-year redemption period has lapsed from
the foreclosure sale and once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court. The alleged
invalidity of the sale of PNB to Atty. Garay is not a ground to defer the issuance of the Writ
of Possession.
Facts:
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly Sombilon were owners of a property in Bukidnon. They
mortgaged it to PNB as security for their loan. It was foreclosed and sold at a public auction
where PNB emerged as the winning bidder. The Certificate of Sale in favor of PNB was duly
registered in 1999. The spouses failed to redeem the property and the one-year redemption
period lapsed.
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Garay, who was once
appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who
happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the property. The spouses wanted to reacquire
the property but had no money. They hoped Atty. Garay would advance the money and in
exchange, they promised to sell to him a portion of the property.
Page 786 of 1553

They all went to PNB to inquire about the property. They were informed that the
property could be purchased at the fair market value of P2,938,000.00. Atty. Garay then
went to the bank alone the next day and offered to buy it by making a down payment of
20% the price. Upon learning that Atty. Garay wanted the entire property for himself, the
spouses made their own offer to PNB. The bank told them to make a 10% down payment
to formalize the offer.
Thereafter, a Transfer Certificate Title was issued to PNB and the bank decided to
approve the offer of Atty. Garay since the spouses failed to make the down payment.
PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession before the RTC
and it was and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr. The petition was
granted. After PNB informed the spouses of their decision to approve Atty. Garay’s offer,
spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of Possession
arguing that Atty. Garay, who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing
the property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Judge Venadas, Sr. then issued an Order holding in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Possession, stating that the implementation and enforcement of the writ of
possession would work great injustice to the registered owner because PNB or in this case
Atty. Garay counsel for the Sombilons is not entitled thereto.
Atty. Garay and PNB filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals with prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or Injunction. The CA issued a TRO and
subsequently, found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession.
Thereafter, Atty. Garay filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave
Abuse of
Authority and Grave Misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing of spouses
Sombilon’s motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of
Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession.
The Court consolidated both cases.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession
Page 787 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes, he committed grave abuse of discretion and thus, the Court upheld the ruling
of the appellate court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the
Register of Deeds within which to redeem his property. During the one-year redemption
period, the purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond. But after the one-year period,
the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need
of a bond. And once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is
left to the court.
Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure
sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ
of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage
or the foreclosure sale. The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance
of a writ of possession.
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property had already
been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue
the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.
The Court recognized that there are instances wherein the writ may be deferred but
none of the exceptions may be applied in this case. The alleged invalidity of the sale is not
a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect
PNB’s right to possess the subject property.
HELEN CABLING assisted by her husband ARIEL CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN
LUMAPAS as represented by NORY ABELLANES
G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014, J. Brion
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to
extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the possession of the property shall be
given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the
property in a capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. It contemplates a situation in which
a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant
or usufructuary, who possesses the property in his own right, and is not merely the successor
Page 788 of 1553

or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
Facts:
Cabling was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted on

December 21, 2007 over a 216-square meter property. On May 6, 2009, Cabling filed an
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession with the RTC. On May 19, 2009, the
RTC issued an order granting the Cabling’s application, and subsequently issued a Writ of
Possession and Notice to Vacate dated May 20, 2009 and May 25, 2009, respectively. On
May 29, 2009, respondent Joselin Tan Lumapas, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave
of Court for Intervention as Party Defendant and an Answer in Intervention, as a third
party in actual possession of the foreclosed property. She claimed that the property had
previously been sold to her by Aida Ibabao, the property’s registered owner and the
judgment debtor/mortgagor in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, pursuant to a Deed of
Conditional Sale.
Cabling argues that the present case is not an exception to the ministerial issuance
of a writ of possession. While recognizing Lumapas’s actual possession of the subject
property, the Cabling contends that such possession is not adverse to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. Neither is possession in the concept of an owner because in a
conditional sale, ownership is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a positive
suspensive condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price.
Issue:
Whether Lumapas holds the property by a title adverse to the judgment debtor
Ruling:
No, she does not.
Generally, in the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, the issuance of a

writ of possession is ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure sale and during the
redemption period when the court may issue the order for a writ of possession upon the
mere filing of an ex parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. There is,
however, an exception to the rule. Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the possession of
the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is
actually holding the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. Thus, the
court’s obligation to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
Page 789 of 1553

extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial when there is a third party in

possession of the property claiming a right adverse to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor.
The exception provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court contemplates
a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that
of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses the property in his own right, and is
not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the
owner of the property. In the present case, Lumapas cannot be said to possess the subject
property by adverse title or right as her possession is merely premised on the alleged
conditional sale of the property to her by the judgment debtor/mortgagor.
JUANITO M. GOPIA vs METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.

It is a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in

a public auction is a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained,
even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent
auction sale. Once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer’s name upon failure
of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer. Its right to possession has then
ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a
ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the court’s discretion. Moreover, a
petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. As one brought for the
benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest, it
is a judicial proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the
relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. Since the judge to whom the application for writ
of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure, it has been ruled that the ministerial duty of the trial court does not become
discretionary upon the filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage.
Facts:
RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga issued a writ of possession in favor of Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. (respondent bank) when it purchased the subject properties at a public
auction and registered the same in its name on October 1, 1998.
Consequently, a notice to vacate was served on Green Asia Construction and

Development Corporation, represented by the spouses Renato and Delia Legaspi (the
Spouses Legaspi)
Page 790 of 1553

Upon learning of the notice to vacate, petitioner Juanito Gopia (Gopia) filed an
affidavit of third-party claims and a very urgent motion for intervention and to recall
and/or stop the enforcement/implementation of the Writ of Possession. In said actions,
petitioner alleged to be in actual occupation of the subject properties and claimed
ownership thereof by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated May 20, 1995 executed by the Spouses
Legaspi in his favor.
In September 2008, the trial court denied petitioner’s claim. CA affirmed.
Gopia posits that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to recognize
his right as a third party adverse possessor. He explains that while the issuance of a writ of
possession after a foreclosure sale is ministerial, it ceases to be a ministerial duty of the
court if there is a third party. holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. He
claims that since he has been in possession of the subject properties by virtue of a Deed of
Sale executed by the Spouses Legaspi in his favor, the RTC exceeded its powers in denying
its intervention. In support of his claim, petitioner cited rulings of this Court wherein we
prevented the enforcement of writs of possession against adverse third-party possessors.
Gopia further maintains that the CA erred in ruling that there exists a double sale in this
case and, thus, the good faith of respondent Bank is material.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to recognize
Gopia’s right as a third party adverse possessor thus dismissing his petition to recall the
implementation of the Writ of Possession.
Ruling:
No. The RTC did not gravely abused its discretion when it failed to recognize Gopia’s
right as a third party adverse possessor thus dismissing his petition to recall the
implementation of the Writ of Possession.
The petition is bereft of merit.
We agree with the CA when it found that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing petitioner’s Affidavit of Third-party Claim and Very Urgent Motion
for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of
Possession.
A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover

the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to
the party entitled under the judgment. Under Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3135, as amended by
Page 791 of 1553

Act 4118, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of a purchaser in a foreclosure sale of
a real estate mortgage either (1) within the one- year redemption period, upon the filing of
a bond; or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.
It is a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser

in a public auction is a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or
restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure
and consequent auction sale. Once title to the property has been consolidated in the
buyer’s name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer.
Its right to possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and
the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise
of the court’s discretion. Moreover, a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and
summary in nature. As one brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial proceeding wherein relief is
granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be
heard. Since the judge to whom the application for writ of possession is filed need not look
into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, it has been ruled that the
ministerial duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the filing of a
complaint questioning the mortgage. Corollary, any question regarding the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of the writ may, likewise, be
determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135. The
foregoing rule, however, admits of a few exceptions, one of which is when a third party in
possession of the property claims a right adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor, as this
Court has time and again upheld in numerous cases, consistent with Section 33 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. As such, petitioner claims that since the following rulings squarely
apply to the instant case, the writ of possession should not be enforced against him.
All told, we observe that there is nothing that would indicate that the lower court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s intervention. Had petitioner properly substantiated his claim of possession
with sufficient evidence, the lower court could have applied the exception instead of the
general rule, permitted his intervention, and prevented the implementation of the subject
writ of possession. Yet, as previously mentioned, not only did petitioner present an
unnotarized and unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale but there exists no trace of petitioner’s
claim of ownership on the titles of the subject properties. Verily, the exception cannot be
made to apply in the instant case as petitioner failed to establish his actual possession of
the same. Measured against established parameters, the rejection by the lower court of
petitioner’s intervention was not without basis and, hence, could not have been arrived at
capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically.
Page 792 of 1553

We disagree. On the contrary, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that apply the
double sales rule to cases where one of the two sales was conducted in a public auction.
To be sure, considering the ex parte nature of the proceedings involved in the

issuance of the writ of possession, and should petitioner still choose to further vindicate
his claim of ownership over the subject properties despite the findings of the courts below,
an independent civil action is an available remedy.
FE H. OKABE vs. ERNESTO A. SATURNINO

G.R. No. 196040, August 26, 2014, J. Peralta
Petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the decision of the CA holding that an
ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was not the proper remedy for the
petitioner. The SC, though agreed with the CA, held that petitioner is not without recourse.
The remedy of a writ of possession is a remedy that is available to a mortgagee-purchaser for
him to acquire possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor. It is made available
to a subsequent purchaser only after hearing and after determining that the subject property
is still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third
party during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without
hearing. Thus, petitioner being a third party who acquired the property after the redemption
period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession over the subject
property is still with the mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of the mortgagor, a
writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no
longer available to petitioner, but he can wrest possession over the property through an
ordinary action of ejectment.
Facts:
The subject of the controversy is an eighty-one (81) square meter property located
in Barangay San Antonio, Makati City, which was initially, covered by TCT No. 175741 under
the name of the wife of respondent Saturnino. Sometime in 1994, the couple obtained a
loan with the PNB which was secured by the subject property. Because of the couple’s
failure to settle their loan obligation, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.
Considering that the property was not redeemed by Saturnino during the redemption
period a new TCT was issued in favor of PNB. Without taking possession of the subject
property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Okabe. A new TCT was later issued in favour of
Okabe.
Thereafter, Okabe filed with the RTC an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession over the subject property. The RTC, in granting the petition, held that the right
Page 793 of 1553

of Okabe to be placed in absolute possession of the subject property was a consequence of

her right of ownership and that Okabe cannot be deprived of said possession being now
the registered owner of the property.
Meanwhile, the branch clerk of court issued a Writ of Possession addressed to the
Sheriff ordering the latter to place Okabe in possession of the subject property. Thereafter,
the Sheriff, together with okabe, tried to cause the service of the notice to vacate upon
Saturnino, but the property was already abandoned by its occupants. The Sheriff then
posted the notice to vacate together with the writ of possession in front of the gate of the
subject property. Subsequently, when they returned to the property to cause the
implementation of the writ of possession they found out that no one was occupying the
same, the Sheriff then turned over possession of the subject property to Okabe free and
clear of occupants and personal property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered
Okabe to desist from proceeding against Saturnino via an ex parte motion for a writ of
possession. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the case at bar, an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession was the proper remedy of the petitioner in obtaining possession of the subject
property.
Ruling:
No, an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was not the proper
remedy.
In the recent case of Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita Marquez v. Spouses
Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, although the Court allowed the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale to demand possession of the land during the redemption period, it still
required the posting of a bond under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. Thus:
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of
the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the
registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and
can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand
possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond
Page 794 of 1553

in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after
the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes
an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof
of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
Here, Okabe does not fall under the circumstances of the aforequoted case and the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, since she bought the property long
after the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is PNB, if it was the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale, or the purchaser during the foreclosure sale, who can file the ex-parte
petition for the issuance of writ of possession during the redemption period, but it will only
issue upon compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
Nevertheless, Okabe is not left without any remedy. Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, provides:
SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successor-in interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent
to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at
any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such
redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-six,
inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
Consequently, the provision of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court relative to
an execution sale is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by
virtue of Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be applied to cases
involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later
sold to third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. The remedy of a
writ of possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire
possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a
subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject
property is still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee
or a third party during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or
without hearing. In other words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property
after the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession
over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a third
party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is
Page 795 of 1553

in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise,
the remedy of a writ of possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest
possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (formerly Prudential Bank) vs. SPOUSES

DAVID M. CASTRO and CONSUELO B. CASTRO
In the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, the name “Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF David
M. Castro” appeared as mortgagor while the amount of mortgaged indebtedness is
P96,870.20 but the mortgagors are Spouses Castro and the amount must be P100,000. The
mistakes and omissions referred to in the above-cited ruling which would invalidate notice
pertain to those which: 1) are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, 2) to depreciate the value
of the property, or 3) to prevent it from bringing a fair price. With jurisprudence as the
measure, the errors pointed out by the spouses appear to be harmless.
Facts:
Spouses Castro contracted two loans from Prudential Bank in the amounts
of P100,000.00 and P55,000.00 in July and August 1987. The P100,000.00 loan was secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over the spouses' property located in Quezon City while
the P55,000.00 loan was secured by another REM over two parcels of land located in Laguna
registered in the name of David’s mother, Guellerma Malabanan.
When the spouses defaulted in payment, Prudential Bank, through counsel, filed
two separate petitions for foreclosure of the mortgage. In their first petition, Prudential
Bank admitted that through inadvertence, the photocopies of the first two pages of the
REM covering the properties in Laguna were mixed and attached to the photocopies of the
last two pages of the REM covering the Quezon City property. Thus, in the Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale, the name “Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF David M. Castro” appeared
as mortgagor while the amount of mortgaged indebtedness is P96,870.20. The real property
described therein however is the Quezon City property. Thereafter, the Quezon City
property was sold at a public auction in favor of Prudential Bank whose winning bid was
P396,000.00.
The issue before the RTC was whether Prudential Bank legally complied with the
jurisdictional requirement of due notice prior to the extrajudicial sale of the property in
question. The trial court ruled in favor of Prudential Bank and dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court.
Page 796 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the errors in the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale invalidate the notice and
render the sale and the certificate of such sale void
Ruling:
No
At the outset, it bears emphasis that foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the
presumption of regularity and the party who seeks to challenge the proceedings has the
burden of evidence to rebut the same. In this case, the spouses failed to prove that
Prudential Bank has not complied with the notice requirement of the law.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Act No. 3135 laid down the procedure regarding foreclosure
sale:
Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property
sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made
is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building
of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty
days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated,
and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be
published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the municipality or city.
Sec. 4. The sale shall be made at public auction, between the hours of nine in the
morning and four in the afternoon; and shall be under the direction of the sheriff of the
province, the justice or auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality in which such sale
has to be made, or a notary public of said municipality, who shall be entitled to collect a
fee of five pesos each day of actual work performed, in addition to his expenses.
In Philippine National Bank v. Maraya, Jr., the Court elucidated that one of the most
important requirements of Act No. 3135 is that the notice of the time and place of sale shall
be given. If the sheriff acts without notice, or at a time and place other than that designated
in the notice, the sheriff acts without warrant of law. In this case, the property sold in the
public auction is located in Quezon City and the foreclosure sale proceeded as scheduled
Page 797 of 1553

at 10:00 o’clock in the morning on 26 August 1996 at the Hall of Justice in Quezon City with
Prudential Bank as the winning bidder, registering the highest bid of P396,000.00.
In Century Savings Bank v. Samonte citing Olizon v. Court of Appeals, the Court
reiterated the purpose of the rule on notice, to wit:
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of
the property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for
the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects
are attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice;
but if mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or
mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a
fair price, such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to
the sale made pursuant thereto.
The mistakes and omissions referred to in the above-cited ruling which would
invalidate notice pertain to those which: 1) are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, 2) to
depreciate the value of the property, or 3) to prevent it from bringing a fair price.
With jurisprudence as the measure, the errors pointed out by the spouses appear to
be harmless. The evils that can result from an erroneous notice did not arise. There was no
intention to mislead, as the errors in fact did not mislead the bidders as shown by the fact
that the winning registered bid of P396,000.00 is over and above the real amount of
indebtedness of P209,205.05. As correctly observed by the trial court, the amount
mentioned in the notice did not indicate a collusion between the sheriff who conducted
the sale and the respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned amount of P96,870.20 refers to
the mortgage indebtedness not the value of the property. Equally notable is the
announcement in the notice that the amount excludes “penalties, charges, attorney’s fees
and all legal fees and expenses for the foreclosure and sale.”
As regards the designation of Guellerma Malabanan as the mortgagor, the Court
agrees with the reference made by the Court of Appeals to the case of Langkaan Realty
Dev’t Inc. v. UCPB which ruled that the erroneous designation of an entity as the mortgagor
does not invalidate the notice of sale.
The notice rule was complied with when the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was published
in Philippine Recorder, a national newspaper of general circulation once a week for three
consecutive weeks or on 29 July, 5 and 12 August 1996.
Page 798 of 1553

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
FORCIBLE ENTRY
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO and his wife REMEDIOS

HERMANO
G.R. No. 160914, March 25, 2015, Sereno, CJ.
In actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
Facts:
Respondents Antonio and Remedios Hermano filed an ejectment case against petitioner
Marcela Dela Cruz before the MTCC of Tagaytay City. In her Answer with Counterclaim,
Marcela contended that Antonio and Remedios had sold the property to one Don Enciso
Benitez, who in turn sold it to Marcela. The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the Complaint. It found that a Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed
executed by Antonio in favor of Benitez, but such sale was subject to a condition. Since the
condition was not satisfied, Antonio still owned the property when Benitez sold and
delivered it to Marcela. It also ruled that the proper remedy was an action for recovery,
instead of the summary proceeding of ejectment, because there was no showing of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer. The RTC affirmed the Decision of the MTCC. However, the CA
reversed rulings of the lower courts. It ruled that the case was an ejectment complaint for
forcible entry, and that Antonio had sufficiently alleged and proved prior physical
possession, as well as petitioner’s entry and possession by stealth. It pointed out that under
BP Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case, even if the
question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership.
They retain jurisdiction, provided that the resolution of the issue of ownership shall only
be for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Issue:
Whether or not Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible entry.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it
must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime
Page 799 of 1553
within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This
requirement implies that in those cases, possession of the land by the defendant has been
unlawful from the beginning, as the possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further,
the complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in
litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one-year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry
into the land, except when entry was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period would
be counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.
The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately aver prior physical
possession by respondents and their dispossession thereof by stealth, because the intrusion
by petitioner was without their knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees with the
findings of the CA that contrary to those of the RTC that the case was an action for
ejectment in the nature of accionreivindicatoria, the case was actually for forcible entry and
sufficient in form.
APOSTOLIC VICAR OF TABUK, INC. vs. SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ELIZABETH

SISON and VENANCIO WADAS
In an ejectment suit (accion interdictal), the sole issue is the right of physical or
material possession over the subject real property independent of any claim of ownership by
the parties involved. Ownership over the property is immaterial and is only passed
upon provisionally for the limited purpose of determining which party has the better right to
possession. The suit is only filed against the possessor(s) of the property at the
commencement of action, and not against one who does not in fact occupy the land. To
determine who should be made a party-defendant, The court simply looks at
who committed the acts amounting to forcible entry and remains in possession of the subject
property.
Ejectment suits are actions in personam wherein judgment only binds parties who had
been properly impleaded and were given an opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
Spouses Sison and respondent Venancio Wadas filed with the MCTC a forcible entry
complaint against the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province represented by Fr. Gerry
Gudmalin. The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. The MCTC
decision became final and executory.
Page 800 of 1553

Petitioner Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc. (the Vicariate of Tabuk) filed an urgent
manifestation and motion before the MCTC. It manifested that the land subject of the case
is owned and possessed by the Vicariate of Tabuk represented by Reverend Monsignor
Prudencio P. Andaya, Jr., not by the Vicariate Apostolic of Mt. Province represented by Fr.
Gerry Gudmalin as alleged in the complaint; and that it had been denied due process
because it was neither impleaded nor served summons. It moved for the court to set aside
its Decision and to summon and implead the Vicariate of Tabuk. The MCTC denied the
petitioner’s urgent motion and manifestation. Petitioner appealed to the RTC but the same
was dismissed.
Then, the Vicariate of Tabuk filed before the RTC a Rule 47 petition for annulment of the
MCTC judgment. It argued that the MCTC rendered the decision without acquiring
jurisdiction over its person. It also alleged that the Vicariate of Mt. Province no longer exists
because it was dissolved in 1990. RTC dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Petition.
RULING:
NO.
Rule 47 authorizes the RTC to dismiss a petition for annulment of judgment outright if
it has no substantial merit. Here, the RTC correctly dismissed the Petition.
First, in an ejectment suit (accion interdictal), the sole issue is the right of physical or
material possession over the subject real property independent of any claim of ownership
by the parties involved. Ownership over the property is immaterial and is only passed
upon provisionally for the limited purpose of determining which party has the better right
to possession. The suit is only filed against the possessor(s) of the property at the
commencement of action, and not against one who does not in fact occupy the land. To
determine who should be made a party-defendant, The court simply looks at
who committed the acts amounting to forcible entry and remains in possession of the
subject property. In the present case, it was alleged that it was Fr. Gerry Gudmalin, acting
for the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, who forcibly entered the property previously
held by the respondents and who remains in possession. Hence, the Vicariate of Mt.
Province was correctly impleaded as the defendant. While the petitioner denies the
existence of the Vicariate of Mt. Province, the Court cannot pass upon this peripheral issue
because we are not a trier of facts.
Page 801 of 1553

Second, ejectment suits are actions in personam wherein judgment only binds parties who
had been properly impleaded and were given an opportunity to be heard. The MCTC
judgment was only rendered against Fr. Gudmalin and the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain
Province, not against the petitioner Vicariate of Tabuk. Hence, the petitioner can only be
bound by the MCTC judgment if it is shown to be: (a) a trespasser, squatter, or agent of the
defendants fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or
other occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendants; (c) a
transferee pendente lite; (d) sub-lessee; (e) co-lessee; or (t) a member of the family, a
relative, or other privy of the defendants.
In such a case, a court hearing is required to determine the character of such possession. If
the executing court finds that the petitioner is a mere successor-in-interest, guest, or agent
of the defendants, the order of execution shall be enforced against it. Since the judgment
was not rendered against the petitioner, it has no legal personality to ask for annulment of
the judgment. Understandably, the petitioner feels aggrieved because it claims ownership
over the subject lot that the MCTC ordered Fr. Gudmalin to turn over to the respondents.
However, from a purely legal perspective, the MCTC judgment did not prejudice the
petitioner.
This is not to say that the petitioner is left without a remedy in law. The petitioner may still
avail of the plenary action of accion reinvindicatoria wherein the issue of its ownership may
be thoroughly threshed out in a full-blown trial after which complete reliefs may be granted
to the proper parties.
CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON

G.R. No. 183589, June 25, 2014, J. Villarama
As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses Ligon were
evicted from the subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting
of Title and Recovery of Possession to restore them to their possession of the subject property.
The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, is that the concept
of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of defendant’s predecessors-
in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession de facto, and not possession
de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of defendant’s predecessors-in-interest cannot
therefore bar an action between the same parties with respect to who has title to the land in
question.
Page 802 of 1553

Facts:
Sometime in 1970, one Tomas Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application over a
parcel of land situated in Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa, Nasugbu, Batangas. After the death
of Tomas Fernandez, his son Felicisimo pursued the application and the survey plan under
Psu No. 04-008565 was approved by the Bureau of Lands. In 1985, the spouses Isaac and
Concepcion Ronulo asked the assistance of the Office of the President and requested
investigation of their claim that a parcel of land which they have been occupying since the
1950s was included in the approved survey plan PSU-04-008565 in the name of Tomas
Fernandez. Regional Director Antonio Prinsipe of DENR issued an Order in DENR Case
No. IV-5516 finding the protest of Spouses Ronulo to be meritorious and cancelling the plan
PSU-04-008565 approved in the name of Tomas Fernandez. The said order was appealed
by Felicisimo Fernandez to the Office of the DENR Secretary. The already widowed
Concepcion Ronulo and her children executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the
parcel of land subject of DENR Case No. IV-5516 in favor of herein defendant Lim who will
"file the appropriate public land application.”
In the meantime, herein plaintiffs Spouses Danilo Ligon and Generosa Vitug-Ligon
purchased the subject property from Felicisimo Fernandez and introduced improvements
thereon, including a beach house TCT No. TP-1792 of the Registry of Deeds was issued in
the name of the spouses Ligon. Defendant Lim filed a complaint for forcible entry against
Spouses Ligon. The MTC ordered Spouses Ligon to vacate the subject land. The trial court
based its decision on the alleged finality of the Order issued by Regional Director Prinsipe.
The RTC and CA affirmed said decision. On 28 May 1999, the DENR Secretary rendered a
decision reversing the order of Regional Director Prinsipe, dismissing the protest of the
Ronulos, and ordering that TCT No. TP-1792 in the name of plaintiffs "shall remain
undisturbed." Ronulos filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. The Ronulos
filed a second motion for reconsideration of the decision of the DENR Secretary in DENR
Case No. 5102.
Meanwhile, as a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses
Ligon were evicted from the subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim
for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with prayer for a TRO and
Preliminary Injunction, to restore them to their possession of the subject property and to
enjoin herein defendant Lim from demolishing their beach house. The Court denied
plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief as a result of which plaintiffs’ beach house was
demolished by the Branch Sheriff on the motion of defendants. Spouses Ligon filed a
supplemental complaint for additional damages as a result of the demolition of their beach
house. Despite due notice, Lim and counsel were absent prompting this Honorable Court,
Page 803 of 1553

upon plaintiff’s motion to consider the cross-examination of plaintiff Danilo Ligon by

defendants as waived. The court ruled in favour of Spouses Ligon.
Issue:
Whether or not the finality of judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive as to

ownership
Ruling:
No. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper court to recover physical
possession or possession de facto and not possession de jure. The use of summary
procedure in ejectment cases is intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right to possession of the property and not to determine the actual
title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of
ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession. Its
determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive.
Detainer, being a mere quieting process, questions raised on real property are
incidentally discussed. In fact, any evidence of ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4 of
Rule 70 (Sec. 4, Rule 70 provides: "Evidence of title, when admissible. - Evidence of title to
the land or building may be received solely for the purpose of determining the character
and extent of possession and damages for detention.") except to resolve the question of
possession. Thus, all that the court may do, is to make an initial determination of who is
the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent
other evidence to resolve the latter. But such determination of ownership is not clothed
with finality. Neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a binding and
conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership.
Thus, under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil Procedure:
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership.– The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, however,
is that the concept of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession
de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of petitioners’
Page 804 of 1553
predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same parties with
respect to who has title to the land in question. The final judgment shall not also be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action not involving possession. As what took place in the case at bar, the final
judgment was not bar to this subsequent action to quiet respondents’ title in order to settle
ownership over the 9,478-square meter property.
AMADA C. ZACARIA vs. VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY,

CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY
ISRAEL
G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014, J. Villarama
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action
for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. In the instant case, the allegations in the
complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that
they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever
occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started.
Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for Ejectment with

Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-
in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and
members of her household.
The MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. The MCTC held that the
allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an action for unlawful
detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of
the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand letter
sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and
strategy, and in petitioner’s own "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent with an action
for forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from the discovery of the
alleged entry. In reversing the MCTC, RTC held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer
because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she
allowed them to stay there for one year. With the failure of respondents to file a notice of
Page 805 of 1553

appeal within the reglementary period, the above decision became final and executory.
Zacarias filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. Respondents’ counsel filed a
petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA. CA reversed and set aside
the decision of RTC. The CA held that the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case
as the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed,
petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-
year period to file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the
property.
Issues:
1. Whether or not an unlawful detainer case is the proper remedy;

2. Whether or not the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has
long become final and executor
Ruling:
1. No. The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as
the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy,
and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence. Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause
of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
The above complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does
not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the
Page 806 of 1553

petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of such lawful
possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued
occupation after her discovery of their entry into the subject premises is incorrect. As she
had averred, she discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007. Such possession could
not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less
was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession of the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess.
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is
essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from
the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy.
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer
cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where
petitioners’ cause of action fails.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of
fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations
that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof."
Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This
failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer
is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause
for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in
this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal
trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when
entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she
discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same",
as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land
Page 807 of 1553

and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts
are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling
and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
2. No. It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of
it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final
and any writ of execution based on it is void.
IRENE D. OFILADA vs. SPS. RUBEN AND MIRAFLOR ANDAL

G.R. No. 192270, January 26, 2015, J. Del Castillo
An allegation of tenancy before the MTC does not automatically deprive the court of
its jurisdiction. The material averments in the complaint determine the jurisdiction of a court.
A court does not lose jurisdiction over an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of a party
raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely
to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown to
exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Irene, together with her husband Carlos Ofilada (Carlos), bought from the heirs of
Teresita Liwag (Teresita) a 27,974-square meter parcel of land principally planted with
rambutan, a number of coconut trees and other fruit-bearing plants located in Quezon.
The sale is evidenced by a Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale wherein
respondent Miraflor Andal (Miraflor), who brokered the sale of the property, signed as
‘tenant.’ Apparently, ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor appeared before Anastacio Lajara
(Anastacio), the then Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman of Barangay
Puri, San Antonio, and executed a Pagpapatunay.
Two weeks after the sale or on February 27, 1997, Miraflor, with the consent of her
husband, respondent Ruben Andal (Ruben), executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein she
acknowledged Irene and Carlos as the new owners of the property. While it was stated
therein that she will continue to take care of the property, she nevertheless waived any
tenancy rights that she and her husband might have over the land.
Page 808 of 1553

Eventually, the land was registered in the names of Irene and Carlos. Eight years
later or in October 2005, Irene filed against the spouses Andal a Complaint for Ejectment
and Damages before the MTC of San Antonio, Quezon. She averred that aside from the
aforementioned property, she and Carlos also acquired an 8,640-square meter ricefield
located in Pulo, San Antonio, Quezon. For humanitarian reasons, she acceded to the
spouses Andal’s request to take care of her two parcels of land, provided that they would
not be considered as tenants.
In their Answer, the spouses Andal denied Irene’s allegations and claimed that they
were tenants of Irene’s predecessor-in-interest and continued to be such despite the
transfer of ownership of the properties to Irene. They likewise contended that since the suit
is an action to dispossess them as tenants, it is not the MTC which has jurisdiction over the
complaint but the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
MTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, holding that spouses Andal failed
to adduce proof that they are tenants. Resolving the appeal of the spouses Andal, the RTC
affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. The motion for reconsideration thereto was also denied,
The CA, on the other hand, took a different view of the case, it reversed and set aside the
decision of RTC. Irene filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether tenancy relationship between Irene and the spouses Andal exists as to strip
off the MTC of its jurisdiction over Irene’s suit for unlawful detainer.
Ruling:
Petition granted.
The tenancy relationship between the former owners of the properties and the
spouses Andal was clearly severed prior to Irene’s purchase of the same; no such
relationship was subsequently created between Irene and the spouses Andal.
Certainly telling are the Pagpapatunay and the Sinumpaang Salaysaywhich were
voluntarily executed and never impugned by the spouses Andal. Both contain express
declarations that at the time Irene and her husband bought the property, the tenancy then
existing between the heirs of Teresita as former owners and the spouses Andal as tenants
had already ceased, and that no tenancy relations would continue between the latter and
Page 809 of 1553

the new owner, Irene. Notably, the Sinumpaang Salaysay, being a public document, is
evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor
the presumption of regularity. The spouses Andal are bound by their admissions against
their own interest.
Indeed, while a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by the sale, alienation,

or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding, the same may nevertheless be
terminated due to circumstances more advantageous to the tenant and his/her family.
Here, records show that Miraflor, who brokered the sale between the heirs of Teresita and
Irene, voluntarily executed, days prior to the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Absolute Sale, her Pagpapatunay before the BARC Chairman stating that she and her
parents have already received a ‘sufficient consideration’ for her to release her former
landlord and the purchaser of the lot from liability. As later disclosed by Irene during trial,
such ‘sufficient consideration’ amounted to P1.1 million by way of disturbance
compensation, a factual allegation which was again never refuted by the spouses Andal
before the lower court and was found to be an uncontroverted fact by the CA. To the Court,
the said amount is adequate enough for the spouses Andal to relinquish their rights as
tenants. In fine, it can be reasonably concluded that the tenancy relationship between the
previous owners and the spouses Andal had already been severed.
The next question now is whether a new tenancy relationship between Irene and
the spouses Andal was subsequently formed. This becomes crucial because for the DARAB
to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Evidence is necessary to prove the allegation of tenancy. “The principal factor in

determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship.”
An allegation of tenancy before the MTC does not automatically deprive the court
of its jurisdiction. Basic is the rule that: x x x the material averments in the complaint
determine the jurisdiction of a court. x x x a court does not lose jurisdiction over an
ejectment suit by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The court continues to have the
authority to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely to determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Page 810 of 1553

The Court agrees with the conclusion of both the MTC and the RTC that for dearth
of evidence, tenurial relationship between the parties was not sufficiently shown. Thus, the
said courts correctly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ

vs. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO AND HIS WIFE REMEDIOS HERMANO
G.R. No. 160914, March 25, 2015, C.J. Sereno
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it
within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. As such, the
complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession (in the concept of possession de
facto, or actual or material possession and not one flowing out of ownership) of the property
in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. In this regard, it has been
settled that tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of possession.
They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the presumption
that no one in one’s right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s actual
or constructive possession.
Facts:
Antonio and Remedios Hermano (respondents) are the registered owners of a house
and lot situated in P.B. Constantino Subdivision, Tagaytay City. On June 13, 2002, Antonio
sued Marcela M. Dela Cruz (Marcela) before the MTCC of Tagaytay City for ejectment and
damages. He averred in paragraph 5 of the complaint that Marcela occupied and possessed
the aforesaid house and lot sometime on September 1, 2001 pursuant to the alleged
Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez, without
his authority and consent. Also, as he asserted in paragraph 6 of the same, the subject
property is used by him and his family as their rest house/vacation place after a hard days
work in Metro Manila. He narrated that on September 27, 2001, through his counsel, he
sent a formal demand letter to Marcela for the latter to vacate and turn over the possession
of the property and to pay the rental in the amount of P20,000.00 a month.
In her Answer with Counterclaim, Marcela while admitting the existence of TCT
No.T-24503, contended that the true and actual owner of the property was Don Enciso
Benitez (Benitez). Allegedly, respondents had already sold the property to Benitez; the
latter, in turn, sold it to her by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on March 1, 2001.
She claimed that Antonio knew about the sale and her immediate occupation of the
Page 811 of 1553

premises. Thus, she contended that estoppel had set in, as he had made her believe that
she had the right to occupy and possess the property.
Eventually, the MTCC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the Complaint. It found that Antonio had, indeed, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property in favor of Benitez. The transfer of title, however, was subject
to a condition which had not yet been satisfied when Benitez executed the Deed of Sale in
favor of Marcela. In other words, Antonio still owned the property when Benitez delivered
it to her. Even so, Antonio’s proper remedy was an action for recovery, instead of the
summary proceeding of ejectment, because there was no showing of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the RTC, which affirmed en toto the
said decision. However, on appeal to the CA, the said decision was reversed and set aside.
Thus, Antonio was declared as the lawful possessor of the property and Marcela was
ordered to vacate the premises. Hence, this Petition for Review.
Issue:
Whether or not Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible
entry.
Ruling:
After an exhaustive review of the case record, the Court finds that the Complaint
was sufficient in form and substance, but that there was no proof of prior physical
possession by respondents. Hence, the decision of the MTCC dismissing the Complaint
against Marcela is hereby reinstated.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it
within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This
requirement implies that in those cases, possession of the land by the defendant has been
unlawful from the beginning, as the possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further,
the complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in
litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one-year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry
into the land, except when entry was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period would
be counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.
Page 812 of 1553

In the case at bar, the allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately
aver prior physical possession by respondents and their dispossession thereof by stealth,
because the intrusion by petitioner was without their knowledge and consent. The Court
thus agrees with the findings of the CA that contrary to those of the RTC that the case was
an action for ejectment in the nature of accion reivindicatoria, the case was actually for
forcible entry and sufficient in form.
Likewise, the Court agrees with the CA’s findings that the Complaint was timely
filed. It is settled that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive
period should be counted from the time the person who was deprived of possession
demanded that the deforciant desist from dispossession when the former learned about it.
The owners or possessors of the land cannot be expected to enforce their right to its
possession against the illegal occupant and sue the latter before learning of the clandestine
intrusion. And to deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of the summary action under Rule
70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder managed to conceal the
trespass for more than a year, would be to reward clandestine usurpations even if they are
unlawful.
Furthermore, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove respondents’

allegation of prior physical possession. To prove their claim of having a better right to
possession, respondents submitted their title thereto and the latest Tax Declaration prior
to the initiation of the ejectment suit. As the CA correctly observed, Marcela failed to
controvert these documents with competent evidence. It erred, however, in considering
those documents sufficient to prove respondents’ prior physical possession. While
possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material
possession, and not one flowing out of ownership hence, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover the possession even against the owner, it has been settled that tax
declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of possession. They are
merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the presumption that
no one in one’s right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s actual
or constructive possession. Also, albeit the claim of respondents that they are using the
property as their vacation house, that claim is not substantiated by any corroborative
evidence. Therefore, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving the element
of prior physical possession.
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
DOMINGA B. QUITO, vs. STOP & SAVE CORPORATION, as represented by

GREGORY DAVID DICKENSON, as its Chairman, and JULIETA BUAN-DICKENSON,
Page 813 of 1553

as its President, ROBERTO BUAN, HENRY CO, ANGELINA LUMOTAN, RODEL

PINEDA and ROSE CALMA,
G.R. No. 186657, June 11, 2014, J. Brion
Dominga filed unlawful detainer case against Stop and Save. However, CA dismissed
the case on the ground that the latter filed annulment of the lease agreement and constitutes
as litis pendencia. The court ruled that unlawful detainer is not the same as annulment of
contract. In the unlawful detainer suit, the issue is who between the parties has a better right
to physical possession over the property or possession de facto and the principal relief prayed
for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property for failure to pay the rent. In contrast, in the
annulment of lease contract, the issue is the validity of the lease contract
Facts:
Dominga filed before the MCTC a complaint for unlawful detaineragainst Stop &
Save and its sub-lessees/co-respondents Roberto Buan, Henry Co, Angelina Lumotan,
Rodel Pineda and Rose Calma. She alleged that Stop & Save failed to pay the agreed monthly
rentals since June 2003 and, despite repeated verbal and written demands, refused to pay
and vacate the leased building, in violation of their April 4, 2002 Lease Agreement. Stop &
Save denied that it committed a violation of the lease contract, but merely suspended its
payment of rent because of Dominga’s failure to comply with their subsequent agreement
they had agreed that rent payments for the months of June, July, August, September and
October 2003 shall be deferred and paid on or before January 15, 2004 - the deadline given
to Dominga to complete the necessary repairs on the 2nd floor of the leased building. Stop
& Save anchored its right to suspend rental payments on Article 1658 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "[t]he lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor
fails to make the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the property leased."
MCTC disposed the Unlawful detainer case. RTC reversed the decision of the MCTC,
dismissing the case due to the pending case for annulment of lease contract filed by Stop
& Save with the same RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 695. It appeared that Stop & Save
had earlier filed, on January 13, 2005, a case to annul its April 4, 2002 Lease Agreement with
Dominga allegedly due to her misrepresentations on the leased building’s condition and
ownership. Dominga filed a petition for review with the CA upon the denial of her motion
for reconsideration with the RTC. CA dismissed Dominga’s petition for review for lack of
merit, which, in effect, affirmed the RTC’s decision dismissing Dominga’s unlawful detainer
complaint. It ruled that the RTC correctly abated the unlawful detainer case because Stop
& Save’s annulment case was filed first in time and was the more appropriate vehicle in
litigating the issues between the parties, since both their claims were anchored on the same
lease contract.
Page 814 of 1553
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the subject unlawful detainer case on
the ground of litis pendentia.
Ruling:
No. The CA erred in dismissing the case.
Litis pendentia refers to the situation where another action is pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action so that one of these actions is unnecessary and
vexatious. The dismissal of a civil action on the ground of litis pendentiais based on the
policy that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject
matter and for the same cause of action in order that possible conflicting judgments may
be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and statuses of persons.
To constitute litis pendentia, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity
of the parties in the two actions; (2) substantial identity in the causes of action and in the
reliefs sought by the parties; (3) and the identity between the two actions should be such
that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.
The court ruled that no substantial identity exists. "The test to determine whether
the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the
two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action."
In the present case, while there is an identity in the facts between the two actions,
involving as they do the same lease contract, the issues and the relief prayed for are
different so that the causes of action remain entirely distinct from each other.
In the unlawful detainer suit, the issue is who between the parties has a better right
to physical possession over the property or possession de facto and the principal relief
prayed for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property for failure to pay the rent. In contrast,
in the annulment of lease contract, the issue is the validity of the lease contract, where Stop
and Save puts in issue Dominga’s ownership. In other words, the issue of physical
possession in the action for unlawful detainer cannot be identical with the issues of
ownership and validity of contract in the action for annulment. From these essential
differences, the lack of required identity in the causes of action for litis pendentia to exist
cannot be denied.
Page 815 of 1553
Since the causes of action in the subject case for unlawful detainer and annulment
of lease contract are entirely different, a judgment in one case would not amount to res
judicata in the other.
BONIFACIO PIEDAD, represented by MARIA INSPIRACION PIEDAD-DANAO vs.

SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and EMETERIA M. GURIEZA
Petitioner filed unlawful detainer against respondents who were the assigned
caretakers. They declared the subject lot under their name for tax purposes and applied for
titling with the DENR when they learned it was public land. Upon learning of their acts,
petitioner demanded them to vacate but they refused. The Court granted the petition, holding
that petitioner has the better right of possession de facto over the subject lot and that the
spouses’ stay on the subject lot was only made possible through the mere tolerance of the
petitioner.
Facts:
Bonifacio filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against spouses
Gurieza. In his complaint, he alleged that he is the absolute owner of the 1/3 middle portion
of the parcel of land designated as Lot 1227 which he acquired through intestate succession
from his father who inherited it from the latter’s parents Alejandro and Tomasa Piedad. His
ownership of the subject lot took place even before his father’s death and was validated
through a Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition executed by his parents’
legal heirs.
Before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow on the property and assigned

caretakers, the last of which were the spouses Gurieza. In 2005, the spouses became
interested in the property after learning from an employee of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that Lot 1227 is public land. They then had the lot
declared under their name for tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and
filed an application for survey authority and titling with the Bureau of Land Management,
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR.
After learning what the spouses did, Bonifacio authorized Ofelia Bay-ag to file a
protest before the DENR which deferred further action on the spouses’ application.
Bonifacio then sent his daughter, Maria Danao to personally demand that the spouses
vacate the lot. Danao filed a complaint in the barangay court. Spouses Gurieza refused to
vacate.
Page 816 of 1553

The spouses alleged that the lot in 1974 was vacant and a public land and that DENR
allowed them to possess and occupy it as an owner. As such, they acquired the same
through acquisitive prescription. They likewise assailed the authenticity and validity of the
Deed of Confirmation, contending that it was only signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and
Tomasa.
MTC ruled in favor of Bonifacio, finding that Bonifacio had a better right of
possession over the subject lot as evidenced by the house he built thereon as early as the
1950s when he took possession of the said lot. MTC held that the spouses’ stay was by
Bonifacio’s mere tolerance and it became illegal when they refused to vacate despite
demand. The RTC affirmed this ruling.
However, the CA set it aside, finding that Emeteria M. Gurieza, whom Bonifacio
recognized as one of the heirs of the subject lot, among others, as well as the other heirs of
Alejandro and Tomasa, did not sign the Deed of Confirmation. It ruled that absent credible
proof that the subject lot was ever partitioned by the heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa,
Emeteria continues to be a co-owner thereof, and, hence, cannot be ejected from the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Bonifacio’s complaint of Unlawful

Detainer
Ruling:
No, the RTC’s ruling should be affirmed.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess. The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties.
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under

the category of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her
property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful
detainer will lie.
Page 817 of 1553

The Court held that that Bonifacio had clearly established his cause of action for
unlawful detainer under Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and that he has the
better right of possession de facto over the subject lot.
Evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of the
subject lot and even built a bungalow-type house thereon. Despite his migration to Hawaii,
Bonifacio never relinquished said possession over the house and lot. Consistent with Article
524 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled that “it is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of
land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act.”
Thus, the Sps. Gurieza’s stay on the subject lot was only made possible through the mere
tolerance of Bonifacio.
Also, upon learning what the spouses did, he immediately took steps to terminate
their tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and demanded that they leave
immediately, rendering the Sps. Gurieza’s stay on the subject lot illegal.
Sps. Gurieza was able to unlawfully withhold possession of the lot from Bonifacio
since they refused to vacate and even challenged Danao to go to court. Bonifacio, through
Danao, made his final demand to spouses Gurieza on January 14, 2008, as evidenced by a
Certificate to File Action issued by the Barangay Captain of the area where the lot was
located, stating that the Sangguniang Barangay had tried to settle the dispute but failed to
do so, and filed his complaint on June 24, 2008, or within the one year period from his last
demand.
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION vs. TORMILREALTY AND

Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals only from the time the demand to
vacate was served upon it and not from the time it began occupying the disputed premises,
Pro-Guard Security Services Corporation (Pro- Guard) sought recourse to the Court. The
Supreme Court held that the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to
be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Facts:
On July 24, 1984, Torres, Jr., assigned to Tormil Realty and Development
Corporation (Tormil) a property located in Pasay City in exchange for shares of stock in the
Page 818 of 1553

said corporation. Despite the assignment, however, title to the real properties remained in
Torres' name. Later, Torres unilaterally revoked the transaction.
Subsequently, Torres assigned the same property to Torres-Pabalan, a partnership

which it established. The building was subsequently rented out. It was occupied by
Edgardo, Augusto, and Pro-Guard.
In March 1987, Tormil filed a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to compel Torres to fulfill his obligation by turning over the documents necessary to
effect the registration and transfer of titles in its name of the properties assigned to it by
Torres. On March 6, 1991, the SEC rendered judgment in favor of Tormil, and this was later
affirmed by the SEC en banc.
Tormil sent letters to Edgardo and Augustus and Pro-Guard, demanding them to
vacate the property and pay monthly rental of P20,000.00 from the time of their occupation
thereof until the same are actually turned over to Tormil. As demands remain unheeded,
the Tormil filed before the Pasay City MeTC ejectment suits against Edgardo and Augustus,
and Pro-Guard. The MeTC adjudged that Tormil has proven its right to possess the
property. The CA affirmed th decision of lower court.
Pro-Guard stresses that the CA erred in affirming the lower courts’ award of
P20,000.00 monthly rental reckoned from the time it occupied the unit. Pro-Guard
maintains that in any case, it owes no unpaid rentals to Tormil for the entire period of its
stay in the building out of Tormil’s tolerance. On the other hand, Tormil argues that Pro-
Guard’s stay ‘out of tolerance’ does not bar it from claiming arrears from the time the latter
occupied a unit in the building. It contends that the demand to vacate was not for the
purpose of counting the reckoning period for payment of rental arrears, but only for the
purpose of counting the prescriptive period to file a case for unlawful detainer.
Issue:
Whether the reckoning the date of payment of rentals shall be reckoned from the
time Pro-Guard occupied the unit or from the time the demand to vacate was served.
Ruling:
Petition granted.
While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the
fair rental value for the use and occupation of the unit in the building, such compensation
Page 819 of 1553

should not be reckoned from the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the
time of the demand to vacate.
“In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession
of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or
expiration of his right to possess.” In other words, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal. Additionally, the Rules of Court requires the filing of such action
within a year after the withholding of possession, meaning that “if the dispossession has
not lasted for more than one year, [then] an ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful
detainer) is proper x x x.”
Here, from the moment Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit in March 1994 up to
November 15, 1998, the right of Pro-Guard to possess the premises was not challenged. It
was only after Tormil prevailed over Manuel in its ownership of the same that it terminated
Pro-Guard’s right to possess the unit it was occupying through a letter to vacate dated
November 16, 1998. Hence, it is only from that point that Tormil is considered to have
withdrawn its tolerance of Pro-Guard’s occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guard’s possession
became unlawful at that same moment. This is supported by the allegation in the complaint
for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not because of non-payment of rentals, but
because of withdrawal of tolerance. Tolerance or “[t]oleration is defined as ‘the act or
practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly approved of,” while tolerated acts
are “those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of the
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without
material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.”
With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance, it is settled that:
x x x A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or

permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose
term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In
such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate.
Indeed, it is inconsistent to demand payment of rentals during the period of

tolerance.
Page 820 of 1553

INOCENCIA TAGALOG vs. MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L.

BUAGAS, RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C.
ARANAS, and RUFINA C. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 201286, July 18, 2014, J. Carpio
The subject of the action is for unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first level court
or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with the RTC, a second level
court, the RTC’s decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the case. The proceedings before
a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It then follows that the
appeal brought before the appellate court, as well as the decisions or resolutions promulgated
in accordance with said appeal, is without force and effect.
Facts:
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land situated in Buanoy, Balamban,
Cebu. On 5 February 2003, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo
City, Cebu, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with
a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with Damages and Attorney’s Fees against
petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog).
In the Complaint, respondents stated that they were the co-owners of the land. They
alleged that Tagalog occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to
month basis by virtue of a verbal contract. Tagalog built a house with light materials on the
land and when a strong typhoon hit Cebu, Tagalog’s house was damaged. Thereafter,
respondents alleged that Tagalog discontinued paying the rent and stopped inhabiting the
house. Sometime before December 2002, respondents demanded that Tagalog remove the
scattered debris on the land, notified her of their intention to use the land, and subdivide
and develop it for their personal use. Respondents informed Tagalog to vacate the premises
asserting that the verbal contract of lease was deemed terminated upon the expiration of
the monthly contract. However, Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she was still a
lessee.
In a Decision dated 5 May 2008, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents.
The RTC ruled that, in the complaint, respondents prayed for the recovery of possession of
the leased property as owners. Thus, the issue of ownership, which was within the original
jurisdiction of the court was primordial and the prayer for eviction was merely incidental
there being no written contract of lease between the parties.
Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Tagalog
then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the case for failure of
Page 821 of 1553

Tagalog to file the required brief within the extended period requested. Tagalog filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.
Ruling:
Petitioner contends that the subject of the action is for unlawful detainer, thus
cognizable by a first level court or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was
filed with the RTC, a second level court, the RTC’s decision should be rendered void for
lack of jurisdiction over the case.
The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the nature of the action

pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. In order to determine whether
the lower court had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of the complaint
filed before it.
In the present case, the complaint was for recovery of possession, preliminary
mandatory injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order with damages and
attorney’s fees. Based on the allegations in respondents’ complaint, it is clear that the case
involves only the issue of physical possession or unlawful detainer as defined in Section 1,13
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In De Leon v. CA, we held that unlawful detainer is the
withholding by a person from another of the possession of a land or building to which the
latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession
by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to
recover not possession de jure but physical possession only or possession de facto, where
dispossession has lasted for not more than one year.
The right to recover possession of the land based on the expiration of the verbal
monthly contract of lease is governed by Article 168715 of the Civil Code. Since the lease is
paid monthly under a verbal contract of lease without a fixed period, the lease period is
from month to month. Respondents demanded that Tagalog vacate the land sometime
before December 2002, after the termination of the monthly verbal lease contract. They
filed the complaint with the RTC in February 2003. Since the complaint was filed within
one year from the expiration of the right to hold possession, this case is clearly an unlawful
detainer suit within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Page 822 of 1553

The conclusion would be different if the action is for the recovery of the right to
possess and dispossession lasted for more than one year which would justify resort to the
remedy of accion publiciana. Accion publiciana is the plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of the land independently of the
title and is filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the land. In such case, the RTC has
jurisdiction.
However, in this case, the unlawful withholding of possession of the land before the
filing of the complaint with the RTC lasted only for more or less three months. Also, neither
of the parties brought forth the issue of ownership which was the reason given by the RTC
for taking cognizance of the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment,
order or resolution issued without it is void and cannot be given any effect. This rule applies
even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final
judgment. In this case, Tagalog raised the issue of jurisdiction in her Answer.
Clearly, the RTC erred in not dismissing the case before it. Under the Rules of Court,
it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In sum, since respondents’ complaint should have been filed with the MTC, the RTC
seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It then follows that the appeal brought
before the appellate court, as well as the decisions or resolutions promulgated in
accordance with said appeal, is without force and effect.
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA and REMEDIOS VELASCO vs. WATERFIELDS

INDUSTRIES CORPORATION
G.R. No.177484, July 18, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment
of rent. It therefore follows that the cause of action for unlawful detainer must necessarily
arise before the termination of the contract and not the other way around.
Facts:
The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a parcel of land which they leased to
Waterfields for 25 years from May 16, 1994 to May 15, 2019. A deposit in the amount of 216,
000 was also made to answer for any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility
charges.
Page 823 of 1553

Beginning April 1997, however, Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental. Hence,
the defendant’s officer sent the spouses Manzanilla a letter dated July 7, 1997 which
mentioned that the deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the
payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other incidental expenses only and applied at the
termination of the lease. This letter thus amended the contract of lease.
The spouses filed an ejectment case against Waterfields with the MTC. MTC ruled
in their favour. RTC affirmed. However, CA reversed the ruling of the inferior courts when
it ratiocinated that the spouses terminated the contract of lease and upon such
termination, the rental deposit should have been applied as payment for unpaid utilities
and other incidental expenses. Since the spouses Manzanilla did not allege that there were
unpaid utilities or incidental expenses for the account of Waterfields as of the termination
of the contract, the whole amount of P216,000.00 should have been returned by the former
to the latter when the contract was terminated. Not having done so, the spouses Manzanilla
therefore, became debtors of Waterfields insofar as the said amount is concerned. And
since Waterfields is also a debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid
rentals, compensation should take place.
The CA thereafter concluded that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action
against Waterfields.
Issues:
1. Do the spouses have cause of action against Waterfields?

2. Would there be unjust enrichment if Waterfields would hand over the subject
premises?
Ruling:
1. Yes.
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur:
(1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2)
there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate. Here, there is no issue with
respect to demand. What is in question is the presence of a cause of action. As mentioned
above, courts, in order to ascertain whether there is cause of action for unlawful detainer,
must inquire into (a) the existence of the lease contract and, (b) the violation of that lease
by the lessee. Since in this case the existence of a lease contract between the parties is
Page 824 of 1553

undisputed, the focus is on the supposed violation of the lease, that is, Waterfields’ alleged
non-payment of rent.
First, the CA should not have immediately assumed as true the spouses Manzanilla’s
allegation that the contract was already terminated. Aside from the fact that this
termination was specifically denied by Waterfields in its Answer, it is settled that a mere
assumption cannot be made the basis of a decision in a case or in granting relief. A
judgment must always be based on the court’s factual findings.
Second, it must be stressed that in this case, the violation of the lease through non-
payment of rent is what constitutes the cause of action. Hence, once the failure to pay rent
is established, a cause of action for unlawful detainer arises. The CA should have therefore
limited itself to the determination of whether Waterfields failed to pay rents for the months
of December 1997 to May 1998 as complained of by the spouses Manzanilla. Upon coming
up with ananswer to this, the CA should have stopped there since at that point, it can
already conclude whether there exists a cause of action for unlawful detainer, which as
mentioned is the only contentious issue involved in this case. The problem, however, is
that the CA acted on its mistaken notion as to when a cause of action arises. It did not base
its determination of the existence of the cause of action from the fact that Waterfields failed
to pay rents from December 1997 to May 1998. To it, the cause of action in this case only
arose after the contract was terminated and the rental deposit was found sufficient to cover
the unpaid rentals. This is erroneous since as already discussed, it is the failure to pay rent
which gives rise to the cause of action. Prescinding from this, the CA’s acknowledgement
that Waterfields failed to pay rent, as shown by its declaration that the latter is the debtor
of the spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals, is clearly inconsistent with
the conclusion that no cause of action for ejectment exists against Waterfields.
Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment
of rent. It therefore follows that the cause of action for unlawful detainer in this case must
necessarily arise before the termination of the contract and not the other way around as
what the CA supposed. Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the contract, the CA
went a bit too far in its resolution of this case.
2. No.
"The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the
expense of another." It does not, however, apply in this case since any benefit that the
spouses Manzanilla may obtain from the subject premises cannot be said to be without any
valid basis or justification. It is well to remind Waterfields that they violated the contract
Page 825 of 1553

of lease and that they failed to vacate the premises upon demand. Hence, the spouses
Manzanilla are justified in recovering the physical possession thereof and consequently, in
making use of the property. Besides, in violating the lease by failing to pay the rent,
Waterfields took the risk of losing the improvements it introduced thereon in favor of the
spouses Manzanilla. This is because despite the fact that the lease contract provides that in
case of termination of the lease agreement all permanent improvements and structures
found in the subject premises shall belong to the lessors, it still violated the lease.
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND

LUIS MANALANG vs. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI
A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an

ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the
expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only
because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which
between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
Facts:
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M.

Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No 4236 with
an area of 914 square meters of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents’ Lot No. 4235
covered by OCT No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation and
verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the
respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. A
preliminary relocation survey conducted by the Lands Management Section of DENR
confirmed the result on the encroachment. Respondents refused to vacate the encroached
portion, hence petitioners commenced an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC of
Guagua (Civil Case No. 3309).
The MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of jurisdiction based on its finding
that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute that should be properly resolved
Page 826 of 1553

in an accion reivindicatoria. On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC, and remanded
the case for further proceedings, holding that because there was an apparent withholding
of possession of the property and the action was brought within one year from such
withholding of possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. Upon remand, the MTC ultimately dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim for lack of merit ruling that the petitioners failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence showing that the respondents had encroached on their property and
had been occupying and possessing property outside the metes and bounds.
Petitioners again appealed to the RTC. The RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct
a relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the
testimony of the surveyor. The RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set
aside the MTC’s decision, observing that the respondents had encroached on the
petitioners’ property based on the court-ordered relocation survey, the reports by Engr.
Limpin, and his testimony; that the respondents could not rely on their OCT No. N-216701,
considering that although their title covered only 481 square meters, the relocation survey
revealed that they had occupied also 560 square meters of the petitioners’ Lot No. 4236. On
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of MTC. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal will prosper.
Ruling:
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not
conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides: The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record
of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as
may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the
RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification
survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for
its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by
the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s
testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.
Page 827 of 1553

The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary

action like accion reivindicatoria. The CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be
resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary
dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed
by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are
limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of
his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s
possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration
or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant
is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and
the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
The Court ruled that the dismissal of MTC of the action because it did not have
jurisdiction over the case is correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action
and the court that has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an
action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. To vest in the MTC the
jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the respondents as the occupants in
unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly
showing the attributes of unlawful detainer. However, the allegations of the petitioners’
complaint did not show that they had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion
of their property by the respondents; or how the respondents’ entry had been effected, or
how and when the dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the petitioners
alleged was the respondents’ “illegal use and occupation” of the property. As such, the
action was not unlawful detainer.
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
EMMANUEL M. OLORES
vs. MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE AND/OR TERESITA O. TURLA
G.R. NO. 201663, MARCH 31, 2014
J. PERALTA
The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
filing of a petition for certiorari is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office
an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the
courts of justice can be had. In the instant case, the NLRC had all the opportunity to review
Page 828 of 1553
its ruling and correct itself. Hence, the CA erred in dismissing the Rule 65 petition filed by
Olores.
Facts:
Respondent is a private higher educational institution. Petitioner was hired as a part-time

faculty of respondent on 07 November 2005. From 03 November 2008, petitioner signed
fixed term employment contracts, this time as a full- time instructor.
Petitioner submitted the final grades of his students to Bernardo, the chair of the
Humanities Area. On 13 April 2010, Bernardo charged petitioner with gross misconduct and
gross inefficiency in the performance of duty. Petitioner was accused of employing a
grading system not in accordance with the system.
Meanwhile, summer classes started on 15 April 2010 without [petitioner] having signed an
employment contract.
Acting on the report of Bernardo, respondent created the Manila Doctors Tribunal (MDT)
which was tasked to ascertain the truth. The MDT sent notices of hearing to petitioner. On
31 May 2010, the MDT submitted its recommendation to the president of respondent. The
culpability of [petitioner] was established, hence, dismissal was recommended. On 07 June
2010, respondent terminated the services of [petitioner] for grave misconduct and gross
inefficiency and incompetence.
Aggrieved by the decision of respondent, [petitioner] filed a case for: a) illegal dismissal. In
a Decision4 dated December 8, 2010, the Labor Arbiter found merit in petitioner’s charge
for illegal dismissal. However, it dismissed petitioner’s claim for regularization. The NLRC
reversed the LA’s ruling. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s Rule 65 petition.
Ruling:
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be

perfected only upon the posting of a cash bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
Page 829 of 1553

dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall

immediately be executory, even pending appeal.
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving

monetary awards from the decisions of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly intended
to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer as
inferred from the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected “only upon
the posting of a employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.
Here, it is undisputed that respondent’s appeal was not accompanied by any appeal bond
despite the clear monetary obligation to pay petitioner his separation pay in the amount of
P100,000.00. Since the posting of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is both mandatory
and jurisdictional, the decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be appealed before the NLRC
had already become final and executory. Therefore, the NLRC had no authority to entertain
the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Nevertheless, assuming that the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant
case, this Court would still be inclined to favor petitioner because the instant case falls
under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule that a motion for reconsideration is
necessary prior to the filing of a certiorari petition.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the
special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct
its error, if any. The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an
indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
However, said rule is subject to several recognized exceptions: (a) Where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) Where the questions raised
in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) Where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) Where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
Page 830 of 1553

petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.
In the instant case, the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself.
The NLRC issued a ruling on February 10, 2011 in favor of petitioner dismissing respondent’s
appeal on the ground that the latter failed to file an appeal bond. However, upon a motion
for reconsideration filed by respondent, the NLRC completely reversed itself and set aside
its earlier resolution dismissing the appeal. The NLRC had more than enough opportunity
to pass upon the issues raised by both parties on appeal of the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration of its resolution disposing the appeal. Thus,
another motion for reconsideration would have been useless under the circumstances since
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed
upon by the NLRC.
All told, the petition is meritorious. However, since this Court is not a trier of facts, we
cannot rule on the substantive issue of the case, i.e., whether petitioner has attained regular
status, inasmuch as the CA has not yet passed upon the factual issues raised by the parties.
BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, ET AL.

vs. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., ET AL.
G.R. NO. 174758, MARCH 26, 2014
J. MENDOZA
The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the
school to demand their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a contumacious
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A
conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause
injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary, SLU was well within its rights
to appeal the decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez group.
Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of
motions as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the
hearing on their “Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt” just one day after
they filed the said pleading. As a rule, any motion that does not comply with the requirements
of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance,
subject only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the rule will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice or if there was substantial compliance.
Page 831 of 1553

Facts:
SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City. While the members of the Olairez
group were fourth-year graduating students of SLU’s College of Medicine who filed a
Complaint for Mandatory Injunction against Dean Dacanay and other individuals
challenging the implementation of the revised version of the Comprehensive Oral and
Written Examination, a prerequisite for graduation from SLU’s medicine course. The RTC
granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
In their Fourth Amended Complaint, the Olairez group disclosed that while they were
allowed to march and attend the commencement exercises, Dean Dacanay refused to issue
certifications of graduation in their favor.
Thus, the Olairez group prayed that Dean Dacanay and SLU be ordered to forward their
final grades to the Registrar’s Office for recording; to issue their clearances, certificate of
graduation, diploma and include them in the SLU Registry of Graduates; to cease and desist
from exerting pressure on the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges to recall their
certifications granting their internship and on Baguio General Hospital to pull them out
from their internship; to declare the Revised COWE as moot and academic insofar as they
were concerned; and to pay them damages. On July 16, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the Olairez group as graduates of the College of Medicine, SLU.
However, SLU did not comply with the order of the RTC. Hence, the Olairez group filed a
“Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in Contempt,” which was granted by the RTC. The
RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and likewise found SLU guilty of indirect
contempt.
Meanwhile, SLU appealed the order of the RTC finding it guilty of indirect contempt before
the CA. The CA reversed the order of the RTC. Thus, the Olairez group filed a petition
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the CA erred in finding that the three-day notice rule was violated
Held:
1. On CA’s dismissal of the petition
Page 832 of 1553

The Olairez group argues that the CA erred in ruling that SLU and its officials were denied
of due process as they were not given the opportunity to comment and be heard on the
contempt charges against them.
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any
abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person
or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by
him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings. (3a)
In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of
it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or
does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting
in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in
some instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be
condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good
faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as
to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and for an illegitimate
or improper purpose.
Page 833 of 1553

The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the school
on July 17, 2003 to demand their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a
contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a
judgment. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate
intent to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary, SLU was well
within its rights to appeal the decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez
group.
2. On the petitioner’s violation of the three-day notice rule
Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of
motions as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the
hearing on their “Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt” on July 18, 2003 or
just one day after they filed the said pleading on July 17, 2003. As a rule, any motion that
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if
filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, subject only to some exceptions, such as where
a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice or if
there was substantial compliance.
Under the attendant circumstances, there was no substantial compliance with procedural due
process because although the hearing on the said motion was reset to July 22, 2003, the disputed
writ of execution was actually issued on July 18, 2003 and served on SLU and its officials on July 19,
2003 before the rescheduled hearing date. while their counsels on record received their copies on
July 21, 2003. In due process, the parameter required is the presence of an opportunity to be heard,
as well as the time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
which it is based. This was not properly afforded to SLU.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC.

vs. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO)
G.R. No. 180962, February 26, 2014
J. Del Castillo
While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari
inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible
representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. Unless it is filed, there
could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would be unavailing. Simply
put, regardless of the proscription against the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same
may be filed on the assumption that rectification of the decision or order must be obtained,
and before a petition for certiorari may be instituted.
Page 834 of 1553
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks a review and setting aside of the September 20,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100324, as well as its
December 14, 2007 Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On the ground that it was suffering business losses, petitioner Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc., a local land transportation company engaged in the business of carrying
passengers and freight, retrenched 21 of its employees. Consequently, the company union,
PWU-AGLU, filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment,
claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices.
Unable to settle their differences at the scheduled preliminary conference, the case was
thereafter referred to the Secretary of Labor.
Acting DOLE Cruz issued a ordering Philtranco to reinstate to their former positions,
without loss of seniority rights, the illegally terminated 17 "union officers", x x x, and pay
them backwages from the time of termination until their actual or payroll reinstatement,
provided in the computation of backwages among the seventeen (17) who had received
their separation pay should deduct the payments made to them from the backwages due
them.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent, on the other hand,
submitted a "Partial Appeal." The Secretary of Labor declined to rule on petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration and private respondent’s "Partial Appeal", citing a DOLE Regulation
which provided that voluntary arbitrators’ decisions, orders, resolutions or awards shall not
be the subject of motions for reconsideration.
The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Philtranco, holding
that, in assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a petition
for review under Rule 43 thereof, which properly covers decisions of voluntary labor
arbitrators. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether Philtranco availed of the proper remedy in this case
2. Whether the petition was filed on time
Held:
Page 835 of 1553

The petition is granted
On whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 5 is proper
It cannot be said that in taking cognizance of NCMB-NCR CASE No. NS-02-028-07, the
Secretary of Labor did so in a limited capacity, i.e., as a voluntary arbitrator. The fact is
undeniable that by referring the case to the Secretary of Labor, Conciliator-Mediator
Aglibut conceded that the case fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code;
the impending strike in Philtranco, a public transportation company whose business is
imbued with public interest, required that the Secretary of Labor assume jurisdiction over
the case, which he in fact did. By assuming jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of
Article 263 became applicable, any representation to the contrary or that he is deciding the
case in his capacity as a voluntary arbitrator notwithstanding.
It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of
the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for
any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. There is no distinction: when
the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an industry indispensable
to national interest, "he exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a solution to the
parties’ dispute. "The authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national
interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The
power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently
dispose of the primary dispute." This wide latitude of discretion given to the Secretary of
Labor may not be the subject of appeal.
Accordingly, the Secretary of Labor’s Decision in Case No. OS-VA-2007-008 is a proper

subject of certiorari. It is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 against the decisions of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the
Labor Code and its implementing and related rules be filed initially in the Court of Appeals.
Paramount consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of the courts,
emphasized in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of
a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction."
On the question of whether the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed
The Court agrees with petitioner’s submission. Rule 65 states that where a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
Page 836 of 1553

petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion. This can only mean that even though a motion for reconsideration is not required
or even prohibited by the concerned government office, and the petitioner files the motion
just the same, the 60-day period shall nonetheless be counted from notice of the denial of
the motion. The very nature of certiorari – which is an extraordinary remedy resorted to
only in the absence of plain, available, speedy and adequate remedies in the course of law
– requires that the office issuing the decision or order be given the opportunity to correct
itself. Quite evidently, this opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for
reconsideration has been filed. This is precisely what the Court said in the ABS-CBN Union
Members case, whose essence continues to this day. Thus:
Section 8, Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides:
"The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal from
receipt of the records of the case. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and
inappealable." x x x
The aforecited provision cannot be construed to mean that the Decision of the public
respondent cannot be reconsidered since the same is reviewable by writ of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, the law requires a motion for reconsideration to
enable the public respondent to correct his mistakes, if any. In Pearl S. Buck Foundation,
Inc., vs. NLRC, this Court held:
"Hence, the only way by which a labor case may reach the Supreme Court is through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Such petition may be filed within a reasonable
time from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
decision." x x x
Clearly, before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed
of, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to afford an
opportunity for the correction of the error or mistake complained of.
So also, considering that a decision of the Secretary of Labor is subject to judicial review
only through a special civil action of certiorari and, as a rule, cannot be resorted to without
the aggrieved party having exhausted administrative remedies through a motion for
reconsideration, the aggrieved party, must be allowed to move for a reconsideration of the
same so that he can bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner received a copy of the Acting Secretary of Labor’s Decision on June 14, 2007. It
timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25, which was a Monday, or the first
working day following the last day (Sunday, June 24) for filing the motion. But for lack of
Page 837 of 1553
procedural basis, the same was effectively denied by the Secretary of Labor via his August
15, 2007 Order which petitioner received on August 17. It then filed the Petition for
Certiorari on August 29, or well within the fresh 60-day period allowed by the Rules from
August 17. Given these facts, the Court finds that the Petition was timely filed.
THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO

G.R. NO. 175723 , FEBRUARY 4, 2014
J. PERALTA
a. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order
as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in
the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
A perusal of RA 9282 amending RA 1125 would show that, while it is clearly stated that
the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs
in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the
amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
b. The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise
of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and
cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
On the strength of the constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is
vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Facts:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, assessed taxes against private respondents
SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace
Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines
Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly
due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code
Page 838 of 1553
of Manila, said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to
collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a
precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were
constrained to pay assessment under protest. However, private respondents filed a
complaint denominated for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended
pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.
RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction causing
petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the RTC orders,
but the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction
over the said petition, since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals.
Issue:
a. Whether Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.

b. Whether the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
Ruling:
a. Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA
which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for
reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the
CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled
that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over
the original case.
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Page 839 of 1553

Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a
petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within
the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when
errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules. Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error
of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the
Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition
for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
b. A perusal of the above provisions (RA 9282 amending RA 1125) would show that, while it
is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under
RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax
cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise
of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law
and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the cases
of Pimentel v. COMELEC, Garcia v. De Jesus, Veloria v. COMELEC, Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has ruled
against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground
that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. It must be observed,
however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, these rulings pertain not to
regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the
Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 now provides that the special criminal court has
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of BP 129
gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to
Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
Page 840 of 1553

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect
to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the
power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing
an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it
must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
considered as partial, not total.
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA
and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
THE NAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 191215, FEBRUARY 3, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
A petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment
or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion
for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule
65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding 15 days.
Page 841 of 1553

However, there are exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, such
as (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules. However, the counting 60 days from private respondent’s
counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent
had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6,
2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed
only on September 8, 2009, which date is beyond the expiration of the period sought to be
extended.
Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint for death benefits unpaid salaries, sickness allowance,
refund of medical expenses against petitioner, alleging that she is the widow of Guillermo
Mendigorin who was employed by petitioner and died of colon cancer during term of
employment contract. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favour of private
respondent, which the NLRC reversed. Private respondent moved for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit. Later, she received NLRC’s resolution and 62 days
thereafter, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari before the CA
alleging that her counsel was saddled and occupied with equally important cases, thus it
would be impossible for him to file the petition on time. Later, private respondent filed her
Petition for Certiorari before the CA, but the CA noted that private respondent’s Petition
for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in
the interest of substantial justice, the CA entertained the petition and directed private
respondent to cure the technical flaws in her petition.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss private respondent’s
Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an absolutely prohibited
pleading. Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still allowable,
private respondent’s motion for extension is nevertheless a useless piece of paper as it was
Page 842 of 1553

filed beyond the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The CA denied petitioners’
motion and gave private respondent one last opportunity to fully comply with its
Resolution by submitting clear and legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five
days from notice thereof. Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended.
Ruling:
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. we had the occasion to settle the seeming
conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing
a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as
laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari
must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition
for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of
such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under
exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion.
In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension
of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the
intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that ‘no
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions
for extension are allowed, subject to the court’s sound discretion."
Then in Labao v. Flores, we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of
the 60-day period rule, thus:
[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive
and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
Page 843 of 1553
(12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.
In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC
Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her
petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such
pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009. It is
a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before
the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since
there would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will
have become final and executory.
Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant
invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the
rules. Here, the reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy
workload of private respondent’s counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious
reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy
workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to
deviate from the 60-day rule."
Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright.
We do not approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the motion for extension
should have been denied outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition for Certiorari is,
in the words of petitioners, a "mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever."
In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng, which likewise dealt with the late filing of a petition for
certiorari, we recognized that although procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by
courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the
rigid application of the rules of procedure in several cases to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice
would be better served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims of the competing parties and
always be guided by the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the
administration of justice. Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation
Page 844 of 1553
and the parties’ right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal
construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and
equity.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. EMMA MONDEJAR

G.R. NO. 200804, JANUARY 22, 2014
J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the remedy of appeal is
not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party
from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Verily, a petition for
certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction
and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to
establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either
grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely
abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to the controversy.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent an amount representing unpaid
water bills. Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect
payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision; that respondent and
her family were unable to pay their water consumption despite repeated demands. In
defense, respondent claimed that she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat
rate; that notwithstanding their agreement that the rate would be adjusted only upon prior
notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive
adjustments far above the average daily water consumption. In the interim, petitioner
disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water charges. The MTCC
ruled in favour of respondent and disregarded the petitioner’s reliance on the HLURB
decision as the source of petitioner’s authority to impose new rates.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC, to which the
RTC dismissed finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-
appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of
Page 845 of 1553

Procedure on Small Claims Cases. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied,
hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy on small claim cases.
Ruling:
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the
same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The
decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for
civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule,
the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move
for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to
other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved
party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Jaca v.
Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of
certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability
of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party
from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate
remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere
absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ
that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that respondent’s
recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims
cases, because it asks the court to supplant the decision of the lower court with another
decision directing the private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has
been awarded." Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original
action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its
nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors
Page 846 of 1553
tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition
based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the
controversy.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy
of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case,
contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it
instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the
ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be
reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO

G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
a. The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether
the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered.
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid

multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision
on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals
will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and
will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate

special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.
Page 847 of 1553
b. The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate
of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of
the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition)
of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of
what properties should be included in the inventory.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the
estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can
do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator.
Facts:
Emigdio Mercado died intestate and was survived by his second wife, Teresita and their
five children, and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin and
petitioner Thelma.
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime, owned corporate shares
in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. Later, he assigned his real properties in exchange for
corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Cebu to Mervir Realty.
Subsequently, Thelma filed before the RTC a petition for appointment of Teresista as the
administrator of Emigdio’s estate, to which the RTC granted and letters of administration
was issued in favour og Teresita.
Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the approval by the RTC,
indicating therein that at the time of Emigdio’s death, he had left only personal properties.
However, Thelma claimed that Emigdio owned other properties which were excluded from
the inventory, thus, Thelma moved that RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory. The
RTC granted Thelma’s motion and Teresita filed a compliance thereto. Again, Thelma
moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory; that Thelma be
allowed file a formal opposition or comment on the inventory. With this, the RTC the
issued an order expressing the need for parties to present evidence to enable it to resolve
the motion for the approval of the inventory, but Thelma opposed the approval of the
inventory.
After series of hearings, the RTC found that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included. Thereafter, Teresita and the other heirs of
Emigdio sought for reconsideration claiming that one of the real properties affected had
Page 848 of 1553
already been sold to Mervir Realty and that the land covered by deed of assignment had
been registered and in the possession of Mervir Realty. The RTC, however, denied the
motion for reconsideration stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration,
and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties
should be included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them from
questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue. The CA partly granted the petition for
certiorari filed by Teresita, reversing the inclusion of lands but affirmed all other respects,
further explaining that because the order of the RTC directing new inventory was
interlocutory, petition for certiorari was the proper remedy. Also, the CA ruled that RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it directed the inclusion of certain properties in
the inventory notwithstanding that the properties had been transferred by sale or exchange
of corporate shares by decedent during his lifetime.
Issue:
a. Whether special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy.

b. Whether probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted
by the administrator.
Ruling:
a. The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether
the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila–Garrido v.
Tortogo, the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose
of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in
the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment
is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the
subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
Page 849 of 1553
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of
the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him
and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been
rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the
judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the
inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a
final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.
Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then
the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for
a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take
against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings,
stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states
that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary
matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is
expressly made non–appealable.
Page 850 of 1553

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the

possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in
which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the
instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
b. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing
to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission
of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the
administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months
from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase
which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must
be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory,
regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of
the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of
the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution
(partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence,
the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion
on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According
to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the
RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in
the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts
should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown
that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC commits no patently
grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance
of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the
Page 851 of 1553

estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and
the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial
court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said inAgtarap v.
Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases,
a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included
in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
Spouses Emmanuel D. Paquiao and Jinkee J. Paquiao vs. The Court of Tax
Appeals (1st Division) and the Commission of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 213394, April 6, 2016
Page 852 of 1553

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioner spouses Pacquiao to set aside and annul the Resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) which granted the petitioners' Urgent Motion to Lift Warrants of Distraint
& Levy and Garnishment and for the Issuance of an Order to Suspend the Collection of Tax
(with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order [Urgent Motion], but
required them, as a condition, to deposit a cash bond in the amount of P3,298,514,894.35
or post a bond of P4,947,772,341.53.
It arose from a Letter of Authority issued to petitioner in 2010 for the examination
of his books of accounts and other accounting records for various tax periods. After
conducting its own investigation, the CIR made its initial assessment finding that the
petitioners were unable to fully settle their tax liabilities. The CIR issued the Preliminary
Assessment Notice (PAN), informing the petitioners that based on third-party information
allowed under Section 5(B)24 and 6 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), they
found the petitioners liable not only for deficiency income taxes in the amount of
P714,061,116.30 for 2008 and P1,446,245,864.33 for 2009, but also for their non-payment of
their VAT liabilities in the amount P4,104,360.01 for 2008 and P 24,901,276.77 for 2009. The
petitioners filed their protest against the PAN. After denying the protest, the BIR issued its
Formal Letter Demand. Aggrieved that they were being made liable for deficiency income
taxes for the years 2008 and 2009, the petitioners sought redress and filed a petition for
review with the CTA. Before the CTA, the petitioners contended that the assessment of the
CIR was defective because it was predicated on its mere allegation that they were guilty of
fraud.
Issues:
(1) Whether the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to issue injunctive writs
to restrain the collection of tax
Ruling:
No, the CTA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to issue injunctive
writs to restrain the collection of tax.
1. CTA has ample authority to issue injunctive writs to restrain the collection of tax and to
even dispense with the deposit of the amount claimed or the filing of the required bond,
Page 853 of 1553
whenever the method employed by the CIR in the collection of tax jeopardizes the interests
of a taxpayer for being patently in violation of the law. Such authority emanates from the
jurisdiction conferred to it by R.A. No. 1125, wherein the authority of the courts to issue
injunctive writs to restrain the collection of tax and to dispense with the deposit of the
amount claimed or the filing of the required bond is not simply confined to cases where
prescription has set in. As explained by the Court in those cases, whenever it is determined
by the courts that the method employed by the Collector of Internal Revenue in the
collection of tax is not sanctioned by law, the bond requirement under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 1125 should be dispensed with. The purpose of the rule is not only to prevent
jeopardizing the interest of the taxpayer, but more importantly, to prevent the absurd
situation wherein the court would declare “that the collection by the summary methods of
distraint and levy was violative of law, and then, in the same breath require the petitioner
to deposit or file a bond as a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of injunction.”
However, the Court finds no sufficient basis in the records for the Court to
determine whether the dispensation of the required cash deposit or bond provided under
Section 11, R.A No. 1125 is appropriate. The case should therefore be remanded to the CTA
for further proceedings to determine whether any of the exceptions under RA No. 1125
apply.
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs. CARDLINE INC., et. al.
The special civil action of prohibition is an available remedy against a tribunal

exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers if it acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The respondents filed a special civil action for prohibition before the CA
without first filing a motion to stay or quash the writ of execution before the RTC. Hence, the
petition for prohibition obviously lacked the requirement that no "other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the petition should have been dismissed.
The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or at least such parties
representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the latter
founded on the same facts; (iii) any judgment rendered in one action will amount to res
judicata in the other action.
Page 854 of 1553

FACTS:
Orix filed a complaint for replevin, sum of money, and damages with an application
for a writ of seizure against respondents. The RTC rendered judgment in Orix’s favor. The
CA and subsequently the Supreme Court denied the respondents’ appeal and affirmed the
RTC judgment. The Supreme Court’s denial of the appeal in G.R. No. 189877 became final
and executory.
Respondent Ng Beng Sheng filed a petition for annulment of judgment. He argued

that the RTC had no jurisdiction over his person since the summons was not properly
served on him. The CA denied the petition on the grounds of forum shopping and res
judicata. The CA explained that this issue had already been addressed by the RTC and by
the CA and the Supreme Court on appeal.
In the main case, Orix filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which
the RTC granted in its December 1, 2010 order. Thereafter, respondents filed before the
CA a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the issuance
of the December 1, 2010 order. The CA granted the petition, annulled the RTC’s order dated
December 1, 2010, and prohibited the sheriff from executing the judgment. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
NO. The RTC’s May 6, 2008 judgment has attained finality and can no longer be
altered. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of
the decision. Thus, the RTC issued the December 1, 2010 order of execution. An order of
execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end.
As a rule, parties are not allowed to object to the execution of a final judgment. One
exception is when the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room
for its interpretation. If the exception applies, the respondents may seek the stay of
execution or the quashal of the writ of execution. Although an order of execution is not
appealable, an aggrieved party may challenge the order of execution via an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The special civil action of
Page 855 of 1553

prohibition is an available remedy against a tribunal exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or

ministerial powers if it acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the present case, the respondents effectively argued that the terms of the RTC’s
May 6, 2008 judgment are not clear enough such that the parties’ agreement must be
examined to arrive at the proper interpretation. The respondents, however, did not give
the RTC an opportunity to clarify its judgment. The respondents filed a special civil action
for prohibition before the CA without first filing a motion to stay or quash the writ of
execution before the RTC. Hence, the petition for prohibition obviously lacked the
requirement that no "other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the
petition should have been dismissed.
However, the CA gave due course to the petition. In granting the petition, the CA
ruled that the judgment had been satisfied; thus, there was no more judgment to execute.
To stress, the CA erred in granting the petition despite the availability of a "plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy."
2. Whether respondents committed forum shopping.
NO. Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules prohibits forum shopping. The rule against forum
shopping seeks to address the great evil of two competent tribunals rendering two separate
and contradictory decisions. Forum shopping exists when a party initiates two or more
actions, other than appeal or certiorari, grounded on the same cause to obtain a more
favorable decision from any tribunal.
In the present case, the CA correctly denied Ng Beng Sheng’s petition for annulment
of judgment and correctly reasoned out that the issue on jurisdiction had been resolved
with finality in the review on certiorari. Thus, the issue could no longer be re-litigated. After
the denial of the petition for annulment of judgment, Ng Beng Shen joined the other
respondents in filing a petition for prohibition.
Page 856 of 1553

The recourse to the petition for prohibition did not amount to forum shopping.
The two cases filed collectively by the respondents are similar only in that they
involve the same parties. The cases, however, involve different causes of actions. The
petition for review on certiorari was filed to review the merits of the RTC's judgment. On
the other hand, the petition for prohibition respects the finality of the RTC's judgment on
the merits but interprets the dispositive portion in a way that would render the execution
unnecessary. Thus, the elements of forum shopping are not present in the two cases.
With respect to Ng Beng Sheng's petition for annulment of judgment, the CA has
already ruled that the filing of the petition constituted forum shopping, specifically due to
the jurisdictional issue raised. The petition for prohibition, however, involves a different
cause of action. Thus, there is no forum shopping.
NIGHTOWL WATCHMAN & SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. NESTOR LUMAHAN

In the case before us, the CA clearly ignored certain compelling facts and misread the
evidence on record by relying on the LA’s erroneous appreciation of facts. The NLRC acted
well within its jurisdiction in finding that Lumahan had not been dismissed. Otherwise stated,
by reversing the ruling that there was no dismissal to speak of, the CA committed a reversible
error in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
FACTS:
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. (Nightowl) hired Nestor Lumahan as a
security guard. The latter’s last assignment was at the Steelworld Manufacturing
Corporation (Steelworld). Lumahan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with other
prayers against Nightowl before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Lumahan admitted in his pleadings
that he did not report to work for a time because he had to go to Iloilo to attend to his
dying grandfather. Steelworld permitted him to do so but Nightowl refused. The LA
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lumahan abandoned his work. When the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case to another LA, the latter
decided in Lumahan’s favor. On appeal to the NLRC, Lumahan’s complaint was dismissed.
The CA ruled in favor of Lumahan, opining that Nightowl failed to discharge its burden of
proving that Lumahan unjustly refused to return to work.
Page 857 of 1553

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling on the course.
RULING:
No. It should be remembered that in cases before administrative and quasi-judicial

agencies like the NLRC, the degree of evidence required to be met is substantial evidence
or such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. In a situation where the word of another party is taken against the
other, as in this case, we must rely on substantial evidence because a party alleging a critical
fact must duly substantiate and support its allegation.We agree with the NLRC that
Lumahan stopped reporting for work and never returned, as Nightowl sufficiently
supported this position with documentary evidence. In contrast, Lumahan failed to refute,
with supporting evidence, Nightowl's contention that he did not report for work on April
22, 1999, and failed as well to prove that he continued working from such date to May 15,
1999. What the Court can only gather from his claim was that he did not work from May
16, 1999 to June 8, 1999; but this was after the substantially proven fact that he had already
stopped working on April 22, 1999. In addition, we find that Lumahan failed to substantiate
his claim that he was constructively dismissed when Nightowl allegedly refused to accept
him back when he allegedly reported for work from April 22, 1999 to June 9, 1999. In short,
Lumahan did not present any evidence to prove that he had, in fact, reported back to work.
In fact, as pointed out by the NLRC, Lumahan was not even sure of the actual date of his
alleged dismissal. Note the following in this respect: he initially indicated in his complaint
that he was dismissed in May 1999. Then, in his amended complaint, he changed the date
from May 1999 to June 1999. However, in his position paper, he claimed that he was made
to wait for six (6) months until he was finally told in December 1999 to look for another
job. Thus, the NLRC concluded, because of Lumahan's uncertainty, that he had not been
actually dismissed.
CENTRAL BICOL STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, REPRESENTED BY ITS

PRESIDENT, ATTY. MARIO T. BERNALES v. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR,
REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. AND
GAWAD KALINGA FOUNDATION, INC. REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, JOSE LUIS OQUINENA, AND ITS CAMARINES SUR CHAPTER HEAD,
HARRY AZANA
Page 858 of 1553

G.R. No. 210861, July 29, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days
from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in
accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Under exceptional cases,
however, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion.
Facts:
Central Bicol State University Agriculture (CBSUA), established under BP 198, was
declaredto be the owner of all parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the
same. However, armed personnel were deployed by the Province of Camarines Sur who
forcibly entered a lot occupied by CBSUA and destroyed the structures erected thereon.
CBSUA then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership with prayer for the issuance of
TRO and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the RTC denied CBSUA’s
application. CBSUA then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. A copy of such
order was received by the CBSUA on October 17, 2011, which gave it 60 days or until
December 16, 2011 within which to assail the RTC’s orders via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Unfortunately, due to time constraints in
securing certified true copies of the RTC’s orders and other pertinent documents, the OSG,
prosecuting the case on behalf of CBSUA, sought an additional period of 10 days from
December 16, 2011 or until December 26, 2011 within which to file its petition for certiorari.
Hence, on December 26, 2011, CBSUA filed its petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA
denied CBSUA’s motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari, pursuant to Sec.
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which no longer allows
extensions to file petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not under the extensions for the filing of petitions for certiorari have been
completely disallowed under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Sec. 4, Rule 65.
Ruling:
NO. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in
accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision
Page 859 of 1553

for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the
previous Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but
only for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days. However, under exceptional
cases, the Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s
sound discretion. In this case, the RTC itself recognized the existence of a law which
mandated the transfer of ownership over the lot to CBSUA. Were it not for the latter’s
failure to have effected the registration of the certificate of title under its name, then there
appears to be no standing objection against the enforcement of the law. In addition, records
show that CBSUA has, all the while, been in possession of the subject land. Thus, it would
serve the interest of substantial justice for the CA to rule upon the merits of this case rather
than dismiss the petition before it on a mere procedural technicality.
ONE SHIPPING CORP., and/or ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN v.

IMELDA C. PENAFIEL
GR. No. 192406, January 21, 2015, PERALTA, J.
If the mode of appeal is that of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, its
reglementary period must be the one followed.
Facts:
Petitioner One Shipping Corp. hired the late Ildefonso S. Peñafiel as Second Engineer on
board the vessel MV/ACX Magnolia. Peñafiel boarded the vessel on August 29, 2004 and
died on July 2, 2005. His wife then filed for monetary claims arising from his death.
Petitioners admitted that they contracted the services of the late Ildefonso, to work on
board MV/ ACX Magnolia for a period of twelve (12) months. However, they denied any
liability for the claims of the respondent and maintained that at the time Ildefonso died on
July 2, 2005, the latter was no longer an employee of the petitioners as he voluntarily
terminated his employment contract with the petitioners when, on April 9, 2005, Ildefonso
requested for a leave and pre-terminated his contract.
The LA, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Thus, respondent filed her appeal with
the NLRC in which the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Undaunted,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
the CA. The CA granted her petition. Petitioners claimed CA has no jurisdiction over the
present case because the Resolutions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have become final
Page 860 of 1553

and executory and that both resolutions have become final and executory as early as June
16, 2008, before respondent filed her petition for certiorari with the CA on June 25, 2008.
Issue:
Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over the petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling:
YES. Basically, this Court, in the above cited case ruled as to the proper court within which
to file a remedy from the decisions of the NLRC. Based on the records, since the petition of
herein respondent was filed before the expiration of the period within which to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the CA, therefore, committed no error in not
dismissing and eventually deciding the case.
DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, ET. AL V. FBLINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari,
because one of the requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no
appeal.
Facts:
De Guzman, et. al were co-owners in fee simple of a parcel of land. One of its adjoining
properties is Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A, a subdivision owned and developed
by respondent Filinvest Development Corporation which, coming from petitioners'
property, has a potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such,
petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent before the
RTC, which rendered a decision granting petitioners the right of way. Upon respondent's
appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners' entitlement to legal easement of right of way. As none
of the parties appealed the said CA Decision, the same became final and executory. In
resolving as to what property it covers, the RTC deduced that the right of way granted
pertains only to Road Lot 15. The CA agreed with respondent and granted the appeal.
Hence, the petition. The Petition is denominated as a petition for certiorari. However,
under the subheading "IV. BRIEF STATEMENT OF MATTERS INVOLVED" of the Petition.
Page 861 of 1553

Yet, in petitioners' Prefatory Statement, they anchor their Petition on the alleged grave
abuse of discretion committed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper remedy in the case herein.
Ruling:
NO. Sifting through the issues and other matters raised in the present petition, it becomes
apparent that the crucial question calling for this Court's Resolution pertains to the CA's
appreciation of the issue and evidence presented by the parties, and not the alleged grave
abuse of discretion committed by the appellate court in rendering its Decision. Therefore,
the issue in the present controversy clearly falls under the classification of errors of fact and
law - questions which may be passed upon by this Court only via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Albeit it must be made clear that questions of fact may only be
reviewed by this Court under exceptional circumstances like when the findings of facts of
the CA are at variance with those of the trial court, as in this case.
EDGAR C. NUQUE v.FIDEL AQUINO and SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and ERLINDA

BABINA
G.R. No. 193058, July 8, 2015, Peralta, J.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or
resolution is appeal.
Facts:
Edgar Nuque is the owner of the subject parcels of land, which he acquired in a public
auction sale in Tarlac. The subject properties were originally owned by one Hospicia
Cardona. Nuque later discovered that Fidel Aquino was able to obtain a free patent over
the subject lands when the subject lots were already owned by Cardona. Nonetheless,
Aquino was able to sell the subject properties to the spouses Alejandro and Erlinda Babina,
who were able to obtain a new title over the subject land. Thus, Nuque filed a Complaint
for cancellation of title damages before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Nuque. The
decision eventually became final and executory. Upon learning that the respondent spouses
were occupying the subject properties, Nuque filed with the RTC an Ex-Parte Motion for
Page 862 of 1553
Writ of Possession. Respondent spouses, on the other hand, filed a motion for
reimbursement of expenses. The RTC denied the motions of petitioner and respondent
spouses.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The CA dismissed petitioner’s certiorari petition on the ground that the
latter failed to move for the reconsideration of the questioned RTC Order before filing his
petition for certiorari. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari for failure of
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration before the filing of subject petition.
Ruling:
YES. At the outset, the Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that the RTC Order
denying his motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is in the nature of a final order,
as it left nothing else to be resolved thereafter. Proceeding from this premise, petitioner’s
proper remedy was, thus, to appeal the RTC Order. It is settled that the proper remedy to
obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This hold
true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because
one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal. Thus, it was
wrong for petitioner to immediately resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when
he could have appealed the assailed RTC Order. While it is true that the availability of an
appeal does not foreclose recourse to a special civil action of certiorari in cases where appeal
is not adequate, equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, petitioner failed to demonstrate
that these instances are present in the instant case.
It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a

matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who
seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense
Page 863 of 1553

with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a
concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do.
BINAN RURAL BANK v. JOSE WILLELMINO G. CARLOS and MARTINA ROSA

MARIA LINA G. CARLOS-TRAN, represented by their attorney-in-fact, ATTY.
EDWIN D. BALLESTEROS
G.R. No. 193919, June 15, 2015, Brion, J.
“Mere error of judgment on the part of the RTC, if any, is insufficient ground to reverse
the CA's dismissal of the petitioner's certiorari petition. As heretofore clarified, a special civil
action for certiorari is for the correction of errors of jurisdiction (where the act complained
of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion), and not errors of judgment; in the latter case, the court may have been legally in
error in its conclusion, but was still acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction.”
Facts:
Jose Willelmino G. Carlos, et.al filed a complaint for reconveyance, annulment of absolute
sale, real estate mortgage, certificate of sale, title, with damages against Binan Rural Bank
(BRB) and its co-defendants before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). BRB moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and that it is not a real pary-in-interest,
but the motion was denied. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail a denial of motion
to dismiss.
Ruling:
NO. We DENY the petition for lack of merit. An order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case; it is interlocutory as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari, as this remedy is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors
Page 864 of 1553
of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal which
is available only after a judgment or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the
denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be justified.
Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that

effectively brings the acting entity outside the exercise of its proper jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted
without jurisdiction.
ROBERTA S. SALDARIEGA v. HON. ELVIRA D.C. PANGANIBAN, PRESIDING

JUDGE, BRANCH 227, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
QUEZON CITY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, 15 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction
over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the
part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the
impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. The term grave
abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because
of passion or hostility. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and
not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed two Informations against Saldariega for violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The hearings were set, however, the
prosecution’s principal witness PO2 Villas, one of the arresting officers, failed to attend the
scheduled hearings. Judge Panganiban issued an Order provisionally dismissing the case
with the express consent of the accused-petitioner. PO2 Villas subsequently filed a Motion
to Re-open the Case against petitioner. The judge granted the motion and ordered the
Page 865 of 1553

reopening of the cases and the continuation of the hearing. Saldariega filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was able to establish that the court acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction
Ruling:
NO. There is no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of certiorari with injunction, as
there was no showing that the alleged error in judgment was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that the issuance of the assailed
orders was patent and gross that would warrant striking it down through a petition for
certiorari . No argument was shown that the trial court exercised its judgment capriciously,
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and hostility.
Francis C. Cervantes vs. City Service Corporation and Valentin Prieto, Jr.
G.R. No. 191616, April 18, 2016
The 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA should be counted
from the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC Decision on November
19, 2009. The NLRC sent the notice of Resolution to petitioner's counsel only on November
19, 2009. Considering that petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on October 7, 2009, the
same was well within the prescribed period to appeal. The petition for certiorari was filed on
time.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal dated December 19, 2007 filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit. Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision, but was denied in a
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. On October 6, 2009,
petitioner, through counsel Atty. Angelito R. Villarin, filed before the CA a Petition
for Certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed Cervantes' petition
for certiorari for having been filed out of time. The appellate court argued that, by
petitioner's admission, his mother received the assailed Resolution of the NLRC denying
his motion for reconsideration on July 30, 2009. Thus, counting sixty (60) days therefrom,
Page 866 of 1553
petitioner had only until September 28, 2009 within which to file the petition. However,
the petition for certiorari was filed only on October 7, 2009, or nine (9) days late.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied in Resolution6 dated March 11, 2010.
Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for certiorari was filed on time
RULING:
The 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA should be counted from
the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC Decision on November 19,
2009. The NLRC sent the notice of Resolution to petitioner's counsel only on November 19,
2009. Considering that petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on October 7, 2009, the
same was well within the prescribed period to appeal. The petition for certiorari was filed
on time.
The rule is – where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of

record, all notices required to be given therein must be given to the attorney of record; and
service of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally
effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary
period for the subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney. Notice
should be made upon the counsel of record at his exact given address, to which notice of
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate
notice to the court of a change of address.
When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be
made upon said attorney; and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel
of record, is not notice in law. The NLRC Rules governing the issuance and service of
notices and resolutions is, likewise, no different.
Republic of the Philippines vs. The Heirs of Spouses Florentino and Pacencia
Molinyawe
G.R. No. 217120, April 18, 2016
FACTS:
Criminal cases for malversation were filed against several accused including Florentino
Molinyawe (Florentino). The Republic meantime filed a forfeiture case pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 against Florentino and the respondents, involving several
Page 867 of 1553

parcels of land. The Republic claimed that Florentino had illegally acquired the said
properties as their values were said to be grossly disproportionate to his declared income..
The CFI-Pasig declared the sale of the subject properties third parties and ordered that the
said properties be forfeited in favor of the Republic. When the judgment attained finality,
a writ of execution was issued.
Many years later, the respondents, as heirs of Florentino, filed a Complaint/Petition praying
for the cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and
77577 and for quieting of title. Meanwhile, the Republic filed a separate action with the
RTC, Branch 138, Makati City for annulment of owner’s duplicate copy of said TCTs and the
issuance of new, which was granted. The owner’s duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129
and 77577 in possession of the respondents were declared null and void. This Decision
became final and executory.
The respondents filed on June 10, 2013, a Motion to Admit Amended and Supplemental
Petition (attaching to it the said Amended and Supplemental Petition), in the case for
cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577,
which the court granted.
ISSUE:
2. Whether RTC-Branch 57 gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the

respondents’ Amended and Supplemental Petition
3. Whether the CA went beyond its jurisdiction under Rule 65 when it stated that the
civil forfeiture case was contingent or dependent on the outcome of a criminal case.
RULING:
1. Yes, RTC-Branch 57 gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the respondents’
Amended and Supplemental Petition. Records further establish that when the
respondents filed their Motion To Admit Amended and Supplemental Petition on
June 10, 2013 before the RTC-Branch 57, a decision had already been rendered by the
RTC-Branch 138 in LRC Case No. M-5469, declaring the owner’s duplicate copies of
TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 in possession of the respondents null and void,
cancelling the same and directing the RD-Makati to issue new owner’s duplicate
copies of said TCTs in the name of the Republic.
It cannot be denied that the forfeiture case involving the subject TCTs was filed
before the CFI-Pasig while the complaint/petition for cancellation of lis pendens
and quieting of title was filed before the RTC-Branch 57. There is likewise no dispute
Page 868 of 1553

that the CFI Pasig tried and decided the forfeiture case. Therefore, it was the CFI-
Pasig that had jurisdiction over the main action or proceeding involving the subject
TCTs, not the RTC-Branch 57. Hence, the RTC-Branch 57 had no jurisdiction over
the respondents’ complaint/petition.
Considering that a judgment in Civil Case No. 6379 had been rendered in favor of
the Republic and said judgment already attained finality, the RTC-Branch 57 could
no longer claim and exercise jurisdiction over the respondents’ original
complaint/petition for cancellation of lis pendens and quieting of title in Civil Case
No. 10-658. It is also to be noted that when the respondents filed their motion to
admit their amended and supplemental petition before RTC-Branch 57, the decision
in LRC Case No. M-5469 rendered by the RTC-Branch 138 had likewise attained
finality.
2. On the CA’s remark that Florentino’s acquittal necessarily rendered the forfeiture of
the properties ineffective and invalid, it clearly was an obiter dictum. Moreover, it
had no substantial or procedural basis. The cases were separate and distinct from
one another. Indeed, there is no law, rule or jurisprudence that mandates the
automatic dismissal of a forfeiture case after an acquittal in the criminal case for
malversation. The CA itself recognized that it had no bearing. In fact, it wrote that
it was not within the thrust of a petition for certiorari. The remedy of the
respondents is to file the necessary motion or action before the court having
jurisdiction over the main case, if still permitted by the rules. It is to be remembered,
however, that prescription and estoppel do not lie against the State.
Edward Thomas F. Joson vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.

G.R. Nos. 210220-21, April 6, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Ombudsman charging the respondents with the
criminal offenses of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and Unlawful
Appointment, defined and penalized under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The filing of the above charges stemmed from the alleged appointment of Ferdinand as
Consultant - Technical Assistance in the Office of the Governor of Nueva Ecija. On
September 8, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a joint resolution dismissing the
criminal and administrative complaints against all the respondents for lack of sufficient
evidence to indict the respondents for the crimes of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 and unlawful appointment; and that the charge of grave misconduct was not
established by substantial evidence.
Page 869 of 1553

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
criminal charges against the private respondents
RULING:
No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
charges against the private respondents.
1. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
It falls upon the petitioner to discharge the burden of proving there was grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, in accordance with the definition and
standards set by law and jurisprudence. Here, the record reveals that the
Ombudsman carefully perused and studied the documents and meticulously
weighed the evidence submitted by the parties before issuing the assailed joint
resolution and joint order which strongly negated any averment that they were
issued capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or in a despotic manner.
2. Moreover, a finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is a finding of fact which is

generally not reviewable by this Court. Only when there is a clear case of grave abuse
of discretion will this Court interfere with the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s
determination of the existence or absence of probable cause. As the Court is not a
trier of facts, it reposes immense respect to the factual determination and
appreciation made by the Ombudsman. It is readily apparent from petitioner’s
assertion in the petition that he was questioning the correctness of the appreciation
of facts by the Ombudsman. He presented an issue which touched on the factual
findings of the Ombudsman. Such issue is not reviewable by this Court via certiorari.
3. With respect to the dismissal of the administrative charge for gross misconduct, the
Court finds that the same has already attained finality because petitioner failed to
file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The assailed ruling of
Page 870 of 1553

the Ombudsman absolving the private respondents of the administrative charge

possesses the character of finality and, thus, not subject to appeal. Though final and
unappealable in the administrative level, the decisions of administrative agencies
are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof
of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a
contrary conclusion.Petitioner, however, failed to do this.
Roberto G. Rosales, et al. vs. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), et al.

G.R. No. 201852, April 5, 2016
The Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari is an improper remedy to assail the Resolutions in
question issued by the ERC in its quasi-legislative power.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) which seeks to
declare the illegality and unconstitutionality of the Members ' Contribution for Capital
Expenditures (MCC), later renamed as Reinvestment Fund for Sustainable Capital
Expenditures (RFSC), which is being imposed by on-grid Electric Cooperatives (ECs ),
pursuant to the Rules and Resolution of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) allowing
for the same. Petitioners opine that the imposition is oppressive and unconstitutional,
directly violating the Constitution’s due process and equal protection clauses; is
tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation; and,
ISSUE:
Whether a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy
RULING:
1. The Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari is an improper remedy. The Resolutions in

question were issued by the ERC in its quasi-legislative power. A respondent is said to be
exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a
term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
Page 871 of 1553

draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature.”
2. Assuming that the Resolutions were issued under the ERC’s quasi-judicial function,
still, the petition should have been filed before the Court of Appeals, which may entertain
a petition for certiorari whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy of courts should
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The
concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of
forum. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before the Supreme Court, the petitioners have
unduly taxed the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction.
3. Petitioners also did not comply with the rule that “there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Since petitioners assail the
validity of the ERC issuances and seeks to declare them as unconstitutional, a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules is the appropriate remedy. Under the Rules,
any person whose rights are affected by any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights
or duties, thereunder.
4. Petitioners also failed to exhaust administrative remedies. They should have filed
the case in the ERC, which, has technical expertise, at the very least, to dwell on the issue.
Considering that petitioners are challenging the MCC/RFSC, which is a rate component
under the RSEC-WR, the original and exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the ERC,
pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 9136.
5. Petitioners failed to join as petitioners or respondents the electric cooperatives

registered under the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), which are indispensable
parties pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules. They will either suffer or benefit from
the decision of the Court. The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties is the complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. While
relief may be afforded to petitioners without the presence of the CDA-registered ECs, it is
uncertain whether the case can be finally decided on its merits without taking into account,
if not prejudicing, the rights and interests of the latter.
Page 872 of 1553

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, AS

CHAIRMAN OF BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., Petitioners, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 222731, EN BANC, March 08, 2016, LEONEN, J.
Mandamus is the relief sought "[w]hen any tribunal corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station," and "there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of

Elections to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election." One of the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated
election system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.
The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act

8436, as amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to
ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.
FACTS:
Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-

VNP, Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition2 for
mandamus before this court to compel respondent Commission on Elections to implement
the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail security feature.
On December 22, 1997, Republic Act No. 8436 authorized the Commission on Elections to
use an automated election system for electoral exercises. After almost a decade, Republic
Act No. 9369 amended Republic Act No. 8436. Republic Act No. 9369 introduced
significant changes to Republic Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code, and other election-related statutes.
For the 2016 National and Local Elections, the Commission on Elections has opted to use
the Vote-Counting Machine. The vote-counting machine is a "paper-based automated
election system," which is reported to be "seven times faster and more powerful than the
PCOS because of its updated processor." Likewise, it is reported to have more memory and
security features, and is "capable of producing the Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT)." This VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen
reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine.
Page 873 of 1553

Petitioners allege that under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369,
there are several safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities to ensure the sanctity of the
ballot. Among these is the implementation of the VVPAT security feature, as found in
Section 6(e), (f), and (n).
Petitioners claim that VVPAT "consists of physical paper records of voter ballots as voters
have cast them on an electronic voting system." Through it, the voter can verify if the
choices on the paper record match the choices that he or she actually made in the ballot.
The voter can confirm whether the machine had actually read the ballot correctly.
Petitioners seek to compel the Commission on Elections to have the vote-counting
machine issue receipts once a person has voted.
Commission on Elections refuses to implement the VVPAT function based on fears that
the security feature may aid in vote-buying, and that the voting period may take longer.
Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court asking the Supreme Court to compel the Commission on Elections to comply with
the provisions of Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. According
to petitioners, the law prescribes the "minimum" criteria of adopting VVPAT as one of the
security features. The use of the word "must" makes it mandatory to have a paper audit
"separate and distinct from the ballot."
ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Elections may be compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to

enable the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections.
RULING:
Petition is granted.
Mandamus is the relief sought "[w]hen any tribunal corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station," and "there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections unlawfully neglected to perform its
legal duty of fully implementing our election laws, specifically Republic Act No. 8436,
Section 6(e), (f), and (n), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369:
Page 874 of 1553

SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. — The automated election system must at

least have the following functional capabilities:
(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the
correctness of reported election results;
(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine
has registered his choice;
Nonetheless, the inaction of the Commission on Elections in utilizing the VVPAT feature
of the vote-counting machines fails to fulfill the duty required under Republic Act No. 8436,
as amended.
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections
to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election." One of the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election
system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.
Based on the technical specifications during the bidding, the current vote-counting
machines should meet the minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT. However,
the Commission on Elections' act of rendering inoperative this feature runs contrary to why
the law required this feature in the first place.
The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as
amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure
the transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.
The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to assuage
its fears regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures.
The Commission on Elections has the power to choose the appropriate procedure in order
to enforce the VVPAT requirement under the law, and balance it with the constitutional
mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. There is no legal prohibition for
the Commission on Elections to require that after the voter reads and verifies the receipt,
he or she is to leave it in a separate box, not take it out of the precinct. Definitely, the
availability of all the voters' receipts will make random manual audits more accurate.
Page 875 of 1553

LUCITA TIOROSIO-ESPINOSA vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE VIRGINIA

HOFILEÑA-EUROPA
G.R. No. 185746, January 20, 2016 [Jardeleza, J.]
A petition for certiorari before a higher court will generally not prosper unless the
inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it. This is because a motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Contrary to the CA’s findings, however, Spouses Espinosa already
complied with this requirement. Their motion to stay execution is, in fact, a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC order dated April 12, 2007. Although not captioned as a "motion
for reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution directly challenged the
RTC’s order of execution pending appeal insofar as it allowed the inclusion of the awards for
moral and exemplary damages.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that execution pending appeal of

awards of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees is not allowed.
A petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the sheriff's actions. The
special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. lt is not available as a remedy for the correction of acts
performed by a sheriff during the execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial but arc purely ministerial functions. The more appropriate remedy would have been
a petition for prohibition filed under Section 2 of Rule 65. Moreover, the matters being raised
by the petitioner are factual in nature and, hence, not proper for the Supreme Court to resolve
at the first instance.
FACTS:
Respondent Necefero Jovero (Jovero) filed an action for damages against Spouses Espinosa.
In the complaint, Jovero alleged that Spouses Espinosa maliciously filed several cases
against him for the sole purpose of vexing, harassing, and humiliating him. Accordingly,
Jovero prayed that Spouses Espinosa be ordered to pay compensatory damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Jovero. Consequently, Jovero moved for
execution pending appeal, citing his advanced age and failing health. Meanwhile, Spouses
Espinosa moved for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The RTC granted Jovero’s motion
for execution pending appeal and denied Spouses Espinosa’s motion for reconsideration.
Page 876 of 1553

The RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution pending appeal which covered the entire
amount stated in the decision.
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Spouses Espinosa filed their
notice of appeal of the main RTC decision. They also filed a separate motion to stay
execution pending appeal and to approve/fix the supersedeas bond. They contended that
execution pending appeal involving awards of moral and exemplary damages is improper
because it is contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court. The RTC denied the motion
to stay execution pending appeal in an order dated September 14, 2007.
Spouses Espinosa filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the
September 14, 2007 order. The CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari for failure
to state the date when the assailed order was received. Spouses Espinosa filed their motion
for reconsideration alleging that their previous counsel received the assailed order on
October 4, 2007, attaching as proof a certified photocopy of postal registry return card.
Thus, they filed the petition for certiorari on time. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration. This time, it cited Spouses Espinosa’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC’s September 14, 2007 order to sustain its earlier dismissal of the
petition for certiorari. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari on
tenuous procedural grounds.
YES.
Under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, the CA has the prerogative to dismiss the
case outright for failure to comply with the formal requirements of an action filed under
Rule 65. The formal requirements include, among others, a statement by the petitioner
indicating the material dates when the order or resolution subject of the petition was
received. The CA identified Spouses Espinosa’s failure to comply with this requirement as
the primary ground for dismissing the petition outright.
An examination of the petition for certiorari filed with the CA shows that the CA is
technically correct with respect to its finding that Spouses Espinosa failed to indicate the
exact date of receipt of the assailed RTC order. However, the CA should have considered
Spouses Espinosa’s explanation regarding this omission, which was apparent on the face of
the petition. Spouses Espinosa likewise executed a "Joint-Affidavit of Material
Dates," which was attached to the petition for certiorari filed with the CA, attesting to the
Page 877 of 1553

fact that the September 14, 2007 order was not among the documents turned over to them
by their former counsel, and that the registry return card had not been returned to the
RTC.
It is therefore apparent that Spouses Espinosa attempted to comply with the material date
requirement. Unfortunately, they themselves could not ascertain when the subject order
was received by their former counsel and thereby make an accurate statement as to such
fact. Moreover, the best evidence to prove receipt of the RTC order, i.e., the registry return
card, was not yet available when they elevated the case to the CA. But, as a sign of good
faith, Spouses Espinosa undertook to submit the return card as soon as it was available—
which they subsequently did on January 30, 2008. Given the foregoing circumstances, it
may be deduced that the basic reason why no precise date of receipt was given by Spouses
Espinosa is because they did not want to misrepresent the date in their petition. In fine,
Spouses Espinosa’s failure to indicate the date of receipt appears to be excusable; the CA’s
outright dismissal of their petition is not commensurate with the degree of their non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure. In any case, the return card showed that the
order was received on October 4, 2007, which means that when Spouses Espinosa filed the
petition for certiorari on November 19, 2007, they did so well within the sixty (60) day
Although it is true that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice, this is not an inflexible tenet. After all, rules of procedure are mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on
technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
be avoided.
2. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for failure of Spouses Espinosa to first
file a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order.
NO.
A petition for certiorari before a higher court will generally not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This is because a motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for reconsideration is required in order to grant the
lower court an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. Contrary to the CA’s
Page 878 of 1553

findings, however, Spouses Espinosa already complied with this requirement. Their motion
to stay execution is, in fact, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order dated April 12,
2007 which granted Jovero’s motion for execution pending appeal.
Although not captioned as a "motion for reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa’s motion to

stay execution directly challenged the RTC’s order of execution pending appeal insofar as
it allowed the inclusion of the awards for moral and exemplary damages. Thus, when the
RTC denied Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution, it was already the second time
the trial court had passed upon the issue of execution pending appeal. Both RTC orders
dealt with the same issue, i.e., the propriety of execution pending appeal. In the first
instance, the RTC allowed the execution pending appeal; in the latter, it denied Spouses
Espinosa's motion to stay execution and, thus, sustained its earlier ruling. On both
occasions, the parties had been accorded ample opportunity to squarely argue their
positions and the RTC more than enough opportunity to study the matter and to deliberate
upon the issues raised by the parties. Under these circumstances, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the stay of execution pending appeal by Spouses
Espinosa could not be considered a plain and adequate remedy but a mere superfluity.
3. Whether the awards of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, may
be the subject of execution pending appeal.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that execution pending appeal of awards of

moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees is not allowed. In Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Lantin, the Court explained why these
cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal:
…The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the
outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be
held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain,
liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts
remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court
and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of
damages and their causal relation to the petitioners' act will have to be determined in the
light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all,
while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as
in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.
In Engineering Construction Inc. v. National Power Corporation, the Court expanded

the RCPI doctrine to likewise exclude consequential damages and attorney's fees from
execution pending appeal. The doctrine has since been reiterated. Clearly, the RTC
Page 879 of 1553

committed legal error when it ordered the premature execution of the awards of moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
4. Whether a Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy to question the sheriff’s actions.
NO.
The rest of petitioner's arguments are devoted to assailing the sheriff's levy of her
properties. However, a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the
sheriff's actions. The special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. lt is not available as a remedy
for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff during the execution process, which acts
are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but arc purely ministerial functions. The more
appropriate remedy would have been a petition for prohibition filed under Section 2 of Rule
65. Moreover, the matters being raised by the petitioner are factual in nature and, hence,
not proper for the Supreme Court to resolve at the first instance.
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs. CARDLINE INC., et. al.
The special civil action of prohibition is an available remedy against a tribunal

exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers if it acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The respondents filed a special civil action for prohibition before the CA
without first filing a motion to stay or quash the writ of execution before the RTC. Hence, the
petition for prohibition obviously lacked the requirement that no "other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the petition should have been dismissed.
FACTS:
Orix filed a complaint for replevin, sum of money, and damages with an application for a
writ of seizure against respondents. The RTC rendered judgment in Orix’s favor. The
CA and subsequently the Supreme Court denied the respondents’ appeal and affirmed the
Page 880 of 1553

RTC judgment. The Supreme Court’s denial of the appeal in G.R. No. 189877 became final
and executory.
Respondent Ng Beng Sheng filed a petition for annulment of judgment. He argued that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over his person since the summons was not properly served on
him. The CA denied the petition on the grounds of forum shopping and res judicata. The
CA explained that this issue had already been addressed by the RTC and by the CA and the
Supreme Court on appeal.
In the main case, Orix filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which the RTC
granted in its December 1, 2010 order. Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA
a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the issuance of
the December 1, 2010 order. The CA granted the petition, annulled the RTC’s order dated
December 1, 2010, and prohibited the sheriff from executing the judgment. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE/RULING:
3. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
NO.
The RTC’s May 6, 2008 judgment has attained finality and can no longer be altered. Once
a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the decision.
Thus, the RTC issued the December 1, 2010 order of execution. An order of execution is not
appealable; otherwise, a case would never end.
As a rule, parties are not allowed to object to the execution of a final judgment. One
exception is when the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room
for its interpretation. If the exception applies, the respondents may seek the stay of
execution or the quashal of the writ of execution. Although an order of execution is not
appealable, an aggrieved party may challenge the order of execution via an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The special civil action of
prohibition is an available remedy against a tribunal exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial powers if it acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and there is no other
In the present case, the respondents effectively argued that the terms of the RTC’s May 6,
2008 judgment are not clear enough such that the parties’ agreement must be examined to
Page 881 of 1553

arrive at the proper interpretation. The respondents, however, did not give the RTC an
opportunity to clarify its judgment. The respondents filed a special civil action for
prohibition before the CA without first filing a motion to stay or quash the writ of execution
before the RTC. Hence, the petition for prohibition obviously lacked the requirement that
no "other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the petition should have
been dismissed.
However, the CA gave due course to the petition. In granting the petition, the CA ruled
that the judgment had been satisfied; thus, there was no more judgment to execute. To
stress, the CA erred in granting the petition despite the availability of a "plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy."
4. Whether respondents committed forum shopping.
NO.
Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules prohibits forum shopping. The rule against forum shopping
seeks to address the great evil of two competent tribunals rendering two separate and
contradictory decisions. Forum shopping exists when a party initiates two or more actions,
other than appeal or certiorari, grounded on the same cause to obtain a more favorable
decision from any tribunal.
In the present case, the CA correctly denied Ng Beng Sheng’s petition for annulment of
judgment and correctly reasoned out that the issue on jurisdiction had been resolved with
finality in the review on certiorari. Thus, the issue could no longer be re-litigated. After the
denial of the petition for annulment of judgment, Ng Beng Shen joined the other
respondents in filing a petition for prohibition.
The recourse to the petition for prohibition did not amount to forum shopping.
The two cases filed collectively by the respondents are similar only in that they involve the
same parties. The cases, however, involve different causes of actions. The petition for
review on certiorari was filed to review the merits of the RTC's judgment. On the other
hand, the petition for prohibition respects the finality of the RTC's judgment on the merits
Page 882 of 1553

but interprets the dispositive portion in a way that would render the execution
unnecessary. Thus, the elements of forum shopping are not present in the two cases.
With respect to Ng Beng Sheng's petition for annulment of judgment, the CA has already
ruled that the filing of the petition constituted forum shopping, specifically due to the
jurisdictional issue raised. The petition for prohibition, however, involves a different cause
of action. Thus, there is no forum shopping.
P/S INSP. SAMSON B. BELMONTE, et. al. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following

requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Petition is likewise dismissible for its violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Petitioners, without awaiting the Ombudsman’s action on their Motion for
Reconsideration, immediately filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court, instead of
the appellate court, as required by said doctrine.
FACTS:
Petitioners were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority
before the Visayas Office of the Ombudsman which issued a Decision finding petitioners
guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the Ombudsman’s decision is not
supported by evidence. Before the Ombudsman could resolve the said motion, however,
petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by filing a Petition for Prohibition,
praying that the Court issue a Writ of Prohibition and Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction commanding the Ombudsman to desist from implementing
its Decision ordering their dismissal from service pending resolution of their Motion for
Reconsideration with said office or until remedies under the Rules and law have been fully
exhausted.
A month after the filing of the Petition, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an
Order modifying its Decision by finding petitioners guilty not of Grave Misconduct, but of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and further modifying the penalty
Page 883 of 1553

from dismissal to suspension from office for a period of six (6) months and (1) day without
pay.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition was proper/appropriate.
NO.
The petition for prohibition filed by petitioners is inappropriate. For a party to be entitled
to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial;
(b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A cursory reading of the
records of the case readily reveals the absence of the second and third requisites.
First, the Court does not find that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the subject Decision. In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Ombudsman carefully
weighed the rights and interests of the parties vis-à-vis the evidence they presented to
substantiate the same. That the Ombudsman’s ruling was unfavourable to petitioners’
interests does not necessarily mean that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
especially so when such ruling was aptly corroborated by evidence submitted by the parties.
Second, petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly had some other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency. Here, the remedy of a
motion for reconsideration was still available to petitioners, as expressly granted by Section
8 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order (AO) No. 17. In fact, as borne by the records, petitioners actually
availed of the same when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration with public
respondent on July 18, 2011.
2. Whether or not petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
YES.
The Petition is likewise dismissible for its violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Petitioners, without awaiting the Ombudsman’s action on their Motion for
Page 884 of 1553

Reconsideration, immediately filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court, instead
of the appellate court, as required by said doctrine.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the
extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action
for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as
cases of national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an
imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
In this case, petitioners directly elevated the instant case before the Supreme Court failing
to advance any compelling reason for the Supreme Court to allow the same. In fact, they
even raised issues concerning the Ombudsman’s factual findings, contrary to the rule that
parties who appeal directly to the Supreme Court must only raise questions of law. It is
clear, therefore, that the Supreme Court has ample reason to dismiss petitioners’ recourse.
TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. TING GUAN TRADING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014, J. Arturo D. Brion
The trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license for Tin Guan to file a
Rule 65 petition before the CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of
a petition for certiorari as Tin Guan still has an adequate remedy before the trial court – i.e.,
to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case. As exceptions, it
may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the Tin Guan or over the subject matter.
Under the Rules of Court, entry of judgment may only be made if no appeal or motion
for reconsideration was timely filed. In the proceedings before the CA, if a motion for
reconsideration is timely filed by the proper party, execution of the CA’s judgment or final
resolution shall be stayed. This rule is applicable even to proceedings before the Supreme
Court, as provided in Section 4, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, Tung Ho timely filed its motion for reconsideration with the CA
and seasonably appealed the CA’s rulings with the Court through the present petition (G.R.
No. 182153).
Page 885 of 1553

To now recognize the finality of the Resolution of Ting Guan petition (G.R. No. 176110) based
on its entry of judgment and to allow it to foreclose the present meritorious petition of Tung
Ho, would of course cause unfair and unjustified injury to Tung Ho
Facts:
Tung Ho is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan, Republic of

China. Respondent Ting Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan) is a domestic corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines. Ting Guan obligated itself under a contract of
sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron and steel to Tung Ho. Subsequently, Tung Ho filed a
request for arbitration before the ICC International Court of Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore
after Ting Guan failed to deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy metal scrap iron
and steel.
The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho. He then filed an action against Ting Guan for
the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Ting Guan moved to dismiss the case based on Tung Ho’s lack of capacity to sue
and for prematurity and based on improper venue. Ting Guan argued that the complaint
should have been filed in Cebu where its principal place of business was located.
The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss. He then filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction. However, Tung Ho argued that a Rule 65 petition is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to dismiss. It pointed out that the proper
recourse for Ting Guan was to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case. CA
dismissed it,
Ting Guan immediately proceeded to file a petition for review on certiorari before
this Court. Ting Guan’s petition before this Court was docketed as G.R. No. 176110. Ting
Guan argued that the dismissal of the case should be based on the following additional
grounds: first, the complaint was prematurely filed; second, the foreign arbitral award is
null and void; third, the venue was improperly laid in Makati; and lastly, the enforcement
of the arbitral award was against public policy. Court issued an entry of judgment in Ting
Guan’s petition. After the entry of judgment, Court referred the matter back to the RTC for
further proceedings which declared the case closed and terminated.
Tung Ho seasonably filed a petition for review on certiorari. This is the present G.R.
No. 182153 now before us. Tung Ho reiterates that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Ting Guan. It also claims that the return of service of summons is a prima facie
evidence of the recited facts i.e., that Tejero is a corporate secretary as stated therein and
Page 886 of 1553

that the sheriff is presumed to have regularly performed his official duties in serving the
summons.
Issue:
1) Whether the present petition is barred by res judicata; and

2) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan,
specifically:
a) Whether Tejero was the proper person to receive the summons; and
b) Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary appearance before the trial court.
Ruling:
1) No, the Court is not precluded from ruling on the jurisdictional issue raised in the
petition
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the rights of the parties or their privies in
all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. For res judicata to
apply, the final judgment must be on the merits of the case which means that the court has
unequivocally determined the parties’ rights and obligations with respect to the causes of
action and the subject matter of the case.
Contrary to Ting Guan’s position, our ruling in G.R. No. 176110 does not operate as
res judicata on Tung Ho’s appeal; G.R. No. 176110 did not conclusively rule on all issues
raised by the parties in this case so that this Court would now be barred from taking
cognizance of Tung Ho’s petition. Our disposition in G.R. No. 176110 only dwelt on technical
or collateral aspects of the case, and not on its merits. Specifically, Court did not rule on
whether Tung Ho may enforce the foreign arbitral award against Ting Guan in that case.
2) Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan.
Tejero was not the proper person to receive the summons
Nonetheless, the Court sees no reason to disturb the lower courts’ finding that
Tejero was not a corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive
the summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of
facts; it cannot re-examine, review or re-evaluate the evidence and the factual review made
Page 887 of 1553

by the lower courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, Court will not deviate from the
rule that factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding on this Court.
Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court
However, the Court cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court
reached, given the established facts. To our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before
the trial court in view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons.
As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal arguments in motions

filed by the parties. Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available. The purpose of this rule
is to obviate multiplicity of motions and to discourage dilatory motions and pleadings.
Party litigants should not be allowed to reiterate identical motions, speculating on the
possible change of opinion of the courts or of the judges thereof.
In this respect, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires the defendant to file
a motion to dismiss within the time for, but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim.
Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, commands the defendant
to file his answer within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different period
is fixed by the trial court. Once the trial court denies the motion, the defendant should file
his answer within the balance of fifteen (15) days to which he was entitled at the time of
serving his motion, but the remaining period cannot be less than five (5) days computed
from his receipt of the notice of the denial.
Instead of filing an answer, the defendant may opt to file a motion for
reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall have denied the motion for reconsideration
does the defendant become bound to file his answer. If the defendant fails to file an answer
within the reglementary period, the plaintiff may file a motion to declare the defendant in
default. This motion shall be with notice to the defendant and shall be supported by proof
of the failure.
The trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license for the defendant to
file a Rule 65 petition before the CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the
subject of a petition for certiorari as the defendant still has an adequate remedy before the
trial court – i.e., to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case. As
exceptions, the defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the
Page 888 of 1553

motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject
matter.
Furthermore, Ting Guan’s failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its
person in the first motion to dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared
before the RTC when it filed a motion to dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss"
without raising the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over its person. The Court categorically stated
that the defendant should raise the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over his
person in the very first motion to dismiss. Failure to raise the issue of improper service of
summons in the first motion to dismiss is a waiver of this defense and cannot be belatedly
raised in succeeding motions and pleadings.
As a Final Note, under the Rules of Court, entry of judgment may only be made if
no appeal or motion for reconsideration was timely filed. In the proceedings before the CA,
if a motion for reconsideration is timely filed by the proper party, execution of the CA’s
judgment or final resolution shall be stayed. This rule is applicable even to proceedings
before the Supreme Court, as provided in Section 4, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, Tung Ho timely filed its motion for reconsideration with the CA
and seasonably appealed the CA’s rulings with the Court through the present petition (G.R.
No. 182153).
To now recognize the finality of the Resolution of Ting Guan petition (G.R. No.
176110) based on its entry of judgment and to allow it to foreclose the present meritorious
petition of Tung Ho, would of course cause unfair and unjustified injury to Tung Ho. First,
as previously mentioned, the Ting Guan petition did not question or assail the full merits
of the CA decision. It was Tung Ho, the party aggrieved by the CA decision, who
substantially questioned the merits of the CA decision in its petition; this petition showed
that the CA indeed committed error and Tung Ho’s complaint before the RTC should
properly proceed.
Second, the present case is for the enforcement of an arbitral award involving
millions of pesos. Tung Ho already won in the foreign arbitration and the present case is
simply for the enforcement of this arbitral award in our jurisdiction. Third, and most
importantly, Tung Ho properly and timely availed of the remedies available to it under the
Rules of Court, which provide that filing and pendency of a motion for reconsideration
stays the execution of the CA judgment. Therefore, at the time of the entry of judgment in
G.R. No. 176110 in the Supreme Court, the CA decision which the Court affirmed was
effectively not yet be final.
Page 889 of 1553

Significantly, the rule that a timely motion for reconsideration stays the execution
of the assailed judgment is in accordance with Rule 51, Section 10 (Rules governing the CA
proceedings) which provides that "entry of judgments may only be had if there is no appeal
or motion for reconsideration timely filed. The date when the judgment or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry." Incidentally, this procedure
also governs before Supreme Court proceedings. Following these rules, therefore, the
pendency of Tung Ho’s MR with the CA made the entry of the judgment of the Court in the
Ting Guan petition premature and inefficacious for not being final and executory.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE R. ESPINOSA and LINDSEY

BUENAVISTA
G.R. No. 199070, April 7, 2014, J. Antonio T. Carpio
The petition for certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. However, the 60-day period
may be extended under any of the circumstances.
In the instant case, the Order of RTC was received by private complainants on 14
October 2010. Then the Petition for Certiorari was filed one day after the 60-day reglementary
period for filing the Petition for Certiorari, in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, since the letter evidencing that the OSG received the documents
erroneously stated that the deadline for filing was 14 December 2010, instead of 13 December
2010.
However, looking back at the records, since private complainants had to transmit
documents to the OSG. It clearly shows that they were able to do so promptly. On 30
November 2010, counsel for private complainants submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor
General the draft petition for certiorari, the verification and certification against forum
shopping, the original copies containing the signatures of the private prosecutors, and the
certified copies of the annexes. These documents were received by the OSG on 3 December
2010 only. Given the circumstances, Court holds that the CA-Cebu should have applied the
rules liberally and excused the belated filing.
Facts:
Ramon Rojas, Jr. (Rojas), the former Vice-Mayor of Ajuy, Iloilo, was shot and killed.
Rojas was jogging with Armando Nacional when they met two assailants riding a
Page 890 of 1553

motorcycle. Rojas was shot several times resulting in his death. Nacional later testified that
Edgar Cordero shot Rojas while Dennis Cartagena (Cartagena) drove the motorcycle.
A complaint for Murder against Cordero and Cartagena was filed. RTC issued
warrants of arrest against Cordero and Cartagena. A group of armed assailants shot
Cartagena and Cordero. While Cartagena survived, Cordero died of gunshot wounds.
Cartagena was arrested and turned over to the custody. In his sworn statement, Cartagena
admitted that he was involved in the killing of Rojas. Cordero shot Rojas while Cartagena
drove the motorcycle. He also claimed that Espinosa paid him and Cordero for killing Rojas.
The RTC dismissed the case applying the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Considering that the extrajudicial confession of accused
Dennis Cartagena is not corroborated by independent evidence, it is therefore inadmissible
and it would be unfair to hold accused Vicente Espinosa for trial.
OSG filed before the CA-Cebu a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The OSG
alleged that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he ordered the dismissal information despite the extrajudicial
confession of their co-accused Dennis Cartagena and corroborating evidence on record
establishing their participation in the crime charged;
CA-Cebu dismissed the petition due to procedural lapses. It erroneously computed

the deadline for filing the petition. Respondents were furnished a copy of the petition after
its filing. The Explanation required under Section 11, Rule 13 referred to a Motion for
Extension and not a Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this petition for review was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA’s dismissal of the OSG’s petition for certiorari based on
procedural lapses was proper.
Ruling:
No, CA’s dismissal of the OSG’s petition for certiorari based on procedural lapses
was not proper.
The first procedural error was the failure to file the petition within the reglementary
period. Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
provides a strict deadline for the filing of petitions for certiorari:
Page 891 of 1553

SECTION 4. When and Where to File the Petition. — The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial
of the motion.
The Court deleted the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 that permitted extensions of the
period to file petitions for certiorari, since sixty (60) days is more than ample time to
sufficiently prepare for filing.
However, the 60-day period may be extended under any of the circumstances:
1. most persuasive and weighty reasons;
2. to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure;
3. good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default;
4. the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
5. the merits of the case;
6. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules;
7. a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
8. the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
9. fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault;
10. peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
11. in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
12. importance of the issues involved; and
13. exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules.
In the instant case, the Order of RTC was received by private complainants on 14
October 2010. Then the Petition for Certiorari was filed one day after the 60-day
reglementary period for filing the Petition for Certiorari, in violation of Section 4, Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure since the letter evidencing that the OSG received the
documents erroneously stated that the deadline for filing was 14 December 2010, instead of
13 December 2010.
However, looking back at the records, since private complainants had to transmit
documents to the OSG. It clearly shows that they were able to do so promptly. On 30
Page 892 of 1553

November 2010, counsel for private complainants submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor
General the draft petition for certiorari, the verification and certification against forum
shopping, the original copies containing the signatures of the private prosecutors, and the
certified copies of the annexes. These documents were received by the OSG on 3 December
2010 only. Given the circumstances, Court holds that the CA-Cebu should have applied the
rules liberally and excused the belated filing.
Second, the CA found that the petition lacked a written explanation as required
under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The Explanation attached to the filed petition
referred to a Motion for Extension and not a Petition for Certiorari.
While the OSG committed glaring errors, Court deems it unjust to penalize private
complainants for the OSG’s carelessness. It is important to point out that private
complainants quickly informed the OSG of the oversight, when the private prosecutors
noticed on Page 39 of the petition under the "Copy furnished:" portion that the names of
the private respondents Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista were not among the list
of parties who were furnished with copies of the petition as required by Rule 65. The copies
sent to the private prosecutors also did not include a copy of the OSG’s Affidavit of Service.
Thereupon, Atty. Penetrante in a letter brought this matter to the attention of the OSG.
Indeed the actual date of filing of the petition as well as compliance with the rest of
the formal and procedural requirements of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, namely
– OSG’s verification and certification on non-forum shopping, the "Copy Furnished"
portion showing service of copies of the petition on the public and private respondents by
registered mail and the required "Explanation" why personal service of the petition on the
respondents was not resorted to –were all in the hands of the OSG. These were beyond the
control or intervention of the private petitioners and private prosecutors.
STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC., CELSO A.

FERNANDEZ and MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ vs. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR
EDWARD HAGEDORN and CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
G.R. No. 181792, April 21, 2014, J. Mendoza
A resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the standard modes of procedure

and forms of remedy are still available and capable of affording relief. So that when the COA
still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should have filed
a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the
COA's refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without any remedy at all. Since remedy is
still available to petitioner, mandamus cannot be sustained.
Page 893 of 1553

Facts:
Before Puerto Princesa became a city, the national government established a

military camp in Puerto Princesa, known as the Western Command. In building the
command’s facilities and road network, encroachment on several properties of Star Special
Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and Manuel V. Fernandez
(petitioners) resulted. In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for Payment
of Just Compensation against Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and the City
Council of Puerto Princesa City (respondents) praying that the court render judgment
ordering respondents to pay petitioners for the fair market value of their land and a
monthly rental fee until fully paid.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. Since the said decision became
final and executory, a writ of execution was issued which directed respondents to satisfy
the money judgment contained in the said decision. Records show that the total negotiated
amount of P12 million was already fully paid and received by petitioners on the basis of the
certification issued by then City Treasurer of Puerto Princesa, Rogelio L. Hitosis.
Nevertheless, petitioners still filed a complaint before the RTC-Br. 223 against respondents
for collection of unpaid just compensation, including interests and rentals, in accordance
with the RTC-Br. 78 Decision.
RTC-Br. 223 rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. Subsequently, petitioners

filed two (2) motions both asking the RTC-Br. 223 to order the Land Bank of the Philippines
to deliver the garnished account of respondents and to order respondents to appropriate
funds for the payment of the money judgment rendered against them and in favor of
petitioners. However, the RTC-Br. 223 issued an order denying both motions on the ground
that pursuant to Section 305(a) of the Local Government Code, government funds could
not be subjected to execution and levy, or to garnishment for that matter, unless there was
a corresponding appropriation law or ordinance. The RTC-Br. 223, however, stated that
respondents must still honor their obligation.
Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit (COA) requesting that it

order respondents to pay petitioners the amount adjudged by the RTC-Br. 223 and to direct
respondents to appropriate/allocate the necessary funds for the full satisfaction of the said
decision but the COA, through its Legal and Adjudication Office-Local denied it for lack of
jurisdiction stating that it could not act upon petitioners’ request because it would
encroach upon the prerogatives of the RTC and the case was already in the execution stage.
The COA was of the position that it had no proper legal standing and jurisdiction anymore.
Page 894 of 1553

Undaunted, petitioners filed similar complaints against respondents before the

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and to the Office of the Undersecretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government praying that respondents pay the subject
money judgment and that they be suspended from office for their refusal to comply with
the money judgment.
Hence, this Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is proper to compel herein respondents
to comply with the decision of the RTC.
Ruling:
No, the remedy of mandamus is not proper in this case.
Mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is

rendered in its favor and against a municipality or city, as in this case. It has been held,
however, that a resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the standard modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are still available and capable of affording relief.
Regarding final money judgment against the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, the legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA pursuant to Supreme
Court Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 25, 2000, which states as follows:
SUBJECT : EXERCISE OF UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN

THE ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF EXECUTION TO SATISFY MONEY JUDGMENTS
AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the

Commission on Audit, judges are hereby enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence
and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against
government agencies and local government units.
It is the opinion of this Court that COA should have acted on the formal request of
petitioners. Sections 26, 49 and 50 of P.D. No. 1445 otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines, provide:
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall
extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and
Page 895 of 1553

controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of
vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of
the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of
the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and
claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled
corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions,
or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental
entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the
government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the
government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
Section 49. Period for rendering decisions of the Commission. The Commission shall
decide any case brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
resolution. If the account or claim involved in the case needs reference to other persons or
offices, or to a party interested, the period shall be counted from the time the last comment
necessary to a proper decision is received by it.
Section 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission. The party aggrieved by any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and
the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the interest of any
government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. [Emphases
supplied]
From the above provisions, it is clear that the COA has the authority and power to
settle "all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities." This authority and power can still be
exercised by the COA even if a court’s decision in a case has already become final and
executory. In other words, the COA still retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a
claim even after the issuance of a writ of execution.
All told, the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution
to allow the parties recourse to the processes of the COA. It may be that the tenor of the
March 23, 2000 Indorsement issued by COA already spells doom for respondents’ claims;
but it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be
conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.
Page 896 of 1553

In fine, it was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate
implementation of the writ of execution through garnishment of the funds of petitioners.
Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate money
claim, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to
Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the petitioners
without any remedy at all.
BANK OF COMMERCE vs. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC., ET. AL.

G.R. No. 195615, April 21, 2014, J. Abad
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari may only
be filed when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case,
the records amply show that Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized exceptions to
the need to file a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari. The Sheriff
forcibly levied on Bancommerce’s Lipa Branch cash on hand amounting to P1,520,000.00 and
deposited the same with the Landbank. He also seized the bank’s computers, printers, and
monitors, causing the temporary cessation of its banking operations in that branch and
putting the bank in an unwarranted danger of a run. Clearly, Bancommerce had valid
justifications for skipping the technical requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) sold to petitioner Bank of Commerce (Bancommerce) its
banking business consisting of specified assets and liabilities through a Purchase and
Assumption (P & A) Agreement. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (BSP's) approval of their P &
A Agreement was however necessary. On November 8, 2001 the BSP approved that
agreement subject to the condition that Bancommerce and TRB would set up an escrow
fund of PSO million with another bank to cover TRB liabilities for contingent claims that
may subsequently be adjudged against it, which liabilities were excluded from the
purchase. Subsequently, P & A Agreement was approved by BSP. To comply with a BSP
mandate, TRB placed P50 million in escrow with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank) to answer for those claims and liabilities that were excluded from the P & A
Agreement and remained with TRB.
Shortly after acting in G.R. 138510, Traders Royal Bank v. Radio Philippines Network
(RPN), Inc., this Court ordered TRB to pay respondents RPN, Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation, and Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (collectively, RPN, et
al.) actual damages plus 12% legal interest and some amounts. Based on this decision, RPN,
et al.filed a motion for execution against TRB before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). But
rather than pursue a levy in execution of the corresponding amounts on escrow with
Page 897 of 1553
Metrobank, RPN, et al. filed a Supplemental Motion for Execution where they described
TRB as "now Bank of Commerce" based on the assumption that TRB had been merged into
Bancommerce.
Subsequently, the RTC issued the assailed Order directing the release to the Sheriff
of Bancommerce’s "garnished monies and shares of stock or their monetary equivalent" and
for the sheriff to pay 25% of the amount "to the respondents’ counsel representing his
attorney’s fees and appearance fees and litigation expenses" and the balance to be paid to
the respondents after deducting court dues.
Issue:
Whether or not Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was correctly applied in the case before
the SC.
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari may only
be filed when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. Since a
motion for reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy,
the failure to first take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal omission. But Bancommerce
invoked certain recognized exceptions to the rule. It had to forego the filing of the required
motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order because a) there was an urgent
necessity for the CA to resolve the questions it raised and any further delay would prejudice
its interests; b) under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would have been
useless; c) Bancommerce had been deprived of its right to due process when the RTC issued
the challenged order ex parte, depriving it of an opportunity to object; and d) the issues
raised were purely of law.
In this case, the records amply show that Bancommerce’s action fell within the
recognized exceptions to the need to file a motion for reconsideration before filing a
petition for certiorari. An urgent necessity for the immediate resolution of the case by the
CA existed because any further delay would have greatly prejudiced Bancommerce. The
Sheriff had been resolute and relentless in trying to execute the judgment and dispose of
the levied assets of Bancommerce. Further, the Sheriff forcibly levied on Bancommerce’s
Lipa Branch cash on hand amounting to P1,520,000.00 and deposited the same with the
Landbank. He also seized the bank’s computers, printers, and monitors, causing the
temporary cessation of its banking operations in that branch and putting the bank in an
Page 898 of 1553

unwarranted danger of a run. Clearly, Bancommerce had valid justifications for skipping
the technical requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, P/C INSP. JOELL. MENDOZA, P/C INSP.
GERARDO B. BALATUCAN, PO3 JOLITO P. MAMANAO, JR., P03 FERNANDO REYS.
GAPUZ, PO2 EDUARDO G. BLANCO, PO2 EDWIN SANTOS and PO1 JOSIL REY I.
LUCENA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 203605 , April 23, 2014, J. Abad
Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112 days
from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition was filed
out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review.
Facts:
Lilian I. De Vera (Lilian) filed a complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
charging with multiple murder the following Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
connected with the PNP Highway Patrol Group (HPG): petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B.
Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao,
Jr., P03 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo G. Blanco, P02 Edwin Santos, and PO1 Josil
Rey I. Lucena (collectively, petitioner HPG officers). The other HPG members were P/C
Supt. Perfecto Palad and P/C Supt. Eleuterio Gutierrez, Jr. Another group of accused
consisted of police officers from the PNP Special Action Force (SAF).
In her complaint Lilian alleged that joint elements of the SAF and the HPG
conspired in carrying out a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera (Jun) and
their 7-year-old daughter, Lia Allana.
When Lilian arrived at the entrance of their subdivision, the police had blocked the
area and did not allow civilians to pass through. She got a call from her house helper who
told-her that Jun and Lia had been involved in the shootout. A certain Hilario Indiana
approached Lilian and advised her to go to the hospital where Lia had been rushed. When
she got there, she learned that Lia had died of gunshot wound on the head. Jun was found
dead near a passenger jeepney with a gunshot wound on his head.
The DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary investigation finding probable cause
to indict all the police officers involved in the police action that led to the shooting of Jun
and Lia for two counts of murder. Subsequently, the DOJ filed the information before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque City.
Page 899 of 1553

On June 16, 2010 ,the RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack
of probable cause against them, given that the witnesses made no mention of seeing anyone
from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and his daughter.
On January 21, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the petition.
The CA thus ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner HPG officers.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in counting the prescriptive period for filing a Rule 65 petition
from the time of receipt of the court order by the OSG rather than by the city prosecutor's
office
Ruling:
Yes.
The OSG contends that the reckoning point should be from the date the
Department of Justice or the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal since, the OSG
alone has the authority to represent the People before the CA. But such a proposition is
unfair. There is no reason for the RTC to serve copy of its judgments or final orders upon
the OSG since it does not enter its appearance in criminal cases before it.
In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public
prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a copy
of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal within the appropriate time
since it is a notice addressed to the RTC and not to the CA. Only the Office of the Solicitor
General, however, may pursue the appeal before the CA by filing the required appellant's
brief or withdraw the same.
In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the public
prosecutor's duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil action
before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his recommendation
to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action. There is no reason the OSG
cannot file the petition since the People is given sixty days from notice to the public
prosecutor within which to file such an action before the CA or this Court.
Page 900 of 1553

Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People
112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition
was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN ET. AL. VS. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ET. AL.
G.R. No. 209287 (Consolidated), July 01, 2014, J. Bersamin
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued
to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by
the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VII of the 1987 Constitution].
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitu-tional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under [the subject constitutional duty] to set right
and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from
making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected
parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both
the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of
checks and balances.
Facts:
The controversy, in the present case, surfaced at the fore of public consciousness
when Sen. Jinggoy Estrada in his privilege speech revealed that some Senators, including
himself, had been allotted an additional PhP50 Million each as incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona. In response, DBM Secretary Florencio
Abad explained that the allocations were part of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) devised to accelerate government spending. He further explained that the funds
under the DAP were sourced from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;
Page 901 of 1553

(2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year;
and (4) budget for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-
disbursing projects.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings, namely:
(1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the
authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section
49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of
Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book Vi of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012
and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and
augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings. As for the use of unprogrammed funds
under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund
contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012, and 2013.
Petitioners, representing various national, sectoral and public interest groups,

through petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, seek to have the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541 and related
issuances, being implemented by respondent officials, and the consequent and related acts
thereto declared ultra vires.
The respondents, thru the OSG, contend that the special civil actions of certiorari
and prohibition are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality and
validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and other executive issuances implementing the DAP.
They further assert that there is no authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or
controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the constitutional
question, and in the event that the Court does review the assailed executive acts it shall
violate the principle of separation of powers.
Issue:
Whether or not the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper
actions to determine the constitutionality and validity of the assailed executive acts.
Ruling:
YES, the special civil actions commenced by the petitioners are proper remedies to
address the questions posed in the instant case.
Page 902 of 1553

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance
of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty,
or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction,
certio-rari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy
used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the
cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a
preventive remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. The
Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor:
“A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in
the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse
of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction
or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the in
the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that “respondents are performing or
threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.”
Page 903 of 1553

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board
or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VII of the 1987
Constitution].
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitu-tional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under [the subject constitutional duty] to set
right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all
precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by
interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is
consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC.

The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of
Castaño vs. Lobingier, that the power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the
Regional Trial Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be exercised within
the limits of their respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever.
Applying previous legislation similar to [Section 21] of BP 129 and its complementary
provision, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case that the CFI of Leyte
had no power to issue writs of injunction and certiorari against the Justice of Peace of Manila,
as the same was outside the territorial boundaries of the issuing court. Also, in Samar Mining
Co., Inc. v. Arnado, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was
filed in the CFI of Manila to question the authority of the Regional Administrator and Labor
Attorney of the Department of Labor in Cebu City to hear a complaint for sickness
compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to enjoin said respondents from conducting further
proceedings thereat. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper
venue, holding that the CFI of Manila had no authority to issue writs of injunction, certiorari,
Page 904 of 1553

and prohibition affecting persons outside its territorial boundaries. Further, in both
Cudiamat vs. Torres (Cudiamat) and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Reyes
(NAWASA), the losing bidders succeeded in securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal
in order to restrain, in Cudiamat, the implementation of an award on a public bidding for the
supply of a police call and signal box system for the City of Manila, and, in NAWASA, the
conduct of the public bidding for the supply of steel pipes for its Manila and Suburbs
Waterworks Project. The Court held in both cases that the injunction issued by the CFI of
Rizal purporting to restrain acts outside the [P]rovince of Rizal was null and void for want of
jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and pronouncements to the

instant case, the writ of prohibition issued by the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond
the bounds of the territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void.
Facts:
In October 2006, Petitioner LBP and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) entered into a loan agreement in connection with the latter’s Support
for Strategic Local Development and Investment Project (S2LDIP). The loan to be extended
was fully guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines and conditioned upon the
participation of at least two (2) LGUs by way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement (SLA) with
LBP. In pursuance of the project, LBP entered into an SLA with the City Government of
Iligan to finance the development and expansion of the city’s water supply system. The SLA
expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to be financed out of the proceeds
of the loan with LBP were to be procured in accordance with the provisions of Section I of
the Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits’ xxx and with the
provisions of [the] Schedule 4. Thus, the BAC of the City Government of Iligan used the
IBRD Procurement Guidelines in contracting out the project.
Respondent Atlanta participated in the bidding process but was later declared
disquali-fied therefrom because it lacked several documentary requirements. Atlanta
contested this action by the BAC which failed to merit any positive action. Consequently,
it opted not to pursue the matter any further and chose to participate in the rebidding.
In the rebidding, Atlanta complained of the use by the BAC of bidding documents
that are not compliant with the latest prescribed forms from the Government Procurement
Policy Board (GPPB) and contained provisions which violates R.A. No. 9184 or the
Government Procurement Act and its IRR). During the pre-bid conference, the BAC
insisted that the project was not covered by R.A. No. 9184 or any issuances of GPPB.
Page 905 of 1553

Atlanta instituted an action for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
injunctive relief against the City Government of Iligan, the BAC and LBP before the RTC of
Manila. Failing to obtain a TRO, the bidding for the project took place wherein Atlanta was
able to post the lowest bid. After due hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of Atlanta,
arguing that the City Government of Iligan cannot claim exemption from R.A. No. 9184 and
its IRR because the loan agreement is between IBRD and LBP, and not the City Government
of Iligan while the SLA executed between LBP and the City is not in the nature of an
international agreement like the said loan agreement.
LBP now comes before the Court alleging that there was improper venue and the
SLA is a related and subordinate covenant to the loan agreement with IBRD.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the instant case for
prohibition and mandamus.
Ruling:
NO, the RTC of Manila wrongly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
While the Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is
assailed relates to “acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person,” the petition must be filed “in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area as defined by the Court.” Section 4 of [Rule 65] provides that: “xxx If the
petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.”
The foregoing rule corresponds to Section 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980” (BP 129), which gives the
Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction but lays down the limitation that the writs
issued therein are enforceable only within their respective jurisdictions.
The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of
Castaño vs. Lobingier, that the power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the
Regional Trial Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be exercised within
the limits of their respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction
Page 906 of 1553

whatsoever. Applying previous legislation similar to [Section 21] of BP 129 and its
complementary provision, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case
that the CFI of Leyte had no power to issue writs of injunction and certiorari against the
Justice of Peace of Manila, as the same was outside the territorial boundaries of the issuing
court. Also, in Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Arnado, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction was filed in the CFI of Manila to question the authority of the
Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney of the Department of Labor in Cebu City to
hear a complaint for sickness compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to enjoin said
respondents from conducting further proceedings thereat. The Court affirmed the
dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue, holding that the CFI of Manila had
no authority to issue writs of injunction, certiorari, and prohibition affecting persons
outside its territorial boundaries. Further, in both Cudiamat vs. Torres (Cudiamat) and
National Water-works and Sewerage Authority v. Reyes (NAWASA), the losing bidders
succeeded in securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal in order to restrain, in
Cudiamat, the implementation of an award on a public bidding for the supply of a police
call and signal box system for the City of Manila, and, in NAWASA, the conduct of the
public bidding for the supply of steel pipes for its Manila and Suburbs Waterworks Project.
The Court held in both cases that the injunction issued by the CFI of Rizal purporting to
restrain acts outside the [P]rovince of Rizal was null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and pronouncements to the

instant case, the writ of prohibition issued by the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts
beyond the bounds of the territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and
void.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY vs. MILLARD R. OCAMPO,

CIPRIANO REY R. HIPOLITO, ERIC F. MERJILLA AND JOSE R. CARANDANG
The Petition for Certiorari should have been filed within 60 days from notice of the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court provides that a special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within 60 days
from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, or from the notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the judgment, order, or resolution being assailed. The 60-day
period, however, is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay, which would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, strict compliance
of this rule is mandatory and imperative. But like all rules, the 60-day limitation may be
relaxed "for the most persuasive of reasons," which must be sufficiently shown by the party
invoking liberality.
Page 907 of 1553

Furthermore, in the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the Petition for Certiorari
should have been dismissed. Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari. Although this
rule is subject to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this case.
The Court must emphasize that while litigation is not a game of technicalities, this
does not mean that procedural rules may be ignored at will or that their non-observance may
be dismissed simply because it may prejudice a party’s substantial rights. Mere invocations
of substantial justice and liberality are not enough for the court to suspend procedural
rules. Again, except only for the most compelling or persuasive reasons, procedural rules
must be followed to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
Facts:
In February 1996, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), through

its Quality Control Investigation Division (QCID), conducted an investigation on 1he
alleged illegal International Simple Resale (ISR) activities in Makati City. ISR is a method
of routing and completing an international long distance call using lines, cables, antennas,
and/or airwave or frequency that directly connect to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country of destination of the call. Likened to a jumper, the unauthorized
routing of international long distance calls by-passes PLDT’s International Gateway
Facilities (IGF) with the use of ISR access numbers, making international long distance calls
appear as local calls, and thereby, depriving PLDT of substantial revenues.
After confirming that some PLDT subscribers were indeed operating ISR businesses
in Makati City, under the business names INFILNET and Emergency Monitoring
System (EMS), PLDT requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to apprehend the said subscribers. After investigation, which affirmed that indeed, the calls
by-passed PLDT’s IGF, NBI applied for search warrants with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila. Thereafter, two search warrants were issed: (a) Search Warrant directed at the
office of INFILNET; and (b) Search Warrant directed at the office of EMS, both located in
Makati City. NBI agents conducted simultaneous raids during which electronic gadgets,
documents, assorted office supplies, several pieces of computer equipment, and some
personal belongings of the employees of INFILNET and EMS were seized.
An Information for the crime of simple theft was filed before the RTC of Makati City
against respondents Millard R. Ocampo, CiprianoRey R. Hipolito, Eric F. Merjilla, and Jose
R. Carandang. Respondents filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Suppress or Exclude
or Return Inadmissible Evidence Unlawfully Obtained, assailing the validity of the Search
Warrants on the ground that the searches conducted were not in accordance with the
Page 908 of 1553

established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines. Said motion was denied by
Makati RTC ruling that it is the issuing court, in this case, the Manila RTC, which has the
jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Search Warrants. On petition for certiorari, CA
found no fault on the part of the Makati RTC in refusing to rule on the Motion to Suppress
Evidence under the Principle of Non-Interference of a co-equal court. However, in order to
avoid any conflict, the CA ordered the search warrant cases consolidated with the criminal
case for theft.
Respondents, then, applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against
certain persons allegedly in possession of documents relating to PAMTEL, a foreign
telecommunications company with tie-ups to INFILNET and EMS. However, said motion
was dismissed by the RTC, On July 11, 2002, finding the documents irrelevant and
immaterial to the resolution of the case. Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC
in its October 10, 2002 Order. On November 29, 2002, the RTC proceeded to hear the
Motion to Suppress but since respondents failed to appear and present evidence to
substantiate their Motion, the RTC denied the motion. On petition for certiorari, the CA
reversed the denial of the Motion to Suppress as there was no intention on the part of
respondents to delay the resolution of the Motion.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition for Certiorari, and in
subsequently granting the same despite evident procedural lapses.
Ruling:
Assailed in the Petition for Certiorarifiled before the CAare three Orders, to wit:
1) The Order dated July 11, 2002, denying respondents’ application for subpoena
duces tecum;
2) The Order dated October 10, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2002; and
3) The Order dated November 29, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress.
The Petition for Certiorari should have been filed within 60 days from notice of the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a special civil action for
certiorari should be instituted within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution, or from the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
judgment, order, or resolution being assailed. The 60-day period, however, is inextendible
Page 909 of 1553

to avoid any unreasonable delay, which would violate the constitutional rights of parties to
a speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, strict compliance of this rule is mandatory and
imperative. But like all rules, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed "for the most persuasive
of reasons," which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality.
In this case, respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2002, denying their application for subpoena
duces tecum, on October 18, 2002. Accordingly, they had until December 17, 2002 within
which to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Records, however, show that it was only
on January 20, 2003 that respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari to assail the Orders
dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002. Instead of admitting that more than 60 days had
lapsed, respondents kept silent about it in their Petition for Certiorari. When petitioner
brought up the issue, respondents’ reply was unresponsive. In fact, they did not even
confirm or deny the alleged lapse of the 60-day period. Siding with respondent, the CA
opted not to discuss the issue and resolved to reverse the Order dated July 11, 2002 on the
ground that the granting of the subpoena duces tecum was necessary in order for
respondents to substantiate their Motion to Suppress.
The CA’s reasoning, however, even if true, does not excuse respondents from
complying with the 60-day period rule, especially since they have not offered any plausible
justification for their non-compliance. In fact, their adamant refusal to admit the obvious
truth as well as their deliberate attempt to hide this procedural lapse cannot be ignored.
Leniency is given only to those deserving of it. In this case, respondents are not entitled to
any because they intentionally omitted to indicate in their Petition for Certiorari the date
they were notified of the Order dated October 10, 2002 in order to mislead the CA. Besides,
relaxing the rule would not only be unfair and unjust but would also be prejudicial to
petitioner, who had every right to believe that the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October
10, 2002 had attained finality and may no longer be altered, modified, or reversed. As the
court has said, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed only for the most persuasive reasons
and only in meritorious cases, which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking
liberality. Such is not the situation in this case.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA erred in giving due course to
the Petition and in reversing the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002, as they
may no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality.
In the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the Petition for Certiorari should
have been dismissed. Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari. Although this
rule is subject to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this case.
Page 910 of 1553

Respondents admit that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated November 29, 2002 prior to filing the Petition for Certiorari. As an excuse, they
alleged that their counsel verbally moved for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion
to Suppress, which the RTC flatly denied in open court. Such allegation, however, as aptly
pointed out by petitioner, is not supported by the evidence as the Order dated November
29, 2002 made no mention of such fact. It is also unlikely for respondents’ counsel to have
moved for a reconsideration of the said Order considering that, as stated in the Order, he
appeared only after the hearings were over. Besides, the lower court should first be
informed of its supposed error and be allowed to correct or rectify the same through a re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case, which could only be done by filing
a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order. This respondents failed to do. Thus, in
the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the CA erred in giving due course to the
Petition and in reversing the Order dated November 29, 2002.
In closing, the Court must emphasize that while litigation is not a game of
technicalities, this does not mean that procedural rules may be ignored at will or that their
non-observance may be dismissed simply because it may prejudice a party’s substantial
rights. Mere invocations of substantial justice and liberality are not enough for the court to
suspend procedural rules. Again, except only for the most compelling or persuasive
reasons, procedural rules must be followed to facilitate the orderly administration of
justice.
JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42,
CITY OF SAN FERNANDO; (Pampanga) represented by its Presiding Judge HON.
MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR,
CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA and ALLIED DOMECQ PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No.173861, July 14, 2014, J. Del Castillo
A Petition for Certiorari will prosper if the following rules will be observed: 1) the
applicant must allege with certainty that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, or when any of those are present, allege facts
showing that any existing remedy is impossible or unavailing, or that will excuse him for not
having availed himself of such remedy; 2) he must also show that the party against whom it
is being sought acted in grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction; and 3)
the hierarchy of courts must be respected. However, it cannot be resorted to when then the
lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case and the person of the petitioners for any
perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence would only be
considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Hence, such is correctible by appeal
and not by certiorari.
Page 911 of 1553

Facts:
In an alleged buy-bust operation on June 22, 2001, Jay Candelaria and Eric Basit
(herein petitioners) were arrested for delivering, with the intention to sell, five cases of
counterfeit Fundador Brandy. As such, they were formally charged with violation of Section
155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines. After arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on inadmissibility of evidence. They contended that the
evidence the prosecution intended to present were obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. They insisted that at the
time the alleged counterfeit products were seized, they were neither committing nor
attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers as to justify the
conduct of search and seizure following their unlawful arrest.
Eventually, the RTC denied said motion. It ruled that the search and seizure was
incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of the accused who were caught in flagrante delicto.
Thus, any evidence obtained during such search and seizure is admissible in evidence. It
also pointed out that any objection to an arrest must be made before an accused enters his
plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashal of the information before the
arraignment, an accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied. Hence, they filed the
present recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion of the petitioners.
Ruling:
The Petition is bereft of merit. Hence, it is hereby DISMISSED.
Pursuant to the ruling laid out in the case of Visca v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, it is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege with
certainty in his verified petition facts showing that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, because this is an indispensable
ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari. Furthermore, where the existence of a remedy
by appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy precludes the granting of the
writ, the petitioner must allege facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible or
Page 912 of 1553

unavailing, or that excuse petitioner for not having availed himself of such remedy.
Otherwise, non-compliance with the rules will render the petition for certiorari dismissible.
In the case at bar, assuming the assailed Order of the RTC to be erroneous, the
mistake is an error in judgment which is beyond the ambit of certiorari. As settled in the
case of Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank:
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made
by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void
judgment.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the petitioners. Its denial of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based
on its assessment that the evidence sought to be suppressed/excluded is admissible, was
also done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. As such, any perceived error in its
interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence is correctible by appeal, not
certiorari, as the same would only be considered an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.
Even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorari is proper, the Petition must still
be dismissed for their failure to show that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Moreover, it is noteworthy that the
main issue they raised in their Petition is when is the proper time to file a motion to
suppress/exclude evidence. They even conceded that this is a pure question of law.
It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC, petitioners made a direct
recourse to this Court thereby violating the principle of hierarchy of courts. It is settled
that while this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners
unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of courts which
Page 913 of 1553

is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against inferior level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, a direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition
which, however, are not obtaining in this case.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES vs. NOWELLA REYES

G.R. No. 208321, July 30, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The appellate court acted within its sound discretion when it re-evaluated the NLRC’s
factual findings and substituted the latter’s own judgment. It is settled that under Section 9
of Batas Pambansa Blg.129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA, pursuant to the
exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, is specifically given the power
to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
Facts:
Respondent Nowella Reyes was appointed as WUP's University Treasurer on

probationary basis. A little over a year after, she was appointed as full time University
Treasurer.
Several years after, a new WUP Board of Trustees was constituted. Among its first
acts was to engage the services of Nepomuceno Suner & Associates Accounting Firm
(External Auditor) to investigate circulating rumors on alleged anomalies in the contracts
entered into by petitioner and in its finances.
Discovered following an audit were irregularities in the handling of petitioner’s

finances, mainly, the encashment by its Treasury Department of checks issued to WUP
personnel, a practice purportedly in violation of the imprest system of cash management,
and the encashment of various crossed checks payable to the University Treasurer by
Chinabank despite management’s intention to merelyhave the funds covered thereby
transferred from one of petitioner’s bank accounts to another.
Upon receipt of her notice of termination, respondent post-haste filed a complaint

for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding complainant herein respondent
Page 914 of 1553

illegally dismissed and that she be reinstated her former or equivalent position without loss
of seniority right.
The NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. In net effect, the NLRC found petitioner’s
contention of loss of trust and confidence in respondent with sufficient basis. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision and reinstated the decision of the LA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals over-reached its power of review under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court when it reversed the judgment of the NLRC considering that a writ
of certiorari only corrects errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Ruling:
No, the CA acted within its sound discretion.
It is settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.129,19 as amended by

Republic Act No. 7902, the CA, pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and
when necessary, to resolve factual issues. Sec. 9 clearly states:
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x
Hence, the appellate court acted within its sound discretion when it re-evaluated
the NLRC’s factual findings and substituted the latter’s own judgment.
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA vs. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 212953, August 5, 2014, J. Velasco, JR.
Festin then filed a Protest Ad Cautelam against Villarosa alleging that there were
various irregularities that transpired during the election. The Regional Trial Court rendered
a decision in favor of Villarosa and declared him to be the winner of the elections and thus
entitled to assume office. The Comelec Special Division issued an order granting Felins prayer
for Preliminary Injunction. With this, Villarosa filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
Page 915 of 1553

with the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that in the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission
on Elections, the court has interpreted the provision to limit the remedy of certiorari against
final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Certiorari will not generally lie against an order,
ruling,or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account the
availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. As
elucidated in the case, Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires
that there be no appeal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide
by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
Facts:
The petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa and the respondent Romulo De Mesa Festin
were candidates for the position of mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Villarosa garnered the highest number votes and was proclaimed as the victor of the
electoral raise. Festin then filed a Protest Ad Cautelam against Villarosa alleging that there
were various irregularities that transpired during the election.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Villarosa and declared him
to be the winner of the elections and thus entitled to assume office. However, when the
matter was elevated to the Comelec, the Comelec Special Division issued an order granting
Felins prayer for Preliminary Injunction. With this, Villarosa filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court. Hence, the current petition.
It is the contention of Villarosa that the Special Division of Comelec acted in excess
of jurisdiction when it granted the prayer for Preliminary Injunction of Felin. He asserts
that the Special Division does not have the jurisdiction to rule upon the matter since it
must be the First Division that must render decision regarding the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec Special Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
granting the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Special Division acted well within its
jurisdiction and dismissed the petition of Villarosa.
Page 916 of 1553

On the first note, the Supreme Court ruled that the petition must be dismissed
outright for failure to comply with the established rules of procedure. Under Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, it is stated that decisions of Comelec divisions must first
be reviewed by Comelec en banc before resort to certiorari to the Supreme Court may be
made. This means that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the Comelec
en banc. Without a prior motion for reconsideration, resort to the Supreme Court via
certiorari will be premature. In addition, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
certiorari will only lie when there is no appeal or other ordinary, plain, speedy remedy
available. Since, in the case at bar, the remedy of motion for reconsideration is available
and was not availed of, then certiorari to the Supreme Court must fail. The Supreme Court
ruled this instance alone would have been enough to dismiss the petition filed by Villarosa.
However, assuming for the sake of argument that the recourse made by Villarosa is
correct, still, his petition cannot be given merit. A careful reading of the petition would not
imply any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Special Divisions Comelec. It has the
power and authority to rule upon the prayer for preliminary injuction. The allegation of
Villarosa that it must be the First Division who must decide on the matter is a result of his
own confusion. In the case at bar, the First Division is the same as the Special Division he
is referring to. What transpired is just a change of name of the First Division to a “special”
division by reason of a temporary vacancy of the positions in the first divisions.
JUANITO MAGSINO vs. ELENA DE OCAMPO and RAMON GUICO

G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014, J. Bersamin
Section 2 (d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the petition for review to be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court,
and the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. The failure of the
petitioner to comply with the requirement shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition for review.
Facts:
Petitioner Magsino filed against the respondents a complaint for forcible entry with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). He alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land
containing an area of 10 hectares situated in Antipolo City; that he had been in physical
possession of the land for more than 30 years; on February 5, 2000, the respondents,
through force, intimidation, threats and strategy and with the aid of armed men, had
Page 917 of 1553

unlawfully bulldozed the portions of his land, destroying ornamental plants and fruit-
bearing trees that he had himself planted several years before, thereby illegally depriving
him of the possession of the land.
The petitioner filed a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction but the
Municipal Trial Court in Taytay, Rizal (MTC) issued only a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent Elena De Ocampo countered that she had held a registered title in the
land by virtue of the original certificate of title issued to her mother, Cecilia De Ocampo;
and that petitioner was a squatter on the land with no possessory rights.
The MTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondents. The writ of preliminary
injunction was ordered set aside and with no further force and effect. The plaintiff is
ordered to leave and vacate that land.
The Regional Trial Court, rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.
The CA promulgated its first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for review
since it is procedurally flawed in view of the following:
The petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings and other material
portions as would support the allegations of the petition, such as:
1) Copy of the complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, Answer, and
Motion to Dismiss;
2) Copies of the appeal memoranda filed by the parties.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground
that the petitioner did not comply with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court: Section 2. Form and contents. – The petition
shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the
case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c)
Page 918 of 1553

set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification
of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the
reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by
clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both
lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite
number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations of the petition.
As earlier mentioned, the CA issued the first assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for review because the petitioner did not attach to his petition the complaint, the
answer, and the motion to dismiss, all filed in the MTC; and the copies of the parties’
memoranda on appeal presented in the RTC. Such dismissal was pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the

petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment
of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
The appeal of the petitioner absolutely lacks merit.
The court would begin by reminding the petitioner that the right to appeal is not a
natural right and is not part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege to be exercised
only in accordance with the law. Being the party who sought to appeal, he must comply
with the requirements of the relevant rules; otherwise, he would lose the statutory right to
appeal. It cannot be overemphasized, indeed, that the procedures regulating appeals as laid
down in the Rules of Court must be followed because strict compliance with them was
indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice.
Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for review was warranted depended on
whether or not there remained sufficient materials in the records to still enable the CA to
act on the appeal despite the omissions.
The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under
Rule 42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached
documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the
petition.
Page 919 of 1553

The first omitted document was the complaint in Civil Case No. 4141. Being the
initiatory pleading, the complaint included all the material facts and dates necessary to
support the petitioner’s cause of action for forcible entry, specifically: (1) his prior physical
possession of the property; (2) his being deprived of the physical possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (3) his filing of the action within one year from
the time he or his representative learned of the deprivation of physical possession of the
land or building.
The direct relevance of the complaint in the appeal could neither be denied nor
diminished, for only from its allegations could the true nature of the action as one for
forcible entry and, consequently, whether the trial court or another court had jurisdiction
over the action be fully determined. Such determination was indifferent to the defenses set
up by the defendants in their answer or other responsive pleadings.
The next omitted pleading was the answer of the respondents. As with the
complaint, the answer was relevant in the appeal in the CA, for the respondents as the
defendants had set forth their defenses therein. The omission of the answer from the
petition deprived the CA of the means to know the factual averments of the complaint that
were admitted and those that were denied.
The third omitted document was the motion to dismiss. Although the motion to
dismiss would appear to be less relevant in view of the filing of the answer by the
respondents, the CA could have had good reasons for noting its omission as a ground to
dismiss the petition for review.
The memoranda on appeal the parties respectively filed in the RTC were the fourth
kind of omitted documents. In respect of the petitioner, his memorandum, which was due
to be filed within 15 days from the filing of his notice of appeal as required by Section 7,
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, would have specified and supported the errors he imputed
to the MTC. Such filing in the RTC could not be dispensed with, for the RTC would consider
only the errors specifically assigned and argued in his memorandum, except errors affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. If the memorandum
was not filed, the appeal could be dismissed. Unless his memorandum was part of his
petition for review, therefore, the CA would likely find his appeal frivolous, or even consider
it dismissible pursuant to Section 3, Rule 42, supra.
On their part, the respondents were required to file their own memorandum on
appeal within a similar period of 15 days from receipt of the petitioner’s memorandum of
appeal. For the petitioner to omit the respondents’ memorandum from his petition for
review was inherently unfair because they had therein submitted matters precisely to
Page 920 of 1553

sustain the judgment of the MTC in their favor. Indeed, the memoranda on appeal of the
parties were relevant in the proper consideration and resolution of the merits of the appeal
of the petitioner.
A perusal of the records indicates that the documents actually attached to the
petition for review were limited to the following, namely: (1) illegible certified xerox copy
of the May 5, 2003 judgment of the MTC in Civil Case No. 4141; (2) duplicate original copy
of the September 17, 2003 order issued by the RTC affirming the judgment of the MTC; (3)
certified xerox copy of the November 6, 2003 order of the RTC denying the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner; and (4) original copy of the September 30, 2003 motion
for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in the RTC.
The petitioner could still have submitted the omitted documents at the time he filed
his motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the first assailed resolution of the CA. Yet, he did
not do so. Instead, he boldly proposed in his motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the first
assailed resolution that the CA should have bowed to the "greater imperative of doing
substantial justice" by not hampering the appeal.
The court cannot agree with the petitioner’s arrogant but unworthy proposition.
The CA was only just in denying his motion for reconsideration through the second assailed
resolution on the following terms, viz:
A careful perusal of the said provision would reveal that the documents mentioned
are required to be appended to the petition and the mandatory character of such
requirement may be inferred from Section 3 of Ruled 42 x x x. The petitioner’s argument
that it is the Court which should get all the records from the court a quo if it really wants
to be more informed of the issues, is not well-taken. The annexes mentioned in Section
2(d) of Rule 42 are required to be appended to the petition in order to enable this Court to
determine even without consulting the record if the petition is patently without merit or
the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration, in which case the
petition should be dismissed outright, or whether there is a need to require the respondent
to comment on the petition.
The petitioner urged us to rely on the documents and pleadings he appended in his
petition which merely consisted of the MTC Judgment, the assailed RTC Order, the Motion
for Reconsideration, and the questioned Order dated November 6, 2003 denying his
Motion for Reconsideration. None of the documents set out the factual milieu of his claims.
He maintained that what he has submitted based on his discretion, are all that are
necessary to support his allegations in his petition. As the court has mentioned, the
accompanying documents were insufficient to support the petition. Also, the petitioner
Page 921 of 1553

could have easily ended his debacle by merely attaching the supplemental documents in
his Motion for Reconsideration. Instead, the petitioner stubbornly chose to insist that this
Court direct the elevation of the records of the case if the court deems that the relevant
documents were not appended to the petition.
It is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or material portions of the record of
the case would support the allegations in the petition. The petitioner's discretion in
choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not unbridled. The Court
has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the submission of
supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to
enable us to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in
the petition. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that if
petitioner fails to comply with the submission of "documents which should accompany the
petition", it "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled with the
unjustified refusal of the petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the
attachment requirement justified the dismissal of his petition.
The petitioner is reminded that any "resort to a liberal application or suspension of

the application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled
principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice." It
cannot be otherwise for him.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most
persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.
In Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, the court declared:
The petitioner did not deserve the liberal application of the rules of procedure that
he was seeking. Indeed, the dismissal of his petition for review was in full accord with the
following pronouncement upon a similar provision in the Rules of Court made in Atillo v.
Bombay, as follows:
The mandatory tenor of Section 2(d), Rule 42 with respect to the requirement of
attaching clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders
of both lower courts is discernible and well settled. In this case, the mandatory or directory
Page 922 of 1553

nature of the requirement with respect to the attachment of pleadings and other material
portions of the record is put in question.
The phrase "of the pleadings and other material portions of the record" in Section
2(d), Rule 42 is followed by the phrase "as would support the allegations of the petition"
clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection
of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. xxx. The crucial issue to
consider then is whether or not the documents accompanying the petition before the CA
sufficiently supported the allegations therein.
ELSIE S. CAUSING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.

G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014, J. Bersamin
The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable

condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The rule is not absolute, however, considering that
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for
certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are
a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions
was applicable herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration,
especially because there was nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the
filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases.
Facts:
On January 1, 1993, Elsie Causing (Causing) assumed office as the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No.
Page 923 of 1553

12, Series of 2010 which details Causing at the Office of the Municipal Mayor effective upon
receipt of this Order and shall likewise receive direct orders from the undersigned as to
particular functions our office may require from time to time.
On the same date, Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing Catalina V.
Belonio (Belonio), another municipal employee, to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to assume the functions and duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate
effective upon receipt of the order.
On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series of 2010,
and Memorandum No. 17-A, Series of 2010 directing her to report to the Office of the Mayor
effective immediately upon receipt of this Order and signing of MCR documents shall
likewise be done at my office where you will be provided with a table for this particular
function.
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the complaint-
affidavit in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming
that Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to
the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior
authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in
connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009 otherwise
known as " In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibition against appointment or hiring of new
employees, creating or filing of new positions, giving any salary increase or transferring or
detailing any officer or employee in the civil service and suspension of local elective officials
in connection with the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.” Further, said transfer of
detail does not fall under any of the exceptions to the requirement of prior authority from
the COMELEC, as provided under Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737.
Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to
closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative
behavior in dealing with her co-employees and with the public transacting business in her
office had been received;8 that as the local chief executive, he was empowered to take
personnel actions and other management prerogatives for the good of public service; that
Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar; that she
was not transferred or detailed to another office in order to perform a different function;
and that she was not demoted to a lower position that diminished her salary and other
benefits.
Atty. Elizabeth Doronilla, the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES), recommended

the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause to charge Mayor Biron
Page 924 of 1553

with the violation of Section (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. the COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES Doronilla, observing that Mayor Biron
did not transfer or detail Causing but only required her to physically report to the Mayor’s
office and to perform her functions thereat; and that he did not strip her of her functions
as the Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not deprive her of her supervisory functions over
her staff. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Causing should file a motion for reconsideration before filing the
Ruling:
Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless otherwise provided by
the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a
copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate rule (Rule 64)
on the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is
generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of the
petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than
60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution assailed.
The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable

condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort
to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent the opportunity to correct
any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual
aspects of the case.
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down
exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a
motion for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government, or
Page 925 of 1553

of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the petitioner was
deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest
is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing
exceptions was applicable herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for
reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
ATTY. FORTUNATO PAGDANGANAN, JR., ATTY. ABIGAIL D. SUAREZ, and

EUGENIO A. VILLANUEVA vs. FLORENTINO P. SARMIENTO
G.R. No. 206555, September 17, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Respondent moved for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in a Resolution. Atty.
Borromeo, respondent’s counsel, was duly notified of the said resolution. The respondent filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA 25 days after the period to file such petition has lapsed.
He reasoned that his counsel has been relieved of his duties long before and that he was not
notified of such resolution. The Court ruled that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction. Under
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party has 60 days from receipt of the
assailed decision, order or resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari. Well-settled
rule that if a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court orders and
decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to his client.
Facts:
Sea Gem Maritime International, Inc., on behalf of its foreign principal, Corinthian
Maritime S. A., hired Sarmiento as Chief Mate of the vessel M/T Intuition but was
transferred to the vessel M/T Setubal I.
While M/T Setubal I was docked at Nigeria, Sarmiento felt a loss of strength in his
left arm and fingers. Upon examination at the Adeiza Clinic in Lagos, Nigeria, he was
diagnosed to have Mild Cardiovascular Stroke, Disused Atrophy of the Left Hand, and
Hypertension, for which his repatriation was recommended. Sarmiento was repatriated to
the Philippines and referred to the MRI Diagnosis Center.
Page 926 of 1553

Subsequently, Sarmiento filed a complaint against Sea Gem, Corinthian, Cielo B.

Peñalosa, Gracia P. Fernandez, Dulce P. Cruz, Grace Ann C. Javier, Allan P. Cruz, Abigail
Torrefil, Joseph Stevenson B. Alican, and petitioners Atty. Pagdanganan, Atty. Suarez, and
Villanueva before the NLRC for the collection of: his unpaid salaries, disability benefits,
sickness allowance, and reimbursement of his medical expenses.
Petitioners denied any liability to Sarmiento, contending that they were no longer
connected with Sea Gem when he filed his complaint. Villanueva resigned before
Sarmiento was hired while Atty. Pagdanganan and Suarez tendered their resignations as
Sea Gem’s President and Corporate Secretary, respectively. Others maintained that they
have divested their respective shares of stock before Sea Gem engaged the services of
Sarmiento.
The Labor Arbiter granted Sarmiento’s money claims but denied his claim for
disability benefits in absence of competent physician’s declaration as to the degree of his
disability. It held that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, corporate directors and
officers cannot be relieved of their liabilities as such for the sole reason that they have
resigned or ceased to become shareholders of Sea Gem.
Only the petitioners appealed rendering the decision final as to the others.
Pending petitioners’ appeal, or on June 4, 2010, Atty. Borromeo entered his

appearance as counsel for Sarmiento and simultaneously filed pleadings on his behalf.
NLRC affirmed the ruling, but absolved the petitioners from liability. NLRC gave credence
to the letter of the POEA stating that petitioners were never recognized as directors of Sea
Gem.
Sarmiento moved for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in a Resolution dated
December, 30, 2010. On January 12, 2011, Atty. Borromeo was duly notified of the said
resolution, as evidenced by the registry return receipt issued by the Bureau of Posts.
On April 7, 2011, Sarmiento, personally and on his own behalf, filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. In the
said petition, Sarmiento claimed that he was personally notified of the December 30, 2010
Resolution only on February 10, 2011, thus, it was seasonably filed.
Thereafter, or on June 1, 2011, Atty. Borromeo filed a Manifestation with Notice of

Withdrawal of Appearance, explaining that he had been long discharged of his duties as
counsel of Sarmiento but due to personal problems and other professional commitments,
Page 927 of 1553

he forgot to file a formal withdrawal of appearance in this case. Further, he denied receipt
of the December 30, 2010 Resolution and claimed that it was his neighbor, a certain Roland
Allan Lomentigar, who received it on January 12, 2011.
The CA did not address the issue raised by petitioners regarding the timeliness of
the filing of Sarmiento’s CA petition. It reinstated the LA’s ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it found grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC in absolving petitioners from liability in connection with Sarmiento’s money
claims notwithstanding the fact that Sarmiento’s petition challenging the NLRC Decision
was filed out of time
Ruling:
Yes, the CA should not have taken cognizance of the case.
Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party has 60 days from
receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution within which to file a petition for
certiorari. Well-settled rule that if a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds,
including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is
considered notice to his client.
The Court did not give credence to Sarmiento’s contention that Atty. Borromeo had
been discharged as counsel even before Sarmiento received the December 30, 2010
Resolution, considering that Atty. Borromeo never filed a formal withdrawal of appearance
prior thereto, conformably with Section 26 Rule 138 of the Rules. For his failure to observe
the proper legal formalities, Atty. Borromeo remained as Sarmiento’s counsel on record.
Fundamental is the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or withdrawal is formally made, any
court record sent to him binds the client, despite an internal arrangement between them
terminating their professional relationship, as in this case.
Atty. Borromeo eventually filed a Manifestation with Notice of Withdrawal of

Appearance before the CA, thus confirming that he was, in fact, Sarmiento’s legal counsel
at the time he received the December 30, 2010 Resolution. Being filed 25 days late, the CA
did not acquire jurisdiction over Sarmiento’s petition, hence, the NLRC Ruling could no
longer be assailed.
Page 928 of 1553

680 HOME APPLIANCES, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE MARY ANNE CORPUS-MANALAC, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH
141, ATTY. ENGRACIO ESCASINAS, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EX-OFFICIO
SHERIFF/CLERK OF COURT VII, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT (SPV-
AMC), INC., AND ALDANCO MERLMAR, INC.
Indeed, [the Court finds] 680 Home’s resort to a certiorari petition rather dubious.
After receiving on February 25, 2013 a copy of the CA decision, 680 Home filed neither a
motion for reconsideration thereof nor an appeal therefrom. Instead, it waited 58 days after
receiving the assailed decision on April 24, 2013 to institute a certiorari proceeding. Although
the petition was filed within the 60-day period to institute a certiorari proceeding, the long
delay negates 680 Home’s claimed urgency of its cause and indicates that it resorted to the
present petition for certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal.
Facts:
The controversy in the instant case stemmed from the foreclosure proceedings
initiated by Deutsche Bank AG London on the real estate mortgage constituted by its
creditor, herein Petitioner 680 Home Appliance. Respondent First Sovereign Asset
Management, Inc. (FSAMI) emerged as the highest bidder of 680 Home Appliance’s
mortgaged properties and later it was able to obtained title over the same following the
non-redemption of the former owner.
While 680 Home Appliance was pursuing its action to annul the mortgage and
foreclo-sure, FSAMI sought the issuance of a writ of possession to which the former and its
present lessee on the subject property, Respondent Aldanco Merlmar, Inc. (Aldanco) tried
to intervene. 680 Home Appliance was denied intervention but still it filed a petition to
cancel the writ of possession, invoking Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135. The trial found the
contentions of 680 Home Appliance untenable. The CA, in resolving against 680 Home
Appliance, likewise ruled, among others, that since FSAMI did not obtain possession of the
property, the 30-day period to file a petition to cancel the writ under Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135
has not yet commenced.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by 680 Home Appliance is the proper
remedy.
Page 929 of 1553

Ruling:
Procedurally… 680 Home availed of the wrong remedy to question the CA

decision.... A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is availed of only
when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Unfortunately, 680 Home’s resort to a certiorari petition could not be justified by
the unavailability or insuffi-ciency of other remedies.
A motion for reconsideration is recognized as an adequate remedy against a

decision, resolution, or order of a lower court, as it provides the court opportunity to
correct any error it might have committed. Hence, the filing of a motion for reconsideration
was made a prerequi-site to the filing of a certiorari petition. The availability of the remedy
of reconsideration gene-rally precludes immediate recourse to a certiorari petition. 680
Home, however, never moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, and offered no
explanation for its failure to comply with the requirement.
Also, the remedy provided under the Rules of Court from a decision of the CA is an
appeal by certiorari under its Rule 45. Instead of instituting a certiorari petition, 680 Home
should have filed an appeal under Rule 45, especially considering that the issue raised here
is primarily legal in nature.
Indeed, [the Court finds] 680 Home’s resort to a certiorari petition rather dubious.
After receiving on February 25, 2013 a copy of the CA decision, 680 Home filed neither a
motion for reconsideration thereof nor an appeal therefrom. Instead, it waited 58 days after
receiving the assailed decision on April 24, 2013 to institute a certiorari proceeding.
Although the petition was filed within the 60-day period to institute a certiorari
proceeding, the long delay negates 680 Home’s claimed urgency of its cause and indicates
that it resorted to the present petition for certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal.
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED

BY HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MALAY, AKLAN,
REPRESENTED BY HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE,
WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER,
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY
FOUNDATION INC., REPRESENTED BY NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY
POLICE, AND JOHN AND JANE DOES
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
Page 930 of 1553

The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive depart-
ment, exercises an executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too
presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or
body which performs it, that determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The first requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the
officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character.
It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically
judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is
sufficient if they are quasi-judicial. To contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial
function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights
of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial function is “a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies xxx required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the [mayor’s] finding that
Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is
illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, against which the special writ of certiorari may lie. xxx.
Facts:
Petitioner Aquino is the president and CEO of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). In January 2010, the company applied
for a zoning compliance with the Municipal Government of Malay, Aklan. While the
company was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of
a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land
measuring 998 sq. mts. located somewhere in Boracay Island, which are is covered by a
Forest Land Use Agreement for Tou-rism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the DENR in favor
of Boracay West Cove.
Through a decision, the municipal zoning administrator denied Aquino’s

application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in the pertinent ordinance.
In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor.
Meanwhile, the Municipal Treasurer sent a Notice of Assessment against Aquino for
Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a recommendation for
Page 931 of 1553

closure in view of its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the necessary
zoning clearance, building permit, and business and mayor’s permit. Subsequently, a Cease
and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and later, the Office of the Mayor issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion,
Aquino filed a petition for Certiorari. In amidst the contentious legal issues, the CA took
the stand the legal recourse taken by is improper as the special writ of certiorari can only
be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions and since the assailed EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and
not of judicial or quasi-judicial func-tions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy
for Aquino, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional
Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant petition for certiorari is the proper recourse of Aquino,
and not a petition for declaratory relief.
Ruling:
YES, the requisites for the proper availment of certiorari are present in this case.
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action
for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of
the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof,
or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it
may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which
it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies
that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies
the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s
enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile
any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives
in the challenged EO.
Page 932 of 1553

Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy
given such a situation.
The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive
depart-ment, exercises an executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This
is tad too presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the
office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not a particular act is
a discharge of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The first requirement for certiorari is
satisfied if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
character.
It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically
judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is
sufficient if they are quasi-judicial. To contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial
function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the
rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial function is “a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies xxx required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the [mayor’s] finding that
Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is
illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, against which the special writ of certiorari may lie. xxx.
The Court likewise holds that, as one of the requisites of certiorari, there is “the
unavai-lability of a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy”, in the instant case. “While it may be
argued that, under the LGC, Executive Orders issued by mayors are subject to review by
provincial governors, this cannot be considered as an adequate remedy given the exigencies
of petitioner’s predicament.”
In a litany of cases, [the Court has] held that it is inadequacy, not the mere absence
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or
resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark
time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled
and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules
of Court.
Page 933 of 1553

[I]t must first be borne in mind that respondents in this case have already taken
measures towards implementing EO 10. In fact, substantial segments of the hotel have
already been demolished pursuant to the mayor’s directive. It is then understandable why
Aquino prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ––a provisional remedy that would
otherwise have been unavailable had he sought a reversal from the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Aklan. Evidently, [Aquino] correctly saw the urgent need for judicial
intervention via certiorari.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION

ADMINISTRATION vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO AND DOLORES LAZ
G.R. No. 195594, September 29, 2014, J. Peralta
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before
a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo
to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following
exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to
file a motion for reconsideration.
Forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse judgment in

one forum, seeks another opinion in another court, other than by appeal or special civil action
of certiorari.
In the instant case, the Court cannot but agree with petitioner Republic that this case
falls within the abovementioned exceptions, to wit: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
The questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those already raised
and passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be
useless and serve no practical purpose. Further, records show that petitioner Republic timely
filed its motion for extension of time to file a petition on March 2, 2011. The petition, however,
was not docketed because the required fees were not paid based on petitioner’s belief that it
Page 934 of 1553

is exempt therefrom. Nonetheless, payment was immediately made the following day, March
3, 2011. The tardiness of petitioner is excusable since no significant period of time elapsed.
Facts:
Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers
of Monte Vista Homes (Monte Vista), a residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing,
Municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily sold to the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an open
irrigation canal that is part ofthe Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project (BPIP). The
consideration of the negotiated sale was in a total amount of P27,180,000.00 at the rate
of P2,500.00 per square meter. Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of Engr.
Donno G. Custodio, retired Chief Geologist ofthe Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to conduct a geohazard study on the
possible effects of the BPIP on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up with a Geohazard
Assessment Report (GAR), finding that ground shaking and channel bank erosion are the
possible hazards that could affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista.
On December 22, 2006, the Sangguniang Bayanof Bantay, Ilocos Sur approved
Resolution No. 34, which adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR. Among
others, it resolved that the GAR recommendations should be observed and implemented
by the concerned implementing agency of the NIA BPIP.
Respondent Rogelio Lazo brought toNIA’s attention Resolution No. 34 through his
letters dated January 15, 2007, September 5, 2007, and November 1, 2007. He specifically
asked for the implementation of the GAR recommendations and the payment of just
compensation for the entire buffer zone involving an aggregate area of 14,381 sq. m., more
or less.
When respondents’ demands were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint
for just compensation with damages against NIA on January 31, 2008. Prior to the filing of
an Answer, respondents filed an Amended Complaint with application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. They further alleged that the BPIP
contractor is undertaking substandard works that increase the risk of a fatal accident.
The trial court issued an ex parte 72-hour TRO and directed the NIA to appear in a
summary hearing on July 9, 2008 to show cause why the injunction should not be granted.
Instead of a personal appearance, the NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Manifestation and Motionpraying that the TRO be lifted and the application
for preliminary injunction be denied for being prohibited by Republic Act. No. 8975.In the
Page 935 of 1553

July 9, 2008 hearing, the trial court ordered respondents to comment on the Manifestation
and Motion (which was later on complied with)and extended the TRO for 20 days from its
issuance.
On September 17, 2008, trial court granted respondents’ application for preliminary
injunction. Two days later, the trial court issued a Supplement to the Order of September
17, 2008, stating that the dispositive portion of the Order of September 17, 2008 is
supplemented whereby the Court hereby fixes the injunction bond in the amount of
Php3,000,000.00. Upon approval of the requisite bond, let the Writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issue.
The trial court ruled that the instant case falls under the exception of Section 3 of
R.A. No. 8975, because respondents’ demand for just compensation is by reason of the
property being burdened by the construction of the open irrigation canal in Monte Vista
which altered its use and integrity. Also, the trial court found that petitioner violated R.A.
No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 wherein: “The Local Government Code
embodies the policy of the State to devolve the powers and authority of a former centralized
government.”
Without moving for a reconsideration of the two Orders, petitioner directly filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged
Orders of the trial court.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner Republic represented by NIA did not follow the Rules when
it filed a petition for certiorari directly with the CA without seeking for a
reconsideration from the trial court.
2. Whether the petition was filed out of time due to belated payment of docket
and other lawful fees;
3. Whether herein petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
Ruling:
The contentions are untenable. A petition for certiorari may be given due course
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was filed in the trial court.
Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari with the CA is discouraged when
litigants may still resort to remedies with the trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of
due course to a petition for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the
Page 936 of 1553

court because the technical provisions of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before
a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a
quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid
down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper
notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon
in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
The Court cannot but agree with petitioner Republic that this case falls within
instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-mentioned. As will be elucidated in the
discussion below, the assailed Orders of the trial court are patent nullity for having been
issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Also, the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings are the same as those already raised and passed upon in the lower court;
hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be useless and serve no practical
purpose.
There is likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government. In its petition and
memorandum filed before the CA, petitioner Republic in fact noted that the BPIP is
intended to cater the year-round irrigation needs of 6,312 hectares of agricultural land
in Bantay, Caoayan, Magsingal, San Ildefonso, San Vicente, Sto. Domingo, Sta. Catalina,
Page 937 of 1553

and Vigan in Ilocos Sur. Even Resolution No. 34 recognizes this. Public interest is
actually involved as the targeted increase in agricultural production is expected to uplift
the farmers’ standard of living. Lastly, the issue raised – that is, under the antecedent
facts, whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondents’ prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction despite the
mandate of R.A. No. 8975 – is one purely of law.
The CA and Supreme Court unquestionably have full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari filed directly
with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
clearly and specifically raised in the petition. The Court deems it proper to adopt an
open-minded approach in the present case.
1. Also, while it has been stressed that payment of docket and other fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal and that such
payment is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, the Court, in exceptional
circumstances, has allowed a liberal application of the Rules when the payments of
the required docket fees were delayed only for a few days. Indeed, late payment of
docket fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to abide by the
rules through immediate payment of the required fees.
In this case, records show that petitioner timely filed its motion for extension of
time to file a petition on March 2, 2011. The petition, however, was not docketed because
the required fees were not paid based on petitioner’s belief that it is exempt therefrom.
Nonetheless, payment was immediately made the following day, March 3, 2011. The
tardiness of petitioner is excusable since no significant period of time elapsed.
2. No. Republic is not guilty of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse

judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion in another court, other than by appeal
or special civil action of certiorari. It is the institution of two or more suits in different
courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the
same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial

remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court." Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned
Page 938 of 1553

because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the
administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets. An important
factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-
litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements
of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are
present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars,
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Taking into account the surrounding circumstances, it cannot be said that

petitioner Republic’s Manifestation and Motion dated March 25, 2011 constitutes forum
shopping.
HEIRS OF JULIO SOBREMONTE and FELIPA LABAPIS SOBREMONTE, Namely,

MARIA LOURDES SOBREMONTE de NORBE, DIOSCORA SOBREMONTE de
BUSLON, NESTOR L. SOBREMONTE, AVELINA SOBREMONTE DE DELIGERO,
HELEN SOBREMONTE DE CABASE, LAURA SOBREMONTE DE DAGOY and
RODULFO LABAPIS REPOLLO, ALL REPRESENTED BY AVELINA SOBREMONTE
DELIGERO AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE VIRGILIO REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND FELICIANO T
APIL, MARCELO BAYNO, VICENTE BAYNO, ROMUALDO DIAPANA, HILARIO
RECTA, NEMESIA RECTA, POLICARPIO RECTA, AMPARO R. DIAPANA, BASILIO
SAYSON BUENA VENTURA BA YNO AND BASILIO BAFLOR
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, Court finds no abuse of discretion, grave or simple in nature, committed
by the CA in dismissing the petitioners’ certiorari petition for being the wrong mode of appeal.
The CA’s dismissal of the certiorari petition is, in fact, well-supported by law and
Page 939 of 1553

jurisprudence. The Court previously held that Rule 43 of the Rules of Court shall govern the
procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary, and
that an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed.
Facts:
A lot was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. During her lifetime, Felipa filed a protest before
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office) in Toledo City. She argued that the subject property
could not be acquired under OLT because it had already been partitioned, then sold or
donated to her children. Felipa filed another protest alleging that no tenancy relationship
existed between her and the identified farmer-beneficiaries of the property.
MARO dismissed Felipa’s 1st protest because the deeds of sale and donation
executed in favor of Felipa’s children were not registered with the Register of Deeds; thus,
the deeds could not serve as the medium for the valid transfers of ownership insofar as the
tenant-farmers were concerned and were not reasons to exempt the subject lot from OLT
coverage. After further investigation, the MARO also dismissed Felipa’s 2nd protest and
maintained that the lot in question is subject to OLT coverage. Felipa appealed to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office, Cebu City which affirmed the
dismissal of Felipa’s protests
CA dismissed the petitioners’ certiorari petition outright because the petitioners

used of the wrong remedy: the correct remedy should have been a petition for review under
Rule 43, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
Issue:
Whether or not Petition for Certiorari is the correct remedy from the decision of
DAR.
Ruling:
No, Petition for Certiorari is not the correct remedy from the decision of DAR.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
Page 940 of 1553

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as its function is
limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
"Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
In this case, Court finds no abuse of discretion, grave or simple in nature, committed
by the CA in dismissing the petitioners’ certiorari petition for being the wrong mode of
appeal. The CA’s dismissal of the certiorari petition is, in fact, well-supported by law and
jurisprudence. The Court previously held that Rule 43 of the Rules of Court shall govern
the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary,
and that an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed.
The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, the
petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, "an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed”
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, and MS. CYNTHIA
C. MENDOZA vs. JOEL P. HIPE, JR.
G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014, J. Perlas- Bernabe
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon it. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC
when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion. The onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability
benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence to justify the grant of relief. Guided by the
Page 941 of 1553

foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting
Hipe’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the
complaint for permanent disability benefits for Hipe’s failure to establish his claim through
substantial evidence.
Facts:
Hipe had been hired by petitioner Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. (Bahia) for its
foreign principal, Fred Olsen Cruise Line (Olsen). He was last employed by Bahia as
plumber for the vessel M/S Braemar (vessel) under a six-month contract commencing on
the day of his embarkation on December 6, 2007. Despite the lapse of the six-month
contract on June 6, 2008, Hipe continued to work aboard the vessel without any new
contract. On June 22, 2008, in the course of the performance of his duties as plumber, he
sustained a back injury. After one (1) month, however, he was repatriated to Manila on
August 5, 2008.
Upon Hipe’s arrival, he was examined by the company-designated physician, Dr.

Lim wherein the medical results revealed that he was suffering from "Lumbosacral Strain
with right L5 Radiculopathy." Thereafter, he was referred to an orthopedic surgeon and a
psychiatrist for supervision and therapy. On October 2, 2008, Dr. Lim issued a medical
assessment that "Hipe still has had considerable improvement with less pain and negligible
tenderness at the lumbosacral area," and that, per advise of the attending orthopedic
surgeon, Hipe was to continue his rehabilitation and medications and to return on October
9, 2008 "for reevaluation and possible resumption of sea duties." On the latter date, Hipe
was declared fit to work, and thus executed the corresponding Certificate of Fitness for
Work.
Subsequently, or on February 25, 2009, Hipe, however, sought a second opinion

from Dr. Dr. Garduce of the UPPGH Medical Center who declared him unfit to work as
seaman-plumber, and assessed his disability rating at Grade 5. Thereafter, Hipe filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for the payment of permanent disability
compensation, sick wages, reimbursement of medical and transportation expenses, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against Bahia, its President, Cynthia C.
Mendoza, and its foreign principal, Olsen (respondents).
LA ruled in favor of Hipe. NLRC reversed and set aside LA’s decision ruling. Hipe
moved for reconsideration which the NLRC, however, denied in a Resolution dated June
22, 2010, prompting the filing of a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA reinstated LA’s
decision as it ruled in favor of Hipe.
Page 942 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in granting Hipe’s petition for certiorari, thereby
setting aside the NLRC Decision dismissing the complaint and adjudging Hipe’s
entitlement to permanent disability benefits.
Ruling:
Yes.
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the
character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter
alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. The onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability
benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence to justify the grant of relief.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed
reversible error in granting Hipe’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent disability benefits for Hipe’s
failure to establish his claim through substantial evidence.
PHILIPPINE MIGRANTS WATCH, INC., et al. vs. OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE

ADMINISTRATION, et al.
G.R. No. 166923, November 26, 2014, J. Peralta
Jurisdiction over the issue of the constitutionality of the OWWA Omnibus Policies is
a question of law, as issuance was done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and
administrative functions within the confines of the granting law. Hence, contrary to the lower
court’s contention, certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy in the instant case. Thus,
the RTC had jurisdiction over the controversy and it was erroneous for it to dismiss the
complaint outright.
Page 943 of 1553

Facts:
Petitioners Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc., et al. filed with the RTC a
complaint seeking to annul the OWWA Omnibus Policies providing guidelines on matters
concerning OWWA membership and its coverage, collection of contributions, and
availment of benefits issued by the respondent OWWA. Petitioners alleged that the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of
jurisdiction, as OWWA was created by law to provide welfare services to all Filipino
overseas contract workers, without limiting the same to member-contributors only.
However, because of the passage of the Omnibus Policies, the OWWA benefits shall be
available only to those overseas contract workers who have paid their monetary
contribution on a per contract basis. It imposed on the overseas workers the compulsory
payment of OWWA membership contribution in the amount of US$25.00, which was
originally collected from their employers. This, petitioners contend, is violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution for it created a distinction between Filipino overseas
workers who contributed to the OWWA Fund and those who have not.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The determination of
constitutionality of the assailed resolution rests, not within its jurisdiction, but within the
jurisdiction of this Court. As such, it ruled that the appropriate remedy to annul and set
aside the subject issuance was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, the lower court held that it
could not arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve the constitutionality of the
administrative act.
Issue:
Did the RTC have jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint challenging the
constitutionality of the omnibus policies of the respondents?
Ruling:
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the mode of appeal in all
cases involving only questions of law shall be by petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45.
In the present petition, the appeal interposed by petitioners stems from the Orders
of the RTC dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The issue raised herein is one
Page 944 of 1553

of jurisdiction over the subject matter, specifically, whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
over petitioners’ complaint challenging the constitutionality of the Omnibus Policies
issued by respondents.
Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and determine a
case. It is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute. The question as to whether or
not the dismissal by the lower court for lack of jurisdiction is proper involves the
determination of whether, admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the trial
court has jurisdiction over the same in light of the laws governing jurisdiction. As such,
jurisdiction is neither a question of fact or of fact and law but a matter of law. For this
reason, the Court has consistently held that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is a question of law, and have, in fact, affirmed dismissals by the CA of appeals
brought to them involving pure questions of law. Considering that only questions of law
was raised in this petition, direct resort to this Court is proper.
The Court cannot, therefore, give credence to the lower court’s contention that the
appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the issuance subject of this case is a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari, as a special civil action,
is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity in
issuing the assailed resolution. They were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of
contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. Instead, their
issuance of the challenged resolution was done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and
administrative functions within the confines of the granting law. Hence, contrary to the
lower court’s contention, certiorari is not the proper remedy in the instant case.
As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved in this case,
it is settled in law and jurisprudence that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, executive order, or administrative
regulation, as recognized in Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. It was,
therefore, erroneous for the RTC to abruptly dismiss the complaint filed by petitioners on
the basis of lack of jurisdiction since said court clearly had the power to take cognizance of
the same. In so doing, the lower court failed to ascertain factual issues necessary to
determine whether the subject issuance is, indeed, invalid and violative of the Constitution.
Page 945 of 1553

TZE SUN WONG vs. KENNY WONG

G .R. No. 180364, December 03, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Bureau of Immigration ordered deportation of petitioner. The Secretary of Justice

affirmed the order. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before the CA which was denied. It
revolves on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation. The Court affirmed the factual matters
already established. The Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner
violated certain provisions of the Immigration Act. Courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
Facts:
Tze Sun Wong is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in 1975 and
subsequently acquired a permanent resident status in 1982. He studied, married, and
continued to reside in the country, and even owned a company called Happy Sun Travel
and Tours.
Kenny Wong filed a complaint against Tze before the Bureau of Immigration,
alleging that the latter had misrepresented, in his driver’s license application, that he was
a Filipino citizen. Kenny prayed that Tze be investigated by the BOI for violation of
immigration laws.
Tze denied the claim of misrepresentation, stating that when he applied for a
driver’s license, it was another person who filled up the application form for him. However,
said person entered the wrong information, particularly, on his name, birth year, and
nationality.
BOI ordered the deportation of Tze on the grounds of: (a) illegal use of alias, i.e.,
Joseph Wong, which was the name appearing in his driver’s license application; and (b)
misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in the same application, in violation of The
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Sections 1, 2, and 3 of R.A. 6085. The BOI
took judicial notice of the fact that driver’s license applications require the personal
appearance of the applicant in order to prevent fraud. By allowing someone to apply for
him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and issuance of a fraudulent driver’s
license.
Acting Secretary of Justice affirmed the ruling of the BOI, holding that since it
undisputedly appears on the face of petitioner’s driver’s license that he is a Filipino citizen
under the name of Joseph Wong, he cannot then raise the defense that it was not his doing
Page 946 of 1553

but that of a stranger who merely helped him. Tze’s use of the alias “Joseph Wong” was
illegal since said name is not registered in the BOI and does not fall under the recognized
exceptions where use of alias may be allowed.
The CA denied Tze’s certiorari petition, and held that Tze should be deported.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly denied Tze’s petition for certiorari
Ruling:
Yes, the Court upheld the denial of CA of the petition.
Section 1, Rule 43 clearly states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments or final orders issued under the
Labor Code) shall be appealed to the CA under this rule.
From the denial of the BOI Board of Commissioners’ motion for reconsideration,
the aggrieved party has three options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule
43 provided that he shows that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b)
absent any of the exceptions, he may exhaust the available administrative remedies within
the executive machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice and then to the OP,
and thereafter, appeal the OP’s decisions via Rule 43; or (c) he may directly resort to
certiorari before the CA strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why
any of the aforementioned remedies cannot be taken as “adequate and speedy.”
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper when it is necessary

to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, and insufficient, and in case of urgency. Tze instituted an administrative appeal
before the Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought direct recourse to the CA via certiorari,
thereby leap-frogging other available remedies, the first being a subsequent administrative
appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal of the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43.
The Court held that these remedies would not afford him speedy and adequate relief
in view of the plain imminence of his deportation. The urgency of such circumstance
therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.
In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over
a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed
Page 947 of 1553

not merely a reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation
of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Tze’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves on his denial of the acts of
misrepresentation, claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation. However, the
commission of said acts involves factual matters that have already been established before
the BOI.
The Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner violated
certain provisions of the Immigration Act. Courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters
falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and
their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the
courts.
As Tze has not sufficiently demonstrated any reason to deviate from the BOI’s
finding, the Court upheld it. Tze’s defense constitute mere self-serving allegations barren
of any independent proof. While he blamed the unnamed fixer filling up the erroneous
details in his application, his version of the story remained uncorroborated.
ANTONIO MARTINEZ vs. HON. RONALDO B. MARTIN, Presiding Judge and

ROLANDO PALMARES, Deputy Sheriff, both of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 73, and NATALIA REALTY, INC.
RTC issued a writ of to which respondent sheriff has reported that it has been fully
implemented. Two years after, petitioner filed for another issuance of writ of execution which
has been denied. Petitioner filed an action for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue such.
The Court dismissed the petition. A writ of mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty which is that which an officer or tribunal in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The writ of execution has already
been implemented. The proper remedy is to cite the disobedient party in contempt.
Page 948 of 1553

Facts:
In compliance with the Court's Decision in the case entitled Natalia Realty, Inc. v.
CA, the RTC issued an alias writ of execution, granting in favor of Antonio Martinez, among
others, possession of portions of two parcels of land.
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Palmares of the same court executed a Certificate of

Delivery of Possession, attesting that portion of the subject lots was already delivered to
Martinez and his co-parties. Subsequently, the RTC directed its Sheriff-in-Charge to ensure
that Natalia Realty Inc.’s guards and developers who may still be found at the premises of
the subject lots are ousted therefrom pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Natalia v. CA and
the Alias Writ. In response, the Deputy Sheriff submitted a report informing the RTC that
the aforesaid alias writ of execution had already been returned, duly served, implemented,
and fully satisfied; thus, there was no longer a need to enforce it again.
More than two years later, Martinez filed a motion for the issuance of another alias
writ of execution, arguing that such issuance was necessary in view of Natalia Realty’s
refusal to comply. The RTC denied the motion. It found no need to issue another alias writ
of execution since it had already been duly served, implemented, and fully satisfied.
Martinez moved for reconsideration. Acting on the belief that the RTC would deny
the motion or might take a long time to resolve the same, he then filed a petition for
mandamus before the Court to compel the RTC to issue another alias writ of execution
against Natalia Realty and for such alias writ to be immediately executed and fully
implemented. It was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
The CA denied it for lack of merit. It held that petitioner’s resort to an action for
mandamus is premature, considering that the RTC has yet to resolve the motion pending
before it. The CA held that Martinez’s remedy for Natalia Realty’s alleged refusal is to
initiate contempt proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus for lack of
merit
Ruling:
Yes, the Court ruled that the petition for mandamus should be dismissed.
Page 949 of 1553

A writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent

jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Being an extraordinary remedy, mandamus is available only when there is no other

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration.
Martinez still had a motion for reconsideration pending resolution when he filed a
petition for mandamus. Absent any showing that any of the recognized exceptions obtain
to the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to a petition for
mandamus, Martinez may not be allowed to do so.
As acknowledged by Martinez through his signature on the Deputy Sheriff’s

Certificate of Delivery of Possession, the subject lots had already been delivered to him and
his co-parties. The Court held that the CA correctly opined that his remedy was to have
Natalia Realty cited for contempt.
The proper procedure if the losing party refuses to deliver possession of the lands is
not for the court to cite them for contempt but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the
premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party. However, if subsequent
to such dispossession, the losing party enters into or upon the properties for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession or in any manner disturb the possession of the
winning party, then and only then may the losing party be charged with and punished for
contempt.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING OMBUDSMAN,

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs. JOSEFINO N.
RIGOR
G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014, J. Peralta
Page 950 of 1553

The OMB contends that the CA should have dismissed Rigor’s Petition for Certiorari
for being an improper remedy. Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of
the OMB should be taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 43 prescribes the manner of appeal from quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
OMB, and was formu-lated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies. Rigor, in support of his petition for certiorari, argues that there was
no other plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy available to him. But it is settled that
certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.
Facts:
In 2005, the General Investigation Bureau-A (GIBA) of the OMB conducted a

lifestyle check on Respondent Rigor, then Regional Director of the DPWH-NCR. The
findings revealed that there were irregularities on Rigor’s 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 SALNs,
allegedly failing to declare therein several properties, business interests, and financial
connections. Thereafter, the GIBA filed a complaint against Rigor charging him criminally
and administratively before the OMB for alleged unexplained wealth and violation of R.A.
No. 3019 and R.A. 1379, and for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official
Documents.
On July 28, 2006, the OMB rendered a decision finding Rigor guilty of dishonesty
and was meted out with the penalty of dismissal from service. Upon motion for
reconsideration, on April 29, 2011, the OMB recalled the earlier decision and merely found
Rigor liable for simple negligence and ordered him to pay the fine of P1,000.00.
Consequently, the DPWH thru the OSG filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
reconsideration of the 2nd decision, which was granted on July 18, 2011. Forthwith, Rigor
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and almost year thereafter a decision was
rendered sustaining his errors and against herein petitioners.
Before the Court, Petitioners OMB and DPWH assert that the CA gravely erred in
giving due course to Rigor’s petition in spite using the remedy of special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, instead of Rule 63.
Issue:
Whether or not Rigor elected the wrong remedy from the decision of the OMB.
Page 951 of 1553

Ruling:
The OMB contends that the CA should have dismissed Rigor’s Petition for Certiorari
for being an improper remedy. Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases
of the OMB should be taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. Rule 43 prescribes the manner of appeal from quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
OMB, and was formulated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure
for quasi-judicial agencies. Rigor, in support of his petition for certiorari, argues that there
was no other plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy available to him. But it is settled
that certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive.
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN

FOUNDATION, INC vs. HON. TEODORO T. RIEL
Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions

defined by the Rules of Court. The conditions are that: (1) the respondent tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Facts:
On October 28, 2004, the petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that
the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the
Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80’s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course
to the petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for
reconstitution. On October 11, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
dismissal, but the same was denied for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground to
reconsider.
Page 952 of 1553

The petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that respondent Judge had
“unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which
is specifically enjoined upon him as a duly under Rule 7, Section 8, of the Revised Rules of
Court. UP and OSG filed their interventions.
Respondent Judge justified the dismissal of the petition by pointing out out that the
petitioner did not present its purported Torrens title to be reconstituted; that the
petitioner’s claim was doubtful given the magnitude of 4,304,623 square meters as the land
area involved; and that the UP’s ownership of the portion of land covered by petitioner’s
claim had long been settled by the Court in a long line of cases. The OSG and the UP argued
that by directly coming to the Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus, the petitioner
had availed itself of the wrong remedies to substitute for its lost appeal; that the correct
recourse for the petitioner was an appeal considering that the two assailed orders already
finally disposed of the case.
In its memorandum, the petitioner indicates that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing its petition for
reconstitution on the basis of the recommendation of the LRA and the opposition of the
Republic and the UP despite having initially given due course to the petition for
reconstitution. It urges that the dismissal should be overturned because it was not given a
chance to comment on the recommendation of the LRA, or to controvert the oppositions
filed
Issue:
Whether or not the petition is meritorious.
Ruling:
The petition for certiorari and mandamus, being devoid of procedural and
substantive merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the

conditions defined by the Rules of Court. The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not
show how respondent Judge could have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his jurisdiction,
or could have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and dismissing the petition. Nor
did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land already
registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA. Secondly, the petitioner did not
Page 953 of 1553

present the duplicate or certified copy of OCT No. 1609. Thereby, it disobeyed Section 2
and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26. Thirdly, with the questioned orders of the RTC having
finally disposed of the application for judicial reconstitution, nothing more was left for the
RTC to do in the case. The correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of
Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration. Fourthly, the filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court
is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Finally, the land covered by the
petition for judicial reconstitution related to the same area that formed the UP campus.
The UP’s registered ownership of the land comprising its campus has long been settled
under the law. Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by
respondent Judge only safeguarded the UP’s registered ownership. In so doing, respondent
Judge actually heeded the clear warnings to the lower courts and the Law Profession in
general against mounting or abetting any attack against such ownership.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP

VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY
vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD
CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral
which aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law, and the
COMELEC twice ordered the latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation
which imposed a size limit on campaign materials, the petitioners may directly file a Rule 65
Petition with the Supreme Court without need for a ruling from the COMELEC En Banc, as
the petitioners are not candidates in the elections but is asserting their right to free speech,
and the COMELEC acts not in its quasi-judicial function but in its regulatory function.
In addition, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not violated, as the case falls under
the exceptions thereto.
The petitioners also did not violate the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as the same yields in order to protect this fundamental right. Even if it applies, the
case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine; namely: it involves a legal question and the
application of the doctrine would be unreasonable.
Finally, the case is about COMELEC’s breach of the petitioners’ fundamental right of
expression of matters relating to election. Such a violation is grave abuse of discretion; thus
the constitutionality of COMELEC’s orders are within the Supreme Court’s power to review
under Rule 65.
Page 954 of 1553

Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners The Diocese of Bacolod and the Most Rev. Bishop
Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The second
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay”. These tarpaulins were not paid for nor sponsored by any candidate, and
they contain names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped
in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013 respondent Atty. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer
of Bacolod City, ordered Bishop Navarra to remove the tarpaulin within 3 days from receipt
for being oversized, in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 which provided for a
size requirement for campaign materials. Petitioners requested for a definitive ruling from
the COMELEC Law Department. On February 27, 2013 the latter ordered the immediate
removal of the tarpaulin for violation of the abovementioned Resolution; otherwise
COMELEC will file an election offense case against the petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free
speech, petitioners initiated before the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013.
Issues:
1. Were the February 22 and February 27 Orders by COMELEC final judgments

which warrant a review under Rule 65?
2. Did the petitioners violate the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a Rule
65 petition with the Supreme Court?
3. Did the petitioners violate the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
when they failed to bring the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its
divisions?
Page 955 of 1553

4. Whether there were exceptional circumstances which would allow the SC to take
cognizance of the case?
Ruling:
1. No. The petitioners were not candidates seeking for public office but are private
individuals asserting their fundamental right to expression; thus the case
pertains not to the quasi-judicial power of COMELEC but to its acts of
implementing election laws.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by
this court, whose power to review is “limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of
the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.”
Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by
COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution on COMELEC’s
power to decide all questions affecting elections.
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not
operate as precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these
cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate
against the winning candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their
petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise

of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the
implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the
COMELEC was allegedly enforcing election laws.
2. No. The case of the petitioners fall under the exceptions to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts.
The Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the
doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such
doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has “full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions
Page 956 of 1553

for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted
by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.” As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, the Court has provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this
court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government.
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’
right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases.
The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform
the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively
engage the public in political discourse.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In

these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of
transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when
clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom
of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court.
The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of
speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only
includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that
choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first
impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. This
court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of
whether the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In this case,
it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality
on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to
the Constitution through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed
during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future
Page 957 of 1553

cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations
would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a
constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that “[i]t is
easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every
province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order
of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to
impotence.”
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through

pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been
binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, this
court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon
COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in
order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are “dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.”
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time
to justify a direct resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected,
the present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this
court directly.
3. No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to

protect this fundamental right. Even if it applies, the case falls under the
exceptions to the doctrine; namely: it involves a legal question and the
application of the doctrine would be unreasonable.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Page 958 of 1553

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter
threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable
infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech. Political
speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. The principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

applicable, the current controversy is within the exceptions to the principle:
a) when there is a violation of due process;

b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction;
d) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
e) when there is irreparable injury;
f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
j) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or
k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.”
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First,
petitioners allege that the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of expression
and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question. Second,
the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention
considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to
require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.
4. Yes. COMELEC’s acts affect free speech and its acts are capable of repetition,
which may result to chilling effects that may mute other citizens who may want
to be heard on issues during the elections.
Page 959 of 1553

The main subject of this case is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement
on speech and the “chilling effect” caused by respondent COMELEC’s notice and letter.
COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable
of repetition. Under the conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this
case, it could result in a “chilling effect” that would affect other citizens who want their
voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views
regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or
sanction by the COMELEC.
Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is
also the procedural platform for raising grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents’ reliance on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions affecting

elections [under] Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution is misplaced. The Court is
not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of
jurisdiction, gravely abused it. The Court is confronted with the question as to whether the
COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent criminal action
effectively abridging meaningful political speech.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s
notice and letter on free speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the
Constitution. The use of the word “affecting” in this provision cannot be interpreted to
mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and all questions that arise
during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should not
operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1)
of the Constitution. This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded
jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave

abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from
COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
Page 960 of 1553

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. BERSAMIN, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD
G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015, J. Carpio
As can be gleaned from both the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
and the Rules of Court, the respondent is required to be furnished a copy of the complaint and
the supporting affidavits and documents. Clearly, these pertain to affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondent. As such, no grave
abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of an order
denying the request of the respondent to be furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. Also, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is mandatory before the
filing of a petition for certiorari. Absent any compelling reason to justify non-compliance, a
petition for certiorari will not lie. All the more, it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a failure to
avail of the opportunity to be heard due to the respondent’s own fault cannot in any way be
construed as a violation of due process by the Ombudsman, much less of grave abuse of
discretion. Finally, a respondent’s claim that his rights were violated cannot be given credence
when he flouts the rules himself by resorting to simultaneous remedies by filing Petition for
Certiorari alleging violation of due process by the Ombudsman even as his Motion for
Reconsideration raising the very same issue remained pending with the Ombudsman.
Facts:
On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada copies of two
complaints one filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod (OMB-C-C-13-0313) and the other filed
by the FIO of the Ombudsman (OMB-C-C-13-0397). Those complaints both prayed, among
others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted
against Sen. Estrada. The latter in turn filed his counter-affidavits in each of those
complaints.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings
(Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313. His request was made “pursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have
been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the
evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).”
Page 961 of 1553

On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313

which stated that Sen. Estrada is not entitled to be furnished all the filings of the
respondents. Further, it held that it has already complied with its obligations as provided
for in the Rules of Court when, as attached to the Orders to File Counter-Affidavit, it
furnished Sen. Estrada a copy of the Complaint and its supporting affidavits and
documents. It asserted that there is no provision under this Office’s Rules of Procedure
which entitles him to be furnished all the filings by the other parties, e.g. the respondents.
Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina G. Amata and Mario L. Relampagos themselves
are all respondents in these cases. Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish
their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence to the complainant, and not to the
other respondents. Nevertheless, it also held that he should be furnished a copy of the Reply
of complainant NBI as he is entitled thereto under the rules; however, no such Reply has
been filed by complainant NBI.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014

Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order. On the same date, 7 May
2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order furnishing Sen. Estrada with the counter-
affidavits of Tuason, Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Francisco Figura, Gregoria
Buenaventura, and Alexis Sevidal, and directing him to comment thereon within a non-
extendible period of five days from receipt of the order.
On 12 May 2014, Sen. Estrada filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend
proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 because the denial of his Request
to be furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents deprived him of his right
to procedural due process, and he has filed the present Petition before this Court. The
Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s motion to suspend. Hence, he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the same which was, however, denied.
As of 2 June 2014, the date of filing of the Ombudsman’s Comment to the present
Petition, Sen. Estrada had not filed a comment on the counter-affidavits furnished to him.
On 4 June 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order stating that while it is true that
Senator Estrada’s request for copies of affidavits of specified co-respondents was denied by
Order dated 27 March 2014, it thereafter re-evaluated the request and granted it by Order
dated 7 May 2014. The Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions
for reconsideration in light of its grant to Sen. Estrada of a period of five days to formally
respond to the above-named co-respondents’ claims. Hence, it declared that Senator
Estrada was not deprived of his right to procedural due process.
Page 962 of 1553

On 2 June 2014, the Ombudsman, the FIO, and the NBI (collectively, public
respondents), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment to the
present Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Senator Estrada’s constitutional right to due process was violated.
Ruling:
The Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estrada’s Request did
not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s
constitutional right to due process.
First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent
with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Albeit Sen. Estrada’s claim that
the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process, he, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states
that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s
claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to
the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman when it states, “after such affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto
a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x.” At this point,
there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b)
refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be
attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied
Sen. Estrada’s Request.
Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Page 963 of 1553

Ombudsman provides that a respondent “shall have access to the evidence on record,” this
provision should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well
as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that “the investigating
officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaint.” The “supporting witnesses” are the witnesses of the
complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.
Second, Section 4(b) states that “the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the
respondent” to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are
the affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the
respondent are the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The
provision in the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent
shall have “access to the evidence on record” does not stand alone, but should be read in
relation to the provisions of Section 4(a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the “affidavits and other supporting
documents” submitted by “the complainant or supporting witnesses.” Thus, a respondent’s
“access to evidence on record” in Section 4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of
Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting documents of “the complainant or
supporting witnesses” in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II. Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “the respondent shall have the right
to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense.” A respondent’s right to examine refers only to
“the evidence submitted by the complainant.”
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under
Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that
the affidavits executed by the co-respondents should be furnished to a respondent.
In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of his Request happened during the preliminary
investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of
determining whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada
from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial
or even during the trial. It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may
present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent
shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine.
Page 964 of 1553

Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present

case when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the
full exercise of the rights of an accused person. While probable cause demands more than
“bare suspicion,” it requires “less than evidence which would justify conviction.” A finding
of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement
of guilt. Hence, the constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him
does not apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary
investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the witnesses against him. A
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
Second, Sen. Estrada’s present Petition for Certiorari is premature. The

unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts
of the public respondent. The plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly provided by
law is a Motion for Reconsideration of the 27 March 2014 Order of the Ombudsman. In the
case at bar, Sen. Estrada did not file any pleading, much less a motion for reconsideration,
to the 27 March 2014 Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313. He immediately proceeded to file this
Petition for Certiorari before this Court. His resort to a petition for certiorari before this
Court stands in stark contrast to his filing of his 7 April 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of
the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution finding probable cause. As a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari. Sen. Estrada,
however, failed to present a compelling reason that the present Petition falls under the
exceptions. Evidently, when the Ombudsman gave Sen. Estrada copies of the counter-
affidavits and even waited for the lapse of the given period for the filing of his comment,
Sen. Estrada failed to avail of the opportunity to be heard due to his own fault. Thus, his
failure cannot in any way be construed as violation of due process by the Ombudsman,
much less of grave abuse of discretion. He has not filed any comment, and still chooses not
to.
Third, Sen. Estrada’s present Petition for Certiorari constitutes forum shopping and
should be summarily dismissed. Clearly, Sen. Estrada expressly raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration with the Ombudsman the violation of his right to due process, the same
issue he is raising in this petition. Furthermore, on the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping attached to his petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 212761-62 filed on 23 June
2014, he disclosed the pendency of the present petition, as well as those before the
Sandiganbayan for the determination of the existence of probable cause. In his petition in
G.R. Nos. 212761-62, he again mentioned the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014 Joint Order
denying his Request. Hence, Sen. Estrada has not been candid with this Court. His claim
Page 965 of 1553

that the finding of probable cause was the “sole issue” he raised before the Ombudsman in
his Motion for Reconsideration dated 7 April 2014 is obviously false.
Moreover, even though Sen. Estrada acknowledged his receipt of the Ombudsman’s
4 June 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2014
Joint Resolution, he did not mention that the 4 June 2014 Joint Order stated that the
Ombudsman “held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration in this
proceeding in light of its grant to Sen. Estrada a period of five days from receipt of the 7
May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the above-named co-respondent’s claims.”
Finally, Sen. Estrada claims that his rights were violated but he flouts the rules
himself. Sen. Estrada resorted to simultaneous remedies by filing this Petition alleging
violation of due process by the Ombudsman even as his Motion for Reconsideration raising
the very same issue remained pending with the Ombudsman. This is plain and simple
forum shopping, warranting outright dismissal of this Petition.
CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING vs. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA

V. CARDONA and NORBERTO DELA CRUZ, in their capacities as Chairperson and
Members, respectively, of the COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 209283, March 11, 2015, J. Brion
Complaints against the petitioner were taken in a meeting of the Commission on

Human Rights. A Show Cause Order was issued against petitioner. Questioning its validity,
petitioner filed petition for certiorari. The Court dismissed it and ruled that there was no
grave abuse of discretion. Special civil action for certiorari is available only when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
or its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Respondents, as Chairperson and Members of the CHR, did not engage in judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. They did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the
contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the investigation.
Facts:
In a meeting of the Commission on Human Rights held, several complaints of

former employees of Commissioner Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing were taken up. Only
respondents Chairperson Rosales, Commissioner Ma. Victoria V. Cardona and
Commissioner Norberto dela Cruz were present during the meeting. Quisumbing was on
sick leave.
Page 966 of 1553

The employees accused Quisumbing of: (1) seriously maltreating and inflicting upon
them mental abuse through her unreasonable behavior and demands on how they should
work in or out of the office; (2) taking a cut from some of her employees’ salaries to form
an office fund under her sole control; (3) repeatedly misplacing and taking no action on
official documents requiring her action; (4) forging another commissioner’s signature; (5)
hiring employees who do not come to work; and (6) contracting consultancy work for
another government agency.
The CHR issued on the same day CHR Resolution Show Cause Order requesting
Quisumbing to submit within five days from receipt, a written explanation as to why she
should not be held liable for any administrative disciplinary actions, and to transmit the
written explanation together with her supporting documents to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Show Cause Order specified allegations of the Quisumbing’s
commission of certain acts of malfeasance or misfeasance constituting misconduct,
dishonesty, oppression, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service, all in violation of the Civil Service Laws and Rules and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Chairperson Rosales sent letters to the President of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the complaints and allegations against
Quisumbing. Attached to the letters were copies of the Show Cause Order and the CHR
Resolution. Chairperson Rosales brought attention to the serious allegations and prayed
for the Offices’ appropriate action. Chairperson Rosales also requested the Office of the
Ombudsman to act on the complaint.
Quisumbing filed with the CHR Secretariat a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
the Show Cause Order. She assailed the validity of the Show Cause Order, claiming that its
issuance is null and void because it denied her due process.
Without waiting for the CHR to act on her motion, Quisumbing filed Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court.
She argued that the respondents gravely abused their discretion when they issued
the Show Cause Order. Quisumbing claimed that the respondents acted in bad faith and
with malice when they brought up the complaints during her absence, depriving her of the
opportunity to refute the allegations and to participate as a member of the CHR. She also
alleged that respondents gravely abused their discretion when they referred the affidavits
of her former employees to the President and the Office of the Ombudsman. She claims
that since the CHR, as a body, was not empowered by law to act on disciplinary complaints
against its own members.
Page 967 of 1553

The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the Quisumbing availed of the wrong
remedy when she filed the special civil action for certiorari to assail the Show Cause Order.
The OSG pointed out that a special civil action for certiorari is available only when any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess or its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Since the respondents, acting in their official capacities as Chairperson and
Members of the CHR, were not engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial functions when they
issued the assailed Show Cause Order, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for
being an improper remedy.
Issue:
Whether or not Quisumbing is entitled to the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition
Ruling:
No, the Court dismissed her petition.
The Court held that the subsequent referral of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the issues raised in the petition moot and academic insofar as the
CHR is concerned. No practical relief can be granted to Quisumbing by resolving the
present petition since the proceedings before the CHR had been terminated.
The Court ruled that the petition likewise fails for lack of merit. The OSG correctly
argued that the respondents, in their official capacities as Chairperson and Members of the
CHR, did not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They did not adjudicate the
rights and obligations of the contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the
investigation of the allegations against Quisumbing.
The inquiry was not a quasi-judicial proceeding, where offenses were charged,
parties were heard and penalties were imposed. It was at most, an exercise of fact-finding
investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from the concept of adjudication. The
power to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman
is within the power of the CHR as an entity with its own distinct personality and is
recognized by no less than the Constitution. Thus, the CHR did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in its actions.
Page 968 of 1553

The petition also fails with respect to Quisumbing's claim of denial of due process.
There can be no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present
his case. Quisumbing was given ample opportunity to air her side on the allegations against
her after being sufficiently apprised of the allegations against her. She was afforded the
chance to submit her written explanation. She failed to avail of that right, and chose to
directly seek the intervention of this Court.
QUO WARRANTO
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO

vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., et. al.
G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016 [Leonardo-De Castro, J.]
The instant special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo
warranto case. Given the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC declaring null and
void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, it cannot be
claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the
claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal
duties and not to try disputed title.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) filed a Petition for Mandamus seeking the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and
Resolution of the Supreme Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office
to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives.
In her Comment, respondent Regina Ongsiako Reyes contends that the petition is actually
one for quo warranto and not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that
she usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in the Roll
of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the petition
must be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether the instant special civil action is one for mandamus.
Page 969 of 1553

RULING:
YES.
The instant special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is
not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is
filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position;
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of
this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and
executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position
of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed
that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed
office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties
and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this
petition to one for quo warranto.
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no
discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the
latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is
beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of the Supreme Court
affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC cancelling Reyes's
Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as
the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque. As such, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th
legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents.
Page 970 of 1553

CONTEMPT
LETICIA P. LIGON
vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT MAKATI CITY, et al.
G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse

party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time
thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the
plaintiff or any proper party. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem,
and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world.
Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which
nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.
Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that
the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances
essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property
patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in law
and jurisprudence.
Facts:
On November 20, 2002, Ligon filed an amended complaint before the Quezon City RTC for
collection of sum of money and damages, rescission of contract, and nullification of title
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, against Sps. Baladjay,
Marasigan, Polished Arrow, and its incorporators, as well as the latter’s spouses.
On February 18, 2003, a similar complaint for collection of sum of money, damages, and
cancellation of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged
before the Makati City RTC by Sps. Vicente against Sps. Baladjay, Polished Arrow, and other
corporations. During the proceedings therein, a writ of preliminary attachment also against
the subject property was issued and annotated on the title. Thereafter, but before the
Quezon City Case was concluded, the Makati City RTC rendered a decision rescinding the
transfer of the subject property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that
the same was made in fraud of creditors.
Meanwhile, the Quezon City RTC rendered a decision directing Sps. Baladjay to pay Ligon.
When Ligon sought its execution, she discovered that the December 3, 2002 attachment
annotation had been deleted from TCT No. 9273 when the subject property was sold by
way of public auction. In this regard, Ligon learned that the Makati City RTC had issued an
Page 971 of 1553

order directing the registration of the Officer’s Final Deed of Sale; and the cancellation of
the title in the name of Sps. Baladjay and issue a new title in the name of Ting, free from
any liens and encumbrances.On June 7, 2007, Atty. Garing issued a title in the name of
Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. Later, Ting sold the subject property to
respondent Techico.
Ligon filed, a certiorari petition alleging, among others, that the Makati City RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders. Consolidated with
Ligon’s certiorari petition is a complaint for indirect contempt against respondents,
whereby it was alleged that the latter unlawfully interfered with the court processes of the
Quezon City RTC, particularly by deleting the December 3, 2002 attachment annotation.
The CA dismissed Ligon’s certiorari petition. Likewise, it dismissed the indirect contempt
charge for lack of sufficient basis. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders
2. Whether Judge Laigo should be cited in contempt and penalized administratively
Held:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Issuance of the Assailed Orders vis-à-vis Grave Abuse of Discretion.
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is

taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter,
as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or
any proper party. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence,
is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the
attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a
proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual
condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or
sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or
the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior
registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has
been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes
the property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said registration
operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons.
Page 972 of 1553
Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances
essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property
patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in
law and jurisprudence. The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its
directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting free from any liens and
encumbrances. This course of action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien
and, also, defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It bears noting that
Ligon’s claim, secured by the aforesaid attachment, is against Sps. Baladjay whose
ownership over the subject property had been effectively restored in view of the RTC’s
rescission of the property’s previous sale to Polished Arrow Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment
lien against Sps. Baladjay as well as their successors-in-interest should have been preserved,
and the annotation thereof carried over to any subsequent certificate of title, the most
recent of which as it appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico, without
prejudice to the latter’s right to protect his own ownership interest over the subject
property.
Indirect Contempt Charges.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public

authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings
or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.
Contempt of court is of two (2) kinds, namely: direct and indirect contempt.1âwphi1
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence
of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.51
The indirect contempt charges in this case involve an invocation of paragraphs b, c, and d,
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which read as follows:
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x x
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, x x x;
Page 973 of 1553

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
Examining the petition, the Court finds that Ligon failed to sufficiently show how the acts
of each of the respondents, or more specifically, Judge Laigo, constituted any of the acts
punishable under the foregoing section tending towards a wilful disregard or disobedience
of a public authority. In issuing the Assailed Orders, Judge Laigo merely performed his
judicial functions pursuant to the December 9, 2004 Decision in the Makati City Case which
had already attained finality.
CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et al. vs. MANUEL O. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
J. Peralta
In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the
Court’s mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the
September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The recourse provided for in the Rule 71 is clear
enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal
from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously,
these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007
Resolution final and executory.
Facts:
On July 1, 2002, Sanchez, a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc.
filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002
and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002. Petitioners, along with their co-
defendants, filed an Answer with Counterclaims and, thereafter, a Motion for Preliminary
Hearing of Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses, which was denied by the RTC.
On August 12, 2002, Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents,
which the court granted in an Order dated September 10, 2002. Capitol Hills Inc. filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order which denied their motion for preliminary
hearing. Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration,
and a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the production and Inspection Order.
The RTC denied the petitioners’ MR of the Order denying the motion for preliminary
Page 974 of 1553

hearing and ordered the immediate implementation of the Production and Inspection
Order.
Capitol Hills Inc. elevated the case to the CA but the same was denied. A petition for review
was filed before the SC, but the same was likewise denied. Respondent sought to enforce
the Production and Inspection Order but Capitol Hills Inc. failed to show willingness to
comply.
In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the order
dated September 10, 2002, the RTC reiterated the said order with a warning that failure of
the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the said will result in this court citing
all the defendants in contempt of court.
Petitioners questioned the said resolution via Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that
there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the threatened citation for contempt is proper
Held:
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any

improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-
suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal
to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules,
if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any
document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be
done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the
court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among
others."
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and

efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery,
such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by
default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of
the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court
Page 975 of 1553
order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance
with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support
or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying
further proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4,

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect
contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity
to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must
investigate the charge and consider respondent’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will
respondent be punished accordingly.
The second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings is through a verified petition.
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that
charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending
in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision.
Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have
the duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been
complied with. It behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it
separately from the main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the
contempt proceedings and the main action.
But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules,
as clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio
initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court
has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due
process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the
respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
Page 976 of 1553

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court’s
mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the
September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of
indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only
serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance
of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying
of the requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with
the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt
proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing
jurisprudence.
Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners’ advantage.
Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in
indirect contempt proceedings. It states:
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal
cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is
filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the
appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and
perform the judgment or final order.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged
in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and
post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required
bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, et al. vs. ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG

G.R. No. 188913, February 19, 2014
J. Villarama
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to

its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court’s orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice. Respondent’s willful disregard and defiance of this Court’s ruling on a matter
submitted for the second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By acting in
opposition to this Court’s authority and disregarding its final determination of the legal issue
pending before him, respondent failed in his duty not to impede the due administration of
Page 977 of 1553

justice and consistently adhere to existing laws and principles as interpreted in the decisions
of the Court.
Facts:
The City Government of Baguio issued an order for the demolition of illegal structures that
had been constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation. A petition for
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
was filed, andAtty. Brain Masweng, the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP-CAR, issued
two temporary restraining orders directing petitioner and all persons acting in its behalf
from enforcing the demolition orders and demolition advices for a total period of 20 days.
Subsequently, the NCIP-CAR, through respondent, granted the application for preliminary
injunction. On appeal, the CA affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the NCIP-CAR against
the demolition orders. The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA and dismissed
NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-06.
Thereafter, petitioner, through the Office of the Mayor, issued Demolition Advices against
owners of structures built on the Busol Watershed. The latter, however, filed a petition for
the identification, delineation and recognition of their ancestral land and enforcement of
their rights as indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples, with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. A petition for injunction with urgent
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
before the NCIP against petitioner and the City Building and Architecture Office was
further filed. On the same day, respondent issued two separate 72-hour temporary
restraining orders. Subsequently, respondent issued two separate extending the 72-hour
temporary restraining orders for another 17 days. The respondent also issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction followed by a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Issue:
Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction
Held:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Only in
cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised, however,
such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
Page 978 of 1553
necessary in the interest of justice. The court must exercise the power of contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint, with the end in view of utilizing the
same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication. In this case, respondent was charged with indirect contempt for issuing the
subject orders enjoining the implementation of demolition orders against illegal structures
constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio
City.
In the Decision dated February 4, 2009 rendered in G.R. No. 180206, the Court indeed
upheld the authority of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction to preserve the rights of parties to a dispute who are members of indigenous
cultural communities or indigenous peoples. However, the Court categorically ruled that
Elvin Gumangan, et al., whose houses and structures are the subject of demolition orders
issued by petitioner, are not entitled to the injunctive relief granted by herein respondent.
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents’ ancestral land claim
was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be
protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued, petitioners must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which injunction is directed are violative of said right.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments
and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the
Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No.
180206 and in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at
bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same
hearing officer), we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant
petition.
Respondent’s willful disregard and defiance of this Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the
second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By acting in opposition to this Court’s
authority and disregarding its final determination of the legal issue pending before him, respondent
failed in his duty not to impede the due administration of justice and consistently adhere to existing
laws and principles as interpreted in the decisions of the Court.
DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU et al.v.ATTY. WALTER T.

YOUNG, ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL et al.
G.R. No. 210554, August 05, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Page 979 of 1553

A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who appears
under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect contempt of
court.
Facts:
In Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, et al,an Opposition was

filed against the appearance of the law firm Young Revilla Gambol &Magat, on the ground
that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009. Petitioners assert that the use of a disbarred
lawyer's name in the firm name is tantamount to contempt of court. Young Revilla Gambol
&Magat filed a Replyto the Opposition stating that the firm opted to retain Revilla's name
in the firm name even after he had been disbarred, with the retention serving as an act of
charity.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is tantamount to
indirect contempt of court.
Ruling:
Yes. Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from using a
deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased
partner's name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures
that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer's name
in the firm name may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized
to practice law. The use of the name of a person who is not authorized to practice law
therefore constitutes contempt of court.
CASTILLEJOS CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA) v. JOSE S.

DOMINGUEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 189949, March 25, 2015, Mendoza, J.
A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or

who commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
Page 980 of 1553

Facts:
The National Electrification Administration (NEA) removed respondents Dominguez, et

al. and all incumbent members of the Board of Directors of Zambales II Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II) for mismanagement of funds and expiration of their term
of office. Dominguez, et al. appealed to the CA on the ground that RA No. 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) abrogated the regulatory and disciplinary
power of the NEA over electric cooperatives. The CA, however, upheld the authority of the
NEA over ZAMECO II. Hence, Dominguez, et al. appealed to the SC. In G.R. Nos. 176935-
36, the SC held that the passage of the EPIRA did not affect the power of the NEA
particularly over administrative cases involving the board of directors, officers and
employees of electric cooperatives. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, an
Entry of Judgment was issued, which was however, recalled upon motion by Dominguez,et
al.
Meanwhile, by virtue of a Resolution of NEA, ZAMECO II was managed and operated by

an interim board of directors under the authority and supervision of NEA. A Memorandum
was issued declaring that the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) should assume
jurisdiction over ZAMECO II. As a result, respondents Fidel Correa, Alicia Mercado and
Angelito Sacro took over the ZAMECO II premises for three days and did not allow
respondent PNP members and security guards inside the premises. Respondent PNP
members and security guards forcefully entered the grounds of ZAMECO II to ask for
discussion. The interim board of directors did not surrender the management of ZAMECO
II to the respondents. Tensions only de-escalated when the respondent-PNP members left
the scene through the intervention of Governor Amor Deloso.
Issue:
Whether the acts of respondents in attempting to take control of ZAMECO II and reinstate
the respondents-former board members to their former positions despite the ruling of the
SC upholding the validity of the removal of the respondents-former board members from
their positions and the pendency of the proceedings before the CA are punishable as
indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 (b), (c) and (d).
Page 981 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect.
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence
of the court. A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a
court or who commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
Also, a contempt charge can either be criminal or civil in nature. A criminal contempt
involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists in failing
to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the
violated order is made.
In the case at bench, the respondents committed several acts which constituted indirect
contempt. The CDA issued the September 1, 2009 Memorandum stating that it had
jurisdiction over ZAMECO II and could reinstate the former members of the Board of
Directors. The CDA officials also issued Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009-
304 to interfere with the management and control of ZAMECO II. Armed with these
issuances, the other respondents even tried to physically takeover ZAMECO II on October
22, 2013. These acts were evidently against the March 13, 2009 decision of this Court and,
thus, constituted indirect contempt against the Court. These contemptuous acts are
criminal in nature because these obstruct the administration of justice and tend to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and LORNA CILLAN-SILVERIO

vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR.
The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a pending
case does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order. Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this clear: x x x
The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case.
Page 982 of 1553

Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (Ricardo Sr.) is the surviving spouse of the
decedent Beatriz S. Silverio, with whom he has children: herein respondent Ricardo Jr.
(Ricardo Jr.); Edmundo; Ligaya; and Nelia SilverioDee (Nelia). Lorna CillanSilverio
(Lorna) is Ricardo Sr.’s second wife. The subject matter of Spec. Proc. M2629 is the
decedent’s intestate estate (the estate), which includes, among others, shares of stock in
Pilipinas Development Corporation (PDC) and a residential house in Urdaneta Village
(house at Urdaneta Village).
In an Omnibus Order issued by the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. M-2629, the
trial court resolved to grant Letters of Administration to Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. anent the
Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio in lieu of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., who is removed as
Administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court.
Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA questioning the trial court’s
Omnibus Order, particularly Ricardo Jr.’s appointment as the new administrator. The CA
later issued two Resolutions, which granted Nelia’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Ricardo Jr. from enforcing the Omnibus Order, and allowing Ricardo
Sr. to continue as administrator, pending resolution of the instant petition.
Ricardo Jr. filed with the Supreme Court an “Appeal under Rule 45 and/or Certiorari
under Sec. 1, Rule 65” with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction seeking among others a reversal of the CA’s Resolution and
the issuance of injunctive relief against him, contending that the CA acted with grave abuse
of discretion.
Ricardo Jr. wrote and sent two letters, one each to petitioners. Ricardo Jr. demanded
in the first letter that Ricardo Sr. cease and desist from 1) exercising the rights of a
stockholder in PDC; 2) managing PDC’s affairs and business; and 3) transacting with third
persons for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records. In the second
letter, Ricardo Jr. demanded that Lorna immediately vacate the house at Urdaneta Village.
Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Indirect Contempt, seeking that Ricardo
Jr. be declared in indirect contempt of court and punished accordingly. They charged that
Ricardo Jr.’s demand letters violate and defy the CA’s Resolutions. Petitioners argued
further that PDC and the house at Urdaneta Village are assets of the estate placed under
Ricardo Sr.’s charge as administrator through the CA’s Resolutions, which characterize
Ricardo Jr.’s acts as undue interference with Ricardo Sr.’s administratorship; moreover,
Page 983 of 1553

Ricardo Jr.’s acts contravene Philippine customs and traditions. Thus, Ricardo Jr.’s acts
constitute indirect contempt as defined and punished under Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules).
The CA issued the assailed Decision, which held that it finds it inappropriate to
make a ruling on whether or not Ricardo Jr. has committed certain acts violative of Revised
Rule 71 of the Rules. Considering the fact that Ricardo Jr. interposed an appeal from the CA
Resolution before the SC questioning in essence said resolution as having been granted to
petitioners with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, the
CA is then compelled to restrain itself from resolving the issues in the petition for indirect
contempt. In other words, the CA invoked the principle of respect for hierarchy of courts
in dismissing the petition for indirect contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of an appeal and a petition for certiorari before the
SC on the validity of the injunction issued by the CA precludes the latter from adjudicating
the question of whether supervening acts committed by Ricardo Jr. constitute indirect
contempt, based on the principle of respect for hierarchy of courts.
Ruling:
No. It does not preclude the CA from proceeding with the petition for indirect
contempt.
The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a pending
case does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this
clear:
x x x
The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
An original action for certiorari is an independent action and is neither a

continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment complained of. The CA
therefore committed error in dismissing petitioners’ indirect contempt petition, on the
ground of pendency of the appeal and certiorari filed by Ricardo Jr. It need not wait for the
Page 984 of 1553

Court to resolve the same before the petitioners’ contempt charge may be heard.
However, at this point, the Court cannot grant petitioners’ plea to resolve the merits
of their petition for indirect contempt; it is the CA that should properly try the same. Aside
from the fact that the CA is the court against which the alleged contempt was committed,
a hearing is required in resolving a charge for indirect contempt. The respondent in an
indirect contempt charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone.
CITY OF DAVAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 200538, August 13, 2014, J. Mendoza
The Court cannot see why the petition questioning the dropping of De Guzman as co-
defendant was patently without merit. Davao City was of the firm and sincere belief that he
had a hand in the reconveyance of the subject property to the Heirs. The use of the word "may"
in the last sentence of the second paragraph or Section 8, Rule 65, indicates that the
assessment of treble costs is not automatic or mandatory. Although the court is afforded
judicial discretion in imposing treble costs, there remains a need to show that it is sound and
with basis that is taking all the pertinent circumstances into due consideration. In the case
at bench, the imposition of treble costs was not explained at all. As the CA never justified it,
the imposition should be stricken off.
Facts:
Davao City was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Daliao, Tori!,
Davao City, covered by TCT No. T-29856. Claiming that this same parcel of land was earlier
donated by the late Engracia Tagalplace and Juan dela Cruz, to be used as a public market
but was not used as such, their heirs wrote to De Guzman, then Davao City Mayor, seeking
reconveyance of the said land. The Sangguniang Panlungsod issued Resolution No. 2398-
01 granting De Guzman the authority to sign for, and on behalf of Davao City a deed of
reconveyance in favor of the said heirs.
A few months later, under its new mayor, Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte, it was
discovered that the subject property was sold, not donated, to Davao City, based on the
annotation found at the back of TCT No. 1417. From the documents discovered, that on
December 29, 1936, TCT No. 1417 was cancelled, caused by the execution of a deed of sale
transferring the rights over Lot 134-A-2-B in favor of then Municipality of Davao. And that,
TCT No. l588 was further cancelled when the Municipality of Davao purchased it from
Tagalplace and dela Cruz, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 29856.
Page 985 of 1553

Based on this documented discovery, Davao City, through Mayor Duterte, filed a
complaint to annul the reconveyance, impleading not only the heirs of Tagalplace and dela
Cruz but also De Guzman. De Guzman filed a motion to dismiss. Judge Fuentes denied the
motion. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, De Guzman filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. RTC Judge Fuentes proceeded with CiviI Case and eventually
rendered a summary judgment voiding the reconveyance and ordering the said parcel or
land restored to Davao City. The Heirs and De Guzman filed an appeal to the CA. The CA
in its Decision, ordered the remand of the case to the said court for further proceedings.
De Guzman reiterated his position that he should not be impleaded because he merely
signed the reconveyance in his official capacity as then mayor of Davao City. Thereafter,
Judge Omelio ordered in open court that De Guzman be dropped as co-defendant.
This prompted Davao City to move for the inhibition of Judge Omelio, alleging bias
and partiality as there was no motion filed by De Guzman. Judge Omelio, however, denied
the motion. The matter of exclusion of De Guzman as a party was elevated to the CA by
Davao City, through a petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of Judge Omelio for dropping him as co-defendant despite the absence of a motion to that
effect. This time, the CA upheld Judge Omelio by dismissing Davao City's petition. The CA
stated that De Guzman could neither benefit nor be injured by the affirmation or
annulment of the deed or reconveyance. De Guzman still filed a motion for partial
reconsideration asking for the imposition of treble costs and award of attorney’s fees, which
the CA granted. Davao City moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in
its second assailed Resolution. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing resolutions directing City of Davao
and its counsel to pay solidarily De Guzman treble costs in the amount of five thousand
pesos.
Ruling:
Yes, the award of treble is not proper.
The issue here is the imposition by the CA of P5,000.00 as treble costs against Davao
City in its resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by De Guzman. The court may
dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In
such event, the court may award in favor of the De Guzman treble costs solidarily against
Page 986 of 1553

the City of Davao and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions
under Rule 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The use of the word "may" in the last sentence of the second paragraph or Section
8, Rule 65, indicates that the assessment of treble costs is not automatic or mandatory. It
merely gives the court the discretion and latitude to impose further sanctions where a
petition is dismissed for being "patently without merit," "prosecuted manifestly for delay,"
or upon finding that the questions raised in the petition for certiorari were "too
unsubstantial to require consideration." Although the court is afforded judicial discretion
in imposing treble costs, there remains a need to show that it is sound and with basis that
is "taking all the pertinent circumstances into due consideration.''
The foundation for considering the case against De Guzman to be "patently without
merit" was never clearly laid out in the assailed August 5, 2011 Resolution. The Court cannot
see why the petition questioning the dropping of De Guzman as co-defendant was patently
without merit. Davao City was of the firm and sincere belief that he had a hand in the
reconveyance of the subject property to the Heirs. Although this matter is still to be decided
by RTC-Br. 14, Davao City believed that he should be impleaded in the case precisely
because from the annotations on TCT No. 1417 covering the subject property, it clearly
appears that the said parcel of land was not donated to the local government unit, but sold
to it. Despite the annotations, De Guzman still executed the deed of reconveyance.
To be considered in favor of Davao City was the fact that initially the motion to
dismiss of De Guzman was denied by Judge Fuentes and upheld by the CA in its January 31,
2008 Decision. His submission that he was wrongfully impleaded as a party-defendant was
not even passed upon by the CA, which merely ruled that his remedy was not certiorari,
among others. Had there been merit in De Guzman's claim that he was wrongfully
impleaded, the CA could have ordered that he be dropped as co-defendant as early as 2008,
as it ordered the remand of the case to RTC-Br. 17 for a full blown trial. The CA, however,
did not make such an order. Despite the undisputed fact that there was no motion to that
effect, however, Judge Omelio ordered that he be dropped as a party defendant. Clearly,
the order was made not after a full blown hearing on the merits. For said reason, Davao
City has a valid cause to elevate the matter to the CA. The case was definitely not patently
without merit. In the case at bench, the imposition of treble costs was not explained at all.
The CA imposed the amount of P5,000.00 but it did not give any reason for such
imposition. As the CA never justified it, the imposition should be stricken off.
ELISA ANGELES vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE MARILOU

C. MARTIN, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOSELITO SP ASTORGA, MARCO BOCO, AND JOHN
DOES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 268
Page 987 of 1553

Elisa Angeles alleged that respondents committed contempt for defying the order of
the trial court to elevate the records of her case to the Court of Appeals. The court ruled that
Contrary to Elisa Angeles allegations, the records show that respondents were merely
implementing the orders issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 69213 and that no stay
order was issued against the enforcement of the subject writ of execution. There is no
sufficient showing of acts committed by respondents which may constitute contempt, such
as among others, refusing to obey [a] lawful order of the court or act of disrespect to the
dignity of the court which tends to hamper the orderly proceedings and lessen its efficiency.
Facts:
A complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, foreclosure sale, reconveyance

and damages – docketed as Civil Case No. 69213 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 268 – was filed by spouses Juan and Anatalia Coronel (the Coronels) against herein
petitioner Elisa Angeles and several others. After trial, or on April 3, 2005, the trial court
rendered a Decision containing the following decretal portion. Declaring Transfer
Certificate of Title No. PT-113632 as null and void.
Elisa Angeles filed a Petition for Contempt with the CA against herein respondents
Officer-In-Charge Marilou C. Martin (Martin), Deputy Sheriff Joselito SP Astorga (Astorga),
Clerk III Marco Boco (Boco), and John Does. The Petition alleged that Martin defied the
trial court’s November 15, 2005 Order to elevate the records of Civil Case No. 69213 to the
CA and acted in collusion with the Coronels to ensure that the latter obtain execution
pending appeal; that the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was hastily and irregularly
issued; that Astorga and Boco “cleverly contrived” and used trickery in ejecting petitioner
from the subject property; that Astorga and Boco favored other tenants and did not evict
them from the property; that Astorga did not have the authority to enforce the writ of
execution inasmuch as the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after the records of Civil
Case No. 69213 were elevated to the CA on February 27, 2006; that the respondent public
officers’ actions were abusive, illegal, and constitute indirect contempt of the appellate
court.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents committed contempt of court
Ruling:
No, Respondents did not commit contempt
Page 988 of 1553

Elisa Angeles’s accusations are rooted not in the individual respondents’ official acts,
but in the directives of the trial court in Civil Case No. 69213. The CA is correct in its
pronouncement that Further, basic is the rule that unless an order/resolution/directive
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction is declared null and void, such orders are
presumed to be valid. But in this case, there is nothing on record to show that petitioner
availed herself of any of the legal remedies under the Rules of Court to assail the validity of
the said order or writ, hence, the same remained valid and enforceable.
It should be stressed that the authority to issue [an] order or writ of execution
pertains to the presiding judge of the court a quo. Respondents do not occupy positions of
discretion, but are subject to the authority or control of the court a quo. Their functions as
officers or employees of the court are purely ministerial or administrative in character and
confined to serving court orders and processes, and carrying the same into effect. Contrary
to petitioner’s allegations, the records show that respondents were merely implementing
the orders issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 69213 and that no stay order was issued
against the enforcement of the subject writ of execution. There is no sufficient showing of
acts committed by respondents which may constitute contempt, such as among others,
refusing to obey [a] lawful order of the court or act of disrespect to the dignity of the court
which tends to hamper the orderly proceedings and lessen its efficiency.
Indeed, contrary to petitioner’s claims, it appears that the respondent public officers
acted faithfully in carrying out the trial court’s directives. If petitioner doubted these
directives – arguing as she does that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when her
appeal was perfected – then she should have questioned them by filing the corresponding
appeal or petition in order to set them aside. Punishing the respondents for contempt will
not solve her dilemma; it will not reverse the effects of the trial court’s orders and processes.
And, speaking of contempt, the appellate court is likewise correct in its position that
if respondent public officers should be punished for their perceived defiance or failure to
abide by the trial court’s directives and processes, then the contempt charge should have
been initiated in the court a quo, and not in the CA. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court state, respectively, that “[p]roceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed” and
“[w]here the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the
charge may be filed with such court.”
Page 989 of 1553

CASTILLEJOS CONSUMNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA) vs. JOSE S.

DOMINGUEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 189949, March 25, 2015, J. Mendoza
A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration
of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the
other hand, consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action
for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in
whose behalf the violated order is made.
Facts:
Petitioner CASCONA is an organization of electric consumers from Castillejos,

Zambales, under the coverage area of Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II).
Acting on a letter-complaint filed by CASCONA, the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) issued its Resolution, dated November 24, 2004, removing
respondents Jose Dominguez, Isias Vidua, Vicente Barreto, Jose Santiago, Jose Naseriv
Dolojan, Juan Fernandez, and Honorario Dilag, Jr., (Dominguez, et al.) and all incumbent
members of the Board of Directors of ZAMECO II for mismanagement of funds and
expiration of their term of office.
The supreme Court promulgated its decision in G.R. Nos. 176935-36 which held that
“[t]he passage of the EPIRA xxx did not affect the power of the NEA particularly over
administrative cases involving the board of directors, officers and employees of electric
cooperatives.”5 The Court further ruled that there was substantial evidence to justify the
penalty of removal from office imposed by NEA against the board members, Dominguez,
et al.
With respect to the issue of ZAMECO II being under the regulatory powers of the
CDA in view of its registration, the Court declared then that the matter could not be
adjudicated yet. It stated that the EPIRA provided that an electric cooperative must first
convert into either a stock cooperative or stock corporation before it could register under
the CDA. “[W]hether ZAMECO II complied with the foregoing provisions, particularly on
the conduct of a referendum and obtainment of a simple majority vote prior to its
conversion into a stock cooperative, is a question of fact which this Court shall not review.
At any rate, the evidence on record does not afford us sufficient basis to make a ruling on
the matter. The remand of the case to the Court of Appeals solely on this question is,
therefore, proper.”
Page 990 of 1553

Meanwhile, by virtue of the November 24, 2004 Resolution of the NEA, ZAMECO II
was managed and operated by an interim board of directors under the authority and
supervision of NEA.
On September 1, 2009, respondent Atty. Fulgencio Vigare (Atty. Vigare), as CDA

Administrator for Luzon, issued the Memorandum, declaring that the CDA should assume
jurisdiction over ZAMECO II. It stated, among others, that in the August 26, 2009 hearing
of the House of Representatives Committee on Cooperative Development (August 26, 2009
House Committee Hearing), the NEA readily acceded that the CDA should assume
jurisdiction over ZAMECO II
CASCONA asserts that the respondents committed several acts of indirect contempt
as follows: first, the CDA officials issued the September 1, 2009 Memorandum for the
takeover of jurisdiction over ZAMECO II; second, CDA also issued Resolution No. 262, S-
2009 and Special Order 2009-304 which scrutinized the management and operation of
ZAMECO II; and lastly, the respondents attempted to forcefully occupy ZAMECO II on
October 22, 2009. According to CASCONA, these acts clearly pre-empted the Court’s
decision in G.R. Nos. 176935-36.
CASCONA contends that, with the intent of reinstating Dominguez, et al. and under
the guise of the purported authority of the CDA over ZAMECO II, the respondents acted
in conspiracy, took the law into their own hands, and attempted to take control of
ZAMECO II.
Issue:
Whether the acts of respondents in attempting to take control of zameco ii and

ultimately reinstate the respondents-former board members to their former positions
despite the ruling of the supreme court upholding the validity of the removal of the
respondents-former board members from their positions and the pendency of the
proceedings before the court of appeals are punishable as indirect contempt under rule 71,
section 3 (b), (c) and (d).
Ruling:
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public

authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings
Page 991 of 1553

or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.
There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect. Indirect
contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the
court. A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or
who commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
Also, a contempt charge can either be criminal or civil in nature. A criminal

contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court
or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends
to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists
in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of
the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf
the violated order is made.
In the case at bench, the respondents committed several acts which constituted
indirect contempt. The CDA issued the September 1, 2009 Memorandum stating that it had
jurisdiction over ZAMECO II and could reinstate the former members of the Board of
Directors. The CDA officials also issued Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009-
304 to interfere with the management and control of ZAMECO II. Armed with these
issuances, the other respondents even tried to physically takeover ZAMECO II on October
22, 2013. These acts were evidently against the March 13, 2009 decision of this Court and,
thus, constituted indirect contempt against the Court. These contemptuous acts are
criminal in nature because these obstruct the administration of justice and tend to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates
the acts which amount to indirect contempt.
The Court remanded the case to the CA to determine whether ZAMECO II was
properly registered as a stock cooperative under the CDA. Until the CA properly had
ascertained such fact, the Court could not determine conclusively that the CDA had
supervisory powers over ZAMECO II. The parties were then expected to maintain status
quo and refrain from doing any act that would pre-empt the final decision of the Court.
Hence, the Court continued to exercise its jurisdiction in G.R. Nos. 176935-36 until a final
decision was promulgated. The respondents, however, unreasonably interfered with the
proper procedure mandated by the Court when they decided for themselves that the CDA
had jurisdiction over ZAMECO II. This constituted a contemptuous act because it
unlawfully interfered with the processes or proceedings of a court.
Page 992 of 1553

Worse, the respondent-officials of the CDA, fully aware of the Court’s

pronouncement, attempted to reinstate respondents Dominguez, et al. despite the
existence of substantial evidence that warrant the latter’s removal from office. Glaringly,
this grave allegation was never refuted by the respondents. Dominguez, et al. were found
unfit to hold office yet the respondents relentlessly endeavoured to return them to the seat
of power in ZAMECO II. This blatant disregard of the March 13, 2009 decision of the Court
is an improper conduct that impedes, obstructs, or degrades the administration of justice.
Indeed, the October 20, 2014 decision of the Court in G.R. Nos. 176935-36
conclusively settled that it is NEA, and not the CDA, that has jurisdiction and disciplinary
authority over ZAMECO II. The substantial issues of the case have now been laid to rest.
The Court, however, cannot turn a blind eye to the contemptuous acts of the respondents
during the pendency of the case. If the Court condones these acts of interference and
improper conduct, it would set a dangerous precedent to future litigants in disregarding
the interlocutory orders and processes of the Court.
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN

vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O
G.R. NO. 205956, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
J. MENDOZA
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
However, A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional

protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding
still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to
obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice.
Facts:
Petitioner P/Supt. Marantan is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a petition filed on
December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final.
Respondent La ‘O is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Diokno
is her counsel therein. G.R. No. 199462 relates to criminal cases pending before the RTC
Branch 256 of Pasig City, where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in the Province of

Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which
Page 993 of 1553

resulted in the death of thirteen men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to
Marantan, elicited much negative publicity for him. Marantan alleges that, riding on the
unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one
Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press
conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made intemperate and
unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well
as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding
Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect
contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
Held:
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect
contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of
contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes
it clear that he intended to commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought
to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision
of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
Page 994 of 1553

should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such
facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their
business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality
of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the
maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper
constitutional boundary between these two rights.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must
be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance
can be punished.
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of
the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to
decide G.R. No. 199462. As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents
claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by
Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely
calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no
malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their
petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court. As to the conduct
of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating
that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that
an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action
from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
Gilda Jardeleza (deceased) substituted by her heirs v. Sps Melecio and Elizabeth
Jaredeleza, JMB Traders Inc. and Teodoro Jardeleza
G.R. No. 167975, June 17, 2015, J. Bersamin
Jurisdiction of RTC as a probate court relates only to matters on settlement of estate

and probate of will of a deceased person and does not extend to the determination of a
question of ownership that arises during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the
property is alleged to belong to the estate unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of
the deceased and they agreed to submit the question for determination by the probate or
Page 995 of 1553
administration court and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced or unless the
purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory
in which case the probate or administration court may decide prima facie the ownership of
the property, but such determination is not final and is without prejudice to the right of
interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.
Facts:
Sps. Gilda and Ernesto commenced a civil action against Sps Melecio and Elizabeth, JMB
Traders and Teodoro Jardeleza raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC. However during the
pendency of the case Ernesto died. Hence special proceedings were commenced in RTC
Branch 38 and Teodoro was appointed as administrator. Teodoro in his capacity as
administrator filed a motion to dismiss on the civil action on the ground that Melecio was
also an heir of Ernesto thus the properties subject to the action for reconveyance should be
advances to inheritance and the action for reconveyance be heard in the special
proceedings. Motion to dismiss was granted. Gilda contended that the in RTC as probate
court cannot determine ownership of the property, thus motion to dismiss should have
been dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC as probate court can resolve issue of ownership
Ruling:
NO. The determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action to resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the
determination of Branch 38 of RTC in the special proceedings with regard to ownership
shall be for the purpose of inventory and the determination is not final is without prejudice
to the right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.
HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS et al vs. RICARDO BASBAS as represented by

EUGENIO BASBAS
G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014, J. PEREZ
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. The case at bar is an action
for annulment of title, reconveyance with damages, a civil action, whereas matters which
Page 996 of 1553
involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased person as well as filiation
and heirship partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. With both parties claiming to be the heirs
of Severo Basbas, it is but proper to thresh out this issue in a special proceeding, since
Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo seeks to establish his status as one of the heirs entitled
to the property in dispute.
Facts:
Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo died on July 14, 1911. They had a
child named Valentin (Basbas). During Severo’s lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in
Santa Rosa, Laguna otherwise known as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Lot
No. 39 is adjacent to Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate which lot was acquired,
by purchase, by Valentin Basbas. Sometime in 1995, herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin
Basbas discovered that respondents were able to secure for themselves Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate.
Sometime in 1987, respondents, through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition for

Reconstitution of Title before the Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna, covering Lot No. 39
of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Subsequently thereafter, or on June 1, 1989, an Order
was issued by the RTC granting the aforesaid petition. On the basis of said Order, the title
covering Lot No. 39 was ordered reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) was issued. On November 13, 1993,
therein defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and respondent Ricardo Basbas y
Talampas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased Severo Basbas stating
among others that the only heirs of Severo Basbas are Felomino Basbas and Melencio
Casubha. On the basis of said Extra-Judicial Settlement, the Registry of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-294295 was issued in the names of therein defendants Crispiniano
Basbas and respondent Ricardo Basbas. Petitioners then brought the matter to the
Barangay but no settlement was reached.
Significantly, the Pre-Trial Order of the MTC contained the following Stipulation of
Facts: (1) Severo Basbas is married to Ana Rivera; (2) Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo
Basbas bear the middle name Talampas; (3) Petitioners are direct descendants of Valentin
Basbas, who is a son of Severo Basbas; and (4) The property at dispute was originally
registered in Severo’s name.
After trial, the MTC rendered a judgment in favor of petitioners and against
defendants including herein respondent Ricardo. On appeal to the RTC by Crispiniano and
Page 997 of 1553

Ricardo, judgment of the MTC was affirmed in toto. Insistent on their stance, Crispiniano
and Ricardo appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed, applying the
ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay vs. Hon. del Rosario, and set aside the uniform rulings of the
trial courts. Hence, this appeal by certiorari of petitioners — Heirs of Valentin.
Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario, herein respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file
anaction to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista
and Marcelo Sr.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in applying the ruling in Heirs
of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay vs. Hon. Roy S. Del Rosario, that prior to the resolution of
the action for annulment of title and reconveyance, the determination of who the heirs are
should first be adjudged in a probate court.
Ruling:
The ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.
In Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, it was ruled that it is
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as it involves the establishment of a status or right.
The case at bar is an action for annulment of title, reconveyance with damages, a
civil action, whereas matters which involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of
a deceased person as well as filiation and heirship partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court. With both parties claiming to be the heirs of Severo Basbas, it is but proper to thresh
out this issue in a special proceeding, since [Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo] seeks to
establish his status as one of the heirs entitled to the property in dispute. Before the action
for annulment of title, reconveyance with damages can beresolved, this Court opines that
the matter of heirship should be adjudicated upon first. The trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding.
Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista — and
thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs — has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in
Suarez v. Court of Appeals. True, this Court is not a trier of facts, but as the final arbiter of
Page 998 of 1553

disputes, we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their
deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a
litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's,
Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling in
Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the
deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.
As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is
reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to herein respondents and to
annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is clearly no intimation in our decision
for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as
heirs of Marcelo Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein
respondents as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that
herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out
Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the latter's status as
legitimate children.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity

of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or
even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple,
the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein
respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and
partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and
separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents.
Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and
prolong this case interminably.
Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of
Severo in order to resolve petitioners’ Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of
the subject property. Prescinding from the foregoing, a closer scrutiny of the documents
presented in evidence by Crispiniano and Ricardo before the trial court, betray the
fraudulence of their claim. Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their successors-in-
interest, are directed to take the appropriate action for titling of the subject property.
Page 999 of 1553

MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, AND THE HEIRS

OF EDWARD T. MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J.
MARCELO REVILLA, AND JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO vs. JOSE T. MARCELO, JR.
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
In this case, the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit
it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. From all of the foregoing, it is
apparent that the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate still requires a regular
administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of the
decedent.
Facts:
The facts herein occurred in two stages: (1) the first litigation between two of Jose
Marcelo, Sr.’s (Jose, Sr.) compulsory heirs, his sons, Edward, (ascendant of herein
petitioners, heirs of Edward T. Marcelo, Katherine J. Marcelo, Anna Melinda J. Marcelo
Revilla, and John Steven J. Marcelo) and respondent Jose, Jr., for the appointment of regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate; and (2) after Edward was appointed regular administrator
of Jose, Sr.’s estate and Edward’s death in 2009, respondent Jose, Jr.’s revival of his pursuit
to administer his father’s, Jose, Sr.’s, estate.
Decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs: (1)
Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially, petitioner Marcelo
Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the issuance of
Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. before the RTC, Branch 76, Quezon City.
At first, Helen, along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately opposed MIMCO’s petition; the
two prayed for their respective appointment as administrator. Edward opposed Helen’s and
Jose, Jr.’s respective petitions for issuance of Letters of Administration in their favor and
Edward himself prayed for his appointment as regular administrator. Ultimately, MIMCO,
George and Edward banded together: (1) opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s petitions, and (2)
prayed for Edward’s appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr.
as special administrators. RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s
estate. Taking issue with the RTC’s Order and questioning Edward’s appointment, Jose, Jr.
Page 1000 of 1553

filed successive motions: (1) motion for reconsideration of RTC’s decision; and (2) omnibus
motion alleging the RTC Acting Presiding Judge Efren Ambrosio’s (Judge Ambrocio)
unusual interest and undue haste in issuing letters of administration in favor of Edward.
RTC, through Judge Ambrosio, denied Jose, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration. Then,
RTC ruled on the Omnibus Motion, thus, after a re-examination of the evidence adduced
by the parties and a consideration of the arguments raised in the aforecited pleadings, this
court arrived at a conclusion that no substantial error was committed by then Acting
Presiding Judge Ambrosio which would warrant a reversal of the questioned orders,
namely, the order dated December 13, 1991 and March 12, 1992.
Adamant on his competence to better administer his father’s estate, Jose, Jr.
appealed Edward’s appointment as regular administrator to the Court of Appeals. However,
the appellate court affirmed in toto the Orders dated 1 October 1993, 13 December 1991 and
12 March 1992 of the intestate court. The question of who between Edward and Jose, Jr.
should administer their father’s estate reached us in G.R. No. 123883 (Jose Marcelo, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals and Edward Marcelo). The Court does not find reversible error in the
appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 43674 and affirmed the RTC’s and the
appellate court’s separate rulings of Edward’s competence and better suited ability to act
as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Thereafter, Jose, Jr. persistently opposed
Edward’s actions as administrator and his inventory of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Anent the submission of complete list of stockholders of all the Marcelo group of
companies together with the number and current par value of their respective
shareholding, suffice it to say that as correctly pointed out by regular administrator
Edward, the shares of stock of the decedent will be equally distributed to the heirs that
there is no necessity therefor.
Regular Administrator Edward respectfully prays that the Liquidation, duly signed
by all four (4) compulsory heirs, be approved as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose
P. Marcelo Sr. and moved for the approval of the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate
of Jose, Sr. as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose, Sr.
RTC issued an Order approving the partition of Jose, Sr.’s estate as proposed by
Edward. Finding said liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. to
bear the conformity of all the heirs of the decedent and considering further that the period
for filing of money claims against the subject estate had already lapsed, the Court resolves
to approve said liquidation of Inventory as the project of partition of the estate of Jose P.
Marcelo, Sr.
Page 1001 of 1553

Petitioners MIMCO and heirs of Edward, joined by George, opposed Jose, Jr.’s
motion and nominated Atty. Henry Reyes as regular administrator in Edward’s stead. RTC
issued the assailed Order, now appointing Jose, Jr. as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s
estate. The estate is left with no one who will administer the estate, i.e., to liquidate the
estate and distribute the residue among the heirs. As well-settled, to liquidate means to
determine the assets of the estate and to pay all debts and expenses. Records clearly show
that the estate taxes due to the government have not been paid.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the 6 January 2010

Order and now moved for the appointment instead of George as administrator of Jose, Sr.’s
estate. After Comment on the Omnibus Motion, the RTC issued another Order dated 23
March 2010, denying the Omnibus Motion and affirming the appointment of Jose, Jr. as
new regular administrator.
Petitioners appealed the RTC’s twin Orders dated 6 January 2010 and 23 March 2010
before the appellate court. This time around, the Court of Appeals affirmed Jose, Jr.’s
appointment as new regular administrator. Ruling that the selection of administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the prior Order
dated 13 December 1991 of the RTC appointing Edward as regular administrator instead of
Jose, Jr., which appointment was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 123883, did not make a
finding on Jose, Jr.’s fitness and suitableness to serve as regular administrator
Wholly, Jose, Jr. is competent and “not wanting in understanding and integrity,” to
act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Hence, this appeal by certiorari ascribing
grave error in the Court of Appeals’ Decision.
Issues:
1. Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at the liquidation,

partition and distribution stage of the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate.
2. Whether Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s

estate bars his present appointment as such even in lieu of Edward who is now dead.
Ruling:
1. The appeal is impressed with merit.
The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at the
liquidation, partition and distribution stage.
Page 1002 of 1553

Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for the Distribution and Partition of the
Estate. The rule provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. –

No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
SEC. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. – If at the time of the distribution

the executor or administrator has retained sufficient effects in his hands
which may lawfully be applied for the expenses of partition of the properties
distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by such executor or
administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent
with the intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties
in proportion to their respective shares or interest in the premises, and the
apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person
interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court
may issue an execution in the name of the executor or administrator against
the party not paying for the sum assessed.
The Court observes that the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, approved by
the RTC in its Order dated 16 February 2001, is not yet in effect and complete. The Court
further notes that there has been no manifestation forthcoming from any of the heirs,
or the parties in this case, regarding the completion of the proposed liquidation and
partition of the estate. In fact, as all parties are definitely aware, the RTC archived the
intestate proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes.
For clarity, the Court refers to the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, which
was divided into two (2) parts: (1) Settlement of the Claims against the Estate, and (2)
After Settlement of the Claims, distribution of the remaining assets of the estate to the
four (4) compulsory heirs. The same document listed payables and receivables of the
estate dependent on a number of factors and contingencies:
Considering that the Estate as of June 3, 1999 has no sufficient cash to pay-off the
above claims of P6,893,425.33, Edward can work out an offsetting arrangement since
the Estate has also receivables or equity from these companies. Although the Marcelo
family, in particular the compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., hold equity in the corporations
mentioned in the inventory, considering that the corporations are family owned by the
Page 1003 of 1553

Marcelos’, these corporations are different juridical persons with separate and distinct
personalities from the Marcelo patriarch, the decedent, Jose, Sr.
More importantly, the liquidation scheme appears yet to be effected, the actual
partition of the estate, where each heir separately holds his share in the estate as that
which already belongs to him, remains intangible and the ultimate distribution to the
heirs still held in abeyance pending payment of estate taxes. Significantly, even the
Liquidation of the Inventory of Jose, Sr.’s estate states that the valuation amount of the
shares of stock as listed therein is based on par value, which may have varied given the
passage of time. To date, more than a decade has passed since the intestate proceedings
were archived, thus, affecting the value of the estate’s assets.
From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the intestate proceedings involving Jose,
Sr.’s estate still requires a regular administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute
remaining assets to the heirs of the decedent.
2. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on
appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.
The RTC did not err in appointing Jose, Jr. as the new administrator, even though
his previous prayer for appointment was denied. Notably, by virtue of Edward’s death,
the office of the regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate was vacated, and it was within
the jurisdiction of the RTC, as probate court, to appoint a new administrator.
Evidently, the Court of Appeals like the RTC in its second order, closed its eyes on
the facts detailed by the RTC in the first order. Considering the two (2) sets of
conflicting rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals in the two stages of this
litigation, The Court put into proper perspective the 13 December 1991 Order of the RTC
appointing Edward over Jose, Jr. as regular administrator of their father’s estate, which
Order was upheld by us in G.R. No. 123883.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification of
those who wish to serve as administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.—

No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
Page 1004 of 1553

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust
by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding
or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude.
Section 6 of the same rule, on the other hand, lists an order of preference in
instances when there is a contest of who should be appointed administrator:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.— If no executor

is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving spouse, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the surviving spouse, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for the
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Plainly, the RTC found Edward competent to serve as regular administrator, more
competent than Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference,
manifesting none of the disqualifications set by law. Still and all, the same Order likewise
judged Jose, Jr.’s suitableness and fitness, or lack thereof, for the office of administrator,
albeit in comparison with Edward and not with the rest of Jose, Sr.’s children. Jose, Jr. was
not what Edward was.
The Court notes that this case has been unnecessarily prolonged and resulted in
added litigation by the non-payment of estate taxes which is the ultimate responsibility of
the heirs having inchoate right in the estate, should there be assets remaining, to be
partitioned and distributed. The inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly the
heirs:
Page 1005 of 1553

SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – When the debts,
xxx, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, xxx
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs
Given the factual considerations that led to the prior findings on the unfitness of
Jose, Jr. to act as regular administrator; the Affidavit of Helen preferring George as
administrator; and the conformity on record of the rest of Jose, Sr.’s heirs to George’s
administration
More importantly, consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not only
is George the eldest son of Jose, Sr. and, therefore, his most immediate kin, he has,
moreover, been chosen by the rest of the heirs of Jose, Sr. to perform the functions of an
administrator. In this regard, in addition to George and the heirs of Edward, Helen
executed an Affidavit to manifest her opposition to Jose, Jr. and to support the appointment
of George and herself as joint administrators, a copy of which was given to the Court of
Appeals.
Supreme Court thus issue Letters of Administration to George to facilitate and close
the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY
VINGSON DEMAISIP vs. JOVY CABCABAN
UDK No. 14817, JANUARY 13, 2014
J. ABAD
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available,
not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that
parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene
where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively,
impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry
throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled.
Page 1006 of 1553

Facts:
Shirly alleged that Shang Ko, her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home causing Shirly
to go to the police station in Bacolod City, upon receipt of information that Shang Ko was
in the custody of respondent Cabcaban, a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban
refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the NBI to rescue her child.
Later, Agent Pura informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was
staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the
child was fine and had been attending school. With this Shirly filed a petition for habeas
corpus against Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the CA rather
than the RTC citing as reason several threats against her life in that city. The CA denied the
petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko, further explaining that
habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a
person or who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of such
person. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is available in custody cases.
Ruling:
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not
only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is
that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to
intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and
abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that
they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly
counselled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City,
it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime,
considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang
Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should remain there pending
hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference
to stay in that place.
Page 1007 of 1553

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN

MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, vs. WARDEN,
QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG
CITY and all other persons acting on his behalf and/or having custody of
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015, Leonen, J.
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being
illegally detained.
Facts:
From November 7 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo were allegedly in Saudi
Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. When he returned in the Philippines, he learned that he
was being suspected to be Butukan Malang, one of the accused who allegedly participated
in the Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo presented himself before the police officers and
explained that he was not Malang. The police assured him that they would not arrest him,
however, he was still apprehended afterwards. The police tore off two pages of his passport
evidencing his departure for Saudi. He was detained and transferred to the Quezon City
Jail. Salibo filed before the CA the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the
legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. When the Return was heard,
Assistant Solicitors argued that the petition should be dismissed because Salibo was
charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. However, Salibo countered that
the information referred to Malang and not him.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Ruling:
YES. The writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom." The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature,
consistent with the law’s "zealous regard for personal liberty." The primary purpose of the
writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
Page 1008 of 1553

and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be
related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It
may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the
liberty of abode. It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The
restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and
academic. However, petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging
him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He
was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition
for Habeas Corpus. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest charged and accused
Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo. Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not
validly arrested without a warrant. The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause
to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty
without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE vs RAQUEL CADA-DEAPARA

G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014, J. VELASCO, JR
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 030404SC, may therefore be filed with any of the
proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought. As regards
petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service
of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 030404SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315 (1959), a writ
of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions,
in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Raquel M. Cada- Deapera (Raquel) filed before the RTC- Caloocan a
verified petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the said petition, respondent demanded the
immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante
(Hazelina) to produce before the court respondent’s biological daughter, minor Criselda
M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally,
respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be
served with summons and other court processes, to wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village,
Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9 Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her office at
Page 1009 of 1553
the Ombudsman Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor, Sandiganbayan, Centennial
Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.
The next day, RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to
bring the child to court. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff
was unsuccessful in personally serving Hazelina copies of the habeas corpus petition and
of the writ. Instead, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at Hazelina’s Caloocan
residence, as witnessed by Raquel’s counsel and barangay officials. Nevertheless, Hazelina
failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC- Caloocan.
Meanwhile, Hazelina filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda
before the RTC Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Raquel filed a Motion to Dismiss the
petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter Raquel
filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor Quezon City
against Hazelina and her counsel.
RTC- Quezon City granted Raquel’s motion and dismissed the guardianship case
due to the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before RTC-Caloocan. Then, Raquel
moved for the ex-parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan,
which was granted by the trial court. The court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ
upon Hazelina at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City. In compliance,
the Sheriff served Hazelina the order as well as the Alias Writ during the preliminary
investigation of the kidnapping case.
Following this development, Hazelina, by way of special appearance, moved for the
quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition claiming, among others, that she was not personally served with summons.
Thus, as argued by Hazelina, jurisdiction over her and Criselda’s person was not acquired
by the RTC-Caloocan.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC- Caloocan has jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus
petition filed by Raquel and in affirmative, whether or not it validly acquired
jurisdiction over the Hazelina and the person of Criselda.
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding.
Page 1010 of 1553

The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas
corpus petition. Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was
served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any
of the proper RTC’s within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, findsrelevance. Said provision, which contains the
enumeration of judicial regions in the country.
In view of the aforequoted provision, it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated
is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial
Region, as here. In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of
Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial
region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above
rule.
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served,
suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus
petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 030404SC. As held in Saulo
v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in
ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA vs. ST.
THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Page 1011 of 1553

Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of
privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced

and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an
act of offensive disclosure was no, more than the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection… These are not
tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.
Facts:
Nenita Julia Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during
the period material to this case, graduating high school students at Respondent St.
Theresa’s College (STC). Sometime in January 2012 while changing into their swimsuits for
a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took
digital pictures of them-selves clad only in their undergarments and other similarly
revealing photos. There were also photos showing them and their classmates drinking
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar.
These photos were uploaded in the facebook profile of Angela Tan (Angela), which
were traced by their teacher, Respondent Escudero, and acted upon STC’s Discipline-in-
Charge Ms. Kristine Tigol (Tigol), who found that the identified students have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. Thereafter, the Julia,
Julienne, Angela and other students involved were summoned to the Office of Sr. Purisima,
the STC’s High School Principal. After an alleged tongue lashing, the STC Administration
meted out the penalty of bar-ring the students involved from joining the commencement
exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012 to which the latter’s parents protested thru a formal
action.
Later, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data, asserting that the STC Officials breached the privacy of the students when they
extracted the photos from the facebook accounts of the students and broadcasted it
through their Memo-randum in the formal action commenced by the petitioners in behalf
of their children. Finding the petition sufficient in form, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data but after due trial it dis-missed the petition and merely ordered the parties to observe
the proper confidentiality of the data involved.
Page 1012 of 1553

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before the Court pursuant to
Sec. 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.
Issue:
Whether or not a Writ of Habeas Data should be issued under the circumstances of
this case and taking into account the resolution of the following minor issues, to wit:
i. Is the writ merely confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced

disappea-rances?
ii. Is the phrase “engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
informa-tion” excludes STC being a private educational institution, and not
a repository of information or data?
iii. To what extent is the privacy of facebook users?
iv. Did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were
kept within their zones of privacy?
Ruling:
NO, the requisites for the issuance of the writ have not been adequately proven.
i. Is the writ merely confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced

disappea-rances?
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted
solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. Sec. 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data [states that]
“[a]ny aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of Habeas Data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by…”
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above [provision] reflecting a
variance of Habeas Data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas Data, to stress, was designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age.” As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances… the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after
explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out
that “[t]he writ of Habeas Data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce one’s… right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right
Page 1013 of 1553

can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or

information or files…”
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
ii. Is the phrase “engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or

informa-tion” excludes STC being a private educational institution, and not
a repository of information or data?
Respondents’ contention that the Habeas Data writ may not issue against STC, it
not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid
to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the Habeas Data protection shall
be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Sec. 1 of the Rule, “[t]he writ of Habeas
Data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information…”
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To

“engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity
must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason
or even for no reason at all, is immaterial…
iii. To what extent is the privacy of facebook users?
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and
intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of
information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable
expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social
networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of [Online Social Networking
or OSN] users, “[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
Page 1014 of 1553

reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful
thinking.”
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information
and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to
stay connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through
the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided
by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or
“walls,” the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her
bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and
videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the
other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has
paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, including the one involved
in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use “to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the
world, and to share and express what matters to them.”
Facebook connections are established through the process of “friending” another

user. By sending a “friend request,” the user invites another to connect their accounts so
that they can view any and all “Public” and “Friends Only” posts of the other. Once the
request is accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other
user’s “Public” or “Friends Only” posts, among others. “Friending,” therefore, allows the user
to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his
or her “Facebook friend” access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the
latter.
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile
as well as information uploaded by the user.
[These] privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to

broa-den or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users
an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to
“when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences.” Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s
desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
Page 1015 of 1553

information as well as to regulate the sprea-ding of his or her personal information.

Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can
view that user’s particular post.
Having said these matters, “STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to
privacy.”
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
neces-sary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to
keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto
or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy
right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools
would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any
personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at “Only Me” or
a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be
deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or
information within the confines of his or her private space.
iv. Did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were
kept within their zones of privacy?
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being
violated, insist that Respondent Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook
accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them,
this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were
under “very private” or “Only Friends” setting safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they
posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to
public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends,
including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. As petitioner’s children testified, it was Angela who uploaded the subject photos
which were only viewable by the five of them, although who these five are do not appear
on the records.
Page 1016 of 1553

In this regard, [the Court] cannot give much weight to the minors’ testimonies for
one key reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without
any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of
them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to
view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were
the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
xxx.
[E]ven assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents

reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to
respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no, more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court
in connection… These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational
privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise,
the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that
they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a
select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Page 1017 of 1553

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may have
been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

A Habeas Data Petition is dismissible if it fails to adequately show that there exists a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Moreover, it is equally dismissible if it is not supported by substantial evidence
showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim.
Facts:
Respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan)alleged that he and

petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July
2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded
to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. Thereafter,
on August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex
video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and
another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to
no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall
inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in
filing various complaints against Ilagan. The latter, on the other hand, claimed that Lee’s
acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper
echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to
life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman. Thus, he sought for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data.
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data
dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s
digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies
thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt
thereof.
Page 1018 of 1553

In compliance therewith, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of the
digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize
the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. Accordingly, she contended that
Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because:
(a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed;
and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the
person of Ilagan.
Eventually, the RTC, on August 30, 2012, granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in Ilagan’s favor. Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data
in favor of Ilagan.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. Hence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the
Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others,
“[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that
the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns
nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports
Page 1019 of 1553

a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its
way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain
the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or
security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As
the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving
the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are
crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a
habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records
show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony
which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data
Rule. There is nothing which would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any
overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor
would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to
use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to
the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her
testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately
utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan.
WRIT OF AMPARO
SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET SANTIAGO

v. RAFFY TULFO, BEN TULFO, AND ERWIN TULFO
G.R. No. 205039, 21 October 2015, First Division, (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
The court has the discretion to determine whether or not it has authority to grant the
relief in the first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the
purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of the
parties through prolonged but futile litigation.
Facts:
Spouses Santiago and respondents’ brother Mon Tulfo had an altercation in the airport
where the spouses saw Mon taking photos of them while they were lodging a complaint
with Cebu Pacific. Respondents allegedly made threats to retaliate against the spouses in
their TV program. This caused the spouses to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of
Page 1020 of 1553

amparoagainst respondents. Respondents’ filed a motion to dismiss before the RTC. The
judge dismissed the petition holding that the petition is not a proper subject of a writ of
amparosince the rules were intended to apply solely to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. Petitioners maintain however that a motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading and as such the court should not have dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s amparo petition was correct
Ruling:
It is undisputed that petitioner’s amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case
of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof. Their petition
is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents’ purported violation of their right
to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or
indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparopetition falls
outside the purview of A.M. No. 07- 9-12-SC and must fail. Hence, the RTC, properly
exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under this principal
determination. The court has the discretion to determine whether or not it has authority
to grant the relief in the first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition falls
beyond the purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice
any of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation.
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson1 of Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and JA HOON KU
G.R. No. 210759 June 23, 2015 PEREZ, J.
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court- Manila, Branch 47 and JAHOONKU
G.R. No. 211403
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of Bureau

of Immigration and Deportation v. JA HOON KU
G.R. No. 211590
Page 1021 of 1553

The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the
special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Facts:
BI officers arrested Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) based on Letter-Request of Embassy of Korea to Hon.

Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest
and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Ku was detained. He filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies and a Supplemental
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. Judge Gallegos issued Writ of Amparo. Later,
Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). Judge Gallegos
issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO. He issued second
Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG. Mison
challenged these orders before the SC and the latter issued TRO enjoining the enforcement
of the said Orders and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku. Thereafter, Judge Gallegos
granted the writ of amparo.
Issue:
Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the
first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’ s
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in
response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."
Page 1022 of 1553

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of
amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as
the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It
is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the
disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of
an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for
the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-

STRUGAR, and BEVERLY LONGID vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO,
RON ALDO PUNO, NORBERTO GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS
VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO DOROMAL, Maj.
Gen. ISA GANI CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio
City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN, and several JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 186050
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY GILBERTO TEODORO, SECRETARY

RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO,
P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI
CACHUELA, and POL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN vs. ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON
BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEVERLY LONGID
G.R. No. 186059, EN BANC, June 21, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to

temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but
where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is
kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon
can be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it
is impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their
lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing
and conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain in these cases.
Here, while it may appear that the investigation conducted by the AFP reached an
impasse, it must be pointed out that there was still an active lead worth pursuing by the
PNP. Thus, the investigation had not reached a dead end - which would have warranted the
case's archiving - because the testimony of Gonzales set forth an immediate action on the
part of the PNP which could possibly solve, or uncover new leads, in the ongoing investigation
of James's abduction. Therefore, the RTC's recommendation that these cases should be
archived is clearly premature, and hence, must be rejected.
Page 1023 of 1553

FACTS:
The instant case arose when James M. Balao (James), founding member of the Cordillera
Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of nongovemment organizations working for the cause
of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region, was abducted by five (5) unidentified armed
men on September 17, 2008, in front of Saymor's Store at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet.
After efforts to find him proved futile, James's siblings filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of amparo in James's favor before the RTC.
In a Judgment dated January 19, 2009, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of amparo,
thereby directing herein public officers to: (a) disclose where James is being detained or
confined; (b) release him from his unlawful detention; and ( c) cease and desist from
inflicting harm on his person. The RTC held that James' s unlawful disappearance was due
to his activist/political leanings and because the CPA was seen as a front of the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA). The RTC further ruled that the
investigation conducted by the public officers was "very limited, superficial, and one-sided"
which, thus, unmistakably violated James's right to security of his person.
In the December 13, 2011 Decision, the Court reversed the grant of the privilege of the writ
of amparo, holding that the totality of evidence presented in these cases did not fulfill the
evidentiary standard provided for by Amparo rule so as to establish that James was a victim
of an enforced disappearance. Notwithstanding these findings, the Court, however,
concurred with the RTC's observations describing the investigations made by the public
officers as "very limited, superficial, and one-sided" and, hence, ineffective.
In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court partly modified the RTC ruling, by reversing
the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo, ordering the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the AFP and Director General of the PNP to continue and pursue with extraordinary
diligence - as required under Section 17 of the Amparo rule – the investigation of James's
abduction. The Court remanded the case to the RTC so as to monitor and ensure that the
investigative efforts by the public officers would be discharged with extraordinary
diligence.
In a Notice dated November 28, 2013, the Court directed the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct independent and parallel
investigations on the disappearance of James. In a Further Partial Compliance dated
October 30, 2014, the RTC informed the Court that it scheduled a hearing on March 7, 2014
to determine, among others, the results of the investigation being conducted by the Special
Investigation Task Group (SITG)-Balao, as monitored by the AFP and PNP, and that of the
CHR.
Page 1024 of 1553

After hearing on the reports of AFP and CHR, the RTC opined that the investigation of
James's abduction had reached an impasse, thereby recommending that these cases be
archived considering that the investigation of the AFP had reached a standstill with its
conclusion that Maj. Tokong(one of the suspects for disappearance of James) did not
conduct surveillance operations on James, and that the testimony of another witness
(Gonzales) presented a new angle in the abduction that must be further verified.
Gonzales testified that James appeared to have wanted to leave the CPA, considering that
he was inquiring on how to obtain a visa to go to Japan; and he suspected the colleagues of
James in the CPA as his abductors, considering that they were the only persons - i.e., such
as his housemates - who knew or had information of his schedule, activities, or
whereabouts, and more importantly, the CPA had been dictating what his cousins should
say or do, and had prevented them from communicating with him.
ISSUE:
Whether the SC should adopt the resolution of RTC to archive the case.
RULING:
Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to archive, and not dismiss,
the case should it determine that it could not proceed for a valid cause, viz. :
Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the petition,
but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such
as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.
Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to

temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but
where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case
is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action
thereon can be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases,
provided that it is impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due
to threats on their lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from
effectively hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain
in these cases.
Here, while it may appear that the investigation conducted by the AFP reached an impasse,
it must be pointed out that there was still an active lead worth pursuing by the PNP.
Thus, the investigation had not reached a dead end - which would have warranted the case's
Page 1025 of 1553

archiving - because the testimony of Gonzales set forth an immediate action on the part of
the PNP which could possibly solve, or uncover new leads, in the ongoing investigation of
James's abduction. Therefore, the RTC's recommendation that these cases should be
archived is clearly premature, and hence, must be rejected.
Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA,
and CELIA C. YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014, J. Villarama
Ma. Christina YusayCaram then filed a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo
before the Regional Trial Court in order to compel the DSWD (Department of Social Welfare
and Development) to produce and give back to her infant Julian. The DSWD and the Office
of the Solicitor General opposed the motion contending that the remedy availed of by
Christina is wrong- the proper remedy is to file a civil action and not a petition for the issuance
of writ of amparo. The Supreme Court ruled that [t]he AmparoRule was intended to address
the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage,
in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
such persons outside the protection of law.
Facts:
Ma. Christina YusayCaram is the mother of Julian YusayCaram. She gave him up for
adoption after his birth. Eventually, petitioner Christina changed her mind about the
adoption. She then filed a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo before the Regional
Trial Court in order to compel the DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and
Development) to produce and give back to her infant Julian.
The DSWD and the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion contending
that the remedy availed of by Christina is wrong- the proper remedy is to file a civil action
and not a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo. Because of this, the Regional Trial
Court denied the petition and ruled that the proper remedy is to file a civil action and not
avail of the remedy of writ of amparo. Hence, the current petition.
Page 1026 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo is the proper remedy when what is
involved is a fight against the custody of a child.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC and ruled that the writ of
amparo is not the proper remedy to be availed of where the case involves the custody of a
child.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1.Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., this
Court held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal

killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined
to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however,
Page 1027 of 1553

the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before
the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the
respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held
in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used
in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her
child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not
searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting
custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the
issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents
and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of

extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless
of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee
or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. NO. 189538, FEBRUARY 10, 2014
J. PERALTA
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by
the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Page 1028 of 1553

Facts:
Respondent requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage as one of the

requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on
June 24, 2002, at the Office of the MTCC, Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate
is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
Olaybar, the RTC granted the petition for cancellation of entries in Olaybar’s marriage
contract. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding
Held:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia
in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case,
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with,
and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding
is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding
per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all
Page 1029 of 1553
persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction;
it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any;
and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same.
Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her
signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported
husband. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court made a
categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers
and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition,
no such marriage was celebrated.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention
of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, and other
related laws. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts, as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given
the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed,
and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent
indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but
the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS
Page 1030 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA

GOMEZ y CAMPOS
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done

thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from
a group of persons lined up for the purpose.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,

courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5)
the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
FACTS:
Pepino and Gomez were charged with and convicted by the RTC of the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. The R TC pointed out that the private complainant positively
identified both Pepino and Gomez during a police lineup conducted inside the NBI
compound. The R TC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from
questioning the validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUES/RULING:
1. Whether Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless arrest for
failure to raise the same before arraignment.
YES.
Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality of her warrantless arrest or the
acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived
any objection to her warrantless arrest. It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure
followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
Page 1031 of 1553

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the
illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the
guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day
to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the
accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a
judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
2. Whether or not out-of-court identification during police line-up is admissible in

evidence.
YES.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done

thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,

courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given
by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness
of the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test in this case, the Supreme Court ruled that
Edward's out-of-court identification is reliable and thus admissible.
ANTONIO M. GARCIA vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC.,

The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months. When the information was filed on September 3,
1990, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act
Page 1032 of 1553

No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had
Facts:
Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as
buyer, entered into a deed of absolute· sale and purchase of shares of stock on July 15,
1988. These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio Garcia. On March 3, 1989, a deed
of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of the deed of absolute sale and
purchase of shares of stock was entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals,
Inc.
Before the end of the 180-day period, Antonio Garcia exercised his right to
repurchase the properties. However, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase
of the shares of stock. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an action for specific performance and
annulment of transfer of shares.
On September 6, 1989, the class “A” share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and
proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., which were included in the
contracts entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at
public auction to Philippine Investment System Organization.
RTC found Antonio Garcia not guilty of estafa, and no civil liability was awarded to
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. However, at present, there is a conflicting decision from the Court of
Appeals awarding Ferro Chemicals, Inc. civil indemnity arising from the offense charged.
On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals the order
of the Regional Trial Court as to the civil aspect of the case. On October 15, 1997, the Makati
City Prosecutor’s Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also filed a petition for certiorari the SC,
assailing the Regional Trial Court’s decision which was subsequently dismissed. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals, in its decision dated August 11, 2005, granted the appeal
and awarded Ferro Chemicals, Inc. the amount of 1 million for actual loss and found that
Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings Organization’s lien
over the club shares.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case
Page 1033 of 1553

Ruling:
No.
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal cases, the
imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court that has
The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in force was Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases.–
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof:Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This
lack of jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment
rendered.
CONTROL OF PROSECUTION

G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, 15 April 2015, Third Division, (Peralta, J.)
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it
is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was
Page 1034 of 1553

any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the
accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto.
Facts:
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not PO2 Villas can file a motion to reopen a provisionally dismissed case
without the participation of a public prosecutor
Ruling:
YES. Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive
because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if
there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the
denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection
thereto.
It must be noted that the accused is charged with a public crime, hence it is a victim-less
crime. Unlike in private crimes where the participation of the private offended party is
generally required for the recovery of civil liability, in the instant case, there is no particular
private offended party who can actually file the motion to revive. Hence, in some instances,
as in this case, it is the arresting officer, PO2 Villas, who filed the motion to revive the case
out of his sense of duty as a police officer and compelled by his sense of obligation
considering that he knew his absence was the cause why the complaint was provisionally
dismissed.
Page 1035 of 1553

People of the Philippines vs. Gerry Lipata y Ortiza

G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder. After trial, the RTC convicted him and
ordered to pay civil indemnity ex delict; actual damages incurred by the heirs of the victim;
as well as moral and exemplary daamges. The appellant had passed away on 13 February
2011. Eventually, the CA issued a Decision affirming the RTC’s judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether the criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant are

declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
RULING:
Yes. Here, there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was
there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in
order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the
cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after
Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the
CA.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both
jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal
representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the
estate in the civil aspect of this case," the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement
in Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a
separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The
independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of
obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be
filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The separate civil action
proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of
evidence. The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal
representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in
relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.
Page 1036 of 1553

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE vs. TEODULO NANO ALAON

G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014, J. Perez
Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, the Secretary of
Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he took cognizance of BBB’s letter and
treated it as a petition for review from the provincial prosecutor’s resolution.
Facts:
AAA filed a complaint against Alaon charging him with the crime of rape occurring on
three separate but successive occasions. The Provincial Prosecution Office found probable
cause to indict Alaon for three (3) counts of rape.
Acting favorably on Alaon’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Provincial Prosecutor

downgraded the offense from rape to acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, an Information
against Alaon was filed before the Regional Trial Court.
However, the Secretary of Justice, directed the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing
of the Information for acts of lasciviousness against Alaon,. The Secretary of Justice’s
directive was based on a letter of BBB, AAA’s mother.
Hence, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, sent a letter to presiding judge requesting
the withdrawal of the Information for Acts of Lasciviousness in compliance with Secretary
Justice’s directive mistakenly assuming that Alaon filed a petition for review before the
Secretary of Justice.
Alarmed, Alaon filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Set Case for Arraignment
with a prayer to lift the RTC’s suspension of proceedings and to immediately set the case
for arraignment in accordance with an accused’s right to speedy trial.
The RTC issued an order granting Alaon’s motion and setting the case for arraignment;
and confirming the earlier finding of judicial probable cause against Alaon for the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness.
Trial of the case ensued.
However, the Deparment of Justice issued a resolution, setting aside the downgrading
of the crime charged against Alaon from rape to acts of lasciviousness. The DOJ reinstated
the previous charge of rape against Alaon and directed the filing of an Information against
him for three (3) counts of rape.
Page 1037 of 1553

Alaon thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the
Resolution of the DOJ for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court
granted Alaon’s petition and annulled the resolution of the DOJ.
Issue:
Whether the DOJ may motu proprio review the resolution of a prosecutor even in the
absence of an appeal or a petition for review filed by an aggrieved party
Ruling:
Yes, however Alaon was deprived of his right to procedural due process, as he was not
given an opportunity to be heard on the letter-appeal of private complainant’s mother.
There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justice’s power of review over the actions of
his subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in
the Secretary of Justice’s authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and
agencies under him, subject only to specified guidelines.
In Noblejas v. Judge Salas, we defined control as the power of the department head to
alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The power
of control implies the right of the President and, naturally, of his alter ego, to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, we do not find
abuse of discretion, much more grave abuse of discretion, by the Secretary of Justice when
he took cognizance of BBB’s letter and treated it as a petition for review from the provincial
prosecutor’s resolution. It cannot be said that in this case, there was an “absence of a
petition for review.” There was in fact an appeal from the prosecutor’s resolution, although
not as described in the National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal. There was, tersely
put, an appeal that the Secretary of Justice had ample power to act upon. In fact, the
Secretary of Justice acted on the letter request of BBB. What was done was not a motu
propio review.
Nonetheless, we agree with the appellate court’s holding that Alaon was deprived of
his right to procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the
letter-appeal of private complainant’s mother.
Page 1038 of 1553

Hence when the Secretary of Justice failed to afford Alaon an opportunity to be heard
on private complainant’s letter which he deemed as a petition for review, we affirm the
appellate court’s issuance of the special writ of certiorari, annulling the resolution issued
by the DOJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO and AIDA C. DELA ROSA

G.R. No. 201644, September 24, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that the Go and Dela Rosa’s right to speedy
trial was violated as they were compelled to wait for five (5) years without the prosecution
completing its presentation of evidence due to its neglect. In their petition for certiorari before
the CA, Go et al failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of
this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved Go et al to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition.
Facts:
Seven (7) Informations – stemming from a criminal complaint instituted by private

complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation(PDIC) – were filed before the RTC
against various accused, including Go and Dela Rosa, charging them of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents for allegedly defrauding Orient Commercial
Banking Corporation of the amount of P159,000,000.00. After numerous postponements,
Go et al were finally arraigned and trial on the merits then ensued
However, the trial of the case was marred by a series of postponements/cancellation

of hearings caused mainly by the prosecution, resulting in its inability to finish its
presentation of evidence despite the lapse of almost five (5) years. This prompted Go et al
to file a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and for violation of their right to speedy
trial, claiming that the prosecution was afforded all the opportunity to complete and
terminate its case, but still to no avail. The RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that
the Go et al’s right to speedy trial was violated as they were compelled to wait for five (5)
years without the prosecution completing its presentation of evidence due to its neglect.
RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that the Go et al’s right to speedy trial was
violated as they were compelled to wait for five (5) years without the prosecution
completing its presentation of evidence due to its neglect. Dissatisfied, the prosecution
moved for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC in the interest of justice, thus
resulting in the reinstatement of the criminal cases against Go et al. This time, it was Go et
Page 1039 of 1553
al who moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the RTC. This prompted
them to file a petition for certiorari before the CA. A copy of said petition was served,
however, only on the private complainant, i.e., the PDIC, and not the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, as it was not even impleaded as
party to the case. The CA, without first ordering the respondents to implead the People,
annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC, and consequently dismissed the
criminal cases against respondents. PDIC moved for reconsideration which was, however,
denied by the CA. OSG filed the instant petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA in giving due course to respondents’ certiorari petition and proceeding to
decide the case. It contends, among others, that the People – the petitioner in this case –
was neither impleaded nor served a copy of said petition, thereby violating its right to due
process of law and rendering the CA without any authority or jurisdiction to promulgate
its issuances reversing the RTC Orders and dismissing the criminal cases pending before it.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases against respondents were properly dismissed by
the CA on certiorari, without the People, as represented by the OSG, having been
impleaded
Ruling:
No.
Respondents’ certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319 that sought the dismissal
of the criminal cases against them should not have been resolved by the CA, without the
People, as represented by the OSG, having first been impleaded. This stems from the
recognition that the People is an indispensable party to the proceedings.
In Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos, where the petition for certiorari filed with the CA
failed to implead the People of the Philippines as an indispensable party, the Court held:
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, Go et al failed to
implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was
obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved Go et al herein to implead the People of the Philippines
as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per sea ground for the
dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court,
Page 1040 of 1553
on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times
as are just, it remains essential – as it is jurisdictional – that any indispensable party be
impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders judgment. This is because the
absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. As explained in Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz:
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination

can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine
a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a
suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In this case, it is evident that the CA proceeded to render judgment, i.e., the
September 28, 2011 Decision and April 17, 2012 Resolution, without an indispensable party,
i.e., the People, having been imp leaded. Thus, in light of the foregoing discussion, these
issuances should be set aside and the case be remanded to the said court. Consequently,
the CA is directed to (a) reinstate Go et al certiorari petition, and (b) order said Go et al to
implead the People as a party to the proceedings and thereby furnish its counsel, the OSG,
a copy of the aforementioned pleading. That being said, there would be no need to touch
on the other issues herein raised.
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ AND AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ

vs. SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY C. CAPCO
G.R. NO. 176055, MARCH 17, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how
entry into the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the
timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC. However, the timeliness of the filing
of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this case. Hence, the failure of the
Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into possession of the property
does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
“The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property,
possession de facto and not possession de jure.” But “where the parties to an ejectment case
Page 1041 of 1553
raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right to possess the property.” Here, both parties anchor their right
to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the
spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the
property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this
case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that “the
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property.”
Facts:
On October 6, 2003, the spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
the spouses Capco before the MeTC of Pateros. They alleged that Teodora, mother of
petitioner Amelia, acquired ownership over a piece of land by virtue of a Decision rendered
by the RTC of Pasig in Land Registration Case No. 9511. The said property was eventually
registered in her name under TCT No. 31873. Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood
relationship, tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation thereof. Subsequently, the subject
property was conveyed to the spouses Dela Cruz. Intending to construct a house thereon
and utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs business, the spouses Dela Cruz thus
demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property. As the spouses Capco refused, the
matter was brought before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation wherein several meetings
were held but to no avail.
In their Answer, the spouses Capco pointed out that the Complaint is defective for failing
to allege the exact metes and bounds of the property. Neither is a title attached thereto to
show that the spouses Dela Cruz are the owners of the disputed property. The MeTC
concluded that since the spouses Capco’s possession of the subject property was by mere
tolerance of the spouses Dela Cruz, the latter have the better right to possess and thus may
recover the same upon demand. The RTC affirmed the MetC Ruling. The CA set aside the
RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in setting aside the rulings of the MeTC and then RTC
Held:
It must be stated at the outset that this Court is not a trier of facts. However, the conflicting
findings of facts of the MeTC and the RTC on one hand, and the CA on the other, compel
us to revisit the records of this case for proper dispensation of justice.
Page 1042 of 1553
Contrary to the CA’s pronouncement, the Complaint sufficiently makes out a case for
unlawful detainer. The CA intimated in its assailed Decision that the MeTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the spouses Dela Cruz’ Complaint for ejectment since the same failed to
describe how the spouses Capco’s entry to the property was effected or how and when the
dispossession started, as held in Go and Melchor. Such a requirement, however, does not
apply in this case.
The Court has already clarified in Delos Reyes v. Odones that: The requirement that the
complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into the property was
made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the
complaint before the MTC x x x.
This is because, in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of
defendants’ actual entry into the property; whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted
from date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on
time, there is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for
unlawful detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how
defendant entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.
The timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this
case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came
into possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over it. “To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant
on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face
to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.”
A complaint, to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall under the
jurisdiction of the MeTC, must allege that: 1. initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; 2. eventually, such
possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession; 3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and; 4. within one year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.
Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz’ predecessor-ininterest, Teodora,
is the registered owner of the property per TCT No. 31873 and that she tolerated the spouses
Capco’s occupation of the lot. The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property
through conveyance and they extended the same tolerance to the spouses Capco. The
Page 1043 of 1553

spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail;
hence, they sent the latter a formal demand letter which, per the attached copy to the
Complaint, is dated September 1, 2003.39 The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or
within one year from the time the formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the
Complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC
jurisdiction over it.
“The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property, possession
de facto and not possession de jure.” But “where the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the
parties has the better right to possess the property.” Here, both parties anchor their right
to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while
the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner
of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership
in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that
“[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.”
The spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they are the
owners of the lot. Their allegation that the subject property was adjudicated to Teodora by
virtue of a decision in a land registration case and was later conveyed in their favor, is
supported by (1) a copy of the Decision in the said land registration case; (2) the title of the
land issued to Teodora (TCT No. 31873), and, (3) the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Teodora wherein the latter’s heirs agreed to convey the said property to
Amelia.
All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion, as affirmed by the RTC, that the
spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material possession of the subject property. As
its present owners, they have a right to the possession of the property which is one of the
attributes of ownership.
GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA vs.ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. and

G.R. No. 190912 January 12, 2015 J. Peralta
The following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of
Page 1044 of 1553

the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered by the offender at the
time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.
FACTS:
Elpidio was outside the house of his sister when all of sudden, he heard his sister’s son
throw inflectives at him. His sister also cursed him which prompted him to slap the latter.
He was under the influence of alcohol at that time. Elpido was persuaded by the Barangay
Chairman to return home and when Elpidio drank coffee, he tried to offer reconciliation to
his sister. Upon reaching his sister’s house, he asked her sister’s son Titus and son-in-law
Gary where his ster was but ressponded with expletives. Elpidio then kicked the door of the
house open and behind the door was Isabelita’s elder son Salvador who was holding a rattan
stick Arnis. Salvador hit Elpio twice with the stick. Salvador and Elidio then grappled for
the possession of the stick but Titus sprayed something on Elpidio’s face. Gary then hit
Elipidio with a tomahawk axe on the right side of his head. The siblings chased after Elidio
and without warning, Rolly hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe. A certain
Mang Gil tried to break them off but to no avail. The bystanders shouted for them to stop
but they only stopped beating him when a bystander fainted because of the incident.
Elpidio pretended to be dead and he was rushed to the hospital. A case for Attempted
Murder was filed against the perpetrators and they pleaded not guilty. The RTC acquitted
Titus, Saligan and Tommy but found Gary and Rolando guiilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Attempted Murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information against the petitioners was defective.
RULING:
NO. The information is not defective. The words "not necessarily mortal" does not mean
that there is an absence of an intent to kill. In Rivera v. People, the Court considered the
following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3)
the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives
of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered by the offender at
the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors. All of these,
Page 1045 of 1553

were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase, what is important
is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6.Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if

it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015, Brion, J.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged
in the Information.
Facts:
Estrellado-Mainar offered for sale to Eric Naval a lot and told the latter that the title to the
land she was selling had no problems and that it would “still be segregated from the mother
title. Estrellado-Mainar then sold the land to Naval and the latter built his house on the
land afterwards. However, representatives of JS Francisco and Sons, Inc. demolished
Naval’s house. Naval then discovered that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a
dispute between Estrellado-Mainar’s family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the
Estrellado-Mainar the return of the amount he paid for the land, and to pay the value of
the house demolished, but the latter refused. Estrellado- Mainar was charged with the
crime of other forms of swindling under Art. 316, par. 1 of the RPC before the MTCC. MTCC
found Estrellado-Mainar guilty of other forms of swindling under Art. 316, par. 2 of the RPC.
The RTC affirmed the conviction. Estrellado-Mainar filed a petition for review before the
CA but the same was dismissed for non-compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. She argued that the courts a quo erred in convicting her of violation of Article 316,
par. 2 of the RPC because the Information charged her with violation of paragraph 1 of the
same article.
Issue:
Whether or not Estrella-Mainar was improperly convicted under Art.316, par. 2 of the RPC.
Page 1046 of 1553

Ruling:
YES. Aside from the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 also provides that the Information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts
alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in
the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense
is comprised must be alleged in the Information. Art. 316, par. 1 punishes any person who,
pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage
the same, while paragraph 2 of the same article punishes the act of any person who,
knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such
encumbrance is not recorded. The Information in this case, aside from expressly indicating
in its caption that it is charging Estrella-Mainar under Art. 316, par.1, alleged that she "with
deceit and intent to defraud," pretended to be the lawful owner of a lot despite her
knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and was owned by JS Francisco.
It had not been alleged that she expressly represented to Naval that the subject property
was free from any encumbrance. Thus, the alleged manner through which such offense was
committed – that is, by pretending to be the lawful owner – did not constitute ground for
conviction under paragraph 2, which may be committed even by the owner of the property.
LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, J. Peralta
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of
the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. Therefore,
Corpuz’s argument that the Information filed against him is formally defective because the
Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be
returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by
private complainant Tangcoy is untenable.
Page 1047 of 1553

Facts:
Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of
jewelry on commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to
Corpuz the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced
by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that Corpuz shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold,
to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without Corpuz
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tangcoy was
able to meet Corpuz, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus, an Information was filed against Corpuz for
the crime of estafa.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. After trial, the
RTC found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The procedural issue raised, as claimed by Corpuz, is the formally defective

Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when
the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant Tangcoy.
Issue:
Whether the information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established

the designation of the offense and the acts complained of
Ruling:
Yes, the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections
as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first
time on appeal.
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
Page 1048 of 1553

received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective.
Accordingly, Lito Corpuz was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR. et al

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, J. Leonen
The inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information does not violate the constitutional rights of appellants Feliciano. Every
aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state
an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It
was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members
of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several
masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that
required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan,
Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette
Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero,
and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the RTC.
The RTC found Alvir, Feliciano, Jr., Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other
penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
It is the argument of appellants Feliciano that the information filed against them
violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. They argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they were
Page 1049 of 1553
presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their
masks fell off.
Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional rights of accused-appellants' Feliciano were

violated when the information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the
use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
Ruling:
No, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in
the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare his defense. A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly.
The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises
during the trial.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants Feliciano, the inclusion of the phrase
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their
constitutional rights. It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being
alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance,
even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on
the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect,
to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it

allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that
the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an
aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
Page 1050 of 1553

inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to
conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not
wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses. In any
case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the
elements of the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time,
place, and persons involved in the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAEL DELFIN

G.R. No. 201572, July 9, 2014, J. Perez
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is
not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information.
The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the
date of commission be approximated. As such, the allegation in an information of a date of
commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule,
be considered as an error fatal to prosecution. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the
information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even
be corrected by a formal amendment of the information.
However, variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the

information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great
that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining
to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not
deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being
violative of the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him.
Facts:
On the night of September 27, 2000 one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-year-old
fisherman from Navotas City—was killed after being gunned down at a store just across his
home. Herein respondent Rael Delfin, was suspected of killing Emilio. As such, he was
formally charged with the crime of murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malabon.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan Cruz (Joan) and
a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez). The first, who is also the live-in partner of
Page 1051 of 1553

the victim, is an eyewitness to the gunning of Emilio. The second, Dr. Marquez, is a
Philippine National Police physician who examined post mortem the corpse of Emilio. In
his Medico-Legal Report, it was revealed that Emilio died as a consequence of two (2)
gunshot wounds: one that penetrated the left side of his head and another that penetrated
his chest. On the other hand, the defense put up an alibi that Delfin was fishing on the seas
of Bataan on the date and time of the supposed shooting. He insisted that, he left for the
seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 and only returned at around 4:00 a.m. of the
next day. He also testified that he was accompanied on this fishing trip by three (3) other
individuals—one of which was witness Rene.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of Delfin. However, he later
admitted that he, Delfin and their other companions actually left for their fishing trip at
3:00 p.m. of 26 September 2000—not the 27th ; and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27
September 2000—not the 28th. Thus, at the date and time of the supposed shooting, Rene
and the appellant were already in Navotas City.
Eventually, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of murder under Article 248(1) of the RPC. The said decision was
affirmed on appeal.
On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the appellant.
In this appeal, Delfin assails the validity of the information under which he was tried
and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date of the
commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of
November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000.
He protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the
commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against
him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon. He
also insists on the credibility of his alibi over and above the version of the prosecution.
Lastly, he questions the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against
him.
Issue:
Whether or not a discrepancy between the date of the commission of the crime
renders the information defective.
Page 1052 of 1553

Ruling:
We sustain the validity of the information under which Delfin was tried, and
convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime as
alleged in the information and as established during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is
not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information.
The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the
date of commission be approximated:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.– A complaint or information

is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have beencommitted on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation
in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established
during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution. In such
cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the
evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of
the information.
The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of
commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence
becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the
information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this
event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence
nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right of the
accused to be informed of the specific charge against him.
Page 1053 of 1553

In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception but the general rule.
Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe that there is no
mistaking that both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one
and the same offense i.e., the murder of Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that the
accused may have been caught off-guard or surprised by the introduction of evidence
pointing to commission of the murder on September 27, 2000, considering that all
documentary attachments to the information all referred to the murder as having been
committed on that date. Indeed, appellant never objected to such evidence during the trial
and was even able to concoct an intelligent alibi in direct refutation thereof.
What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate
allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious
from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder as having been
committed on the 27th of September2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the
month when the crime was committed. Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed
supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION,
MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND
MOISES ALQUIZOLA
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise,
the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and
enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused
two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule
is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. The accused herein, however, cannot
avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity
of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their
right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are
merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant
case, there is no duplicity to speak of.
Facts:
AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony in the morning and asked
permission from her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner with her
Page 1054 of 1553

friends. AAA, together with Christian John Lim (Lim), Joefhel Oporto (Oporto), and
Raymund Carampatana (Carampatana), ate dinner at the house of one Mark
Gemeno. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a
walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they were
greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they
went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw
Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a
certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to
celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor
before. During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was
AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first
shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of
Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s
lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This
angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But
they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and
then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already
at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there
before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the
times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts
of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when
she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the
room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was
inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then
joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her
body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower
garments. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already
furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They
brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
district hospital for her medical examination. Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District
Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal
laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The
vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
Page 1055 of 1553

On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. After hearing, RTC found
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved, Carampatana et
al brought the case to the CA, where the court reversed the decision of the trial court and
acquitted Carampatana et al. In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove
Carampatana et al guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of
the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress.
Subsequently, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed Carampatana et al conviction and
ardently contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the information filed against was defective as it contained several

charges.
Ruling:
The Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or
information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale
behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused
the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare
for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which
might confuse him in his defense.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint
or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may
raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived. The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because
they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information during their
arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the same.
Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different
counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is
no duplicity to speak of. There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be
Page 1056 of 1553

informed of the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they
“took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA” on March 25, 2004.
Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal
that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs
and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one
crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of
them during the commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus
be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself
testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him
of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in the
Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through
sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE
SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and EMERLINA MOLETA
G.R. Nos. 175750-51, April 2, 2014, J. Perez
Moleta filed a case against Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna,
Surigao del Norte, for the violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices and Estafa before the
Sandiganbayan. Cosigna argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction because the
crime as charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type
of Estafa. In that issue, the Supreme Court ruled that what is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited.
Facts:
On or about 14 June 1994, Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna,

Surigao del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from Hermelina Moleta
(Moleta), the sum of P320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the
Page 1057 of 1553
municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s Internal

Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. As payment, Consigna issued three (3) Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent
mayor of the Municipality of General Luna.
Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different occasions,
Moleta demanded payment from Consigna and Rusillon, but to no avail. Thus, on 18 August
1994, Moleta deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account in MetrobankSurigao
Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the checks to Moleta as the
checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited the checks. This time,
however, she deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon presentation for payment,
the checks were again returned for the reason, “Signature Not on File.” Upon verification,
LBP informed Moleta that the municipality’s account was already closed and transferred to
Development Bank of the Philippines, and that Consigna, the municipal treasurer, has been
relieved from her position. Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of
Information against Consigna, in the latter’s capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon,
in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, to wit: (1) Criminal
Case No. 24182 — Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as AntiGraft and Corrupt
Practices Act. (2) Criminal Case No. 24183 — Art. 315 of the RPC, otherwise known as
Estafa.
As defense, Consigna argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction because the
crime as charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific
type of Estafa.
The Sandiganbayan admitted that the Information for violation of Estafa did not
specify the provision of law allegedly violated. However, based on the allegations of deceit
and misrepresentation, the court a quo allowed the prosecution to indict Consigna and
Rusillon under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC. After trial, the Sandiganbayan, on 12 December
2006, found Consigna guilty, but exonerated Rusillon. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error for finding Consigna

guilty of estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision
allegedly violated.
Ruling:
No. Consigna insists that even if the Sandiganbayan already admitted that the
Information failed to specifically identify the mode or manner by which estafa was
Page 1058 of 1553
committed by Consigna, it nonetheless went on to convict her by relying on the allegation

in the Information of deceit and misrepresentation and applying par. (2)(a), Art. 315 of the
RPC.
Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge
is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
As held in People v. Dimaano: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must

state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited.
AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX
APPEALS
G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014, J. Brion
Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor filed amended
complaint which changed the date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled that
amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original
one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal
amendments.
Facts:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the

Department of Justice against the Dr. Joel Mendez single proprietor doing business and/or
exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to 2003 for failure to file his income tax
return and evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the government.
In his defense, the Dr Joel Mendez admitted that he has been operating as a single
proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando.
However, he countered that he did not file his income tax returns in these places because
his business establishments were registered only in 2003 at the earliest; thus, these business
Page 1059 of 1553
establishments were not yet in existence at the time of his alleged failure to file his income
tax return.
After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found

probable cause against Mendez for non-filing of income tax returns for taxable years 2001
and 2002 and for failure to supply correct and accurate information as to his true income
for taxable year 2003, in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code. Accordingly an
Informationwas filed with the CTA charging the Mendez with violation of Section 255 of
Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997). The accused was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty on March 5, 2007.12 On May 4, 2007, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Amend
Information with Leave of Court."13 The amended information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the
jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above named accused, doing business under the name and
style of "Weigh Less Center"/Mendez Medical Group", with several branches in Quezon
City, Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong City and Makati City, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his income tax return (ITR) with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for income earned for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice
of the Government in the estimated amount ofP1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties,
surcharges and interest
Issue:
Whether the prosecution’s amendments made after the Mendez’ arraignment are
substantial in nature and must perforce be denied?
Ruling:
No. Amendments were not substantial
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the matter
of amending the information:
Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in

form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
Page 1060 of 1553
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the
original one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as
formal amendments.
In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the
alleged change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the
addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical
Group;" (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of Mendez’s operation; and (iv)
the addition of the phrase "for income earned." We cannot see how these amendments
would adversely affect any substantial right of the Mendez as accused.
The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase "for
income earned"
At the outset the court note that the actual year of the commission of the offense
has escaped both the Mendez and prosecution. In its Motion to Amend the Information,
the prosecution mistakenly stated that the information it originally filed alleged the
commission of the offense as "on or about the 15th day of April, 2001" – even if the record
is clear that that the actual year of commission alleged is 2002. Mendez makes a similar
erroneous allegation in its petition before the Court. Interestingly, in its August 13, 2007
resolution, denying the Mendez’s motion for reconsideration, the CTA implicitly ruled that
there was in fact no amendment of the date in the information by correctly citing what the
original information alleges. This, notwithstanding, the Mendez still baselessly belaboured
the point in its present petition by citing the erroneous content of the prosecution’s motion
to amend instead of the original information itself.28 This kind of legal advocacy obviously
added nothing but confusion to what is otherwise a simple case and another docket to the
High Court’s overwhelming caseload.
That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year 2002 is
only consistent with the allegation in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for
the taxable year 2001. Since the information alleges that Mendez failed to file his income
tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the offense could only possibly be committed
when Mendez failed to file his income tax return before the due date of filing, which is on
April of the succeeding year, 2002. Accordingly, the addition of the phrase "for the income
earned" before the phrase "for the taxable year 2001" cannot but be a mere formal
amendment since the added phrase merely states with additional precision something that
is already contained in the original information, i.e., the income tax return is required to
Page 1061 of 1553
be filed precisely for the income earned for the preceding taxable year. Since the Mendez
operates as a sole proprietor from taxable years 2001 to 2003, the Mendez should have filed
a consolidated return in his principal place of business, regardless of the number and
location of his other branches. In the amended information, the prosecution additionally
alleged that Mendez is "doing business under the name and style of ‘Weigh Less
Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’" Given the nature of a sole proprietorship, the addition of
the phrase "doing business under the name and style" is merely descriptive of the nature of
the business organization established by the Mendez as a way to carry out the practice of
his profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the Mendez cannot feign
ignorance of the "entity" "Mendez Medical Group" because this entity is nothing more than
the shadow of its business owner - Mendez himself.
INTERVENTION OF OFFENDED PARTY
LEONARDO A. VILLALON AND ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON vs. AMELIA CHAN

Sec. 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an
offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of
civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by Chan. The fact
that Chan, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the
Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy
case and to recover civil liability from the Vilalon. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and
should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as Chan,
being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the
prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
Facts:
On May 6, 1954, Chan married Leon Basilion Chua in a civil ceremony. During his
marriage to Chan, Leon Basilio Chua, using the name of Leonardo Villalon, allegedly
contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993.
Chan, who was then living in the US, could not personally file a case for bigamy and
so she requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings
Page 1062 of 1553

against Villalon. Eventually, probable cause was found against the Villalon and an
Information was filed with the RTC. During the pre-trial, Atty. Atencia appeared in behalf
of Amelia. Leonardo then filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty.
Atencia on the basis of Chan having no standing in the case as she did not file the
complaint-affidavit. In a resolution dated March 3, 2006, the RTC granted Leonardo’s
omnibus motion.
On March 27, 2006, Chan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, with the CA, which was
granted. Despite its issuance, trial of the bigamy case proceeded with the presentation of
the prosecution’s evidence, to which Leonardo filed a demurrer to evidence. Subsequently,
the RTC dis-missed the bigamy case for failure of the prosecution to prove the Villalon s’
guilt.
The CA resolved the petition in favor of Chan and caused the reinstatement of the
case for bigamy against the Villalon. It mainly held that the crime of bigamy, being public
in nature, can be denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the
prosecuting authorities without the offended party losing her right to recover damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Chan has no right to intervene in the criminal case under the
foregoing circumstances
Ruling:
NO, Chan has the right to participate in the prosecution of the case as there is no
express waiver of her right with respect to the civil aspect thereof.
The petitioners Villalon argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia as
private prose-cutor, and that Atty. Atencia’s disqualification violated Chan’s rights to
intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even with Atty. Atencia’s
disqualification, [Chan] was never denied her right to participate in the proceedings and
was even called to stand as a witness but Chan never appeared before the court because
she was out of the country during the whole proceedings on the bigamy case.
Sec. 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an
Page 1063 of 1553

charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by Chan. The
fact that Chan, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in
the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the
bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the Villalon. Thus, the RTC should have
allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy
case as Chan, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through
counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
RULE ON IMPLIED INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ACTION WITH CRIMINAL ACTION
DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 192123, MARCH 10, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand,
consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.
Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental
right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been
alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in
an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Facts:
Gerald was born an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the
abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of
his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for
a pull-through operation. Dr. Solidum is part of the team of anesthesiologists assigned to
Gerald. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His
Page 1064 of 1553

coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no
longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Luz lodged a complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office
of Manila against the attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum. The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein
2. Whether Dr. Solidum was negligent
3. Whether Ospital ng Maynila should be held jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum
Held:
The appeal is meritorious.
1. Applicability of res ipsa loquitur
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical
procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies
only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that
are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar
with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are
competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a
reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of
physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res
ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper
proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its
fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common
knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the
Page 1065 of 1553

patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise
to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When
the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody
and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no
other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must
first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.
Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were
present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within
the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the
operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was
undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians
for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound
body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced
bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile.
Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the
heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process
of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but
such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians,
including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists
attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could
have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the
patient.
2. Negligence of Dr. Solidum
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
Page 1066 of 1553

Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do,
without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and
properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at
100% halothane. In affirming the conviction.
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable
doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr.
Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration
of the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof
of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach
and the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the
attendingphysician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and
newborn baby, this Court held that: “In order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’”
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia,

the committee find that the same were all in accordance with the universally accepted
standards of medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of
the anaesthesiologists.
3. Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.48
It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila
jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that
Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum.
The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their
Page 1067 of 1553

judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA
overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the
instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA
should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by
a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule
would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the
subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach
to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with.
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. vs. HANZ CALAPIZ

G.R. NO. 163753, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered
against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Page 1068 of 1553

Facts:
Spouses Calapiz brought their son, Hanz, to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital
for an emergency appendectomy, which was attended to by the petitioner, and who
suggested that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost. With the parents’
consent, the petitioner performed the circumcision after the appendectomy. The following
day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters and his testicles were
swollen. Also, the parents noticed that Hanz urinated abnormally after the petitioner
forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner declared such was normal. Later, Hanz
was discharged from the hospital over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to
continue taking antibiotics. Nevertheless, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of a
formation in his penis, to which the petitioner presumed to be ulceration brought about
by appendicitis. As such, the petitioner referred Hanz to an urologist, who diagnosed the
boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was
operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanz’s parents
brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries. At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses,
including an expert witness, who testified on the injury sustained by Hanz and explaining
that the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, without however, determining
the kind of trauma that had caused the injury. With this, petitioner denied the charges.
The RTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence, but
declared that petitioner was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance
of evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by
the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral
damages. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether civil liability attaches despite acquittal from criminal charge.
Ruling:
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidates on the
two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal
on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
Page 1069 of 1553

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be
held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a
judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case
unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of

conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining
and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere
preponderance of evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for
insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability
should be through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not
forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold
him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the
injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the
circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with
their uniform findings.
LEONARDO A. VILLALON AND ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON vs. AMELIA CHAN

Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an
Page 1070 of 1553
charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The fact
that Chan, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the
Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy
case and to recover civil liability from the Villalon.
Facts:
On May 6, 1954, Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in a civil ceremony. Chan
claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present Villalon, Leonardo A. Villalon,
are one and the same person. During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio
Chua, this time under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second
marriage with Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993. Since Amelia was then living
in the US and could not personally file a case for bigamy in the Philippines, she requested
Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings against the Villalon
s. A verified complaint-affidavit alleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was.
Consequently, an Information was filed with the RTC. On arraignment, the Villalon s
pleaded not guilty. Atty. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia and later on formally filed
his entry of appearance as private prosecutor. Leonardo filed an omnibus motion with the
RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be represented
in the bigamy case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-
affidavit. He also argued that Amelia had already waived her right to file a civil and criminal
case against him and his co-defendant Erlinda. Amelia opposed the omnibus motion. The
RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. Trial of the case ensued thereafter.
On March 27, 2006, Amelia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, with the CA. The CA
issued a TRO enjoining further proceedings on the case. Despite the TRO issued by the CA,
trial of the bigamy case proceeded with the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, to
which Leonardo filed a demurrer to evidence. In an Order dated September 5, 2006, the
RTC dismissed the bigamy case for failure of the prosecution to prove the Villalon s’ guilt.
With respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Chan to the CA. The CA
granted Amelia’s petition and annulled the RTC’s resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia
from participation in the case, and its order that dismissed the bigamy case against the
Villalons. The CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the right to intervene
in the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the civil action or reserves the
right toinstitute one. The CA found no such waiver from Amelia and held that Atty.
Atencia’s appearance as private prosecutor was proof enough of Amelia’s determination to
Page 1071 of 1553

enforce her claim for damages in the bigamy case. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals gravely transgresses the
Villalons’ constitutional right to due process of law, apart from being violative of the legal
proscription against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No.
First, Villalon argue that the RTC’s order dismissing the bigamy case against them
had already become final because it was not assailed by Chan in her petition for certiorari
before the CA. The Villalon contend that the CA, in ordering the remand and re-raffle of
the bigamy case to another RTC branch, violates their right against double jeopardy. The
Villalon are mistaken. The review by the CA on whether the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion encompassed, not only the issuance of the resolution dismissing the bigamy
case, but all proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter. The records show that the CA had
issued a TRO which should have prohibited the RTC from further proceeding on the case.
But the RTC, instead, continued with the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. Under
this circumstance, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order was actually without force and effect
and would not serve as basis for the Villalon to claim that their right against double
jeopardy had been violated. The RTC, clearly, acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its September 5, 2006 order in view of the earlier TRO issued by the CA.
Second, the Villalon argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia as
private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia’s disqualification violated the Chan’s rights to
intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even with Atty. Atencia’s
disqualification, Chan was never denied her right to participate in the proceedings and was
even called to stand as a witness but Chan never appeared before the court because she was
out of the country during the whole proceedings on the bigamy case. In this case, the CA
found no such waiver from or reservation made by Chan. The fact that Chan, who was
already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her
willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover
civil liability from the Villalon . Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have
disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as Chan, being the offended
Page 1072 of 1553

party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the
offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
WHEN CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY
CRISTINA B. CASTILLO vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
However, even if respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, his guilt was not proven by preponderance of evidence that
would make him liable to civil liability.
Facts:
Cristina B. Castillo testified that she is engaged in real estate business, educational
institution, boutique, and trading business. She met respondent Phillip R. Salvador
through a common friend in December 2000 and became close since then. In a meeting,
they talked about the matter of engaging in a freight and remittance business. Salvador
enticed Castillo to go to Hong Kong to see for herself the viability of such business and
Ramon suggested to use Salvador’s name to attract the overseas contract workers. As
Castillo had deeply fallen in love with Salvador and since she trusted him very much as he
even acted as a father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to
embark on the remittance business.
Castillo paid for all the travel expenses of Salvador to promote their prospective
business and even gave Salvador US$10,000.00 as pocket money for the Hong Kong trip and
another US$10,000.00 for the Bangkok trip. Castillo admitted being blinded by her love for
Salvador which made her follow all the advice given by him and his brother Ramon, i.e., to
save money for her and Salvador’s future because after the annulment, they would get
married and to give the capital for the remittance business in cash so as not to jeopardize
her annulment case. She did not ask for a receipt for the US$100,000.00 she gave to Salvador
as it was for the operational expenses of a business which will be for their future, as all they
Page 1073 of 1553
needed to do was to get married. She further testified that after the US$100,000.00 was not
returned, she still deposited the amount ofP500,000.00 in Salvador’s UCPB bank account
and also to Ramon’s bank accounts. And while Salvador was in the United States in August
2003, she still gave him US$2,000.00as evidenced by a Prudential Telegraphic Transfer
Application dated August 27, 2003. Castillo’s mother, Zenaida, corroborated her daughter’s
testimony.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Salvador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and acquitted
Ramon. This was reversed by the CA.
Castillo filed a petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) with respect only to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip
R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of estafa.
Issue:
Whether or not Castillo is still entailed to the award of damages even if the court
of Appeals decided to acquit Salvador
Ruling:
No Castillo is not entitled to damages.
In Manantan v. CA, the Court discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil
liability of the accused as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability
of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the
actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never
be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out
of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
Page 1074 of 1553

only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is "for the same act or omission."
A reading of the CA decision would show that Salvador was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, since the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, Salvador is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only or that evidence which is the weight, credit, and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
However, the guilt of Salvador was not proven by preponderance of evidence that
would make him liable to civil liability. In discrediting Castillo’s allegation that she gave
Salvador US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA correctly found that: (1) Castillo failed to show
how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting
versions on the source of the same; (2) Castillo failed to require Salvador to sign a receipt
so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the
money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) Castillo’s claim of trust as reason for
not requiring Salvador to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her
previous transactions with him; and (4) Castillo’s behavior after the alleged fraud
perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been
swindled.
EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED OR CONVICT ON CIVIL ACTION
Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao and Dr. Clenio Ynzon vs. People of the Philippines and
Spouses Roldolfo M. Palma and Rosario F. Palma
It is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same
is not based on delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based, and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Page 1075 of 1553

Facts:
On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F.
Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain to his mother. He was brought to the clinic
of accused Dr. Cabugao wherein he gave medicines for the pain and told Palma's parents
to call him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in
the early morning of June 15, 2000, they returned to Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao did a rectal
examination wherein the initial impression was Acute Appendicitis, and hence, he referred
the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon. In the later part of the morning of June
15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital and ordered the administration of massive
antibiotics and pain reliever to JR.
In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of abdominal pain and his
parents noticed a swelling in his scrotum. JR vomitted out greenish stuff three (3) times
and had watery bowels also three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's condition to
Dr. Ynzon who merely gave orders via telephone. Accused continued medications to
alleviate JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR again vomitted twice, had
loose bowel movements and was unable to sleep. The following morning, June 17,2000, JR's
condition worsened, he had a running fever of 38°C. JR's fever remained uncontrolled and
he became unconscious, he was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's
condition continued to deteriorate that by 2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's temperature
soared to 42°C, had convulsions and finally died.
On February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against accused for reckless

imprudence resulting to homicide. While this case is pending appeal, counsel for Dr. Ynzon
informed the Court that the latter died on December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as
evidenced by a copy of death certificate.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil aspect of the case against Dr. Ynzon be distinguished upon
his death.
Ruling:
No.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in
this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
Page 1076 of 1553
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delictoin senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same
act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x x e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where
the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code,that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
It is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the
same is not based on delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based, and in accordance with Section
4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal
liability and the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, the party may file a separate civil action based on the other sources of
obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111. If the same act or omission complained
of arises from quasi-delict, as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court.
NATURE OF RIGHT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
GIRLIE M. QUISAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016 [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. Thus, as a general
Page 1077 of 1553

rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or
approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore,
subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 11 7 of the same Rules.
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya or
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner Quisay for violation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610. Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before
the RTC charging petitioner of such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of
authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion,
petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by the
Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the Senior Assistant City Prosecutor, while
the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by the Assistant City Prosecutor, without any approval from
any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that the ACP has prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard,
petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that
the ACP and/or SACP had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to
file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such, petitioner contends that
the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot
be cured.
The RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Pasiya and
Pabatid Sakdal.
RULING:
The CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s motion to quash the
Pasiya/Resolution but erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to
quash the Pabatid Sakdal or Information.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of
a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
Page 1078 of 1553

officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. Thus, as
a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and,
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 11 7 of the same Rules.
In this relation, People v. Garfin firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an
officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity
which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence,
such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the grounds
that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate its authority to approve the filing of
the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order
No. 32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the
RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.
The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the
City Prosecutor the power to "[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and
filed against the persons accused," he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates
as he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly
stressed that it is under the auspice of this provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati
issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs or review prosecutors
"authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other action, and any
information recommended by any prosecutor for approval," without necessarily
diminishing the City Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases.
By virtue of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated the Deputy City
Prosecutor and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor as review prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the
crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review
prosecutors for OCP-Makati, as evidenced by his signature therein.
Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before
the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of
Makati or any of the OCP Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained
was a Certification from the Assistant City Prosecutor to the effect that "the filing of the
Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor." The Court had
already rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such
Page 1079 of 1553

certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the
same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior
written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that the ACP
was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself.
Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized the
ACP to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief
or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that the
ACP sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant
to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal.
RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA vs. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN et al

G.R. No. 146376, April 23, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Agdeppa’s assertion that he had been denied due process is misplaced, bearing in mind
that the rights to be informed of the charges, to file a comment to the complaint, and to
participate in the preliminary investigation, belong to Junia. Clearly, the right to preliminary
investigation is a component of the right of the respondent/accused to substantive due
process. A complainant cannot insist that a preliminary investigation be held when the
complaint was dismissed outright because of palpable lack of merit. It goes against the very
nature and purpose of preliminary investigation to still drag the respondent/accused through
the rigors of such an investigation so as to aid the complainant in substantiating an
accusation/charge that is evidently baseless from the very beginning.
Facts:
Agdeppa filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against

Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia, docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Agdeppa’s
criminal complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 is essentially rooted in two external acts
by Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo in OMB-0-99-1015: (1) Jarlos-Martin’s issuance of the Order
dated September 23, 1999 requiring Junia to personally appear before the Office of the
Ombudsman to swear to his Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015, followed by the Order dated
October 6, 1999 directing Agdeppa and Castillo to file their counter-affidavits to Junia’s
Complaint which was then already under oath; and (2) Laurezo’s certifying that Junia
personally appeared before him on October 6, 1999 to swear to the Complaint in OMB-0-
99-1015. Agdeppa alleged that these acts were committed by Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and
Page 1080 of 1553

Junia in conspiracy with one another to deliberately benefit Junia and prejudice Agdeppa
and, thus, constituted corrupt acts under Section 3(a), (e), (f), (j) of Republic Act No. 3019.
In the Order dated June 6, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the Office of the

Ombudsman required only Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo to file their counter-affidavits and
evidence. Agdeppa asserts that the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over Junia, a
private individual, who conspired with Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo, public officers, in the
commission of acts violative of Republic Act No. 3019. The exclusion of Junia in the Order
dated June 6, 2000 was in contravention of procedural due process as Junia was an
indispensable party in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 and without his counter-affidavit, there
could be no complete preliminary investigation in said case.
The Office of the Ombudsman, in the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order
dated September 28, 2000, dismissed Agdeppa’s charges for lack of basis in fact and in law.
Issue:
Whether or not the exclusion of Junia in the Order dated June 6, 2000 is effectively
an outright dismissal of the complaint as against him
Ruling:
Yes, the Office of the Ombudsman excluded Junia from the Order dated June 6,
2000, not because it did not have jurisdiction over a private individual, rather, because it
found no merit in Agdeppa’s accusations against Junia in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470.
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989, explicitly provides:
Section 22. Investigatory Power. – x x x.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a

private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include
such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as
the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be
tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
There is therefore no question that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute a private person who conspired with a public officer or employee
in the performance of an illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient act or omission.
Page 1081 of 1553

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) – as counsel for the Office of the
Ombudsman, Jarlos-Martin, and Laurezo – explains that the allegations in Agdeppa’s
Affidavit-Complaint “basically focused on the purported violations of the provisions of RA
3019 by MARTIN and LAUREZO as graft investigating officers” and “a reading of the
complaint shows that JUNIA’s alleged participation, if ever, was peripheral and secondary,”
thus, “the investigating officer, after evaluation, considered the complaint against Junia as
not warranting further proceedings.” In effect, the exclusion of Junia from the Order dated
June 6, 2000 was an outright dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of Agdeppa’s
Affidavit-Complaint insofar as said Affidavit-Complaint involved Junia.
The Ombudsman has the discretionary power to dismiss a complaint outright or

proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation. While the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed outright the Affidavit-Complaint as against Junia in OMB-MIL-
CRIM-00-0470, it decided to conduct a preliminary investigation of the charges against
Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo contained in the same Affidavit-Complaint. After the
preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman likewise dismissed the Affidavit-
Complaint as against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo for reasons that are notably not dependent
upon Junia’s non-participation in the preliminary investigation. The reasons for the
dismissal of Agdeppa’s complaint against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo, as well as Junia, were
collectively discussed by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Resolution dated July 31, 2000.
Agdeppa’s assertion that he had been denied due process is misplaced, bearing in
mind that the rights to be informed of the charges, to file a comment to the complaint, and
to participate in the preliminary investigation, belong to Junia.
A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to secure the

innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open
and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a
public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and
expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component
of due process in administering criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound for trial and before being exposed to the risk
of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
To deny the accused’s claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive him of the full
measure of his right to due process.
Clearly, the right to preliminary investigation is a component of the right of the

respondent/accused to substantive due process. A complainant cannot insist that a
preliminary investigation be held when the complaint was dismissed outright because of
palpable lack of merit. It goes against the very nature and purpose of preliminary
Page 1082 of 1553

investigation to still drag the respondent/accused through the rigors of such an

investigation so as to aid the complainant in substantiating an accusation/charge that is
evidently baseless from the very beginning.
PURPOSES OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE vs.

HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS
G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014, J. Lucas P. Bersamin
The preliminary investigation is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the investigation does not approximate that
of a trial before the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to
establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed.
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove
the duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take
place only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation.
Facts:
The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired was outside the house of
the Enrile gave rise to the issue subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the victims
in that mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano, Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano
charged the Enrile and one Alfredo Enrile in the MTC with frustrated homicide; with less
serious physical injuries; and with less serious physical injuries. MTC found probable cause
against them and denied the motion to quash.
RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari because the issues raised in the motion to
quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the
merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private
complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein Enrile
by means of competent evidence
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy,
the proper remedy being an appeal.
Page 1083 of 1553

Issues:
1) Whether or not denial of Motion to Quash is proper
2) Whether or not Petition for certiorari is the wrong remedy
Ruling:
1) Yes, denial of Motion to Quash was proper.
The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea,
challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its facein point of law, or for
defects apparent on its face. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged
do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the
complaint or information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more
than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the
complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to
prove the duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should
take place only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. The
preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the parties’ respective
affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering whether a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the information.
Page 1084 of 1553

It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof. The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before
the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish
probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed.
All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss the subject criminal cases filed
against the herein Enrile when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial of the
merits.
2) Yes, Petition for Certiorari was a wrong remedy.
And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the MTC by
bringing the special civil action for certiorari in the RTC, the Enriles deliberately
disregarded the fundamental conditions for initiating the special civil action for certiorari.
These conditions were, firstly, Enrile must show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or
exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and, secondly, because the denial was interlocutory, they must show that there was no
The proper recourse of the Enrile was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial
in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate
the issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign as error the unwarranted denial of
their motion to quash. Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC because they had
an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
WHO MAY CONDUCT DETERMINATION OF EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 189176, MARCH 19, 2014
J. PEREZ
While the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive function, the

Court would not hesitate to interfere if there is a clear showing that Secretary of Justice
gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his
determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached.
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on
the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into
the merits of the defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of
Page 1085 of 1553
the pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a
trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his
jurisdiction.
Facts:
In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, SPO1 Gorion and PO2 Remaneses attested that Task Force
Roulette of the Aklan Police and the PDEA received information from an asset that
petitioners Barry and Perlita were engaged in selling illegal drugs in Boracay Island. The
police operatives conducted a test-buy at petitioners’ residence where they were able to
purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from petitioners. On
the basis of the test-buy operation, they were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC
of Aklan.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo filed an Information charging petitioners of

violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. A Motion to Quash the
Information was filed before the RTC. The RTC denied the Motion to Quash and remanded
the case to the provincial prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
In a Resolution dated 8 March 2004, the provincial prosecutor upheld the Information and
directed the return of the records to the trial court for disposition. Petitioners, however,
filed a petition for review before the DOJ assailing the Resolution of the provincial
prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice acted on the petition favorably and directed the
withdrawal of the Information which directive the provincial prosecutor heeded by filing a
Motion to Withdraw Information before the trial court. The trial court granted the Motion
to Withdraw Information. On appeal, the CA nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolutions
and the RTC Order and reinstated the Information against petitioners. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the Information against petitioners
Held:
Petitioners defend the Secretary of Justice in ordering the withdrawal of the Information
on the ground that the pieces of evidence obtained through an illegal search becomes
inadmissible in evidence. Petitioners explain that the search was illegal because it violated
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when the search was not made in
the presence of the lawful occupants of the house.
Page 1086 of 1553

It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public
prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general
rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of
probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function;
while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the
judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present
Constitution to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of

whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the
executive branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has
been made in grave abuse of discretion.
As a requisite to the filing of a criminal complaint, probable cause pertains to facts and
circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required,
not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based
on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. What
is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession
of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug.
The presence of these elements was attested to by evidence such as the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest and the Receipt of the Properties seized. The police officers averred that they
recovered 3 sachets of shabu weighing 10.4 grams inside a jewelry box on petitioners’ living
room. They also seized one (1) big gift pack containing dried marijuana leaves weighing
more or less 950 grams and two (2) gift packs containing nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana
Page 1087 of 1553

leaves weighing 800 grams on top of the head board of petitioners’ bed. Moreover, the
finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused
is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the
lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the
merits of the defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of
the pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a
trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his
jurisdiction.
Regarding the submission of petitioners that the remedy from the RTC’s Order to withdraw
the filing of the Information should have been an ordinary appeal, we rule that on a finding
of grave abuse of discretion, the RTC Order may be elevated to the Court of Appeals on
certiorari.
There is, here, a basis for such finding. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the
merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not
bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding farther with the
trial. While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. When the trial
court’s Order rests entirely on the assessment of the DOJ without doing its own
independent evaluation, the trial court effectively abdicates its judicial power and refuses
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
The RTC erroneously held that it has not yet effectively acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused as no commitment order has yet been issued against them. At the
risk of sounding repetitive, we must emphasize that the trial court, having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it
before proceeding further with the trial. While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error when it nullified and set
aside the Resolutions and Order, rendered by the Secretary of Justice and the RTC,
respectively.
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, et al.

G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
Issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a
warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are
Page 1088 of 1553
normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari, such as the petitions filed in the
instant consolidated cases.
Facts:
P C/Insp. Almaden of the PNP sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte.
The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith
accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder,
including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. Recovered from the
grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation
VD.
Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple

murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. Judge Abando issued an Order
finding probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged."
He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for
their temporary liberty.
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the Order of
Judge Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero. Petitioner Ocampo argued that a
case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then pending before the RTC Makati.
Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common
crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when
committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
Issues:
1. Whether the preliminary investigation was validly conducted

2. Whether Ocampo was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal
the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero
3. Whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy in this case
4. Whether there is double jeopardy
Ruling:
The petition is dismissed.
Page 1089 of 1553

On the validity of the preliminary investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent

from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a
preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a
substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall
decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has
been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the
investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one's defense. What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one
who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial
of due process.
Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondents were issued and
served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-
affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no
longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other
hand, Ocampo, Lim, Palejaro and Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Ladlad and Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As
long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was
put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution
of offenses.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the
named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was
only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses
that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
On Ocampo’s right to appeal the resolution of Prosecutor Vivero

Page 1090 of 1553
As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or
to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the
Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution
of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the
2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has
been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion
for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
On whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy in this case
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance
of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact
that are normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari, such as the petitions
filed in the instant consolidated cases.
On whether there is double jeopardy
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of rebellion.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.
The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured
an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to
determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, if
during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed
in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy,
to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended,

in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave
of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Page 1091 of 1553

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided
the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information
for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy
attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent
court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during
arraignment.
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several
others.
Page 1092 of 1553

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders
of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel
due to lack of impartiality and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners
Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 06-944. We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is
clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. MICHAEL TAN a.k.a. PAUL D. TAN

G.R. NO. 179367, JANUARY 29, 2014
J. BRION
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is

essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their
findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not
subject to review by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s
exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause. Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. To justify
judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is
"probability of guilt."
Facts:
Agent of the NBI applied for issuance of search warrants for the search of a warehouse
allegedly owned by respondent, wherein it is alleged that the respondent had in his
possession counterfeit shampoo products which were being sold or intended to be disposed
of, in violation of Section 168, in relation with Section 170, of RA 8293 or Intellectual
Page 1093 of 1553
Property Code of the Philippines. On the same day, Judge Eugenio, Jr. granted the
application and issued Search Warrants. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI searched
the premises and seized the alleged counterfeit shampoo products. The NBI thereafter filed
with the DOJ a complaint against the respondent for violation of R.A. No. 8293.
Respondent claimed that he is "Paul D. Tan," and not "Michael Tan" as alluded in the
complaint; he is engaged in the business of selling leather goods and raw materials for
making leather products, and he conducts his business under the name "Probest
International Trading," registered with DTI; he is not engaged in the sale of counterfeit
Unilever shampoo products; the sachets of Unilever shampoos seized from his are genuine
shampoo products which they use for personal consumption; he does not own and does
not operate the searched warehouse.
State Prosecutor Abad of the DOJ dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence petitioner filed a petition for review with
the DOJ, which the Acting Secretary of Justice, Merceditas N. Gutierrez, dismissed.
Petitioner thereafter sought, but failed, to secure a reconsideration. As such, petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioner failed to establish facts and circumstances that would constitute
acts of unfair competition.
Under the present petition, petitioner argues that while it may be possible that the
respondent is not the owner of the warehouse, the overwhelming pieces of evidence
nonetheless prove that he is the owner of the counterfeit shampoo products found therein.
The petitioner also maintains that the voluminous counterfeit shampoo products seized
from the respondent are more than sufficient evidence to indict him for unfair competition.
Issue:
Whether the determination of probable cause lies within the competence of the public
prosecutor.
Ruling:
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is

essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and
their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally
not subject to review by the Court.
Page 1094 of 1553

Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise
of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts
can neither override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the
latter. They cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has
not found a prima facie case.
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution

itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely
abused. In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable
cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-
existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice.
To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of the DOJ shows that the
complaint’s dismissal was anchored on the insufficiency of evidence to establish the
respondent’s direct, personal or actual participation in the offense charged. As the State
Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner failed to prove the ownership
of the warehouse where counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the
conclusion that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for unfair competition as the
petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer
of the counterfeit shampoo products found in the warehouse.
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it
was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required
is "probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Thus, in
concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the very offense charged.
It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on
the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity
of testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters are better ventilated
during the trial proper of the case.
Page 1095 of 1553
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. MA. MERCEDITAS

NAVARRO- GUTIERREZ, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 194159, 21 October 2015, First Division, (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation

proceedings - whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to
determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for
the supposed crime that he committed.
Facts:
PCGG filed cases against former officers/directors of DBP and Galleon for anomalous
behest loans entered into by the DBP to Galleon. The Ombudsman found no probable
cause against private respondents and, accordingly, dismissed the criminal complaint
against them. It found that the pieces of evidence attached to the case records were not
sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual respondents, considering that
the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive summaries, which are
hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value.
Issue:
Whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to
indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Ruling:
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings
- whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine
whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the
supposed crime that he committed. A review of the records of the case reveals that Galleon
made a request for guarantees from DBP to cover its foreign borrowings for the purpose of
acquiring new and secondhand vessels. In an evaluation memorandum dated August 27,
1979, the DBP itself already raised various red flags regarding Galleon's request. Despite the
foregoing, DBP still agreed to grant Galleon's request under certain conditions (e.g.,
increase in paid-up capital, placement of adequate collaterals), which were eventually not
complied with. Further, when Galleon's arrearages and obligations skyrocketed due to its
failure to service its debts, DBP, instead of securing its interest by demanding immediate
Page 1096 of 1553

payment or the foreclosure of the collaterals, granted Galleon further accommodations in

the form of foreign currency loans and release of certain collaterals.
In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant of behest loans, Roque,
Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell merely denied liability by maintaining that they had no
participation in such grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better
ventilated during the trial proper. On the other hand, Ferry, Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison
miserably failed to debunk the charges against them by not filing their respective counter-
affidavits despite due notice. Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to
believe that individual respondents may have indeed committed acts constituting the
crimes charged against them, and as such they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial
on the merits.
SANDRA CAM v. ORLANDO CASIMIRO, et al.

G.R. No. 184130, June 29, 2015, Sereno, C.J.
Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded

belief that a crime has been committed, and that respondent is probably guilty. The
determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the prosecuting
officers after a preliminary investigation.
Facts:
Cam claims that she met Mosqueda in the course of her job as liaison officer of the governor
of Masbate. She claims after having had frequent transactions with Police Security and
Protection Office (PSPO) in Camp Crame, she became close to PSPO officials. Mosqueda
admits that he met her but only in passing. Cam claims that Mosqueda called her that day
to ask her to arrange a meeting with the governors of Bicol. Hence, Mosqueda allegedly
met with the governors. Later, Mosqueda asked her if she could do him a favor of collecting
"the thing," referring to jueteng money. Cam further alleges that a certain "Tita Fanny" went
to her room to deliver P250,000 and another person delivered P100,000. She avers that
Mosqueda called her that same night to inquire about the money and that Col. Gumban
would pick it up the next day. Allegedly upon instruction of Mosqueda, Cam kept P10,000
for herself and gave P340,000 to Col. Gumban. "Tita Fanny" was supposed to have witnessed
the delivery. Cam gave her bank details to Col. Gumban upon his request and that the
gambling lords would make deposits to these accounts. Cam attests that upon Mosqueda's
instructions, she withdrew money from her bank accounts and gave it to him. Cam claims
that another call from Mosqueda paved the way for her personal delivery of P900,000 to
Page 1097 of 1553
Reps. Iggy and Mikey Arroyo. Cam also alleged that Mosqueda received cars from the
jueteng payola with which she presented receipts of the sale. The Ombudsman dismissed
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence presented was insufficient to establish probable cause.
Ruling:
YES. For the purpose of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The determination of the
existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after they
have conducted a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party. A
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case;
sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the
case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal.
While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to
examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play. The need for a
careful examination of the evidence is also intended to protect the State from the burden
of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting and trying cases arising from false, fraudulent or
groundless charges.
Being the complainant, petitioner had the burden of establishing probable cause. Burden
of proof is defined in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court as "the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law." In order to engender the well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, the elements of the crime charged should be present. This rule
is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there
should be - at the most - no criminal offense.
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC.
G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, J. Leonen
While the determination of probable cause charge a person of a crime is the sole
function of the prosecutor, the trial court may, in the prosecution of one’s fundamental right
Page 1098 of 1553
to liberty, dismiss the case, if upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the
evidence does not establish probable cause. Hence, while the information filed by the
Prosecutor was valid, Judge Umali still had the discretion to make her own finding of whether
probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Facts:
Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car
Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a
partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released
by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission.
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo
failed to remit the payments totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there
were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation
revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City
1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the
acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its
prejudice and damage.
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure
to prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported
unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage. Provincial Prosecutor Rey
F. Delgado issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an
information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. The trial court issued an
order dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and
reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of
probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable
cause."
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In
essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable
cause as shown by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of
probable cause is broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause" and that
Page 1099 of 1553

"[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on
the prosecutor x x x."
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its
comment that the appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings
of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination
of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Ruling:
Yes, it can.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa under
Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the
public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis
to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with the
court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of
probable cause exists.
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of

the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no
Page 1100 of 1553

capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge
makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found
that the facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of Mendoza. There
was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted
to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali
still had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order
the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent
this, the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any

disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence

on record and concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable
cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa."41 Specifically, she found that Juno Cars
"failed to prove by competent evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered
by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received
by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the
complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or
their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused,"
which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for
clarificatory hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and
even directed the private complainant to bring documents relative to the same/payment as
well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed
probable cause exists to commit the present case which private complainant failed to do.
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-
Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Page 1101 of 1553

RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA vs. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN et al

G.R. No. 146376, April 23, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and requires more than
bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction. However, Agdeppa’s
accusations were mere suspicions that do not support a finding of probable cause to
criminally charge Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia under Section 3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of
Republic Act No. 3019
Facts:
Agdeppa filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against

Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia, docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Agdeppa’s
criminal complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 is essentially rooted in two external acts
by Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo in OMB-0-99-1015: (1) Jarlos-Martin’s issuance of the Order
dated September 23, 1999 requiring Junia to personally appear before the Office of the
Ombudsman to swear to his Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015, followed by the Order dated
October 6, 1999 directing Agdeppa and Castillo to file their counter-affidavits to Junia’s
Complaint which was then already under oath; and (2) Laurezo’s certifying that Junia
personally appeared before him on October 6, 1999 to swear to the Complaint in OMB-0-
99-1015. Agdeppa alleged that these acts were committed by Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and
Junia in conspiracy with one another to deliberately benefit Junia and prejudice Agdeppa
and, thus, constituted corrupt acts under Section 3(a), (e), (f), (j) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The Office of the Ombudsman, in the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order
dated September 28, 2000, dismissed Agdeppa’s charges for lack of basis in fact and in law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was probable cause to criminally charge Jarlos-Martin,

Laurezo, and Junia with corrupt acts
Ruling:
No, Agdeppa’s accusations were mere suspicions that do not support a finding of
probable cause to criminally charge Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia under Section 3(a),
(e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019
Page 1102 of 1553

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 describes and penalizes the following as corrupt acts:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient

justification to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for
the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating
against any other interested party.
xxxx
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor
of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so
qualified or entitled.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The Court had set the standard
to support a finding of probable cause in Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
Page 1103 of 1553

It bears stressing that probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence
which would justify conviction.
In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the Office of the
Ombudsman found no probable cause and dismissed Agdeppa’s complaint against Jarlos-
Martin, Laurezo, and Junia. The Office of the Ombudsman determined that one or more
element/s for each corrupt act in Agdeppa’s complaint is/are missing and/or lacked factual
basis. Agdeppa’s accusations were nothing more than his bare suspicions.
As the Office of the Ombudsman frankly declared in its Order dated September 28,
2000, denying Agdeppa’s Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of OMB-MIL-CRIM-
00-0470, “Agdeppa miserably failed to adduce any evidence, direct or circumstantial, to
prove any concert of voluntary action among Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia other than
surmises and conjectures.”
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
A person who induced another to invest his money to a corporation which does not
exist or dissolved shall be liable for estafa. And when the said corporation was made to solicit
from the public, the offense shall be syndicated estafa.
Facts:
Manuel Dy was a longtime client of Asiatrust Bank where Victor Ngo was a manager.
Ngo then introduced Dy to Gracia Hao, who claimed that she was an officer of several
reputable companies including State Resources. Hao invited Dy to invest with State
Resources promising high returns. Dy then invested with State Resources and in exchange,
Gracia issued a check in favor of Dy representing his profits. However, when Dy tried to
deposit the checks, they were all dishonored.
Dy sought help from Ngo who promised to help him but suddenly could no longer
be located. Dy learned that his money was invested with Danny Hao’s construction
business. Despite his demands, Gracia and Danny failed to return his investment.
Dy filed an action for syndicated estafa against Spouses Hao, Victor Ngo and several
officers of State Resources. The RTC issued warrants of arrest against spouses Hao and 6
Page 1104 of 1553

other co-accused. Spouses Hao moved for the lifting of the warrants of arrest but was
denied. The CA, however, held that the records show that there was no probable cause for
syndicated estafa but estafa only.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient probable cause to charge Spouses Hao of estafa
Ruling:
Yes. Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge is
mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime
charged. These provisions command the judge to refrain from making a mindless
acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts
and circumstances presented by both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal complaint or information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable
cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice
in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause.
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the Hao and
their co-accused. To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with
the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this
stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of
the accused. In doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing; he only needs to personally
review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The Hao’s, in fact, did
not present any evidence to controvert this.
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the
warrants of arrest against the Hao. As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after
his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was
probable cause to apprehend the Hao for their commission of a criminal offense.
Page 1105 of 1553

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC ET AL.

G.R. No. 183551, November 12, 2014, J. Mendoza
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises
a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court,
and the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against
the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion
can be imputed to the public prosecutor. In this case, there is no question that the
Information filed against Yecyec et al was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft
because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review
of the resolutions of the MCTC, the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that
there is substantial basis to support finding of probable cause against the Yecyec et al. Hence,
as the Information was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on
the part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they
overturned the finding of probable cause against Yecyec et al.
Facts:
Calixto B. Sison was the supervisor of Pioneer Corporation’s rubber processing p

lant. Sison bought for Pioneer a total of 2,433 kilos of rubber cup lumps wherein out of
these, some 1,500 kilos were purchased from Edon, caretaker of the plantation of Poño.
Considering that Pioneer did not have any storage facility in the place of sale, Sison placed
the newly-purchased rubber cup lumps inside the fenced premises which he rented out as
his residence.
Later that day, Sison was approached by Sechico, chairman of the FARBECO Multi-
purpose Cooperative who informed him that he wanted to verify if the rubber cup
lumps/coagulum he had bought earlier were the same as those that were earlier stolen from
FARBECO. Upon inspection, the group informed Sison that six (6) tons of the rubber
lumps/coagulum that Edon sold to him were the ones earlier stolen from FABRECO. In the
afternoon, Sison was surprised when Yecyec, manager of FARBECO, arrived at his place on
board a "weapons carrier truck." Yecyec, together with co-respondents totaling to 35 men,
demanded that Sison give them the rubber lumps/coagulum he bought from Edon. When
Sison asked if they had any written authority and/or Court order authorizing them to take
the rubber cup lumps from his house, Yecyec answered in the negative. For said reason,
Sison refused to accede to their demands. Sison warned Yecyec and his men not to enter
his residence and added that he would leave and ask a police officer and a barangay
kagawad to witness the incident. Immediately after Sison left, Yecyec, together with his
men proceeded to destroy the fence of Sison’s residence to gain entrance to the premises.
As they were unable to completely destroy the fence, Yecyec climbed over the enclosure to
gain entrance to Sison’s residence. About eleven (11) of Yecyec’s men followed him. Once
Page 1106 of 1553
inside the fenced premises, Yecyec and his companions took the rubber cup lumps and
loaded them on to their truck. Two (2) of Yecyec’s men were armed during the incident.
Benjamin Toto (Toto), a security guard, was armed with a shotgun while waiting outside
the fence. Ireneo Viño (Viño), who entered the fenced premises, was armed with a bolo.
From the total of 2,433 kilos of rubber cup lumps stored inside Sison’s fenced
premises, only 207 kilos were left. Pioneer, through Sison, thus filed an affidavit-
complaint against Yecyec et al before the PNP. In turn, PNP filed a criminal complaint
against Yecyec et al for Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. However, the provincial
prosecutor only found probable cause for the lesser offense of theft which was affirmed by
MTC. The RTC and CA however found no probable cause to charge Yecyec et al of the
crime of theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA are correct in finding that there is no probable
cause to charge Yecyec et al of the crime of theft
Ruling:
No.
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of

arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge should not
override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to hold an accused for
trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest
warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public
prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case
should be filed in court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when
the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the
prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination
of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether
the arrest warrant should be issued against the accused.
In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against Yecyec et al was
sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to support
Page 1107 of 1553
finding of probable cause against Yecyec et al, albeit with the RTC and the CA having
varying opinions as to the application and interpretation of such basis. Hence, as the
Information was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the
part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they
overturned the finding of probable cause against Yecyec et al
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR. et al.

Borje et al assailed the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause and the filing of
plunder case against the them. People maintains that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman is an executive, not a judicial function. As such,
it asserts that respondent Sandiganbayan should have given deference to the finding and
determination of probable cause in their preliminary investigation. People is correct. It is well
settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the
presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. This rule is based not only on respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Facts:
The Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Simeon
Datumanong, issued Department Order No. 15, Series of 2002, creating a committee for the
purpose of investigating alleged anomalies and illegal disbursements in connection with
the repair of DPWH-owned motor vehicles and equipment. As a result of the investigation,
it was discovered that during the period of March 2001 to December 2001, the emergency
repairs conducted on hundreds of DPWH vehicles, approved and paid for by the
government, did not actually take place, resulting in the loss of about P139,000,000.00.
Atty. Irene D. Ofilada filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended, against the several
officials/employees of the DPWH, including Borje et al.
The Special Prosecution Officer, Humphrey T. Monteroso, of the Office of the

Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, filed an Information with
Sandiganbayan accusing the Borje et al , of the crime of Plunder defined and penalized
under RA No. 7080, as amended. Thereafter, Borje et al filed their responsive pleadings
assailing the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan issued an
Order giving Borje et al a period within which to submit their memoranda of authority. In
Page 1108 of 1553

its Omnibus Comment/Opposition, People questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan

to act on Borje et al ’ motions, arguing that the same had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of Borje et al and, hence, it had no authority to hear and decide their motions.
It also alleged that it successfully established probable cause justifying the issuance by Borje
et al court of a warrant of arrest.
The Sandiganbayan upheld its authority to act on Borje et al motions for their filing
of the same may be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court and
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice
to the filing of appropriate charges against the accused- Borje et al. People maintains that
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman is an executive,
not a judicial function. As such, it asserts that Sandiganbayan should have given deference
to the finding and determination of probable cause in their preliminary
investigation. Moreover, People faulted the Sandiganbayan for taking into consideration
the findings of Atty. Irene Ofilada of the Investigating Committee that it was not Borje
who encashed the checks but the respondent-suppliers, by virtue of a blanket authority
given by the former to the latter. It posits that said findings cannot bind the Office of the
Ombudsman in its determination of the existence of probable cause.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court can interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause;
2. Whether or not the Ombudsman’s act of filing an information is arbitrary,

capricious, whimsical, or despotic amounting to a grave abuse of discretion
Ruling:
1. No. It is well to recall that there are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial.
On the one hand, executive determination of probable cause ascertains whether a

criminal case must be filed in court. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and
to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
should be held for trial. On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause
ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. It is one made
by a judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence presented, there is necessity
in placing the accused under custody so that the ends of justice will not be frustrated.
Page 1109 of 1553

Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the

determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation
for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is
empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause exists,
and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law.
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman
to determine the presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. This rule is based not only on
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the functions
of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in
court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
2. No. A review of the records clearly reveals that accused Borje, Jr. was the payee
of 4,406 checks amounting to P82,321,855.38 covering the reimbursements of the
supposed payments for the anomalous and questionable repairs of the DPWH
vehicles.
While there may have been evidence presented which may lead to an inference that
the end-receiver of the amounts covered by the checks is not actually accused Borje, Jr., but
the accused private individuals-suppliers, the fact that the name of accused Borje, Jr.
appears on the subject checks cannot be denied. Indeed, mere belief that Borje et al
probably committed the crime suffices to establish probable cause. Whether they are, in
fact, guilty of plunder is a different matter, which can properly be determined at a full-
blown trial on the merits of this case. Moreover, the fact that the decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman differs from the findings of Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit
Service of the DPWH, who conducted the initial investigation, falls short of being
capricious or arbitrary. The Ombudsman in this case, however, was merely performing his
duty as mandated by the Constitution and by law. Filing an Information against Borje et al
in this case based on sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that Borje et al are probably guilty thereof cannot be said to be
whimsical or despotic. As effectively shown by evidence, the Ombudsman’s charge was not
Page 1110 of 1553

at all baseless for the link between the Borje et al and the anomalous transactions herein
have been satisfactorily established.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR. ET. AL.

The OMB, in this case, found probable cause which would warrant the filing of an
information against Borje et al . For purposes of filing a criminal information, probable cause
has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that Borje et al are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. Thus, unless it is shown that the OMB’s finding of probable cause
was done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court will not interfere
with the same.
Facts:
The People thru the Ombudsman (OMB) filed the instant petition for review
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated January 20, 2005 and October 12,
2005 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division dismissing the criminal case against Borje et al for
lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder.
The nefarious corrupt activities subject of the criminal case were discovered in 2002
when the committee, organized by the then DPWH Sec. Datumanong, found anomalies
and illegal disbursements in connection with the repair of DPWH-owned motor vehicles
and equip-ment. The Internal Audit Service (IAS) of the DPWH traced emergency repairs
conducted on hundreds of DPWH vehicles, approved and paid for by the Government,
which did not take place, resulting in the loss of about PhP139,000,000.00 and so the IAS
forthwith filed a criminal complaint before the OMB.
On March 1, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the OMB filed an
Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Borje et al of the crime of plunder.
Thereafter, Borje et al filed their responsive pleadings essentially assailing the OMB’s
finding of probable cause. Subsequently, Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolutions
Page 1111 of 1553

upholding its authority to act on respondents’ motions as it considered their filing thereof
as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court and dismissing the case for lack of
probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the instant case
Ruling:
YES, the Sandiganbayan overstepped its bounds in making a second finding of

probable cause.
The People contends that the preliminary investigation conducted by the OMB is
an executive function, not a judicial function. On the other end, Borje et al assert that the
Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the case for the evidence clearly shows the absence of
certain elements of the imputed crime.
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the OMB to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. This rule is based not only on
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the OMB but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the functions of the
Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the [OMB] with regard to complaints filed before
it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they
could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.
The [OMB], in this case, found probable cause which would warrant the filing of an
information against Borje et al. For purposes of filing a criminal information, probable
cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and that Borje et al are probably guilty thereof. It is such set
of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspect. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
Page 1112 of 1553

of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. Thus, unless it is shown that the OMB’s
finding of probable cause was done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, [the Court] will not interfere with the same.
In the instant case, the act of filing an Information against Borje et al by the OMB
cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion. A review of the records clearly reveals that accused Borje, Jr. was
the payee of 4,406 checks amounting to P82,321,855.38 covering the reimbursements of the
supposed payments for the anomalous and questionable repairs of the DPWH vehicles.
While there may have been evidence presented which may lead to an inference that the
end-receiver of the amounts covered by the checks is not actually accused Borje, Jr., but
the accused private individuals suppliers, the fact that the name of accused Borje, Jr.
appears on the subject checks cannot be denied. Indeed, mere belief that Borje et al
probably committed the crime suffices to establish probable cause. Whether they are, in
fact, guilty of plunder is a different matter, which can properly be determined at a full-
blown trial on the merits of this case.
Moreover, the fact that the decision of the Office of the OMB differs from the
findings of Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH, who
conducted the initial investigation, falls short of being capricious or arbitrary. It has
consistently been held that there is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The OMB in this case, however, was merely performing his duty as mandated by the
Constitution and by law. Filing an Information against Borje et al in this case based on
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that Borje et al are probably guilty thereof cannot be said to be whimsical or despotic. As
effectively shown by evidence, the OMB’s charge was not at all baseless for the link between
the Borje et al and the anomalous transactions herein has been satisfactorily established.
In the absence, therefore, of any showing that the questioned acts of the OMB were done
in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court will not interfere with
the OMB’s exercise of his constitutionally mandated powers.
Page 1113 of 1553

ARREST
VINSON* D. YOUNG A.K.A. BENZON ONG AND BENNY YOUNG A.K.A. BENNY
ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to

ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. At this stage, the judge
makes a preliminary examination of the evidence submitted, and on the strength thereof, and
independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines the necessity of placing
the accused under immediate custody in order liot to frustrate the ends of justice. While a
judge's determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing
arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause.
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of RA 9208 was filed against petitioner before the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City (OCP). The OCP found probable cause and ordered the
indictment of petitioners, and as a result, the corresponding information was filed before
the RTC.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable
cause, praying that the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest be held in abeyance
pending resolution thereof, and for the case against them to be dismissed for lack of
probable cause. The RTC granted the omnibus motion and dismissed the case for lack of
probable cause.
Respondent People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari before the CA imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the case for lack of probable
cause.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in dismissing the criminal case against petitioners for lack of probable cause.
RULING:
NO.
Page 1114 of 1553

Judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain
if a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. At this stage, the judge makes a
preliminary examination of the evidence submitted, and on the strength thereof, and
independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines the necessity of placing
the accused under immediate custody in order liot to frustrate the ends of justice. While a
judge's determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of
issuing arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged.
In this case, the evidence on record does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence
of probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that
the prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of
RA 9208. In view of this, probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.
Moreover, the defenses raised by petitioners are matters which are best threshed out in a
full-blown trial. Thus, the proper course of action on the part of the RTC was not to dismiss
the case but to proceed to trial. Unfortunately, the RTC arrogated upon itself the task of
dwelling on factual and evidentiary matters upon which it eventually anchored the
dismissal of the case. Consequently, grave abuse of discretion was correctly imputed by the
CA against the RTC for its action.
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, et. al. vs. MARIO JOEL T. REYES

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not
make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. However, even
when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation
of grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming,
reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Page 1115 of 1553

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation
becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of probable cause and issues
a warrant of arres.
FACTS:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in
Palawan, was shot dead on 24 January 2011. On February 6, 2011, Rodolfo Edrad executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T.
Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.
Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel
of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel
concluded its preliminary investigation and dismissed the Affidavit-Complaint. On June
28, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife, filed
a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation and a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Both were denied by the First Panel.
The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of
investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of
service and due process". Pursuant to Department Order No. 710, the Second Panel issued
a Subpoena requiring former Governor Reyes to appear before them and to submit his
counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. Subsequently, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before
the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's
Resolution.
On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
Meanwhile, the Second Panel issued a Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including former Governor
Reyes. The Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision declaring Department Order No. 710 null and
void and reinstating the First Panel's Resolutions. According to the Court of Appeals, the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued Department
Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel. Aggrieved, the Secretary of Justice filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Page 1116 of 1553

ISSUES/RULING:
1. Whether or not the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the
findings of prosecutors may be subject to judicial review.
YES.
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or
reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of
an accused. The prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." As such, the prosecutor does not
perform quasi-judicial functions. The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of
the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary
investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable
cause in any case.
However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is
an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary
of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. Whether, under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice may, even
without a pending petition for review, motu proprio order the conduct of a
reinvestigation.
YES.
Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice is
authorized to issue Department Order No. 710.
The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary
of Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city
Page 1117 of 1553

prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of
a reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu
proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state
prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. This is because the Secretary of
Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority to
affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority
to directly act on any "probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the
prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city
prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation
even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable
miscarriage of justice.
3. Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of
preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its
determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest
YES.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to proceed with resolving
respondent's Petition for Review pending before her. It would be more prudent to refrain
from entertaining the Petition considering that the trial court already issued a warrant of
arrest against respondent. The issuance of the warrant signifies that the trial court has
made an independent determination of the existence of probable cause.
Page 1118 of 1553

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or
recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially
determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other
venue has been rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them
when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially
determined, a petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary
investigation ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" provided by law. Since
this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be
rendered moot.
The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial. Respondent,
however, is not without remedies. He may still file any appropriate action before the trial
court or question any alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation during pre-trial.

vs. RAFAEL CUNANAN Y DAVID ALIAS “PAENG PUTOL”
Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely raised in a motion
to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing which, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the regularity of his arrest.
Facts:
A confidential informant went to the EPD-District Intelligence Investigation
Division Headquarters of Pasig City and informed PSI Abalos that a certain “Paeng Putol,”
appellant, was engaged in selling illegal drugs in Pasig City. PSI Abalos organized a buy-
bust team to entrap appellant. PO1 Gunda was designated as the poseur-buyer and was thus
given two 100-peso bills which he marked with his initials “DG,” while the rest of the team
would act as back-ups. The informant saw a man wearing gloves standing beside the store
and informed PO1 Gunda that the man was Paeng Putol. Together, they approached
appellant who is familiar to the informant. PO1 Gunda was introduced to appellant as a
drug user who wanted to buy shabu worth P200.00. After receiving the marked money
from PO1 Gunda, appellant entered a narrow alley and came back with a small plastic
Page 1119 of 1553
sachet containing white crystalline substance, which he handed to PO1 Gunda. Thereupon,
PO1 Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to inform the buy-bust team of the consummated
transaction and arrested Paeng Putol. When asked to empty his pocket, recovered from
appellant were the two marked 100-peso bills used as buy-bust money. Appellant denied
the charge and interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion.
Issue:
1. Whether Paeng Putol’s arrest was illegal.
2. Whether he can still question the legality of his arrest.
Ruling:
No, it was not.
Paeng was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling an illegal
drug in a buy-bust operation. Contrary to his contention, it was not inconceivable that he
would openly sell an illegal drug in public. It is crystal clear that a sale transaction took
place between appellant and PO1 Gunda. That the said transaction involved the illegal sale
of dangerous drug was sufficiently shown by the prosecution through its establishment of
the following elements of the offense: “(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, object
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.”
Undoubtedly, Paeng Putol was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto
selling shabu in a buy-bust operation.
In any event, jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the arrest of
an accused should be timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before
arraignment, failing which, he is deemed to have waived” his right to question the
regularity of his arrest. As the records show, except during the inquest proceedings before
the prosecutor’s office, Paeng never objected to the regularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, he even actively participated in the trial of the case. With these
lapses, he is estopped from raising any question regarding the same.
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT, WHEN LAWFUL
MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG, LT. COL. JALANDONI COTA, MAYOR AMER
ODEN BALINDONG, AND ALI BALINDONG, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
STATE PROSECUTOR LEAH ARMAMENTO, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AND ZENAIDA LIMBONA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015, Bersamin, J.
Page 1120 of 1553

The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information
and supporting papers implies the determination of probable cause for the offense charged.
Facts:
A shooting incident took place in Lanao. The investigating prosecutor found probable
cause to charge private respondents (petitioners herein) Balindong, et al. with murder but
it was later downgraded. The private complainant filed a petition before the DOJ, to which
the then Secretary directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file instead "two informations for
frustrated murder with attempted murder, two informations for frustrated murder and an
information for attempted murder." The respondents filed two MRs which were denied.
However, the third MR was granted. Thus, complainant went to the CA, which reinstated
the resolution denying the MR. The criminal cases were filed against the respondents and
warrants of arrest were issued. The respondents went to the SC, however, their petition was
denied and it became final and executory. The judge was expressly ordered by the Supreme
Court to enforce the warrants of arrest The case was re-reraffled to another branch in RTC.
Private respondents then filed before RTC-Branch 83 a Motion to Re-Determine the
Existence or Non-Existence of Probable Cause. Respondents Balindong, et al. insist that
they were not precluded from still seeking from the RTC as the trial court the judicial
determination of probable cause against them because all that the Court had upheld in G.R.
No. 159962 was only the executive determination of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can still file a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause, considering that the decision upheld only the executive determination of
probable cause.
Ruling:
No. The Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962, that the proper criminal charges against
Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder, was clear. The Supreme Court, by
ordering the RTC "to implement its Resolution relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest," did not need to dwell specifically on the judicial determination of probable cause
independently of the executive determination. The trial judge, by issuing the warrants of
arrest, already found the existence of probable cause against Balindong, et al. Indeed, the
Page 1121 of 1553

act of issuing the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers
implied that the judge has determined the existence of probable cause for the offenses
charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial determination of
probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed independently
of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper offense. Moreover,
Balindong, et al. cannot rely on Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court because it applies
only to a situation in which there has been a mistake on the part of public prosecutor in
charging the proper offense. In this case, there was no mistake in charging the proper
offenses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, vs. REYMAN ENDAYA y LAIG

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph

(a) of the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
In this case, the arrest of appellantwas effected under paragraph (a) or what is termed
"in flagrante delicto." For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictounder
paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
Facts:
Police operatives, acting on a report from a barangay official that Laig is involved in
illegal drug activities, conducted surveillance operations on him. A team, composedof
SPO4 Moriel Benedicto (SPO4 Benedicto), SPO3 Nestor Babadilla(SPO3 Babadilla) and
PO2 Edwin Chavez (PO2 Chavez), was formed to perform a buy-bust operation against
appellant. A civilian asset, armed with five(5) pieces ofP100.00 bills as marked money, acted
as poseur-buyer.
On board a car, the police operatives and the civilian asset proceeded to the place
of operation. Laig subsequently arrived and approached the civilian asset, who was
standing in front of the beer house. The two talked for a while, after which, the police
operatives saw the civilian asset hand the marked money to appellant who, in turn, handed
something to the former which later turned out to be a plastic sachet containing shabu.
Page 1122 of 1553
After receiving the plastic sachet from Laig, the civilian asset made the pre-arranged
signal of touching his head to signify that the transaction had been completed. The police
officers then immediately approached Laig, introduced themselves as police officers and
informed him that he is under arrest for selling shabu. Appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights in Tagalog and then frisked by SPO3 Babadilla and PO2 Chavez for
any deadly weapon.
During this body search, SPO3 Babadilla recovered the marked money from
appellant. Meanwhile, the shabu subject of the sale between Laig and the civilian asset was
handed by the latter to PO2 Chavez. The shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, on the
other hand, was marked by PO2 Chavez by writing the same figure "8" on the sachet but
he added a distinctive mark by burning the edges of the plastic sachet to distinguish it from
the other eight sachets confiscated from appellant.
The team thereafter conducted an inventory of the items seized from appellant in
the presence of appellant. A photograph of appellant and the seized items, together with
the aforementioned witnesses was taken at the police station. Finally, a letter request for
laboratory examination, together with the marked sachets, was transmitted to the
Philippine National Police crime laboratory. The qualitative examination conducted on the
specimens yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
RTC convicted Laig of the offenses charged in these cases for violation of Section 5
(paragraph 1) and Section 11 (paragraph 3), both of Article II of Republic Act 9165 which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Sachets of shabu are admissible being a fruit of poisonous tree
Ruling:
Yes, the Sachets of shabu are admissible being a fruit of poisonous tree.
Appellant continued to crave for acquittal claiming that, assuming without

conceding that he had in fact sold and possessed the plastic sachets of shabu, they cannot
be admitted in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous tree, having been obtained after an
unlawful arrest and search.
Page 1123 of 1553

Appellant’s insistence on the illegality of his warrantless arrest lacks merit. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following
circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In this case, the arrest of appellantwas effected under paragraph (a) or what is
termed "in flagrante delicto." For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante
delictounder paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, SPO4 Benedicto, SPO2 Babadilla, and PO2 Chavez personally witnessed the
exchange between appellant and the poseur-buyer of the marked money and the plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance which subsequently tested positive for
shabu. At the time he was arrested, therefore, appellant was clearly committing a crime in
full view of the buy-bust team.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWARD ADRIANO y SALES

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted
as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In such an instance, the violator
is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that
Page 1124 of 1553

may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. Hence, a warrant of arrest is
not needed to make a valid buy-bust operation.
Facts:
In an Information dated October 25, 2008, Edward Adriano y Sales (Adriano) was
charged of the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under Section 5, Article II of the
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act (CDDA) of 2002, by
selling, delivering, and giving away to a poseur buyer, zero point twelve (0.12) gram of a
white crystalline substance, commonly known as "shabu" which is a dangerous drug, in
consideration of the amount of Two Hundred Pesos (Php200.00).
During trial, the prosecution presented Police Officer 1 Teodoro Morales (PO1
Morales), who testified that acting on a report received from a barangay official and an
informant that Adriano was selling drugs in North Daang Hari, Taguig City, Police Chief
Inspector Porfirio Calagan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap
Adriano, designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking the buy-bust money
consisting of ten P100.00 bills with the initials "PC". After briefing, PO1 Morales, together
with the informant and his team, proceeded to North Daang Hari where PO1 Morales
bought P200.00 worth of shabu from Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked money and
after receiving a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, PO1 Morales signaled
his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Ronnie Fabroa immediately arrested Adriano. The marked
money confiscated from Adriano was brought to the police station for investigation, while
the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which was marked with "ESA-
251008" at the crime scene was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory by PO2 Vergelio Del Rosario, who also prepared the letter-request. In the PNP
Crime Laboratory, the result of the laboratory examination conducted by Police/Senior
Inspector Yelah Manaog confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Eventually, the RTC found Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. On appeal, Adriano argued that the shabu allegedly seized from his possession is
inadmissible because of the following reasons: (1) the warrantless arrest on his person is
invalid; and (2) the arresting officers violated Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC arguing that even if the prosecution failed to comply with the
requirements provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not render
the seized items inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not a warrant of arrest is needed for the validity of a buy-bust operation
Page 1125 of 1553

Ruling:
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three (3) instances as provided by Section 5 of

Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Based on the above provision, Adriano was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), which
provides that a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In the case at bar, Adriano was caught
in the act of committing an offense, in flagrante delicto, when Adriano was caught selling
illegal shabu through a buy-bust operation, within the plain view of the arresting officers.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in

flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized
but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have
been part of or used in the commission of the crime." In People v. Agulay, we discussed
buy-bust operation as a form of a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers:
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been

accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried
out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust
operation deserves judicial sanction.
JOEY M. PESTILLOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, ET AL vs. MORENO

GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Page 1126 of 1553

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable

ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. In light
of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be
present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2)
the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests. Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the
warrantless arrest of the Pestillos, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for
a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were
arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the Pestillos committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the
arresting officer possessed at the time of the Pestillos' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and
prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
Pestillos? We rule in the affirmative.
Facts:
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police
Station) to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo
Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the
scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02 Javier, together with augmentation
personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the
scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the Pestillos as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to invite the Pestillos to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation. Pestillos et al went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. At
the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that Pestillos et al
stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the
attack.
The Pestillos et al were later indicted for attempted murder.
Page 1127 of 1553

Pestillos et al thus filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that
they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to
the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.
Both RTC and CA denied the Pestillos et al’s motion. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was valid warrantless arrest.
Ruling:
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal
proceedings against Pestillos et al should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that Pestillos et al filed has to reach this
Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply
to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the
proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules
have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their
origins, development and the current applicable interpretation. In our jurisdiction, early
rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based
these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court,
were not different from the Spanish laws. These court rulings likewise justified warrantless
arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)

above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b)
has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. For purposes of this case, we shall focus on
Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone
changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our
jurisprudence. We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
Page 1128 of 1553

American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate
present application.
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended
with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's
determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for
purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated
offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless
arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined
by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it. It is clear that the present rules have
"objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1)
commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the
crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere
suspicion or hearsay. As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial
proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for
triat. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, we defined probable cause as the existence of facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted. In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of
probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of
the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead
Page 1129 of 1553

a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must
be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage
of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence
submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates
the evidence in determining probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. In contrast, the
arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts
or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable

ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual
facts. In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the
following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just
committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of
probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of
the present Pestillos et al, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a
valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they
were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that Pestillos et al committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and
circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of Pestillos et al arrest, would
a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty.
Generoso was committed by Pestillos et al? We rule in the affirmative.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the
Page 1130 of 1553

scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime
transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the Pestillos et al reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified Pestillos et al as those responsible for his mauling and,
notably, Pestillos et al and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when Pestillos et al were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not
deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of Pestillos et al, we deem it reasonable to
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
justifying Pestillos et al warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the
police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon

the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to
the victim. This fact alone negates Pestillos et al argument that the police officers did not
have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately
responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent
(as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed
the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it

took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-
the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the
Page 1131 of 1553

perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor
conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199042, November 17, 2014, CJ. Sereno
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to
have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
Facts:
Sometime in 2004, Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz was charged for violating Section 11,
Article II of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, specifically due
to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody of
"shabu," weighing zero 0.063 gram.
Four witnesses testified during the course of trial. They revealed that a complaint
was filed by one Brian Resco against accused Alcaraz for allegedly shooting the former
along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter, police
officers along with complainant Resco, proceeded to the house of Alcaraz. They informed
the latter about the complaint lodged against him and then invited him to the police
station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of
shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants.
During the arraignment, said accused Alcaraz pleaded not guilty in which in his
defense he testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when the
officers, invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been
identified as responsible for shooting the complainant, the accused Alcaraz was then
frisked and detained at the police station.
The RTC ruled for conviction of Alcaraz . Upon review of the Court of Appeals, it
finds no reversible error as to the legality of Alcaraz’s warrantless arrest and search.
Thus, the present appeal.
Issues:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search is valid?
Page 1132 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes, the arrest is valid but the search is not.
Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests either by a peace officer or a private person, under the following instances: (a) when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between Alcaraz and the arresting officers show
none of the above that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records
reveal that Alcaraz never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case.
Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. While

Alcaraz has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed
to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be

conducted. These searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view;
(3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. While this type may
seemingly fall under the consented search exception, we reiterate, "consent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence". Having been
obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence
against accused Alcaraz.
Page 1133 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMMEL ARAZA y SAGUN

An accused cannot assail any irregularity in the manner of his arrest after
arraignment. Objections to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be manifested prior to entering his plea.
Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Facts:
Sometime in 2003, Rommel Araza y Sagun was charged for violating R.A. 9165, the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, specifically due to willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one transparent plastic sachet
containing "shabu," weighing zero 0.06 gram. Such was frisked from him in an alleged pot
session with nine other persons when, arresting officer, PO1 Talacca accompanied the
barangay officials in confiscating a video karera machine from one Alejandro Sacdo.
During the arraignment, said Sagun pleaded not guilty in which in his defense he
mentioned that he was sleeping in one room of Sacdo’s residence then he suddenly woke
up by said police officer and frisked him then charged him for mentioned violation.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish Sagun’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It gave credence to the testimony of the arresting officer since he is
presumed to have regularly performed his duties and there was no evidence that he had
any motive to falsely testify against accused Sagun. It then rejected the aforementioned
alibi as a feeble defense that cannot prevail over the positive testimony of said officer.
Sagun then filed a notice of appeal in which it was granted by the court, he averred
the legality of his arrest and the shabu being illegally seized is inadmissible in evidence,
having been taken from his pocket and not as an incident of an arrest in flagrante delicto.
He also argued about the rule of chain of custody wherein the shabu may be subject of
tampering. The Court of Appeals was not impressed and sustained the decision of the RTC.
Thus the appeal.
Issues:
1) Whether or not Rommel Sagun’s warrantless arrest was valid?
Page 1134 of 1553

2) Whether or not the procedure for the custody and control of prohibited drugs was
complied with?
Ruling:
1) Yes, such was valid.
The prosecution satisfied the foregoing elements during trial. The arresting officer,
positively identified accused-appellant as the person caught in possession of the shabu
presented in court. He stated that the shabu was validly confiscated after accused-appellant
was arrested in flagrante delicto sniffing shabu in the company of other people. The
elements that must be established in the successful prosecution of a dangerous drugs case
are: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the drug."
PO1 Talacca’s testimony, the physical evidence and the facts stipulated upon during
trial were consistent with each other. Sagun also failed to adduce evidence showing that
the had legal authority to possess the seized drugs.
An accused cannot assail any irregularity in the manner of his arrest after arraignment.
Objections to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be manifested prior to entering his plea. Otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived. Moreover, jurisprudence dictates "the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction
of the accused."
Further, failure by the prosecution to prove that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory of the seized shabu does not immediately result in the unlawful
arrest of an accused or render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. "What is essential
is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Here, the
records reveal that the police officers substantially complied with the process of preserving
the integrity of the seized shabu. Thus, failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R. A.
9165 is not fatal.
2) The chain of custody has not been broken.
Based on the foregoing findings, the chain of custody of the seized substance was not
Page 1135 of 1553

broken.
The suspected illegal drug confiscated from accused Sagun was the same substance
presented and identified in court. There is therefore no reason to disturb the findings of
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of a dangerous drug.
NATURE OF BAIL
CABIB ALONTO TANOG v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, 12th Judicial Region, MARAWI CITY, AND GAPO
SIDIC
G.R. No. 187464, November 25, 2015, Brion, J.
The right to bail flows from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of the law who may be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a
security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions.
Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. If the offense
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Bail is
denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
Facts:
An Information charging murder was filed against private respondent Gapo Sidic (Sidic)
for the death of one CabibTanog Jr., son of petitioner Cabib Tanog (Tanog). Claiming that
the evidence of guilt against him was not strong, Sidic filed a motion to fix bail. In its order
dated February 11, 2009, Judge Balindong granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, and fixed the
amount at P30,000.00. In the present petition, Tanog alleged that Judge Balindong
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
granted Sidic's motion to fix bail despite the strong evidence of guilt against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Balindong committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted
Sidic’s motion to fix bail.
Page 1136 of 1553

Ruling:
No. The Court pointed out that the accused were charged of murder, a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. If the information charges a capital offense, the right to bail
becomes a matter of discretion and the grant thereof may be justified as a matter of right
if the evidence of guilt is not strong. The determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. In the present
case, we find that Judge Balindong did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, and capricious
manner when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail. The records showed that a hearing on
the application for bail was conducted and that the prosecution presented four witnesses,
namely Noma Tanog CabibTanog, Sr., SaripadaTanog, and Saripoden Tanog Lucman. Judge
Balindong evaluated the testimonies of these witnesses, and found out that none of them
witnessed the actual shooting of the victim: Noma merely saw Sidic running towards the
direction of the vehicles after he (Noma) went to Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. to
verify the gunshots he heard; Saripada admitted that he did not see Sidic shoot the victim;
Cabib admitted that it was Noma who pointed Sidic to him as one of the victim's assailants;
and Saripoden merely described the attire of one of the men he saw at the canteen, and did
not mention the name of Sidic. On the basis of these testimonies, Judge Balindong
concluded that the prosecution failed to show that the evidence against Sidic was strong.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, Bersamin, J.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The
strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight
or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Facts:
Petitioner Enrile and several others was charged by the office of the Ombudsman with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Subsequently,
Enrile filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition praying that he be allowed
to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying Enrile's motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that he had not yet been placed under the custody of the law.
Page 1137 of 1553
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile but he voluntarily surrendered
to the CIDG and was later on confined at the PNP General Hospital after his medical
examination. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital
and his Motion to Fix Bail. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Petitioner’s motion to
fix bail. The Sandiganbayan also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence the
case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail.
Ruling:
Yes. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent.
Also, Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion. The general rule is, therefore,
that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. On the other hand, the granting
of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present. Thus, Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion.
Enrile's poor health justifies his admission to bail. In granting Enrile's petition for certiorari,
the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court
is further mindful of the Philippines' responsibility in the international community arising
from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person.
In the Court’s view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his
flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. The court also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
Page 1138 of 1553

processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as
a flight risk. The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELCHOR D. BRITA

Brita asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the
prosecution is not strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. "A grant of
bail does not prevent the trial court, as the trier of facts, from making a final assessment of
the evidence after full trial on the merits." It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused
person granted bail is convicted in due course.
Facts:
On October 24, 2002, 2 separate Informations were filed against appellant Brita
before the RTC. One was for selling shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
as amended, and the other for illegal possession of shabu, in violation of Section 11, Article
II of the same law.
After his arraignment wherein he pleaded not guilty, Brita filed a Petition for Bail.
During the bail hearing, the prosecution presented PO2 Archibald Tejero and PO3 Edgar
Orias. They narrated that in the afternoon of October 23, 2002, upon being told by a
confidential informant that a certain "Boboy" (appellant Brita) was engaged in selling of
illegal drugs, Police Inspector Eduardo Paningbatan (P/Insp. Paningbatan), Chief of the
Taguig Police Station, set up a buy-bust team. PO2 Tejero was designated as the poseur-
buyer and was given P500.00 as buy-bust money marked with "AT."
At about 4:30 p.m., the buy-bust team went to the house of Brita. The informant
with PO2 Tejero, called Brita who came out of his house and approached them. After having
been introduced, PO2 Tejero gave Brita the marked money. In return, Brita took from his
pocket a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and handed the same to PO2
Tejero. Thereupon, PO3 Orias and the rest of the team rushed to the scene. After he was
placed under arrest, PO2 Tejero recovered from Brita the buy-bust money. While, PO3
Orias frisked appellant and found in his possession two plastic sachets containing
suspected shabu. PO3 Orias marked the recovered plastic sachets.
The team brought Brita and the confiscated items to the Taguig Police Station. After
preparing the request for laboratory examination, PO2 Tejero and the investigator brought
Page 1139 of 1553

the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory and the substance tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In an Omnibus Order the RTC-Pasig denied both Brita's Petition for Bail and
Demurrer to Evidence as it found the evidence against him for the charge of violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 strong. However, it dismissed the case for violation of
Section 11, Article II of the same law as it found that the guilt of the accused was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Subsequently, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Transfer/Re-Raffle which was
granted by RTC-Pasig. The case was re-raffled to RTC-Taguig, after finding that the
evidence of the prosecution was not that strong, the court reconsidered and set aside the
RTC-Pasig Omnibus Order and allowed Brita to post bail.
Meanwhile, Brita, for his defense, proffered denial. He claimed that there was no
buy-bust operation and that he was merely a victim of frame-up.
The RTC-Taguig found Brita guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. It gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers who were
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. It ruled that the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the object evidence consisting of
the seized substance that tested positive for shabu, sufficiently established the elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the said RTC Decision. Hence, the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of bail in Brita's favor means that the evidence of guilt is
not strong.
Ruling:
The contentions of Brita deserve scant consideration.
The Court agrees with the CA that the testimonies of PO2 Tejero and PO3 Orias
established beyond reasonable doubt Brita's culpability. Their narrations of what
transpired in the afternoon of October 23, 2002, from the moment the informant disclosed
to them the illegal activities of Brita up to the time of his arrest, deserve credence as the
Page 1140 of 1553

same emanated from the direct account of law enforcement officers who enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
It should be noted that "unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy bust team were inspired by any improper motive, their testimonies on
the operation deserve full faith and credit." while Brita is correct that the presumption of
regularity should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence, still, he must be
able to present a viable defense.
Here, what Brita interposed is merely denial and a claim of frame-up. "For the claim
of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence
to overcome the presumption of regularity," which it failed to do.
Hence, the Court finds no error on the part of the courts below in upholding the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police officers who conducted
the buy-bust operation.
Brita asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the
prosecution is not strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. "A grant
of bail does not prevent the trial court, as the trier of facts, from making a final assessment
of the evidence after full trial on the merits." It is not an uncommon occurrence that an
accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR., EDGAR ALLEN

ALVAREZ, RODEL CABALLERO, LUIS EVANGELISTA et al
G.R. No. 191060, February 02, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
The concept of speedy trial is available not only to the accused but also the State.
Facts:
Edgar Allen Alvarez and Rodel Caballero along with the other accused who remain at large,
were found guilty by the RTC of the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of Nicanor Morfe
Agon. They assail that they were denied due process when the RTC ordered the
discontinuance of their presentation of additional witnesses.
Page 1141 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were denied due process of law.
Ruling:
No. There was unreasonable delay when the accused sought postponements on many
instances. In addition, considering the fact that the accused intended to present other
witnesses, they should have been more discerning in seeking the resetting of the trial
proceedings to avoid delay. The concept of speedy trial is available not only to the accused
but also the State because, while an accused does have rights, let it not be forgotten that
the aggrieved also have the same rights. Thus, the Accused-Appellants were not denied due
process considering that they were able to testify on their own behalf and that it is within
their power to ensure that they are able to present their case without delay
ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR.

vs. ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO AND RITCHIE YERRO
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC denying in due course its appeal
with respect to the criminal aspect of the case which is estafa. The basis of the ruling is that
the dismissal of the RTC is based on failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Bonsubre
contends that the CA erred in renderings such decision because there was a compromise
agreement entered into. The Supreme Court ruled that At the outset, it must be borne in mind
that a dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the
effect of acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense
Facts:
This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for estafa filed by Bonsubre against
respondents Erwin Yerro, Erico Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro (Yerro) before the RTC. This case
stemmed from a criminal complaint for estafa filed by Bonsubre against respondents Erwin
Yerro, Erico Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro (Yerro) before the RTC.
Although a Compromise Agreement was reached between Bonsubre and Yerro

relative to the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution failed to furnish the RTC a copy of
the same and file the necessary motion as manifested. As a result, the RTC, in an Order
dated September 18, 2001(September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order), dismissed the case for
Page 1142 of 1553

failure of the prosecution to comply with the court’s directive, as well as to take any further
step to prosecute the case, in view of the accused’s (i.e., respondents’) constitutional right
to speedy trial.
More than 2 years from the issuance of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order,
Bonsubre, through a new collaborating counsel, Atty. Bernarditto M. Malabago (Atty.
Malabago), filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that he learned of the September
18, 2001 Dismissal Order only on June 7, 2004, and that he believed in good faith that the
case was merely archived in accordance with the terms of the Compromise Agreement.
The RTC denied Bonsubre’s motions, holding that the dismissal, which was
grounded on failure to prosecute, had long become final and executory and thus can no
longer be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Dissatisfied, Bonsubre filed a notice
of appeal. In a Decision dated November 24, 2011, the CA dismissed the certiorari petition.
It confined its ruling to the propriety of the denial of due course to Bonsubre’s notice of
appeal, holding that the dismissal of the criminal case for failure to prosecute had long
attained finality and thus can no longer be the subject of review
Issue:
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
upholding the RTC’s ruling denying due course to Bonsubre’s notice of appeal with respect
to the criminal aspect of the case.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals did not err in upholding RTC’s ruling.
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that a dismissal grounded on the denial of
the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that would bar the further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. In People v. Judge Hernandez, the Court
explained the parameters of this rule:
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute
clearly conferring that right. Thus, errors of judgment are not appealable by the
prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal
case by the trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was
denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. This is so as while it is
true that double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a [D]ecision
Page 1143 of 1553

acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really “acquit” and therefore
does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void
indictment.
In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against Yerro for the denial of
their right to speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on the
ground of the denial of the accused’s right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Thus, we have held
that where after such dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order
of dismissal and the court re-set the case for trial, the accused can successfully claim double
jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final and cannot be reconsidered.
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and

JOJO B. JOSON
G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015, J. Peralta
Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application
of the limitation of the period for suspending arraignment. While the pendency of a petition
for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
Facts:
Ventus and Joson filed a complaint for estafa against Aguinaldo and Perez. The
Assistant City Prosecutor recommended both Aguinaldo and Perez to be indicted in court
for estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Perez was arrested. On the same day, Aguinaldo and Perez filed a Very Urgent
Motion to Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest and a Motion for Reconsideration. Aguinaldo
and Perez also filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment, pending resolution
of their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's
motion, the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the resolution
of Aguinaldo and Perez' motion for reconsideration. The OCP of Manila, through denied
Page 1144 of 1553

the motion and filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial. Aguinaldo and Perez filed a petition for
review before the DOJ.
Almost one (1) year and seven (7) months passed from the time Aguinaldo and Perez
filed their petition for review with the DOJ. The public respondent issued an Order setting
Aguinaldo and Perez' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows only
a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. He also ruled that the issuance of the warrant
of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial court.
Aggrieved, Aguinaldo and Perez filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. The CA dismissed it. Aguinaldo and Perez argue that the provision of Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60)
days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive Aguinaldo and Perez of their procedural
right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Is the provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension
for arraignment to only sixty (60) days merely directory?
Ruling:
No, it is compulsory.
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that in a long line of
decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience
of invoking “substantial justice.” Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or when
the purpose of justice requires it.
The Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
Page 1145 of 1553

In the case at bar, Aguinaldo and Perez petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon the Aguinaldo
and Perez' motion, the arraignment of Aguinaldo and Perez was ordered deferred by the
public respondent. The Court believed that the period of one year and one month from
April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the public respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give Aguinaldo and Perez the
opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. Aguinaldo and
Perez though submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30, 2005 stating that their
petition for review is pending resolution by the Department as of May 27, 2005. However,
such delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days prescribed under the
afore-quoted Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Besides,
Aguinaldo and Perez may be faulted for the delay in the resolution of their petition.
According to their counsel, she received the letter dated April 15, 2004 from the DOJ
requiring her to submit the pertinent pleadings relative to Aguinaldo and Perez ' petition
for review; admittedly, however, the same was complied with only on October 15, 2004.
The Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from
the time Aguinaldo and Perez filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27,
2004 to September 14, 2005 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more
than ample time to give Aguinaldo and Perez the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their
petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very liberal with Aguinaldo and Perez in
applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of
arraignment to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than
eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and Aguinaldo and
Perez have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
MOTION TO QUASH
People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta

G.R. No. 20212, April 5, 2016
The facts, as alleged in the Information, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of
the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the
result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. While the Informations
in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense, and, as a general rule, a
complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective,
Page 1146 of 1553

here, the accused entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for
the quashal of the Informations. Under Section 9 of Rule 117, “[t]he failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided
for.”
FACTS:
This is an appeal against the Judgment convicting the accused for Double Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
It was alleged that the accused shot several times at the house of the victim and his family.
While the victim and his wife and two other children were unhurt, two (2) of his daughters
got hit and died because of the incident.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the conviction should be reversed due to the inconsistencies in the victim's
testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants
had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to
kill his children.
(2) Whether the Information is defective.
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the accused, as evidence on record
fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant
acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and
simultaneously firing at the victims. Factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine
evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by
the CA.
2. The facts, as alleged in the Information, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of
the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not
the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. While the
Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense,
Page 1147 of 1553

and, as a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective, here, the accused entered a plea of not guilty during
arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations. Under Section
9 of Rule 117, “[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver
of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for.” Thus, he is
deemed to have waived his right to question the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG

FUNG YUEN, RICKY YU, VICENTE SY, ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA, SINDAO
MELIBAS, SATURNINO LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA and RAMON NAVARRO
It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect in the information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order the amendment to be made. In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly
dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the
Informations. Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present
its evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right
to due process.
Facts:
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Dionisio R. Santiago, ordered that a

random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine
samples of 38 inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing and out of that number,
21 urine samples tested positive.
After confirmatory tests done by the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division, those 21 urine
samples, which included that of Andrade et al, yielded positive results confirming the result
of the initial screen test. The 21 inmates were charged with violation of Section 15, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165. (the above-named accused, without having been authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any manner
introduced into the physiological system of his body, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
otherwise known as "shabu,")
All Andrade et al pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their
arraignment. On August 29, 2006, Andrade et al filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on
Page 1148 of 1553

the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section
15, RA 9165.
A strict reading of the provisions of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 reveals that the
accused did not commit the offense charged. Under RA 9165, the offense of Violation of
Section 15 thereof is committed by a person apprehended or arrested for using dangerous
drug, and who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory
test.
Andrade et al’s lawyer, on the date set for hearing, manifested that he intends to
pursue the Motion to Dismiss filed by Andrade et al s' previous counsel, hence, the pre-
trial and trial were reset to November 29, 2006.
The RTC of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial and trial,
issued an Order granting respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss, ruling as follows:
To be liable under this Act the following essential requisites must be present:
1. The offender must have been arrested or apprehended for use of dangerous drugs; or
apprehended or arrested for violation of RA 9165 and the apprehending or arresting officer
has reasonable ground to believe that the person arrested or apprehended on account of
physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation is under the influence
of dangerous drugs; or must have been one of those under Sec. 36 of Art. III of RA 9165 who
should be subjected to undergo drug testing;
2. The offender must have been found positive for use of dangerous drug after a screening
and confirmatory test;
3. The offender must not have been found in his/ or her possession such quantity of
dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act;
4. That if the offender arrested or apprehended has been found to be positive for use of
dangerous drugs after a screening laboratory examination, the results of the screening
laboratory examination of test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after receipt of
the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical laboratory
equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry or some such modern method.
It is clear from the facts that the inmates were not apprehended nor arrested for
violation of any provision of R.A. 9165. These inmates were in the National Bilibid Prisons
(NBP) serving sentences for different crimes which may include also drug offenses. They
Page 1149 of 1553

were subjected to drug tests only pursuant to the request made by then Director Dionisio
Santiago. They were not one of those persons enumerated in Section 36 of the said Act who
may be subjected to mandatory drug testing. Hence, the first essential requisite has not
been complied with. If one essential requisite is absent, the Court believes that these
inmates cannot be held liable for the offense charged. They may be held liable
administratively for violation of the Bureau of Corrections or NBP rules and regulations
governing demeanor of inmates inside a penitentiary but not necessarily for violation of
Sec. 15 of R.A. 9165.
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information
these cases are ordered DISMISSED with costs de officio.
The CA affirmed the trial court's Order. People filed its Motion for Reconsideration,
but was denied in a Resolution. Thus, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of Andrade et al s' motion
and eventually dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause.
Ruling:
This Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The ground relied upon by Andrade et al s in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is,
that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an offense, is actually one of the
grounds provided under a Motion to Quash in Section 3 (a),14 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
It must be emphasized that Andrade et al s herein filed their Motion after they have
been arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after
arraignment because their failure to raise any ground of a motion to quash before they
plead is deemed a waiver of any of their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
Page 1150 of 1553

those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and (i) of Section
3 of this Rule.
However, since the ground asserted by Andrade et al s is one of the exceptions

provided under the above-provision, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential. The
mistake lies in the RTC's dismissal of the case. The RTC judge went beyond her authority
when she dismissed the cases based on lack of probable cause and not on the ground raised
by Andrade et al s, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information
these cases are ordered DISMISSED with cost de officio.
Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in
a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the present case, what the
Andrade et al s claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations
do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge.
The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the arraignment. Once the
information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there is probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia, this Court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those
whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and should be
held for trial. Such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or
not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
Page 1151 of 1553

under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable
cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns

itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The
judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of
one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives.
The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground
to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether
or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is
the function of the Prosecutor.
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of

the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no
capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge
makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
In this case, by proceeding with the arraignment of Andrade et al s, there was already
an admittance that there is probable cause. Thus, the RTC should not have ruled on
whether or not there is probable cause to hold Andrade et al s liable for the crime
committed since its duty is limited only to the determination of whether the material
averments in the complaint or information are sufficient to hold Andrade et al s for trial.
In fact, in their motion, Andrade et al s claimed that the facts alleged in the Informations
do not constitute an offense.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied
the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a
demurrer to evidence to be filed by Andrade et al s, if they opt to, or allowed the
prosecution to amend the Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until
the amendment of the Information without dismissing the case.
Page 1152 of 1553

Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if
the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment,
thus:
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is

based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall
be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information. The fact
that the allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or that the information
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment.
The court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.
In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. In People v. Talao
Perez, this Court ruled that, "...even granting that the information in question is defective,
as pointed out by the accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can be cured by
amendment, the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered
the Fiscal to amend the information." When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the
complaint or information, the court should direct its amendment or that a new information
be filed, and save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when the
complaint might easily be amended.
Even the CA admitted that the RTC erred in that regard. However, it still upheld the
ruling of the RTC, stating that "whatever perceived error the trial court may have
committed is inconsequential as any intended amendment to the informations filed surely
cannot cure the defects," and to justify such conclusion, the CA proceeded to decide the
merits of the case based merely on the allegations in the Information. Such
pronouncement, therefore, is speculative and premature without giving the prosecution
the opportunity to present its evidence or, to at least, amend the Informations.
In People v. Leviste, we stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is entitled to
its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents the
Page 1153 of 1553

State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner
consistent with public interest. The prosecutor's role in the administration of justice is to
lay before the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to
exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the
accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge
may or is disposed to do.
In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample discretionary
power to control the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which
is the option to choose what evidence to present or who to call as witness.
Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its
evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right
to due process.
In light of the foregoing, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SPEEDY TRIAL
NAPOLEON D. SENIT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192914, January 11, 2016 [Reyes, J.]
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. It is established that notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner
and his failure to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear
on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the
proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the
constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.
FACTS:
Petitioner Napoleon Senit was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. Trial ensued. However, after the initial
presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his employment and
transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was not presented
as a witness by his new counsel.
Page 1154 of 1553

The RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime charged.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial on the ground that errors of law or
irregularities have been committed during trial that are allegedly prejudicial to his
substantial rights. He claimed that he was not able to present evidence during trial because
he was not notified of the schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly believed that the case against
him has been dismissed as private complainant purportedly left the country.
The RTC denied the motion for new trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in denying the motion for new trial or to re-open
the same in order to allow the petitioner to present evidence on his behalf.
RULING:
NO.
No errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner, have
been committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. He theorizes that there was an error of law or irregularities
committed when the RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he had
waived his right to present evidence resulting to denial of due process, a one-sided decision
by the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
against him.
The petitioner’s claims, however, that he had not testified because he did not know the
schedule of the hearings, and mistakenly believed that the case had already been
terminated do not merit consideration. The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is established that notices have
been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his
whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the
arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of
Page 1155 of 1553

judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional right to due process are
doomed to fail.
The petitioner clearly had previous notice of the criminal case filed against him and was
given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner was not in any way
deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded
all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but
he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the
scheduled hearings.
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting
to his failure to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases that
it is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly
posted about the case. He is mandated to inquire from his counsel about the status and
progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back,
relax and await the outcome of the case. Further, there is neither rule nor law which
specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel are
sufficiently communicated with his client.
Verily, there is no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the motion for new
trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial.
The Court believes that the petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard but he chose
to put this opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough to ask about the status of
the criminal case against him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
FE P. ZALDIVAR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 197056, March 02, 2016 [Reyes, J.]
The trial court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in question, for strict observance of the order of trial or
trial procedure under the rules depends upon the circumstance obtaining in each case at the
discretion of the trial judge.
FACTS:
In a criminal case for Estafa, RTC Judge Catilo issued an Order nullifying the previous pre-
trial proceedings conducted and setting the case anew for pre-trial conference. According
to the RTC, the proceedings in the case wherein prosecution witnesses were presented but
whose affidavits were only considered as their direct testimonies are void for want of
procedural due process. The CA ruled that Judge Catilo grossly abused the exercise of his
Page 1156 of 1553

discretion and judgment when he nullified the pre-trial proceedings taken before Branch
33 and ordered the conduct of a new pre-trial. According to the CA, the trial court's order
is tantamount to ordering a new trial or re-opening of the case to the prejudice of the rights
of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
when it nullified the proceedings previously conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial of the
case
RULING:
The CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it
nullified the proceedings previously conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial of the case.
One of the main reasons presented by Judge Catilo in nullifying the pre-trial proceedings
was that the proceedings conducted after the pre-trial conference did not comply with the
prescribed procedure in the presentation of witnesses. But as propounded by the CA, what
the trial court should have done to correct any "perceived" procedural lapses committed
during the presentation of the prosecution's evidence was to recall the prosecution's
witnesses and have them identify the exhibits mentioned in their respective affidavits. This
is explicitly allowed by the rules, specifically Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
trial court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue in question, for strict observance of the order of trial or trial
procedure under the rules depends upon the circumstance obtaining in each case at the
discretion of the trial judge.
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY

PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY
Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining

whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in
view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration
of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings
which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the Court recognizes the accused's right
Page 1157 of 1553

to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive
the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend
the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Facts:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is

the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for
Violation of B.P. 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC
Branch 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed. Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal
Cases. Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the
motion and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration. When Co moved for recusation, Judge
Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases. The cases were, thereafter, raffled
to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. It was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit. Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently,
denied. Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 171096 which was later dismissed and became final and executory.
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent
Dismissal". Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues
already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban
V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated granting Co’s motion. When the court subsequently
denied Uy’s motion for reconsideratio, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of
Caloocan City. Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on
the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
Co argues that when the Court provisionally dismissed the criminal cases, it should
be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied.
He reasons out that from his arraignment until the initial trial, there was already a
"vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic
Act 8493 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure mandating that the entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first
Page 1158 of 1553

day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction
over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion
because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioner on the
ground of denial of his right to speedy trial constitutes final dismissal of the cases.
Ruling:
The petition is unmeritorious. Co’s arguments are nonetheless untenable on the

grounds as follows:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously,
he failed to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay
in the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or
justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution.
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal
of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the
case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
(4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case. In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for
the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the
hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three days before
said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. The fact is that it was only in
open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records,
complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint."
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the
dismissal of the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order and not after notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance of the order temporarily
dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such.
Page 1159 of 1553

Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the
court order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is
unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise
would definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly
or unwittingly not comply.
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND

ROGELIO “NOELE DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 203961, July 29, 2015, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.
Facts:
The Court affirmed the RTC decision convicting Licayan and Lara of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing them to death. Before the date of Licayan and
Lara’s scheduled execution, Delos Reyes was arrested and was also charged and convicted
of the same crime. The PAO then filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of
Court, in which the Court resolved to grant pro hac vice the motion and ordered the
suspension of their execution. The prosecution alleged that Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes,
along with other men, conspired to kidnap Joseph Co and Linda Manaysay. During the
second trial, the “new” evidence adduced consists in (1) allegations that the identification
of Licayan and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and affidavits of
the recently apprehended Delos Reyes, who alleged that Licayan and Lara were not
involved in the crime; and (3) testimonies purporting to establish that Lara was at work in
Antipolo during the kidnapping incident. In the appeal before the Court, Licayan and Lara
seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the newly discovered evidence presented
during their retrial.
Issue:
Whether or not Licayan and Lara should be acquitted based on purportedly newly
discovered evidence.
Page 1160 of 1553
Ruling:
NO. The pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the effects of Rule 121, Section 6(b} of
the Rules of Court, which provides: when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered
and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced
shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record. The new
evidence alluded to by the Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new trial was
supposed to be the testimony of Delos Reyes, who denied that Licayan and Lara
participated in the crime. The statement Delos Reyes, however, would have been given
more weight had they personally admitted their own involvement in the crime.
Furthermore, while Co and Manaysay may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan was
among the armed men who abducted them,they nevertheless positively identified Licayan,
and testified that Lara was at the scene of the crime. Thus, the new evidence presented by
Licayan and Lara not only failed to prove that either of them was in another place during
their alleged participation in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but likewise failed to
discredit the positive identification made by both Co and Manaysay.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
JOVITO CANCERAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 206442, 01 July 2015, J. Mendoza
For legal jeopardy to attach, the accused must have entered a valid plea and there was
no unconditional dismissal of the complaint.
Facts.
The facts of the case according to the prosecution are as follows: a witness saw Canceran
pushing a cart with two boxes of Magic Flakes, which upon inspection actually contained
smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20. Canceran thereafter
hurriedly left, a chase ensued where he was eventually apprehended. Canceran vehemently
denied the allegations and claimed that an earlier Information for theft was already filed
on October 9, 2002 which was eventually dismissed. A second Information was filed for the
same offense over the same incident and became the subject of the present case. RTC found
Canceran guilty of consummated Theft in line with the ruling in Valenzuela v. People that
there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. Canceran appealed and raise the issue of double
jeopardy which the CA found unmeritorious.
Page 1161 of 1553
Issue.
Whether or not there was double jeopardy.
Held.
NO. There is no double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached. To raise the
defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double jeopardy
before the RTC. Even assuming that he was able to raise the issue of double jeopardy earlier,
the same must still fail because legal jeopardy did not attach. First, he never entered a valid
plea. He himself admitted that he was just about to enter a plea, but the first case was
dismissed even before he was able to do so.Second, there was no unconditional dismissal
of the complaint. The case was not terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but
simply because he posted bail. Absent these two elements, there can be no double jeopardy.

G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, 15 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reopening of the case
against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The
requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not
present in this case.
Facts:
Page 1162 of 1553

certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the case operates as an acquittal thus making
the re-opening of the case violative of the proscription against double jeopardy
Ruling:
NO. The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his
acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general
rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid
indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused,
(4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the
dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However,
there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if
the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, whenthere is
insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has
been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial.
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express
consent of the accused-petitioner. Neither does the case fall under any of the
aforementioned exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the
presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency
of evidence cannot be established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in the
proceedings that would be tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO

v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA
G.R. No. 200465, 20 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
Page 1163 of 1553

The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded
to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused. Definitely, there is no double jeopardy
in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for
the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence.
Facts:
Asistio being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Cooperative) acquired in violation of her duty as
such, personal interest or equity adverse to the Cooperative by entering into a contract with
Coca-cola Products in her own personal capacity when she knew that the sale of Coca-cola
Products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The school principal directed Asistio to
submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson, but she refused. Despite
requests for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly
misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so, thus, the Cooperative filed criminal
charges against petitioner. After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution,
petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence. She argued, among
other matters, that the RTC has no jurisdiction, as the crime charged (Violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally
liable. The RTC dismissed the case holding that it has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
Issue:
Whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double
jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Ruling:
NO. The accused-appellee cannot contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon
this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon
her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that
it is bereft of jurisdiction. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal was
ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his
Page 1164 of 1553

protection against double jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon
motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.
CESAR T. QUIAMBAO and ERIC C. PILAPIL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ADERITO YUJUICO and BONIFACIO C. SUMBILLA
Double jeopardy shall not attach when the court that declared the revival of the case
has no jurisdiction to the same. When the court does not have jurisdiction over the case, all
subsequent issuances or decisions of the said court related to the pending case shall be null
and void.
Facts:
Quiambao and Pilapil were the president and corporate secretary of Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC), respectively. They were charged of
violations of BP 68 or the Corporation Code of the Philippines for refusing to turn over the
stock and transfer books of STRADEC to Yujuico and Sumbilla.
During the determination of finding probable cause, Quiambao and Pilapil claimed
that the respondents failed to adduce evidence to support a finding of probable cause
against them. The MTC denied the Quiambao and Pilapil’s motion to dismiss which was
reversed by the RTC. The private respondents raised the matter to the Supreme Court via
rule 65 and was docketed as G.R. No. 180416.
While the said case was pending before the SC, the MTC dismissed the criminal case
ratiocinating that the private respondents were not armed with authority to prosecute the
case. Private respondents moved for reconsideration which was granted. MTC reinstated
the criminal case after learning the pendency of G.R. No. 180416 with the SC. Quiambao
and Pilapil filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC claiming that the revival constituted
double jeopardy but the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC erred in dismissing and reviving the case
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held in PAA v. Court of Appeals that an appeal to the SC via a Petition
for Review on Certiorari stays the judgment, award or order appealed from. Thus, until after
Page 1165 of 1553

the appeal of the defendant shall have been resolved by the Court with finality, and its
records transmitted to the court of origin, the judgment, award or order appealed from
cannot be executed, enforced, much less, modified by the court of origin. Once the case
has been appealed and given due course by this Court, the lower court or the court of origin
could no longer take cognizance of the issue under review. It cannot execute the judgment
appealed from because to do so would constitute encroachment on the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of this Court.
In the present case, the MTC’s Order of Dismissal is a jurisdictional error that must
be struck down as flawed for having been issued without jurisdiction. It amounts to a
premature execution which tended to render moot the issue raised in the order appealed
from and would render ineffective any decision which might eventually be made by this
Court.
Moreover, the jurisdiction over the issue of probable cause in Criminal Case No.
89724 had already been acquired by this Court. From the moment the case had been
elevated to us, the MTC no longer had authority to further act on the issue which was
pending review. In fact, at the time the MTC issued the Order of Dismissal, even the RTC
had lost jurisdiction. Thus, inasmuch as the case had already come under our exclusive
appellate jurisdiction, the MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order of
Dismissal.
Like the Order of Dismissal, the Order of Revival that followed should be declared
null and void. While said order merely sought to correct the previous Order of Dismissal,
it suffers from the same infirmity of having been issued without jurisdiction. Hence, it
naturally follows that all the issuances and/or orders issued by the lower court relative to
the issue pending review will become null and void.
Since the MTC clearly had no jurisdiction to issue the Order of Dismissal and the
Order of Revival, there can be no double jeopardy.
Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In this case, there is no question that the first four requisites are present in the case
at bar. However, in view of the nullity of the Order of Dismissal and the Order of Revival,
Page 1166 of 1553

the fifth requisite – that the accused be acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent – is absent.
EFFECTS OF DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BECOME STATE WITNESS
MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR.

When an accused did not have any direct participation with the killing of the victim,
he may be discharged as a state witness. The basis of the phrase “not most guilty” is the
participation of the person in the commission of the crime and not the penalty imposed such
that a person with direct participation shall be considered as the most guilty.
Facts:
Manuel Montero was a former employee of BSJ, a corporation owned by the

Jimenezes. Montero came to the authorities confessing to the killing of Ruby Rose
Barrameda. He revealed the location where Ruby Rose’s body was dumped and imputed
Manuel Jimenez Jr, among others as the person who ordered the killing of the victim.
Montero, together with Manuel Jr and several others were charged for the killing of
Ruby Rose. However, the People moved for the discharge of Montero as a state witness.
The acting judge of the RTC denied the motion stating that the prosecution failed to prove
that Montero was the least guilty. When Judge Docenas, a regular judge, assumed, he
granted the motion of the People ratiocinating that there would not even be a case if it
were not for Montero’s confession as no one other than him came forward. Also, the
prosecution has proven that he is the least guilty because his participation was to secure
the steel case where the body of Ruby Rose was going to be placed and manage the boat
that would dump the body. The CA affirmed that Montero may be discharged as a state
witness. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Montero can be discharged as a state witness
Page 1167 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that the prosecution has complied with
the requisites under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that:
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness,

the following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests
its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of
the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged

when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is not
there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution’s evidence.
In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was
willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing.
Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and in accordance
with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero.
He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.
Page 1168 of 1553

Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero’s statements and the physical

evidence, such as the absence of “busal” in the mouth of the retrieved cadaver; his failure
to mention that they used packaging tape wrapped around the head down to the neck of
the victim; and his declaration that the victim was killed through strangulation using a rope
(lubid). However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more
material than the inconsistencies pointed out by Jimenez, at least for purposes of the
motion to discharge.
We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that the
testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its
material points, not on all points.
By jurisprudence, “most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms

of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity
of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of
conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account
his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. We draw attention to the
requirement that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she
should not only “appear to be the most guilty.”
From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to

discharge Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation,
and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in
the actual killing of Ruby Rose.
While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not
indicate that he had active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which
allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose
which was executed by accused Lennard. Montero’s participation was limited to providing
the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the steel
box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and, together with his co-
accused, dropping the steel box containing the cadaver into the sea.
At any rate, the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he

does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely depends on the
appreciation of who had the most participation in the commission of the crime. The
appellate courts do not interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court on this
factual issue except when grave abuse of discretion intervenes.
Page 1169 of 1553

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SPOUSES FERNANDO AND MA. ELENA SANTOS

vs. LOLITA ALCAZAR, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT DELFIN CHUA
G.R. NO. 183034, MARCH 12, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are
authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent. Hence,
Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking of
her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said
hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case.
Moreover, the rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only
to parties to such instrument. Hence only Fernando may be held liable for the judgment
amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the Acknowledgment.
Facts:
Alcazar, proprietor of LCC, instituted through her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a

Complaint for sum of money against the spouses Santos, to collect the value of paint and
construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to P1,456,000.00, which
remained unpaid despite written demand. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9954
and assigned to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Respondent’s cause
of action is based on a document entitled “Acknowledgment” apparently executed by hand
by petitioner Fernando
Respondent presented her evidence and testified in court as the lone witness. Petitioners
filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which respondent opposed. Petitioners argued that the
Acknowledgment – respondent’s Exhibit “A” which was presented in court – was not an
original copy and thus inadmissible; petitioners’ receipt of the written demand was not
proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and construction materials were not covered by
delivery receipts; and respondent’s testimony was merely hearsay and uncorroborated.
The RTC denied petitioners’ demurrer for lack of merit.
On March 20, 2006, or the day of the scheduled hearing, petitioners’ counsel failed to
appear, prompting the trial court to issue an Order 1) denying petitioners’ March 15, 2006
motion to reset for lack of merit and for violating Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of
Page 1170 of 1553

Civil Procedure; 2) declaring that petitioners have waived their right to present evidence;
and 3) declaring that Civil Case No. 9954 is deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioners went up to the CA on certiorari. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 93889, the
Petition questioned the denial of petitioners’ demurrer. Meanwhile, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the March 20, 2006 Order denying their motion to reset, but the trial
court denied the same in an Order dated April 24, 2006. The RTC rendered judgment
ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff.
In two separate dates, the CA issued decisions sustaining both the RTC’s denial of their
demurrer and the RTC judgment ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petitioner’s demurrer to evidence
Held:
Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking
of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at
said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case. It was a mere procedural
inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect petitioners’ cause in any
manner. As conceded by them and as held by the CA, the original exists and was made part
of the records of the case when respondent’s evidence was first taken. Though respondent
now claims that she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document resides in
the record. This would explain then why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is
with the court as an exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question raised
on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and identified in
court; petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible as a result of
respondent’s failure to present the original, which they nevertheless admit to exist and is
found and included in the record of the case.
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy,
there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated,
identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent.
More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this
is that the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted.
“By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that
Page 1171 of 1553
the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another
for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly
as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and
that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a
forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized x x x; or that the party charged signed the
instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out x x x; or
that it was never delivered x x x, are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due
execution.”
“There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the
genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party.” With the
consequent admission engendered by petitioners’ failure to properly deny the
Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication, identification
and offer by the respondent, not to mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of
their Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment
may be had solely on the document, and there is no need to present receipts and other
documents to prove the claimed indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary
acknowledgment receipt, is “valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a
document evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into.” The absence of rebutting
evidence occasioned by petitioners’ waiver of their right to present evidence renders the
Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the transactions between the parties and the
consequential indebtedness incurred.
Indeed, the effect of the admission is such that “a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff
which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment
on the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by
the defendant.”
However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be held liable for the
judgment amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the
Acknowledgment. She may be held liable only to the extent of P600,000.00, as admitted by
her and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against her may be proved over
and beyond such amount, in the absence of her signature and an acknowledgment of
liability in the Acknowledgment. The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them
under oath, applies only to parties to the document.
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO

v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA
G.R. No. 200465, 20 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
Page 1172 of 1553

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is “filed after the prosecution had rested
its case” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed,
for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of
acquittal, the case ends there.
Facts:
Asistio being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Cooperative) acquired in violation of her duty as
such, personal interest or equity adverse to the Cooperative by entering into a contract with
Coca-cola Products in her own personal capacity when she knew that the sale of Coca-cola
Products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The school principal directed Asistio to
submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson, but she refused. Despite
requests for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly
misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so, thus, the Cooperative filed criminal
charges against petitioner. After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution,
petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence. She argued, among
other matters, that the RTC has no jurisdiction, as the crime charged (Violation of Section
46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
The RTC dismissed the case holding that it has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence based on
lack of jurisdiction amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable.
Ruling:
NO. In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the
case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner’s
guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case,
the RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal hence, may be subject to
ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Page 1173 of 1553

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ

The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer
to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. The Sandiganbayan should
have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where the Supreme Court held that it is
better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright
reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds. In case of doubt, courts should proceed
with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order
granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. Thus, it is imperative that it be a
reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is
based.
FACTS:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),

instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages
against the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan seeking to recover ill-gotten wealth
acquired by the Gimenez Spouses as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos.
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The
Republic likewise presented the testimonies of several witnesses. After presenting its last
witness, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days to file its formal offer of evidence.
The Republic moved for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file its formal offer
of evidence. This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Republic
moved for an additional 15 days within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This
Motion was again granted by the Sandiganbayan. Following this, no additional Motion for
extension was filed by the Republic.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution noting that the Republic failed to file its
Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days
from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence, arguing that the Republic
showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. Two days
after, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the Sandiganbayan Resolution]
and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. However, the Sandiganbayan issued
Page 1174 of 1553

another Resolution denying the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granting
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. Aggrieved, the Republic filed its Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES/RULING:
1. Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions.
YES.
In assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner correctly filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the
mode of appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by

certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal

Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities.
YES.
The Rules of Court specifically provide that evidence must be formally offered to be
considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the
case. "Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed
a waiver to submit it." In this case, however, a liberal interpretation was more appropriate
and in line with substantial justice.
The Court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees. Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly.
Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as
Page 1175 of 1553

shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence. Undeniable from the records of the case
is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case. The most tedious and crucial stage
of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been accomplished. Petitioner completed
its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and character of the funds and
assets sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital testimonial and
documentary evidence consisting of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the
subject funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be reconveyed
to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the Constitution and the Anti-
Graft statutes.
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays
petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on
recovering ill-gotten wealth, the Supreme Court is of the belief that it is but only just that
the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of
Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
3. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss on

demurrer to evidence.
YES.
The Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence. It

erred in making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the documentary
evidence offered by petitioner and in excluding other evidence offered during trial without
full evaluation based on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.
The Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there
was no evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.
It brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, it is clear that the
Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner during the 19
years of trial. Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended
to establish a presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent
Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was
manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful
income or properties. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of
petitioner’s witnesses. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s evidence without
any basis or justification.
Page 1176 of 1553

The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to
evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. The Sandiganbayan should
have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where the Supreme Court held that it
is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to
outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds. In case of doubt, courts should
proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An
order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. Thus, it is imperative that
it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on
which it is based.
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary
evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
4. Whether or not respondents should be deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence.
NO.
The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to
dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." This procedure, however, does not
apply.
In this case, the Supreme Court principally nullified the assailed Resolutions that denied
the admission of the Formal Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting
demurrer should be denied. This is not the situation contemplated in Rule 33, Section
1. Respondents were not able to even comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence. Due
process now requires that the case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may,
at their option and through proper motion, submit their Comment. The Sandiganbayan
should then rule on the admissibility of the documentary and object evidence covered by
the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner. Respondents then may avail themselves of any
remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and
FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES
G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Go et al were charged with a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of

documents. After the prosecution presented its evidence, Go et al filed a motion for leave to
Page 1177 of 1553

file demurer to evidence alleging that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence that the
crime was committed by Go et al. The prosecution contends that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it granted the motion for demurer to evidence filed Go et al. The
Court ruled that the power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised
with great caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended party
and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the
offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges must
act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection,
drawing on their experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence
on hand.
Facts:
Go,Dela Rosa and Necomedes are officers of Orient Commercial Banking

Corporation. They were charged with a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification
of documents. Under the information, they allegedly falsified loan documents to make it
appear that loans were granted in favor of certain companies but the funds released for
these loans were actually deposited in the account of the bank’s President who is Go.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, Go et al filed a motion for leave to file
demurer to evidence alleging that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence that the
crime was committed by Go et al. The motion was granted by the RTC and the case was
then dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal made by the trial
court. Hence, the current petition.
The prosecution contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it
granted the motion for demurer to evidence filed by Go et al. It asserts that it sufficiently
proved by evidence that Go et al committed the crime charged. On the other hand, Go et
al contend that the dismissal of the case by virtue of a demurer to evidence operates as an
acquittal and since an acquittal is immediately executory. Therefore, any subsequent
prosecution of the case would already amount to double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s motion for leave
to file demurer to evidence
Page 1178 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
and ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove that the crime of estafa
through falsification is committed by Go et al.
Demurrer to the evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges
the sufficiencyof the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt. x xx Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such
evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action
demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the
evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of
participation therein by the accused." Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court
must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave
abuse of such discretion." As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
The order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is present, an
order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to

an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled
that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence,its
judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil
action of certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set
Page 1179 of 1553

aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the
accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its
consequent order of acquittal void.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly

erred in affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the Go et al’s demurrer, which
Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and
manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public
interest. The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain
the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and
that Go et al s appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial
court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the Go
et al s, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved
hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that the
banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted
itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order –
concluded that based on the evidence adduced, the Go et al s could not have falsified the
loan documents pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. since the individuals
who assert that their handwriting and signatures were forged were not presented incourt
to testify on such claim; that the prosecution witnesses – Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of
PDIC, the designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia RowellaFamirin
(Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch – were not present when the loan documents
were executed and signed, and thus have no personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged falsification; and as high-ranking officers of OCBC, Go et al s could
not be expected to have prepared the saiddocuments. The evidence, however, suggests
otherwise; it shows that respondents had a direct hand in the falsification and creation of
fictitious loans. The loan documents were even signed by them. By disregarding what is
evident in the record, the trial court committed substantial wrong that frustrates the ends
of justice and adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of

discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
Page 1180 of 1553

gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty

enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.
As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial
court, any dissection of the truly questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla – which
should merit appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a patent ignorance of
procedure, if not indolence or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case – becomes
unnecessary. It is conceded that the lack of Campanilla’s approval and/or conforméto
PDIC’s Motion for Reconsideration should have rendered the trial court’s assailed
Ordersfinal and executory were it not for the fact that they were inherently null and void;
Campanilla’s irresponsible actions almost cost the People its day in court and their right to
exact justice and retribution, not to mention that they could have caused immeasurable
damage to the banking industry. Just the same, "[a] void judgment or order has no legal
and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-
existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it
is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or
final order; it may simply be ignored." More appropriately, the following must be cited:
x xxClearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer
any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise
a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave Go et al without any recourse to rectify the public
injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file
administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and the prosecutor. A
party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence

should x xx be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the
accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing
done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant
is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court
may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are
reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as
members of the Bench xx x."
Page 1181 of 1553

ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN

and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336, November 12, 2014, J. Mendoza
Accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case
which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. The current scenario,
however, is an exception to the general rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature because
it was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet ruled on the
admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution when Magleo filed her
demurrer to evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had legal basis to overturn the order
granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no proper acquittal.
Facts:
Magleo is the accused in the criminal case of estafa. She averred that in an Order,
dated May 13, 2010, Judge Manalo granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her of
the charge of estafa. Thereafter, the prosecutor filed a motion to inhibit Judge Manalo from
the case which was later re-raffled to Branch 166, RTC, presided over by Judge Quinagoran.
Magleo avers that, instead of motu proprio dismissing the case on ground of double
jeopardy, Judge Quinagoran through her Order, dated November 4, 2010, overturned the
order of acquittal and set the case for reception of defense evidence on February 23,
2011. Magleo asserts that the November 4, 2010 and February2, 2011 orders Judge
Quinagoran were indicative of her gross partiality and lack of knowledge of the existing
laws and jurisprudence, violating Magleo’s right against double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Quinagoran erred in overturning the order of acquittal of

Magleo after the previous granting of demurrer to evidence.
Ruling:
No.
This Court is convinced that Judge Quinagoran acted in accordance with the law
and jurisprudence. It was the February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order which elucidated the clear
legal basis why Judge Quinagoran continued the criminal case despite the earlier order
granting the demurrer to evidence. Generally, if the trial court finds that the prosecution
evidence is not sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an
Page 1182 of 1553

adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no
longer be appealed. The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The
demurrer to evidence was premature because it was filed before the prosecution rested its
case. The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the
prosecution when Magleo filed her demurrer to evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had
legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no proper
acquittal. Jurisprudence eruditely instructs that double jeopardy will not attach when the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the
trial was a sham. In addition, this Court rules that there is no double jeopardy when the
prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court.
PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT
REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS
OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA
G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015, C. J. SERENO
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that it is incumbent upon the
accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the
availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused
fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the
remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from
the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). It is among the rules of procedure which the Supreme
Court is competent to adopt pursuant to its rule-making power under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution. As such, said rules do not take away, repeal or alter the right to file
a motion for reconsideration as said right still exists. The Supreme Court merely laid down
the rules on promulgation of a judgment of conviction done in absentia in cases when the
accused fails to surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from promulgation. Clearly,
the said provision does not take away substantive rights; it merely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented. Hence, it does not take away per se the
right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment. Moreover, it also provides the remedy by which the accused who were absent
during the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against
the judgment of conviction.
Page 1183 of 1553

Facts:
Reynaldo Jaylo (Jaylo), William Valenzona (Valenzona) and Antonio Habalo

(Habalo), together with Edgardo Castro (Castro), were officers of the Philippine National
Police Western Police District placed on special detail with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
In June of 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (US DEA) approached
the NBI with information on the sale of a considerable amount of heroin in the Philippines.
Jaylo was assigned by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim to head the team that would conduct
a buy-bust operation with the aid of US DEA undercover agent Philip Needham
(Needham).
Needham, posing as a member of an international drug syndicate, conducted

negotiations for the purchase of 10 kilos of heroin from Estella Arrastia (Arrastia), Franco
Calanog (Calanog) and Rolando De Guzman (De Guzman). The exchange was scheduled
on the evening of 10 July 1990 at the parking lot of the Magallanes Commercial Center. As
to what subsequently occurred in the said buy-bust operation, the versions of the
prosecution and the defense, particularly on the manner of the arrest, diverged.
Verily, after the shootout, the operatives brought De Guzman, Calanog, and
Manguera to the hospital. Upon verifying their identities, the victims were found to be
soldiers: Colonel Rolando de Guzman and Major Franco Calanog. Manguera was the
driver/security aide of Major Calanog.
Eventually, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 182 creating
the “Elma Committee” which was tasked to conduct an investigation of all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the seizure of heroin and the shooting incident. Thereafter, it
recommended the prosecution of Jaylo for the killing of De Guzman, Castro for that of
Calanog, and Valenzona and Habalo for that of Manguera. However, in three separate
Amended Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and
Habalo, together with several John Does, were charged with conspiracy in the murder of
De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera.
The Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide.
Subsequently, on 30 April 2007, their counsel filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the said decision. However, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered
the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. The court ruled
that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any
of the accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the promulgation. Under
Page 1184 of 1553

Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, they have lost the remedies available under the
Rules against the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction, including the filing of a motion
for reconsideration.
Issue:
What are the effects of the nonappearance of the accused, without justifiable cause,
in the promulgation of the judgment of conviction?
RULING:
1) Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by

reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which
it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When
the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the

judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon
request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating
the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to
approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved
by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present
at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia
because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be
served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of

judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.
Page 1185 of 1553

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a)
Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of

promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the
judgment of conviction. To reiterate, when the accused fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a
new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule
122).
When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a

judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without
any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.
2) Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away substantive rights;
it
merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented. In the
case at bar, Jaylo et al claimed that their right to file a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal is a statutory right based Section 7 of P.D. 1606. They further asserted that as the
said law did not provide for any situation as to when the right to file a motion for
reconsideration may be deemed lost, it is available at all times and the Rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court cannot operate to diminish or modify the right of a convicted
accused to file a motion for reconsideration. Hence, they further argued that their absence
at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have
resulted in the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration. This Court, however,
is of the view that those arguments are patently without merit.
Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or
privilege. Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within
15 days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the movant must also comply
with the conditions laid down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all cases and
proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Page 1186 of 1553

Section 6, Rule 120, ROC as well as Section 4, Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan (which makes applicable Section 6, Rule 120, ROC when the accused is
absent during promulgation of judgment) merely regulates the right to file a motion for
reconsideration under P.D. 1606. These are mere rules of procedure which the Supreme
Court is competent to adopt pursuant to its rule-making power under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution. And, contrary to the view espoused by the accused, said rules do
not take away, repeal or alter the right to file a motion for reconsideration as said right still
exists. The Supreme Court merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a judgment of
conviction done in absentia in cases when the accused fails to surrender and explain his
absence within 15 days from promulgation. Indeed, there is nothing in P.D. 1606 which
prevents the Supreme Court from regulating the procedure for promulgation of decisions
in criminal cases done in absentia.
Hence, premises considered, Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take
away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It
is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of
promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of
the remedies against the judgment.
3) Contrary to Jaylo et al’s insistence that the Sandiganbayan did not bother to
determine whether their absence at the promulgation of judgment was without justifiable
cause hence, the conditions under which an accused loses the remedies do not obtain in
this case, is without merit. It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
also provides the remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation
may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of
conviction. In order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1)
surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons
for their absence, within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the accused to show justifiable cause for their absence at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show that their reason for
being absent at the promulgation of judgment was justifiable. If the court finds that the
reasons proffered justify their nonappearance during the promulgation of judgment, it shall
allow them to avail of the remedies. Thus, unless they surrender and prove their justifiable
reason to the satisfaction of the court, their absence is presumed to be unjustified.
In the case at bar, for the failure of Jaylo et al to regain their standing in court and
Page 1187 of 1553

avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TERESITA A. CIRON v. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, FLORIZA A. BRIONES AND TERESITA P. BUTARDO-
TACATA, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS GRAFT INVESTIGATION &
PROSECUTION OFFICER II OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NONNA O.
BELTRAN, 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR, RAUL E. CONTRERAS, CITY
PROSECUTOR, BOTH OF NATIONAL PROSECUTION OFFICE, IRIGA CITY, AND
SANTIAGO D. ORTEGA, JR.
G.R. Nos. 194339-41, April 20, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
When an order dismissing a case without prejudice has attained finality, the case may
no longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer within the court's power to modify or
amend; instead, new Information shall be filed for purposes of reviving a criminal case.
Additionally, a new preliminary is required only in the following instances: (a) where the
original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or
may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged;
(b) where aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; (c) if under a new criminal
complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint,
the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to that of a principal.
Facts:
Pursuant to the criminal complaints filed by Ortega, Jr., the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Iriga City (OCP-Iriga) found probable cause to indict petitioner Ciron of 2 counts of
estafa. Consequently, Informations therefore were filed before the RTC. The RTC
dismissed the cases without prejudice to their re-filing. Such Order attained finality. In
view of the dismissals without prejudice of the aforesaid criminal cases, the OCP-Iriga
reviewed the evidence on hand resulting in its issuance of 2 Supplemental Resolutions
which were penned by Beltran as Assistant Prosecutor and approved by Contreras as City
Prosecutor. In the said Resolutions, the OCP-Iriga recommended the filing of a total of 21
Informations for estafa against Ciron. Aggrieved, Ciron filed a complaint before the
Ombudsman against Beltran, Contreras, and Ortega Jr. accusing them of violating Section
3 (e) of RA 3019. She contended that since the Order dismissing the cases against her had
Page 1188 of 1553
already attained finality, the OCP-Iriga could no longer revive nor reinstate the estafa
charges against her without Ortega, Jr. filing a new complaint before it.
Issue:
Whether a new complaint should be filed with the prosecutor’s office in order to revive a
criminal case when the order dismissing without prejudice the pertinent criminal case had
attained finality.
Ruling:
NO. When an order dismissing a case without prejudice has attained finality, the case may
no longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer within the court's power to modify
or amend; instead, the action must be instituted anew. This means that new Informations,
not complaint, shall be filed for purposes of reviving a criminal case. In criminal cases, what
is filed in court is an Information and not a complaint. Additionally, a new preliminary
investigation need not conducted. It is settled that the same is only required in order to
accord the accused the right to submit counter- affidavits and evidence only in the
following instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them
may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and
new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where aside from the original accused, other
persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been
upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is
upgraded from being an accessory to that of a principal. Since none of the foregoing
instances obtain in this case, the Court holds that the OCP-Iriga, through Beltran and
Contreras, need not conduct another preliminary investigation before it can issue the
Supplemental Resolutions and subsequently, file the consequent Informations in court.
APPEAL
Jose Burgos, Jr. Vs. Spouses Eladio Sj. Naval, et al.

G.R. No. 219468. June 8, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner Burgos filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against several persons. Later
on, a criminal Information was filed against the respondents. Before arraignment,
respondents filed a motion to quash based on the following grounds: (a) that their criminal
liability has been extinguished due to prescription; ( b) that the information failed to charge
Page 1189 of 1553
them with an offense; and (c) that they were not afforded the opportunity of a preliminary
investigation. Respondents averred that since the information was filed on February 11,
2013, beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) years from the registration of the title on
April 1, 1998, the crime had already prescribed. The RTC ruled in their favour and dismissed
the criminal case. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, peititoner Burgos filed
a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Petition was not consented to or
approved by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioner
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner Burgos's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 138203 sought for
the reinstatement of the Information and/or a ruling that the crime has not yet prescribed.
Accordingly, the same was not intended to merely preserve his interest in the civil aspect
of the case. Thus, as his certiorari petition was filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the
criminal aspect of the case, it is necessary that the same be filed with the authorization of
the OSG, which, by law, is the proper representative of the People, the real party in interest
in the criminal proceedings. There being no authorization given -as his request to the OSG
filed on April 10, 2015 was not shown to have been granted -the certiorari petition was
rightfully dismissed.
If there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of

the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing
the People. The rationale therefore is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the
dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere
complaining witnesses.
For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the
criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings
pending in the CA or in this Court. In view of the corollary principle that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is
perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an
Page 1190 of 1553

appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the
intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil of the
case.
ROSVEE C. CELESTIALv. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015, Velasco Jr., J.
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides: SEC. 8. Dismissal of
appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. - The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of
the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the
appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by Glory Philippines as its "Accounting-in-Charge." As such, she

handles the company's bank transactions and accounting ledgers. However, she was
discharged when it was discovered that she made anomalous withdrawals from the
company's dollar account. Glory Philippines lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner
for qualified theft. The RTC rendered a decision convicting petitioner. Allegedly
unknown to petitioner, the CA, issued a Resolution considering petitioner's appeal
abandoned and dismissed for failure to file her appellant's brief. Petitioner then claimed
that she was surprised to have received a copy of the resolution with attached Notice of
Entry of Judgment. But, the CA still dismissed the Omnibus Motion though a resolution.
Hence, the case.
Issue: Whether not the CA erred in dismissing the case for petitioner's failure to file her
appellant's brief.
Ruling:
No. The CA's dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute was in order. As aptly observed
by the CA, petitioner's claim that she was not personally informed of the dismissal of the
appeal deserves scant consideration. Fundamental is the rule that notice to counsel is
notice to the client. When a party is represented by a counsel in an action in court,
Page 1191 of 1553

notices of all kinds, including motions and pleadings of all parties and all orders of the
court must be served on his counsel. In the case at bar, it cannot be disputed that Atty.
Paredes represented petitioner in the proceedings before the CA. And based on the registry
return receipt, counsel received a copy of the Resolution. Thus, the CA complied with the
procedural requirement under Section 8, Rule 124 and no violation of petitioner's right to
notice of the dismissal can be attributed to the appellate court.
JOSE “PEPE” SANICO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-TENIO

G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015, Bersamin, J.
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases.
Facts:
The MCTC of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu convicted Jose Sanico and MarsitoBatiquin of

the crimes of trespassing and theft of minerals. Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in
the MCTC. Consequently, the RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. For
failure to comply with the said order, the RTC dismissed the appeal. The RTC also denied
Sanico’s motion for reconsideration. Sanico filed a petition for review in the CA, contesting
his conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum
on appeal. The CA denied the petition. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to file a memorandum of appeal is a ground for the dismissal of
the appeal.
Ruling:
No. To start with, the RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of
Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the appeal
for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied
on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal of the appeal
once the appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal. The RTC thereby ignored Rule
122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in criminal cases. The failure
to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in
civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c), supra,
Page 1192 of 1553
imposes on the RTC the duty todecide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the
case and of suchmemoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the
appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence,
the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file
the memorandum on appeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLEN PIAD y BORI, ET. AL.

The CA should not have entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an accused escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses
his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. As no such surrender was made
in this case, in the eyes of the law, Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore, not entitled
to seek relief from the courts.
FACTS:
Davis was charged in two (2) informations with the crimes of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs during a party weighing 0.03 gram and illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia during a party. On the scheduled date of arraignment, Davis was not
arraigned because he had jumped bail. Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. Davis was
subsequently arrested and arraigned.The RTC found Davis guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during parties and illegal possession
of drug paraphernalia during parties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Davis’
conviction. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Wheter Davis has standing to appeal after having jumped bail.
RULING:
NO.
Davis lost his standing to appeal
Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than death, reclusion perpetua or
Page 1193 of 1553
life imprisonment. If the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In case bail is granted, the accused
must appear whenever the court requires his presence; otherwise, his bail shall be forfeited.
When a person is finally convicted by the trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
Here, Davis was charged with the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a
party and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party. Both offenses did not
have a prescribed penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, thus, bail was
a matter of right. Accordingly, Davis secured a surety bond with Summit Guaranty &
Insurance Company, Inc.
On the day of arraignment, Davis however failed to appear before the RTC which
considered him to have jumped bail. At that point, the RTC should have cancelled the
bailbond of Davis with Summit Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc. Although he was
subsequently arrested and arraigned, no record of Davis’ confinement in any detention
facility was ever found.
When the RTC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis and his counsel were present
in the courtroom. Yet, they did not file any motion for bail pending appeal before the RTC
or the CA. Nonetheless, any motion for bail pending appeal should have been denied
because Davis violated the conditions of his previous bail. Necessarily, as he previously
jumped bail and no bail pending appeal was secured, the RTC should have immediately
issued a warrant of arrest against him.
In the same manner, the CA should not have entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an
accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court. As no such surrender was made in this case, in the eyes of the law, Davis is a fugitive
from justice and, therefore, not entitled to seek relief from the courts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and

HELEN Y. DEE vs. PHILIP PICCIO et al
G.R. No. 193681, August 6, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The right to prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively to the People, which is therefore
the proper party to bring the appeal through the representation of the OSG. Hence, being
mere private complainants, they lacked the legal personality to appeal the dismissal of such
Page 1194 of 1553

criminal case. It must, however, be clarifiedthat it is without prejudice to their filing of the
appropriate action to preserve their interests but only with respect to the civil aspect.
Facts:
Jessie John P. Gimenez, President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency – the
advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group of Companies, to which Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. is a corporate member – filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel before the
Office of the City Prosecutor against a group called the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition,
Inc. (PEPCI) for posting on the website www.pepcoalition.com an article entitled "Back to
the Trenches: A Call to Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance with Coalition." As alleged
in the complaint, such publication was highly defamatory and libelous against the
Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco Group of Companies, particularly Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc. and Helen Y. Dee
The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict 16 trustees, officers and/or
members of PEPCI. Hence, an criminal information was filed to the Regional Trial Court.
However, upon motion of Piccio, the trial court quashed the criminal information for
libel and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,holding that the criminal information
failed to allege where the article was printed and first published or where the offended
parties reside.
The People of the Philippines (People), through the private prosecutors, and with the
conformity of public prosecutor filed a notice of appeal.
Piccio filed a motion to dismiss appeal, citing as ground for dismissal the fact that the
notice of appeal filed by Malayan et al did not carry the conforme of the OSG.
In their defense, Malayan et al argued that the notice of appeal was signed by the public
prosecutor and therefore valid; and that jurisprudence shows that the conformity of the
OSG is not required when grave errors are committed by the trial court or where there is
lack of due process.
Issue:
Whether Malayan et al et al being mere private complainants, may appeal an order of

the trial court dismissing a criminal case even without the OSG’s conformity
Ruling:
No.
Page 1195 of 1553

Being mere private complainants, they lacked the legal personality to appeal the
dismissal of such criminal case.
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an
appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in
the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People
and not the Malayan et al who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason, the People
are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only
the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
Here, it is clear that Malayan et al did not file their appeal merely to preserve their
interest in the civil aspect of the case. Rather, by seeking the reversal of the trial court’s
quashal of the information in the criminal case and thereby seeking that the said court be
directed to set the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial, it is sufficiently clear that
they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of Piccio for libel. Being an
obvious attempt to meddle into the criminal aspect of the case without the conformity of
the OSG, their recourse, must necessarily fail. To repeat, the right to prosecute criminal
cases pertains exclusively to the People, which is therefore the proper party to bring the
appeal through the representation of the OSG.
It must, however, be clarified. that the aforesaid dismissal is without prejudice to their
filing of the appropriate action to preserve their interests but only with respect to the civil
aspect of the libel case following the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including
one not raised by the parties, and the accused waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. Thus, when Geroche et
al appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they
are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since
it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed
judgment. Geroche et al could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside
the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the
Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.
Page 1196 of 1553

Facts:
Geroche, Garde and Marfil were charged with violation of domicle under Art. 128 of
the RPC. The prosecution alleged that the Geroche was a barangay captain while Garde and
Marfil are members of the CAFGU. One evening, they suddenly entered the house of
Baleriano without any search warrant. Geroche et al mauled him, striking with a Garand
rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away
his airgun. Geroche et al denied the charge, declaring that they were in their respective
houses.
The RTC found Geroche et al guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less
Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one
(1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that
Geroche et al are public officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC.
Geroche et al elevated the case to the CA, which set aside the RTC decision, holding
that Geroche et al should be held liable for Violation of Domicile considering their judicial
admissions that they were barangay captain and part of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit.
Issue:
Did the CA err in convicting them for violation of domicile when their appeal is
limited to their conviction for the crime of less serious physical injuries?
Ruling:
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question
including one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the
trial court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon
to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. An appeal confers upon the appellate
court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or
reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. The appellate court
may, and generally does, look into the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court.
Page 1197 of 1553

Thus, when Geroche et al appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less
Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the
prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct
errors as may be found in the assailed judgment. Geroche et al could not have been placed
twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of
Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical
Injuries.
The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche
denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU
members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public officers/employees.
JOSE "PEPE" SANICO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015, J. Bersamin
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the appeal by the accused on the ground of
his failure to submit his memorandum on appeal. The failure to file the memorandum on
appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does
not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to
decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or
briefs as may have been filed" upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or
upon the expiration of the period to file the same.
Facts:
On April 2, 2009, Jose and Marsito Batiquin were convicted for trespassing and theft
of minerals in the MCTC.
On April 22, 2009, Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the

MCTC. Consequently, on January 5, 2010, the RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum
on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC ruled that the failure of the accused to
file Memorandum on Appeal is a ground for dismissal of the Appeal.
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration because of its lack of verification
and affidavit of merit; and because the supposed sickness of Sanico’s wife and the lapses of
Atty. Baring were not justifiable reasons.
Page 1198 of 1553

Sanico, through Atty. Cañete, filed a petition for review in the CA, contesting his
conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum on
appeal but CA denied the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum on appeal is
correct
Ruling:
No
To start with, the RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of
Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by Sanico. In dismissing the appeal for the
sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied on
Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal of the appeal once
the appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal, viz.:
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.
(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court
of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a
copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of
the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the
period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial
Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda as are filed.
The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed
appeals in criminal cases. The relevant portions of Rule 122 are the following:
Section 3. How appeal taken.—
xxx x
Page 1199 of 1553

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of

Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party.
Section 8. Transmission of papers to appellate court upon appeal.—Within five (5)

days from the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the court with whom the notice of
appeal was filed must transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court the complete
record of the case, together with said notice. The original and three copies of the transcript
of stenographic notes, together with the records, shall also be transmitted to the clerk of
the appellate court without undue delay. The other copy of the transcript shall remain in
the lower court. (8a)
Section 9. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts.—(a) Within five (5) days from
perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the original record to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court. (b) Upon receipt of the complete record of the case,
transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify
the parties of such fact.(c) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said notice, the
parties may submit memoranda or briefs, or may be required by the Regional Trial Court
to do so. After the submission of such memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the
period to file the same, the Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the
entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed. (9a)
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss
the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because
Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the
entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed" upon
the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period
to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the Jose’s appeal cannot be properly premised on
the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the
Jose was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether
he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by
the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that
occasioned severe prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time
appeal being a matter of right, and because his conviction was then declared to have
attained finality, causing the execution of the decision as to its civil aspect.
Page 1200 of 1553

The parties have argued on whether or not the negligence of the Jose’s counsel
should be binding on him. In the Court’s view, however, they do not need to belabor the
point with a lengthy discussion. Without doubt, he could reasonably expect that his
counsel would afford to him competent legal representation. The mere failure of the
counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the protection of the interests of
Sanico as the client – as manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings discovered in
the petition for review – was gross negligence in any language because the defects were
plainly avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the Rules
of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result
was so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation
ought to be re-opened to give to the client another chance to present his case. The
legitimate interests of the accused, particularly the right to have his conviction reviewed
by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.
NATURE OF SEARCH WARRANT
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION AND CHERRYLL L. YU

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY
G.R. NO. 161106, JANUARY 13, 2014
CJ. SERENO
a. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It
is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public
necessity. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, hence,
the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for
reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.
b. Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal
of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the
said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein." In contrast,
where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be
filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant)
ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter. In the case, the
applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and when the
search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, the quashal were final orders
proper for an appeal.
Page 1201 of 1553

c. When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts. It is presumed that a judicial
function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. However,
a trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by
him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued
presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified,
they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are
essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. On the other hand, innocent and
negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search
warrant.
d. The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of
description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and
certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant
shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the
part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look
for. A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things
to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Facts:
Police Chief Inspector Villegas of PNP-RISOO filed applications for warrants before the
RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of petitioner WWC located at the 11th
floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office
premises of petitioner Planet Internet located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that
petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations amounting to theft and violation
of PD 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of respondent PLDT. Subsequently, the trial court conducted a
hearing on the applications for search warrants, wherein the applicant, Rivera, and Gali of
PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to the witnesses, before an international call can be considered legitimate, the
international call should first pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone
network (PSTN) on to the toll center or one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs) in
Page 1202 of 1553

the Philippines. After which it is then transmitted to the other country through voice
circuits before it passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the detination country, and the
toll center would meter the call passing through the PSTN of the dialled number as
completion. This process however, was allegedly bypassed by petitioner by rerouting the
calls but using PLDT’s telephone line.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units
to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers
and servers that would be taken. Later, the RTC granted the search warrant application,
which warrants were implemented by the RISOO operatives on the same day of warrant
issuance. Upon the warrant’s implementation, hundreds of items were seized, to which
petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrants citing that the warrants were issued
without probable cause; the act complained of was not a crime; and the warrants were
general warrants thus, the objects seized pursuant thereto were fruits of the poisonous tree.
With this, PLDT filed its opposition, but the RTC granted the petitioners’ motion to quash.
Motion for reconsideration was denied prompting PLDT to appeal to the CA, which
reversed the RTC Resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied, thus
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 was filed to assail CA decision.
Issues:
a. Whether conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary, to gain personality to

question the quashal of search warrant.
b. Whether an appeal lies in case of an order quashing the search warrant.
c. Whether there is probable cause on the issuance of the search warrants where the acts
complained of do not constitute theft.
d. Whether the search warrants are general warrants.
Ruling:
a. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states the general rule that the
public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "all criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by
the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.
An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal
action. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and
the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action
in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power
to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over
which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
Page 1203 of 1553
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on
search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for
purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we
have consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those
warrants. Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order
granting a motion to quash search warrants.
b. An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident

in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be
filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already
been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper
remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in
Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something
more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein."
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal
case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for
reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done
thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications
for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to
Page 1204 of 1553
pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by
the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search
warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken
therefrom.
c. There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search
warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of
exercising their judicial function. They determine probable cause based on "evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed"
by the offender.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts. It is presumed that a judicial
function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.
Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by
him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued
presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses
testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on
matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. In that case, the
finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by
the witnesses.
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses

will not cause the quashal of a search warrant. In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and
Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They
neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through
other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the
witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the
conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and
haphazardly." On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order.
d. A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to
the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of
Page 1205 of 1553

one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant
the discretion over which items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their
properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of

description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and
certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant
shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to
be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on
the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible
for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things
to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to
pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard
put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred
percent precision.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to
be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched
as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business.
Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems,
or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as
software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal
toll bypass operations."
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Page 1206 of 1553

Police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches
and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not
result in a reasonable search.
Facts:
Comerciante contended that P03 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him.
Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the
plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in
his acquittal. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
People of the Philippines, maintained that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly
made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest on petitioner made pursuant to the
"stop and frisk" rule.
Ruling:
No. There was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabuis
the very corpus delictiof the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant
case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante.
On the basis of the testimony of P03 Calag, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03
Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also
notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing,
or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and
Page 1207 of 1553

handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact,
even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect
a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his
fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on
illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a
conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5
(b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show
that P03 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by
Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.In this relation, the Court finds
respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante
untenable.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must
not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.
In this case, the Court reiterated that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These
circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which
would constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on
the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be
deemed unlawful.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION vs.

ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION
Page 1208 of 1553

An application for a search warrant is a “special criminal process,” rather than a

criminal action. Proceedings for applications of search warrants are not criminal in nature
and thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of
whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one
involving jurisdiction because, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all
courts.
Facts:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) and Petron Corporation (Petron)

received information that Romars International Gases Corporation (RIGC) was selling,
offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel
cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of
Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team to
investigate. The investigators went to RIGC’s premises bringing along with empty cylinders
of Shellane, Gasul, Total and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. RIGC's
employees then refilled said cylinders at their refilling station. The refilled cylinders were
brought to the Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that RIGC was not
authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or
use or imitate any Petron trademarks.
Shell and Petron then requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
investigate said activities of RIGC for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting
establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale of LPG products using
the same containers of Petron and Shell.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial
quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at RIGC's warehouse. They
also witnessed trucks coming from said refilling facility loaded with Gasul, Shellane and
Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places. The
investigators then bought Shellane and Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which
they were issued an official receipt.
The NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the court two application for a
search warrant for Violation of Section 155.1, in relation to Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293
against RIGC and/or its occupants. The court then granted said warrants. On the same
day, the NBI served the warrants at RIGC premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and
articles or items described in the warrants were seized.
RIGC then moved to quash the warrant, which was then denied by the court. Upon
Page 1209 of 1553

motion for reconsideration, it was only then where RIGC raised for the first time, the issue
of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when
the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-
Iriga City. They pointed out that it lacks the necessary imputation of compelling reasons,
as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Shell and
Petron opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late for
RIGC to raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing of the application for search
warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.
The RTC-Naga City granted the motion for reconsideration and moved for the the
warrants to be quashed. Upon appeal by Shell and Petron to the Court of Appeals, it
affirmed the former’s decision. Thus, the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether venue in an application for a search warrant is jurisdictional?
Ruling:
No, for the issuance of search warrants is inherent in all courts.
As we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant is a

“special criminal process,” rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and
the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action
in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power
to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over
which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
The foregoing explanation shows why the appellate court arrived at the wrong
conclusion. It gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications for search
warrants with criminal actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said
applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does
not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed in
RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the
afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.
Page 1210 of 1553

APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT, WHERE FILED
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al

G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014, Per Curiam
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. As in ordinary
search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe therein the places to be
searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The
Executive Judges of these RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not
physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such
applications and "shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts." The Court observes that all the above-stated
requirements were complied with in this case. As the records would show, the search warrant
application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP
Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor,
Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as
the rules state, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Facts:
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the (RTC) of Manila, Branch50 (Manila-
RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed
by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found.
In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to

the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of
the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued
the Search Warrant which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of the Scene of the
Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009.
Page 1211 of 1553

The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of
human remains. On July 20, 2009, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent
Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the following
grounds (a) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the Search Warrant which was to
be enforced in Davao City; (b) the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause;
(c) there was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be seized.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite
non-compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule126
of the Rules of Court
2. Whether or not the requirements of probable cause and particular description were
complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court was violated;
Ruling:
1. Yes, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City
RTCs to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for
as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this
case.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance
of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These
special criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court."
Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by "the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police(PNP) and the Anti Crime Task Force
(ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As in ordinary search
warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched
and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The
Executive Judges of these RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on
Page 1212 of 1553

such applications and "shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts."
The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in
this case. As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the
Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized in connection
with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his
capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the rules state, may
be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC. As explicitly
mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8- 02-SC, the rule on search warrant
applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the special criminal cases "shall
be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
2. In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant
is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that
he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of the judge
should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the
existence of probable cause had been met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." "A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement."
Page 1213 of 1553

The Search Warrant evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it
particularly describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even made explicit
reference to the sketch contained in the application. These, in the Court’s view, are
sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
to be searched, which they in fact did. The things to be seized were also particularly
described, namely, the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the
aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that human remains are not "personal property" and,
hence, could not be the subject of a search warrant deserves scant consideration.
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement – both as
to the place to be searched and the things to be seized – had been complied with.
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to prevent the
issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific
offense. Hence, given that the Search Warrant was issued only for one specific offense –
that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court had been violated.
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS E. TANCINCO

G.R. No. 200598, June 18. 2014, J. Perez
It is important to note that the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, and the corresponding testimony of the arresting officers on the buy-bust
transaction, can only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence showing either of
two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired
by any improper motive.
Facts:
Tancinco was charged in an Information for illegal possession of shabu.
In the afternoon of 5 March 2006, a team of police officers was on roving patrol along
M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, when SPO1 Mendaros received a call from a member of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who gave information of an ongoing pot session by an
unidentified alleged armed man and his companions. The police officers met with the BIN
Page 1214 of 1553
informant at a designated place and thereafter proceeded to the location of where the
armed person and his companions were supposedly holding their pot session.
Thereat, they did not find the alleged armed man. Instead, the police officers caught
two other persons for violation of Republic Act No. 9165. A few minutes later, the BIN
informant approached SPO1 Mendaros and told him that the alleged armed man had been
spotted playing a bingo machine at a nearby house. The BIN informant guided the team of
police officers to an area which looked like an extension of a house. The door of this house
extension was open allowing SPO1 Mendaros to view the inside which had five bingo
machines in use by people. One of these persons playing the bingo machines was the
alleged armed man, who turned out to be herein accused-appellant, Tancinco.
With the preliminary information that Tancinco was carrying a firearm, the
policemen cautiously approached Tancinco who attempted to dispose of the firearm from
his person and conceal its possession thereof by placing it at the side of the bingo machine.
Before Tancinco actually relieved himself of the firearm, PO2 Abatayo apprehended him
and asked for his license to carry such. Since Tancinco was unable to produce a license to
carry the firearm, PO2 Abatayo confiscated the firearm and arrested Tancinco without a
warrant. SPO1 Mendaros instructed PO2 Dio to make a body search of Tancinco. PO2 Dio’s
body search of Tancinco produced three medium plastic sachets, all of which contained a
white substance suspected to be shabu, placed in the right front pocket of Tancinco’s short
pants. These three sachets of white substance suspected to be shabu were likewise
confiscated by the police.
After informing him of his constitutional rights, Tancinco, together with the
confiscated items, were brought by the police officers to the Police Station. Separate
Informations for violation of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, and for illegal possession of firearm were filed by the arresting police
officers against Tancinco. Not surprisingly, Tancinco counters the charges and account of
the prosecution, completely denying the story and decrying frame-up. The trial court as
well as the court of appeals found Tancinco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically illegal possession of a dangerous
drug.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted against Tancinco was valid.
Ruling:
Yes, it was.
Page 1215 of 1553

Tancinco was searched as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Section 5, Rule

113 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person. (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
PO2 Dio’s statement that he did not clearly see Tancinco holding the firearm does
not detract from the prosecutions’ evidence and story that Tancinco was arrested while
attempting to conceal a firearm and could not produce a license to carry thereof when
asked by the police officers. To begin with, the testimony of the police officers, including
PO2 Dio, as to what went down when they arrested Tancinco was direct, straightforward
and positive. PO2 Dio’s statement that he did not clearly see Tancinco holding the firearm
does not detract from the prosecutions’ evidence and story that Tancinco was arrested
while attempting to conceal a firearm and could not produce a license to carry thereof when
asked by the police officers. Immediately thereafter, as an incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest, Tancinco was searched and found to have three sachets of shabu in his possession.
It is precisely because the firearm was found in Tancinco’s possession without license to
carry such that he was then lawfully arrested. Immediately thereafter, he was searched and
found to be in possession of three sachets of shabu, a dangerous drug.
It is important to note that the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, and the corresponding testimony of the arresting officers on the buy-bust
transaction, can only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence showing either
of two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were
inspired by any improper motive. In the face of the straightforward and direct testimony of
the police officers, and absent any improper motive on their part to frame up Tancinco,
stacked against the bare and thin self-serving testimony of Tancinco, we find no reason to
overturn the lower courts’ findings.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The accused cannot claim that the evidence obtained from a search conducted
incident to an arrest is inadmissible because it is violative of the plain view doctrine. The plain
Page 1216 of 1553
view doctrine only applies to cases where the arresting officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Facts:
While driving a towing truck, Edwin Lojera had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a
white taxi cab and the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao,
alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his
driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo
Ramirez who immediately responded to the complaint. When they found the taxi, two
armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards the police officers and ran away.
PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased the suspects and recovered from Calantiao a black
bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion a .38
revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Pablo
Temena, and PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with
his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. Jesse Dela Rosa
revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
At the trial, the testimony of PO1 Mariano was corroborated by PO3 Ramirez who testified
that he personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. The driver
of the taxi, Mr. Crisendo Amansec, was also presented in open court and testified that on
that date, two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted
and fired three (3) shots and ran away.
According to the testimony of Calantiao, this instant case originated from a traffic
mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided
with another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against the
persons on board of that car. The act of Reyes resulted in a chase where PO1 Reyes
subsequently slapped Reyes and poked his gun against the latter. When Calantiao and
Reyes were apprehended, they were told in the police station that they will be charged for
drugs and that they were shown a newspaper containing marijuana.
The RTC found Calantiao guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In

convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence
Page 1217 of 1553

as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of
possessing a gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the elements
of the offense to have been duly established by the prosecution.
Calantiao appealed to the CA questioning the admissibility of the evidence claiming

that it violates the plain view doctrine and the propriety of the chain of custody. However,
the Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s conviction. It found that there
was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a
legitimate complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the
scene were the perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the
search and subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being
incidental to a lawful arrest. Calantiao then raised the issue to the SC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana was valid
2. Whether or not the evidence is admissible despite the fact that the marking was not
made in the presence of the accused at the time of the arrest
Ruling:
1. Yes, the search and seizure of marijuana is valid.
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the marijuana in his
possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered
and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers’ "plain view."
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may

be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used
or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest
is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within
reach." It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully
arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety
Page 1218 of 1553

of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the
reach of the arrestee.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid
arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his
immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession
and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or
dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was
in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers
could validly conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced. The Plain
View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises
under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence." "The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be
a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
– and permits the warrantless seizure."
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because
the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not
inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they
deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
2. Yes, the evidence is still admissible.
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the
marijuana is still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending
Page 1219 of 1553

officers to comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police
station.
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical
inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly
specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures
to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence
subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken
at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the
"chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to
truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence
of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the
investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination. This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which
both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render
the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering
of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will
remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police
officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their
duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Page 1220 of 1553

FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION vs. ARTURO LOO PO,

FACTS:
In a complaint for unlawful detainer filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it
was the owner of Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street,
Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement. From March
2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew
the lease agreement anymore.
On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding that he pay the
rental arrears, and that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter and the lapse of the said 15-day
period to comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the
premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he
failed to do so. Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.
In its Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s
failure to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that although
the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove that it was
entitled to the possession of the subject property. There was no evidence presented to
support its claim against Po either.
The RTC and, subsequently the CA, affirmed the MeTC ruling.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of preponderance of evidence.
NO. Section 6 of the Rules of Summary Procedure is clear that in case the defendant
failed to file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon
plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert
the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the
complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation except to render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
Page 1221 of 1553

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within
the period provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead,
the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of
summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as
no answer was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint.
Thus, the lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on
the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of evidence its ownership over the
subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach
his evidence to the complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has to file his
complaint to establish his cause of action. Here, the court was only tasked to determine
whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and to render
judgment thereon.
2. Whether failure to attach annexes to the Complaint is fatal.
NO. There was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint because the
allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of action for unlawful detainer. Only when
the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to form a cause of action shall the
attachment become material in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the
Rules of Summary Procedure, it is not mandatory to attach annexes to the complaint.
People of the Philippines Vs. Apollonius "Toting" Avila y Alicante

G.R. No. 201584. June 15, 2016
Facts:
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of murder. The accuser’s
defense is alibi and denial. After trial, the trial court found him guilty with the crime of
murder.
Issue:
Whether the CA appropriately did not give credence to accused-appellant's defenses
of alibi and denial
Page 1222 of 1553
Ruling:
The CA appropriately did not give credence to accused-appellant's defenses of alibi
and denial; more so when it is pitted against the testimony of an eye witness. The child
witness in this case positively identified the accused several times during the trial as the
person who killed his sister. Such resoluteness cannot be doubted of a child, especially of
one of tender age. The testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is
sufficient to support a conviction even of murder. The defense failed to destroy the
credibility of the child witness during the questioning. The defense of denial of the accused
cannot be given more weight and credence over that of the child's positive identification.
It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive
identification of the accused-appellant; more so where the defense did not present
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been
present at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. A defense of denial
which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes
negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative
matters. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.
Virginia D. Calimag Vs. Hiers of Silvertra N. Macapaz,

represented by Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr.
G.R. No. 191936. June 1, 2016
Facts:
Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property subject matter of this case with
Silvestra. Anastacio, Jr. and Alicia are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela. Silvestra died without issue. A new TCT over the property was issued on the basis
of a Deed of Sale between Silvestra and petitioner. Respondents, asserting that they are the
heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of
the new TCT with Damages against the petitioner.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner averred that the

respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are
illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the respondents have the personality to initiate the action as
the alleged heirs of Silvestra. The marriage between Anastacio Sr. and Fidela is evidenced
Page 1223 of 1553

by the Certificate of Canonical Marriage. Also, Fidela’s name is indicated in the

respondents' respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden name but Fidela signed
the same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio
Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the father.
Issue:
Whether the fax or photo copy of the marriage contract and the canonical certificate
of marriage cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage
Ruling:
Yes, the fax or photo copy of the marriage contract and the canonical certificate of
marriage can be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage.
1. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides when the subject of the inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can
still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified by
law. A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section
5, which states that when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause
of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is
burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or
existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-
production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith
on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document
and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary
evidence.
2. A canonical certificate of marriage. Church registries of births, marriages, and

deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the
passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must
therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence. Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due
Page 1224 of 1553
execution of the canonical certificate of marriage was duly proven, it cannot be

admitted in evidence. Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be
offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. Hence, even a person's birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents. In this case, the respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 1 7 of both
documents. A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries
(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). Thus, being public
documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are
prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated.
People of the Philippines Vs. Daryl Polonio y Tuangcay

G.R. No. 211604. June 8, 2016
Facts:
The accused was charged with, and later on convicted, for the crime of rape. During
trial, it was established that he raped AAA, a minor, while the latter was unconscious.
Issue:
Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proof beyond reasonable
doubt in the instant case
Ruling:
Yes. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient and competent, may warrant the
conviction of the accused of rape. Direct evidence was not the only means of proving rape
beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence would also be reliable means to do so,
provided that (a) there was more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences were derived were proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances was
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What was essential was that the
unbroken chain of the established circumstances led to no other logical conclusion except
the appellant's guilt.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals declared AAA's testimony and those of CCC
and POI Patil-ao to be credible and convincing. We thus find it unnecessary to disturb the
findings and conclusions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly
Page 1225 of 1553

maintained the sanctity of the factual findings of the trial courts, especially when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
The observance of the witnesses' demeanor during an oral direct examination, cross-
examination, and during the entire period that he or she is present during trial is indispensable
especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect,
consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and microexpressions that could, more than the
words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will. These important aspects
can never be reflected or reproduced in documents and objects used as evidence.
TOMAS P. TAN, JR. v. JOSE G. HOSANA

G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016 [Brion, J.]
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed
inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters
that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the
execution of the contract.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility
of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by
the Rules for its admissibility. Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the
purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not
to enforce the terms of the document itself.
FACTS:
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and
Damages against his wife Milagros and Tomas, seeking to annul the sale of their conjugal
property which was allegedly sold without his consent and knowledge. The RTC decided
in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale was void. However, the CA
modified the judgment of the RTC by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the
purchase price of P200,000.00 only. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for
the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that established this
claim.
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision arguing that: first,
all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated, cannot be used
Page 1226 of 1553
as evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically
offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale; third, his testimony establishing the
actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted. The motion was denied.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the deed of sale is admissible to prove the amount of consideration paid.
RULING:
YES. While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it
is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to
prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party
has given in the execution of the contract.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing
the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an
obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means
to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the
determination of what each party has given under the void contract to allow restitution
and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law of these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and
not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility. Hence, a void document is admissible as
evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth
respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be

of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and
not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other
hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
Page 1227 of 1553

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision
of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does
not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein.
The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the
court to admit the evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the
courts.
People of the Philippines Vs. Edgardo T. Cruz

G.R. No. 200081. June 8, 2016
Facts:
A criminal complaint was filed against the accused-appellant for qualified theft. It
was alleged that while he was enlisted to register and manage the business of private
complainant, i.e., attend to the needs of the customers, receive orders, issue receipts and
accept payments, and to prepare daily sales report, it was later discovered that he was
stealing from the company.
After trial, the trial court convicted accused-appellant. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court is sufficient to
support a judgment of conviction
Ruling:
Yes. As sufficiently discussed by the trial court, besides Cruz's own admission that
he took the unaccounted money without Carlos' knowledge and authority, Cruz's guilt was
also proven through the following circumstantial evidence: Cruz, as the manager of
Chromax, had sole access to the money and other collectibles of Chromax; he had sole
authority to issue receipts; he gave commissions without Carlos' authority; he forged the
amount in the sales report and receipts; and finally, insinuated that it was Albaitar who
misappropriated the money without providing any scintilla of proof to support his
accusations.
Contrary to the defense's allegation that due to lack of direct evidence the Court
cannot uphold Cruz's conviction, circumstantial evidence is not a "weaker" form of
Page 1228 of 1553
evidence. The Rules of Court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial
evidence insofar as their probative value is concerned. In the case at bar, the combination
of the circumstantial evidence draws no other logical conclusion, but that Cruz stole the
money with grave abuse of confidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN ANCAJAS

G.R. No. 199270, 21 October 2015, Third Division, (Peralta, J.)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) and the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
Facts:
AAA was on her way to her parents’ house when appellants, her neighbors since childhood
appeared and held her hands. She struggled and shouted but the appellants covered her
mouth with a handkerchief and punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose
consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she was naked and felt pain all over her
body and her vagina. She returned to her employers’ house and narrated to them that she
was raped by appellants. She went to the police station to report the rape incident and was
instructed to undergo a physical examination. Dr. Jabat found that AAA had lacerations in
the perineum and hymen which were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male
organ and that the presence of spermatozoa signifies sexual intercourse. The RTC and the
CA convicted the appellants. The appellants now claim that the prosecution was unable to
prove beyond reasonable doubt their guilt since AAA was unconscious at the time of the
rape so she would not know that the appellants actually raped her.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants’ guilt for
the crime of rape
Page 1229 of 1553

Ruling:
While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that appellants had carnal
knowledge of AAA as the latter was unconscious, however, proof of the commission of the
crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also
sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) and the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. It is well settled that when
the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration, there is
sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge.
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the

circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the
guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other
person has committed the crime.
Facts:
The prosecution alleged that Randolph Alas and Kyle Zabala, a jeepney driver and a
mechanic, were neighbors and kumpares. Alas would allow Zabala to follow him in his
bedroom to get cash for spare parts to be bought for the repair of his vehicle. Alas later on
discovered that his money which he kept in an envelope in his closet was missing. When
he asked the persons living in their house if they knew where he kept his money, they
answered in the negative. Zabala’s girlfriend testified that she saw Zabala climbing through
the fence of Alas’s house, and was able to successfully gain entrance to his house. She also
testified that Zabala went out of the house with a bulge in his pockets and later that day,
they went shopping for a cellphone. For his defense, Zabala testified that he did not drop
by Alas’s house and did not meet his girlfriend on the day the alleged crime happened.
Page 1230 of 1553
Zabala was then charged with theft and found guilty by the RTC. The CA affirmed Zabala’s
conviction. Zabala argued that the evidence presented before the RTC is insufficient to
convict him of theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt
sufficient to convict Zabala of theft.
Ruling:
NO. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the

circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to
a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as
the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other
Unfortunately, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to present sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict Zabala of the offense charged. The pieces of evidence
presented before the RTC fail to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove, or even
allege, that it was impossible for some other person to have committed the crime of theft
against Alas. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft was
committed, there was no other person inside the house of Alas, or that no other person
could have taken the money from the closet of Alas. Alas himself admitted that there were
other residents in the house, but these persons were never presented to prove their
whereabouts at the time the incident took place. This failure of the prosecution leads the
Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to establish that culpability could only
belong to Zabala, and not to some other person.
People of the Philippines vs. Allan Menaling y Canedo

G.R. No. 208676, April 13, 2016
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly

unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be
repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or monetary
Page 1231 of 1553

consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the
relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.
FACTS:
This involves a rape case, wherein the alleged victim sought to recant her testimony
identifying the accused after the prosecution had already filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.
The trial court rejected the recantations. The RTC noted that the alleged real culprit had
died in 2004, two (2) years before the commission of the rape charges in 2006. The trial
court dismissed the recantations as incredulous and unworthy of belief, and found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether the recantation of the victim should be appreciated in favor of the accused
RULING:
No. The victim’s recantation is unreliable. In her testimony, AAA intimated that she was
not raped by her father, but was actually raped by her grandfather who had already passed
away. A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly
unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be
repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or monetary
consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the
relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.
Denial could not prevail over the victim’s direct, positive and categorical assertion.
Appellant’s guilt of the crime charged was established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUBEN BARON

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Page 1232 of 1553

FACTS:
Ruben Baron was charged with and convicted of the crime of rape with homicide by the
trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Before the Supreme Court, Baron
contends that the prosecution has not established his involvement with certainty. He
bewails the prosecution’s reliance on supposedly tenuous circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baron was properly convicted of the crime on the basis of mere
circumstantial evidence.
RULING:
YES.
The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are settled. Rule 133,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
Moreover, "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied
any fact or circumstance of weight and substance."
A careful examination of the records shows that there is nothing that warrants a reversal of
the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals. As pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, a multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible
witnesses and duly established from the evidence, points to no other conclusion than that
Baron was responsible for the rape and killing of the seven-year-old child victim.
TOMAS P. TAN, JR. v. JOSE G. HOSANA

G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016 [Brion, J.]
Page 1233 of 1553

inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters
that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the
execution of the contract.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility
of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by
the Rules for its admissibility. Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the
purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not
to enforce the terms of the document itself.
FACTS:
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and

Damages against his wife Milagros and Tomas, seeking to annul the sale of their conjugal
property which was allegedly sold without his consent and knowledge. The RTC decided
in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale was void. However, the CA modified
the judgment of the RTC by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase
price of P200,000.00 only. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the
subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that established this claim.
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision arguing that: first, all
matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated, cannot be used
as evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically
offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale; third, his testimony establishing the
actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted. The motion was denied.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale is admissible to prove the amount of consideration paid.
RULING:
YES.
inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove
Page 1234 of 1553

matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given
in the execution of the contract.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing
the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an
obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means
to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the
determination of what each party has given under the void contract to allow restitution
and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility
of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded
by the Rules for its admissibility. Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because
the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of
fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of

doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not
reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other
hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the
law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does not,
however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The
admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court
to admit the evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN, INC. AND/OR ESTANISLAO AGBAY

vs. JESUS J. COMING
G.R. NO. 186621, MARCH 12, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
Petitioners’ admission that the five affiants were their former employees is binding
upon them. While they claim that respondent was the employee of their suppliers Mayol and
Page 1235 of 1553
Apondar, they did not submit proof that the latter were indeed independent contractors;
clearly, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving their own affirmative
allegation.
Facts:
Estanislao Agbay is the President and General Manager of SEIRI, a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting furniture to various countries with
principal place of business at Paknaan, Mandaue City.
On November 3, 2003, respondent Jesus J. Coming filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay, with prayer for reinstatement, back wages, damages and attorney’s fees. The LA
ruled that respondent is a regular employee of SEIRI and that the termination of his
employment was illegal. The NLRC set aside and vacated the LA decision and dismissed
the complaint. The CA reversed the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly appreciated the evidence presented by both parties
Held:
The issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists in a given case is

essentially a question of fact. As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with
greater force in labor cases. Only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court. This
rule is not absolute, however, and admits of exceptions. For one, the Court may look into
factual issues in labor cases when the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and
the CA are conflicting. Here, the findings of the NLRC differed from those of the Labor
Arbiter and the CA, which compels the Court’s exercise of its authority to review and pass
upon the evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions therefrom.
The CA gave more credence to the declarations of the five former employees of petitioners
that respondent was their co-worker in SEIRI. One of said affiants is Vicente Coming’s own
son, Gil Coming. Vicente averred in his second affidavit that when he confronted his son,
the latter explained that he was merely told by their Pastor to sign the affidavit as it will
put an end to the controversy. Vicente insisted that his son did not know the contents and
implications of the document he signed. As to the absence of respondent’s name in the
payroll and SSS employment report, the CA observed that the payrolls submitted were only
from January 1, 1999 to December 29, 2000 and not the entire period of eighteen years when
Page 1236 of 1553
respondent claimed he worked for SEIRI. It further noted that the names of the five affiants,
whom petitioners admitted to be their former employees, likewise do not appear in the
aforesaid documents. According to the CA, it is apparent that petitioners maintained a
separate payroll for certain employees or willfully retained a portion of the payroll.
x x x As to the “control test”, the following facts indubitably reveal that respondents wielded
control over the work performance of petitioner, to wit: (1) they required him to work
within the company premises; (2) they obliged petitioner to report every day of the week
and tasked him to usually perform the same job; (3) they enforced the observance of
definite hours of work from 8 o’clock in the morning to 5 o’clock in the afternoon; (4) the
mode of payment of petitioner’s salary was under their discretion, at first paying him on
pakiao basis and thereafter, on daily basis; (5) they implemented company rules and
regulations; (6) [Estanislao] Agbay directly paid petitioner’s salaries and controlled all
aspects of his employment and (7) petitioner rendered work necessary and desirable in the
business of the respondent company.
We affirm the CA.
In their comment to the petition filed by respondent in the CA, petitioners emphasized
that in the certifications issued by Mayol and Apondar, it was shown that respondent was
employed and working for them in those years he claimed to be working for SEIRI.
However, a reading of the certification by Mayol would show that while the latter claims to
have respondent under his employ in 1997, 1998 and 1999, respondent’s services were not
regular and that he works only if he wants to. Apondar’s certification likewise stated that
respondent worked for him since 1999 through his brother Vicente as “sideline” but only
after regular working hours and “off and on” basis. Even assuming the truth of the foregoing
statements, these do not foreclose respondent’s regular or full-time employment with
SEIRI. In effect, petitioners suggest that respondent was employed by SEIRI’s suppliers,
Mayol and Apondar but no competent proof was presented as to the latter’s status as
independent contractors.
Petitioners’ admission that the five affiants were their former employees is binding upon
them. While they claim that respondent was the employee of their suppliers Mayol and
Apondar, they did not submit proof that the latter were indeed independent contractors;
clearly, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving their own affirmative
allegation. There is thus no showing that the five former employees of SEIRI were
motivated by malice, bad faith or any ill-motive in executing their affidavit supporting the
claims of respondent. In any controversy between a laborer and his master, doubts
reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in favor of the laborer.
Page 1237 of 1553

As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279
of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the
dismissal becomes illegal.
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA

A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014
PER CURIAM
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices. In administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents.
Facts:
Bansig filed a Petition for Disbarment against respondent Atty. Celera for Gross Immoral
Conduct, alleging that respondent and Bansig’s sister, Gracemarie, entered into a contract
of marriage on May 8, 1997 as evidence by a certified Xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage issued by Civil Registry of Manila; that despite the validity of the prior marriage,
respondent contracted another marriage with Alba on January 8, 1998, as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of
San Juan, Manila.
In a Resolution, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant
complaint. However, respondent failed to submit his comment, despite receipt of the copy
of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt. Thus, the Court, in
another Resolution, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint
against him. Subsequently, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that
respondent's failure to file his comment be deemed a waiver to file the same, and that the
case be submitted for disposition. Nonetheless, respondent though a Motion, claimed that
he did not know of the nature or cause of the administrative case as he received no pleading
Page 1238 of 1553

or any processes thereof, save that of Bansig’s Omnibus Motion. He then prayed that he be
furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
Later, the Court required Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the complaint and to
submit proof of such service, further requiring respondent to comment on the complaint.
With this, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof of service which is
evidenced by Registry Receipt, however, respondent failed anew to file his comment. This
prompted the Court to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, to which respondent, in his
Explanation, reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint and asked for
Bansig to furnish him with the complaint; this the Court again granted.
Later, Bansig via Manifestation, lamented the dilatory tactics undertaken by respondent,
asserting that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to
frustrate the actions of the Court. She further attached a copy of the complaint and
submitted an Affidavit of Mailing with Registry Receipt thereof. Later, the Court issued a
Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for failure to comply despite service of copy of the complaint by registered
mail. Further, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order
sent to respondent, and required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of
respondent. With this, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court the submitted address as his residential address. However,
all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail
server. Bansig also averred that in a civil case pending before the RTC of Tuguegarao City,
respondent used the mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City." Thus the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order
to respondent’s new address.
Due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order, for failure to file his
comment on this administrative complaint the Court resolved imposed upon respondent a
fine and required respondent to comply with the Resolution filing the required comment.
Further, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's latter Resolutions,
the Court ordered that the filing of respondent’s comment be dispensed with and that
respondent be arrested, and further referred the complaint to the IBP. The return of
warrant, however, showed that respondent cannot be located in the new address as the
new address used by respondent was a vacant lot. Meanwhile, the IBP reported that as per
their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd.,
Taytay, Rizal.
Page 1239 of 1553

Respondent also failed to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, despite
several notices, causing respondent to be declared in default and the case was submitted
for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent,
however, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
Issue:
Whether there is quantum of evidence required in an administrative proceeding.
Ruling:
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather
an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer
the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial

evidence, the allegations in the complaint. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary
to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a

second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced
by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the
City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of
Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the
certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City
Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church,
Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his
first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still
subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
Page 1240 of 1553

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section
7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two
marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a

member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
People of the Philippines v. Jorie Wahiman y Rayos

G.R. No. 200942, June 16, 2015, Del Castillo J.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that (a) he was in another
place at the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) he was so far away that he could
not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the
time of its commission.
Facts:
During one evening while Buensucesco, the victim, was about to enter the company staff
house, he was gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard
on duty, Azucena, who was then opening the gate, identified one of the assailants as herein
appellant Rayos. During the trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of Rayos taken during the preliminary investigation of the case admitting the
killing of Buensucesco. However, when it was Rayos’ turn to testify, he narrated that at the
time of the killing he was attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law at
Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City. The RTC rendered a decision finding Rayos guilty of
Page 1241 of 1553

the crime of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
Rayos argues that during the time his supposed extrajudicial confession was being taken,
Atty. Dumlao, the lawyer who supposedly assisted him, was not around. According to him,
Atty. Dumlao arrived only when Rayos was about to sign the extrajudicial confession. Rayos
further contends that he executed the extrajudicial confession because he was tortured.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Rayos beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
YES. There is no doubt that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, Rayos shot
Buensuceso while the latter was about to enter the gate of the staff house of Stanfilco-Dole
in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Moreover, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and
the CA that Rayos’ extrajudicial confession was voluntarily and duly executed and replete
with details that only appellant could supply.
Rayos narrated that he was hired by Alex Laranjo (Laranjo) and Kid Canadilla (Canadilla),
for and in behalf of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to kill the
victim for a fee. According to Rayos, Alonzo wanted the victim killed because the latter
withheld the release of his collectibles from Stanfilco-Dole. Rayos then narrated how he
met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo; how he received payments and instructions; how
he planned the killing; and how he executed the plan. Rayos signed his extrajudicial
confession, with the assistance of Arty. Dumlao, and subscribed the same before Atty.
Dennis B. Caayupan at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to Rayos all
throughout the proceedings and carefully explained to him the ramifications of his
admission. He informed Rayos of his rights and that anything he says may be used in
evidence against him. Notwithstanding, Rayos insisted on giving his extrajudicial
confession.
In any event, it must be stressed that Rayos’ conviction was not based solely on his
extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of
Page 1242 of 1553

Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw Rayos about 5
meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the victim. Rayos was riding in tandem aboard a
black motorcycle and was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs
found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from Rayos.
Moreover, Rayos was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO ZABALA Y BALADA AND ROMEO

ALBIUS, JR. Y BAUTISTA
G.R. NO.203087, November 23, 2015, Peralta, J.
“When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the findings are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the CA, since it is settled
that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, these findings
are generally binding upon this Court. We see no reason to depart from this rule.”
Facts:
One evening,Joseph Agapay together with his friends Cesar Lopez, Emmanuel Rumbawa,
Roland Albius and Aldrin Zabala were exchanging stories at the house of Catherine Perez.
Thereafter, Joseph decided to go home. His friends offered to accompany him but he
refused. On his way home, Edgardo Balada and Romeo Bautista suddenly appeared and
followed him from behind. Corollarily, Agapay’s friends decided to follow him. When
Joseph's friends were about 15 to 20 meters away from him, the group heard the latter's
outcry and saw Romeo place his left hand on Joseph's shoulder and instantly box the latter,
while Edgardo held Joseph's hands from behind. Joseph struggled to free himself from
Edgardo's hold until they fell down the nearby creek. Despite Joseph's plea, Edgardo
continued throwing fist at Joseph and ordered him to shut up. Romeo, who was then
standing beside the creek, saw Joseph's friends looking and approached them and told
them to just go home and not to get involved, hence, the group then all ran away from the
crime scene. However, Aldrin and Roland immediately returned to the crime scene and
saw Edgardo and Romeo mauling Joseph who then fell to the ground unconscious. Edgardo
then smashed Joseph's head with a stone. Aldrin and his friends reported the incident to
the police the following day and executed their respective sworn affidavits.
Page 1243 of 1553
Dr. Victoria B. Gonzales conducted a post mortem examination on Joseph's body and
testified on the death certificate that the fractures of the skull with brain hermation was
caused by the pressure exerted on the victim's skull caused by a hard object such as a stone.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court found Romeo and Edgardo conspired to murder
Joseph and that the crime committed was attended with treachery. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove their identities beyond reasonable doubt
considering the lighting condition on the night of the incident.
Ruling:
No. Prosecution witness Aldrin positively identified appellants as the persons who mauled
and killed Joseph on the night of December 12, 2003. He testified that both appellants
mauled Joseph until the latter fell to the ground unconscious, and then appellant Edgardo
smashed Joseph's face with a stone. Aldrin's testimony that appellant Edgardo smashed
Joseph's face with a stone was confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Gonzales that Joseph died
of intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple depressed fractures of the skull with brain
hermation which was caused by the pressure exerted on the victim's skull.
Appellants' alibi and denial cannot prevail as against the positive identifications made by
the prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any improper motive to falsely
testify against them. Where there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JOHNI GLENN D. RUNES

A.M. NO. P-12-3055, MARCH 26, 2014
C.J. SERENO
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as “frequent unauthorized absences
from duty during office hours.” The word “frequent” connotes that the employees absent
themselves from duty more than once. Respondent’s two absences from his post, being
Page 1244 of 1553

without authority, can already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and

dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice.
Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation

conducted by the investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two (2) instances when
he was out of his assigned post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently
refute these findings.
Facts:
In a letter dated 20 February 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman, endorsed a Complaint
received through ephemeral electronic communication (text message) to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). On 22 May 2009, then Executive Judge Manalastas submitted
a Confidential Report finding the complaint against subjects Mr. Glen Runez and Mr.
Conrado Gonzales being “fixers” in the San Courts is factual. The impression that these two
(2) employees give is that their actions are condoned and tolerated by the Court since the
motions for reduction of bail are usually granted. They have been at this illegal activity for
a long time since no one has dared to openly prevent them from doing so for fear that their
employment or their cases be jeopardized.
On 31 July 2009, the matter was referred to the NBI for entrapment operations. Failing to
get a response from the NBI, the OCA organized sometime in January 2010, an investigating
team composed of lawyers. The team was asked to conduct a discreet investigation to
determine the veracity of an anonymous Complaint on alleged case fixing in the MeTC of
San Juan City. Thus, in a Memorandum addressed to Court Administrator Jose Midas
Marquez dated 9 September 2010, Wilhelmina Geronga, Chief, OCA Legal Office,
recommended that the alleged case fixing be denied due course for insufficiency of
evidence.
In the course of the investigation, however, the investigating team found that respondent
had the habit of loafing during office hours. He was found loafing in two (2) instances: (1)
on 26 January 2010 when he was nowhere to be found in his station; and (2) on 26 April
2010 wherein he left his post at 1:45 p.m. and was caught leaving the parking area in a Toyota
Corolla sedan bearing plate number JLL 933. In both instances, he declared in his Daily
Time Records (DTRs) complete working hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. In a Memorandum
dated 21 February 2012, the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of the
offense of loafing with the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay.
Issue:
Whether respondent is guilty of the offense of loafing
Page 1245 of 1553

Held:
Respondent is guilty of loafing
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from
duty during office hours.” The word “frequent” connotes that the employees absent
themselves from duty more than once. Respondent’s two absences from his post, being
without authority, can already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and
dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice.
Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation

conducted by the investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two (2) instances when
he was out of his assigned post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently
refute these findings.
It is imperative that as Clerk III, respondent should always be at his station during office
hours; hence, if his absence were indeed because of some errand, he has yet again failed to
provide sufficient proof that those errands were official in nature. As previously mentioned,
he had not filed any application for leave, nor did he possess any written authority to travel
to justify his absence. Absent such proof, his absence remains indubitably unauthorized.
He maintains that his DTRs, which were signed by him and certified as true and correct by
the Clerk of Court, support his claim that he never left his station. He cannot rely on the
certification made by the Clerk of Court in his DTR because, as clearly shown therein, the
latter’s verification pertains to the prescribed office hours, and not to the correctness of the
entries therein.
In Lopena v. Saloma, this Court ruled: Respondent is reminded that all judicial employees
must devote their official time to government service. Public officials and employees must
see to it that they follow the Civil Service Law and Rules. Consequently, they must observe
the prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof for public service
if only to recompense the government and ultimately the people who shoulder the cost of
maintaining the judiciary. To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials
and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time. This is because
the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the last and lowest of its
employees. Thus, court employees must exercise at all times a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty; it is a
mission.
Page 1246 of 1553

Respondent is found guilty of loafing. Accordingly, he is hereby suspended for six (6)
months and one (1) day, with a very stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERWIN TAMAYO Y BAUTISTA

G.R. NO. 196960, MARCH 12, 2014
J. ABAD
Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the
fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and
the others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy
makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
Facts:
While the group of Joeywas having a drinking session beside the Iglesia Ni Cristo chapel,
someone from the group of the accused who was also having a drinking session hurled
empty bottles of gin at them. Joey’s group, in turn, threw stones and empty gin bottles at
accused Erwin and his companions. Enraged, the latter group gave chased after Joey and
his companions. Unfortunately, Joey tripped and fell to the ground. He was in this position
when Erwin and his companions attacked and mauled him. Some, including Erwin, stabbed
Joey with their knives. The assailants scampered away afterwards.
Joey was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but died shortly after arrival. Erwin
and John were originally charged homicide and theft of a necklace, but the prosecution
amended the charge to murder, qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and
employing means to weaken the defense and afford impunity. It also claimed the
attendance of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Trial
took place only as to Erwin since John jumped bail and remained at-large.
On November 21, 2008 the RTC found accused Erwin guilty of murder but innocent of the
separate charge of theft. Although it did not find sufficient evidence of treachery, evident
premeditation, or employment of means to weaken the defense and afford impunity, the
RTC elevated the crime that Erwin committed from homicide to murder based on its
finding that abuse of superior strength attended the killing. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution’s failure to identify the who among Erwin’s group inflicted the
fatal wounds that caused Joey’s death is a ground for Erwin’s acquittal
Page 1247 of 1553
Held:
The Court has always been inclined, with few exceptions, to defer to the findings of fact of
the trial court since it had the opportunity to observe how each witness expressed himself
and whether his eyes agreed with his lips. The Court finds nothing from the transcripts that
would indicate that the trial court and the CA misapprehended the facts.
The Court also finds no error in the RTC and the CA’s rejection of his alibi. The site of the
murder was not far from where he lived. Besides, he presented no corroborating testimony
that he was then at his house. As to his lament that the RTC and the CA should not have
given credit to Norman’s testimony for he had a grudge against him, Erwin presented no
proof apart from his word that this was so. At any rate, the accounts of the remaining
eyewitnesses were just as positive, straightforward, consistent, and clear. They all testified
that Erwin stabbed Joey with a knife.
Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal
wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the
others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy
makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim,
relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was
dead, there is no question that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SHERWON BIS Y AVELLANEDA

G.R. NO. 191360, MARCH 10, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of

bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with and in such case, the
burden of proof rests on the appellant. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge this
burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed by the CA, appellant did not seasonably question
these procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it to say that objection to evidence cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
Bis was arrested in a buy bust operation organized by the San Fernando City Police. He
was, thereafter, charged in a criminal information for a violation of Section 5, Article II,
Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged
Page 1248 of 1553
that he sold three (3) heat sealed transparent sachet containing a total of 0.068 gram of
“shabu”, a dangerous drug for Php 1000. The RTC found Bis guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the appellant’s guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
Appellant points out that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
render them incredible witnesses. The Court is not convinced. While there are indeed
minor contradictions in Espejo and Arce’s testimonies, the same are nevertheless
inconsequential and do not detract from the proven elements of the offense of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.
It is now too well-settled to require extensive documentation that “inconsistencies in the

testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not
affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused.”16 Significantly, in the
case at bench, the testimonies of the said witnesses for the prosecution were in harmony
with respect to their positive identification of appellant as the one who sold the illegal drugs
to Espejo, the poseur-buyer, in a planned buy-bust operation, as well as to the other
surrounding circumstances that transpired during the said operation.
Appellant posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the procedures laid down
in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations regarding
the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. Non-compliance therewith, he
argues, casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu
allegedly bought and confiscated from him.
On the matter of handling the confiscated illegal drugs after a buy-bust operation, Section
21(1), Article II of RA 9165 provides: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Accordingly, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 which
Page 1249 of 1553
implements the afore-quoted provision reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; Case law has it that non-compliance
with the abovequoted provision of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations is
not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible. “What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
In the present case, the totality of the prosecution’s evidence shows the integrity of the
drugs seized to be intact. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with” and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the appellant. Here, appellant miserably
failed to discharge this burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed by the CA, appellant did
not seasonably question these procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it to say that
objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Appellant’s defense hinges principally on denial. But such a defense is unavailing

considering that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate buy-bust
operation. “The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the
courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY CARANTO Y PROPETA

G.R. 193768, MARCH 5, 2014
J. PEREZ
The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the
performance that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill
motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. The presumption of regularity in the
Page 1250 of 1553

performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the presumption is
precisely just that – a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it cannot be
regarded as binding truth.
Facts:
Jerry was arrested in a buy bust operation organized by the Taguig PNP Drug Enforcement
Unit. He was, thereafter, charged in a criminal information for a violation of Section 5,
Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was
alleged that he sold one (1) heat sealed transparent sachet containing 0.39 gram of “shabu”,
a dangerous drug for Php 500. The RTC found Jerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
Held:
A buy-bust operation resulting from the tip of an anonymous confidential informant,

although an effective means of eliminating illegal drug related activities, is “susceptible to
police abuse.” Worse, it is usually used as a means for extortion. It is for this reason, that
the Court must ensure that the enactment of R.A. No. 9165 providing specific procedures
to counter these abuses is not put to naught.
Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, par. 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states: (1) The apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
a copy thereof.
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. No. 9165, which reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
Page 1251 of 1553
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
This Court recognizes that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions, many of them far from ideal.
For this reason, the Implementing Rules provide that non-compliance with the strict
directive of Section 21 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case because courts
recognize the possible occurrence of procedural lapses. However, we emphasize that these
lapses must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved. In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to present any explanation
to justify the non-observance of the prescribed procedures. Therefore, the non-observance
by the police of the required procedure cannot be excused. It likewise failed to prove that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted.
The “chain of custody” rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items – to truly ensure
that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from
dubious and concocted searches. “Marking” means the placing by the apprehending officer
or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized.
A perusal of the records will show that the procedure of preserving the chain of custody as
laid down by jurisprudence was not observed. Ultimately, when the prosecution evidence
is wanting, deficient to the point of doubt that the dangerous drug recovered from the
accused is the same drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, or
the same drug presented to the court, an essential element in cases of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is absent.
The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance
that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that
would induce him to falsify his testimony.
Page 1252 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ

G.R. NO. 190632, FEBRUARY 26, 2014
J. PEREZ
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering
or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation
be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force
or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
In the case at bench, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive testimony

revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she
was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for
her life and personal safety.
Facts:
On June 24, 2003, three informations for the crime of rape under paragraph 1(a), Article
266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
were filed against Lucena.
The information alleged that Lucena, a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of
his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or
intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against
her will and consent.
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus,
offered a different version of the story.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Lucena guilty of three counts of rape. The CA affirmed
the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Lucena is guilty of the crime charged
Held:
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove,
Page 1253 of 1553
it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation
be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind. Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the
time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of
such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is
sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.
In the case at bench, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed
that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was
ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for
her life and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and
successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened
despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened
AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of
killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on
their way to Kabuboy Bridge. It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation
were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment
he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3)
episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being
killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the
fact that the gun was still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of
his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAA’s
lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit
her testimony.
In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the
result of AAA’s medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also
penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony. To the mind of
this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to
appellant’s advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s
testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical
Page 1254 of 1553
certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a

successful prosecution for rape. Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any anal
penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the
appellant.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these
defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed
without force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him
and AAA was consensual.This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-
motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against him.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron, insists that he
cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because
he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew
it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again
his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the
victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted
again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From
these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape
despite the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in the records from
which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate and distinct
acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where
the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred
during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single
criminal intent.
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the
other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his
lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA].
Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated
by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three
(3) counts of rape is indubitable.
Page 1255 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE ROM

G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014
J. Perez
Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence
of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s
guilt for the offense of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended.
Facts:
In three separate Informations all dated 1 September 2000, the appellant was charged with
violation of Sections 15, (illegal sale of shabu) 15-A(maintenance of a drug den and 16(illegal
possession of shabu), Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
The RTC rendered a decision finding herein Rom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged. On appeal is the Decision dated 9 August 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579 affirming with modification the Decision dated 24 June 2002
of the The Court of Appeals, however, modified and reduced the penalty in Criminal Case
Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063 to an imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in convicting the appellant in spite of the failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to
overturn the findings of both lower courts, which were adequately supported by the
evidence on record.
Page 1256 of 1553

Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s guilt
for the offense of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended.
On the occasion of the appellant’s arrest for having been caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu, PO3 Yanson conducted a body search on the former resulting to the recovery of four
more heat-sealed plastic packets containing white crystalline substance inside his wallet
that was tucked in his pocket. Definitely, the records do not show that the appellant has
the legal authority to possess the four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu. Settled is the
rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused
to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which the appellant in this case
miserably failed to do.
There is also no truth on the appellant’s claim that the entry in the house was illegal making
the search and the seizure in connection thereto invalid, rendering the pieces of evidence
obtained by the police officers inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree." The
appellant, in this case, was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was lawfully
arrested. Following Dimacuha, the subsequent seizure of four heat-sealed plastic packets
of shabu in the appellant’s wallet that was tucked in his pocket was justified and admissible
in evidence for being the fruit of the crime.
With the foregoing, this Court is fully convinced that the prosecution had likewise proved
beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the offense of illegal
possession of shabu in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
Going to the charge of maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the prosecution had also established appellant’s guilt
In his attempt to exonerate himself, the appellant vehemently asserts that he was no longer
the owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, and he was no longer residing
therein. The defense also presented Teresita Bitos to corroborate this claim of the
appellant, but the testimony of Teresita Bitos corroborating the appellant’s testimony was
not credible. She herself admitted that the appellant requested her to testify in his favor.
Also, considering the seriousness of the charges against the appellant, he did not bother to
present his daughter, who is the alleged owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu
City, to bolster his claim.
Page 1257 of 1553

Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak defense and has always
been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be
concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive
identification of the appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance
only when the prosecution’s evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on
affirmative matters. Moreover, there is a presumption that public officers, including the
arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties. In this case, the defense failed to
overcome this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, this
Court finds no ill motive that could be attributed to the police officers who had conducted
the buy-bust operation. Even the allegation of the appellant that PO2 Martinez got angry
with him when he failed to pinpoint the big time pusher cannot be considered as the ill
motive in implicating the appellant on all the three charges against him for this is self-
serving and uncorroborated.
EMILIO RAGA y CASIKAT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 200597, February 19, 2014
J. Villarama, Jr.
When the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often
accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if
properly considered, would alter the result of the case.
The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in coming forward to avenge the
immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and plausible compared to the weak
and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the minor inconsistencies in her testimony,
her general statements remained consistent throughout the trial as she recounted the sordid
details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father.
Facts:
Complainant AAA is the daughter of petitioner and BBB. One night, sometime in the year
2000, while AAA’s mother, BBB, was out of the house and while AAA and her other siblings
were sleeping, AAA, who was then five years old, was suddenly awakened when petitioner
removed her clothes and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. When petitioner was
unsuccessful in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina, he inserted his finger instead. He did
Page 1258 of 1553

that several times while holding his penis. A white substance later came out of his penis.
AAA told BBB what petitioner did to her, but BBB did nothing.
One night in May 2004, AAA, who was then already nine years old, was sleeping in the
room while her siblings were sleeping with their father in the living room. AAA was
suddenly awakened when her father carried her from the room to the living room.
Petitioner then let AAA watch bold movies but AAA turned away. Petitioner, who was half-
naked waist down, thereafter removed AAA’s clothes. He then laid on top of AAA and tried
to insert his penis into her vagina. As he was unsuccessful in inserting his penis into her
vagina, he inserted his finger instead. Because AAA was afraid of petitioner who used to
whip her, she did not do anything.
According to AAA, petitioner raped her several times but she could only remember two
dates: one during the year 2000 and the other in May 2004. On September 2, 2004, two
Informations for the crime of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 25 of
the Revised Penal Code were filed against petitioner. On May 24, 2010, the RTC rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The
Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the accused should be acquitted on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s guilt for the crimes charged
Held:
Time and again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses
and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve
great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact
or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The
trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the witness’s deportment and manner of
testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" -- all of which are useful
aids for an accurate determination of a witness’s honesty and sincerity. The trial judge,
therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
Page 1259 of 1553
while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
From our own careful examination of the records, we are convinced that there is no reason
to disturb the assessment and determination of AAA’s credibility by the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in
coming forward to avenge the immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and
plausible compared to the weak and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the
minor inconsistencies in her testimony, her general statements remained consistent
throughout the trial as she recounted the sordid details of her tormenting experience in
the hands of her own father. Nonetheless, while this Court also upholds petitioner’s
conviction, we modify the penalty imposed on petitioner.
RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 188694, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
J. PERSLAS-BERNABE
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law
and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of
jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
On March 24, 1995, Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968
in one of the volumes of the CA Original Decisions, but Atibula refused. Atienza later
offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260, which the latter
turned down. Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Macapagal, the Assistant Chief of the
CA Reporter’s Division, who then instructed him to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 267 in a
safe place.
On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 was missing. He immediately reported
the same to Atty. Macapagal. On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed
at the CA Reporter’s Division, handed to Atibula a bag containing the missing Volume 266.
He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said package to Atibula.
Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the decisions and noticed
that there were two new documents inserted therein. Consequently, Atibula reported his
findings to Atty. Macapagal who, in turn, informed Atty. Tablate, then Chief of the CA
Page 1260 of 1553

Reporter’s Division, of the same. They tried to verify the genuineness, authenticity and
existence of the subject resolution and decision, and found that the compilation of the
duplicate original decisions/resolutions of Justice Enriquez did not bear the said
promulgations. Atty. Tablate reported the incident to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael
P. De Pano, Jr. who immediately requested the NBI to conduct an investigation on the
matter.
The NBI investigation found that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed been altered; and (b) the
signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and and their standard/sample
signatures "were not written by one and the same person," leading to the conclusion that
the questioned signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July
1995, an inspection of the air-conditioning units at the office of the CA Reporter’s Division
was conducted. Said investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there were no signs of
forcible entry; (b) the perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA Reporter’s Division
"by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the air conditioning unit"
located on the right most [sic] end from the main door; (c) there was conspiracy to commit
the crime of Falsification of Public Document between Atienza and Dario in view of their
"concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous acts and deeds;" and (d) Castro
assisted Atienza and Dario "to profit from the effects of the crime by returning safely the
missing volume.
A criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and the Ombudsman against Atienza, Castro,
and Dario before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB,
charging them Falsification of Public Document. After investigation, it was determined that
there existed probable cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario for the crimes of Robbery,
and of Falsification of Public Document.The RTC found Atienza and Castro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioners’ conviction for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document should be upheld on account of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which
the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
Page 1261 of 1553
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.
Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on
record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven
must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.
Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no
sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the elements of
Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the same code, or of petitioners’ supposed
conspiracy therefor. Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the falsification case since Falsification of Public Document under
Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC and MCTC. While petitioners raised this
jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from
questioning the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES Y ZAMORA

G.R. NO. 190178, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
J. PEREZ
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received
with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of
giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an
alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape
is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in
mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created

reasonable doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth
in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.
Page 1262 of 1553

Facts:
AAA alleged that Patentes forcibly took her to his house on December 5, 1998 and raped
her for more than a week. To free herself from her predicament, AAA promised to marry
Patentes and convinced him to accompany her to her mother to tell the latter about their
marital plans.
Patentes on the other hand, argues that their December 5 meeting was pursuant to their
previous agreement. AAA stayed in appellant’s house together with the latter’s relatives.
AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse.
Throughout AAA’s stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the
household chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAA’s grandfather went to appellant’s
house on 7 December 1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999.
Appellant’s mother also went to AAA’s house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December
1998. However, AAA’s mother rejected the marriage proposal because of appellant’s social
standing.
Eight sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape were filed by AAA against
Patentes where RTC rendered a decision finding the latter guilty of the crime charged. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Patentes is guilty of the crime charged
Held:
Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There
is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.
Nevertheless, the Court must be guided by established principles.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man
of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be
innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private
complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.
Page 1263 of 1553
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created

reasonable doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption
of innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought
forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.
We are mindful that appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone
stand. It must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually,
these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the
lovers. There is such corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the
defense presented appellant and AAA’s common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the
veracity of appellant’s claim.
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt,

which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon
the prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of
establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with
precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving
undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an
alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the
rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the
anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLITA PALOMARES y COSTUNA

G.R. No. 200915, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
J. ABAD
In the case at bar, the evidence is unclear as to where the responsible police officer
marked the seized substance and whether it was done in Merlita’s presence. In fact, it is also
not clear from the evidence which police officer did the marking. This uncertainty concerning
a vital element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of conviction.
Though Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such cannot relieve the
prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal
transaction actually took place.
Page 1264 of 1553

Facts:
On March 21, 2007 the City Public Prosecutor charged Merlita with selling prohibited drugs
in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 before the Regional Trial
Court (R TC) of Manila in Criminal Case 07-251767.
On March 18, 2008, the trial court found Merlita guilty as charged and sentenced her to life
imprisonment with a fine of P500,000.00 and liability for the cost of suit. Upon review, the
CA rendered judgment, affirming in full the RTC Decision, hence, the present appeal to
this Court.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding, like the RTC before it, that the prosecution succeeded in
proving beyond reasonable doubt that accused Merlita sold dangerous drugs in violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165
Held:
To secure conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the identity of the prohibited drug
seized from the accused must be proved with moral certainty. The prosecution must
establish with such measure of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the
buy-bust operation is the same substance offered as evidence in court. Proof of the chain
of custody from the time of seizure to the time such evidence is presented in court ensures
the absence of doubt concerning the integrity of such vital evidence. This requires as a
minimum that the police mark the seized item (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation.
Of course, the Court has ruled that immediate marking could be made at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. Here, however, the evidence is unclear as to
where the responsible police officer marked the seized substance and whether it was done
in Merlita’s presence.
In fact, it is also not clear from the evidence which police officer did the marking since P02
Mallari and P02 Flores gave conflicting testimonies on this point. This uncertainty
concerning a vital element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of conviction.
Besides, neither P02 Mallari nor P02 Flores testified that they conducted a physical
inventory and took photos of the article that was seized from Merlita. In fact, their joint
Page 1265 of 1553

affidavit of arrest made no mention of any inventory taking or photographing of the same.
And they did not bother at all to offer some justification for the omission.
Parenthetically, barangay kagawad Lizano, an elected public official, testified that he saw
the police officers enter Merlita's shanty and arrest her on the date in question. This
testimony from a neutral party strikes at the heart of the prosecution's theory that they
arrested Merlita at Unit 52, Building 8, of Paradise Heights in Balut, Tondo. Though
Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such cannot relieve the prosecution the
burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal transaction actually
took place.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. GLENN SALVADOR and DORY ANN PARCON
G.R. NO. 190621, FEBRUARY 10, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph

the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated
from him inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said
items have been preserved.
Facts:
An Information for violation of Section 5 (illegal sale), Article II of RA 9165 otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was filed against appellant and Parcon,
while an Information for violation of Section 11(illegal possession) of Article II, RA 9165 was
filed against Parcon. Upon motion of the prosecution, the cases were consolidated.
The prosecution presented PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano) to testify on the entrapment
operation that resulted in the arrest of appellant and Parcon. Trial ensued. Parcon failed to
attend the scheduled hearings, hence, she was tried in absentia. To claim innocence,
Salvador used denial and frame up as a defense.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Salvador and Parcon guilty of the offenses charged.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this appeal filed by Salvador.
Issue:
Whether Salvador is guilty of the offense charged
Page 1266 of 1553

Held:
All the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently established in
this case. Prosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Their narration of the incident, "buttressed
by the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight." Here, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling that the testimonies and facts stipulated upon were consistent with each other as
well as with the physical evidence. Thus, there is no justification to disturb the findings of
the RTC, as sustained by the CA, on the matter.
The defenses of denial and frame-up are unavailing. Denial cannot prevail against the
positive testimony of a prosecution witness. "A defense of denial which is unsupported and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving,
deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing,
straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters."
Appellant cannot likewise avail of the defense of frame-up which "is viewed with disfavor
since, like alibi, it can easily be concocted and is a common ploy in most prosecutions for
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law." To substantiate this defense, the evidence must
be clear and convincing and should show that the buy-bust team was inspired by improper
motive or was not properly performing its duty.
Non-compliance with Section 21(Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.),
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal. The failure of the prosecution to show that
the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photographed the objects
confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render
inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the
implementing rules stating that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds
and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved.
"What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved
for they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
"The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as
the chain of custody of the same are duly established." "‘Chain of Custody’ means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
Page 1267 of 1553

seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in

court. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who had temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition."
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation,
namely: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court." In this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated shabu.
Lastly, appellant’s argument that the entrapment operation is fatally flawed for failure of
the buy-bust team to coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant consideration.
"Coordination with PDEA, while perhaps ideal, is not an indispensable element of a proper
buy-bust operation;" it is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO ZABALA Y BALADA AND ROMEO

ALBIUS, JR. Y BAUTISTA
G.R. NO.203087, November 23, 2015, Peralta, J.
“When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the findings are accorded high respect, if
not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the CA, since it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, these
findings are generally binding upon this Court. We see no reason to depart from this rule.”
Facts:
One evening,Joseph Agapay together with his friends Cesar Lopez, Emmanuel Rumbawa,
Roland Albius and Aldrin Zabala were exchanging stories at the house of Catherine Perez.
Thereafter, Joseph decided to go home. His friends offered to accompany him but he
refused. On his way home, Edgardo Balada and Romeo Bautista suddenly appeared and
followed him from behind. Corollarily, Agapay’s friends decided to follow him. When
Joseph's friends were about 15 to 20 meters away from him, the group heard the latter's
Page 1268 of 1553

outcry and saw Romeo place his left hand on Joseph's shoulder and instantly box the latter,
while Edgardo held Joseph's hands from behind. Joseph struggled to free himself from
Edgardo's hold until they fell down the nearby creek. Despite Joseph's plea, Edgardo
continued throwing fist at Joseph and ordered him to shut up. Romeo, who was then
standing beside the creek, saw Joseph's friends looking and approached them and told
them to just go home and not to get involved, hence, the group then all ran away from the
crime scene. However, Aldrin and Roland immediately returned to the crime scene and
saw Edgardo and Romeo mauling Joseph who then fell to the ground unconscious. Edgardo
then smashed Joseph's head with a stone. Aldrin and his friends reported the incident to
the police the following day and executed their respective sworn affidavits.
Dr. Victoria B. Gonzales conducted a post mortem examination on Joseph's body and
testified on the death certificate that the fractures of the skull with brain hermation was
caused by the pressure exerted on the victim's skull caused by a hard object such as a stone.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court found Romeo and Edgardo conspired to murder
Joseph and that the crime committed was attended with treachery. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove their identities beyond reasonable doubt
considering the lighting condition on the night of the incident.
Ruling:
No. Prosecution witness Aldrin positively identified appellants as the persons who mauled
and killed Joseph on the night of December 12, 2003. He testified that both appellants
mauled Joseph until the latter fell to the ground unconscious, and then appellant Edgardo
smashed Joseph's face with a stone. Aldrin's testimony that appellant Edgardo smashed
Joseph's face with a stone was confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Gonzales that Joseph died
of intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple depressed fractures of the skull with brain
hermation which was caused by the pressure exerted on the victim's skull.
Appellants' alibi and denial cannot prevail as against the positive identifications made by
the prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any improper motive to falsely
testify against them. Where there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the
Page 1269 of 1553

prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
Preponderance of Evidence
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v.

INTERPACIFIC CONTAINER SERVICES AND GLORIA DEE CHONG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194328, July 01, 2015, PEREZ, J.
The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater

weight or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth.
Facts:
A Fuso truck owned by Chong figured in an accident resulting in four fatalities and three
casualties. Stronghold Insurance undertook to indemnity Chong under a comprehensive
motor car insurance policy. However, the claim was denied by Stronghold as the driver of
the truck was heavily drunk.
Issue:
Whether Stronghold is able to prove its defense through preponderance of evidence.
Ruling:
NO. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case rested the burden of proof. Notably, in the course of trial
in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden
of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's.
What further dampens petitioner's position is the absence of the crucial fact of intoxication
in the blotter report which officially documented the incident. Entries in police records
made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be substantiated or
Page 1270 of 1553
nullified by other competent evidence. In this case, the lack of statement to the effect that
the driver was under the influence of alcohol in the said report is too significant to escape
the attention of this Court.
PEDRO MENDOZA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS FEDERICO

MENDOZA AND DELFIN MENDOZA, AND JOSE GONZALESv. REYNOSA VALTE
G.R. No. 172961, September 07, 2015, LEONEN, J.
The CA gave more weight to the Joint Affidavit of Mendoza and Vallegaand discussed
the reasons why the statements by Mendoza and Gonzales’ witnesses were not credible: First,
the statements of Sabado and Pagibitan were taken during the ex parte investigation where
Valte had no opportunity to present contrary evidence.Second, Sabado and Pagibitan's
statements that Mendoza and Gonzales occupied the property as early as 1929 or 1930
appeared doubtful and unreliable.Third, even if such evidence were taken at face value, these
would not sufficiently establish their possession since 1929 or 1930 and the nature of this
possession.
Facts:
Valte filed a free patent application for a parcel of land. The Director of Lands then issued
the Notice of Application for Free Patent stating that all adverse claims to the tract of land
above- described must be filed in the Bureau of Lands on or before the 7th day of August
1978. Any claim not so filed will be forever barred. The Land Investigator certified that the
land formed part of the old cadastral lot subdivided and approved. Thus, Lot 1035-B was
equivalent to Lot 2391. The Land Investigator recommended the grant of Valte's application
and the Bureau of Lands approved Valte's application and issued the Free Patent and an
OCT was issued. Mendoza and Gonzales filed a protest. DENR secretary ruled in favour of
Mendoza and Gonzales and directed to cause the reversion of the area. Office of the
President set aside said decision and ordered an investigation of the case. DENR secretary
dismissed the protest for finding Mendoza and Gonzales to be mere tenants of the land.
Office of the President reversed it’s former decision and ordered the reversion of the area
covered in the OCT. CA reversed the Office of the President decision and reinstated DENR
secretary’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the Office of the President Decision that found
fraud and misrepresentations by Valte in her free patent application.
Page 1271 of 1553

Ruling:
No. The evidence on record preponderates to the fact that Reynosa Valte has preferential
rights over the controverted lot. In the report of Land Investigator Bacena, it was found
that the controverted land has been occupied and cultivated by Reynosa Valte, and
previously by her predecessor-in-interest since 1945. Herein protestants, Mendoza and
Vallega, thru an affidavit supported Valte's application for free patent over the controverted
land, under oath, confirmed that the latter has continuously occupied and cultivated the
land since 1945 by herself and by her predecessors-in-interest. The aforestated joint
affidavit is a very convincing documents to strengthen Valte's assertions that, indeed, the
protestants are tenants and that their rights on the controverted lot cannot rise higher than
its source.
The CA gave more weight to the Joint Affidavit of Mendoza and Vallega and discussed the
reasons why the statements by Mendoza and Gonzales’ witnesses were not credible. First,
the statements of Sabado and Pagibitan were taken during the ex parte investigation where
Valte had no opportunity to present contrary evidence. Valte presented the Joint Affidavit
where Mendoza admitted against his interest in the land by stating that "the said applicant
has continuously occupied and cultivated the land herself and/or thru her predecessor-in-
interest since July 4, 1945, or prior thereto and it is free from claims and conflicts. "Second,
Sabado and Pagibitan's statements that Mendoza and Gonzales occupied the property as
early as 1929 or 1930 appeared doubtful and unreliable. The Certification by Nueva Ecija
Deputy Clerk of Court Ciriaco states that other persons had possession of the land during
this time, and these persons sold the land to Valte’s father in 1941. Also, Sabado was only 4
years old in 1929, and he could not have had the comprehension to adequately inform
himself on the concept of the alleged possession of the land. Third, even if such evidence
were taken at face value, these would not sufficiently establish their possession since 1929
or 1930 and the nature of this possession. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
Certification reveals that Mendoza and Gonzales’ possession was merely that of
tenants.Also, Valte’s mother, Miguela, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that she
and her husband bought the land in 1941, and they cultivated it and paid the taxes until
they transferred its care to their daughter, Reynosa Valte, in 1964.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM. PAS IMIO

G.R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
Page 1272 of 1553

It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts a right and the quantum
of evidence required by law in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of
evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of
credible evidence."
Facts:
Ligaya Pasimio (Pasimio) filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and
damages before the RTC of Parañaque City alleging that having a peso and dollar time
deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4, 322,057.57 and US$5,170.80,
respectively; that both investment placements have matured; and when she sought to
withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige. PNB admitted
the fact of deposit placement for the amount but it claimed that Pasimio is without right
to insist on their withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been used in payment
of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank. PNB narrated how the set off of sort came
about: Pasimio and her husband took out three "loans against deposit hold-out" from the
PNB Sucat branch, as follows: P3, 100,000 loan on March 21, 2001; P1, 700,000 loan on April
2, 2001; and a US$31,100 loan on December 7, 2001.
Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the corresponding loan
proceeds. She claimed that she agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in
blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager,
Teresita Gregorio (Gregorio), and Customer Relations Officer, Gloria Miranda (Miranda),
led her to believe that what she was signing were related to new high-yielding PNB
products. The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio, and ordered PNB to pay Pasimio. The CA
affirmed that the RTC stating that as it found and declared PNB's bank personnel grossly
negligent and their transactions with Pasimio highly unacceptable, CA held that no loan
proceeds were ever released to Pasimio, thus sustaining the RTC appreciation of the
evidence thus presented on the matter by Pasimio.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint
for a sum of money.
Page 1273 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. Just as settled is the rule that the plaintiff in civil cases must rely on strength of his or
her own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendant. In the case at bench,
this means that on Pasimio rests the burden of proof and the onus to produce the required
quantum of evidence to support her cause/s of action.
Pasimio has failed to discharge this burden. There can be no quibbling that Pasimio had,
during the time material, opened and maintained deposit accounts with PNB. For this
purpose, she submitted two passbooks and one certificate of time deposit to establish her
peso and dollar placements with the bank. However, PNB also succeeded in substantiating
its defense for refusing to release Pasimio's funds by presenting documents showing that
her accounts were, pursuant to hold- out arrangement, made collaterals for the loans she
obtained from the bank and were eventually used to pay her outstanding loan obligations.
Unfortunately, Pasimio failed to trump PNB's defense after the burden of evidence shifted
back to her.
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
LUIS DERILO Y GEPOLEO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 190466, April 18, 2016
The totality of these circumstances – the failure to mark the plastic sachets, the
discrepancy in the weight, and the uncertainty of the individuals who handled the seized items
– broke the chain of custody and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as
evidence before the trial court. Given that the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable
element of corpus delicti, the petitioner must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Facts:
A team of police officers conducted a police operation to serve a search warrant at the
residence of the petitioner. During the search, the barangay tanods, under the supervision
of the police, recovered twelve (12) plastic sachets each containing white crystalline
substance. The police officers also recovered suspected drug paraphernalia/ While at the
scene, SPO1 Evasco proceeded to mark the confiscated items with his initials, "S.B.E.," while
SPO1 Calupit took their photographs. In addition, SPO1 Evasco prepared an inventory of
the items seized, but the petitioner refused to sign the inventory. The petitioner and the
seized items were then taken to the police station. Thereafter, the seized items were
Page 1274 of 1553
brought to the court and then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. At the PNP
Crime Laboratory, a drug screener/laboratory technician conducted an initial field test of
the drug specimens.
The prosecution charged the petitioner with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of RA
No. 9165, for possession of twelve (12) plastic sachets. After trial, the accused was convicted.
Issue:
Whether the accused should be acquitted since the chain of custody over the seized items
appears broken and questionable, considering that the seized items were not marked in his
presence
Ruling:
Yes, the accused should be acquitted. The chain of custody required in drug cases was not
strictly followed.
1. The marking of the seized drugs or other related items is crucial in proving the
unbroken chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions. As the first link in the chain
of custody, the marking is of vital importance because succeeding handlers of the
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking
of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they
are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence. In other words, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items
is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.
The seized items were not marked in his presence the following links must be
established to ensure the preservation of the identity and integrity of the confiscated
drug: 1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; 2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; 3) the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and 4)
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
3. There is also no record of who exercised custody and possession of the drug
specimens after they were examined by P/Inspt. Clemens and before they were
presented before the court.
Page 1275 of 1553

4. The totality of these circumstances – the failure to mark the plastic sachets, the
discrepancy in the weight, and the uncertainty of the individuals who handled the
seized items – broke the chain of custody and tainted the integrity of
the shabu ultimately presented as evidence before the trial court. Given that the
prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of corpus delicti, the petitioner
must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC., et al. vs. LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL

G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014
C. J. Sereno
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a
court cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that
the latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's
counsel to protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses. If
respondent actually believed that the testimony of Kenneth would greatly affect that of
Stephen's, then respondent's counsel was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of
his client when he did not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner.
Facts:
Eristingcol bought Pergo flooring from Design Sources. The flooring was installed in her
house, but the same later turned out to be defective. Eristingcol insisted on the repair or
replacement of the flooring at the expense of the latter but Design Sources did not comply
with the demand. A complaint for damages was thus filed by the Private Respondent before
the RTC.
During the hearing, the RTC issued an order refusing to allow Stephen Sy to testify as to
material matters in the case. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but their
motion was denied by the RTC on the ground that "the Court deems it no longer necessary
to allow Stephen Sy from testifying when a different witness could testify on matters similar
to the intended testimony of the former." The Order also stated that "to allow Stephen Sy
from testifying would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he already heard the
testimony of witness Kenneth Sy."
Petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the same was likewise denied by
the RTC. The CA sustained the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.
Page 1276 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
disallowing petitioners from presenting Stephen as their witness
Held:
The controversy arose from the objection of respondent’s counsel to the presentation of
Stephen as petitioners’ witness. However, as aptly found by the CA, respondent failed to
substantiate her claim that there was a prior request for the exclusion of other witnesses
during the presentation of Kenneth. Respondent did not even allege in her Comment that
there was any such request.
Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may
exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not
hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept
separate and to be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been
examined.
Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or
ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent
them from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify
to the truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In
other words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses.
The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of
discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from the
opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a witness
from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.
There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there was an order of
exclusion from the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondent’s counsel to exclude
other witnesses from the courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the
testimony of Kenneth. We are one with the CA in finding that under such circumstances,
there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of Kenneth. Therefore,
the RTC should have allowed Stephen to testify for petitioners.
The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of the testimony of
Stephen, which became their basis for not allowing the latter to testify.1âwphi1 Applying
Page 1277 of 1553
Sandal, the CA ruled that the absence of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the
position of petitioners saved the judgment of the RTC in issuing the order of exclusion.
We agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced. Contrary to the
present case, in Sandal there was a court order for exclusion which was disregarded by the
witness. The defiance of the order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit
or reject the testimony of the witness who had defied its order. Again, in this case, there
was no order or motion for exclusion that was defied by petitioners and their witnesses.
Thus, the determination of the materiality of Stephen's testimony in relation to the
strengthening of petitioners' defense was uncalled for.
Respondent is bound by the acts of her counsel, including mistakes in the realm of
procedural techniques. The exception to the said rule does not apply herein, considering
that there is no showing that she was thereby deprived of due process. At any rate,
respondent is not without recourse even if the court allows the presentation of the
testimony of Stephen, considering the availability of remedies during or after the
presentation of witnesses, including but not limited to the impeachment of testimonies.
SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 184371. MARCH 5, 2014
J. BRION
The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only
those errors assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional
circumstances. As exceptions to the rule, the Court has considered grounds not raised or
assigned as errors in instances where: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned
as errors on appeal, whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the
trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the
parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but are closely related to the assigned error/s; and (6) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal, whose determination is necessary to rule on the question/s properly assigned as
errors.
The present case falls into the exceptions. We find no error by the CA in resolving the
issues on the nature and duration of the petitioners’ possession and on the alienable character
of the subject land. These issues were apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal
Page 1278 of 1553
before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the petitioners have registrable title
over the subject land.
Facts:
On November 17, 2003, the petitioners applied for the registration of a 6,904 square meter-
parcel of land situated in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union.
The MTC approved the application of registration of title of Lot No. 3876, Cad-474-D, Case
17, Bauang Cadastre, filed by the spouses Mario and Julia Campos (petitioners). The CA
reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in ruling on non-issues and on established and undisputed facts that
were not raised by the Republic as errors in its appeal
Held:
First, we address the procedural issue raised by the petitioners. Section 8, Rule 51 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. – No error which does not affect the jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings
therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass
upon plain errors and clerical errors.
The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those
errors assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional
circumstances. The Court has, however, considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors
in excepted instances. The present case falls into the exceptions.
We find no error by the CA in resolving the issues on the nature and duration of the
petitioners’ possession and on the alienable character of the subject land. These issues were
apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal before the CA, but are crucial in
determining whether the petitioners have registrable title over the subject land. In
Mendoza v. Bautista, the Court held that the appellate court reserves the right, resting on
its public duty, to take cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and
Page 1279 of 1553

proceedings, and to notice errors that are obvious upon inspection and are of a controlling
character, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice due to oversight.
In deciding on the merits of the present petition, we affirm the CA in dismissing the
petitioners' application for registration of title.
Persons applying for registration of title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
152911 must prove: (1) that the land sought to be registered forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
As the CA did, we find that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. The oldest documentary evidence presented by the petitioners was a 1948 tax
declaration over the subject land in the name of Margarita Laigo. The petitioners failed to
present evidence of their possession prior to 1948. In fact, the petitioners, in their
application for registration, base their possession of the subject land only from 1948, and
not "since June 12, 1945, or earlier" as required by law.
We emphasize that since the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 13 on January 25, 1977, it must be
shown that possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered by the applicant
himself or through his predecessors in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, which
totally conforms to the requirement under Section 14(1) of P.D. No 1529. A mere showing
of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years or more is no longer sufficient.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGIPIT, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 204894. MARCH 10, 2014
J. ABAD
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the
accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead. This
may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that
meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the
totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis
for the conviction of all the accused.
Page 1280 of 1553

Facts:
Enojas, driver of a taxi which was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass
shop, was spotted by POs2 Gregorio and Pangilinan. Enojas was invited to the police station
for further questioning and he voluntarily went with the police officers. On their way to
the police station, the police officers stopped the car infront of the 7-11 store because PO2
Pangilinan needed a restroom break. As he approached the store’s door, he saw two
suspected robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit
the other who still managed to escape before he himself was shot dead. PO2 Gregorio left
the mobile car and exchanged shots with the running suspects, but the latter were able to
board a taxi and escape. Upon returning to his mobile car, PO2 realized that Enojas had
fled.
Suspecting that Enojas, was involved in the attempted robbery, the police officers who
came to PO2 Gregorio’s backup searched the abandoned taxi and found Enojas’ mobile
phone. They monitored the messages in the said phone and concluded that Enojas is in
connivance with the robbers. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that
resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently,the police were also
able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of
the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged Enojas, Arnold Gomez,
Santos, and Jalandoni with murder. The RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused
guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The CA affirmed in toto the
conviction of the accused. The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation
since the prosecution failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before
committing it. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the appellants cannot be convicted despite the prosecution’s failure to produce
direct evidence
Held:
It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more
than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Page 1281 of 1553
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently
provides basis for the conviction of all the accused.
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojasas the driver of the taxicab suspiciously
parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop x x x Subsequent inspection of the taxicab
yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led to the entrapment and
capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers; 2. Enojas fled during the
commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station x x x He certainly did
not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi; 3. PO2 Gregorio
positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene
of the shooting; 4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of those who engaged
PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to “Kua Justin” as the one who
was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages
linked the other accused; 5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators
succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all
named in the text messages; 6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi
driven by Enojas clearly made references to the7-11 shootout and to the wounding of “Kua
Justin,” one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death; 7. The context of the messages
showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged
in illegal activities; 8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of
mobile phones with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances
of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2
Pangilinan to murder. In “aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only. They must
not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal
accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of
unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not
among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying
a homicide to murder. Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for
homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the
information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same
or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas,
exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As
the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3
Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
Page 1282 of 1553
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming
that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search
as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime
had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had
committed it. The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused
Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the
police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs. NENA E. LANUZO, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 161151, MARCH 24, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to
establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in
nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.
Hence, the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, who failed to
establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was
the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino could not recover damages.
Facts:
This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a
nighttime accident due to the supposed negligence of a construction company then
undertaking re-blocking work on a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that the
accident happened because the construction company did not provide adequate lighting
on the site, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of
the motorcycle rider himself. The trial court decided in favor of the construction company,
but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision and ruled for the plaintiffs. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur despite and contrary to
the finding by the trial court that the proximate cause of the accident is the victim’s own
negligence
Page 1283 of 1553

Held:
Inasmuch as the RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact on who was the
negligent party, the Court holds that an examination of the evidence of the parties needs
to be undertaken to properly determine the issue. The Court must ascertain whose
evidence was preponderant, for Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in
civil cases, like this one, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. It is basic that
whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not
evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no burden to prove. In civil cases, the burden
of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The
burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the
complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant
if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense
or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater
weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant’s.
Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that the
Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance
of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the
fatal accident of Balbino.
In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1
Corporal than to those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo heirs. There was justification for
doing so, because the greater probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimonies is preferred
to that of the appellate court’s because of the trial court’s unique first-hand opportunity to
observe the witnesses and their demeanor as such.
Page 1284 of 1553

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself.” For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist,
namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. This rule is grounded on the superior logic of
ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common knowledge
that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence,
the rule is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed
to the company considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs
and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the
exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose
that he himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino
overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid hitting
a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly
cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s investigation report corroborated Zamora’s declaration.
This causation of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs. Hence, the
Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.

G.R. No. 201001 November 10, 2014, J. Velasco Jr.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the
requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original document whenever the original copy has been lost: Before a party is allowed to
adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the
following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. In the instant case, the
CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark
has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such
testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, "findings
of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial
Page 1285 of 1553
court. Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of
Peregrino. MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the
contract that they entered into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite
the request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business
practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement.
Facts:
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from Monark

Equipment Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental
Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment
to the project site of MCMP, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well as Documents
Acknowledgment Receipt, received and signed by representatives of MCMP.
Notably, the invoices state that: credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date
of invoice. Customer agrees to pay interest at 24% p.a. on all amounts. In addition,
customer agrees to pay a collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and 2% per month
penalty charge for late payment on amounts overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum equal
to 25% of any amount due as attorney's fees in case of suit, and expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of the courts of Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for any
legal action arising from, this transactions.
Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices, MCMP
failed to pay the rental fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount due,
partial payments were made but the part remains unpaid. Further demands went
unheeded.
Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the RTC.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino

(Peregrino), its Senior Account Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2)
original copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark, while the other was given to
MCMP. He further testified that Monark's copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to
recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract
which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary evidence
to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to search
for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract
notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to produce the same.
Page 1286 of 1553

RTC later rendered judgment in favor of Monark. CA affirmed it on toto. Hence this
instant petition.
CMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the appellate court should have
disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the Contract,
following the Best Evidence Rule. MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of
Peregrino, Monark did not diligently search for the original copy of the Contract as
evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented; 2)
the alleged loss was not even reported to management or the police; and 3) Monark only
searched for the original copy of the document for the purposes of the instant case.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, erred in allowing the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the contract.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner's contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original
document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the
requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original document whenever the original copy has been lost: Before a party is allowed to
adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction
of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the
offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both
the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract
in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the
same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly
held by this Court, "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters
best left to the trial court. Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on
the credibility of Peregrino. MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by
Page 1287 of 1553

Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the
Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of the
Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained
a copy of their agreement.
Thus, MCMP's failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only
justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse
to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Evidently, the instant petition must be dismissed.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILFREDO SOLANO, JR.Y GECITA

“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.” In this case, it is beyond doubt that all the circumstances taken together point to the
singular conclusion that appellant Solano, to the exclusion of all others, committed the crime.
As found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the victim was last seen in the
presence of the appellant Solano. Edwin Jr. saw appellant Solano chasing the victim. Nestor
also saw appellant Solano dragging the motionless body of “AAA.” The body of the victim was
eventually found buried in the mud near the place where she was last seen with Solano. Solano
admitted holding a grudge against the family of “AAA” because he believes that a relative of
“AAA” had raped his sister. The autopsy report showed that “AAA” was raped and strangled.
Likewise, Solano could not ascribe any ill–motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Edwin
Jr., Edwin Sr. and Nestor whom he even considered as friends.
Facts:
Wilfredo Solano, Jr. y Gecita was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in
an Information. To prove the charges against accused–appellant Solano, Edwin Canon, Jr.
testified that in the morning of 22 April 2007, he and his brother were on their way home
when he saw Solano chasing AAA on a grassy area located at the outskirts of their barangay.
Not minding the two, they left and proceeded home. That same morning, he learned that
people were looking for AAA so he told his father of what he saw. His father in turn
Page 1288 of 1553

informed the barangay officials and, after conducting a search, AAA’s lifeless body was
found in a swamp near the place where Edwin, Jr. saw Solano chasing the victim. On cross–
examination, Edwin, Jr. maintained that he was able to see and recognize Solano and AAA
from a distance of about 50 to 60 meters before they ran towards the knee–high cogon grass
area. According to him, Solano stopped and looked at them before running after the victim.
On cross–examination, Nestor testified that he was about 9 meters away from where
he saw Solano drag AAA. When he arrived at the town proper, he learned that there was a
search for AAA so he relayed what he saw to Chief Tanod Zaldy Campo and went home.
Thereafter, he was informed that the body of AAA was found in the place where he saw
Solano dragging the victim. On further questioning, he asserted that he knew AAA because
he was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the victim’s mother. He also knew Solano
because he was a friend of his father.
Solano denied that he raped and killed AAA. On cross–examination, he admitted

that he personally knows the family of the victim since he worked for them for less than a
year. When he learned about the alleged rape of his sister by a relative of “AAA” sometime
in the year 2000, he quit his job with them. He also admitted holding a grudge against the
family of “AAA” but denied that he knows anything about AAA’s death. He also did not
know of any reason why prosecution witnesses Edwin, Jr., Edwin Sr., Nelson and Chief
Tanod Campo would testify against him inasmuch as he was in good terms with them.
Lastly, Solano admitted that the place where he was then staying can easily be negotiated
by walking or any means of transportation and that he could leave the place and return to
it easily.
The RTC held Solano guilty as charged based on circumstantial evidence. The CA
affirmed Solano’s conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to hold appellant

Solano for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
Ruling:
Yes, the SC declared that it is beyond doubt that all the circumstances taken
together point to the singular conclusion that appellant Solano, to the exclusion of all
others, committed the crime.
Page 1289 of 1553

“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
doubt.”
In this case, it is beyond doubt that all the circumstances taken together point to
the singular conclusion that appellant Solano, to the exclusion of all others, committed the
crime. As found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the victim was last
seen in the presence of the appellant Solano. Edwin Jr. saw appellant Solano chasing the
victim. Nestor also saw appellant Solano dragging the motionless body of “AAA.” The body
of the victim was eventually found buried in the mud near the place where she was last
seen with Solano. Solano admitted holding a grudge against the family of “AAA” because
he believes that a relative of “AAA” had raped his sister. The autopsy report showed that
“AAA” was raped and strangled. Likewise, Solano could not ascribe any ill–motive on the
part of prosecution witnesses Edwin Jr., Edwin Sr. and Nestor whom he even considered as
friends.
ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014, J. Brion
Although based on the evidence adduced by both parties, no direct evidence points to
Almojuela as the one who stabbed Quejong. A finding of guilt is still possible despite the
absence of direct evidence. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence may result if
sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the
crime.
Facts:
This case stemmed from two information for attempted homicide and homicide
filed with the RTC of Manila, against accused Almojuela. That on or about November 21,
1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said Almojuela feloniously with intent to kill,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon Ricardo Quejong y Bello by stabbing him
with a bladed weapon twice, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter. The trial court dismissed the charge for attempted homicide for insufficiency of
evidence. During arraignment, Almojuela entered a plea of "not guilty". Pre-trial
conference was conducted then trial on the merits followed. Two different versions of the
facts surrounding the victim Ricardo Quejong’s death surfaced.
Page 1290 of 1553

Sanito Masula narrated the prosecution’s account of the events which transpired. At
around 8:00 in the evening, Masula, Quejong, Jose Buenhijo Paz, along with some others,
were on their way home from a party when they encountered Almojuela, who was having
a drinking spree with his friends in front of his house. Almojuela called on Paz and shouted,
"Matagal ka nang namumuro sa akin," to which, Paz replied, "Ganoon ba? What do you
want?" Immediately, a fight ensued between the two. In the course of the fight, Almojuela
stabbed Paz in his right arm, causing the latter to retreat. It was at this point that Quejong
joined in the fight and grappled with Almojuela to the ground. A certain Dale Abarquez at
that point, came to pacify the parties. This prompted Kagawad Abarquez to hit Quejong
twice in his back and to fire two warning shots in the air. On hearing the gunshots, Quejong
and his group immediately ran away. Masula testified that he did not actually see Almojuela
stab Quejong when they were grappling on the ground. However, he also said that he
noticed blood on Quejong’s back. On Quejong’s way home, their friends saw that he had
stab wounds in his back. They immediately rushed him to the University of Santo Tomas
Hospital where he died approximately two to three hours from admission.
The evidence for the defense showed that on November 21, 1993, Almojuela was
cooking pulutan for his drinking when he saw the group of Paz, Quejong, Masula, and
others, smoking marijuana. Almojuela confronted the group, to which Paz responded by
cursing him. When Paz’s group was already high on drugs, they called on Almojuela and
challenged him to a fistfight, which he accepted. They were grappling on the ground when
Kagawad Abarquez arrived to intervene to stop the fight. No one heeded the kagawad;
hence, he fired two warning shots in the air. The shots forced Quejong and his group to
scamper away.
At around 10:30 in the evening of the same day, policemen came to Almojuela’s
house, they did not find him. He voluntarily surrendered himself, however, when he
learned from Kagawad Abarquez that Quejong had died from stab wounds. The RTC found
Almojuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The CA affirmed Almojuela’s
conviction but reduced the RTC’s imposed penalty. The CA appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The CA also gave evidentiary weight to the attendant
circumstantial evidence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution’s evidence was
sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not Almojuela should be awarded the mitigating circumstances of

incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender.
Page 1291 of 1553

Ruling:
1. No, the CA did not err.
We find it clear, based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties that
no direct evidence points to Almojuela as the one who stabbed Quejong. A finding of guilt
is still possible despite the absence of direct evidence. Conviction based on circumstantial
evidence may result if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an
unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, was the author of the crime. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence may
be sustained if the following requisites are all present: a. There is more than one
circumstance; b. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c. The
doubt.
They are like puzzle pieces which when put together reveal a convincing picture
pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime. In the present case,
the RTC and the CA relied on the following circumstances in concluding that Almojuela
was the perpetrator of the crime: 1. Almojuela orally provoked Paz when the latter and his
group passed by Almojuela’s house; 2. A fight ensued between them and Almojuela
wounded Paz’s right arm with a knife; 3. The wounded Paz retreated and Quejong next
fought with Almojuela; 4. During Quejong and Almojuela’s fight, they grappled and
wrestled with each other on the ground; 5. Quejong and Almojuela were only pacified when
Kagawad Abarquez came and fired two gunshots in the air; 6. Masula did not see Almojuela
stab Quejong but he saw blood in Quejong’s back during the fight; 7. Quejong’s group
scampered away after the gunshots. On Quejong’s way home, one of his friends noticed
that he had stab wounds in his back; 8. Quejong was immediately rushed to the hospital
where he expired a few hours after; and 9. Almojuela hid when policemen came to his home
to investigate. The nine circumstances, individually, are not sufficient to support
Almojuela’s conviction. But taken together, they constitute an unbroken chain leading to
the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela is guilty of the crime of homicide. These proven
circumstances lead to the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela stabbed Quejong during
their fight, causing the latter’s subsequent death.
2. Almojuela is only entitled to mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim

had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. This
mitigating circumstance is inapplicable in the present case because the unlawful aggression
did not start from the victim Quejong but from Almojuela. The prosecution proved that it
Page 1292 of 1553

was Almojuela who first challenged Paz and his group to a fight. Almojuela came prepared
to fight and was in fact armed with a bladed weapon. Moreover, there is no lack of sufficient
provocation on Almojuela’s part as shown by his confrontational stance right from the start.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or he wished to
save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture. Although Almojuela hid when policemen first visited him in his home, it was also
duly proven that soon after he learned of Quejong’s death, Almojuela voluntarily gave
himself up to a certain SPO4 Soriano who then turned him over to SPO1 Danilo Vidad of
the Western Police District.
JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Under the Doctrine of Independently Relevant Statement, if the purpose of placing the
statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such
statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant
is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the
statement may be shown. Thus, the statement of an NBI Agent that a witness confided to him
that the latter heard the accused in a murder case tell the other suspect that “ayoko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si victim”, while they were armed with firearms and boarding a car,
is independently relevant and proves what the witness heard, and not the truthfulness or
falsity of the statement.
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the

circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Thus, the court may convict the accused in a murder case on the basis of the 1.) independently
relevant statement of the NBI Agent that a witness heard the accused utter statements as to
the killing of the victim, 2.) the getaway vehicle was properly identified by the previous owner,
3.) the statement of the medico-legal officer that high-powered firearms were used in the
killing of the victim, and 4.) the escape from detention of the accused.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Espineli was charged before the RTC with murder for the death of
Alberto Berbon. In the early evening of December 15, 1996, Berbon was shot in the head
and different parts of the body in front of his house. Meanwhile, Romeo Reyes was arrested,
and confided to NBI officers that he was willing to give vital information regarding the
Page 1293 of 1553

Berbon case. NBI Agent Segunial interviewed Reyes and reduced his statement into writing
whereby Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996 he saw Espineli and Sotero Paredes
board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, respectively, and that
Espineli told Paredes that “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon”. Afterwards,
Reyes posted bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial testified on these facts
during trial.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao, testified that he sold his red Ford
Escort car to three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1, 1996.
He later identified the said car from the photographs presented to him by the police
officers. Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted a post-mortem
examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple
gunshot wounds in the head and body. He also stated that based on the size of the gunshot
wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
Espineli filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. The RTC convicted
Espineli, and the CA affirmed the RTC.
Issues:
1. Is the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes hearsay, unconfirmed and unauthenticated

by him and thus is inadmissible in evidence?
2. Did the prosecution fail to prove Espineli’s guilt?
Ruling:
1. No, as the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial on the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes
is an independently relevant statement.
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the
latter’s statement into writing declaring, among others, that in the morning of December
15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas
yang si Berbon” and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively,
before boarding a red car. The CA gave weight to Reyes’ sworn statement in this wise: The
probative value of Romeo Reyes’ sworn statement as to the words spoken by appellant to
his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed.
Espineli takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said sworn
statement belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He
Page 1294 of 1553

asserts that its contents were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks
probative value.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought
to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by
another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement
on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such
statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant
is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the
statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of
independently relevant statements.
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was
investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard Espineli telling Sotero
“Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and that he saw the two (petitioner and
Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red
car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s
testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose
of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing
such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness’ oral testimony. Moreover,
NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the
truthfulness of Reyes’ statement. Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be admitted
was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the
nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes
made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the
statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.
Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been duly
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As
such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this instrument or
document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in
Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by Espineli to overcome such
Page 1295 of 1553

presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes’ sworn
statement as testified to by NBI Agent
Segunial.
2. No, the court may rely on circumstantial evidence to convict Espineli, as the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to Espineli, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the

1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in September 1996
clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red car used in the killing of
Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen
immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same car previously
sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered multiple
gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered guns, served as
corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way in establishing the level of
proof that the law requires in convicting Espineli.
Lastly, Espineli’s escape from detention while the case was pending can also be
considered as another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of the
alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same circumstances found
by the trial court and the appellate court, to have satisfied the requirement of Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken
together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that
Espineli was responsible for the killing of the victim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO

G.R. No. 194068, July 9, 2014, J. Perez
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than

one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime, it has been
Page 1296 of 1553

settled that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar
the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes accused’s
participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads
to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be
convicted.
Facts:
Benjie Consorte y Franco (Consorte) was a former conductor of Elizabeth Palmar’s
jeepney. Sometime in June 2000, Elizabeth’s residence was robbed and several personal
belongings, including cash, were taken. Consorte was the only one who had access to the
house, aside from Elizabeth’s family. When Elizabeth’s brother tailed Consorte, it was
found out that the latter pawned her jewelry set to Frederic Francisco. As such, Elizabeth
sued Consorte for robbery. Thereafter, a hearing was scheduled on January 23, 2001, but on
the night of January 22, 2001, Elizabeth was murdered.
On January 22, 2001, Jose Palmar, Elizabeth’s husband, instructed Rolando Visbe to
haul feeds from Morong, Rizal and deliver them to their piggery in Binangonan, Rizal. As
he was driving the jeepney, Rolando saw Elizabeth together with her 14-year old daughter
Myrna and her 3-year old nephew "Big Boy." They went with him to deliver the feeds to
Binangonan. On their way back to Morong, Rolando noticed Consorte who was wearing a
hat. When they got near him, Rolando slowed down and asked him where he was going.
The latter however did not reply. Rolando veered to the right to avoid hitting him. In the
process, the jeepney ran over a stone, lost its balance, and rolled into a ditch. While
struggling to release the vehicle, Rolando heard a gunshot. He looked around and saw
Consorte standing near the jeepney’s left rear, holding a handgun. The latter immediately
fled afterwards. Rolando then heard Myrna shouting "Ninong, may dugo si Nanay!" They
rushed Elizabeth to Angono District Hospital. But due to her fatal gunshot wound on the
forehead, she died.
Consorte was arrested the following day in Morong, Rizal while attending the
hearing of the robbery case against him. During the trial, Aneline Mendoza, a resident of
Greenpark, Cainta, Rizal, testified that on January 22, 2001, around 8:45 pm while on her
way home, a stranger greeted her "magandang gabi po." He was carrying something
wrapped in a black cloth which looked like a gun. She was somewhat frightened so she let
him walk ahead of her. She saw him turn to a corner. Immediately after she entered her
house, she heard a gunshot. She opened her window and saw the stranger, standing by the
side of the jeepney. The stranger immediately ran toward the direction of Elizabeth’s house.
On the other hand, Consorte interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that at around 8
or 9 o’clock in the evening of 22 January 2001, he was at his brother’s house in Antipolo. He
had dinner with his brother’s family and left at 10 o’clock in the evening, after his brother
Page 1297 of 1553

gave him P100.00 as fare. His sister-in-law corroborated his statement, testifying that
appellant was at their house on the questioned date from 5 to 10 p.m.
Eventually, the trial court found that the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution leaves no doubt that it was indeed Consorte who shot Elizabeth. The CA
dismissed the appeal on the ground that Consorte’s attack on the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Rolando Visbe and Aneline Mendoza has no merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Consorte shall be held liable for the crime of murder despite the
fact that the witnesses did not actually see him fire the fatal shot to Elizabeth.
Ruling:
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than
one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. All the foregoing elements were sufficiently established in this case. Here, two
witnesses established appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime and the fact that he
had, in his possession at that time, a gun. While, as pointed out by the CA, the said
witnesses did not actually see appellant fire the gun at Elizabeth, the circumstances
surrounding the incident, as enumerated by the CA, "unerringly points to him as the
perpetrator."
Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime. But
jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial
court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct
evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the
prosecution establishes Consorte’s participation in the crime through credible and
sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellant committed the imputed crime, the latter should be convicted. In the case at bar,
those circumstances were enumerated by the CA in its decision, as follows:
First. Appellant had an axe to grind against Elizabeth for filing a robbery case against
him. Elizabeth got murdered the night before the initial hearing of the case; Second.
Rolando saw appellant near the jeepney’s left rear, holding a gun, right after he heard a
gunshot; Third. Right before the incident, Aneline saw appellant holding something in his
hand wrapped in a black cloth, which looked like a gun; Fourth. Immediately after Aneline
entered her house, she heard a gunshot and when she peeped through the window, she saw
appellant standing by the side of the jeepney where Elizabeth’s lifeless body was sprawled.
Shortly after, Aneline saw appellant running towards the direction of Elizabeth’s house.
Fifth. Notably, appellant himself did not accuse Rolando and Aneline of any ill motive to
Page 1298 of 1553
falsely testify against him and cause his damnation for such a serious crime of murder.
Although he claims their loyalty belonged to the victim and her family, loyalty does not
equate with perjury, let alone, persecution of an innocent person. Settled is the rule that
when there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why the
prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a
serious offense, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR
REINARIO “REY” ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO A.K.A. “EDEL ESTONILO,”
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES A.K.A. “NONONG ITCOBANES,” NONOY ESTONILO-AT
LARGE, TITING BOOC-AT LARGE, GALI ITCOBANES-AT LARGE, ORLANDO
TAGALOG MATERDAM A.K.A. “NEGRO MATERDAM,” AND CALVIN DELA CRUZ
A.K.A. “BULLDOG DELA CRUZ”
G.R. No. 201565, October 13, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral facts
and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to
reason and common experience.
Facts:
A shooting incident happened at an elementary school in Masbate City. It resulted

to the death of District Supervisior Floro Casas. Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo and Mayor
Estonilo allegedly induced Edel, Nonong, and Calvin to kill the victim after the latter was
found to be supporting the opposite mayoralty candidate.
The prosecution presented 9 witnesses and among them is Serapion who testified
that he was on the scene when the crime was committed and he heard gunshots coming
from inside the compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or
less six persons coming out of the school; that he saw the six men approach Mayor Carlos,
Sr.’s vehicle, which was parked near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of
a house nearby; that upon reaching the vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos,
Sr. “mission accomplished, sir”; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to
escape, which they did using two motorbikes.
Antipolo was also presented as an eyewitness to the incident narrating the same set
of facts presented by Serapion. The defense of the accused was alibi. RTC found them to
be guilty. CA affirmed. Hence, this appeal.
Page 1299 of 1553

Issues:
1. Can the accused be convicted based on circumstantial evidence?
2. Can the defense of alibi be given credence?
Ruling:
1. Yes.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and

circumstantial evidence. The testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of
the commission of the crime.
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral
facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. Here, the circumstantial evidence consists
of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr.
ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was executed can be answered by relating
it to Antipolo’s eyewitness account as well as Serapion’s testimony.
2. No.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its
commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between
the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the
accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically
present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. Here,
the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. In fact,
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were
near the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing took
place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-
appellants at the school, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to
be, unnoticed.
Page 1300 of 1553

MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

A driver who is in-charge for the delivery of diesel to a client shall be liable for qualified
theft when he fails to return the vehicle to the office and the product itself was not delivered
to the client. Circumstantial evidence, as an exception, may prove the guilt of the accused
when there are multiple circumstances which were given.
Facts:
Viron Transport Corporation ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Unioil
Philippines. Candelaria was an employee of Unioil who was tasked to drive the vehicle
containing the fuel to Laon Laan, Manila. Viron then informed the owner of Unioil, Jesselyn
Lao, that the fuel has not been delivered yet. Lao attempted to communicate with
Candelaria but the latter failed to answer his phone. On the same day, Candelaria’s
colleague, Mario Romano (died before the resolution of the case) returned to the office of
Unioil and revealed that Candelaria pointed a balisong at him.
Lao filed an action against Candelaria for qualified theft. During the trial, it was
found out that Candelaria was truly the person tasked to deliver the fuel to Viron. In his
defense, Candelaria contended that Lao did not have any personal knowledge as to what
really happened with the fuel and that Romano’s testimony shall be considered hearsay due
to his untimely death.
The RTC found Candelaria guilty of qualified theft based on the circumstances that
he was the person tasked to deliver the fuel and that it was not received by Viron.
Candelaria raised the matter to the Court of Appeals arguing that he could not be convicted
based on circumstantial evidence. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC holding that
conviction need not always be based on direct evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Candelaria can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence
Ruling:
Yes, a person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
Page 1301 of 1553


doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must
exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.
Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant
circumstances in this case, as duly established by the prosecution’s evidence, amply justify
the conviction of Candelaria under the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. These circumstances are: (a) on August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000
liters of diesel fuel from Lao’s Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was given the task
of delivering the same to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano
left the company premises on the same day on board the lorry truck bearing plate number
PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the same
day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed to
reply to Lao’s phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office sans
Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported
the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently
found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil
since then.
Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture

that the crime of Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated
the same. To be sure, this determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelaria’s
companion, Romano, had died before he could testify as to the truth of his allegation that
the former had threatened him with a balisong on August 23, 2006.
NILO MACAYAN JR. y MALANA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015, J. Leonen
The prosecution has the task of establishing the guilt of the accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Facts:
Annie Uy Jao is the owner of Lanero Garments. In 1995, she hired Macayan as a
sample cutter and to undertake materials purchasing for her garments business. Jao
acknowledged that in 2000, when her business was doing poorly, she allowed her
Page 1302 of 1553
employees to accept engagements elsewhere to augment their income, provided they

prioritize their work at Lanero. It came to her attention that Macayan and his wife (also an
employee at Lanero) accepted work for a rival company. Thus, Jao confronted Macayan to
impress upon him the need to prioritize work at Lanero. Macayan still took his work at
Lanero for granted, so Jao confronted him again. Macayan then stopped reporting for work.
Following this, Jao was surprised to find out that Macayan had filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal against her. Thereafter, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family would
be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give him P200,000.00. Marjorie Angel, Jao’s
secretary, was supposedly present when she was threatened.
Fearing for her family’s safety, Jao sought assistance from the National Bureau of
Investigation. They then proceeded to McDonald’s EDSA and waited for Macayan, while
the NBI operatives waited outside. Macayan arrived and proceeded to where Jao and Angel
were seated. Jao handed him an envelope containing the marked bills. Macayan pulled the
bills halfway out of the envelope, and the NBI operatives accosted him.
According to Macayan’s version, On August 18, 2000, as his child was confined in a
hospital, Macayan inquired with Jao regarding his Medicare benefits. This displeased Jao.
The following day, she prevented him from performing his tasks at work. Construing this
as harassment, he stopped reporting for work. On February 16, 2001, at about 9:00 a.m.,
Angel called Macayan. She told him that Jao was ready to settle the illegal dismissal case.
The Information charging him with robbery dated February 20, 2001 was then prepared,
and the criminal case.
In the meantime, on October 31, 2001, the illegal dismissal case was decided in
Macayan’s favor by Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona. After trial, Macayan got
convicted of robbery. On July 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division increased the
duration of the penalty imposed.
Issue:
Whether or not Macayan’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No, it wasn’t.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum
of evidence in criminal cases. This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing
the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the
Page 1303 of 1553

weakness of the defense of an accused. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden,
it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.
Here, Macayan asserts that the lower courts committed a serious misapprehension
of facts, thereby wrongly concluding that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the resolution of this case hinges on
whether Jao was indeed threatened and/or intimidated by Macayan into giving him money,
that is, whether he extorted money from Jao. Jao’s absence in the intended conference
(though subsequently postponed despite both parties to the illegal dismissal case being
represented) places serious doubt on the occurrence of the supposed first instance of
intimidation on February 12, 2001. Here, there is serious doubt on whether Jao was actually
threatened or intimidated at the time she specified. Thus, there is serious doubt on the
existence of the fourth requisite for robbery — violence against or intimidation of a person
— in relation to the alleged February 12, 2001 incident.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON ABETONG y ENDRADO

G.R. No. 209785, June 4, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The presumption of regularity obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that
the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for
in the law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course. Thus, when it is clear that the police officers were
remiss in showing that they preserved the chain of custody when they failed to present the
testimony of the inspector who had the only keys to the evidence locker where the sachet of
shabu was kept, the presumption of regularity shall not apply.
Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC, charging accused-appellant Marlon Abetong
with a violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. For the
prosecution, PO3 Perez testified that he conducted a buy-bust operation on August 22,
2003 to purchase illegal drugs from accused-appellant Marlon Abetong. After Abetong
handed PO3 Perez a sachet of a white crystalline substance, the latter introduced himself
as a police officer and signaled his back up to arrest Abetong and his three companions.
The suspects attempted to flee but their plans were foiled by the timely arrival of the other
policemen. They were then brought to the police station where their arrest and the list of
the items confiscated from them were entered in the police blotter. From their arrest until
the items seized were transmitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, the pieces of evidence were allegedly under PO3 Perez’s custody. In his
Page 1304 of 1553
testimony, PO3 Perez stated that he kept the items inside the evidence locker in the Drug
Enforcement Unit Office, to which only Inspector Lorilla has a key.
On August 25, 2013, PO3 Perez brought the sachet containing crystalline substance
and the tooter to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. The items were received by
Inspector Augustina Ompoy (Inspector Ompoy), the Forensic Chemical Officer the PNP
Crime. Inspector Ompoy testified that after she received the pieces of evidence, she
performed the necessary examinations them. The tests revealed that the white crystalline
substance was positive for shabu.
Abetong argued that he was illegally arrested. He was at home, sweeping the floor
when suddenly, a male person entered the open door and held him by his pants. When
Abetong asked what his fault was, the man answered to just go with him. The person was
in civvies, fair skinned and tall; he did not introduce himself. Abetong was handcuffed
while they were at the foot-walk and searched, but nothing was recovered from him except
his money – P9.00. Hewas made to board a vehicle at Aguinaldo; three handcuffed persons
were inside. All four were brought to BAC-Up 2 and placed in a cell. Abetong was not
informed of the cause of his arrest; no drugs were presented to him. He knew of the charge
– Violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165 – only during arraignment in court.
The RTC convicted Abetong, and the CA affirmed the RTC.
Issues:
Was the prosecution incorrect in relying on the presumption of regularity to uphold

the credibility of the testimony of PO3 Perez?
Ruling:
The appeal is granted.
The CA erred in applying the doctrine that the testimony of a lone prosecution
witness, as long as it is credible and positive, can prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Such doctrine is unavailing in drugs cases wherein all who acquired
custody over the confiscated items would necessarily have to testify in order to establish
an unbroken chain. Additionally, worth noting is that PO3 Perez’s testimony is not
"virtually free from any form of inconsistency and contradictions as to besmirch it with
doubt and question" contrary to the CA’s findings. In fact, it can be gleaned from the
records that one of his key statements has been refuted by forensic chemist Ompoy herself.
Page 1305 of 1553

The prosecution cannot skirt the issue of the broken chain of custody by relying on
the presumption of regularity. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. Any
taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption
unavailable. The presumption, in other words, obtains only when nothing in the records
suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty
as provided for in the law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as
in this case, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course.
BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. vs. SPOUSES ENRIQUE GABRIEL LOCSIN and
MA. GERALDINE R. LOCSIN
It is a settled rule that, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength
of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This
principle holds true especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence
because of a default order, as in the present case. The petitioner is not automatically entitled
to the relief prayed for. The pieces of documents presented by BDO are not only self-serving
but are not supported by sufficient and credible evidence. BDO failed to meet its burden of
proving its claims by preponderance of evidence.
Facts:
For failure to pay, BDO extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages which served as
security of the two loans the Spouses Locsins obtained from BDO. At the auction sale, BDO
was declared as the highest bidder with a bid of Three Million Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Six Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P3,879,406.80) for the properties.
On 5 February 1999, BDO sent a letter to the Locsins demanding the payment of an
additional One Million Two Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Six Pesos
and Twenty-One Centavos (P1,259,166.21), representing an alleged deficiency on the
foreclosure after deducting from the bid price all expenses for foreclosure and registration
of the certificate of sale. However, according to the Bid Statement prepared by BDO's legal
counsel, the deficiency was not P1,259,166.21 but only One Million One Hundred Forty Four
Thousand Eighty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P1,144,089.84)
On 29 November 1999, BDO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City the instant action for Collection of a Sum of Money against the Locsins,
Page 1306 of 1553

praying that the latter be ordered to pay the deficiency of P1,144,089.84. The court declared
the Spouses Locsin in default and ordered BDO to present evidence ex parte.
Among the evidence presented by BDO was a Statement of Account showing that
the Locsins' original deficiency of P1,144,089.84 had ballooned to P3,709,961.00 by 24
November 2006. The Statement of Account appears to have been prepared by a certain
Pham Arcenal, checked by Evelyn Magdangan and noted by Paul Gasatan, Senior Manager-
LAMU. However, none of these people were presented by BDO to properly identify the
document. Only BDO's Vice-President, Ms. Agnes C. Tuason, testified on the allegations of
the complaint.
The Statement of Account shows how BDO arrived at the figure of P3,709,961.00.
On February 20, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner. The RTC held
that based on the testimony of petitioner's VicePresident, as “supported by competent and
relevant documentary evidence, the veracity of which is unchallenged, petitioner's
allegations stand uncontroverted.”
Aggrieved, respondents filed an appeal with the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA
ruled that BDO failed to prove its claims by a preponderance of evidence. Thus, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC decision and, accordingly, dismissed petitioner's complaint.
Issue:
Whether the CA committed grave and reversible error in ruling that petitioner BDO
failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence its right to recover the deficiency amount.
Ruling:
Petitioner presented the following as bases for its claim for the recovery of the
alleged deficiency amount: (1) Application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure; (2) Amended
Application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure; (3) Bid Statement; (4) Statement of Account; (5)
Official Receipts for foreclosure expenses. However, the Court agrees with the CA that
these pieces of documents are not only self-serving but are not supported by sufficient and
credible evidence. These are just summaries of respondents' alleged unpaid obligations.
The Court also notes that the figures contained in some of these documents contradict each
other. In the Application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure and the Amended Application for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure, the total principal sum owed by respondents is P3,200,000.00;
however, in its Bid Statement the principal sum owed is P2,949,035.59. Petitioner failed to
explain this discrepancy.
Page 1307 of 1553

More importantly, petitioner failed to submit supporting documents and

testimonies to prove and explain the figures appearing in its Bid Statement and Statement
of Account. In addition, the legal fees (Filing Fee, Sheriff's Fee, Sheriff's Commission,
Publication Fee) totaling P117,157.00 which were supposed to be paid by petitioner, are not
supported by official receipts. The Official Receipts submitted as evidence only account for
filing fees in the amount of P6,288.
Moreover, nothing on record would show that the testimony of petitioner's Vice-
President, who was petitioner's sole witness, explained how petitioner arrived at the figures
which supposedly represented the deficiency amount which it seeks to recover. In fact, as
the CA correctly observed, both the Bid Statement and the Statement of Account were
prepared by persons other than petitioner's Vice-President. However, these persons were
not presented in court as competent witnesses who could have properly identified,
authenticated and explained the contents of the said documents. Neither was there any
showing that the Vice-President witnessed the preparation of these documents or that the
persons who prepared them acknowledged to her such preparation or that she recognizes
the signatures of the persons who prepared the same. Thus, both the Bid Statement and
Statement of Account have no proven real basis and, thus, could not be taken at face value.
It is a settled rule that, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense.
This principle holds true especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present
evidence because of a default order, as in the present case. The petitioner, as plaintiff below,
is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some
measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by
the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving
it and a mere allegation is not evidence In the present case, the Court agrees with the CA
that petitioner failed to meet its burden of proving its claims by preponderance of evidence,
as discussed above.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSALINDA CASABUENA

This Court stress that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. Where the
official act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can arise. The
Page 1308 of 1553

presumption obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law
enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the
law. This Court also find it highly unusual that the police would allow a civilian walk-in
informant like Armando to transact with Casabuena on his own.
Facts:
The prosecution charged the Casabuena with illegal sale of shabu under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. That Casabuena, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell in a buy bust operation to Armando Joaquin acting as the poseur-buyer
0.0139 gram of shabu, a dangerous drug, contained in one plastic sachet, without any
license or authority to sell the same. The Casabuena was duly arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the charge laid.
SPO1 Balolong testified that on February 4, 2004, one of the police informants,
Armando, went to the Laoag City Police Station and informed him that the Casabuena was
selling shabu in Barangay 5. Acting on this information, the city’s chief of police formed an
entrapment team. The team conducted a ‘briefing’, assigned Armando as the poseur-buyer,
and then went to the target area. When the team arrived there, they positioned themselves
15 meters from the Casabuena’s compound. Armando followed them after receiving a call
from SPO1 Balolong. Armando entered the Casabuena’s house when he arrived; he went
out after two (2) minutes and made the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the
buy-bust team. Once inside, Armando handed the sachet of shabu to SPO1 Balolong.
Armando then led the police to the bathroom, and there, Armando grabbed the left hand
of the Casabuena. SPO1 Balolong, for his part, “forced open” Casabuena’s right hand and
took two P100 bills from her. SPO1 Balolong informed the Casabuena of her constitutional
rights, and then ordered PO1 Mangapit to arrest her.
The police then brought the Casabuena and the seized items to the Laoag City Police
Station. When they arrived there, SPO1 Balolong submitted the seized items to SPO2
Loreto Ancheta, the evidence custodian who, in turn, marked these items. On cross
examination, SPO1 Balolong stated that Armando was just a “walk-in” informant. SPO1
Balolong also admitted that he did not witness the transaction between Armando and the
Casabuena since he was outside the latter’s house. P/Sr. Insp. Cayabyab, the Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Laoag City, stated that, Merlita Pasion,
the laboratory’s receiving clerk, handed to her a letter-request and a small plastic sachet
containing alleged shabu. She put her initials on the sachet, made an initial preliminary
examination on the submitted specimen, and found it positive for the presence of 0.0139
gram of shabu. She conducted a confirmatory test on the specimen, and this test yielded
the same result. The results of these two tests were reflected in the Initial Laboratory Report
Page 1309 of 1553

and in Chemistry Report. With regard to the marked money, SPO2 Ancheta claimed that
he noted their respective serial numbers, and then placed them in a steel cabinet. He
maintained that the item presented to him was the same item given to him by SPO1
Balolong because it bore the markings he made.
The Defense version states that Abian recalled that at around 11:00 a.m. on February
4, 2004, he was in front of the gate of the Casabuena’s house when Armando approached
him and asked if there was any available shabu, and whether his aunt was selling shabu.
When he answered in the negative, Abian asked him for his aunt’s identity. Abian pointed
to the Casabuena – who was then near the bathroom. Thereafter, the Casabuena called
Abian and asked him to buy a shampoo. Abian did as instructed and bought shampoo.
When he returned, he handed the shampoo to the Casabuena who, in turn, went inside the
bathroom. Afterwards, SPO1 Balolong went to the bathroom, kicked the door open, and
asked the Casabuena where the money was. When the Casabuena answered that there was
no money, SPO1 Balolong pulled her out of the bathroom. The police asked Casabuena to
put her clothes on, and then brought her to the police headquarters. According to the
Casabuena, the police did not sign any confiscation receipt. She maintained that she did
not sell shabu to Armando on February 4, 2004. The RTC found the Casabuena guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA held that the prosecution was able to prove that the appellant sold shabu to the
poseur-buyer.
Issue:
Whether or not there is presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official

Duties in the present case.
Ruling:
No, there is no presumption in the present case.
Finally, this Court stress that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty.
Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can
arise. The presumption obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact
that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as
provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face,
an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. There is indeed merit in the contention
that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members
Page 1310 of 1553

of the buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly
performed their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the
conduct of police duty was irregular.
We also find it highly unusual that the police would allow a civilian walk-in
informant like Armando to transact with Casabuena on his own. During the sale, all the
police officers were positioned outside Casabuena’s house, such that Armando even had to
step out of the house in order to give the pre-arranged signal to them. SPO1 Balolong also
admitted that he did not witness the Casabuena hand the shabu to the poseur buyer. While
police are given wide leeway in the manner of conducting their entrapment operations, the
ideal scenario would have been to have a member of the police act as a poseur buyer, so
that a member of the police could be part of, and be a witness to, the transaction.
While buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due regard
for constitutional and legal safeguards, we remind the courts to be extra vigilant in trying
drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses. Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the
crucible of a severe testing, and the presumption of innocence requires them to take a more
than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the
accused.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANGEL LIWAGON AND FRANCESA DUMALAGAN, et al. vs.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES DEMETRIO LIWAGON AND REGINA LIWAGON
G.R. No. 193117, November 26, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
By law, a notarial document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It enjoys
the presumption of regularity and is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein – which
may only be overcome by evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. Without such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. Thus, if the validity
of a notarized deed of sale is being assailed by the heirs of the seller on the ground that the
seller’s signature was forged, the testimony of one of the heirs to that effect, absent any clear
and convincing evidence to corroborate the claim will not be enough to overcome the
presumption of validity.
Facts:
Petitioners and respondents are all children and grandchildren of the late spouses
Angel and Francisca Liwagon. One of Angel’s sons named Demetrio, together with his wife
Regina, stayed with the former and administered the a portion of the Y. Furukawa
plantation that Angel bought from the plantation. The respondents – who are all
Page 1311 of 1553

Demetrio’s children – helped with the cultivation and took care of the family’s copra-
making business.
Upon Angel’s demise, Demetrio’s siblings demanded the partition of the land, but
the same was delayed. When both Demetrio and Regina died, the siblings demanded the
partition anew from one of Demetrio’s sons named Rodrigo. Rodrigo ignored the demand,
contending that they now owned the property as inheritance from Demetrio and Regina,
who had earlier lawfully acquired the land by purchase from their grandfather, as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale which was executed before a notary public dated 24 July 1972. As heirs of
Angel and Francisca, the petitioners sought for annulment of the sale, partition, accounting
and damages against the defendants-heirs of Spouses Demetrio and Regina.
Petitioners presented the testimony of Josefina Liwagon-Escauso before the RTC,

who testified that she is the attorney-in-fact of petitioners and respondents are her
nephews from her brother Demetrio. She testified, among others, that the signature
appearing on the assailed Deed of Sale is not the signature of her father, and that his father’s
true signature is the one found on the Application for the sales patent.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of merit, finding that that
petitioners failed to disprove the genuineness of the signature of Angel in the purported
Deed of Sale which was duly executed before a notary public. Thus, the RTC held that the
authenticity of the document must be upheld under the doctrine of presumption of
regularity. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Were the petitioners able to prove that Angel’s signature in the Deed of Sale was
forged?
Ruling:
Both the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled in favor of the due execution of
the subject Deed of Sale which was duly acknowledged and recorded by Atty. Alfredo
Abayon in his notarial registry. It is a rule in our jurisdiction that the act of notarization by
a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. By law, a notarial document is entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. It enjoys the presumption of regularity and is a prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein – which may only be overcome by evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Without such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld. Petitioners failed to overcome this presumption. In the case
Page 1312 of 1553

at bar, a single fact fatal to the cause of petitioners is clear: that aside from the sole
testimony of petitioner Josefina that the signature appearing in the assailed Deed of Sale is
not that of her father, no clear, positive and convincing evidence was shown to corroborate
such claim. The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Josefina in its ruling on
the issue.
The Court reiterated in Tapuroc v. Loquellano Vda. de Mende that forgery cannot be
presumed and it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Its mere
allegation is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. The Court
held in that case that the bare denial of therein petitioners that their predecessors-in-
interest signed the subject Deed of Sale did not suffice to overcome the presumption of
regularity of notarized documents.
The contention of petitioners must fail that a “visual comparison” of Angel’s

signatures in the purported Deed of Sale and in his Application with the Bureau of Lands
and Affidavit would reveal “that the signature in the Deed of Sale was not genuine.” Not
only did petitioners fail to present clear, positive and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity in favor of the assailed document, they merely stated these two
sentences in this petition for review to support their claim of forgery via a visual
comparison of two signatures.
BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MINDA G.

ROSALES(NOW REPRESENTED BY HER NEW ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, GARY LLOYD
G. ROSALES) vs. SPOUSES VICTOREY ANTONIO GARABATO AND JOSEPHINE S.
GARABATO
G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015, J. Villarama
The RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that the Gepulle-Garbo failed to prove the fact
of forgery. The Supreme Court ruled that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established by a
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of
the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
Facts:
Nick Garbo (Nick) was married to Eduviges Garabato (Eduviges) sometime before
1978. During their marriage, they had a daughter named Florence Garabato (Florence) who
Page 1313 of 1553

in turn had a son out of wedlock, respondent Victorey Antonio Garabato (Victorey). During
the subsistence of Nick and Eduviges’ marriage, Nick cohabited with petitioner Betty
Gepulle-Garbo (Betty).
In 1996, respondent Victorey, married to co-respondent Josephine, registered the

subject property in his name by virtue of a Deed of Sale9 executed by Florence in his favor.
On October 15, 1996, respondent was issued TCT No. 136900. On August 2, 2001, petitioner
filed a petition for cancellation of TCT No. 136900 against respondents. She impugns the
validity of the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale on the ground that the signatures of Nick and
Eduviges were forged by Florence. Petitioner also assailed the deed of sale between
Florence and Victorey.
Garbo claimed that Nick had previously sought the examination of his alleged
signature on the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The NBI examiner allegedly found that the questioned signature and the standard
signatures of Nick were not written by one and the same person. Garbo further alleged that
Nick had filed a criminal complaint for falsification against Florence though the case was
dismissed due to lack of probable cause. In addition, Garbo averred that on February 6,
1993, Nick wrote a letter to respondent Victorey reminding him that the subject property
was his despite the transfer of title. Garbo prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 136900
and the issuance of a new certificate of title in her name.
Victorey and Josephine denied the allegation of forgery. They raise that the action
had prescribed and/or barred by laches. Further they claimed that Betty has no cause of
action as the subject property is the paraphernal property of Eduviges. Lastly, they assert
that the sale was regular, valid and genuine. They asserted that the signatures appearing
on the deeds of sale are true and genuine signatures of the parties including Nick Garbo.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for cancellation of title filed by Garbo. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling that Garbo failed to prove by clear, positive and convincing proof
of forgery in Nick’s signature in the deed of sale. Hence, the current petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Garbo was able to prove the fact of forgery.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Page 1314 of 1553

The issue raised by petitioner is essentially factual in nature, the determination of

which is best left to the courts below. Well settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts.The function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. As a matter of
sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings
of trial courts, more so, when as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court.
Stated otherwise, the Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts,
more so when those findings are affirmed by the CA. To do otherwise would defeat the very
essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which is not meant to
be. Certainly the rule admits exceptions none, however, is applicable to the case at bar.
Absent any application of any of the recognized exceptions, this Court is bound by the
findings of fact by the lower courts.
In any event, Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of
proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue
by the amount of evidence required by law.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges
forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged
signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized to have been forged.
In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church,

USA, the Court identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and
comparison of handwritings:
The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its

general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the
strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned
signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former’s
authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the
benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There
are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer,
the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is
written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or
paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature.
Page 1315 of 1553

Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of
direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned
handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.
The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the
expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form
its own opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is
mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently
existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination
of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.
Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the manner of
examination of the specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not point
out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and
false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection by an
untrained observer. The Court also aptly ruled that courts are not bound by expert
testimonies especially that the examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and
they had complete control on what documents and specimens to be examined by the NBI.
Betty, in coming before us, had the onus of showing that the signatures were forged. She
fell short of demonstrating that her case fell within the limited exceptions for disturbing
conclusiveness of factual findings of lower courts.
The petitioner having not shown any reason for us to disturb the ruling of the
courts a quo, we are constrained to affirm the decision of the CA.
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015, J. Velasco, Jr.

circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the
guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other
person has committed the crime. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the Supreme Court finds
that the prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the Zabala
of the offense charged. We find that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court fail
Page 1316 of 1553

to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.
Facts:
An Information was filed against Kyle Anthony Zabala (Zabala) before the RTC,
Branch 22, Malolos City, charging him with theft.
When arraigned, Zabala pleaded “not guilty.” Trial on the merits ensued. During the
trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the complaining witness, Randolph Alas
(Alas), and Zabala’s alleged former girlfriend, Marlyn Piñon (Piñon). On the other hand,
the defense presented the testimonies of Zabala and of one Muriel John Ganas (Ganas), his
alleged companion on the day that the incident took place.
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that Zabala is a jeepney driver
who earns Two Hundred Pesos (P200) to Four Hundred Pesos (P400) per day on an
alternate day basis. Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at the Manila City Hall. It is
through this job that he was able to save the Sixty-Eight Thousand Pesos (P68,000) stolen
by Zabala. Piñon, on the other hand, had been the girlfriend of Zabala for about five
months when the incident pertinent to this case occurred.
Alas testified that he and Zabala were neighbors in San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan.
As neighbors, he had treated Zabala as his kumpare and would often invite the latter to
drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he would also call Zabala to repair his vehicle,
because Zabala is also a mechanic. He would allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to
get cash whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repair of his vehicle.
Alas further testified that on June 18, 2007, at about 4:00 in the morning, he left his
house to go to work. When he returned from work, at around 11:00 in the evening, he
discovered that his money amounting to Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (P68,000), which he
kept in an envelope inside his closet, was missing. During that time, there were only five
(5) persons living in their house: Alas, his parents, his nine (9) year-old son, and his aunt.
He asked his parents and aunt if they knew where he kept his money, but they did not
know.
Witness Piñon, on the other hand, testified that in the early morning of June 18,
2007, she and Zabala, her boyfriend at the time, were together at a store owned by the
latter, which was six to seven steps away from the complainant’s house. She then saw Zabala
climb the fence and scale the tree in front of the complainant’s house, and enter the house.
When he returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket, which she later found to
Page 1317 of 1553

be a plentiful sum of money. Zabala then brought her home, and agreed to meet her again
at about 10:00 in the morning. They then went to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two
Nokia mobile phones, which cost about Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P8,500).
For his defense, Zabala testified that in the early morning of June 17, 2007, he was
driving his passenger jeepney, together with his friend, witness Ganas. They parted ways at
around 6:00 in the morning of the following day. During the whole time they were together,
they did not drop by the house of the private complainant. Neither did he have the time to
meet Marilyn Piñon, of whom he regarded only as an acquaintance and not his girlfriend.
Witness Ganas corroborated the declaration of Zabala. He testified that he was with
Zabala, acting as the conductor, while Zabala was plying the route of his driven jeepney.
He had known Zabala since his childhood, and was his good friend.
On July 7, 2011, the RTC rendered its Judgment convicting Zabala of the offense
charged.
In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on July 15, 2013, the CA denied the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court, but with modification as to the penalty
to be imposed upon Zabala. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant through circumstantial evidence.
Zabala moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed Resolution, the CA denied it.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish Zabala’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No.
Prosecution was not able to establish the guilt of Zabala beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of theft.
Given that the case for the prosecution is largely based on circumstantial evidence,
a short discussion on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict an accused is in
order.
Page 1318 of 1553

It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction,

and that direct evidence is not always necessary. This is but a recognition of the reality that
in certain instances, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime, it is not always possible
to obtain direct evidence.

circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to
a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as
the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the Supreme Court finds that the prosecution
failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the Zabala of the offense
charged. We find that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court fail to provide
a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where the money amounting
to 68,000 was allegedly kept and hidden. It is interesting to note that while Alas testified
that there were other persons living in that house, i.e. his family members, the prosecution
failed to put any of them on the witness stand, to testify that they saw or heard something
out of the ordinary at the time the incident allegedly took place, or to explain why nobody
else was able to notice that the theft took place while Alas was absent. Witness Piñon,
meanwhile, merely testified that she saw Zabala scale the fence of Alas’ house and enter it.
She did not actually see Zabala enter the room of Alas, where the money was hidden.
Second, the evidence presented below is insufficient to determine without a

reasonable doubt that the 68,000 in cash was lost due to felonious taking, and, more
importantly, that it was Zabala who committed the felonious taking. Even if believed in its
entirety, the testimony of witness Piñon does not show that when Zabala left the house of
Alas, he was carrying the 68,000 in cash which was supposedly lost. All that Piñon saw was
the bulge in Zabala’s pockets. Piñon’s testimony can considered as evidence to prove that
when Zabala entered the house of Alas, he did so because of his intent to commit
asportation.
Third, Pifion's testimony fails to establish that Alas' pocket indeed contained the
stolen money, as she never actually saw what was inside the pocket of Zabala. While she
testified that later that day, they went to buy 2 cellphones amounting to P8,500, she failed
to testify whether the money that Zabala used in paying for the cellphone was retrieved
from the very same bulging pocket which she saw earlier in the day, which would have led
Page 1319 of 1553

to the conclusion that Zabala's pocket contained money. Failing this, what is left is the fact
that Pifion saw a bulge in Zabala's pocket, and there is no evidence whatsoever to prove
that his pocket in fact was used to hide the money that he allegedly stole. The trial and
appellate courts committed error in accepting as fact that Zabala's pocket contained
money, when there is a dearth of evidence to support such allegation.
And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must
exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime. In the case here,
however, the prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was impossible for some
other person to have committed the crime of theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to
adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside
the house of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of
Alas. Alas himself admitted that there were other residents in the house, but these persons
were never presented to prove their whereabouts at the time the incident took place. This
failure of the prosecution leads the Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to
establish that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to some other person.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO LUJECO

It has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and
crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. It should be noted that for
alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when
the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him
to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. As
testified by Lujeco, he was at the public market of Don Carlos, Bukidnon. Undoubtedly, it was
not impossible for him to be at the crime scene.
Facts:
AAA was playing with her friends near the old market at Don Carlos, Bukidnon,
which was about 20 meters away from her house. After her playmates left, appellant
Antonio Lujeco (Lujeco) suddenly grabbed AAA and dragged her to the house of his
granddaughter which was located nearby. Inside the house, appellant forcibly undressed
AAA, poked a knife at her, and then had carnal knowledge of her. After satiating his lust,
appellant Lujeco told “AAA” to go home.
Page 1320 of 1553

Thereafter, Lujeco was charged with the crime of statutory rape. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals properly convicted Lujeco of statutory rape defined under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code. Lujeco interposed the defense of alibi.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the fact that
during the time that the alleged rape was committed, he was at another place.
Ruling:
No. The appeal is dismissed.
As regards Lujeco’s contention that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him
despite the fact that during the time that the alleged rape was committed, he was at the
public market of Don Carlos, the Court finds the same wanting in merit.
It has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and
crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. It should be noted that for
alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when
the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him
to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. As
testified by Lujeco, he was at the public market of Don Carlos, Bukidnon. Undoubtedly, it
was not impossible for him to be at the crime scene.
The elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and, (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age or is demented. In this case, the
prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA. It was
also established beyond reasonable doubt that AAA was below 12 years of age.
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

[RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II,
RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a

respondent’s malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting versions of complainant and respondent, the
Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her
Page 1321 of 1553

witnesses who testified clearly and consistently before the Investigating Judge. In the instant
case, the strongest corroborative evidence to support complainant Emilie’s allegations was
the exchange of text messages between her and respondent Pecaña regarding the dinner
meeting. These text messages were admitted by respondent Pecaña.
Facts:
Emilie Emilie Sison-Barias (Emilie) is involved in three cases pending before the sala
of respondent Judge Marino Rubia. In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and part of the estate of Emilie’s husband was involved.
Emilie alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition
for issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother,
Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a
data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna.
Emilie, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr., met with
respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010. During this meeting, Emilie informed respondent
Pecaña of the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. She then asked respondent Pecaña to check the status of the publication
of the notice. Respondent Pecaña asked for Emilie’s number so that she could inform her
as soon as any development takes place in the case. Enrique and Perlitoexecuted affidavits
to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecaña asked Emilie to meet her again at her house in Biñan, Laguna.
Emilie went there with Enrique. Respondent Pecaña then informed Emilie that she could
no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration of the
properties to Evelyn Tanael.
Emilie stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael
because these concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias. She
was only concerned with the administration of the properties of her late husband, to which
respondent Pecaña replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."
Emilie alleged that respondent Pecaña sent her a text message on March 2,
2010 asking Emilie to call her. Emilie called respondent Pecaña who informed her that
respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her. Emilie agreed to meet with respondent Judge
Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaña would be present as well.
Page 1322 of 1553

On March 3, 2010 at around 7:00 p.m, Emilie picked up respondent Pecaña. They
proceeded to Café Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said that
respondent Judge Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club
meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.
During the dinner meeting, respondents allegedly asked Emilie inappropriate

questions. Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still connected with
Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. Emilie was then informed that
respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias
Almeda-Barias. This disclosure surprised Emilie, as she was under the impression that
opposing counsel and respondent JudgeRubia had no business discussing matters that were
not relevant to their pending cases.
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed
involvement with another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-
Barias. She was asked about the hospital where she brought her husband at the time of his
cardiac arrest.
These details, according to Emilie, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the
course of the trial. Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the
opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court proceedings. The impression
of Emilie was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in favor of Atty.
Zarate.
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told Emilie to just talk to Atty.
Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Emilie was appalled by
such suggestion and replied[,] ‘Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un.’
Even before he left, she alleged that respondent Judge Rubia had made insinuations
that she was awaiting the company of another man. From then on, Emilie and respondents
did not communicate and/or meet outside the courtroom until August 8, 2010.
In the meantime, Emilie alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that
showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-
Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate.
Emilie enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of

respondent Judge Rubia. Emilie admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner
meeting she had with respondents. It was Enrique who allegedly told Emilie’s lawyers about
it when he went to the lawyer’s office to pay some bills. Emilie said that her lawyer
Page 1323 of 1553

immediately admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge Rubia. Emilie
then texted respondent Pecaña on August 8, 2010 on her lawyer’s reaction concerning the
March 3, 2010 meeting.
On September 15, 2010, Emilie moved for respondent Judge Rubia’s inhibition. This
was denied on October 6, 2010. Emilie then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an
order dated November 15, 2010.
On November 11, 2010, Emilie filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of the
Court Administrator charging respondent Pecaña for gross misconduct and respondent
Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct. The Office of the Court Administrator
referred the complaint to respondents for comment.
On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative
complaint to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Samuel H. Gaerlan.
Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012. In his
report, Justice Gaerlan recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents. He
was "convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter" and found
that Emilie failed to prove her claim with substantial evidence that would justify the
imposition of a penalty on respondents. The Office of the Court Administrator referred the
report to this court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held

administratively liable.
Ruling:
This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel
Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable for
their actions.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a

respondent’s malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence,
i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
Page 1324 of 1553

support a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting versions of Emilie and respondent,
the Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of the Emilie and her
witnesses who testified clearly and consistently before the Investigating Judge.
After scrutinizing the testimony of Emilie and the evidence she presented to support
her allegations, we find her account of the event to be genuine and believable. Emilie’s
narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading
up to the dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by
Emilie that took place with respondents during the meeting was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support Emilie’s allegations was the

exchange of text messages between Emilie and respondent Pecaña regarding the dinner
meeting. These text messages were admitted by respondent Pecaña. However, Justice
Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact was not
included in his investigation report
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to greet
respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court
employees should not have any dealings with litigants, respondent Pecaña should not have
gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.
The odds that Emilie and respondent Pecaña would meet respondent Judge Rubia
by pure coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons
may take place, but a chance meeting between a litigant in the company of a court
employee who acceded to assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is
outside the realm of common experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one
in a million. The sheer improbability of such an occurrence already puts into question the
truth of respondents’ allegations.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOJO SUMILHIG, ET AL

There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Mario’s identification of the appellants

considering that (1) Jerry was just six meters away from them; (2) the moon was bright and
Jerry was familiar with all the accused as most of them are his relatives; and (3) Mario knows
Jojo ever since he was small. Besides, time- tested is the rule that between the positive
assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former
undisputedly deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight. Anent the
respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of a credible witness.
Page 1325 of 1553

Facts:
On October 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry), together with
Eugenio Santander (Eugenio) and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenio’s house
in Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun bursts and saw six persons firing at
the kitchen where members of the Santander family were having dinner. Jerry and Mario
recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused. The strafing of the
kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted, “At last,
I have retaliated!”
In the aftermath, the children of Eugenio’s other son Remegio Santander

(Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy, 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel, sustained
gunshot wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while
Rolly was pronounced dead-on-arrival. Marissa sustained gunshot wounds at the right
breast area and left wrist, while Micel was wounded in the left sternal area and elbow.
Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio
Limama, were later charged with double murder and double frustrated murder. Only Jojo,
Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of “not guilty” during their arraignment,
aced trial. The other accused could not be located and remain at-large to this day.
The RTC convicted the appellants. On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC.
Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill feelings and
vendetta Jojo harbored against the Santander family. They contend that this motive for
committing the crime is not a substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover,
Jojo’s alibi that it was impossible for him to be at the crime scene due to the gunshot
wounds in his knee and anus is amply corroborated by a medical prognosis. Appellants
likewise question the finding of conspiracy and treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC, affirmed by the appellate court is correct in convicting
the appellants.
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC, affirmed by the appellate court, is correct in convicting the appellants.
Page 1326 of 1553

The appeal has no merit. Appellants’ conviction was based on their positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses. Assessing the evidence presented by both
prosecution and defense, we see a less than glaring hint of vendetta. As part of his defense,
the accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred by Jerry Santander,
brother of Remigio Santander in February 1998. Short of admitting the crime, Sumilhig
stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against Jerry and Carlos
Santander but also against their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the Santander family
has been established giving credence to prosecution witnesses’ allegation that after the
strafing Jojo Sumilhig shouted “Nakabalos na ko!” The likelihood of his intention to wipe
out the said family became even more apparent. Despite his positive assertion that it was
the Santanders that killed his family, he did not file any case against them. It was only after
he was arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos Santander.
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as Dr.
Quirapas appeared determined to rule out the possibility that he could walk without
crutches five months after his discharge, the same was based on general medical prognosis.
Such prognostication admits certain exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony
of the doctor himself that the healing period may vary depending on the age and phys cal
condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old. What was certain
was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander of all of
the accused.
DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN vs. ATTY. CASAN MACABANDING

A.C. No. 7919, October 8, 2014, J. REYES
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is

preponderance of evidence. When the complainant adduced preponderant evidence that his
signature was indeed forged in an affidavit which the respondent notarized and submitted to
the COMELEC, respondent should be held administratively liable for his action.
Facts:
Domado Disomimba Sultan (Sultan) ran for the position of Mayor for the
Municipality of Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur in 2007. Sultan filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) dated March 29, 2007 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
for the May 14, 2007 elections. Thereafter, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of
Candidacy for Municipal Mayor (Affidavit of Withdrawal) dated April 10, 2007 was
notarized and submitted by the Atty. Casan Macabanding (Atty. Casan) to the COMELEC,
withdrawing the complainant’s candidacy without the latter’s knowledge or authorization.
When the Sultan learned of this, he wrote a letter dated April 18, 2007 and submitted an
Page 1327 of 1553
Affidavit to the Acting Election Officer of the COMELEC in Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del
Sur alleging that he neither executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody
to prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal be ignored and
that his name be retained on the list of candidates.
On May 16, 2007, Sultan filed a petition with the COMELEC to count the votes cast
in his favor. The COMELEC Second Division found merit in Sultan’s petition and ordered
the reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates for the position of mayor in its
Resolution dated June 12, 2007. All votes cast in favor of the complainant were also counted.
Thus, Mariano elevated the matter to the COMELEC en banc, which issued a subpoena
requiring the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to study the signature appearing on
the Affidavit of Withdrawal. Subsequently, the NBI stated that the signature in the Affidavit
of Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant were not written by one
and the same person. Hence, Sultan filed the present administrative complaint against the
Atty. Casan with prayer for his disbarment.
On the other hand, Atty. Casan countered that the administrative case was filed
against him as political harassment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation.
After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner issued a report recommending

"that Atty. Casan be suspended from the active practice of law for six (6) months and two
(2) years as notary public," which the IBP Board of Governors adopted in a resolution
suspending Atty. Casan from practice of law doe six (6) months and from notarial practice
for two (2) years. Atty. Casan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP Board of
Governors denied.
Issue:
Whether Sultan was able to sufficiently prove his claims against Atty. Casan making
the latter administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Casan is liable.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is

preponderance of evidence. In Rodica v. Lazaro, the Court expounded: In Siao v. Atty. De
Guzman, Jr., this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in suspension or disbarment
Page 1328 of 1553

proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence.
Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court declared thus:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance
of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity ofknowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean
that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
The complainant adduced preponderant evidence that his signature was indeed
forged in an affidavit which Atty. Casan notarized and submitted to the COMELEC.
Consequently, Atty. Casan should be held administratively liable for his action. "Where the
notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of
his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession." "It should be noted that a notary public’s function should not be
trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed
with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to;
most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves tobe part of illegal
transactions." In fact, Atty. Casan admitted that the affidavit was notarized in his office
without the presence of the complainant.
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the penalties meted out against a lawyer

commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such are: the
revocation of notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Thus, Atty. Casan Macabanding is found administratively liable for misconduct and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Further, his notarial commission,
if any, is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a
Page 1329 of 1553

period of two (2) years, with a stem warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
ANTONIO DALURAYA vs. MARLA OLIVA

The term “reasonable doubt” is not equivalent to the phrase “the act from which
criminal responsibility may arise did not at all exist.” Although both have the force of
acquittal, the latter provides connotes that the accused have not committed the offense.
Facts:
Daluraya allegedly while driving his car hit Marina Oliva, the mother of Marla. As a
result, Daluraya was charged of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. In his defense,
Daluraya raised that he was never positively identified as the driver of the car and filed a
demurrer to evidence.
The MTC granted the demurrer. Marla filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. On appeal to the RTC, the court affirmed the decision of the MTC holding
that the act from which criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist. Undaunted,
Marla elevated the matter to the CA which reversed the rulings of MTC and RTC and ruled
that Daluraya admitted that he hit Marina and that based on the police blotter, he was
identified as the suspect.
Issue:
Whether or not CA correctly overturned the decision of the MTC and RTC
Ruling:
No. In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state
“whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show
that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish
that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and
categorical when the MeTC declared that “the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
Page 1330 of 1553

wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely
committed the crime charged against him.”37 Furthermore, when Marla sought
reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly
clarified that “the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of
the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva”38 and that “there is no competent
evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death
of Marina Oliva.”
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed
by the RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would
necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s
evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the
fact that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist” in view
of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime
ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by
the nature of such acquittal.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM AND THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD. vs.
GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD.
It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the
foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our local or domestic law. This is
known as processual presumption. While the foreign law was properly pleaded in the case at
bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court. While a photocopy of the foreign statute relied upon by the court a quo to
relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the trial, the same
however was not accompanied by the required attestation and certification.
Facts:
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam is a foreign corporation engaged in the business of

carrying goods by sea, whose vessels regularly call at the port of Manila. It is doing business
in the Philippines thru its local ship agent, co-petitioner East Asiatic Co., Ltd. Glow Laks
Page 1331 of 1553

Enterprises, Ltd., is likewise a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Hong Kong. It is not licensed to do, and it is not doing business in, the Philippines.
On or about 14 September 1987, Glow loaded on board M/S Scandutch at the Port of
Manila a total 343 cartoons of garments, complete and in good order for pre-carriage to the
Port of Hong Kong. The goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. MHONX-2 and MHONX-
34 arrived in good condition in Hong Kong and were transferred to M/S Amethyst for final
carriage to Colon, Free Zone, Panama. Both vessels, M/S Scandutch and M/S Amethyst,
are owned by Nedlloyd represented in the Phlippines by its agent, East Asiatic. The goods
which were valued at US$53,640.00 was agreed to be released to the consignee, Pierre
Kasem, International, S.A., upon presentation of the original copies of the covering bills of
lading. Upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Colon on 23 October 1987, Nedlloyd
purportedly notified the consignee of the arrival of the shipments, and its custody was
turned over to the National Ports Authority in accordance with the laws, customs
regulations and practice of trade in Panama. By an unfortunate turn of events, however,
unauthorized persons managed to forge the covering bills of lading and on the basis of the
falsified documents, the ports authority released the goods.
On 16 July 1988, Glow filed a formal claim with Nedlloyd for the recovery of the
amount of US$53,640.00 representing the invoice value of the shipment but to no avail.
Claiming that Nedlloyd are liable for the misdelivery of the goods, Glow initiated Civil Case
before the RTC of Manila, seeking for the recovery of the amount of US$53,640.00,
including the legal interest from the date of the first demand. After the Pre-Trial
Conference, trial on the merits ensued. The RTC rendered a Decision ordering the
dismissal of the complaint but granted Nedlloyd counterclaims. The Court of Appeals
reversed the findings of the RTC and held that foreign laws were not proven in the manner
provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, and therefore, it cannot be
given full faith and credit.
Issue:
Whether or not there is no need to prove Panamanian laws because they had been
judicially admitted and an admission by a party in the course of the proceedings does not
require proof.
Ruling:
Yes, there is a need to prove Panamanian laws.
Page 1332 of 1553

It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites

are mandatory: (1) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or
by his deputy; and (2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consular or consular agent or foreign service
officer, and with the seal of his office. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Contrary to the contention of the Nedlloyd, the Panamanian laws, particularly Law
42 and its Implementing Order No. 7, were not duly proven in accordance with Rules of
Evidence and as such, it cannot govern the rights and obligations of the parties in the case
at bar. While a photocopy of the Gaceta Official of the Republica de Panama No. 17.596,
the Spanish text of Law 42 which is the foreign statute relied upon by the court a quo to
relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the trial of the
case below, the same however was not accompanied by the required attestation and
certification.
It is explicitly required by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that a
copy of the statute must be accompanied by a certificate of the officer who has legal custody
of the records and a certificate made by the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consular or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not merely a technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith
and credit to the genuineness of the document in a foreign country. Certainly, the
deposition of Mr. Enrique Cajigas, a maritime law practitioner in the Republic of Panama,
before the Philippine Consulate in Panama, is not the certificate contemplated by law.
It is worth reiterating at this point that under the rules of private international law,
a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading
and proof, the laws of the foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our
local or domestic law. This is known as processual presumption. While the foreign law was
Page 1333 of 1553

properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner provided by
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. The decision of the RTC, which proceeds
from a disregard of specific rules cannot be recognized.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
CARLITO VALENCIA y CANDELARIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 198804, JANUARY 22, 2014
J. REYES
The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly
monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from
the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover,
as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case, the prosecution
must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-
compliance with the procedures must be justified by the State’s agents themselves. The
arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures
laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not
followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites
under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the
arresting officers at their own convenience.
Facts:
Valencia was charged in an Information with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Upon arraignment, Valencia pleaded not guilty, thus,
Page 1334 of 1553

trial ensued. According to the prosecution, P/Supt. Cuaton, received a call from a
concerned citizen regarding the rampant sale of illegal drugs in Caloocan, causing for the
organization a team to conduct surveillance and a possible buy-bust operation in the said
area. The team immediately proceeded to the target area, wherein PO3 Modina and PO2
Rosales approached a group of 6 persons playing cara y cruz, and PO3 Modina posed as a
bettor. While watching the game, PO3 Modina saw Valencia, place a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance as a bet. Thereupon, PO3 Modina introduced
himself as a police officer, confiscated the plastic sachet, and arrested Valencia. When
asked to empty his pockets, Valencia brought out another transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance from his right pocket. PO3 Modina then apprised
Valencia of his constitutional rights and Valencia was brought to the police station,
together with the confiscated transparent plastic sachets.
At the police station, the two plastic sachets that were confiscated were turned over to PO2
Hipolito for investigation and were then marked by PO2 Hipolito, thereafter were sent to
the crime laboratory for investigation. Upon examination, it yielded a positive result for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Valencia denied the allegations against him. The RTC convicted Valencia, which the CA
affirmed by ruling that the prosecution was able to show an unbroken chain of custody of
the seized drugs.
Issue:
Whether the rule on chain of custody was complied with.
Ruling:
In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor,
the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been
preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic
that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration
or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty
on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-
appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A.
No. 9165 fails.
Page 1335 of 1553

There must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during and
after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and
transfer thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly
monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from
the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in
court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. In People v. Gonzales, the Court
explained that:
The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related
items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying
signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon
arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding
handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the
marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other
material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of
the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting or contamination of
evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the
dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and
evidentiary value.
A perusal of the foregoing testimonies of PO3 Modina and PO2 Rosales shows that there
are significant lapses in the chain of custody of the plastic sachets that were confiscated
from Valencia. Indeed, while the prosecution was able to prove that the two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance that were confiscated from Valencia were marked
as "CVC-1" and "CVC-2" by PO2 Hipolito, after the same were turned over to him at the
Page 1336 of 1553
police station for investigation, there was no showing that the marking had been done in
the presence of Valencia or his representatives.
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case, the prosecution must
still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-
compliance with the procedures must be justified by the State’s agents themselves. The
arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the
procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the
procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground.
Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may
not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENNIS SUMILI

G.R. No. 212160, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The "chain of custody rule" requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has
initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such
items were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s representative or counsel, a
representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official
who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation conducted, Dennis Sumili was caught in the act of selling shabu.
The poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2 Englatiera, who
marked the same. A request for laboratory examination was prepared by him and
instructed Non-Uniform Personnel Carlito Ong to bring the sachet together with the
request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so
on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed. It was only on June 9,
2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong was able to bring and
turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Upon examination, it was
confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu. The RTC found him guilty of violating Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed
his conviction.
Page 1337 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not Sumili is guilty of violating Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165.
Ruling:
No. Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the procedure that
the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve
its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team
that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such
items were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s representative or counsel, a
representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official
who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
While the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers,
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as
jurisprudence nevertheless provide that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule
will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long
as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case, NUP Ong failed to bring the sachet
as well as the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination within 24 hours after
the buy-bust operation as he only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERIC PAVIA Y PALIZA @ "JERIC" AND JUAN

BUENDIA Y DELOS REYES@ "JUNE"
G.R. No. 202687; JAN.14, 2015; PEREZ, J.
Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the
custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw
that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
Facts:
Page 1338 of 1553

On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, a confidential informant reported to

SPO3 Melchor dela Peña (SPO3 Dela Peña) of the San Pedro Municipal Police Station, San
Pedro, Laguna, that a pot session was taking place at the house of a certain “Obet” located
at Barangay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Upon receipt of the information, SPO3 Dela Peña
formed a team to conduct police operations against the suspect. At around 9:00 in the
evening of the same date, the team proceeded to the target area. When the team arrived,
the members saw that Obet’s house was closed. Since the house was not surrounded by a
fence, PO2 Bautista approached the house and peeped through a small opening in a
window where he saw four persons in a circle having a pot session in the living room. PO3
Parunggao then tried to find a way to enter the house and found an unlocked door. He
entered the house, followed by PO2 Bautista and they caught the four persons engaged in
a pot session by surprise. After they introduced themselves as police officers, they arrested
the four suspects and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene. Among those
arrested were herein appellants, from each of whom a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance were confiscated by PO3 Parunggao after he conducted a body search
on their persons. PO3 Parunggao marked the plastic sachet he seized from appellant Pavia
with “JP,” representing the initials of Jeric
Pavia while that taken from appellant Buendia was marked, also by PO3 Parunggao, with
“JB,” representing the initials of Juan Buendia. These plastic sachets were transmitted to
the crime laboratory for qualitative examination where they tested positive for “shabu.” In
their defense, the accused invoked the the defenses of denial and frame-up
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was illegal and, therefore, the items seized from them
as a result of that arrest were inadmissible in evidence against accused.
Ruling:
The warrantless search was legal. The elements for the illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165 are the same as those for the violation of Section 11
of the law: (1) possession by the accused of an item or object identified to be a prohibited
or dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; (3) the free and conscious
possession of the drug by the accused, with the additional element that (4) the accused
possessed the prohibited or dangerous drug during a social gathering or meeting, or in the
company of at least two persons. The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of
Page 1339 of 1553

all these elements. The fact that the apprehending team did not strictly comply with the
procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily
render appellants’ arrest illegal or the items seized from them inadmissible in evidence.
Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to
the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious
flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RECTO ANGNGAO and ROBERT CARLIN

Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 only requires a substantial compliance with the
requirements of markings and photographing instead of an absolute or literal compliance.
FACTS:
After a buy-bust operation involving the accused Recto Angngao and Robert Carlin and the
apprehender SPO4 Marquez Madlon, the confiscated substances brought to the Benguet
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office were identified and testified positive for marjijuana
resin and hashish oil. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed in the RTC two (2)
informations against the accused, charging them with illegal sale and possession of the said
dangerous drugs. The RTC convicted Angngao but acquitted Carlin. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has substantially complied with the chain of custody rule.
RULING:
No. It is beyond dispute, for one, that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for
documentation purposes. It was also not shown why, despite the requirement of the law
itself, no representative from the media, from the Department of Justice, or any elective
official was present to serve as a witness during the arrest. The Prosecution’s testimonial
evidence is actually bereft of the showing of the efforts undertaken by the law enforcers to
see to the presence of any of such representatives during the operation against the
appellant from his apprehension until the seizure of the drugs. It is true that Section 21 of
the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 only requires a substantial compliance with the requirements of
Page 1340 of 1553

markings and photographing instead of an absolute or literal compliance. Hence, an

accused can still be held guilty provided that a justifiable ground for excusing the non-
compliance with the requirements has been satisfactorily established by the Prosecution.
Such justifiable ground is wanting here. SPO4 Madlon and the rest of the buy-bust team
tendered no explanation for the non-compliance. They were required to render sufficient
reasons for their non- compliance during the trial; otherwise, the persons they charged
would be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Yet, they even seemed unaware
that such requirements existed at all. There is no question that the State had the
responsibility to explain the lapses in the procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody
of the dangerous drugs. Without the explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus
delicti became unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground
that his guilt had not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Absent the justification by the
arresting lawmen for their noncompliance with the requirement of an intact chain of
custody, the trial court and the CA did not fairly convict the appellant in whose favor the
safeguards have been erected by the law. As the Court well stated in People v. Relato:
“Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and
related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be
presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the successful prosecution of
illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs. Consequently, we reverse the
conviction of the appellant for possession of or for the sale of illegal drugs under R.A. No.
9165 for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGAR BOLO Y FRANCO

G.R. No. 200295, August 19, 2015, Perez, J.
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed
physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated
persons. The IRR of R.A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs
states: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items.
Facts:
Page 1341 of 1553

Col. Cuaton, Chief of the SAID SOU of the Caloocan City Police Station, acting on an
information that an alias Gagay was engaged in illegal drug activities at Caloocan City,
ordered that a buy bust team be formed to conduct an operation against the said person.
The buy-bust team then proceeded to the target place at Caloocan City. As a result of the
said operation, the accused was arrested and plastic sachets were recovered from him. An
information was filed against him. The accused, however, raised as defense that the
arresting officers did not comply with the requirements for the proper custody of seized
drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the arresting police officers to comply with Section 21, Article
II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, specifically on the
requirements of markings, physical inventory and photographs, translates to their failure
to preserve the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
Ruling:
No. The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed
physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the
enumerated persons. In the case at bar, PO1 Montefrio and PO3 Pagsolingan testified that,
after one of the subject sachets was seized by PO1 Montefrio during the buy-bust operation
and after the three other subject sachets were seized by PO3 Pagsolingan during the arrest,
both of them turned over the seized items to PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) at the
police station. PO2 Hipolito then testified that he received and marked the seized items
(EBF-1 BB 04-01-06 for the sachet seized by PO1 Montefrio, and EBF-2 to EBF-4 for the
sachets recovered by PO3 Pagsolingan), and that he brought them to Police Senior
Inspector Jesse dela Rosa19 (PSI Dela Rosa), a forensic chemist. PSI Dela Rosa then testified
that he received the seized items, that he conducted a qualitative examination on said
items, and that his examination confirmed that the seized items were positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride. In open court, PO1 Montefrio, PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2
Hipolito, and PSI Dela Rosa were able to identify the seized items as those confiscated from
accused-appellant, as the sachets still bore the markings inscribed by PO2 Hipolito.
Page 1342 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOCELYN POSADA y SONTILLANO and

FRANCISCO POSADA y URBANO
G.R. No. 196052, September 2, 2015, BRION, J.
It is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of Section 21, Article II of
RA Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated
inadmissible.
Facts:
In the morning of April 8, 2006, police officers went to the house of the accused-appellants
Jocelyn Posada (Jocelyn) and Francisco Posada (Francisco) in Virac, Catanduanes, to
implement a search warrant. After the search warrant was read, Francisco argued with the
police officers though later insisted that he be allowed to have breakfast before anything
else. While PO1 Jigger Tacorda (PO1 Tacorda) and Kagawad Eva Sarmiento (Kag.
Sarmiento) were escorting him to the nearby eatery, they saw him throw something on the
pavement. PO1 Tacorda immediately accosted and reprimanded accused-appellant
Francisco while Kag. Sarmiento picked up the plastic sachets containing a white crystalline
substance. A total 37 sachets were recovered from the pavement which were photographed
by PO3 Raul Santos (PO3 Santos), and then were turned over to the crime laboratory for
inventory, documentation, and examination. The accused-appellants were charged of
violating Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The RTC found Jocelyn guilty of illegal
possession of 2.2825 grams and Francisco guilty of illegal possession of 24.2313 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu. The CA affirmed the RTC decision
with the modification.
Issue:
Whether or the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
Ruling:
Yes. The Office of the Solicitor General correctly argued that any question as to the validity
of the search warrant was closed by the September 21, 2006 Resolution of the RTC, which
the accused- appellants opted not to question further. As mentioned by the CA, the judicial
finding of probable cause in issuing a search warrant should not be doubted when the judge
Page 1343 of 1553

personally examines the applicant and/or witnesses and there is no basis to doubt his
reliability and competence in evaluating the evidence before him. With regard to the
designation of the place to be searched, the RTC sufficiently justified that the search
warrant particularly described the place to be searched: a sketch showing the location of
the house to be searched was attached to the application and the search warrant pointed
to only one house in the area.
For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following
essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. The prosecution
was able to establish the presence of all the required elements for violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. From the established facts, it is clear that accused-
appellants knowingly possessed shabu – a prohibited drug – without legal authority to do
so in violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
After a careful reading of the records, the Court also found that the chain of custody over
the forty-two (42) plastic sachets of shabu was not broken. Based on the records, PO1
Jacinto narrated how he found the five (5) heatsealed transparent plastic sachets and how
he turned over said items to PO1 Sevilla after they were photographed by PO3 Santos. Kag.
Arcilla, who was present during the search, corroborated his testimony. The RTC found
that PO1 Jacinto properly placed all five (5) plastic sachets in a transparent plastic bag which
was sealed with masking tape and duly signed by him. As for the thirty-seven (37) plastic
sachets, PO1 Sevilla testified that Kag. Sarmiento saw Francisco throw the plastic sachets
on the pavement; and that Kag. Sarmiento and he picked up said plastic sachets. The RTC
found that all thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets were placed in a transparent plastic bag
which was sealed with masking tape duly signed by Kag. Sarmiento. Finally, PSI Josephine
Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen) narrated that the fortytwo (42) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances were turned over to the crime laboratory for
qualitative examination; that said confiscated items were thereafter found positive for
shabu, and were identified by PSI Clemen herself before the RTC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE SORIN y TAGAYLO

G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as

jurisprudence, provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not
Page 1344 of 1553

automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a)
there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.
Facts:
After receiving a report that Charlie Sorin was selling illegal drugs at his residence, the PNP
formed a buy-bust team. The team went to the house of Sorin and asked if they could buy
shabu. Sorin responded that each sachet costs P200.00. PO2 Dador, one of the poseur-
buyers, purchased two sachets containing white crystalline substance and gave Sorin the
P400.00 marked money. After the sale was consummated, Sorin was arrested and was
brought to the police station. At the police station, PO2 Dador turned over the seized items
and the marked money to SPO1 Mugot, who marked the same, prepared the inventory and
request for laboratory examination, and sent the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The RTC found Sorin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA
9165. The CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorin’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be
upheld.
Ruling:
No. In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
the prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment. Accordingly, it is of paramount importance for the prosecution to
establish that the transaction actually took place, and to present the corpus delicti, i.e., the
seized drug/s, before the court. Similarly, it must be shown that the integrity and
evidentiary value of such seized items have been preserved. In other words, the dangerous
drug presented in court as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized
from him. The chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed.
While the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers,
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as
jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this
Page 1345 of 1553

rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so
long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any deviation from the prescribed
procedure must be justified, but, at all times, should not affect the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated items.
The Court is unconvinced that the chain of custody rule had been substantially complied
with. Not only did the apprehending officer who had initial custody over the seized drugs,
i.e., PO2 Dador, fail to mark the same or even witness its alleged marking, but also the
officer to which the marking of the seized items was attributed to, i.e., SPO1 Mugot, himself
disclaimed that he had done such marking and admitted that he only marked a transparent
plastic cellophane container, and not the individual sachets PO2 Dador had turned-over to
him containing the seized drugs themselves. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RANDY ROLLO Y LAGASCA

G.R. No. 211199, March 25, 2015, Perez, J.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Facts:
After receiving a tip that appellant Randy Rollo was engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs,
a buy-bust team was immediately formed. Upon the team’s arrival in the target area, PO1
Ayad, who acted as poseur-buyer, made a brief conversation with appellant. Appellant
handed to PO1 Ayad two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. In
exchange, PO1 Ayad handed the pre- marked five hundred peso (P500.00) bill to appellant.
After making the pre-arranged signal, appellant was arrested by the police and was brought
to the police station. The police was able to recover the buy-bust money and one heat-
sealed sachet of white crystalline substance from appellant. The seized items were properly
marked at the police station in the presence of PO1 Ayad. A request for laboratory
examination was also made. The seized items tested positive for shabu. Both the RTC and
CA convicted appellant of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Page 1346 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All the
elements for illegal sale were duly established with appellant being caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu through a buy- bust operation conducted by members of the PMG in
Camiling, Tarlac.
Jurisprudence dictates that a testimony that included the marking of the seized items at
the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance
with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. The failure
of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical
inventory in the place where the subject shabu was seized does not automatically render
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. A proviso was added in
the implementing rules that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
of and custody over said items.” Pertinently, it is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EFREN BASAL CAYAS

G.R. No. 215714, August 12, 2015, Villarama, Jr. J.
In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the primary
consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have been
preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as
evidence in court.
Page 1347 of 1553

Facts:
In a buy-bust operation, appellant was arrested and was brought to the police station. A
crime of illegal sale of drugs was thereafter charged against him. On his part, he claimed
the poseur- buyer in the alleged transaction was only an “informant,” who was not
presented in court; that no pre-operation report was submitted to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency; that the prosecution could not exactly lay down the details of the
alleged transaction; and that the sachet of shabu presented in court was not proven to be
the same sachet of shabu that was allegedly sold by appellant and belatedly marked in the
police station. For the State, the OSG asserted that a pre- operational report is not
indispensable to a buy-bust operation. Hence, the absence of which did not render the said
operation invalid. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the arresting officers in this case duly
preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item which was proven to be
shabu upon examination.
Issue:
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to prove that appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in committing the illegal sale of drugs.
Ruling:
Yes. It bears reiterating that in the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs
have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their
presentation as evidence in court. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty that
the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs,
and finally introduced in evidence against the accused was the same illegal drug that was
confiscated from him. In this case, the chain of custody was clearly established.
The lack of a pre-operation report had no effect on the legality and validity of the buy- bust
operation as the same is not indispensable thereto. Another, marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team. In this light, the marking of the seized sachet of shabu at the police
station immediately after the arrival thereat of the police officers who conducted the buy-
bust operation was in accordance with the law, its implementing rules and regulations, and
Page 1348 of 1553

relevant jurisprudence. Furthermore, the testimony of the civilian informant was not
indispensable or necessary; it would have been cumulative merely, or corroborative at best.
CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA Y HORARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 212940 September 16, 2015, Mendoza, J.
The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale
is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This materiality
derives from the dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of the
corpus delicti, there is uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not.
Facts:
In 2009, Christopher Dela Riva was arrested for selling “shabu” during a buy-bust operation
at Brgy. Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales. Instead of bringing the drugs to the PDEA regional
headquarters, the apprehending officer brought the seized shabu to the PDEA National
Headquarters in Quezon City. The seized shabu was marked and photographed at the
PDEA office. The inventory was witnessed only by a Kagawad from Brgy. Piñahan, Quezon
City. During trial, the apprehending officer gave three (3) different and conflicting answers
for the delay in the marking, physical inventory, and photographing of the seized items.
Issue:
Whether or not Christopher Dela Riva may be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
No. The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale
derives from the dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of
the corpus delicti, there is uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not.
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 (as amendment by RA 10640) provides the four links to the chain of
custody that should remain unbroken: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
Page 1349 of 1553

examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by
the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the first link in the chain of custody was broken. The facts cited herein are clear
enough to establish that none of the procedures herein were followed, thereby breaking
the chain of custody. Moreover, while the new Sec. 21 provides for a saving clause where
failure to follow the procedure to the letter is excusable “under justifiable grounds”, the
PDEA and its agents failed to present any justifiable reason for their delay and mishandling
of the subject shabu.

vs. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y CARLOS
G.R. 212196 January 12, 2015 J. Mendoza
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Facts:
The PDEA oformed a buy-bust operation composed of 4 police officers to apprehend a

certain “Buddy” and “Mel”. Upon the consummation of the sale, the team apprehended
Ramil Dahil and Rommel Castro and they recovered 5 sachets of marijuana and 1 brick of
suspected marijuana. The RTC found Dahil and Castro guilty for violating Sections 5 and 11
of RA 9165. The accused appealed to the ca and they stated that there were irregularities
on the preservation of the intergrity and evidentary value of the illegal items. The
prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which
generated clouds of doubts as to the identiy of the seized items however the CA denied
the appeal and held that the illicit drugs confiscated were the same drugs presented in the
RTC. It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody.
Issue:
Whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of
custody procedure of RA9165.
Page 1350 of 1553

Ruling:
NO. The law enforcement officers did not comply with the proper procedure. Although the
prosecution offered in evidence the Inventory of the Property Seized signed by the arresting
officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
were not observed. The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required tosign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
First, the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and
confiscation as it was only done at the police station. Second, there is doubt as to the
identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA
decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruz who prepared the said document. PO2 Cruz on the
other hand, testified that it was their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1
Licu’s testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator. Third, there
were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence of
the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA Y HORARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 212940 September 16, 2015, Mendoza, J.
Page 1351 of 1553

The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale
derives from the dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of the
corpus delicti, there is uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not.
Facts:
In 2009, Christopher Dela Riva was arrested for selling “shabu” during a buy-bust operation
at Brgy. Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales. Instead of bringing the drugs to the PDEA regional
headquarters, the apprehending officer brought the seized shabu to the PDEA National
Headquarters in Quezon City. The seized shabu was marked and photographed at the
PDEA office. The inventory was witnessed only by a Kagawad from Brgy. Piñahan, Quezon
City. During trial, the apprehending officer gave three (3) different and conflicting answers
for the delay in the marking, physical inventory, and photographing of the seized items.
Issue:
Whether or not Christopher Dela Riva may be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
No. The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale
derives from the dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of
the corpus delicti, there is uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not.
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 (as amendment by RA 10640) provides the four links to the chain of
custody that should remain unbroken: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by
the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the first link in the chain of custody was broken. The facts cited herein are clear
enough to establish that none of the procedures herein were followed, thereby breaking
the chain of custody. Moreover, while the new Sec. 21 provides for a saving clause where
failure to follow the procedure to the letter is excusable “under justifiable grounds”, the
Page 1352 of 1553

PDEA and its agents failed to present any justifiable reason for their delay and mishandling
of the subject shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN

G.R. NO. 199087, November 11, 2015, Villarama, Jr.,J.
“The chain of custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.”
Facts:
Upon issuance of a search warrant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Intelligence
Officer 1 AldwinPagaragan with other PDEA officers in coordination with some barangay
officers and media representatives proceeded to the three (3)-storey house of Jerry
Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan. Consequently, PDEA was able to seize heated-plastic
sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and other drug
paraphernalia inside the house which were marked as “ADP” and inventoried. Photographs
were likewise taken during the search. Thereafter, the spousespunzalan were brought to
the PDEA office for investigation. Consequently, the seized items underwent a laboratory
examinatation which proved positive results for the presence of shabu. Thereafter, the
spousespunzalan were brought to the PDEA office for investigation. The spouses were
charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 Illegal Possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, dangerous drug. The spouses
denied the charge and contended that the search was invalid. Subsequently, the RTC
convicted the spouses of the crime charged which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA). Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the shabu seized by the PDEA officers are admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its
identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt.
In this case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly established from the
time the heat-sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by IO 1 Pagaragan to its
Page 1353 of 1553

subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in Quezon City. IO 1 Pagaragan was
also the one who personally delivered and submitted the specimens composed of 293
sachets of shabuto the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens
were kept in custody until they were presented as evidence before the trial court and
positively identified by IOI Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked during the
inventory.
The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does
not undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-
appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory
of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies or
glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented
and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind,
the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellants
at the time of the search was the same one tested, introduced and testified to in court. In
other words, there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence against accused-
appellants.
People of the Philippines v. Nicolas Lara III y Agatep, Randy Alcayde y

Maguindayao, Abdul Mammad y Macdirol, LadgerTampoy y Bagayad, and
HataSariol y Maddas
G.R. No. 198796 September 16, 2015, Peralta, J.
Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
shall not render void and invalid such seizure as long as the arresting officers successfully
preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items
Facts:
On Augusut 4, 2004, a confidential informant informed the police that he has been buying
shabu from the herein accused. The police then formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation in which, PO2 Manny Panlilio (PO2 Panlilio) is designated as the poseur-buyer.
Page 1354 of 1553

During the course of the operation, it was the informant who introduced Panlilio to one of
the accused and told them that PO2 Panlilio will buy shabu worth p500. After the money
was given to them, PO2 Panlilio then introduced himself as a police officer then the police
rushed to the scene to arrest the accused. Subsequently, they were convicted for illegal
possession and sale of dangerous drugs under RA 9165. For their defense, the accused assert
that the police officers failed to follow the procedures laid down in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 providing among others, that upon seizure of the dangerous drugs, the police
having custody shall inventory and photograph the seized item in the presence of the
accused from whom such items were seized.
Issue:
Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the procedure laid down in Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
Ruling:
Yes, there was substantial compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21, Article
II of
R.A. No. 9165. Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 shall not render void and invalid such seizure as long as the arresting officers
successfully preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items. Here,
while it is true that the police officers failed to make an inventory and take photographs,
the prosecution was able to prove, however, that the sachet of shabu confiscated during
the buy-bust operation was the same item presented and identified before the court. They
were able to maintain the integrity of the seized drug and establish that the links in the
chain of custody were not compromised. The prosecution was able to establish the
unbroken chain of custody over the recovered drug, from the time it came into the
possession of the apprehending officers, to the time it was brought to the police station,
then to the crime laboratory for testing, up to the time it had to be offered in evidence.
There was indeed substantial compliance with the procedures provided in R.A. 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL ROS Y ORTEGA, RODOLFO JUSTO, JR.

Y CALIFLORES, AND DAVID NAVARRO YMINAS
G.R. No. 201146, 15 April 2015, Third Division, (Peralta, J.)
Page 1355 of 1553

While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect and unbroken, it is not in reality
"as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." Thus, non-compliance with
Section 21 does not automatically render illegal the arrest of an accused or inadmissible the
items seized/confiscated.
Facts:
The three accused in this case were caught selling marijuana by the police in a by-bust
operation. The policemen brought the packages of marijuana and had them tested by the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory. The specimens were determined positive to be
marijuana after chemical analysis. The accused essentially interposed denial as a defense.
The RTC convicted the three accused. Now they are questioning the failure of the
prosecution to prove the chain of custody of the seized marijuana.
Issue:
Whether the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged
despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the chain of custody of the alleged seized
marijuana, in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165
Ruling:
NO. Section 21, however, was not meant to thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement
agents. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the law clearly expresses that "non-
compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items." While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect and unbroken, it is not in
reality "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." Thus, non-
compliance with Section 21 does not automatically render illegal the arrest of an accused
or inadmissible the items seized/confiscated. As the law mandates, what is vital is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated illegal
drugs since they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The appellants did not present any evidence to substantiate their allegation that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the marijuana presented as evidence at the trial had been
compromised at some point. What the records show is that there had been substantial
Page 1356 of 1553

compliance with the prescribed procedure, preserving in effect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized marijuana. The prosecution had submitted evidence proving
beyond reasonable doubt the crucial links in the chain of custody of the marijuana, starting
from its seizure and confiscation from the appellants until its presentation as proof of the
corpus delicti before the RTC. The appellants cannot be allowed to belatedly question the
police officers' alleged non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal. The
issue on the chain of custody was neither raised nor mentioned with specificity during the
trial. In no instance did the appellants manifest or at least intimate before the trial court
that there were lapses in the handling and safekeeping of the seized marijuana that might
affect its admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value. This omission is fatal to the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES v. MHODS USMAN Y GOGO

G.R. No. 201100, February 04, 2015, Perez, J.
While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, “as it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
Accused-appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation for selling illegal drugs. Due to his
resistance to the arrest, the policeman acting as poseur buyer kept possession of the
evidence and upon arriving in the police station, marked the same with the accused’s
initials “MUG”. Accused- appellant now raises the claim that since no inventory was
prepared, nor was a photograph taken of the small plastic sachet allegedly recovered from
him, and that, moreover, there was no representative from the media and the Department
of Justice, nor any elected public official who signed the copies of the inventory, and he
must be acquitted.
Issue:
Whether there was a broken chain of custody since the seized sachet was marked only at
the police station and no inventory was prepared, nor was a photograph taken of the sachet.
Ruling:
Page 1357 of 1553

NO. The marking of the seized substance immediately upon arrival at the police station
qualified as a compliance with the marking requirement. Such can also be said here in light
of the fact that the reason why PO1 Sta. Maria was unable to immediately mark the seized
sachet was due to accused-appellant’s resistance to arrest and, as at that time, he did not
know accused-appellant’s name yet. Hence, the prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence
the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of
R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOMER BUTIAL

G.R. No. 192785, February 04, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
The prosecution’s evidence must establish that the illegal drug presented in court is
the same illegal drug actually recovered from appellant.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente, appellant was
arrested and was brought to the police station. The two transparent plastic packets
containing white crystalline substance appear to have no markings at all. Only the heat-
sealed transparent plastic supposedly containing them has the marking letter “I.” During
the trial, PO2 Martirez, himself, admitted that he did not put any markings on the two
plastic sachets that were handed to him by Borlagdan after the latter’s purchase of the same
from appellant. While he mentioned that the police investigator to whom he turned over
the items wrote something down or made some initials thereon, he nevertheless could not
remember who wrote the initials.
Issue:
Whether police officers failed to properly observe the procedure outlined in Section 21, RA
9165 and thus constitutes a break in the chain of custody.
Ruling:
YES. A review of the records reveals that the confiscated sachets subject of the illegal sale
of shabu were not marked. Clearly, the absence of markings creates an uncertainty that the
two sachets seized during the buy-bust operation were part of the five sachets submitted
Page 1358 of 1553

to the police crime laboratory. The prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the marking
of the two sachets of shabu subject of this case, which is the first link in the chain of custody
and which would have shown that the shabu presented in evidence was the same specimen
bought from appellant during the buy-bust operation. The lack of certainty therefore on a
crucial element of the crime i.e., the identity of the corpus delicti, warrants the reversal of
the judgment of conviction. It therefore appears that the sachets of shabu confiscated
during the buy-bust operation are totally different from the sachets forwarded to the police
crime laboratory and thereafter presented in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN DIAZ y ROXAS

G.R. No. 917818 February 25, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
An accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. 9165, for as long as the chain of custody
remains unbroken.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation, PO2 Coronel bought a sachet of shabu from Diaz with 3 100-peso
bills with his initials as marked money. After arrest and after being apprised of his
constitutional rights, Diaz was brought to the station where the sachet was marked by
Coronel with ARD-1, the initials of Diaz. A request for laboratory examination was prepared
and the chemistry report revealed that the crystalline substance inside the sachet was 0.018
grams of shabu. He was charged and convicted of selling shabu under RA 9165. The CA
affirmed the decision, hence the appeal to the SC. Diaz contends that the prosecution failed
to comply with the requirements of law with respect to the proper marking, inventory, and
taking of photograph of the seized specimen.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody remains unbroken
Ruling:
YES. Diaz failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. In
fact, at no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the
police officers in handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value.
Page 1359 of 1553

Objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In
this case, appellant raised the police operatives' alleged non-compliance with Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on appeal before the CA. Thus, following
established jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the prosecution's case.
In any event, it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to
faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as long
as the chain of custody remains unbroken."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY BASILIO y HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 195774 February 23, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
In the chain of custody of seized drugs, marking upon immediate confiscation

contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
Facts:
A police team conducted a buy-bust operation where Basilio was arrested after selling a
packet of chabu to the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Chua. After the arrest, Basilio was informed of
his constitutional rights and was brought with the seized packet to the police station. SPO1
Chua marked the sachet “LBH” turned over the same to the investigator, PO3 Jimenez. A
request for laboratory examination was prepared and together with the sachet, was
delivered by Jimenez to the Manila Police District Crime Laboratory. There, it was received
by Forensic Chemical Officer PSI Elisa Reyes. She conducted a qualitative examination of
the specimen which tested positive for shabu. Basilio denied the charge for sale of illegal
drugs and alleged that it was a frame-up. The RTC convicted him, which the CA affirmed.
Basilio contends that the chain of custody rule was not followed.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody of the seized item was broken
Ruling:
NO. While R.A. No. 9165 provides for the immediate marking of the seized item, it does
not specify a time frame when and where said marking should be done. In fact, in People
v. Resurreccion, the Court had the occasion to rule that marking upon immediate
Page 1360 of 1553

confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team. Finally, while it is admitted that the apprehending officers failed to
conduct an inventory of the seized item and to photograph the same as required by
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, the non-compliance did not affect the seized item's evidentiary
weight and admissibility in evidence. As previously discussed, the chain of custody of the
seized item was unbroken, hence, its integrity and evidentiary value were not
compromised. It must be stressed that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL PRAJES and ALIPA MALA

Noncompliance with the Chain of Custody Rule under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items. What is essential is ‘the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Facts:
The accused appellants were accused of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 via an Information filed with the RTC of Cebu. They pleaded “not guilty” when
arraigned. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued. According to the prosecution, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Cebu City received reports that the accused
appellants were engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Following surveillance operations
conducted during the last week of August 2002, a buy bust operation was organized by the
NBI for September 4, 2002 to which the accused appellant was apprehended.
The accused appellants denied the charge against them. Prajes claimed that at about
4:00 p.m. on September 4, 2002, he was sleeping at his house in Kinasangan. For Mala’s
defense, witness Magdalena Abarquez claimed that at around 4:00 p.m. on September 4,
2002, she saw Mala enter the house of Prajes. When he tried to leave the house, he was
prevented by someone who was inside the house.
On June 29, 2004, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15, rendered a Decision finding the
accused appellants guilty for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In a Decision
dated May 30, 2012, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The appellate court
found no credence in the denials that were posed by the accused appellants. Hence, the
Page 1361 of 1553
present appeal wherein the accused appellants insist on the prosecution’s failure to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appellants also question the subject
drugs’ identity and the NBI’s observance of the rule on the chain of custody. They argue
that it was unclear as to who actually marked the subject packs of shabu, and that there
were no photographs and physical inventory of the seized items, even when the same are
required under the law.
Issue:
Whether the failure of the apprehending officers in following the chain of custody
rule warrants the acquittal of the accused appellants.
Ruling:
No. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that “the apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the seized drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
a copy thereof.” In relation thereto, Section 21 of the law’s Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) provides in part:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.— x x x: (a) x x x
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non compliance with these requirements under justifiable rounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
These “statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited

drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence
to be presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the successful
prosecution of illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.”
In a line of cases, the Court has nonetheless explained that “while the chain of
custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, ‘as it is almost always impossible to
Page 1362 of 1553
obtain an unbroken chain.’” The limitation on chain of custody is also recognized in the
aforequoted Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165’s IRR, as it states that noncompliance with the rules’
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. In resolving drug cases, we then
repeatedly emphasize that “what is essential is ‘the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.’
Also, the fact that the marking was performed by SA Saavedra only upon the buybust
team’s arrival at the NBI office did not adversely affect the prosecution’s case against the
accused appellants. Given the situation at the house where the accused appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto and then arrested by the buybust team, the failure of SA
Saavedra to mark the seized drugs at the said site was justified. Even the failure of the
prosecution to present a physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs did not
render inadmissible the packs of shabu that were seized from the accused appellants,
especially as the Court considered that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs did
not appear to have been compromised.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SONNY SABDULA y AMANDA

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting
point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The records
in the present case do not show that the police marked the seized plastic sachet immediately
upon confiscation, or at the police station. Notably, the members of the buy-bust team did
not also mention that they marked the seized plastic sachet in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
Facts:
In the morning of February 1, 2004, a confidential informant told the members of

the Central Police District (CPD) about the illegal drug activities of one alias "Moneb" at a
squatter’s area in San Roque II, Quezon City. Acting on this information, operatives of the
Station Intelligence and Investigation Branch, Baler Police Station 2, CPD formed a buy-
bust team composed of PO2 Centeno (the designated poseur-buyer), PO1 Fortea, PO2
Rolando Daduya, PO1 Victor Porte, PO1 Louise Escarlan and PO1 Noel de Guzman.
At around 7:00 p.m., the buy-bust team and the informant went to the target area.
When they arrived there, the informant introduced PO2 Centeno as his "kumpare" to the
Page 1363 of 1553
Sonny Amanda. PO2 Centeno asked the appellant if he could "score" two hundred pesos
worth of shabu. Sonny Amanda responded by taking out a plastic sachet from his pocket,
and handing it to PO2 Centeno. PO2 Centeno in turn handed P200.00 to the Sonny
Amanda, and then gave the pre-arranged signal. As the other members of the buy-bust
team were rushing to the scene, PO2 Centeno introduced himself as a police officer and
arrested the Sonny Amanda. Afterwards, he frisked Sonny Amanda and recovered the buy-
bust money from his right pocket.
The police thereafter brought Sonny Amanda to the Police Station 2 for
investigation. Upon arrival, PO2 Centeno gave the seized plastic sachet to SPO2 Salinel
who, in turn, handed it to PO3 Chantengco who made a request for laboratory examination
that PO3 Centeno brought, together with the seized item to the Central Police District
Crime Laboratory for analysis. Per Chemistry Report of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (the
forensic chemist), the submitted specimen tested positive for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
The prosecution charged the Sonny Amanda is guilty of violation of Section 5,

Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Sonny Amanda is guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.

No. 9165.
Ruling:
No.
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No.
9165 defines chain of custody as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to the receipt in the forensic
laboratory, to safekeeping and the presentation in court for identification and eventual
destruction.
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. "Marking" means the
placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature
on the items seized. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, this Court has consistently
held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs casts reasonable
doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. Marking after seizure is the starting point
Page 1364 of 1553
in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The
marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting,"
or contamination of evidence.
The records in the present case do not show that the police marked the seized plastic
sachet immediately upon confiscation, or at the police station. Nowhere in the court
testimony of PO2 Centeno, or in the stipulated testimonies of PO3 Chantengco and PO1
Fortea, did they indicate that the seized item had ever been marked. Notably, the members
of the buy-bust team did not also mention that they marked the seized plastic sachet in
their Joint Affidavit of Arrest. How the apprehending team could have omitted such a basic
and vital procedure in the initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles and alarms us.
We point out that succeeding handlers of the specimen would use the markings as
reference. If at the first or the earliest reasonably available opportunity, the apprehending
team did not mark the seized items, then there was nothing to identify it later on as it
passed from hand to hand. Due to the procedural lapse in the first link of the chain of
custody, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the
prosecution introduced into evidence.
We are not unaware that the seized plastic sachet already bore the markings "BC 02-
01-04" when it was examined by Forensic Chemist Jabonillo. In the absence, however, of
specifics on how, when and where this marking was done and who witnessed the marking
procedure, we cannot accept this marking as compliance with the required chain of custody
requirement. There was also no stipulation between the parties regarding the
circumstances surrounding this marking. We note in this regard that it is not enough that
the seized drug be marked; the marking must likewise be made in the presence of the
apprehended violator. As earlier stated, the police did not at any time ever hint that they
marked the seized drug.
These conditions were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the apprehending team to follow the
prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drug. We stress that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be adequately explained; the Court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.
Page 1365 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ

G.R. No. 205202, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes
Chain of Custody Rule – Non-compliance with Section 21 of Article II of Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 9165, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law
or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
accorded it by the courts.
In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence show that the poseur-buyer, PO2
Aseboque, marked the seized illegal drug at the crime scene with his initials "REA". At the
same place, he also prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt of the items seized from the
accused-appellant whose refusal to sign was duly noted in the same document. The alleged
discrepancy between the testimony of P02 Aseboque that he placed the marking REA on the
seized item, the forensic chemist's report stating that the specimen was marked "R.E.A." and
the absence of any such, description in the Spot Report of P02 Castillo did not cause a gap in
the chain of custody.
Facts:
Nenita Gamata y Valdez (Gamata) was charged by Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
Court of Appeals (CA) of the violation of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 wherein
she pleaded “Not Guilty”. Gamata, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver to another, zero
point zero three [0.03] gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous
drug, in exchange of Php.500.00 pesos.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer 2

RenieAseboque (PO2 Aseboque), Noel Pulido (Pulido) and Juan Siborboro, Jr., both
operatives of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC), and Police Inspector May
Andrea Bonifacio (P/Insp. Bonifacio), Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory. The aforementioned parties narrated that on July 25, 2006, an
information was received by Senior Inspector Joefel Felongco Siason (S/Insp. Siason) of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF), Makati City, from a
confidential asset of the MADAC that rampant illegal drug peddling in Laperal Compound,
Page 1366 of 1553

Barangay Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City was being carried out by the accused-appellant, Jun
Gamata (Jun), Toto Madera and Totoy Pajayjay. Apparently, their names are also included
in the watch list of the MADAC.
A team composed of SAIDSOTF police officers and MADAC operatives was formed
to conduct a buy-bust operation against the said subjects. PO2 Aseboque was designated
as the poseur-buyer while the rest of the team members were assigned to be his back-up.
The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
under Pre-Coordination Sheet Control Number MMRO-072506-0212 duly acknowledged to
have been received by PO1 Nemencio V. Domingo of the PDEA. One piece of a 500.00 bill
was also marked for use in the operation.
At around 4:30 p.m., the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded
to the subject area. The team members positioned themselves in spots where they can
monitor the possible transaction. Meanwhile, PO2 Aseboque and the informant walked
towards Laperal Compound and thereupon noticed a woman clad in white t-shirt and
maong pants. The informant identified her to PO2 Aseboque as the accused-appellant.
The two of them then approached the accused-appellant whom PO2 Aseboque
queried as to the whereabouts of Jun. In response, the accused-appellant said that Jun was
not around and that "kami nandito lang, bakit kukuhaba kayo?" PO2 Aseboque
comprehended her response as the street language used in the dealing ofdangerous drugs
and that she actually meant that she was selling shabu if they wanted to buy one. PO2
Aseboque repeated his query to which the accused-appellant replied, "Wag niyong
hintayinsi Jun, ako meron." PO2 Aseboque took her response as a confirmation that she
was indeed selling shabu. He then asked her if she had 500.00 worth of shabu. The accused-
appellant took out one plastic sachet from her right pocket and handed it over to PO2
Aseboque who in turn examined its contents and thereafter handed the buy-bust money
to the accused-appellant. As she was placing the money inside her pocket, PO2 Aseboque
made the pre-arranged signal to his buy-bust team mates by lighting a cigarette.
Upon seeing MADAC operative Pulido rushing towards the scene, PO2 Aseboque
held the accused-appellant and introduced himself as a police officer. He directed her to
empty the contents of her pockets but she refused. This prompted PO2 Aseboque to order
Pulido to dig into the accused-appellant’s pockets. Pulido complied and discovered three
more pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected
as shabu along with the buy-bust money and 120.00 of the accused-appellant’s personal
money.
Page 1367 of 1553

Gamata was then informed of her constitutional rights while the sachet she sold to
PO2 Aseboque was immediately marked by the latter with his initials "REA" while those
recovered by Pulido were marked with "REA-1", "REA-2", and "REA-3". At the crime scene,
PO2 Aseboque also prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt7which he and the arresting team
signed.
Gamata and the seized evidence were subsequently brought to the Makati
SAIDSOTF office where they were turned over to PO2 Rafael Castillo (PO2 Castillo) for
investigation, interrogation and proper disposition. At the same office, PO2 Aseboque
executed an Affidavit of Arrest and a Supplemental Affidavit. She then refuted all of the
above occurrences and has her own version of the said event.
RTC sustained the prosecution’s version and held that the pieces of evidence
submitted established the presence of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Gamata’s denial and alibi were rejected for being unsubstantiated. Her imputations of
frame-up to the police officers were likewise found uncorroborated by convincing proof
and thus overthrown by the presumption of regularity attached to the performance of the
police officers’ official duties. The RTC found Gamata guilty of violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with paragraph
1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 mandating the procedure for the inventory and
photograph of seized illegal drugs affected the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from
Gamata rendered it inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
No. The failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with paragraph 1, Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 mandating the procedure for the inventory and photograph
of seized illegal drugs did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from the
accused-appellant.
Non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory
and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For
evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If
Page 1368 of 1553

there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary
weight that will accorded it by the courts.
The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of

admissibility—but of weight—evidentiary merit or probative value—to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.
This is especially true when the chain of custody of the corpus delicti or the illegal
drug itself was shown to be unbroken, as in this case. Testimonial and documentary
evidence show that the poseur-buyer, PO2 Aseboque, marked the seized illegal drug at the
crime scene with his initials "REA". At the same place, he also prepared an
Acknowledgment Receipt of the items seized from the accused-appellant whose refusal to
sign was duly noted in the same document.
Indeed, the following links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drug were
duly accounted for, to wit: (1) the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court.
The alleged discrepancy between the testimony of P02 Aseboque that he placed the
marking REA on the seized item, the forensic chemist's report stating that the specimen
was marked "R.E.A." and the absence of any such, description in the Spot Report of P02
Castillo did not cause a gap in the chain of custody.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIVIAN BULOTANO y AMANTE

G.R. No. 190177, June 11, 2014, J. Perez
Bulotano was charged with illegal possession of drugs. However he alleged that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were not maintained because the
chain of custody rule was not followed. The court ruled negatively. In the prosecution of a
case for sale of illegal drugs punishable under Section 5, Artic1e II of Republic Act No. 9165,
noncompliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of the law is not necessarily fatal as
to render an accused's arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible as
evidence of his guilt, if, nonetheless, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items is preserved, there will yet be basis for the establishment of the guilt of the accused.
Page 1369 of 1553

Facts:
Upon a tip-off, a team of agents from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) conducted a buy-bust operation in Barangay 31, Sto. Niño, Cagayan de Oro City,
toentrap Bulotano for allegedly selling illegal drugs or shabu. Acting as poseur-buyers, PO1
Dizon Dagaraga (PO1 Dagaraga), together with an informant, approached Bulotano, who
was playing a card game with two (2) other persons inside a billiard hall. When Bulotano
noticed the two, she approached them and asked what they were looking for. PO1 Dagaraga
replied that he wants to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. After Bulotano handed PO1 Dagaraga
a transparent plastic sachet containing crystals, PO1 Dagaraga handed Bulotano marked
money in the amount of P200.00. Immediately, PO1 Dagaraga went out of the billiard hall
to call the back-up officers to arrest Bulotano. Trial court found Bulotano guilty of violation
of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. CA affirmed the trial court decision. Bulotano insists
that her conviction is without basis. She anchors her arguments on the following
allegations: (1) There were no photographs of the alleged seized illegal drugs taken; (2) The
inventory of the alleged seized illegal drugs was not immediately done after her arrest. The
inventory was conducted only after she underwent inquest proceedings at the City
Prosecutor’s Office, following which the inventory was shown to her and she was forced to
sign the same. There were no witnesses in the conduct of the inventory and that the
inventory report was solely signed by PO1 Dagaraga; (3) The Chemistry Report, prepared
by P/S Insp. April Madroño was not duly notarized.
Issue:
Whether or not the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items were
preserved
Ruling:
Yes, such were maintained
The duty of the prosecution is not merely to present in evidence the seized illegal
drugs. It is essential that the illegal drugs seized from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in evidence in court as the identity of the drug must be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 as a legal safeguard that the seized illegal drugs
are the same one presented in court.
Because of the unique characteristic of illegal drugs, rendering them indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and susceptible to tampering, alteration or substitution either by
Page 1370 of 1553
accident or otherwise, the law laid down rules to preserve the identity and integrity of the
seized illegal drugs. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires that upon seizure of illegal
drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a
physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the
person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official (e) who shall all be
required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.
In sum, the procedural requirements of Section 21, Republic Act No. 9165 were not
followed. First, no photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Second, the arresting officers
did not immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime. Third, although there
was testimony about the marking of the seized items at the police station, the records do
not show that the marking was done in the presence of Bulotano. Fourth, no representative
of the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected official attended the conduct
of the physical inventory and signed the inventory. And finally, the Chemistry Report was
not duly notarized.
The "chain of custody" rule.
Without doubt, the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements
provided in Section 21. However, noncompliance with the regulations is not necessarily
fatal as to render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible
as evidence of his guilt, for what is of the utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items that will be utilized in the
determination of his guilt or innocence. Such that, when there is a failure to follow strictly
the said procedure, the crime can still be proven, i.e., that the noncompliance was under
justifiable grounds or that the shabu taken is the same one presented in court by proof of
"chain of custody".
Noncompliance with the enumerated requirements in Section 21 of the law, does

not automatically exonerate the accused. Upon proof that noncompliance was due to
justifiable grounds, and that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, the seizure and custody over said
items are not, by the noncompliance, rendered void. This is the "chain of custody" rule.
In detail, the records of the case indicate that after Bulotano’s arrest, she was taken
to the police station and turned over to the police investigator. Although there were no
photographs taken, PO1 Dagaraga, the poseur-buyer and arresting officer, testified that he
personally made the markings "DGD" (representing his initials) on the plastic sachet
containing crystalline substance. PO1 Dagaraga also testified that he was the one who
drafted the inventory. PO1 Dagaraga, also, drafted the request for chemical laboratory
Page 1371 of 1553
examination. After drafting the request, it was still PO1 Dagaraga, who delivered the plastic
sachet containing crystalline substance, which had the marking "DGD" to the PNP
Chemical Laboratory for examination. The request, together with the sachet containing
crystalline substance, was received by SPO1 Tabligan. Then, it was transferred to the
Forensic Chemical Officer, P/S Insp. Madroño. The plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance was later on determined to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu.
Despite noncompliance with the requirements in Section 21, there is no showing of

a break in the chain in the custody of the seized item, later on determined to be shabu,
from the moment of its seizure by the entrapment team, to the investigating officer, to the
time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination. The prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the required photograph and
inventory conducted in the presence of the accused and witnesses of the seized drugs
pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not exonerate
Bulotano. Noncompliance with the requirements is not fatal and will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GIL SALVIDAR y GARLAN

G.R. No. 207664, June 25, 2014, J. Reyes
PO3 Galvez positively testified that he marked the ten (10) plastic sachets containing
marijuana and the pieces of white paper while still in the place where the accused-appellant
was arrested, and in the presence of the latter. The accused-appellant lamented that the
evidence seized were not photographed and inventoried in the presence of a member of the
media, a representative from the DOJ, and an elective government official. While this factual
allegation is admitted, the Court stresses that what Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165
requires is "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect adherence," as long as it can be proven
that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
The prosecution offered the following as witnesses: (a) Police Officer 3 Ramon
Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against the
accused-appellant; (b) PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), likewise a member of the
buy-bust operation; (c) Senior Police Officer 1 Fernando Moran (SPO1 Moran), then the
Page 1372 of 1553

investigator-on-duty to whom the accused-appellant and the seized evidence were turned
over at the police station; and (d) Police Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo (PCI Arturo),
Forensic Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
Caloocan City, who conducted the examination on the evidence seized from the accused-
appellant.
PO3 Ramon Galvez testified that he was ordered by their chief to conduct a
surveillance operation to verify reported illegal drug selling activities in Don Antonio
Street, Barangay19, Caloocan City. A confidential informant told the police that a certain
"Keempee," who would later on be identified as the herein accused-appellant, was
notoriously selling marijuanain the area. A buy-bust team was thereafter formed. A
hundred peso bill, marked with PO3 Galvez’s initials, was prepared. To send a signal to the
other members of the buy-bust team of the consummation of the transaction with the
accused-appellant, PO3 Galvez was instructed to throw a lit cigarette.
The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. PO3 Galvez and the informant saw
the accused-appellant near the front door of his house, stripping marijuana leaves. PO3
Galvez approached the house, uttered "Keempee, pakuha nga ng damo, halagang isang
daan," and gave the latter the 100.00 marked money. The accused-appellant Gil then held
ten (10) pieces of plastic, which appeared to contain marijuana and white pieces of paper,
placed them inside a Marlboro pack, and handed them all to PO3 Galvez. When PO3 Galvez
threw a lit cigarette, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito joined him in arresting the accused-appellant,
who was apprised of his constitutional rights. After a further search, one transparent plastic
box containing what likewise appeared to be dried marijuana leaves, one plastic sachet with
white pieces of paper, and a few empty transparent plastic sachets were also seized from
the accused-appellant.
PO3 Galvez marked the ten (10) plastic sachets with "GSG/RG 11/12/07" representing
his and the accused-appellant’s initials and the date the imprint was made. The rest of the
items seized were also marked. Accused-appellant Gil and the seized items were thereafter
taken to the police station and turned over to SPO1 Moran, who prepared the letter request
for laboratory examination. The crime laboratory tested the seized items and found the
same to be marijuana.
The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulations of fact regarding PCI
Arturo’s (1) receipt of a letter request for laboratory examination of ten (10) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing white pieces of paper and dried marijuana
fruiting/flowering tops; (2) conduct of a laboratory examination Science Report No. D-382-
07 stating therein the result of the laboratory examination. The RTC found the accused
guilty CA affirmed.
Page 1373 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution had complied with the procedural requirements
mandated by Section 21of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
with respect to the chain of custody over the evidence seized
Ruling:
Yes.
PO3 Galvez positively testified that he marked the ten (10) plastic sachets containing
marijuana and the pieces of white paper while still in the place where the accused-appellant
was arrested, and in the presence of the latter. PO2 Hipolito did the same relative to the
plastic container with marijuana likewise found in the accused-appellant’s possession.
When the members of the buy-bust team arrived in the police station, they turned-over
the person of the accused-appellant and the items seized from him to SPO1 Moran, who in
turn, prepared the Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and letter request for laboratory
examination. Thereafter, PCI Arturo conducted the laboratory examinations and found the
specimens to be marijuana. These were the same items identified by the prosecution
witnesses and presented to the trial court as evidence.
The accused-appellant lamented that the evidence seized were not photographed
and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media, a representative from the DOJ,
and an elective government official. While this factual allegation is admitted, the Court
stresses that what Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 requires is "substantial" and not
necessarily "perfect adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The accused-appellant attempted to establish that there was a breach in the chain
of custody over the evidence seized from him by pointing out that SPO1 Moran twice
delivered the items to the crime laboratory – at first to a certain PO1 Bolora and later, to
PCI Arturo. The Court notes that despite the foregoing allegation, the defense agreed with
the prosecution to dispense with the testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo. The
parties entered into stipulations and admissions of facts as regards the participation of the
aforementioned two. This is no less than an admission on the part of the defense that there
was nothing irregular in SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo’s performance of their duties relative
to preserving the integrity of the evidence which fell in their custody. Had the accused-
appellant sincerely believed that there was indeed a breach in the chain of custody over the
Page 1374 of 1553

seized items, he would have insisted on putting SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo on the witness
stand for cross-examination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER RENATO EDANO y EBDANE

G.R. No. 188133, July 07, 2014, J. Brion
Edano was acquitted because the shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible
in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the prosecution's
failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody
requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to
adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. Although the Court has recognized
that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused, the Court have also declared that when there is gross disregard of the
procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious uncertainty
is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.
Facts:
On the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement
Group, together with a female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds, West
Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against a certain alias “Nato”.
At around 7:00 p.m., Edano arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The
informant approached Edano and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the
informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching Edano, the latter went
out of the vehicle and ran away. The officers chased Edano and thereafter recovered a
“knot-tied” transparent plastic bag from Edano and seized a gun tucked in Edano's waist.
The other members of the police arrested Siochi.
Thereafter, the police brought the Edano, Siochi and the seized items to the police
station for investigation. The seized items were examined and were found positive for the
presence of shabu.
The RTC found Edano guilty of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable
doubt. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid
Page 1375 of 1553

Ruling:
1. No. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto.
“For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two

requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that
could be properly attributed to Edano to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he
had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact,
PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each
other when he approached them.
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, Edano and the informant were just talking to
each other; there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car.
Notably, while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that
this was not the pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been
consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal
knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when
he approached it.
That Edano attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant
and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal
knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity. Trying to run away when no crime has been
overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
Considering that the Edano's warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white
crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an
invalid search and seizure.
Page 1376 of 1553

Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the Edano's warrantless arrest was
valid, the latter’s acquittal is still in order due to the prosecution’s failure to establish the
evidence of the corpus delicti with moral certainty.
The Court stresses that “[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua
non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the
very corpus delicti of the crimes.” Thus, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the various lapses – enumerated and discussed below –
committed by the police in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug
tainted the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.
First, the Court finds it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers would
let the appellant mark the drugs seized from him, instead of doing the marking themselves.
Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. “Consistency with
the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure
that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation.”
Second, the police did not inventory or photograph the seized drugs, whether at the
place of confiscation or at the police station. The required procedure on the seizure and
custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which
states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereo.
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the
handling and safekeeping of the seized items. “We stress that it is the prosecution who has
the positive duty to establish.
Page 1377 of 1553

Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures
under R.A. No. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared
that when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the
substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the
seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This doubt cannot be remedied
by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for
a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively
produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMONITO VILLARTA Y RIVERA and ALLAN

ARMENTA Y CABILES
G.R. No. 205610, July 30, 2014, J. Perez
The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts
as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show
by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time
it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. The facts in the case
persuasively proved that the three plastic sachets of ephedrine presented in court were the
same items seized from the Villarta and Cabiles during the buy-bust operation. The integrity
and evidentiary value thereof were duly preserved.
Facts:
A confidential informant arrived and spoke with Police Inspector Pamor wherein he
gave the tip that a certain Monet was selling shabu. As a result, Pamor conducted a short
briefing wherein Pamor instructed PO1 Mapula to prepare a pre-operational report to be
submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and directed PO1 Caparas
to act as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Cambronera was to serve as his back-up.
The following day, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the confidential informant
called and told a member of the SAID-SOTF that Monet was already in the target place.
Subsequently, the buy-bust team met with the former at a market terminal. When they
reached Cupa Compound, the latter secretly told PO2 Caparas that Monet was standing at
the alley. They approached Monet. He told Monet that he would buy P200.00 worth of
shabu after which, he handed Monet the money. At this point, a male person arrived and
asked Monet: "Pare, meron pa ba?" Monet retorted: "Dalawang piraso na lang ito." The male
person then gave Monet P100.00. Immediately thereafter, Monet handed one sachet to PO2
Caparas and the other one to the male person. PO2 Caparas examined the sachet and gave
Page 1378 of 1553

the pre-arranged signal by wearing his cap. He then introduced himself as a police officer,
and arrested Monet who was identified as herein appellant Ramonito Villarta y Rivera.
When the other members of the team arrived, PO2 Caparas told PO2 Cambronero that the
other male person was also possessing shabu. In a bit, he was also apprehended and
identified later on as herein appellant Allan Armenta y Cabiles alias Ambo. PO2 Caparas
recovered from Monet the marked money and one plastic sachet while PO2 Cambronero
recovered from Ambo the other plastic sachet. Both PO2 Caparas and PO2 Cambronero
marked the items they had seized.
At the police station, PO1 Mapula prepared the requests for drug test and laboratory
examination. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemical Officer Go received the above-mentioned requests
and conducted laboratory tests on the subject specimens. The seized drugs gave positive
result for ephedrine, a dangerous drug. Likewise, the drug tests showed that the respective
urine samples of Monet and Ambo were positive for methamphetamine and THC
metabolites, both of which are dangerous drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not Villarta alias Monet and Cabiles alias Ambo are not guilty of Illegal
possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs for failure to comply with the provision of
Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Chain
of Custody Rule.
Ruling:
No.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21, paragraph 1 of
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Under the proviso, non-compliance with the
stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the implementing rules is centered
on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The chain of
custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by
records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time
Page 1379 of 1553
it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.
In the case at bench, after PO2 Caparas seized and confiscated the one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of ephedrine, which was the subject of the
sale transaction, as well as the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03
gram of ephedrine, which was recovered from appellant Villarta after he was arrested and
ordered to empty his pocket, and the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, the
former immediately marked the seized drugs at the place of arrest. He put the markings
RRV/RRC 04-20-06 on the seized drug subject of the sale and the markings RRV/RRC on
the seized drug recovered from appellant Villarta. PO2 Cambronero, the immediate back-
up of PO2 Caparas, also recovered from appellant Armenta one-heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of ephedrine. PO2 Cambronero, who was then beside
PO2 Caparas, similarly marked the seized drug from appellant Armenta at the place of
arrest. They then brought the appellants, together with the seized items at their station.
Where PO1 Mapula, the investigating officer, prepared the Request for Laboratory
Examination, the Request for Drug Test and the Affidavit of Arrest of PO2
Caparas. Thereafter, PO2 Caparas personally brought all the seized items to the crime
laboratory for examination. The seized items were examined by P/Sr. Insp. Go and they all
yielded positive results for ephedrine, a dangerous drug. When the seized items were
offered in court, they were all properly identified by the prosecution witnesses. These facts
persuasively proved that the three plastic sachets of ephedrine presented in court were the
same items seized from the Villarta and Cabiles during the buy-bust operation. The
integrity and evidentiary value thereof were duly preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO CERDON y SANCHEZ

G.R. No. 201111, August 6, 2014, J. Perez
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated in the presence of
representatives from the media and the DOJ pursuant to said guidelines does not
automatically render appellant’s arrest illegal or the item seized from him inadmissible. A
proviso was added in the implementing rules that "non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
Page 1380 of 1553

Facts:
Alfredo Cerdon y Sanchez was charged for violation of Sec. 5 of Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. The prosecution presented as witnesses, PO1 Michael Yusi (PO1 Yusi), who
acted as poseur-buyer, and PO3 Henry Laxamana (PO3 Laxamana), a back-up operative
who assisted PO1 Yusi.
Based on their testimonies, it was established that acting on a tip from an asset that
a certain "Fred" was selling shabu in his residence. Hence, the Chief of Police of Mabalacat
Police Station formed a buy-bust team composing of PO1 Yusi and PO3 Laxamana. PO1 Yusi
was then given two One Hundred Peso bills to be used as buy-bust money. He marked his
initials "MVY" on the bills. On the same day, the team proceeded to Cerdon’s residence.
PO1 Yusi was introduced by the asset to a certain Fred, who later was identified as Alfredo
Cerdon. Cedron asked from PO1 Yusi how much shabu the latter would buy, then went
inside the house and came out a few minutes later handing one plastic sachet of shabu to
PO1 Yusi in exchange for P200.00. After the exchange, PO1 Yusi made the pre-arranged
signal of scratching his head. PO3 Laxamana and PO3 Agustin rushed to the scene while
PO1 Yusi introduced himself as a police officer. PO3 Laxamana confiscated the marked
money from Cedron. Cedron then brought to the barangay hall where the confiscation
receipt was prepared. PO1 Yusi likewise placed his markings on the confiscated shabu.
Thereafter, appellant was brought to the police station.
Cedron denied all charges stating that three male persons entered his house. He
recognized them as PO1 Yusi, PO3 Laxamana and PO3 Agustin. These three police officers
poked their guns on him while PO1 Yusi searched his room. While he was held at the
kitchen, he heard PO1 Yusi utter the word "bingo”. He was immediately arrested but he
resisted. A commotion ensued before the barangay chairman arrived. The barangay
chairman asked Cedron to go with the police officers to the barangay hall. Afterwards,
Cedron was brought to the police station.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Cedron guilty of violation of Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165.
In his appeal, Cedron avers that there was no testimony which proves that the police
officers complied with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 in effecting his arrest and in the
subsequent disposition of the prohibited drug involved. Cedron asserts that there was no
evidence presented to show that the police officers conducted an inventory, and took
photographs, of the confiscated items in his presence, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ). Furthermore he points out that the confiscation receipt
was neither prepared by the police officers in the presence of the media representative and
Page 1381 of 1553

the DOJ, nor was it signed by the latter. Furthermore, appellant claims that the police
officers presented no valid justification as to their non-compliance with the procedural
mandates of the law.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish an unbroken chain of

custody of the confiscated drug
Ruling:
Yes.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated in the presence of
representatives from the media and the DOJ pursuant to said guidelines does not
automatically render appellant’s arrest illegal or the item seized from him inadmissible. A
proviso was added in the implementing rules that "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Pertinently, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti.
PO1 Yusi was able to put the necessary markings on the plastic sachet of shabu
seized from appellant at the police station. The general rule is that "marking" of the seized
items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually
the ones offered in evidence – should be done, (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. To be able to create a first link in the chain
of custody, then, what is required is that the marking should be made in the presence of
the accused and upon immediate confiscation. In People v. Gum-Oyen, a testimony that
included the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the
accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking
upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team.
Page 1382 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO BALAQUIOT y BALDERAMA

G.R. No. 206366, August 13, 2014, J. Perez
To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, what is required is that the
marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation.
"Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen, testimony
that included the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the
accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking
upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team.
Facts:
On 11 June 2008, Eduardo Balaquiot y Balderama was arrested during a buy bust
operation performed by officers of the PNP in Camiling, Tarlac. He was charged with the
offense of illegal sale of shabu under an Information filed before the RTC of Tarlac.
During trial, the prosecution presented, the following object evidence: 1 heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.049 grams of white crystalline substance; dated "11
June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB," and Chemistry Report D-184-085. It is
supplemented by the testimonies of Police Officer Jay Espiritu, Special Police Officer Noli
Daraman and police chemist Jebie. PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman were the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of Balderama. Their
testimonies recounted the following events. On 11 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1
Daraman engaged in a buy-bust operation against Balderama after receiving confirmation
from the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Camiling PNP that he was involved in the
peddling of shabu.
PO3 Espiritu met with the Balderama outside the latter’s residence. While, SPO1
Daraman hid behind a tree about 10-20 meters from where PO3 Espiritu and Balderama
were standing. PO3 Espiritu was able to successfully purchase one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet. In exchange, PO3 Espiritu handed a previously marked P500
bill. After the transaction, PO3 Espiritu arrest Balderama. SPO1 Daraman, who was able to
witness the exchange, emerged from his hiding place and aided in the arrest.
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman retrieved from appellant the marked P500 bill; call
the barangay officials to witness the inventory of the plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance and the marked money. Photographs of the plastic sachet, the marked
bill were also taken. They brought Balderama and the items to the Camiling PNP station.
Page 1383 of 1553

The plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance were then dated "11 June 2008"
and marked with "JSE-EBB"—the initials of both PO3 Espiritu and the appellant.
On 12 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory the
plastic sachet, now dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB," along with a request for
laboratory examination. Mr. Timario, is a police chemist for the Camiling PNP and the one
who conducted laboratory examination on the contents of the plastic sachet. He is also the
signatory of Chemistry Report D-184-08 and he was able to confirm the contents of the
plastic sachet as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The defense,
relied on the testimonies of Balderama and his brother, Exequil Balaquit. Balderama denied
being caught, in flagrante, selling shabu and claimed that he was merely a victim of a police
frame-up. Exequil corroborated the denial of his brother.
RTC rendered a decision finding Balderama guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal sale of shabu under Section 512 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu, SPO1
Daraman and Mr. Timario. RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The CA rendered a decision affirming the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Balderama is entitled to his acquittal for the charges against him
because the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged.
Ruling:
We find that the corpus delicti of the offense was adequately proven in this case.
Corpus delicti of the offense proven beyond reasonable doubt
A review of the evidence on record will show that the prosecution was able to
establish an unbroken chain of custody over the shabu that it claims as having been sold
by the Balderama: 1. PO3 Espiritu testified that he was able to buy P500.00 worth of shabu
inside a transparent plastic sachet from balderama which he brought to the Camiling PNP
station. 2. Upon arrival at the station, PO3 Espiritu Espiritu testified that he dated the
plastic sachet "11 June 2008" a marked it with "JSE-EBB." A request for laboratory
examination was prepared. 3. The next day, plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and marked
"JSE-EBB" was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory along with the request for laboratory
examination. 4. At the PNP Crime Laboratory, Mr. Timario conducted examination on the
Page 1384 of 1553

contents of the plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB" that yielded
positive results for shabu. 5. Afterwards, the shabu was retrieved for purposes of the trial.
The prosecution was able to account for each and every link in the chain of custody
over the shabu, from the moment it was retrieved during the buy-bust operation up to the
time it was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti.
Contrary to Balderama’s assertion, the failure by PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman to
mark the seized shabu immediately at the place where the buy-bust was conducted will not
automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody so established. Strictly speaking,
marking the seized contraband at the nearest police station,rather than at the place where
the buy-bust operation was conducted, is not even a violation of the procedure set forth in
Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Thus, in People v.
Resurreccion, this Court explained:
Balderama broaches the view that SA Isidoro’s failure to mark the confiscated shabu
immediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the drug’s identity. People v.
Sanchez,however, explains that RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for "immediate
marking," or where said marking should be done:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify
is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the
evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the
place of arrest. Consistency with the enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation.
To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that
the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation.
"Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen, testimony
that included the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of
the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody.
Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team.
Page 1385 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOSTHENES BONTUYAN

G.R. No. 206912, September 10, 2014, J. Perez
Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or

animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation. Also, it is worthy to mention that failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render the arrest of the accused
Bontuyan illegal or the item seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The essential thing to
consider is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
Here, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the seized items from
accused appellant was preserved.
Facts:
By virtue of Search Warrant No. 07-05-F issued by the court a quo against accused
appellant Demosthenes Bontuyan (Bontuyan), a team ofPolice Officers headed by P/Supt.
Pablo Labra, with members PO2 Tahanlangi designated as the Searcher and SPO1 Petallar
as the Recorder, together with some SWAT and CIIB members implemented the said
warrant on July 26, 2005, at around 4:55 early dawn at Sitio Dita, Barangay Pulangbato,
Cebu City.
With the assistance of PO1 Luardo, one of the deponents for the issuance of the
Search Warrant, the team was able to locate the residence of Bontuyan. Upon their arrival,
PO2 Tahanlangit saw Bontuyan sleeping. He knocked the door calling the Bontuyan’s
attention; informed him that they have a search warrant; and ordered him to read the same.
After reading the warrant, Bontuyan requested that his brother, Barangay Councilor
Segundo Bontuyan, Jr. (Councilor Bontuyan), be summoned to witness the search, which
the police officers granted. In less thanone (1) minute and being a neighbour of Bontuyan,
Councilor Bontuyan arrived at the subject house and read the search warrant.
Thenceforth, the searcher PO2 Tahanlangit, together with SPO1 Petallar, witnesses
Councilor Bontuyan and Barangay Tanod Lucio Leyson (Barangay Tanod Leyson),
conducted the search first in the sala where he found no illicit items. They went to the
room where he found one (1) tin foil, two (2) used candles, one (1) disposable lighter, (and)
one (1) folded long tissue paper found on top of a small wooden stool. When they proceeded
to the lower portion ofthe house, PO2 Tahanlangit found a plastic container with a name
Centrum. Councilor Bontuyan opened the container and found therein twenty (20) small
packs of white crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
Page 1386 of 1553

PO2 Tahanlangit turned over the confiscated items to SPO1 Petallar for proper
inventory. The latter, who was designated as the "Recorder" then prepared a Receipt and a
Certificate of Good Conduct of the Search which were duly signed by Councilor Bontuyan
and Barangay Tanod Leyson. Bontuyan refused to sign them.
The police officers then placed Bontuyan under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and proceeded to the Police Station with the confiscated items. SPO1
Petallar took custody of the evidence and marked the twenty (20) plastic sachets with SW-
DB-1 to SW-DB-20.
The defense presented another version of the story. The corroborative testimonies
of Bontuyan, his brother Councilor Bontuyan and Barangay Tanod Leyson showed that on
July 26, 2004 at around 4 o’clock in the morning, accused was sleeping at the house of his
deceased parents when somebody woke him up. He turned the lights on and saw some
police officers in uniform informing him that they are conducting a raid in his house.
Showing no authority to search the house, accused argued that the said search cannot be
done. He also requested that his brother be ordered to witness the search, which the police
officers acceded.
While accused’s brother was being fetched by one of the implementing officers, he
stayed in the living room. Thereafter, they placed a plastic bottle of Pharmaton vitamins in
the table.
Just across the house subject of the raid, Segundo Bontuyan, Jr., accused’s brother,
was sleeping in their house when he was awakened by police officers who commanded him
to go with them to witness the search. When he reached his parents’ house, he saw his
brother being handcuffed in the nook of the house.
When Councilor Bontuyan arrived, the police officers commanded him to open the
plastic bottle and when he did so, they declared that the small packs inside it were shabu.
They then introduced themselves as police officers and informed the accused that they
were conducting a raid. The accused got scared but did not resistor attempt to run. He was
then brought to the police station.
Barangay Tanod Leyson testified that when he arrived at the place of the raid, he
saw accused seated in the house already handcuffed. The police officers then announced
that they should start and subsequently opened the bottle placed on top of the table. When
the bottle was opened, the police officers uttered that there was shabu. Later, he was
instructed to sign a piece of document. He requested permission to go home and left the
place.
Page 1387 of 1553

The RTC rendered a Joint Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for violations of Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 9165. On intermediate
appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Joint Decision in convicting the accused-
appellant. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the
prosecution was sufficient to convict Bontuyan for violations of Sections 11 and 12, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling:
No, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the decisions of the RTC and
the CA. Bontuyan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 11and12,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
In resolving the issue, Bontuyan seeks before this Court to delve into the factual
matters of the case. However, settled is the rule that factual findings of the appellate court
affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing
that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error. Considering that Bontuyan failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, these findings
deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. Besides, an assiduous review
of the records at hand reveals that the CA did not err in affirming Bontuyan’s conviction.
By way of emphasis, we have adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal
possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. In the case at bench, all these elements
were duly established by the prosecution. As aptly pointed out by the appellate court:
Despite the presence of such inconsistencies, the categorical fact remains, as proven
by the implementing police officers, that there were indeed illegal drugs and paraphernalia
recovered from the house of the Bontuyan where he was the sole occupant. With positive
and straight-forward declarations, the police officers proved that the seized items
composing the twenty (20) sachets marked with SW-DB-1 to SW-DB-20 and the shabu
paraphernalia – one (1) disposable lighter, one (1) tin foil strip, two (2) used candles and
one (1) long tissue paper – were the same illicit items recovered during the implementation
Page 1388 of 1553

of the search warrant issued against accused appellant. What assumes primary importance
in drug cases is the prosecution’s proof, to the point of moral certainty, that the prohibited
drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from
his possession. In the same vein, the testimonial evidence coincides and concurs with the
pieces of object evidence presented before the Court affording greater strength to the case
of the prosecution. Certainly, Bontuyan was found to have in his possession 7.04 grams of
shabu and some drug paraphernalia. There was nothing in the records showing that he had
authority to possess them. And jurisprudence is rich in pronouncing that mere possession
of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. Worst,
Bontuyan likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his possession of the shabu
and drug paraphernalia; hence, his guilt was indeed established beyond reasonable doubt.
Also, it is worthy to mention that failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render the arrest of the Bontuyan
illegal or the item seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The essential thing to
consider is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused." Thus, applying the foregoing principle in the case at bench, the chain of
custody of the seized prohibited drugs was adequately established herein.
Admittedly, a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is

almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. What is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. Here, there
was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the seized items from accused
appellant was preserved.
While it is true that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven
guilty, the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own strength and not rely on the
weakness of the evidence of the defense. In this case, the quantum of evidence necessary
to prove accused appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been sufficiently met.
Accordingly, the prosecution was able to overcome Bontuyan’s constitutional right to be
presumed innocent.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWARD ADRIANO y SALES

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 deals with the procedure for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs. As provided for in its Implementing Rules
and pointed out by the Court in a long line of cases, non-compliance therewith does not
Page 1389 of 1553

invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized from him
as inadmissible as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved.
This can be made if the prosecution will be successful in establishing an unbroken chain of
custody of the seized item from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in court.
Facts:
In an Information dated October 25, 2008, Edward Adriano y Sales (Adriano) was
charged of the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under Section 5, Article II of the
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act (CDDA) of 2002, by
selling, delivering, and giving away to a poseur buyer, zero point twelve (0.12) gram of a
white crystalline substance, commonly known as "shabu" which is a dangerous drug, in
consideration of the amount of Two Hundred Pesos (Php200.00).
During trial, the prosecution presented Police Officer 1 Teodoro Morales (PO1
Morales), who testified that acting on a report received from a barangay official and an
informant that Adriano was selling drugs in North Daang Hari, Taguig City, Police Chief
Inspector Porfirio Calagan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap
Adriano, designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking the buy-bust money
consisting of ten P100.00 bills with the initials "PC". After briefing, PO1 Morales, together
with the informant and his team, proceeded to North Daang Hari where PO1 Morales
bought P200.00 worth of shabu from Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked money and
after receiving a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, PO1 Morales signaled
his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Ronnie Fabroa immediately arrested Adriano. The marked
money confiscated from Adriano was brought to the police station for investigation, while
the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which was marked with "ESA-
251008" at the crime scene was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory by PO2 Vergelio Del Rosario, who also prepared the letter-request. In the PNP
Crime Laboratory, the result of the laboratory examination conducted by Police/Senior
Inspector Yelah Manaog confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Eventually, the RTC found Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. On appeal, Adriano argued that the shabu allegedly seized from his possession is
inadmissible because of the following reasons: (1) the warrantless arrest on his person is
invalid; and (2) the arresting officers violated Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC arguing that even if the prosecution failed to comply with the
requirements provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not render
the seized items inadmissible in evidence.
Page 1390 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 renders the items
seized as inadmissible.
Ruling:
No, will not render it inadmissible.
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following two (2) elements
must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In the case at bar,
the prosecution successfully established the said elements in the following manner: (1) to
account that the transaction or sale indeed took place, PO1 Morales narrated the
transaction in a clear and direct manner; and (2) the seized illegal drugs and marked money
were presented before the trial court as proof of the identity of the object of the crime and
of the corpus delicti.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 deals with the procedure for the custody and disposition
of confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs. As repeatedly noted by the Court,
the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 offer some measure of flexibility through the
proviso, "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items". Otherwise stated, non-compliance does not invalidate the seizure or
render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved.
To prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved,
the Implementing Rules allow the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody
of the seized item, which in this case, has been duly established by the prosecution. "Chain
of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
In the case at bar, the details of the unbroken chain of custody as found by the CA:
The first link in the chain of custody is from the time PO1 Morales took
possession of the plastic sachet of shabu from accused-appellant and marked
the same with the initials "EAS", to the time the plastic sachet of shabu was
brought to the Police Station. The Certificate of Inventory for the items
Page 1391 of 1553

seized from accused-appellant was signed by PO1 Morales, PO2 Ronnie

Fabroa, and the accused-appellant. The second link in the chain of custody
is from the time the plastic sachet of shabu was brought from the Police
Station, to the PNP Crime Laboratory. A letter-request was made for the
laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachet of shabu seized
from accused-appellant. The letter-request, and plastic sachet of shabu, were
delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory by PO2 Del Rosario. Per Chemistry
Report No. D-334-08 prepared by Police Senior Inspector Yelah Manaog, the
contents of the plastic sachet tested positive for shabu.
Thus, despite the arresting officers’ failure to strictly observe the requirements of
Section 21 on the custody and disposition of the seized items, the violation of the CDDA of
2002 was duly proven. The arresting officers duly recorded the movements and custody of
the seized items from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping up to presentation in court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARVE JOHN LAGAHIT

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Record shows that while
the identities of the seller and the buyer and the consummation of the transaction involving
the sale of illegal drug have been proven by the prosecution, this Court, nonetheless, finds the
prosecution evidence to be deficient for failure to adequately show the essential links in the
chain of custody, particularly how the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes subject
of the sale transaction came into the hands of PO3 Lawas, Jr. from the trusted informant,
who was the designated poseur-buyer. Going to the crime of illegal possession of marijuana,
the records do not contain any physical inventory report or photograph of the confiscated
items. Even the lone prosecution witness never stated in his testimony that he or any member
of the buy-bust team had conducted a physical inventory or taken pictures of the items.
Although PO3 Lawas, Jr. testified that the seized drugs subject of the illegal possession case
had been marked, nowhere can it be found that the marking thereof was done in the presence
of Lagahit or any third-party representatives.
Page 1392 of 1553

Facts:
Based on the reports of teachers of Barangay Lahug Elementary School and on the
information gathered by the trusted informant who is a resident of the place, regarding the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs in the area and that the Lagahit was among the perpetrators,
PO3 Lawas, Jr., being the community cop together with two barangay tanod formed a buy-
bust team to conduct a buy-bust operation against Lagahit. PO3 Lawas, Jr., the team leader,
designated his trusted informant to act as the poseur-buyer while he and the two barangay
tanod were to serve as back-ups. At the target area, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay
tanod positioned themselves on the opposite side of the road near the target area. On the
other hand, the trusted informant, who is the designated poseurbuyer, immediately
approached Lagahit upon seeing the latter. The trusted informant handed the P20.00 peso
bill marked money to Lagahit and the latter, in turn, gave four sticks of handrolled
marijuana cigarettes to the former. Upon the consummation of the sale, the trusted
informant executed at once their prearranged signal by taking off his bull cap. Without a
do, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod crossed the road to apprehend Lagahit. But,
before they could do so, another person approached Lagahit and walked with him towards
the opposite side of the road. Nonetheless, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod
followed them until they apprehended the Lagahit. Lagahit’s companion, on the other
hand, managed to escape. After the Lagahit was handcuffed, PO3 Lawas, Jr. recovered from
the pocket of the former eight more sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes. The P20.00
peso bill marked money and the cash money amounting to P90.00, consisting of three
piecesP20.00 peso bills and six pieces P5.00 peso coins, believed to be proceeds of Lagahit’s
illegal activities, were also recovered from the latter’s possession.
Lagahit was, thereafter, brought to the barangay hall and was later transferred to
the Mabolo Police Station. All the seized items remained with PO3 Lawas, Jr. until they
reached the police station. Upon arrival thereat, Barangay Tanod Nicor marked the four
sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes, which were the subject of the sale transaction,
with BBCJLR 08292003. While the other eight sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes,
which were recovered from the possession of the Lagahit during his arrest, were marked by
PO3 Lawas, Jr. with CJLR-08292003-18. Afterwards, all the marked pieces of evidence,
together with a Request for Laboratory Examination of the same, were brought by PO3
Lawas, Jr. to the PNP Crime Laboratory. All specimens yielded positive result for the
presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.
Issue:
Whether or not Lagahit is guilty of illegal sale and possession of illegal drugs.
Ruling:
Page 1393 of 1553
No.
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Record shows that while
the identities of the seller and the buyer and the consummation of the transaction involving
the sale of illegal drug have been proven by the prosecution, this Court, nonetheless, finds
the prosecution evidence to be deficient for failure to adequately show the essential links
in the chain of custody, particularly how the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes
subject of the sale transaction came into the hands of PO3 Lawas, Jr. from the trusted
informant, who was the designated poseur-buyer.
PO3 Lawas, Jr.’s testimony was lacking as to when, where and how the said four
sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes sold by Lagahit to the trusted informant were
turned over to him by the latter. Considering that PO3 Lawas, Jr. was not the poseur-buyer
and he was not even with the poseur buyer during the sale transaction as he was on the
opposite side of the road, the turning over to him by the trusted informant of the four sticks
of handrolled marijuana cigarettes sold Lagahit was the supposed first link in the chain of
custody. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish the same. This Court cannot
overlook this evidentiary gap as it involves the identification of the sold four sticks of
handrolled marijuana cigarettes. In the absence of the aforesaid link in the chain of custody,
doubt arises if, indeed, the recovered four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes that
PO3 Lawas, Jr. brought to the barangay hall and then to the Mabolo Police Station;
subsequently marked by Barangay Tanod Nicor; later brought to the crime laboratory; and
examined by the forensic chemist, which yielded positive for marijuana, were the same
drugs actually sold by Lagahit to the trusted informant.
Now, going to the crime of illegal possession of marijuana, there is also no doubt
that the prosecution was able to fully satisfy all the elements of the crime. The prosecution,
however, failed to show that the apprehending team complied with the required procedure
for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs
set forth in Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. In the present case, the records
are bereft of any indication that would show that the prosecution was able to establish the
apprehending team’s compliance with the procedural safeguards. The records similarly do
not contain any physical inventory report or photograph of the confiscated items. Even the
lone prosecution witness never stated in his testimony that he or any member of the buy-
bust team had conducted a physical inventory or taken pictures of the items. Although PO3
Lawas, Jr. testified that the seized drugs subject of the illegal possession case had been
Page 1394 of 1553

marked, nowhere can it be found that the marking thereof was done in the presence of
Lagahit or any third-party representatives.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN CABRERA

When an accused raises the issue of non-compliance by the police officers with [Sec.
21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165] particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized
specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof on appeal after the CA rendered a
decision, the Court must uphold his conviction. [Cabrera] should have raised the said issue
before the trial court. Truly, objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal;
when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal.
Facts:
After receiving information from informants and a report from a confidential asset,
police operatives, namely PO1 Palconit, PO3 Cabuenas, and PO2 Cunan conducted a buy-
bust operation against Accused-appellant Cabrera on September 30, 2002. At about 4:30
p.m., poseur-buyer PO1 Palconit, together with the confidential asset, approached Cabrera
who was standing outside his house. The confidential asset introduced PO1 Palconit to
Cabrera as a person who wanted to buy shabu. PO1 Palconit gave Cabrera two marked
PhP50.00 bills, while the latter handed to him two plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance. Thereupon, PO1 Palconit made the pre-arranged signal by touching
his head with his right hand. His back-ups then rushed to the scene and simultaneously
therewith PO1 Palconit arrested the appellant. He then wrote the markings “EC” on the two
plastic sachets and brought the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Labo-
ratory for forensic examination.
Thereafter, a complaint/information was filed against appellant charging him with

violation of Sec. 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165 as amended. The chemistry report from the
PNP Crime Laboratory later revealed that the two plastic sachets marked with “EC” tested
positive for shabu, a dangerous drug. Cabrera pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged and
interposed a denial.
The RTC convicted Cabrera of the crime charged which was affirmed by the CA.
Cabrera in his ultimate appeal raised as additional assignment of errors the lack of physical
inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of its photograph pursuant to Sec. 21
of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.
Page 1395 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not Cabrera should be held guilty for violating R.A. No. 9165 in spite
certain procedural lapses of the arresting officers.
Ruling:
Yes, Cabrera can still be held liable.
With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Sec. 21 of the IRR of
R.A. No. 9165 as alleged by appellant in his Supplemental Brief, particularly the lack of
physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof, the
Court notes that [Cabrera] raised the same only in this appeal.
The records of the case is bereft of any showing that [Cabrera] objected before the
RTC regarding the seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the
failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of the said drugs.
The only time that [Cabrera] questioned the chain of custody was before the CA but not on
the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of photograph, but on the alleged
gap between the time of confiscation of the specimen and the time of its submission to the
PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to do
so. [Cabrera] should have raised the said issue before the trial court.
In similar cases, the Court brushed aside the [Cabrera's] belated contention that the
illegal drugs confiscated from his person were inadmissible because the arresting officers
failed to comply with [Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165]. Whatever justifiable grounds
may excuse the police officers from literally complying with [Sec. 21] will remain unknown,
because [Cabrera] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from
him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection.
Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. Besides
and as already mentioned, the CA had already aptly concluded that the identity of the
seized drugs was established by the prosecution and its integrity preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELCHOR D. BRITA

The Court finds that the prosecution was able to show the unbroken chain of
custody/possession of the seized item from the moment the sale was consummated, until it
Page 1396 of 1553

was tested in the crime laboratory, and up to the time it was offered in evidence. Clearly, its
integrity and evidentiary value have not been compromised at any stage.
Facts:
On October 24, 2002, 2 separate Informations were filed against appellant Brita
before the RTC. One was for selling shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
as amended, and the other for illegal possession of shabu, in violation of Section 11, Article
II of the same law.
After his arraignment wherein he pleaded not guilty, Brita filed a Petition for Bail.
During the bail hearing, the prosecution presented PO2 Archibald Tejero and PO3 Edgar
Orias. They narrated that in the afternoon of October 23, 2002, upon being told by a
confidential informant that a certain "Boboy" (appellant Brita) was engaged in selling of
illegal drugs, Police Inspector Eduardo Paningbatan (P/Insp. Paningbatan), Chief of the
Taguig Police Station, set up a buy-bust team. PO2 Tejero was designated as the poseur-
buyer and was given P500.00 as buy-bust money marked with "AT."
At about 4:30 p.m., the buy-bust team went to the house of Brita. The informant
with PO2 Tejero, called Brita who came out of his house and approached them. After having
been introduced, PO2 Tejero gave Brita the marked money. In return, Brita took from his
pocket a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and handed the same to PO2
Tejero. Thereupon, PO3 Orias and the rest of the team rushed to the scene. After he was
placed under arrest, PO2 Tejero recovered from Brita the buy-bust money. While, PO3
Orias frisked appellant and found in his possession two plastic sachets containing
suspected shabu. PO3 Orias marked the recovered plastic sachets.
The team brought Brita and the confiscated items to the Taguig Police Station. After
preparing the request for laboratory examination, PO2 Tejero and the investigator brought
the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory and the substance tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In an Omnibus Order the RTC-Pasig denied both Brita's Petition for Bail and
Demurrer to Evidence as it found the evidence against him for the charge of violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 strong. However, it dismissed the case for violation of
Section 11, Article II of the same law as it found that the guilt of the accused was not proven
Subsequently, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Transfer/Re-Raffle which was
granted by RTC-Pasig. The case was re-raffled to RTC-Taguig, after finding that the
Page 1397 of 1553

evidence of the prosecution was not that strong, the court reconsidered and set aside the
RTC-Pasig Omnibus Order and allowed Brita to post bail. Meanwhile, Brita, for his defense,
proffered denial. He claimed that there was no buy-bust operation and that he was merely
a victim of frame-up.
The RTC-Taguig found Brita guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. It gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers who were
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. It ruled that the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the object evidence consisting of
the seized substance that tested positive for shabu, sufficiently established the elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA affirmed the said RTC Decision. Hence,
the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody has been properly observed.
Ruling:
The contentions of Brita deserve scant consideration.
The Court agrees with the CA that the testimonies of PO2 Tejero and PO3 Orias
established beyond reasonable doubt Brita's culpability. Their narrations of what
transpired in the afternoon of October 23, 2002, from the moment the informant disclosed
to them the illegal activities of Brita up to the time of his arrest, deserve credence as the
same emanated from the direct account of law enforcement officers who enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
It should be noted that "unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy bust team were inspired by any improper motive, their testimonies on
the operation deserve full faith and credit." while Brita is correct that the presumption of
regularity should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence, still, he must be
able to present a viable defense.
Here, what Brita interposed is merely denial and a claim of frame-up. "For the claim
of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence
to overcome the presumption of regularity," which it failed to do. Hence, the Court finds
no error on the part of the courts below in upholding the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.
Page 1398 of 1553

He contends that the police failed to comply with the requirements of the law with
regard to the handling of evidence, specifically the absence of the required physical
inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Section 21, par. 1, Article
II of RA 9165 as implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
However, it was only during appeal that Brita raised these alleged breaches in the
handling of the seized evidence. During trial, the item object of the sale was duly marked,
subjected to rigid examination, and offered as evidence. Yet, at no instance did Brita even
hint that there were lapses in its safekeeping which affected its admissibility and
evidentiary value. Besides, mere lapses in procedures need not invalidate a seizure if the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items can be shown to have been preserved. In
this regard, the Court quotes with favor the CA' s disquisition on chain of custody, viz:
Appellant sold one (1) sachet of shabu to P02 Archibald Tejero in the buy-bust
operation. P02 Tejero, after the arrest of Brita, marked the sachet "MDB-1" before turning
it over to Police Inspector Paningbatan. Back at the station, Police Inspector Paningbatan
prepared the documents for the transmittal of the sachet for laboratory examination. At
the laboratory, the sachet was received by Police Inspector Lourdeliza Gural, who found
the sachet positive for point nineteen .19 gram of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. The same sachet was identified in open court by P02 Tejero.
Hence, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to show the unbroken chain
of custody/possession of the seized item from the moment the sale was consummated, until
it was tested in the crime laboratory, and up to the time it was offered in evidence. Clearly,
its integrity and evidentiary value have not been compromised at any stage.

vs. DATSGANDAWALI y GAPAS and NOL PAGALAD y ANAS
G.R. No. 193385, December 1, 2014, J. DEL CASTILLO
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. As
long as the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved, strict
compliance of the requisites under Section 21 of RA 9165 may be disregarded. Though there
were deviations from the required procedure, i.e., making physical inventory and taking of
photograph of the seized item, still, the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug
seized from appellants were duly proven by the prosecution to have been properly preserved;
its identity, quantity and quality remained untarnished.
Page 1399 of 1553

Facts:
On July 3, 2003, an Information for Violation of Section Article II of RA 9165 was

filed against Gandawali and Pagalad.
This is the version of the Prosecution: On June 30, 2003, a confidential informant
informed the Baler Police Station 2 that a possible drug deal would take place at the corner
of Sto. Niño St. and Roosevelt Avenue, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. A buy-bust
team was thereupon created composed of P/Insp. Joseph de Vera (P/Insp. DeVera), as team
leader; PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano), as the poseur-buyer who was given a P500.00
bill as buy-bust money; and PO1 Alvin Pineda (PO1 Pineda), PO1 Ernesto Sarangaya (PO1
Sarangaya), PO2 John John Sapad (PO2 Sapad), and PO2 Eric Jorgensen (PO2Jorgensen),
as members.
The team along with the informant proceeded to the target area and arrived there
at at around 1:30 p.m. In accordance with the plan, PO2 Soriano and the informant
approached Gandawali and Pagalad, while the rest of the team positioned themselves
strategically. The informant introduced PO2 Soriano to appellants as a drug dependent
who wanted to buy shabu worth P500.00. As Pagalad first asked for payment, PO2 Soriano
gave theP500.00 billto Gandawali. Gandawali, in turn, gavethe money to Pagalad who took
a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet from his pocket. Pagalad gave the plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance to Gandawali, who then handed the same to
PO2 Soriano. Thereupon, PO2 Soriano signaled to his team members by taking off his cap.
He then arrested appellants together with PO1 Sarangaya, and the latter recovered from
Pagalad the P500.00 bill used as buy-bust money. Appellants were thereafter brought to
the Baler Police Station 2.
PO2 Soriano marked the plastic sachet with the initials "ES-6-30-03" (the initials of
PO1 Sarangaya) and together with the P500.00 bill, turned them over to the desk officer for
proper disposition. Thereafter, P/Insp. De Vera prepared a Request for Laboratory
Examination.7 On the same day, PO2 Soriano and the other team members submitted the
plastic sachet to P/Insp. Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. (P/Insp. Banac) at the Central Police
District Crime Laboratory Office where a qualitative examination of its contents was made.
The specimen, as found by P/Insp. Banac, tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Version of the Defense
Appellants denied the accusation against them and claimed extortion. Their version
of the incident is as follows: At about 6:35 a.m. of June 30, 2003, while waiting for a bus at
Litex, Fairview, Quezon City, Pagalad was arrested for unknown reason by PO1 Sarangaya.
When questioned, he told the arresting officer that he has a companion Gandawali, who
Page 1400 of 1553

was likewise later arrested. Both were then brought to Police Station 2 at Baler, Quezon
City where PO1 Sarangaya demanded from them P15,000.00 in exchange for their release.
Unfortunately, they were unable to produce the money, hence, their incarceration.
Gandawali and Pagalad explained that despite their wrongful apprehension and the
police’s act of extortion, they did not file any case against them because they were afraid
and were also unfamiliar with the procedures in filing a case. Finding sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding of guilt, the RTC convicted appellants. On appeal, the CA found no reason
to overturn appellants’ conviction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not all the elements for Violation of Section Article II of RA 9165 were
proven; and
2. Whether or not the police officers failed to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item.
Ruling:
All the elements of the offense charged were duly established by the prosecution.
The essential requirements for a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous

drugs, such as shabu are: "(1) the identity ofthe buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration ofthe sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor." Equally settled is the rule that "[t]he delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-
bust transaction." Here, the Court is satisfied that the prosecution discharged its burden of
establishing all the aforesaid elements. The prosecution positively identified appellants as
the sellers of the seized substance which was later found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Appellants sold the drug to PO2
Soriano, the police officer who acted as the poseur-buyer, and received from the latter
the P500.00 buy-bust money as payment therefor.
The integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from appellants
were duly proven by the prosecution to have been properly preserved; its identity, quantity
and quality remained untarnished.
Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure for the
custody and disposition of seized drugs. The law mandates that the officer taking initial
Page 1401 of 1553

custody of the drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct the physical
inventory of the same and take a photograph thereof in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),and any
elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof. The explicit directive of the above statutory provision notwithstanding, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the said law provide a saving clause whenever the
procedures laid down in the law are not strictly complied with.
As gleaned from a plain reading of the implementing rules, the most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as
they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. As long as the
evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved, strict compliance
of the requisites under Section 21 of RA 9165 may be disregarded.
The prosecution established that after the seizure of the small plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance and of the buy-bust money from appellants’
possession, PO2 Soriano marked the sachet with "ES 6-30-03," the initials of PO1 Sarangaya.
The police officers thereafter took appellants and the recovered items to the desk officer
who investigated the case. After the investigation, a request for laboratory examination was
prepared by P/Insp. De Vera. On the same day, the confiscated small plastic sachet bearing
the same marking, "ES-06-30-03," and the request were thereupon brought by PO2 Sapad,
a member of the team, together with PO2 Soriano and some others to the Central Police
District Crime Laboratory Office and were received by P/Insp. Banac for examination.
P/Insp. Banac conducted a laboratory examination of the 0.24 gram of white crystalline
substance found inside the plastic sachet marked with "ES-06-30-03," which per Chemistry
Report No. D-555-03 tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. During trial,
and based on the marking he placed, PO2 Soriano identified the seized item as the very
same sachet containing shabuthat he bought and recovered from appellants. He also
identified appellants to be the same persons who sold the shabu to him. Moreover, as
gleaned from the Pre-Trial Order, P/Insp. Banac, the chemist, brought the specimen
himself to the court during the scheduled hearing.
Following the above sequence of events, the Court entertains no doubt that the
sachet containing white crystalline substance sold by appellants to the poseur buyer was
the same one marked with "ES-06-30-03," which was submitted for laboratory examination,
found positive for shabu, and later presented to the court during the trial as the corpus
delicti. Contrary therefore to appellants’ claim, "the totality of evidence presented by the
prosecution leads to an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated item from
[appellants]. Though there were deviations from the required procedure, i.e., making
Page 1402 of 1553

physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized item, still, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from [appellants] were duly proven by the
prosecution to have been properly preserved; its identity, quantity and quality remained
untarnished."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VENERANDO DELA CRUZ Y SEBASTIAN,

G.R. No. 193670, December 03, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Sebastian was charged of illegal sale of drugs. He argued that failure to mention the
place where the three plastic sachets of shabu were marked constitutes a gap in the chain of
custody of evidence. The court ruled that even if there was no statement as to where the
markings were made, what is important is that the seized specimen never left the custody of
PO3 Bongon until he turned over the same to SPO1 Antonio and that thereafter, the chain of
custody was shown to be unbroken. Indeed, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized shabu is shown to have been properly preserved and the crucial links in the chain of
custody unbroken.
Facts:
Ebio, SPO3 Tuason and SPO1 Morano alighted from their vehicle. Ebio proceeded
towards the meeting place while the other two positioned themselves nearby. A few
minutes later, Sebastian riding a motorcycle arrived. The buy-bust team recognized him as
the seller based on his attire as described by him to Ebio. Ebio introduced himself as the
buyer. When Sebastian asked for payment, he gave him the buy-bust money. Sebastian
then took out two transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from
his right pocket and gave them to Ebio. Thereupon, Ebio took off his hat, the pre-arranged
signal that the transaction was already consummated. Immediately, PO3 Bongon, SPO1
Morano and SPO1 Antonio rushed towards Sebastian and apprehended him. They
recovered from him the buy-bust money and another plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. Immediately after Ebio turned over to him the two sachets subject of
the sale, PO3 Bongon marked the same with “RSB-1” and “RSB-2.”
On the other hand, he marked the third sachet recovered from the seller after he
conducted a search on him with “RSB-3.” PO3 Bongon thereafter turned over these seized
items together with the marked money to SPO1 Antonio for proper disposition. A police
investigation followed where the person arrested was identified as the appellant.
Afterwards, SPO1 Antonio brought the sachets to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for examination, during which Forensic Chemist Josephine Macura Clemen
(Clemen) found their contents positive for shabu. Sebastian argued that failure to mention
Page 1403 of 1553

the place where the three plastic sachets of shabu were marked constitutes a gap in the
chain of custody of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody of the drugs was violated
Ruling:
No. It was not violated
Chain of custody is “the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.”
It eliminates doubts concerning the proper preservation of the identity and

integrity of the corpus delicti or the shabu in this case. Marking of the seized shabu is the
initial stage in the chain of custody in buy-bust operations. As requisites, the marking must
be made in the presence of the apprehended offender and upon immediate confiscation,
and this contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team.
In this case, Ebio turned over to PO3 Bongon the two sachets of shabu sold to him
by the appellant. Together with another sachet of shabu he recovered from appellant, PO3
Bongon immediately marked each sachet with “RSB-1,” “RSB-2” and “RSB-3,” respectively,
before giving them to SPO1 Antonio. While it is true that the exact location where the
markings were made was not mentioned, it can reasonably be concluded that the same
happened during appellant’s apprehension, in transit to the police station or before the
sachets were turned over to SPO1 Antonio in the police station. Upon receipt, SPO1 Antonio
then submitted the sachets to the crime laboratory. PO2 Henry Escalora, Sr. received the
three sachets and handed them to Forensic Chemist Clemen whose examination of the
contents thereof revealed that they were positive for shabu. During trial, Forensic Chemist
Clemen presented and identified the specimens. Clearly, the prosecution was able to
establish the chain of custody of the shabu from its possession by the police officers, testing
in the laboratory to determine its composition, until the same was presented as evidence
in court. Hence, even if there was no statement as to where the markings were made, what
is important is that the seized specimen never left the custody of PO3 Bongon until he
turned over the same to SPO1 Antonio and that thereafter, the chain of custody was shown
Page 1404 of 1553

to be unbroken. Indeed, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu is shown to
have been properly preserved and the crucial links in the chain of custody unbroken.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERIC PAVIA AND JUAN BUENDIA

The fact that the apprehending team in this case did not strictly comply with the
procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render
appellants’ arrest illegal or the items seized from them inadmissible in evidence. RA 9165 and
its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict compliance
as to the chain of custody rule. The Court has emphasized that what is essential is “the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
The arrest was triggered by a “tip” from a concerned citizen that a “pot session” was
in progress at the house of a certain “Obet” at Baranggay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. In
view of the urgency, SPO3 Melchor dela Peña immediately dispatched his men to proceed
to the identified place to verify the report. At the place, the responding police officers
verified through a small opening in the window and saw the accused-appellants and their
other two (2) companions sniffing “shabu” to use the words of PO2 Bautista.
After they introduced themselves as police officers, they arrested the four suspects
and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene. Among those arrested were Pavia
and Buendi, from each of whom a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
were confiscated by PO3 Parunggao after he conducted a body search on their persons. PO3
Parunggao marked the plastic sachet he seized. These plastic sachets were transmitted to
the crime laboratory for qualitative examination where they tested positive for “shabu.”
Consequently, they were charged with violation of Section 13, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The trial court found that the prosecution was able to prove the offense charged
through the spontaneous, positive and credible testimony of its witness. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that the evidence on record support the
trial court’s conclusion that a lawful arrest, search and seizure took place.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest is illegal or the items seized from them are inadmissible
in evidence
Page 1405 of 1553

Ruling:
No.
Pavia and Buendia are charged under Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which
provides:
Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
– Any person found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering
or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the
maximum penalties provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of the quantity and
purity of such dangerous drugs.
The elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165
are the same as those for the violation of Section 11 of the law: (1) possession by the accused
of an item or object identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; (3) the free and conscious possession of the drug by the accused,
with the additional element that (4) the accused possessed the prohibited or dangerous
drug during a social gathering or meeting, or in the company of at least two persons.
It is likewise important to note that it was PO2 Bautista himself who brought the
request for laboratory examination of the substance taken from appellants from the San
Pedro Police Station to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Calamba City, thereby ensuring that
the integrity of the confiscated items are preserved. Thus, the fact that the apprehending
team did not strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render appellants’ arrest illegal or the items seized from
them inadmissible in evidence.
As held by this Court in the case of People v. Llanita:
RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not
require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x. We have emphasized that
what is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.”
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and
its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended
persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a
buy-bust operation.
Page 1406 of 1553

MANUEL R. PORTUGUEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 194499, January 14, 2015, J. Villarama
Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requirements is not fatal. Non-compliance

with Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is
“the preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
Facts:
Sometime in April 2003, Manuel R. Portuguez was charged for violating Section 11,
Article II of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, specifically due
to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody of
"shabu," weighing 0.05 grams.
The prosecution, through the testimonies of Police Officer 1 (PO1) Aldrin R. Mariano
(PO1 Mariano) and PO1 Janet Sabo (PO1 Sabo), established that upon receipt of an
information of illegal drug drug activities, they initiated a by-bust operation wherein PO1
Mariano was the supposed buyer. On cross-examination, PO1 Mariano testified that at a
distance of seven to eight meters, he saw Bobot handing something to Portuguez. PO1
Mariano said that the intended buy-bust operation failed because of the commotion
Portuguez caused when he tried to run away. PO1 Mariano also testified that he got hold
of Portuguez because he was nearer to him. He claimed that the other police operatives ran
after Bobot but they failed to arrest him.
Portuguez testified that at the time of his arrest, he was fixing the katam and was
eating infront of his house with his friends Two persons from the Pasig Police headquarters
arrived and spoke to his sister who used to work at the said headquarters. When his sister
called him, he was mistaken to be Bobot, who was his brother and thus, they arrested him.
Portuguez denied that he was in possession of the shabu allegedly seized from him. He
claimed that he saw the said shabu for the first time at the headquarters. He also claimed
that at the time he was arrested on April 2003, Bobot was actually detained at a jail in
Bicutan.
The RTC charged him of the said crime; it invoked the principle of the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty, gave credence to the testimony of PO1
Mariano, and rejected the self-serving testimony of Portuguez. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, it affirmed the decision of the RTC. The said court held that petitioner was deemed
to have waived his right to question the irregularity of his arrest since he failed to move to
quash the Information on this ground and instead, elected to proceed with the trial. It also
Page 1407 of 1553

held that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto when he was arrested by the police
officers as PO1 Mariano saw him buying illegal drugs from Bobot. The court then denied
Portuguez motion for reconsideration, which lead to the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody was properly followed?
Ruling:
Yes, the chain of custody was properly followed.
Based on the foregoing, this Court has held that non-compliance with the above-
mentioned requirements is not fatal. Non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR does not
make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is “the preservation of the integrity
and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
In this case, the chain of custody was established through the following link: (1) PO1
Mariano marked the seized sachet subject of the in flagrante delicto arrest which stands for
his full name, Aldrin Reyes Mariano; (2) a request for laboratory examination of the seized
item was signed by P/Sr. Inspector Villaruel; (3) the request and the marked item seized
were personally delivered by PO1 Sabo and received by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the
same day of the arrest on April 2003; (4) Chemistry Report confirmed that the marked item
seized from Portuguez was shabu; and (5) the marked item was duly identified by PO1
Mariano in court and offered in evidence.
Hence, it is clear that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were
preserved. This Court, therefore, finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC that
the drugs seized from Portuguez were the same ones presented during trial. Accordingly,
we hold that the chain of custody of the illicit drugs seized from petitioner remains
unbroken, contrary to the assertions of Portuguez.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAKIM MINANGA Y DUMANSAL

G.R. No. 202837, January 21, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
In this case, the chain of custody can be easily established through the following link:
(1) PO1 Condez marked the seized four sachets handed to him by appellant with RCC 1 to RCC
4; (2) a request for laboratory examination of the seized items marked RCC 1 to RCC 4 was
signed by Police Superintendent Glenn Dichosa Dela Torre; (3) the request and the marked
Page 1408 of 1553

items seized, which were personally delivered by PO1 Condez and PO2 Virtudazo, were
received by the PNP Crime Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-106-200235 confirmed
that the marked items seized from appellant were methamphetamine hydrochloride; and (5)
the marked items were offered in evidence.
preserved. This Court, therefore, finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC that the
drugs seized from appellant were the same ones presented during trial. Accordingly, it is but
logical to conclude that the chain of custody of the illicit drugs seized from appellant remains
unbroken, contrary to the assertions of appellant.
Facts:
After receiving reliable information from a police asset that Rakim is actively
engaged in selling illegal drugs, a team and the police asset was formed to conduct a buy-
bust operation in Butuan City, against the appellant. PO1 Rommel dela Cruz Condez (PO1
Condez) was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with PO2 Saldino Virtudazo (PO2
Virtudazo) as his back-up. The team brought with them the amount of P20,000.00 as show
money.
Upon arrival at the designated place, the police asset introduced PO1 Condez to
Rakim as an interested buyer of shabu. After Rakim agreed to sell to PO1 Condez four
“sacks” of shabu for the amount of P20,000.00, appellant told PO1 Condez to
wait. Appellant then left and after a few minutes returned. He then showed PO1 Condez
four big sachets of shabu. After receiving the four sachets, PO1 Condez examined them
and being convinced of their genuineness, gave the prearranged signal. Thus, PO2
Virtudazo rushed to the scene. The police officers introduced themselves as PDEA agents
and arrested the appellant, informing the latter of his constitutional rights. The money
was not given to appellant as it was intended only as show money. PO1 Condez marked
the four sachets given by the appellant as RCC 1 to RCC 4. The appellant was then brought
to the police station for investigation.
At the police station, Rakim was photographed in the presence of a Barangay

Captain and a State Prosecutor. Armed with the corresponding requests, the four marked
sachets and the appellant were brought by PO1 Condez and PO2 Virtudazo to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. At the PNP Crime Laboratory, the four sachets were
marked as A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 by the Forensic Chemist. While the drug test conducted
on the person of the appellant yielded a negative result, the four sachets with a total weight
of 12.882 grams were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Page 1409 of 1553

Initially the PDEA filed a case against the appellant for violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 or for illegal sale of shabu but when the investigation reached the Office
of the City Prosecutor the case was modified to one for illegal possession. On the other
hand, Rakim denied such allegations and presented different witnesses to belie the claim.
The RTC found Rakim guilty as charged of violation of Section 11, paragraph 2, sub-
paragraph (1),20 Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision and subsequently denied a
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether there is doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs as there was no
inventory of the prohibited items seized and there was a break in the chain of custody.
Ruling:
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
Page 1410 of 1553

Evidently, the law itself lays down exceptions to its requirements. Thus, non-
compliance with the above-mentioned requirements is not fatal. In fact it has been ruled
time and again that non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items
seized inadmissible. What is imperative is “the preservation of the integrity and the
evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
In this case, the chain of custody can be easily established through the following
link: (1) PO1 Condez marked the seized four sachets handed to him by appellant with RCC
1 to RCC 4; (2) a request for laboratory examination of the seized items marked RCC 1 to
RCC 4 was signed by Police Superintendent Glenn Dichosa Dela Torre; (3) the request and
the marked items seized, which were personally delivered by PO1 Condez and PO2
Virtudazo, were received by the PNP Crime Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-106-
200235 confirmed that the marked items seized from appellant were methamphetamine
hydrochloride; and (5) the marked items were offered in evidence.
preserved. This Court, therefore, finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC that
the drugs seized from appellant were the same ones presented during trial. Accordingly, it
is but logical to conclude that the chain of custody of the illicit drugs seized from appellant
remains unbroken, contrary to the assertions of appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDER DACUMA Y LUNSOD

G.R. No. 205889, February 04, 2015, J. Perez
In the prosecution of illegal sale, what is essential is to prove that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus
delicti. The consummation of sale is perfected the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the four sachets which tested
positive for shabu and eventually presented in court were the same ones confiscated by the
police officers due to its non-marking at the place where the buy-bust operation was
committed at the police station.
This non- marking violated the measures defined under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165
and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165
which are also known as the Rule on Chain of Custody.
Page 1411 of 1553

Facts:
PO2 Cabaltera, certain PO3 Macalino, PO3 Baltar and PO2 Llovia, members of Anti-
Illegal Drug Task Force of Leyte Provincial Police Office under the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), were ordered by their superior Superintendent Unay to
proceed to Carigara Police Station to verify the veracity of a report of a confidential
informant about the sale of dangerous drugs. Upon arrival at the police station, Chief of
Police Repulda gave a short briefing to conduct a buy-bust operation and gave the
assigned poseur-buyer PO2 Cabaltera four pieces of one hundred peso bills to be used as
marked money. Thereafter, PO2 Cabaltera, PO2 Parena and the confidential informant
proceeded to the target area. Upon arrival, PO2 Cabaltera and the confidential informant
approached the accused-appellant Dacuma and proposed to buy shabu worth P600.00.
Meanwhile, PO2 Parena remained at a distance to act as a back-up police officer. Dacuma,
accepted the offer and took from his pocket four plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance and handed them to PO2 Cabaltera, who in turn, handed the marked money
including his personal money worth P400.00. Thereafter, PO2 Cabaltera raised his hand as
pre-arranged signal to alert the back-up police officers that the illegal sale had already been
consummated. PO2 Parena immediately ran towards them and introduced himself as a
police officer. They then apprehended the accused and brought him to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Station. Barangay Councilor Lesiguez and a certain Councilor
Macalinao were summoned by the police officers to conduct a body search on the person
of Dacuma inside the police station. During the search, three sachets of shabu, marked
money and one disposable lighter were recovered from Dacuma.
Issue:
Whether or not Dacuma is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
No.
The following requisites are necessary in order to successfully prosecute an offense

of illegal sale of dangerous drugs: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In the prosecution of illegal sale, what is essential is to prove that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus
delicti. The consummation of sale is perfected the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the four sachets which tested
Page 1412 of 1553

positive for shabu and eventually presented in court were the same ones confiscated by the
police officers due to its non-marking at the place where the buy-bust operation was
committed at the police station.
This non- marking violated the measures defined under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No.
9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
No. 9165 which are also known as the Rule on Chain of Custody.
In this case, records show that the first element to establish chain of custody which
is the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer is missing to establish illegal sale. In fact, no one among the
prosecution witnesses testified about the marking of the four sachets subject of illegal sale.
Though the police officers in their testimonies narrated that there was a buy-bust operation
and they apprehended the accused red-handed, all of them failed to testify on who among
them complied with the marking requirement to identify the seized items. Quite notably,
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest also failed to mention that the apprehending officers marked
the four sachets confiscated from Dacuma. It was only then when Police Superintendent
Amado E. Marquez, Jr. sent a request for a laboratory examination to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Region 8 that the fours sachets containing white crystalline substance were
shown to be marked as “SD.” These specimens eventually became the specimens tested by
Forensic Chemist Cruto which resulted to a positive result of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and presented in court as the corpus delicti. Clearly from the foregoing, there
is a serious doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti presented in court as subject of illegal
sale.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOMAR BUTIAL

G.R. No. 192785, February 04, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The initial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachets
from appellant and their marking by the apprehending officer. “Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately
marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The
marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, ‘planting,’ or contamination
of evidence. A review of the records, however, reveals that the confiscated sachets subject of
the illegal sale of shabu were not marked. PO2 Martirez, himself, admitted that he did not
put any markings on the two plastic sachets that were handed to him by Borlagdan after the
latter’s purchase of the same from appellant. While he mentioned that the police investigator
to whom he turned over the items wrote something down or made some initials thereon, he
Page 1413 of 1553

nevertheless could not remember who wrote the initials. And albeit later, PO2 Martirez
identified the police investigator as SPO1 Desuasido, the latter, however, when called to the
witness stand, did not testify that he made any markings on the said sachets or, at the very
least, that he received the same from PO2 Martirez. His testimony merely focused on the fact
that he prepared the affidavit of a certain Baltazar. Clearly, the absence of markings creates
an uncertainty that the two sachets seized during the buy-bust operation were part of the five
sachets submitted to the police crime laboratory. The prosecution’s evidence failed to
establish the marking of the two sachets of shabu subject of this case, which is the first link
in the chain of custody and which would have shown that the shabu presented in evidence
was the same specimen bought from appellant during the buy-bust operation. The lack of
certainty therefore on a crucial element of the crime i.e., the identity of the corpus delicti,
warrants the reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Facts:
The Chief of Police of Tabaco City instructed PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente to
conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant Jumar Butial (Butial) after receiving information
that he was selling illegal drugs. Thus, PO2 Martirez arranged for Borlagdan, a police asset,
to act as a poseur-buyer and gave him four P100 bills as marked money. PO2 Martirez,
SPO4 Bonavente and Borlagdan proceeded to the place entrap Butial.
Upon their arrival, Borlagdan walked towards a house which is under construction.
PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente, on the other hand, hid behind houses which were
about seven meters away from where Borlagdan was. Borlagdan approached Butial who
was then working at the construction site and asked if he could purchase shabu. When an
agreement was reached, Borlagdan handed over the marked money to Butial while the
latter, in turn, gave him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. After
the transaction, Borlagdan walked towards the place where PO2 Martirez and SPO4
Bonavente were hiding. When he passed by them, Borlagdan nodded his head as a signal
that the sale was already consummated and gave the sachets to PO2 Martirez. Thereupon,
the police officers came out of hiding. They immediately approached Butial who threw
something on the ground. PO2 Martirez arrested Butialt and brought him to the police
station. SPO4 Bonavente who was left behind searched the place where he saw Butial
throw something and found therein a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. He also summoned for the owner of the house being constructed and asked for
Butia’s belongings. He was given a backpack which he brought to the police station.
Meanwhile at the police station, PO2 Martirez ordered Butial to empty his pockets
and recovered from him one of the four P100 bills used as marked money. PO2 Martirez
then turned over the said marked money and the two plastic sachets to the police
Page 1414 of 1553

investigator. When SPO4 Bonavente arrived, he likewise gave appellant’s backpack to the
police investigator, who, in turn, searched the same. Found therein were more sachets
containing white crystalline substance.
Two days later, five sachets with white crystalline substance were referred and
delivered to the crime laboratory for examination which all tested positive for shabu
Butial was later charged for violation of RA 9165. Both RTC and CA convicted Butial.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC, affirmed by the CA is correct in convicting Butial.
Ruling:
No. RTC, affirmed by the CA is not correct in convicting Butial.
The appeal must be granted. The prosecution failed to show that the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti have been preserved. There is merit in appellant’s contention
that not all elements of the offense of illegal sale of shabu were proven and that there were
unexplained gaps and irregularities in the chain of custody of the seized items.
In a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of drugs, there must be evidence of
the following elements: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The
evidence of corpus delicti must also be established beyond doubt. In this case,
the shabu “constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction
under RA 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to
have been preserved. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
The initial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachets
from appellant and their marking by the apprehending officer. “Marking after seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
‘planting,’ or contamination of evidence.”A review of the records, however, reveals that the
confiscated sachets subject of the illegal sale of shabu were not marked. PO2 Martirez,
Page 1415 of 1553

himself, admitted that he did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets that were
handed to him by Borlagdan after the latter’s purchase of the same from appellant. While
he mentioned that the police investigator to whom he turned over the items wrote
something down or made some initials thereon, he nevertheless could not remember who
wrote the initials. And albeit later, PO2 Martirez identified the police investigator as SPO1
Desuasido, the latter, however, when called to the witness stand, did not testify that he
made any markings on the said sachets or, at the very least, that he received the same from
PO2 Martirez. His testimony merely focused on the fact that he prepared the affidavit of a
certain Baltazar. Clearly, the absence of markings creates an uncertainty that the two
sachets seized during the buy-bust operation were part of the five sachets submitted to the
police crime laboratory. The prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the marking of the
two sachets of shabu subject of this case, which is the first link in the chain of custody and
which would have shown that the shabu presented in evidence was the same specimen
bought from appellant during the buy-bust operation. The lack of certainty therefore on a
crucial element of the crime i.e., the identity of the corpus delicti, warrants the reversal of
the judgment of conviction.
The failure of the prosecution to identify the corpus delicti is more glaring after
considering that none of the five sachets submitted to the police crime laboratory for
qualitative examination and turned out positive for shabu weighed close to the two plastic
sachets that had an approximate weight of 0.1 gram each as stated in the Information. As
previously mentioned, the police officers sent five sachets that were marked and given
corresponding weight.
It therefore appears that the sachets of shabu confiscated during the buy-bust
operation are totally different from the sachets forwarded to the police crime laboratory
and thereafter presented in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA NEPOMUCENO Y PEDRAZA

G.R. No. 194999, February 09, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting the accused for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5 or RA 9165. It is the contention of the
accused that her conviction is not warranted because of the failure of the police officer to
observe the procedure outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 otherwise known as the chain of
custody rule. The Supreme Court ruled that non-compliance with the procedure outlined
therein does not make the conviction of the accused invalid. It can be easily understood from
a cursory reading of the implementing rules that the crucial factor is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items since they will be used to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
Page 1416 of 1553

Facts:
The accused Gloria Nepumuceno was charged with two information accusing her of
violations of Section 5 and 15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. The police officers found the
accused in flagrante delicto selling dangerous drugs and found that the accused tested
positive for use of dangerous drugs. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused only
for illegal selling of dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, the current petition.
Appellant denied selling shabu. She recalled that on August 9, 2003 at around 1:30
p.m., while she was standing in front of her house in San Andres, Manila, six men in civilian
clothes arrested her. They informed her that they were from the DEU of Makati and that
she was being arrested for selling them shabu. They dragged her away from her house while
her husband and son-in-law were inside and unaware of what was happening to her. At the
DEU office, appellant was told to empty her pockets and was asked of the whereabouts of
a certain Johnny, who was an alleged supplier of illegal drugs in their area.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
The Court is satisfied that the prosecution discharged its burden in a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which are: “(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object and consideration; and, (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.”8 This offense merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction,
which occurs the moment the buyer exchanges his money for the drugs of the seller.
In cases involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, “credence should be given to
the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police
officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there
is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute
such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, shall prevail over [appellant’s] self-serving and uncorroborated denial.”
Appellant therefore had the burden to overcome the presumption that the police officers
regularly and properly discharged their duties which she failed to do. Against the evidence
of the prosecution, her defenses of alibi, denial and frame-up crumble. Aside from being
weak and uncorroborated, such defenses are viewed with disfavor since they can easily be
Page 1417 of 1553

concocted and are common and standard ploy in prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Appellant’s contention that her warrantless arrest was unlawful does not deserve
credence. The facts on record do not substantiate her claim that she was apprehended
merely on suspicion of committing a crime. On the contrary, appellant was arrested after
committing a criminal offense that resulted from a successful buy-bust operation. Having
been apprehended in flagrante delicto, the police officers were not only authorized but
were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant.
Also, appellant’s guilt for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, cannot be reversed by her
assertion that the apprehending officers failed to observe the procedure for the custody
and disposition of the seized drug as provided in Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165,
particularly the conduct of physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized item.
Notwithstanding the explicit directive of said law, Section 21(a) of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations provides a saving clause whenever there is non-compliance, to wit:
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under

justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
It can be easily understood from a cursory reading of the implementing rules that
the crucial factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items since they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In this case, it is admitted that there was no physical inventory and photographing
of the seized drug as mandated by law. However, it was shown that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the item has been preserved and remained intact. All told, there is no
reason to disturb the findings that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 as well as the penalty imposed upon her.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BEVERLY ALAGARME y CITOY

G.R. No. 184789, February 23, 2015, J. Bersamin
Appellant questions the decision of the CA finding that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated items had been safeguarded notwithstanding the Prosecution’s
failure to comply with the requirements prescribed under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. The SC ruled that
for failure of the buy-bust team to observe the procedures laid down by Republic Act No. 9165
and its IRR, appellant should be acquitted. The marking of the seized drugs or other related
Page 1418 of 1553

items immediately upon seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody
because it is the starting point in the custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a two-
fold function, the first being to give to succeeding handlers of the specimens a reference, and
the second being to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until their disposition at the end
of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of
evidence. This requirement of marking as laid down by the law was not complied with.
Facts:
According to the prosecution, a buy-bust team had been formed after P/Insp.
Valerio had received an information from a concerned citizen about Beverly engaging in
the illegal sale of drugs. When the buy-bust team arrived at the target area, PO1 Mendoza,
the poseur-buyer, approached Beverly and told her that he is in need of shabu. Upon
receiving the marked bills Beverly gave PO1 Mendoza two plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substances suspected to be shabu. PO1 Mendoza then performed the pre-
arranged signal to alert the rest of the buy-bust team about the consummation of the sale.
Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, the rest of the buy-bust team rushed forward and
assisted PO1 Mendoza in apprehending Beverly. Thereafter, Beverly was required to board
a Toyota Revo. It was only inside the vehicle where PO1 Mendoza marked the plastic
sachets with his initials.
The buy-bust team then brought Beverly and the confiscated items to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for testing and examination. Her urine sample and the white crystalline
substances contained in the two plastic sachets tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. Appellant Beverly was then charged with
violations of Sections 5 and 11, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Beverly on the other hand denied the
allegations of the prosecution and pleaded not guilty to charges against her. She alleged
that she had been a victim of frame-up.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Beverly guilty of the offenses charged. On
appeal, Beverly contended that the Prosecution’s patent non-compliance with the
requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165 warranted her acquittal. The CA however
affirmed the decision of the RTC and held that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items had been safeguarded notwithstanding the Prosecution’s failure to
comply with the requirements prescribed under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Did the CA err in finding Beverly guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses
charged.
Page 1419 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes it did.
After careful examination of the records, we acquit the appellant because of the
State's failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In every prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the presentation of the drugs as evidence in court is
material, because the identity of the drugs seized should be established beyond any
reasonable doubt. What is more, the fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust
operation is the same substance offered in court should be proven. The preservation of the
chain of custody of the drugs seized performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary
doubts attending the identity of the evidence are removed.
Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the procedure to be followed in the
seizure and ensuing custody of the seized dangerous drugs, viz.:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9165, states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
Page 1420 of 1553
of and custody over said items;
The foregoing procedure underscores the value of preserving the chain of custody
in relation to the dangerous drugs. To give effect to the procedure, the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB), which is the policy-making and strategy-formulating body in the planning
and formulation of policies and programs on drug prevention and control tasked to develop
and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced national drug abuse
prevention and control strategy, has defined chain of custody involving the dangerous
drugs and other substances in Section l(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 thusly:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition;
With this concern for the due recording of the authorized movement and custody
of the seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment, the presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject
of the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. This materiality derives from the dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus
delicti. Indeed, proof of the corpus delicti is essential in every judgment of
conviction. Without proof of the corpus delicti, there is uncertainty about whether the
crime really transpired or not. To eliminate the uncertainty, the Prosecution should
account for every link in the chain of custody; otherwise, the crime is not established
beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the Prosecution does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
either when the dangerous drugs are missing or when there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of
the evidence presented in court.
A reading of the record indicates that the buy-bust team did not observe the
procedures laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR. The marking of the seized drugs
or other related items immediately upon seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the
chain of custody because it is the starting point in the custodial link. The marking upon
seizure serves a two-fold function, the first being to give to succeeding handlers of the
specimens a reference, and the second being to separate the marked evidence from the
Page 1421 of 1553

corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused
until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence. This requirement of marking as laid down by the
law was not complied with. Firstly, PO1 Mendoza simply stated that he did the marking of
the confiscated items with his initials inside the Toyota Revo. Although the appellant was
also inside the Toyota Revo at that time, he did not state if his marking was done within
the view of the appellant, or within the view of any representative from the media,
Department of Justice or any elected public official. Secondly, both he and MADAC
Operative Castillo did not indicate if any media or DOJ representative or elected public
official had been present during the buy-bust operation and when the drugs were recovered
from the appellant at the scene of the apprehension. The law unequivocally required such
presence. Thirdly, there was also no showing of any inventory of the confiscated items
being undertaken or prepared. The lack of the inventory was confirmed by the absence of
any certificate of inventory being formally offered as evidence by the Prosecution. Lastly,
the Prosecution did not produce any photographs taken of the sachets
of shabu immediately following their seizure.
The last paragraph of Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165
provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance with the
safeguards to preserve the chain of custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution's
case against the accused. However, in order for such saving mechanism to apply, the
Prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures and then
explain the lapse or lapses. Here, however, the Prosecution did not bother to show that a
media representative, DOJ representative or elected public official had been notified of the
buy-bust operation or, assuming that the DOJ representative or public official had been so
priorly informed, the lawmen did not explain why none of such representatives was around
to witness the actual marking of the evidence. Indeed, the Prosecution did not even try to
show that the application of the saving mechanism provided in Section 21 (a), Article II of
the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 would be justified. Under the circumstances, the
identification of the seized evidence in court during the trial became
ambiguous and unreliable, rendering the proof of the links in the chain of custody of
the corpus delicti unworthy of belief.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRIAN MERCADO Y SARMIENTO
G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015, J. Perez
The break in chain of custody does not ipso facto render the evidence presented by the
prosecution as inadmissible. There must be substantial and convincing proof from the defense
for the Court to consider the inadmissibility of the evidence.
Page 1422 of 1553

Facts:
A tip from an anonymous informant that Mercado was selling dangerous drugs was
received by the police. The police then planned a buy bust operation with SPO2 William
Quillan as team leader and PO3 Ramon Galvez as poseur buyer. PO3 Galvez told Mercado,
“Pre, pa-iskor naman.” Mercado then answered, “Magkano?” PO3 Galvez handed two
marked 100-peso bills to Mercado and was given an opportunity to choose 1 from the 3
sachets containing crystalline substance. After making his choice, PO3 Galvez claimed from
Mercado a sachet and signaled to his colleagues. The police force arrested Mercado and the
3 sachets were confiscated and transmitted to laboratory for examination. The results
confirmed that the crystalline substance was shabu and Mercado was charged of violations
of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the trial, Mercado denied the version of facts of the prosecution and
contended that he was suddenly arrested by the police on the morning of July 27, 2007 and
was asked to produce P10,000 in exchange for his freedom. Having failed to do so, he was
charged of the said offenses.
The RTC found Mercado guilty. On appeal, Mercado raised that he was wrongfully
convicted on the ground of inadmissibility of evidence due to break in chain of custody.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and rejected the stance of the
accused holding that Mercado cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence is inadmissible due to break in chain of custody
Ruling:
No, the evidence is still admissible.
The Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
Page 1423 of 1553

been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its
identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt.
Alongside these rulings are Court’s pronouncements, just as consistent, that failure
to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not
render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.”
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the prosecution
established that they had custody of the drug seized from the accused from the moment
he was arrested, during the time he was transported to the police station, and up to the
time the drug was submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The same witnesses
also identified the seized drug with certainty when this was presented in court. With regard
to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring
inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and
scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the
testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant at
the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced, and testified to in
court.
In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the denial
and allegation of extortion of the accused-appellant fails. Courts generally view the defense
of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his
or her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain
more credibility than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who testify clearly,
providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RECTO ANGNGAO AND ROBERT CARLIN

There were other indicia of non-conformity with the requirements. It is beyond

dispute, for one, that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for documentation
purposes. It was also not shown why, despite the requirement of the law itself, no
representative from the media, from the DOJ, or any elective official was present to serve as
Page 1424 of 1553

a witness during the arrest. It is true that Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 only requires a
substantial compliance with the requirements of markings and photographing instead of an
absolute or literal compliance. Hence, an accused can still be held guilty provided that a
justifiable ground for excusing the non-compliance with the requirements has been
satisfactorily established by the Prosecution.
Such justifiable ground is wanting here. The buy-bust team tendered no explanation
for the non-compliance. They were required to render sufficient reasons for their non-
compliance during the trial; otherwise, the persons they charged would be acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Yet, they even seemed unaware that such requirements existed
at all. The Court is aghast at their dismissive treatment of the requirements.
Facts:
The PDEA in Cordillera Autonomous Region (PDEA-CAR) conducted a buy-bust

opera-tion which led to the apprehension of Accused-appellant Angngao, recovery of the
marked money and seizure of marijuana hashish oil and marijuana resin he was peddling.
Thereafter, the confiscated substances were brought to the crime laboratory office and
positively tested as dangerous drugs. Thus, Angngao was formally charged for violation of
R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Angngao was then
convicted by the trial court for two (2) counts of illegal sale, senten-ced him to serve life
imprisonment and ordered him to pay a certain fine. The judgment of conviction was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody, or to be
precise the identity of the corpus delicti.
Ruling:
No, under the circumstances of the case, the prosecution fell short of discharging
their onus of establishing the chain of custody.
To ensure a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
constituting the crime must be present, namely: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller,
the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. The presentation of the drugs as evidence in court is indispensable
in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs because the drugs are the corpus
delicti of the crime. As such, the State should establish beyond doubt the identity of the
Page 1425 of 1553

dangerous drugs by showing that the dangerous drugs offered in court as evidence were
the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This requirement is complied
with by ensuring that the custody of the seized drugs from the time of confiscation until
presentation in court is safe-guarded under what is referred to as the chain of custody...
The manner and timing of the marking of the seized drugs or related items in
accordance with the foregoing statutory rules are crucial in proving the chain of custody.
The marking by the arresting officer of the drugs, being the starting point in the custodial
link, should be made immediately upon the seizure, or, if that is not possible, as close to
the time and place of the seizure as practicable under the obtaining circumstances. This
immediate marking is essential because the succeeding handlers of the drugs would use
the markings as their reference to the seizure, and because it further serves to segregate
the marked seized drugs from all other evidence from the time and point of seizure until
the drugs are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings. The deliberate taking of
these identifying steps is statutorily aimed at obviating switching, “planting” or
contamination of the evidence. Verily, the preservation of the chain of custody vis-à-vis the
drugs ensures the integrity of the evidence and fulfills the element of relevancy as a
requisite for the admissibility of the evidence.
The Court accepts that “while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality
it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” This limitation on
the chain of custody is well recognized in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165’s IRR, which in case of
non-compliance shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved... In resolving drug-related offenses, therefore, the courts should deem to be
essential “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
The conviction would have been watertight. The police operative, who acted as the
poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, succeeded in purchasing from the Angngao the
brick of marijuana resin..The ensuing physical search conducted on the appellant further
yielded the marijuana hash oil. The elements constituting the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs were seemingly established.
However, the conviction must have to be undone. The integrity of the evidence
presented – the corpus delicti no less – became suspicious by the mysterious silence of the
record on what transpired after the transaction. On its part, the trial court, after reliving
the buy-bust operation, uncharacteristically jumped to the conclusion that the accused was
guilty as xxx. In turn, the CA devoted little, if any, discussion on the chain of custody vis-à-
vis the seized drugs.
Page 1426 of 1553

The Prosecution cannot avoid confronting the issue of the broken chain of custody
by embellishing its case with the presumption of regularity. This presumption, which is not
conclusive, vanishes upon the slightest hint or taint of irregularity. It stands only when
nothing suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of
official duty as provided for in the law. But where, like here, the official act in question is
irregular on its face, the presumption does not arise as a matter of course. As such, the non-
conformity with the requirements for preserving the chain of custody on the part of the
arresting lawmen closed the door to the application of the presumption of regularity.
There were other indicia of non-conformity with the requirements. It is beyond

dispute, for one, that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for documentation
purposes. It was also not shown why, despite the requirement of the law itself, no
representative from the media, from the [DOJ], or any elective official was present to serve
as a witness during the arrest. xxx It is true that Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 only
requires a substantial compliance with the requirements of markings and photographing
instead of an absolute or literal compliance. Hence, an accused can still be held guilty
provided that a justifiable ground for excusing the non-compliance with the requirements
has been satisfactorily established by the Prosecution.
Such justifiable ground is wanting here. The buy-bust team tendered no explanation
for the non-compliance. They were required to render sufficient reasons for their non-
compliance during the trial; otherwise, the persons they charged would be acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Yet, they even seemed unaware that such requirements existed
at all. The Court is aghast at their dismissive treatment of the requirements.
There is no question that the State had the responsibility to explain the lapses in the
procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the
explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus delicti became unreliable, and the
acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt had not been shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Absent the justification by the arresting lawmen for their
noncompliance with the requirement of an intact chain of custody, the trial court and the
CA did not fairly convict the appellant in whose favor the safeguards have been erected by
the law.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.)

vs. ARTURO P. FRANCO, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: MAURICIA P.
FRANCO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180069, MARCH 5, 2014
Page 1427 of 1553

J. PERALTA
When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove
nonpayment for it is presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that
the debt has not been discharged by payment.
In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject Trust
Indenture Certificates strongly supports his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return
the principal plus interest of the money placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the
hands of respondent is a proof of indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not
been paid.
Facts:
Arturo P. Franco decided to save up for his retirement and to invest his hard earned money
with PCIB which later on merged with defendant Equitable Banking Corp. and is now
known as Equitable PCIBank. He chose defendant PCIB for the latter’s representation that
by making such investment, he was actually providing for his future since his investment
would be commingled, pooled and automatically rolled-over for better investment return
and which will provide for his needs upon retirement, without need for him to take any
further action. He secured from defendant Trust Indenture Certificates, and that despite
demands, defendants refused and still refuses to return to plaintiff the trust amounts, plus
the stipulated interest.
Respondent Arturo P. Franco died on July 23, 2008. However, his son, Alexander P. Franco,
also passed away on September 5, 2012.
PCIB alleged that the four TICs were already paid or cancelled, or that respondent’s
participation therein was already withdrawn. This prompted Arturo P. Franco to file an
action for damages against PCIB where the RTC rendered a decision ordering defendant
PCIB, to pay plaintiff. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the claim of respondent is already barred by prescription
Held:
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the
Page 1428 of 1553

burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove
nonpayment for it is presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof
that the debt has not been discharged by payment.
In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject TICs strongly
supports his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of
the money placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the hands of respondent is a
proof of indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid.
Petitioner Bank could have easily presented documentary evidence to dispute the claim,
but it did not. In its omission, it may be reasonably deduced that no evidence to that effect
really exist. Worse, the testimonies of petitioner Bank's own witnesses, reinforce, rather
than belie, respondent's allegations of non-payment.
CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD. vs. TRAVELER KIDS, INC.

G.R. No. 200065, September 24, 2014, J. Mendoza
CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against TKI. CSFL, through its
witness, identified several sales invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its
transactions with TKI. The latter objected pointing out that the documents being presented
were mere photocopies Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads: “When a document
is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.” In the case at bar, Chiu convincingly explained that
CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy
to a client and retaining the other copy. The evidence presented were duplicate originals of
invoices and order slips, and not mere photocopies.
Facts:
Petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL), a foreign corporation engaged in the
manufacturing and trading of children's shoes and similar products, and respondent
Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI),a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing,
importing and distributing shoes, sandals and other footware entered into an agreement,
wherein they agreed that TKI would import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its
China factory. After TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL began manufacturing the
goods pursuant to the special designs and specifications of TKI. CSFL then shipped the
goods to TKI. It was their arrangement that TKI would pay thirty (30%) percent of the
purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the balance of seventy (70%)
percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty (30) days from the date of delivery of the
goods.
Page 1429 of 1553
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and the shipments
made by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its payments. CSFL granted
numerous concessions and extensions to TKI. Thereafter, TKI was able to make a partial
payment on its unpaid accounts. Both verbal and written demand letters were made by
CSFL to TKI for the payment of its unpaid accounts, but to no avail.
To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages against TKI before the RTC. During the trial, CSFL, through its witness, identified
several sales invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI. The
latter objected to the identification pointing out that the documents being presented were
mere photocopies. TKI also objected to the evidence presented by CSFL to prove the
amount of attorney’s fees on the ground that it was not an issue raised during the pre-trial.
The RTC noted the objections.
After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of
Exhibits seeking the admission of, among others, the sales invoices and order slips earlier
objected to by TKI. The latter objected to the admission of the documents offered,
contending that several of the sales invoices and order slips should not be admitted because
they were merely photocopies. The court admitted all the exhibits offered by CFSL.TKI filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for certiorari with prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
CA. As there was no injunction order issued by the CA, the RTC continued the proceedings
and directed TKI to present evidence. TKI refused, citing the petition for certiorari it filed
with the CA. Because of its refusal, the RTC considered TKI’s right to adduce countervailing
evidence as waived and ordered CSFL to submit its memorandum.
The CA ruled that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" should be denied
admission for being merely photocopies. As such, they are inadmissible for failure of private
respondent to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly modified the RTC order admitting the exhibits
offered by CSFL
Page 1430 of 1553

Ruling:
No.
The Court is of the considered view that the CA erred in not admitting the invoices
and order slips denominated as Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1," which were
duplicate originals. Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document. — (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at
or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said: When carbon sheets are inserted
between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the
outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces a
facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same
stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on
are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as
such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain
that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of invoices and
order slips, and not mere photocopies. The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly
show that Chiu convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of
invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other
copy. The Court combed through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate
that the documents offered were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with
her statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at
the same time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of
Chiu. The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that, contrary to the
assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals were produced in court and compared with their
photocopies during the hearing before the trial court. The transcripts bare all of these but
were missed by the appellate court, which believed the assertion of TKI that what were
produced in court and offered in evidence were mere photocopies. The TSNs further reveal
that after the comparison, the photocopies were the ones retained in the records.
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by
the public respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence
the photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of
its "jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of
Page 1431 of 1553

jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the original copies
predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions sine qua non to the admission of the
said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been
committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence
must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the photocopies of
the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is
convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.
SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON vs. VICENTE

CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND
VIOLETA C. BINADAS
G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015, J. Perez
In Bartolome vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the requirement
of proper custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by
the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this
case however, the Court finds that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and
Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held “as evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the
veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. “The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church,
by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person
baptized.” As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in whose custody the marriage
contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that the marriage
contract was given to her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said
document because she cannot read and write.
Facts:
The parties to this case are the heirs of deceased Vicente Castillo, as petitioners
would claim it or Vicente Ditablan insofar as the respondents are concerned. On one hand,
the petition-ners asserts that Vicente Castillo was validly married to their mother Benita
Castillo, while, on the other hand, the respondents say that their father was married to
Leonora Ditablan. The petitioners discovered this starling possibility when they read the
publication of the extrajudicial settlement of the respondents affecting the property of their
father in Rizal. Consequently, the petitioners sought the nullification of this settlement
chiefly on the ground that the parties therein are not the lawful heirs of the deceased.
Page 1432 of 1553

In the civil suit, in order to prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, the
petitio-ners presented these pertinent documents, namely: Contrato Matrimonial or the
marriage contract, certification from the church of its acceptance of original marriage
contract, Certificate of Baptism of Petitioner Simplicia, and Joint Affidavit of two
disinterested persons attesting that Petitioner Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita.
In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente
and Leonora, who were married on June 27 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate. They
averred that petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest to institute the case because
they failed to present their birth certificates and that marriage between Vicente and Benita
are not valid.
Both the trial court and the CA did not skirt from passing upon the issue of the
validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita. However, the CA rejected the ruling
of the trial court because the evidence proffered by the petitioners to prove the marriage
between their parents is unreliable and in view of this the deed of extrajudicial settlement
executed by the respon-dents cannot be nullified.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence submitted by the petitioners amply prove the marriage
between their parents.
Ruling:
No, the marriage certificate in the case at bench does not pass the requirements laid
down in past precedents.
The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora
hinges on the existence of the first marriage of Vicente and Benita.
In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a copy
of the Contrato Matrimonial. There is no dispute that said marriage contract was issued by
Iglesia Filipina Independiente Church.
The [CA] correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S.
vs. Evangelista, it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths
made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No.
190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They
Page 1433 of 1553

are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private
writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Under Sec. 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before
whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed,
or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the
parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the
[CA], petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified
that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not
present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia
admitted that she is illiterate.
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it
is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. [The Court does] not
agree. [The Court] had previously ruled in Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals that “a signed
carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known
as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-
production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a
carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging
the accuracy of the copy.”
Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document,
they now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated.
Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Sec. 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as
one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence
it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of
alteration.
The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place
from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved
to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to
render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and
naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.
Page 1434 of 1553

In Bartolome vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the requirement
of proper custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court
by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it.
In this case however, the Court finds that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to
Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held
“as evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk.
“The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the
Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity
of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of
the person baptized.” As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in whose custody
the marriage contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified
that the marriage contract was given to her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out
the contents of said document because she cannot read and write.
On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya’s kinship is a Joint
Affidavit executed by two persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita.
These two affiants were never presented in court. Thus, their statement is tantamount to
hearsay evidence.
Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that
the records of birth from 1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said documents,
there contains an advice that petitioners may make a further verification with the NSO
because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the birth certificate of every registered
birth with the NSO.
The advice was not heeded. Petitioners failed to present a certification from NSO
whether such records do exist or not. While [the Court acknowledges] the difficulty of
obtaining old records, [the Court] simply cannot ignore the rules on evidence, specifically
the rule on authentication with respect to private documents which is precisely in place to
prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in the body of evidence that will determine
the resolutions of an issue.
Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between
Vicente and Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case for the
declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.
Page 1435 of 1553

PAROLE EVIDENCE
MULTI-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DATA SYSTEM, INC. v. RUEL MARTINEZ

G.R. NO.175378, November 11, 2015, Jardeleza, J.
“It is established that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where
the creditor alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the debtor has the burden to prove
payment, rather than the creditor. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty
that the obligation has been discharged by payment. Where the debtor introduces some
evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence—as distinct from the
general burden of proof—shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some
evidence to show non-payment.”
Facts:
Ruel Martinez works as operations manager in Multi-International Business Data System,

Inc. (MBDSI). Consequently, he applied for a car loan and was granted the same in the
amount of P648,288. Ruel and MBDSI agreed that the loan is payable through deductions
from Ruel’s bonuses or commissions, if any. Further, if Ruel shall be terminated for any
cause before the end of the the loan obligation, the unpaid balance shall pe immediately
demandable without need of demand. Subsequently, Ruel was terminated from work thus
MBDSI demanded the unpaid balance. However, the former contended that the said
balance had already been paid evidenced by the certification of the company president,
Helen Dy. MBDSI filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Ruel to pay
the outstanding balance. The RTC ruled in favor of MBDSI on the ground that Ruel failed
to prove payment. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision
on the ground that Ruel had already paid the remaining balance pursuant to the
certification signed by Dy. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruel was able to prove payment of the loan obligation.
Ruling:
No. It must be emphasized that both parties have not presented any written agreement or
contract governing respondent’s obligation. Nevertheless, it has been established that
respondent obtained a car loan amounting to P648, 288.00 from petitioner. Thus, the
Page 1436 of 1553
burden is now on respondent to prove that the obligation has already been extinguished
by payment. Although not exclusive, a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact
of payment. The held in a long line of cases that the fact of payment may be established
not only by documentary evidence but also by parol evidence.
Except for respondent’s bare allegations that he has fully paid the P648,288.00 car loan,
there is nothing in the records which shows that full payment has indeed been made.
Respondent did not present any receipt other than the certification dated September 10,
1996 which only proves that respondent has already paid P337,650.00 of the car loan. A
balance of P310,638.00 still remained.
SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, Petitioners, vs. KIMWA

CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015, Leonen, J.
For parol evidence to be admitted, the party must put in issue in his pleadings any of
the four exceptions under Rule 130 Sec. 9 of the Rules on Evidence.
Facts:
Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete aggregates while Lucia Paras was a
concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit. They entered into an agreement where 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates were allotted by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa hauled
10,000 cubic meter of aggregates however, it stopped. Lucia alleged that Kimwa violated
the agreement, thus she filed a complaint alleging that Kimwa approached Lucia to
purchase gravel and sand but she informed them that her concession area was due to be
rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit expires. Thus, she will enter into a
contract provided that the 40,000 cubic meter aggregates will be extracted before May 15,
1995. Kimwa assured her that it will be hauled before such date. In its Answer, Kimwa
denied committing to obtain such and asserted that the Agreement articulated that the
true intention is that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was
never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras
were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed
differently.
Issue:
Page 1437 of 1553

Whether the Spouses Paras are allowed to introduce evidence which would show a different
agreement.
Ruling:
YES. Two things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four exceptions under Rule 130 Sec. 9 has been put in issue in a
party's pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol
evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the
presenting party. Petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the
trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's failure
to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer,
also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an
exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and
documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which
attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties' true intent, may
be admitted and considered. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder
of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras.
JOSE JUAN TONG, ET AL. vs. GO TIAT KUN, ET AL.

Contrary to the claim of the respondents, it is not error for the trial court to rely on
parol evidence, i.e., the oral testimonies of witnesses Simeon Juan Tong and Jose Juan Tong,
to arrive at the conclusion that an implied resulting trust exists. Because an implied trust is
neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be evidenced by writing, Article
1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parol evidence to prove their existence.
Parol evidence that is required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has
to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Facts:
The petitioners are nine of the ten children of Spouses Juan Tong (Juan Tong) and
Sy Un (Spouses Juan Tong). Completing the ten children of Spouses Juan Tong is the
deceased Luis Juan Tong, Sr. (Luis, Sr.) whose surviving heirs are: his spouse Go Tiat Kun,
and their children, Leon, Mary, Lilia, Tomas, Luis, Jr., and Jaime, who being already dead,
is survived by his wife, Roma Cokee Juan Tong who are the respondents.
Page 1438 of 1553

Sometime in 1957, Juan Tong informed them of his intention to purchase Lot 998 to
be used for the family’s lumber business. However, since he was a Chinese citizen and was
disqualified from acquiring the said lot, the title to the property will be registered in the
name of his eldest son, Luis, Sr., who at that time was already of age and was the only
Filipino citizen among his children. Subsequently, Juan Tong bought Lot 998 from the heirs
of Jose Ascencio. Accordingly, TCT No. 10346 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the
name of Luis, Sr.
Sy Un and Juan Tong later on died intestate on 1984, and 1990, respectively.
Meanwhile, on 1981, Luis, Sr. died and the respondents, being his surviving heirs, claimed
ownership over Lot 998 by succession, alleging that no trust agreement exists and it was
Luis, Sr. who bought Lot 998. On 1982, the respondents executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of Luis, Sr., adjudicating unto themselves Lot 998 and claiming that
the said lot is the conjugal property of Luis, Sr., and his wife, which the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo City approved. Later on, the said deed was registered
causing the cancellation of TCT No. 10346 and the issuance of TCT No. T-60231 in the name
of the respondents. Subsequently, the respondents agreed to subdivide Lot 998. After Lot
998 was subdivided, Luis, Jr. sold Lot 998-B to Fine Rock Development Corporation
(FRDC), which in turn sold the same to Visayas Goodwill Credit Corporation (VGCC). It
was only after the petitioners received a letter from VGCC, on 1995, that they discovered
about the breach of the trust agreement committed by the respondents. To protect their
rights, the petitioners filed an action for Annulment of Sales, Titles, Reconveyance and
Damages of Lot 998-B against Luis, Jr., FRDC and VGCC. On 1997, the trial court ruled in
favor of the petitioners which were later affirmed by the CA and this Court on appeal.
Consequently, Lot 998-B was reconveyed to the petitioners and TCT No. T-14839 was issued
under their names including the late Luis, Sr.
Then, on 2001, Go Tiat Kun ( wife of Luis Sr.) executed a Deed of Sale of Undivided
Interest over Lot 998-A in favor of her children, Leon, Mary, Lilia, Tomas, and the late
Jaime. Hence, on August 2, 2005, the petitioners filed the instant case for Nullification of
Titles, and Deeds of Extra-judicial Settlement and Sale and Damages claiming as owners of
Lot 998-A.
Issue:
Whether or not parol evidence be used as proof of the establishment of the trust.
Ruling:
Yes.
Page 1439 of 1553

Contrary to the claim of the respondents, it is not error for the trial court to rely on
parol evidence, i.e., the oral testimonies of witnesses Simeon Juan Tong and Jose Juan Tong,
to arrive at the conclusion that an implied resulting trust exists. What is crucial is the
intention to create a trust. "Intention—although only presumed, implied or supposed by
law from the nature of the transaction or from the facts and circumstances accompanying
the transaction, particularly the source of the consideration—is always an element of a
resulting trust and may be inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties rather than from
direct expression of conduct. Certainly, intent as an indispensable element is a matter that
necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even circumstantial, of statements
made by the parties at or before the time title passes. Because an implied trust is neither
dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be evidenced by writing, Article 1457
of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parol evidence to prove their existence. Parol
evidence that is required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be
trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations."
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda

R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA
REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY
G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.,
The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and agreement of
the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present case. The RTC is justified to
apply the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said,
considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely
simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add
to the terms of the written agreement.
Facts:
Petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco

(Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale before the court. Petitioners alleged that Avelina
was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria Villareal (Victoria).
Eulalio died intestate survived by his wife Victoria, six legitimate children, and one
illegitimate child and he left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City.
In 2001, Avelina was made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter Emelinda
Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo),
Page 1440 of 1553

respondents in this case, that the documents were needed for the titling of the lot. In 2003,
Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of respondents. As respondents ignored her when she tried to talk
to them, Avelina filed in the RTC to declare null and void the two (2) documents to reinstate
and correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.
In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of the subject
property. Petitioner Avelina together with the other heirs brought out the idea to
respondent Emelinda to have the property registered. It was agreed that the property’s tax
declaration could be transferred to respondents Spouses Emelinda and Domingo Gualvez
who will spend all the cost subject to reimbursement; It was agreed that all the heirs will
be given their shares; That Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the consent of the other
heirs signed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondents Gualvez.
The RTC ruled that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale
should be annulled on the ground that with regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication,
she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not solely entitled to their estate;
Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate leaving behind
several living heirs including respondent Emelinda.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held
that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication on petitioners’ allegation
of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, that issues on heirship must be made in
administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. The appellate court
observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document
that has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face.
Aggrieved by the CA’s Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her heirs

except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before this Court ascribing
reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
Issue:
Can the court nullified the Deed of Absolute Sale as it is a notarized document that
has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face?
Page 1441 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes, the court a quo can nullified the Deed of Absolute Sale even if it is notarized.
Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the quality of
incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a contract
does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act valid. The rule on parole evidence is
not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and agreement of
the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present case. Again, respondents
themselves admit in their Answer that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of
Absolute Sale were only executed to facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is justified
to apply the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain
the true intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said,
considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely
simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the written agreement.
Page 1442 of 1553

Authentication and Proof of Documents
FRIDA YAP BITTE AND HEIRS OF BENJAMIN BITTE v.SPOUSES FRED AND ROSA
ELSA SERRANO JONAS
G.R. No. 212256, December 9, 2015, Mendoza, J.
A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity. Nonetheless, it

can be impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaws or defects on the document.
Facts:
Before Rosa Elsa went to Australia, she executed a SPA authorizing her mother, Andrea
Serrano, to sell her property.Cipriano, brother of Rosa Elsa, offered the property for sale to
Spouses
Bitte who later received P200,000 as advance payment for the property and an additional
amount of P400,000.Spouses Bitte sought a meeting for final negotiation with Rosa Elsa
butshe was in Australia. Spouses Bitte paid for Rosa Elsa’s round trip ticket. Upon arrival,
Rosa Elsa revoked the SPA and gave a copy to Andrea. The parties met but no final
agreement was reached then Rosa Elsa withdrew from the transaction.Spouses Bitte filed a
complaint for Specific Performance with Damages seeking to compel Rosa Elsa, Andrea
and Cipriano to transfer to their names the title over the subject property. While the case
was pending, Andrea sold the subject property to Spouses Bitte, through a notarized deed
of absolute sale. Rosa Elsa asked Andrea about the sale but was ignored. On the other hand,
Rosa Elsa mortgaged the property to Mindanao Development Bank which was foreclosed
and sold at a public auction. However, Spouses Bitte were able to redeem the propertyfor
P1.6M and they sold it to Ganzon Yap, married to Haima.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale in favor of
Spouses Bitte were proven.
2. Whether or not the contract of sale should be given effect for having been executed
by
someone appearing as authorized to sell.
3. Whether or not Spouses Yap are purchasers in good faith and for value.
Page 1443 of 1553

Ruling:
1. No. The Court agrees with the CA that the genuineness and due execution of the
deed of sale in favor Spouses Bitte were not established. Indeed, a notarized document has
in its favor the presumption of regularity. Nonetheless, it can be impugned by strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects
on the document. In the case at bench, it is on record that the National Archives, Records
Management and Archives Office, Regional Archives Division, Davao City, certified that it
had no copy on file of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated February 25, 1997, sworn before
Atty. Bernardino N. Bolcan, Jr., denominated as Doc. No. 988, Page No. 198, Book No. 30,
Series of 1997.
Not having been properly and validly notarized, the deed of sale cannot be considered a
public document. It is an accepted rule, however, that the failure to observe the proper
form does not render the transaction invalid. It has been settled that a sale of real property,
though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing is, nevertheless, valid and
binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale
or real estate produces legal effects between the parties.Not being considered a public
document, the deed is subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132.
Accordingly, the party invoking the validity of the deed of absolute sale had the burden of
proving its authenticity and due execution. Unfortunately, Spouses Bitte were declared as
in default and, for said reason, they failed to discharge such burden in the court below.
Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that the RTC erred in applying the presumption of
regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents as distinguished from private
documents.
2. Granting arguendo that the deed of sale may still be considered, the transaction is,
nevertheless, unenforceable. To persons who relied in good faith on the appearance of
authority, no prejudice must be had by virtue of such reliance on what appeared to them
as perfectly in accordance with the observable authority of an agent. It must not be
disturbed unless it can be shown that they had been notified or became aware of the
termination of the agency. Stated differently, a third party cannot be bound by a revocation
unless he had notice or knowledge of such revocation.
In the case at bench, records show that Spouses Bitte initially transacted with Andrea as
Rosa Elsa's agent on the basis of the SPA, dated July 19, 1985. Thereafter, however, Rosa Elsa
returned to the Philippines and directly negotiated with them on October 11, 1996. Rosa
Page 1444 of 1553

Elsa's act of taking over in the actual negotiation for the sale of the property only shows
that Andrea's authority to act has been revoked pursuant to Article 1924. At that point,
Spouses Bitte had information sufficient enough to make them believe that Andrea was no
longer an agent or should have compelled them to make further inquiries. No attempt was
shown that Spouses Bitte took the necessary steps to inquire if Andrea was still authorized
to act at that time. Despite their direct negotiation with Rosa Elsa, they still entered into a
contract with Andrea on February 25, 1997.
3. Settled is the rule that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith
and for value lies upon one who asserts that status. This onus probandi cannot be
discharged by mere invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith. Considering that
the title was still registered in the name of Rosa Elsa when Spouses Yap bought it from
Spouses Bitte, the burden was on them to prove that they were purchasers in good faith. In
this regard, they failed. Not an iota of evidence was adduced by them to prove their
ignorance of the true situation.Spouses Yap were not purchasers in good faith and for value.
Significantly, Ganzon transacted with someone who was not even the registered owner of
the property. At the time of the transfer, the property was still registered in the name of
Rosa Elsa.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MARIA RIZA G. VERGEL DE DIOS

G.R. No. 203536, February 4, 2015, Villarama Jr., J.
As a public document, the picture seat plan need not be identified or presented by the
custodian thereof in order to be admissible in evidence.
Facts:
An investigation conducted by CSC revealed that there were discrepancies in the signatures
and pictures of the respondent in her personal data sheets and on the picture seat plan
used for said examination. It was alleged that respondent, among others, employed a fixer
to pass the CSC's Career Service Professional Examination. CSC Regional Office found
respondent guilty of serious dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official
documents, and dismissed her from the service. CA dismissed respondent’s petition for
review. However, on reconsideration, CA reversed the same and noted that the room
examiners were not presented to prove that the examination procedures were strictly
implemented.
Page 1445 of 1553

Issue:
Whether presentation of the room examiners is required to prove the observance of the
procedure in preparing the picture seat plan and in implementing the civil service
examination.
Ruling:
NO. There is also no need to present the room examiners to establish the authenticity and
due execution of the picture seat plan. The picture seat plan is a public document which is
admissible in evidence without need of proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Pertinently, Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "documents consisting
of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As a public document, the picture seat plan need
not be identified or presented by the custodian thereof in order to be admissible in
evidence.
In Antillon v. Barcelon, the Court explained the legislative policy behind the admissibility
of public documents, to wit: "were there no exception for official statements, hosts of
officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in
the court or delivering their depositions before an officer."
JANET CARBONELL, Petitioner, v. JULITA A. CARBONELL-MENDES,

REPRESENTED BY HER BROTHER AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, VIRGILIO A.
CARBONELL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205681, July 01, 2015, CARPIO, J.
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own
independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can
do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere
handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of
specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.
Page 1446 of 1553

Facts:
Julita A. Carbonell-Mendes is the owner of a residential land in Pangasinan registered

under her maiden name. The TCT was cancelled and replaced by another TCT in the name
of Spouses Carbonell. She prays for the annulment of this title as it was issued on the basis
of a simulated Deed of Sale. The RTC held that the Deed of Absolute Sale was fictitious and
that the signature of Julita was forged. The RTC found significant differences in the
signature of respondent on the Deed of Absolute Sale and respondent's original signature
as found on her passport.
Issue:
Whether the trial court may validly determine forgery on its own.
Ruling:
YES. Besides, the Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the finding of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals that the signature of respondent was forged on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997, which was clearly established by the evidence presented
during the trial. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, among the methods of
proving the genuineness of the handwriting are through a witness familiar with such
handwriting or a comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and the admitted
genuine specimens of the handwriting. Comparing the genuine signature of respondent on
these documents with her purported signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale, the RTC found
"significant differences in terms of handwriting strokes, as well as the shapes and sizes of
letters, fairly suggesting that the plaintiff [Julita A. Carbonell-Mendes] was not the author
of the questioned signature." Signatures on a questioned document may be examined by
the trial court judge and compared with the admitted genuine signatures to determine the
issue of authenticity of the contested document. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting
"with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge."
Page 1447 of 1553

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY OBOGNE

G.R. NO. 199740, MARCH 24, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
In a rape case filed by a mental retardate, the Court held that mental retardation per
se does not affect a witness’ credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. Only
those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others are disqualified.
Facts:
Appellant Jeny Obogne was charged with the crime of rape of a 12-year old mental
retardate. The RTC rendered a Judgment finding Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of simple rape committed against “AAA.” The trial court did not consider
“AAA’s” mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the Information
failed to allege that appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental disability. The CA affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of “AAA” despite her mental
disability
Ruling:
Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. -Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses. x x x x
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following

persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.
Page 1448 of 1553

In this case, “AAA” is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental
condition. As correctly observed by the trial court: “This Court finds “AAA” a very credible
witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to defense counsel’s objection that “AAA”
was not capable of intelligently making known her perception to others, “AAA” managed
to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the accused, though in a soft
voice and halting manner x x x. “AAA’s” simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects
sincerity and truthfulness. While it is true that, on cross-examination, “AAA” faltered in
the sequence of events x x x this is understandable because even one with normal mental
condition would not be able to recall, with a hundred percent accuracy, events that
transpired in the past. But “AAA” was certain that ‘it was a long time x x x after the incident’
when it was reported to the police. Likewise, she was very certain that the accused inserted
his penis into her vagina x x x.”
In the same vein, the appellate court found “AAA” qualified to take the witness stand, viz:
“Our own evaluation of the records reveals that “AAA” was shown to be able to perceive, to
make known her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents.”
We stress that, contrary to accused-appellant’s assertions, mental retardation per se does

not affect a witness’ credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness.
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple
rape and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
266-B, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that “AAA’s” mental
disability could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information
failed to allege that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission
of the crime.
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call
for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental
disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
Under Article 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the
mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission
of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death
penalty. As such this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly
proved by the prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But in the absence of
a specific or particular allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her mental
Page 1449 of 1553

disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact,
Article 266-B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied x x x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI

G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014
J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that the accused may be

convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things. In this regard, we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of AAA’s
testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
On October 9, 2002, two criminal Informations, each charging appellant with one count of
rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code were filed by a 16-year old girl, who
happened to be the appellant’s niece by affinity.
The trial court convicted appellant Mervin Gahi of two counts of rape defined under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
According to the prosecution, appellant used force or intimidation in order to successfully

have unlawful carnal knowledge of AAA. To be exact, appellant is alleged to have utilized,
on two occasions, a knife and the threat of bodily harm to coerce AAA into submitting to
his evil sexual desires. A careful perusal of AAA’s testimony in open court reveals that she
was clear and straightforward in her assertion that appellant raped her twice in the manner
described by the prosecution. We sustain as proper the appellate court’s findings regarding
the first instance of rape.
Page 1450 of 1553

Appellant questions the weighty trust placed by the trial court on the singular and
uncorroborated testimony of AAA as the basis for his conviction. On this point, we would
like to remind appellant that it is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape
that the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided
that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things. In this regard, we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of AAA’s testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent the inconsistent statements made by AAA in her testimony which were pointed out
by appellant, we agree with the assessment made by the Court of Appeals that these are
but minor discrepancies that do little to affect the central issue of rape which is involved in
this case. Instead of diminishing AAA’s credibility, such variance on minor details has the
net effect of bolstering the truthfulness of AAA’s accusations. We have constantly declared
that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to
minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair
the credibility of the witnesses because they discount the possibility of their being
rehearsed testimony.
Notable is the fact that no ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse appellant was ever
brought up by the defense during trial. This only serves to further strengthen AAA’s case
since we have consistently held that a rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is
credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused.
It is also equally important to highlight AAA’s young age when she decided to accuse her
kin of rape and go through the ordeal of trial.
In a bid to exculpate himself, appellant argues that he could not have possibly been guilty
of rape because the time period between the rape incidents and the birth of the alleged
fruit of his crime is more than the normal period of pregnancy. He also points out that
defense witness Jackie Gucela’s admission that he was AAA’s lover and the father of her
child should suffice to negate any notion that he raped AAA twice. Lastly, he puts forward
the defense of alibi.
We are not convinced by appellant’s line of reasoning which appears ostensibly compelling,
at the outset, but is ultimately rendered inutile by jurisprudence and the evidence at hand.
It is well-entrenched in our case law that the rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant
childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was
fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the
latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
Page 1451 of 1553

manner. Likewise, we assign no significance to the testimony of defense witness Jackie

Gucela.
For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship must
be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his
claim to be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there
should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens
of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like. In any event, even
assuming for the sake of argument that AAA had a romantic attachment with a person
other than the accused at the time of the rape incidents or thereafter, this circumstance
would not necessarily negate the truth of AAA’s statement that the appellant, her aunt’s
husband, twice had carnal knowledge of her through force and intimidation and without
her consent.
We are similarly unconvinced with appellant’s defense of alibi. We have consistently held
that alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.
Moreover, we have required that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must
prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far
away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the
crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all

surnamed DIMAGUILA vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO
G.R. NO. 201011, JANUARY 27, 2014
J. MENDOZA
a. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. In relation thereto,
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides
that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be
evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. The
Page 1452 of 1553
cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records,
fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
b. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys.
The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of
cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
Facts:
The respondent Spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before
the RTC, against the petitioners, wherein it was alleged that all the parties were co-owners
and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot. Spouses Monteiro anchored their
claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. The
Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership, alleging
that the property, then owned by Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between
her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
with its southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to
Vitaliano. They further claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses
Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or
Vitaliano.
During the course of the proceedings, several motions and notices were initiated. Upon
resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend
and/or Admit Amended Complaint, which the RTC granted. The amended complaint
abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession
of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants. In
amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their
original answer that the subject property had been partitioned between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. In contrary, the Dimaguilas admitted
that the subject property was inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had been actually
divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial
Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and share and share
alike."
Page 1453 of 1553

Further, Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a
certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners and
Tolentino, a record officer of the DENR, testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and
safekeeps the records of surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region. Asuncion
Dimaguilas also testified that their first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their
original answer that the property had already been partitioned into northern and southern
portions between the two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were
never given a copy of it.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and the CA affirmed such decision declaring
that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence thru their
presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map and the municipal
assessor's records. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were estopped from denying their
admission of partition after the respondent spouses had relied on their judicial admission.
Issue:
a. Whether admission made in the course of proceeding in the same case was made through
palpable mistake.
b. Whether there was a violation of the hearsay rule and best evidence rule.
Ruling:
a. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners
argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to
file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them.
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota

of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof. Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only
almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in response to the amended
complaint of the respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for
partition, their claim that there was already a partition into northern-half and southern-
half portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was precisely this admission which
moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The petitioners cannot now
insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake.
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
Page 1454 of 1553
person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners'
admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of
possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from
denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners
would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented
by the respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served
to corroborate the petitioners' admission.
b. Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule
provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or
the record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants
of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was
Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such
documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record
officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The
cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records,
fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience
and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that
the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official
Page 1455 of 1553

records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are
exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no
evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the
admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of
evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject property.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORO MANIGO

G.R. NO. 194612, JANUARY 27, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
Factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses,
and its assessment of their probative weight are given great respect if not conclusive effect,
unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual
assault, especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a
public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own
degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and
punished.
In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the
Court has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken
into consideration: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Facts:
Appellant was charged for the rape of AAA, a 13-year old minor, to which appellant pleaded
not guilty. In the trial, the prosecution present AAA to testify as to the events that took
place resulting to the crime charged. However, it appears that AAA’s testimony during trial
and statement in her affidavit are somehow inconsistent. Further, the prosecution also
presented the medical findings of the doctor that examined AAA, revealing swelling on the
posterior portion of AAA’s private part. In his defense, appellant raised denial and alibi,
claiming that there could have been no rape as appellant was at their home on the day of
the alleged rape and that appellant does not know the victim.
Page 1456 of 1553

The RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of "AAA" on how the incident
happened and her positive identification of the appellant, thereby rejecting appellant’s
defense of denial. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, sustaining the credibility
of AAA and her out-of-court identification of appellant.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of the victim deserves full faith and credence, despite
inconsistencies.
Ruling:
"AAA’s" testimony deserves full faith and credence.
Appellant’s contentions basically relate to the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its factual findings based thereon.
"The legal aphorism is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given great
respect if not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would
alter the outcome of the case." A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the case at
bench is not an exception.
Like the lower courts, we find the narration of "AAA" to be candid, frank and
straightforward. There is nothing therein that appears to be unnatural or illogical.
Moreover, "AAA’s" claim of rape is supported by the medical findings of Dr. Perez, another
prosecution witness. "Where a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physical findings
of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.
A rape victim’s account is sufficient to support a conviction for rape if it is straightforward,
candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in the
present case."
Also, "courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual
assault, especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo
a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own
degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and
punished."
Insofar as the alleged inconsistency between "AAA’s" statements in her affidavit and
testimony in open court is concerned, it has often been noted by this Court that if there is
Page 1457 of 1553
an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be
given more weight since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and
inaccurate. Besides, the inconsistency respecting the physical appearance of appellant has
no bearing on the principal question of whether appellant had carnal knowledge of the
victim. Neither the failure of "AAA" to describe the tricycle will dent her credibility. Suffice
it to say that these matters are not so material in the prosecution of the crime.
In Vidar v. People, the Court laid down the following:
In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the

Court has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors
are taken into consideration: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
Guided by the above, we find "AAA’s" out-of-court identification of appellant not tainted
with any irregularity.
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO

G.R. NO. 173540, JANUARY 22, 2014
J. PEREZ
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it

is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.
The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the
contents, which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the
loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral
or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
Page 1458 of 1553
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from
its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the
document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even
by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has
also held that the loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by
anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or
places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in
whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any
other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument has indeed been
lost.
Facts:
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly
married to the same man, now deceased. Respondent Tecla instituted a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina on the ground that Tecla, is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio. In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in rites officiated by the Parish Priest.
According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, which however, were destroyed due to the war.
Thus, only a Certification was issued by the LCR. Further, Tecla claimed that during the
existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four children. Howver, Eustaquio left
his family and his whereabouts was not known. Later, Tecla and her children were informed
that Eustaquio was in Davao living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura who
later died without any issue.
Subsequently, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to Peregrina, which marriage she
claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. On the contrary, Peregrina
averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died in Davao City, as their
marriage was celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City, further
contending that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her
own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued and Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence. On the other
hand, Peregrina testified and likewise presented documentary evidence, among which is
the Marriage Contract between her and the Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3
March 1979. The RTC denied Tecla’s petition, which decision was reversed by the CA.
Page 1459 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document.
Ruling:
Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing

precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of
the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of
Appeals. Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they
have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v.
Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x The court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of
the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, which may
not be proven by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible.
Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence
of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence of the contents. x x x x
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic
papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by
parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
Page 1460 of 1553
available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be proven
by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even
by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court
has also held that "the loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or
by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument has
indeed been lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event.
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONALD VASQUEZ

G.R. NO. 200304, JANUARY 15, 2014
a. Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary
submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
Page 1461 of 1553
the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
b. Credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially
so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary.
Facts:
In an information, Vasquez was charged for violation of dangerous drugs for selling shabu
or methamphetamine hydrochloride. Upon arraignment, Vasquez pleaded not guilty and
trial on the merits ensued. During the trial, prosecution presented the testimonies of
P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo, who both took part in the buy-bust operation
conducted by the police to capture Vasquez.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that they received a confidential information about Vasquez being
engaged in illegal drug activity and claimed about being an employee of the NBI. This
information was relayed to their commanding officer, and thus a team was formed to
conduct a buy-bust operation. The informant and the team went to the location with
P/Insp. Fajardo acting as the potential buyer. The deal to buy shabu was closed, with an
agreement to meet the following day for the delivery of the drugs. As such, the buy-bust
team went to the agreed meeting place, but Vasquez told P/Insp. Fajardo to have the sale
take place in a more secured place, to which Fajardo agreed and the exchange of money
and shabu took place in the new agreed place with Vasquez and companion being captured
therein. With this, Fajardo took custody of the shabu and placed her initials therein, further
Vasquez and companion were brought to the police station where their rights were read to
them. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the
Crime Laboratory. Further, P/Insp. Fajardo testified that she noticed that there were
markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not
bother to check out what they were for or who made them, however, upon interrogation it
was revealed that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory and
that Vasquez was working as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. PO2
Trambulo also testified and corroborated that of Fajardo. The defense denied the
prosecution’s allegation of events, contending Vasquez was framed up.
The RTC convicted Vasquez giving more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police
officers was not overcome. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Page 1462 of 1553

Issue:
a. Whether the search and arrest done by the police officers were valid.
b. Whether testimony of prosecution witness supports conviction.
Ruling:
a. At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his
arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment.
Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any
irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction." Be
that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus,
falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of
the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal
drugs from the appellant is likewise valid
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his
arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
b. In People v. Ting Uy, the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration
of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily
prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would
falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have
any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in
fact did not know them at all. In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is
presumed to exist.
Page 1463 of 1553
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked
or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will
not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since
the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.
Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the
trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
People of the Philippines Vs. Edison C. Magbitang

G.R. No. 175592. June 8, 2016
Facts:
Magbitang was charged with rape with homicide under the information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija. The lone witness to the rape with homicide was a 6-
year old CCC. The RTC found Magbitang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide, and held that CCC had the capacity to observe, recollect and communicate what
he had witnessed; hence, he was entitled to credence. It ruled that sufficient circumstantial
evidence pointing to Magbitang as the author of the rape with homicide also exists.
Issue:
1. Whether minor CCC is a competent witness
2. Whether the accused was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence
Held:
1. Yes. Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial
court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as
to render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be
examined and of relating the facts truthfully. The testimony of the child of sound
mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the perception can be believed
in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify.14 Once it is
established that the child fully understands the character and nature of an oath, the
testimony is given full credence. In the case of CCC, the defense did not persuasively
discredit his worthiness and competence as a witness. As such, the Court considers
the reliance by the trial court on his recollection fully justified.
Page 1464 of 1553

2. No, we dismiss the argument of Magbitang that the trial court erroneously relied on
circumstantial evidence to establish his criminal responsibility for the rape with
homicide. The evidence of guilt against him consisted in both direct and
circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence was supplied by CCC's testimony,
while the circumstantial evidence corroborated CCC's testimony. Such evidence,
combined, unerringly pointed to Magbitang, and to no other, as the culprit. In this
connection, it is worth reminding that circumstantial evidence is not necessarily
weaker in persuasive quality than direct evidence. the Rules of Court makes no
distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from
which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty
is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct.
People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Mercado

G.R No. 213832, December 7, 2015, J. Reyes
Jurisprudence holds that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is
credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.
Facts:
Rosario had visitors on he her daughters’ birthday. Included are the accused Mercado and
his girlfriend Analiza and both deceased Victor and Charlie who were drinking at the party.
Thereafter for no reason Mercado shot Victor and Charlie which resulted to their
immediate death. The prosecution presented Analiza as a witness which testified that she
saw that Mercado shot both deceased then hurriedly left corroborated by testimony of
Rosario. Mercado on his part denied allegation contending that he was not at Rosario’s
house on the claimed date of death of both deceased and that he denied knowing the
Analiza thereby convicting him with two charged of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not his alibi would prosper
Ruling:
No. Given the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, as against the
denial and alibi presented by the defense, the Supreme Court found no reason to
Page 1465 of 1553
reverse the conviction of Mercado. His denial and the alibi that he was at some other place
at the time the shootings happened failed to sufficiently support his plea for an acquittal.
Jurisprudence holds that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is
credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense
failed in this regard, as only the testimony of Mercado's father was presented to
substantiate his claim. Such physical impossibility was not established in this case, given
the RTC's finding that Barangay Tetuan, where Mercado claimed to be at when the killings
happened on the evening of the incident was a mere seven kilometers away from Barangay
San Roque.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATHANIEL PASION Y DELA CRUZ A.K.A.

“ATHAN” AND DENNIS MICHAEL PAZ Y SIBAYAN
G.R. No. 203026, January 28, 2015, PEREZ, J.
The well-entrenched principle of giving full faith and credence to the narration of
police officers, due to the presumption of regularity, equally apply in buy-bust operations.
Facts:
A confidential informant came to the INSET office of the PNP Police Station in Laoag City
to inform about the illegal activities of Nathaniel Pasion. Pasion was included in the watch
list of drug personalities. A buy bust operation was conducted where Pasion was caught
giving one plastic sachet containing crystalline substance to the poseur-buyer. On board
the PDEA service vehicle, Pasion offered to divulge his supplier. Subsequently, Pasion
arranged a meeting with Dennis Paz, his alleged supplier. Paz was apprehended while in
the process of handling over the suspected shabu to Pasion. The RTC found Pasion guilty
of illegal sale of shabu while Dennis Paz guilty of illegal delivery of shabu. Pasion and Paz
insist that the intelligence officers’ testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. Some of
the alleged inconsistent statements are the location of Pasion when the PDEA-INSET
arrived and the manner of apprehension.
Issue:
Whether or not the statements of the PDEA intelligence officers should be discarded for
their inconsistencies.
Page 1466 of 1553

Ruling:
No. The well-entrenched rule is that full faith and credence are given to the narration of
police officers who testify for the prosecution on the entrapment or buy-bust operation,
because as police officers, they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. The
presumption of regularity must prevail over appellants’ unsubstantiated allegations. This
presumption is overturned only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the officers
were not properly performing their duty or that they were inspired by improper motive. In
any criminal prosecution, the defenses of denial and frame-up, like alibi, are considered
weak defenses and have been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for they can just
as easily be concocted but are difficult to prove. The foregoing principles apply with equal,
if not greater, force in prosecutions involving violations of R.A. No. 9165, especially those
originating from buy-bust operations.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARTIN NERIO, JR.

G.R. No. 200940, July 22, 2015, PERALTA,J.
It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when
the victim is a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot
effectively testify as to the details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort
to circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable.
Facts:
The RTC of Bansalan, Davao del Sur found Nerio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against AAA, a mentally disabled child. Nerio thus sought relief
from the CA. The appellate court rendered a Decision affirming the trial court’s ruling.
Nerio sought the reversal of the CA Decision. He was questioning whether there can be a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape where the victim, who is
mentally disabled, was not presented in court during trial to substantiate the accusation in
the criminal information. Nerio doubted the trial court’s conclusion that AAA is mentally
retarded based merely on its observation of her demeanor in court. He strongly pressed
that AAA was never presented in court as a witness.
Page 1467 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not there can be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of
rape where the victim, who is mentally disabled, was not presented in court during trial to
substantiate the accusation in the criminal information.
Ruling:
Yes. It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when the
victim is a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot
effectively testify as to the details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort
to circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable. The Court reiterates that direct evidence of
the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court may draw its finding of
guilt. Here, AAA was not presented to testify in court because she was declared unfit to
fully discharge the functions of a credible witness. The psychologist who examined her
found that her answers reveal a low intellectual sphere, poor insight, and lack of capacity
to deal with matters rationally. She could hardly even understand simple instructions.
More importantly, when it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, as in this case. Since it had the full
opportunity to observe directly the deportment and the manner of testifying of the
witnesses before it, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly
evaluate testimonial evidence. Unlike the trial courts, the appellate courts are far detached
from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in
its review. The defense failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness
on the trial court’s findings of fact; these findings must, therefore, be given due deference
and great weight.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO PATEÑO DAYAPDAPAN

G.R. No. 209040, December 09, 2015 PEREZ, J.
Victim's uniform testimony regarding the manner by which she was raped does not
diminish her credibility
Page 1468 of 1553

Facts:
AAA was then 14 years old. She was awakened by his father, Rodolfo P. Dayapdapan, who
removed her short pants and underwear. He threatened AAA with a scythe and ordered
her to stay quiet. He proceeded to perform this bestial act on AAA for the four (4)
succeeding nights. AAA intimated to her teacher her harrowing experience. Dayapdapan
was then charged with five (5) counts of rape. The RTC found him guilty as charged. This
was affirmed by the CA on appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA err in finding Dayapdapan guilty as charged.
Ruling:
No. Accused-appellant insists that AAA's claim of sequent rape identically done is highly
improbable and contrary to human experience. In People v. Solomon, we held that the
victim's uniform testimony regarding the manner by which she was raped does not
diminish her credibility. We explained, thus: Men are creatures of habit and are bound to
adopt a course of action that has proven to be successful. As appellant was able to fulfill his
lustful designs upon complainant the first time, it comes as no surprise that he would
repeat the horrific acts when the circumstances obtaining in the first rape again presented
themselves.
As in the aforestated case, AAA did not immediately report the incident to her teacher and
instead, she suffered for four more similar incidents before she broke her silence. There is
a plausible explanation for the conduct of the victim. The Court explained in Solomon, viz.:
Complainant's youth partly accounts for her failure to escape appellant's lust. A young girl
like complainant cannot be expected to have the intelligence to defy what she may have
perceived as the substitute parental authority that appellant wielded over her. That
complainant had to bear more sexual assaults from appellant before she mustered enough
courage to escape his bestiality does not imply that she willingly submitted to his desires.
Neither was she expected to follow the ordinary course that other women in the same
situation would have taken. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted
by a shocking incident. Verily, under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to
follow a predictable path. Thus, Dayapdapan was found GUILTY for each count of the crime
of rape, qualified by minority and relationship.
Page 1469 of 1553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE BUAT ALIAS DATU SINSUAT

Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if

the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape.
Facts:
Appellant Ronnie Buat is the husband of DDD, the sister of the victim AAA. AAA’s parents
had requested DDD to sleep in the house because AAA’s mother BBB had to attend a wake
while her father CCC was on night duty. AAA slept in the sala next to her twin nephews,
along with DDD, and appellant. At around 2:00 a.m., AAA was awakened by appellant who
was half-naked and lying on top of her. AAA tried to talk aloud but appellant suddenly
covered her mouth with his right hand. Appellant managed to remove AAA’s panties using
his left hand while holding a knife threatening to kill AAA should she tell her parents about
the act. AAA tried to resist but to no avail. Appellant inserted his two fingers into her vagina
before inserting his penis. AAA told DDD about what appellant did but DDD ignored her.
After appellant and DDD left the house, AAA immediately told one of her younger brothers
about the incident. AAA also told CCC about what happened upon his arrival. Both the
RTC and CA convicted the appellant of the crime of rape. Appellant contends that AAA’s
account of the alleged rape is riddled with improbabilities and inconsistencies which lead
to failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Appellant states that it is physically impossible for him to have restrained AAA using
his two hands to cover her mouth, hold a knife, remove her panties, and insert his two
fingers into her private parts. The Court rejects the submission. The Court finds that it is
not implausible for appellant to have physically subdued AAA because these acts were not
committed simultaneously, but successively. Appellant also notes the inconsistency in
AAA’s testimony that appellant allegedly covered her mouth with his right hand but in her
sworn statement, she stated that appellant covered her mouth with his left hand. It has
Page 1470 of 1553
been held that inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility,
especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape.
The Court ordinarily puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted
the trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves. This is especially
true in rape cases where the crime is usually committed in the presence of no other person
than the victim and the accused. Compared to appellate magistrates who are merely faced
with the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of records brought before them, the
trial judge comes face to face with the rape victim herself on the witness stand. He
personally observes her conduct and demeanor while responding to the questions
propounded by the prosecutor on direct examination as well as those from the defense
counsel on cross examination. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the chance to
pose clarificatory questions to the victim. Thus, when the trial judge makes his findings as
to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight upon the appellate court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO EDAÑO AND NESTOR EDAÑO

G.R. No, 206970, July 29, 2015, Perez, J.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the testimony or deposition of
a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Facts:
The prosecution presented Fernando Layson, one of its witnesses, who alleged that one
evening, when he was on his way home, he heard a person moaning. He quietly followed
the sound and saw Leonardo Dabalos being stabbed by Antonio Edaño while Nestor Edaño
held him on both arms. He witnessed the incident while hiding behind some plants. .
Terrified by the incident, Fernando did not go home and instead went to the house of his
brother. He told his brother the stabbing incident that he witnessed. On the following day,
Fernando reported the matter to the police and to Leonardo’s family. Fernando
accompanied Leonardo’s son and the police officers to the scene of the crime. Thereat, they
found Leonardo sprawled on the ground. On the other hand, Antonio testified in his
defense and interposed denial and alibi. Antonio and Nestor were then charged with
murder. The RTC found them guilty as charged, and such conviction was affirmed by the
CA. Antonio now targets the credibility of Fernando as an eyewitness to the alleged
Page 1471 of 1553
stabbing incident. Antonio argues that Fernando’s testimony was fraught with
improbabilities. He insists that Fernando’s failure to intervene and seek help cast doubt on
the credibility of his testimony and that it was impossible for Fernando to identify the
perpetrators when he admitted to have been hiding in darkness.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of Fernando, as the lone eyewitness, is sufficient to prove
Antonio’s complicity.
Ruling:
YES. Pursuant to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the testimony or deposition of
a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. In this case, the
prosecution properly offered the testimony of Fernando in the case against Nestor.
Fernando was already deceased during Antonio’s trial. Thus, the testimony of the lone
eyewitness Fernando is sufficient to prove Antonio’s complicity. This is because during the
direct examination, Fernando gave a straightforward narration of the stabbing incident and
positively identified accused-appellant and his co-accused as the assailants.
DST MOVERS CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE

CORPORATION
A traffic accident investigation report prepared by a police officer relying solely on the
account of a supposed eyewitness and not on his or her personal knowledge is not evidence
that is admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
FACTS:
People's General Insurance Corporation (PGIC) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money before
the MeTC, alleging that a Honda Civic sedan was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck owned
by DST Movers Corporation. In support of its recollection of the events, PGIC relied on a
Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas
(PO2 Tomas) of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National
Police. This was attached as Annex "E" of PGIC’s Complaint and also as Annex "E" of its
Position Paper.
Page 1472 of 1553
The MeTC rendered a Decision favoring PGIC’s version of events and finding DST Movers
liable. On appeal, the ruling of the MeTC was affirmed in toto by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals.
Hence, DST Movers filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court insisting
that its liability was not established by a preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults
the lower courts for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how its version of events was supported
by nothing more the Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this
Report was misplaced as it was supposedly "improperly identified [and] uncorroborated."
ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court, in a Rule 45 Petition, review the factual findings of
the lower courts.
YES, under exceptional circumstances.
A Rule 45 petition pertains to questions of law and not to factual issues. As a general rule,
it becomes improper for the Supreme Court to consider factual issues: the findings of fact
of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the
Supreme Court. The reason behind the rule is that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
and it is not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence
adduced before the lower courts.
A determination of whether a matter has been established by a preponderance of evidence

is, by definition, a question of fact. It entails an appreciation of the relative weight of the
competing parties’ evidence. The determination is a "query [that] necessarily invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole and the probabilities of the situation."
However, there are exceptions that leave room for the Supreme Court to make a factual
determination for itself and, ultimately, to overturn the factual findings with which it is
confronted. In this case, the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial
Court, and the Court of Appeals in this case are all in accord. They consistently ruled that
the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the sedan was the negligent driving of a
vehicle owned by petitioner. However, this conclusion is founded on the misplaced
probative value accorded to a traffic accident investigation report. In the first place, this
Report should not have been admitted as evidence for violating the Hearsay Rule. Bereft of
Page 1473 of 1553

evidentiary basis, the conclusion of the lower courts cannot stand as it has been reduced to
conjecture. Thus, we reverse this conclusion.
2. Whether or not the Traffic Accident Investigation Report is admissible in evidence.
NO.
A traffic accident investigation report prepared by a police officer relying solely on the
account of a supposed eyewitness and not on his or her personal knowledge is not evidence
that is admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Hearsay Rule. It
renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons who are not
presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated. This rule proceeds
from the basic rationale of fairness, as the party against whom it is presented is unable to
cross-examine the person making the statement.
The Hearsay Rule, however, is not absolute. Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence enumerate the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Of these, Section 44—
regarding entries in official records—is particularly relevant to this case. Precisely as an
exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does away with the need for presenting
as witness the public officer or person performing a duty specially enjoined by law who
made the entry. This, however, is only true, for as long the following requisites have been
satisfied:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Here, respondent presented proof of the occurrence of an accident. As to the identity,

however, of the vehicle or of the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan,
all that respondent relies on is the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas. The matters indicated
in the Report are not matters that were personally known to PO2 Tomas. The Report is
candid in admitting that the matters it states were merely reported to PO2 Tomas by "G.
Page 1474 of 1553

Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX." It was this "G. Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies entries
made by a public officer in the performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite
for admissibility for entries in official records as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the person who prepared the
Report—PO2 Tomas—to have himself presented as a witness and then testify on his
Report. However, even as the Report would have been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’
testimony would not have sufficed in establishing the identity of the motor vehicle and/or
the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan. For this purpose, the
testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.
Of course, the Supreme Court is aware that the case was decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Court pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (considering that petitioner’s
total claims amounted to less than P200,000.00). Accordingly, no trial was conducted as,
after the conduct of a preliminary conference, the parties were made to submit their
position papers. There was, thus, no opportunity to present witnesses during an actual trial.
However, Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure calls for the submission of
witnesses’ affidavits together with a party’s position paper and after the conduct of a
preliminary conference. These affidavits take the place of actual testimony in court and
serve to expedite the resolution of cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Thus, it was still insufficient for respondent to have merely annexed the Report
to its Position Paper. By its lonesome, and unsupported by an affidavit executed by PO2
Tomas, the Report was hearsay and, thus, inadmissible.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO "JAY-R" and

EDUARDO QUISAYAS
G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014, J. Diosdado M. Peralta
It appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the
records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made
the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief
in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying
declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival
and looked on death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not
be considered as a dying declaration.
Page 1475 of 1553

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring
to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. At that time,
Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus,
had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about appellant and
his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made
in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is
relevant because it identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of
Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
Facts:
While Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home, he saw Januario being mauled
by two persons. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front a church until such time that
the accused ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol
vehicle. On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol
vehicle performing their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as
Caballero and Quisayas, who were running at a fast speed. When asked why they were
running, the accused did not answer prompting the policemen to chase them. The
policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when it became evident that
they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. There they saw Januario
lying on the street. As he was severely injured, the policemen immediately boarded
Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital.
While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He
answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be
the appellant herein, while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large. At the Zigzag
Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition. Three
fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually
caused his death. Later, Maria Castillo (his wife), SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel testified
against Quisayas. RTC rendered a Decision convicting Eduardo Quisayas guilty for robbery
with homicide which was affirmed by CA but was changed to murder.
Issue:
Page 1476 of 1553

Whether or not a dying declaration of Januario was admissible for crime of robbery
with homicide.
Ruling:
No, dying declaration of Januario was not admissible for crime of robbery with
homicide.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay

character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a)
the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify
had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject
of inquiry involves the declarant's death.
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are
present. From the records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded
to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his
impending death when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by
the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in
point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant
has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Thus, the
utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration.
However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying

declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve
to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence
as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was
referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused.
At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the
Page 1477 of 1553

hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance
about appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3
Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the accused as the authors of the
crime. Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the
prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILAN ROXAS Y AGUILUZ

Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a
girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed.
Facts:
Accused-Appellant Milan Roxas was charged with five counts of rape with force and
intimidation. AAA testified that from 1997 to 1998, Roxas had carnal knowledge of his
minor niece, AAA, while pointing a sharp instrument at the latter. In his defense, Roxas
presented the testimony of Dr. Aglipay, the Regional Psychiatrist of the BJMP, who said
that Roxas was suffering from a mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to
ten (10) years old.
The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on
the ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr.
Aglipay merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development
comparable to that of children between nine to ten years old. The CA affirmed with
modification the RTC decision.
Issue:
May AAA, who was merely 14 years old at the time she testified, be considered a
credible witness?
Ruling:
The Court has repeatedly held that testimonies of child-victims are normally given
full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit
Page 1478 of 1553

to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also
the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAYSON CRUZ y TECSON

G.R. No. 194234, June 18, 2014, J. Reyes
In cases of rape, the testimony of the victim alone may be sufficient to obtain a
conviction. However, this is not true to all rape cases as the Supreme Court may consider
other circumstances and evidence present in the case such as behavior of the victim and her
family during and after the incident, the intent of the accused to flee and the medico legal
report submitted.
Facts:
On May 26, 2003 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, AAA was at her home when
Cruz called her through her father’s cellphone and asked her to go over the latter’s place.
After getting her mother’s permission, AAA went to Cruz’ house and there she saw the
latter and his friends having a drinking spree and when Cruz’ friends saw AAA, they left
her alone with Cruz. According to AAA, Cruz dragged her to the bedroom where he
overpowered her and succeeded having sexual intercourse with her without her consent.
AAA tried to scream but no one came to her aid and after the act, Cruz locked her inside
the house. AAA shouted for help when she saw people outside the house but they ignored
her. After 3 days, AAA was able to escape from the accused’s house when Cruz left the door
open and went to the comfort room. AAA did not immediately tell her mother what
happened but instead confided to her elder sister and the latter helped AAA to inform their
mother. As a result, Cruz was charged of rape. Upon arraignment, Cruz pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, AAA’s testimony was presented together with the medico-legal
officer who testified as to AAA’s non-virgin state. On the other hand, Cruz interposed the
defense of alibi and denial. He claimed that AAA was his girlfriend since 2002 and when
AAA went to his house, she asked him to elope with her. However, he declined which
angered AAA and threatened Cruz to tell her mother that the latter raped her as a
consequence of his refusal. The testimony of the accused was corroborated by Rodrigo
Francisco who was outside of the house of the accused when the incident happened and
Christopher Idago who was able to hear the conversation between the accused and AAA.
The RTC found Cruz guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt. In appeal, Cruz
assailed propriety of the decision of the RTC because medico-legal report revealed the
presence of deep healed lacerations when the wounds or lacerations should have been fresh
Page 1479 of 1553

if it was indeed the victim’s first time to have any sexual contact. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Cruz’ guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
Ruling:
No. The Court reverses the RTC and the CA ruling due to the presence of lingering
doubts, inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of
evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case.
"The Court has exhorted courts to keep in mind settled principles in the decision-
making process, i.e., (1) that an accusation for rape can be made with facility; (2) that it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove;
(3) that, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with great caution;
and (4) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall in its own merits, and it
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense."
The Court is not unmindful of the general rule that the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great respect and even finality
on appeal. However, this principle does not preclude a reevaluation of the evidence to
determine whether material facts or circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted
by the trial court. In the past, the Court has not hesitated to reverse judgments of
conviction, where there were strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape
charge was false.
The CA sustained the conviction of Cruz on the basis of AAA’s testimony such that
AAA made direct, positive and categorical statements on the witness stand on the material
circumstances regarding the commission of the crime committed against her person. The
CA decision has also for its basis the jurisprudential doctrines that "when a woman says
that she had been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that the rape had
been committed and that, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof. No one would wish to be exposed to public ridicule,
shame and dishonor or allow her private parts to be examined if the accusation of rape
were not true. No one would want to go through the trouble and humiliation of a trial
unless she was really raped and her motive was solely to seek justice."
Page 1480 of 1553

While the Court maintains that the aforementioned doctrines still hold true, these
principles must be applied in a case to case basis and cannot pertain to all cases where a
woman claims to have been a victim of rape.
As the records bear, AAA did testify in a straightforward and candid manner but
some circumstances are present in the instant case which made the Court pause and
reconsider the rulings of the RTC and the CA.
First, AAA claimed that Cruz called her father’s cellular phone and asked her to
come over his house that fateful night. Interestingly, AAA’s father is a policeman. It is
puzzling then why Cruz, who would have had bestial intentions at that time, would call
AAA through the cellular phone of her father. Assuming that AAA’s version is true, Cruz
must have thrown so much caution in the air, knowing that he could be identified by AAA’s
father as the last person who called AAA before she was detained in the house of Cruz.
Second, if Cruz had indeed raped and detained AAA in his house, why would Cruz
be so certain that AAA’s family did not know her whereabouts that night? AAA testified
that she merely lied to her mother about buying something so she can get out and go to
Cruz’s house. If Cruz raped AAA, Cruz must have known beforehand that AAA lied to her
mother about her exact location. Otherwise, Cruz again took a gigantic leap and risked that
AAA’s parents do not know where she is and would not be able to locate her in his house.
Third, it is also perplexing that after AAA managed to escape from the clutches of
Cruz after almost three days of being held captive, Cruz did not flee from his home, which
incidentally, is also the scene of the crime. As AAA’s father is a policeman, AAA could at
anytime pinpoint Cruz as the one who raped and detained her to cause his arrest. Thus, it
is not too far-fetched to presume that Cruz, allegedly only 18 years old at that time, would
have fled at the first opportunity he is presented with to avoid the implications of their
wrath, if he is guilty. "Jurisprudence has repeatedly declared that flight is an indication of
guilt. The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be established ‘for a truly innocent
person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert
his innocence.’"
Lastly, Cruz is charged of a single count of rape. However, AAA testified that Cruz
subjected her to repeated sexual abuse during the days of her ordeal in his hands. AAA
neither testified as to the number of times she was raped nor as regards the particulars of
the other instances of rape, all of which occurred in less than three days. Although these
are immaterial to the single count of rape which is the subject of the present case, it could
not be helped that the Court finds it a bit mystifying as to how AAA could not have
Page 1481 of 1553

sustained other physical injuries, no matter how slight, if she was raped again and again in
a short period of time.
It is relevant to know that carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual
bodily connections with a woman." Thus, even if there are no lacerations or the lacerations
are old and healed, the fact of rape can still be proven by other evidence. Nonetheless, the
Court is wary of applying these principles, in light of the unique factors attendant to this
case.
The physical examination which AAA underwent on June 8, 2003, which is 10 days
after her escape from Cruz’s house, disclosed lack of external signs of physical trauma. The
Court cannot deny the existence of deep healed lacerations in AAA’s genitalia. However,
there is a cloud of doubt if Cruz is undeniably the author thereof. Furthermore, there is
also uncertainty as to the approximate time when the lacerations were inflicted. The
medico legal officer testified that she herself cannot denote the exact date when the
lacerations were inflicted.
RES GESTAE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR. et al

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, J. Leonen
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school
campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were
made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence
given in res gestae.
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members
of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several
masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that
required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan,
Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette
Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero,
and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the RTC.
Page 1482 of 1553

The RTC found Alvir, Feliciano, Jr., Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other
penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the statements made by the bystanders are admissible as part of the
res gestae
Ruling:
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value
in this case.
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the
scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the
attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be
given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. All other kinds of testimony
are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several
exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to
wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances
are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
Page 1483 of 1553

and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a

school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders
were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as
evidence given in res gestae.
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive
value since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage
points and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time
of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some
remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who
witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former
become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the
incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG

G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014, J. Reyes
Res gestae means the “things done.” It refers to those exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during,
or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement.” There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res
gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood;
and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.
In this case, AAA’s statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as
part of res gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable
time between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity for
Page 1484 of 1553

reflection.
Facts:
Accused Anecito Estibal y Calungsag (Estibal), while taking advantage of his moral
authority and ascendancy and with his intention to gratify his sexual desire upon his
daughter [AAA], by means of force, violence and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with the latter against her
will and consent, the said crime having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority, as the said accused being the natural father of the victim, a 13
year old, a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, which is aggravated by the
circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling, all to the damage and prejudice
of the said victim [AAA].
Estibal pleaded not guilty. But during the pre-trial, BBB, wife of the Estibal and
mother of AAA, the minor victim, disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case. Her
reasons were that she pitied the Estibal and, according to her, AAA had already forgiven
her father. The prosecution’s last witness, Police Officer 3 Fretzie S. Cobardo (PO3
Cobardo), was the officer assigned at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Women and
Children Protection Center of Taguig City. It was she who investigated the above incident
and took down the sworn statement of AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009. On
clarificatory questioning by the court, PO3 Cobardo narrated how she was trained to
prepare for her assignment as desk officer at the PNP Women and Children Protection
Center; that during her investigation of AAA and BBB, they were both crying; that without
being asked leading questions and without being coached by her mother, AAA, 13 years old
and a first-year high school student, revealed in detail how the Estibal abused her for
several years and how he raped her that morning of February 5, 2009; that AAA told that
the first time she was raped by her father was when she was in Grade III, but this was the
first time she was telling anyone about the rapes; that BBB told PO3 Cobardo that she could
not imagine how her husband could commit such an outrage against their own daughter;
that from her own observations of AAA’s demeanor, PO3 Cobardo was convinced that she
was telling the truth.
Estibal’’s defense consisted mainly of denial. Relying on PO3 Cobardo’s testimony of

what AAA narrated to her, the RTC considered the spontaneity of the declarations made
by AAA as confirmed by PO3 Cobardo as part of the res gestae , and convicted the Estibal.
Thus, the court considers the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed
by PO3 Cobardo. Further, the testimony of PO3 Cobardo was corroborated by the findings
of Dr. Jesille Baluyot of a shallow healed lacerations at 4 and 8 o’clock and deep healed
Page 1485 of 1553

laceration at 5 o’clock positions in the hymen of AAA which Anogenital findings are
diagnostic of previous blunt force or penetrating trauma.
On appeal to the CA, the Estibal maintained that due to the absence of AAA’s
testimony, the prosecution failed to establish the circumstances proving beyond reasonable
doubt that he raped his daughter; that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses PO3
Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, not being themselves victims or witnesses to the
“startling occurrence” of rape, cannot create the hearsay exception of res gestae [literally,
“things done”]; and, that the medical findings of Dr. Baluyot do not prove that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA but only that she had had sexual relations.
Office of Solicitor General (OSG) asserted that although AAA did not personally
testify, and none of the prosecution witnesses had any direct knowledge of the sexual
molestation of AAA by the Estibal, his guilt was fully established by circumstantial evidence.
In particular, the OSG argued that the testimony of PO3 Cobardo concerning what AAA
narrated to her during her investigation was part of the res gestae pursuant to Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
The OSG reasoned that AAA had just undergone a startling occurrence at the time
she told PO3 Cobardo that she had been raped by her father that morning, a statement
which PO3 Cobardo found spontaneous and credible; that the gap between the sexual
assault and the time when AAA made her narration to PO3 Cobardo was too short to permit
fabrication by AAA of such a serious accusation against her own father; and, that AAA made
the charge in the presence of her mother could only have lent credence to her claim.
The appellate court agreed with the RTC and the OSG that the testimonies of the
three prosecution witnesses, PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, form part of
the res gestae, although none of them was a participant, victim or spectator to the crime.
According to the CA, “they heard what [AAA] said when she reported the sexual abuse
committed against her by Estibal Estibal.”
Issue:
Whether or not the inculpatory statements of AAA to the barangay tanod and the
police are part of the res gestae occurrence of the rape.
Ruling:
No.
Page 1486 of 1553

Without the res gestae exception, the evidence of the prosecution would consist
mainly of hearsay statements by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas all reiterating
what AAA allegedly told them. The same question, whether res gestae as an exception to
the hearsay rule must be appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case, is now
before this Court in this automatic review.
To pardon her father, AAA chose to ignore the trial court’s subpoenas to testify in
her rape complaint, thus leaving missing a vital component in the prosecution’s case, her
eyewitness account. But in itself, her pardon would not have worked the dismissal of the
rape case since it was given after the complaint was filed in court.
AAA never appeared at the trial proper despite several subpoenas for her to testify,
and subsequent subpoenas could not be served after her family moved to a new but
unknown address on April 13, 2010. A charge of rape by its very nature often must be
resolved by giving primordial consideration to the credibility of the victim’s testimony. But
if for some reason the complainant fails or refuses to testify, as in this case, then the court
must consider the adequacy of the circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution.
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience,
observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven
facts and the facts sought to be proved.
In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the
declarations must have been “voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and
explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of
design or deliberation.”
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “a witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.” Res gestae, one of eleven
(11) exceptions to the hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130, thus:
Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as part of
the res gestae.
Page 1487 of 1553

There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae,
namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood;
and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth

or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does
not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
AAA’s statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as part of res
gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time
between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity for
reflection.
It is of particular significance to note that in her sworn statement to the police, AAA
admitted that she first revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to her cousin DDD in the
afternoon of February 5, 2009, although her mother BBB had returned from her overnight
guard duty that morning. After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA found the
courage to reveal to her mother her heart-rending saga of sexual abuse by her own father.
AAA’s revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable chain of events that led to
the arrest of the Estibal. There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous,
unreflected or instinctive about the declarations which AAA made to the barangay
tanod and later that night to the police. Her statements were in fact a re-telling of what she
had already confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this time however, her story to
the tanods and the police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve,
exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put behind bars.
Res gestae means the “things done.” It “refers to those exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement.” A spontaneous exclamation is defined as “a statement
or exclamation made immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator
and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him.
Page 1488 of 1553

Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original
declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-examination by
the defense, except in a few instances as where the statement is considered part of the res
gestae.
A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon
for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to
her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.
The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under
oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish

the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-examine her
adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require
that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or
affirmation. The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party.
When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the
test of moral certainty required for conviction. An accused has in his favor the presumption
of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. Hence, Estibal is acquitted.
CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO DADAO

G.R. NO. 201860, JANUARY 22, 2014
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness, which is
best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having
heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal
Page 1489 of 1553

unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or

misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
Where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill
motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all
material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations
of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and
insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point
bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy
their credibility.
Facts:
In an information, accused-appellants were charged of murder for the death of Yacapin.

Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution presented several witnesses, including Ronie and Edgar the stepsons of the
victim and Nenita the widow of the victim, as eyewitnesses. In his testimony, Ronie stated
that he saw the appellants helping each other with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to
death the victim in their house. This statement was corroborated by Edgar and Nenita. In
all, the witnesses presented by prosecution all point to the appellants as the perpetrator of
the crime. On the contrary, the defense also presented witnesses to negate the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Amongst the defense’s witnesses are P/Insp. Armada, who
testified that the paraffin test on the appellants yielded negative result; Eddie one of the
accused who provided for an alibi, which was corroborated by his co-accused.
The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged, which decision was
affirmed by the CA. On petition to the SC, the appellants reiterate that their guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt because the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution were afflicted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus, making them of
doubtful veracity.
Issue:
Whether the eyewitness’ testimonies are credible to sustain conviction despite

inconsistencies.
Page 1490 of 1553

Ruling:
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question is
best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and that, absent any misapprehension of
facts or grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In
People v. De la Rosa,11 we yet again expounded on this principle in this wise:
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness,

which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to
decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing
the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its
observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected
to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters
will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the
prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and
their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. In the case at bar, no imputation of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses was ever made by appellants.
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material
details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a
witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and
insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point
bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy
their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a
prosecution witness.
Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details, Ronie, Edgar and Nenita
positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly crime of murder
committed on the victim which they categorically and consistently claimed to have
personally witnessed.
In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the
defense of alibi which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-
Page 1491 of 1553
honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the
latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. Hence, it must be supported by
credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. An
examination of the record would indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to
present a corroborating witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm
owned by a certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio Yacapin’s murder. While the
witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao
and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the disinterested
witnesses that is required by jurisprudence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE PAREJA

G.R. NO. 202122, JANUARY 15, 2014
a. The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and
when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court." Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s
testimony are generally expected. Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,
accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility
of a witness.
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.
b. A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is
merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction.
Facts:
Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. Upon arraignment,
Pereja pleaded not guilty, and after pre-trial conference, trial ensued. During the trial, the
victim narrated on how Pereja committed the crime charged. Further, the prosecution also
presented the Medico-Legal Report to corroborate the testimony of the victim, which
indicated that there is clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma, confirming that
Page 1492 of 1553

the victim was raped. Pereja denied the charges, averring that it was impossible for the
incident to happen, by describing the layout of their house, but admitted that he knew the
victim for being the daughter of his live-in partner. The RTC acquitted Pareja from the
charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crime of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC
judgment.
Issue:
a. Whether testimony of the victim is credible, despite inconsistencies.

b. Whether medical certificate is necessary to prove rape.
Ruling:
a. When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow
certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v.
Sanchez, we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness
on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome
of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe
their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate
courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are
generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." While there are recognized exceptions
to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions
of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally

expected. Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For
such an offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be
worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds
Page 1493 of 1553
and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious
and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone.
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness. The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential
matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The
inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining
to AAA’s ordeal. The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes
important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the
sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the "date of the
commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the
complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the
crime." Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the
crime.
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires
the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.
b. A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony
is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the
time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination
actually bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not
just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence
and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
PDIC v. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO(OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN), FIDEL

C. CU, CARMELITA B. ZATE, AND MARY LOU S. APELO
G.R. No. 206866, September 02, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Page 1494 of 1553

Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of

evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. Thus, probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
Facts:
PDIC as statutory receiver,purposedly went on to gather, preserve, and administer its

records, assets, and liabilities for the benefit of its depositors and creditors. Gomez-a
former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI until its closure-went to the PDIC
and submitted an Affidavit outlining the alleged irregularities committed when BDBI was
still in operation.Cu instructed Gomez to take money from the vault and to deposit the
same to Apelo's bank account in PNB-Legazpi City Branch. On further orders/directives
from Cu and Zate, additional deposits were made to Apelo's bank account. After the
deposits were made, Gomez was initially instructed to cover the unofficial and unbooked
cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as "Other
Cash Items;" and thereafter, to regularize and remove from BDBI's books such
disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they were completely
covered. PDIC filed a criminal complaint against them. Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause
to indict Cu, Zate and Apelo of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
Yes. It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez's affidavit as
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the
initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not
be applied in the course of its proceedings. Thus, probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
Page 1495 of 1553

because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as written in her affidavit are
indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, considering that
she was a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI - a high-ranking officer
that may be privy to delicate transactions such as the purported "under-the-table" deal
involving private respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining
the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause,
only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not
absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To
reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party's defense or accusations as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than
in the preliminary stage.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE BUAT ALIAS DATU SINSUAT

Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if

the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape.
Facts:
Appellant Ronnie Buat is the husband of DDD, the sister of the victim AAA. AAA’s parents
had requested DDD to sleep in the house because AAA’s mother BBB had to attend a wake
while her father CCC was on night duty. AAA slept in the sala next to her twin nephews,
along with DDD, and appellant. At around 2:00 a.m., AAA was awakened by appellant who
was half-naked and lying on top of her. AAA tried to talk aloud but appellant suddenly
covered her mouth with his right hand. Appellant managed to remove AAA’s panties using
his left hand while holding a knife threatening to kill AAA should she tell her parents about
the act. AAA tried to resist but to no avail. Appellant inserted his two fingers into her vagina
before inserting his penis. AAA told DDD about what appellant did but DDD ignored her.
After appellant and DDD left the house, AAA immediately told one of her younger brothers
about the incident. AAA also told CCC about what happened upon his arrival. Both the
RTC and CA convicted the appellant of the crime of rape. Appellant contends that AAA’s
Page 1496 of 1553

account of the alleged rape is riddled with improbabilities and inconsistencies which lead
to failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Appellant states that it is physically impossible for him to have restrained AAA using
his two hands to cover her mouth, hold a knife, remove her panties, and insert his two
fingers into her private parts. The Court rejects the submission. The Court finds that it is
not implausible for appellant to have physically subdued AAA because these acts were not
committed simultaneously, but successively. Appellant also notes the inconsistency in
AAA’s testimony that appellant allegedly covered her mouth with his right hand but in her
sworn statement, she stated that appellant covered her mouth with his left hand. It has
been held that inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility,
especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape.
The Court ordinarily puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted
the trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves. This is especially
true in rape cases where the crime is usually committed in the presence of no other person
than the victim and the accused. Compared to appellate magistrates who are merely faced
with the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of records brought before them, the
trial judge comes face to face with the rape victim herself on the witness stand. He
personally observes her conduct and demeanor while responding to the questions
propounded by the prosecutor on direct examination as well as those from the defense
counsel on cross examination. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the chance to
pose clarificatory questions to the victim. Thus, when the trial judge makes his findings as
to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight upon the appellate court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO ABAIGAR

G.R. No. 199442, April 7, 2014, J. DEL CASTILLO
It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province
and expertise of the trial court. In this case, we find no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the trial court. The court below categorically found that Relecita had no ill motive
Page 1497 of 1553
to testify against appellant. She has no reason to impute on him the heinous crime of murder
had she not witnessed the actual killing of the victim. Similarly, the appellate court found
Relecita to have positively identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Also, the
failure of Relecita to warn the victim of the appellant’s impending attack should not be taken
against her. Neither should it be taken as a blemish to her credibility.
Facts:
An Information was filed charging appellant Francisco Abaigar (Abaigar) with the
crime of murder. During his arraignment, Abaigar pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
trial court rendered its judgment finding appellant guilty as charged. The trial court lent
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Relecita del Monte (Relecita) that at
about 9 o’clock in the evening of July 11, 2001, at a distance of about 3½ meters, she saw
appellant shoot Joseph Gabuya (Gabuya) from behind hitting the victim at the back of his
head. Aggrieved, Abaigar appealed before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision, the appellate
court affirmed in full the Judgment of the trial court. Appellant basically argues that the
trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in lending credence to the testimony of
eyewitness Relecita and that Relecita could have forewarned the victim of his presence if
indeed Relecita saw him in the vicinity and that it was improbable that Relecita could see
him considering the poor lighting condition of the place.
Isuue:
Whether or not the witness is not a credible witness thus warrants an acquittal of
the accused.
Ruling:
The appeal is dismissed.
We are not persuaded. It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is within the province and expertise of the trial court. In this case, we find no cogent reason
to depart from the findings of the trial court. The court below categorically found that
Relecita had no ill motive to testify against appellant. She has no reason to impute on him
the heinous crime of murder had she not witnessed the actual killing of the victim.
Similarly, the appellate court found Relecita to have positively identified the appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime. Also, the failure of Relecita to warn the victim of the
appellant’s impending attack should not be taken against her. Neither should it be taken
as a blemish to her credibility.
Page 1498 of 1553

As regards the visibility, the appellate court correctly ruled that the distance
between Relecita and appellant, the light coming from a 50-watt bulb on the street post
about eight meters away from the place where the victim was shot, the light coming from
passing vehicles, and the light coming from the kerosene lamp in the house of the appellant
are enough to illuminate the place and for Relecita to positively identify the appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS

Contending that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant destroyed

her credibility as a witness, the appellant argues that the RTC and the CA erred in finding
guilty of the crime of rape. The SC however ruled that inconsistencies and discrepancies in
details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As long
as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of
witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies
considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even
suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Facts:
Around noon of March 19, 1996, or subsequent thereto, while the victim [AAA], a
house-helper of spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, was weeding grass using a bolo at her
employer’s farm in [XXX], appellant Democrito Paras approached her from behind. He
pulled [AAA] towards the lower portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her
mouth. While pointing the gun at [AAA], Paras pulled down her long pants and panties.
Paras also pulled down his pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and
mounted her. He spread [AAA’s] legs with his two hands after putting down his firearm.
He then inserted his penis into [AAA’s] vagina. [AAA] felt pain. [AAA] struggled and tried
to kick appellant but all proved futile as appellant was physically stronger
Since [AAA] was afraid of Paras and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did
not strike Paras with the bolo she was holding. Paras told [AAA] not to shout. He made a
push and pull movement. [AAA] felt appellant’s organ inside her while she continued to
struggle. While struggling, [AAA] even threw stones at Paras.
After Paras consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and fled, while [AAA] went
back to the house of her employers. Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident.
She gave birth to a child who was more than a year old when [AAA] testified on January 11,
2000. In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, the RTC convicted Paras of the crime charged.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Page 1499 of 1553

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant Paras
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove that Paras is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged Paras guilty of rape by
having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The
courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of
this case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony
that Paras was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse
with her. The Court, thus, see no reason to disturb the lower courts’ appreciation of the
credibility of AAA’s testimony. People v. De Guzman teaches that:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them
on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not
be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The
record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the
contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered
lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply.
The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession
or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not
show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his
observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.
The Court likewise upholds the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
inconsistencies pointed out by Paras in the testimony of AAA, namely, her inability to
remember the birth date of her child and the name of her neighbor, did not destroy her
credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to do with the essential elements of rape,
that is, carnal knowledge of a person through force or intimidation. As held in People v.
Maglente:
Page 1500 of 1553

Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of

the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only
minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling
witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the
lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even suggest that
the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO DELA CRUZ

For having admitted that they harbored ill feelings against respondent, the latter
contends that the credibility of the witnesses has been affected, thus, respondent alleges that
the testimonies of the witnesses should have been disregarded by the lower court. The SC
however ruled that jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of
primordial consideration, as in this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is
because the trial court has had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness
and was in the best position to discern whether they were telling the truth.
Facts:
Two separate informations were filed against respondent Dela Cruz charging him of
two (2) counts of rape that were allegedly committed against her daughter AAA.
AAA is the third of four (4) girls in the family of CCC and respondent Dela Cruz.
The family is living in a one-storey house with one bedroom in [XXX]. CCC the mother
works as a "labandera" and "plantsadora" while the father is a "mananari" or the person
installing the bladed instrument during cockfights. The mother usually leaves the house
early in the morning to sell at the Bocaue market.
One early morning in October of 1999, AAA was roused from sleep after she felt a
touch from somebody. It turned out to be her father who immediately covered her mouth
and told her to keep quiet. Out of shock and fear, she was not able to do anything and just
laid down while her father kissed and touched her private parts. AAA was only eleven (11)
years old at that time. On 09 September 2003, AAA and her three (3) sisters were in the
bedroom while their parents were sleeping in the sala. At about 3:00 o’clock in the morning
of that date, AAA was awakened by the touch (kalabit) on her foot by her father; her mother
was then out to the market. When she sat on the bed, respondent Dela Cruz forcibly held
her hand to stand up and led her out of the room. Overcome by fear, she offered no
Page 1501 of 1553

resistance as her father laid her on the bed at the sala. In an instant, respondent Dela Cruz
inserted his penis in her vagina.
Moments later, AAA’s eldest sister BBB woke up to urinate; as she switched on the
lights at the sala, she was horrified to see their father respondent Dela Cruz on top of her
sister with a blanket covering the lower part of their bodies. Caught by surprise, Dela Cruz
hurriedly stood up, put on his pants while holding his brief and proceeded to the kitchen
in pursuit of BBB. On the other hand, AAA quickly went out of the house without a word.
BBB looked for her and eventually proceeded to their aunt’s house to tell what she
witnessed. Later in the day, BBB also told her mother about the incident.
Dela Cruz on the other hand, besides denying the allegation that he had raped his
daughter AAA, contends that the only reason why AAA filed a case against him is because
she is mad about his wrong doings to his wife and for having another family. He further
contended that the admissions of AAA and BBB that they harbored ill feelings against him
for having another family affected their credibility as witnesses.
The RTC in its decision held that respondent Dela Cruz is indeed guilty of qualified
rape for the incident that occurred on September 9, 2003. However, Dela Cruz was only
convicted for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness for the incident that transpired on
October 1999. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of respondent Dela Cruz
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove was able to prove the guilt of respondent Dela
Cruz beyond reasonable doubt.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must be able to prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished the act through force,
threat or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
On the other hand, the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as punished under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code.
Page 1502 of 1553

The elements of this crime are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (2) it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended
party is another person of either sex.
The lower courts gave credence to the testimony of AAA, who narrated the
harrowing details of the sexual abuses she experienced at the hands of respondent Dela
Cruz. AAA positively identified Dela Cruz as the person who sexually abused her. AAA’s
testimony established the fact that sometime in October 1999, she was awakened from her
sleep when Dela Cruz kissed her and touched her body. Thereafter, AAA testified that on
September 9, 2003, Dela Cruz succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her when he was
able to partly insert his penis into her vagina before BBB caught them and Dela Cruz
abruptly got up to plead with BBB to not reveal what she saw. The lower courts also found
the testimony of AAA to be fully supported by the testimony of BBB, the sister of AAA, as
well as the medico-legal report, which concluded that AAA was in a "non-virgin state
physically." After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent
reason to overturn the above findings of fact of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. As held
in Dizon v. People:
Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial

consideration, as in this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as
its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This
is because the trial court has had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a
witness and was in the best position to discern whether they were telling the truth. When
the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, as in the present case,
said findings are generally binding upon this Court. (Citation omitted.)
Contrastingly, the bare defense of denial of Dela Cruz deserves scant consideration.
The same cannot overcome the positive identification and affirmative testimonies of AAA
and BBB. Anent the argument of Dela Cruz that the alleged ill motives of AAA and BBB
destroyed their credibility, the same is utterly unconvincing. The Court of Appeals was
correct in holding that ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and
credible declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the liability of Dela
Cruz. In this case, AAA never wavered in her identification of Dela Cruz as her abuser. We
had occasion to rule in People v. Balunsat that it is unlikely for a young girl and her family
to impute the crime of rape to their own blood relative and face social humiliation if not to
vindicate the victim’s honor. Indeed, no member of a rape victim’s family would dare
encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor tainting the family unless the crime
Page 1503 of 1553

was in fact committed, more so in this case where the offender and the victim are father
and daughter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO P. FERNANDEZ, NELSON E. TOBIAS

and FRANK R. BAAY
G.R. No. 193478, June 23, 2014, CJ. Sereno
A few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to

minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their
credibility. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen
their credibility, because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.
Facts:
On 16 June 2004, PO1 Padua met with the accused Fernandez, a retired Makati City
police at the latter’s house to negotiate Fernandez’s possible surrender of 150 kilos of
cocaine in exchange for a monetary reward. The two were known to each other due to their
past positions in the police force. Not satisfied with the monetary award being offered,
Fernandez instead asked Padua to find a buyer of the cocaine. Pretending to have a buyer,
Padua asked for samples. The samples given by Fernandez were delivered to Bona, who
brought it to a forensic chemist at the crime laboratory for examination. They turned out
to be cocaine. Bona then formed a buy-bust team composed of Barbero, Hernando, and
Gonzales as back-ups and Padua as the poseur-buyer. Also prepared was boodle money
consisting of cut newspapers and photocopies of P1,000 bills supposedly amounting to P2
million, which was to be used as buy-bust money.
On the morning of 22 June 2004, the team went to the house of Fernandez on board
two vehicles and parked 20 meters away. Inside the house, Tobias showed the cocaine and
gave it to Padua, while the latter handed the boodle money to the former. After the
exchange, Padua sent missed calls to the team through his cellphone, the prearranged
signal that the sale had been consummated. The team rushed to the house and arrested
Fernandez and Tobias. The boodle money was found in the latter’s possession. When
interrogated, Tobias admitted that the two other persons in the car were Baay and Uy, who
were waiting for him at the nearby McDonald’s restaurant. The police officers went to the
restaurant and arrested both men. Upon further interrogation, Fernandez and Tobias told
the police that the cocaine came from Cagayan Valley and was brought to Manila by the
spouses Manuel, who at that time were staying at the house of Tobias in Fort Bonifacio.
The police proceeded to the identified house and arrested the spouses.
Accused Fernandez interposed the defense of denial. Nelson Tobias, on the other
hand, claimed having known Padua for a long time, but denied having knowledge of the
existence of the 150 kilos of cocaine. Only accused Tobias appealed from the judgment of
Page 1504 of 1553

conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Tobias’ guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, it was.
As observed by the trial court, witness Padua "testified in a clear, straightforward
manner and despite the rigorous cross-examination by the defense counsels, did not waver
or hesitate in his testimony, a clear proof that he was telling the truth."
The accused failed to destroy the credibility of the police officers. They failed to
show a plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely impute
to them such a serious and unfounded charge. What the accused offered were merely
denials and allegations of frame-up. But such allegations are invariably viewed by the Court
with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but are difficult to prove. Further, their bare
denials were not proven by convincing evidence. Hence, full faith and credit are accorded
to the police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The accused, too, in their attempt to discredit the police officers’ testimonies, point
to inconsistencies. In any event, the Court has ruled time and again said that a few
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details
and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility
of witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to
strengthen their credibility, because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PORFERIO BALINO alias "Toto,"

G.R. No. 194833, July 2, 2014, J. Perez
Contending that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness affected her
credibility as such, the accused-appellant filed the instant petition arguing that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The SC ruled that due to its
intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the
victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility
becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is
straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility,
and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s
testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters
Page 1505 of 1553

that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial court’s assessment of
the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. In the case
at bar, the trial court found the testimony of AAA to be clear, candid, and straightforward,
one which could not be considered as a common child’s tale.
Facts:
During trial AAA, the complainant-victim in this case, testified that she knows Toto,
the accused, for the latter was his neighbour. AAA frequently went to the house of Toto to
watch TV. However, in the middle of August 2001, when AAA was about to leave the house
of Toto, the latter pulled her and brought her to the room and undressed her. After Toto
undressed her, he then undressed himself, took off his clothing and then put himself on
top of her then kissed her and when she was about to shout for Mama, he covered her
mouth. Toto then kissed her and inserted his penis to her vagina wherein AAA testified
that she felt "very painful". After Toto had sexual intercourse with her, he then dressed AAA
and pushed her outside. Toto then said to AAA that he will kill her if she reveals that he
raped her. When returned home nobody was around because her mother was working in
Quirino. She did not immediately tell her mother what happened because she was not yet
around. AAA was 8 years old at the time the incident took place.
BBB, AAA’s mother, testified that she only found out about the incident when she
brought her daughter to the hospital due to the latter’s fever. At the hospital the Doctor
said that AAA was molested. BBB then asked AAA and the latter told her that she was raped
by the accused Toto. The accused Toto on the other hand merely denied all the allegations
against him.
The RTC then rendered a decision finding Toto guilty of the crime of statutory rape.
The RTC gave weight to the positive testimony of AAA and disregarded inconsistencies
considering that testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible,
especially if they are without any motive to falsely testify against the accused. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC finding Toto guilty of the crime of statutory rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimony of AAA despite
the inconsistencies in her testimony.
Ruling:
No, it did not.
The Court finds no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine that
where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in this case their testimonies as well,
Page 1506 of 1553

the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain
facts of substance and value, which have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of
the case.
Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or modify the
findings of the RTC on the credibility of AAA’s testimony, less so in the present case, in
which its findings were affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that the court a quo
was in the best position to weigh the evidence presented during trial and ascertain the
credibility of the witnesses who testified. In addition, there is no showing that the lower
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight which
would have affected the outcome of the case.
The Court is not unaware that due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime
bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus,
in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial
consideration. It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing,
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any
material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may
be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not
impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not
alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial court’s assessment of the
witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding.
In the present case and based on the findings of the trial court, AAA’s demeanor
during her testimony reveals the pain of remembering that ill-fated event. Her narration of
the entire traumatic ordeal was clear, candid, and straightforward, one which certainly
could not be considered as a common child’s tale. Undoubtedly, both the trial and appellate
courts properly applied the long-standing rule in rape cases that testimonies of victims
which are given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner are
considered worthy of belief, for, as correctly pointed out, no woman would concoct a story
of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be
perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOY ALCALA y NOVILLA

G.R. No. 201725, July 18, 2014, J. Perez
Where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in this case their testimonies as
well, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain
the case. Moreover, in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as
Page 1507 of 1553
amended, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Facts:
Alcala Joy Alcala (Alcala) was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Upon arraignment, Alcala pleaded not guilty to
said charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
The factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are stated
as follows:
The Version of the Prosecution
Around 5 o’clock in the afternoon of September 30, 2004, a female informant came
to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force of the Central Police District, Station
11, Quezon City, to report the illegal drug activities of a certain alias Joy in the vicinity of
Quezon City. Thereupon, P/Insp. Erwin Guevarra formed a buy-bust team composed of,
among others, PO2 Erwin Bautista, who was designated as poseur-buyer. The team was
briefed on the details of the buy-bust operation against alias Joy and PO2 Bautista was given
buy-bust money, a one hundred peso bill, which he marked with his initials “EB.” Past 6:00
p.m. of the same day, the team arrived at the target area. The informant and Bautista sought
alias Joy, who was later identified as Alcala, Joy Alcala. The informant saw and approached
Alcala. He introduced PO2 Bautista as a buyer of shabu. Then, Alcala asked him, “Iiskor
kayo, magkano?” PO2 Bautista replied “piso lang,” meaning P100.00 worth of shabu. Alcala
took a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from the right front
pocket of her pants and then asked for payment. PO2 Bautista handed her the marked
money and then took the plastic sachet from Alcala. Thereafter, PO2 Bautista lighted a
cigarette, the prearranged signal that the sale was consummated. The other members of
the team converged on the scene and arrested Alcala. Alcala was asked to empty her
pockets, after which, the buy bust money was recovered. Alcala was brought to the police
station. Thereat, the confiscated plastic sachet was marked by PO2 Bautista with the letters
“EBJA.” He then turned it over to the duty desk officer who prepared the standard request
for laboratory examination. The specimen and the request were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. After a qualitative examination conducted by a forensic chemist, it was
reported that the contents of the plastic sachet EB-JA proved positive for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Page 1508 of 1553

The Defense Version
On September 30, 2003, Alcala accompanied her friend, alias Baba, to Police Station
11, purportedly, to talk to a very important person there. However, while they were in the
station, she was arrested and ordered detained by the woman whom alias Baba talked to.
She kept crying inside the detention cell but nobody helped her. She did not see her friend
nor the woman anymore. Alcala vehemently denies the accusation against her and claims
that she does not know the cause of her detention.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Alcala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The trial court concluded that the evidence
presented by the prosecution sufficiently satisfied the quantum required for Alcala’s
conviction. It found the testimonies of the police officers who participated in the buy-bust
operation credible and reliable since absence of any showing of ill motive on their part to
concoct trumped-up charges, they enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance
of their duties.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision convicting Alcala. It ruled that the prosecution
was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elements of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the
prosecution was sufficient to convict Alcala of the alleged sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, in violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling:
No.
The RTC and the CA correctly found that the evidence of the prosecution was
sufficient to convict Alcala for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
The Court finds no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine that
where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in this case their testimonies as well,
the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain
the case.
Page 1509 of 1553

In addition to the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their official

duty, the court a quo was in the best position to weigh the evidence presented during trial
and ascertain the credibility of the police officers who testified as to the conduct of the
buy-bust operation and in preserving the integrity of the seized illegal drug.
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended,

credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties
in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. In this regard, the defense
failed to show any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police operatives to impute
such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person,
such as in the case of Alcala.
Furthermore, the Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, which
makes it essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. However,
failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs
does not render the arrest of Alcala illegal or the items seized/confiscated from her
inadmissible. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.”
Although the Court finds that the police officers did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Article II, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not affect
the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from Alcala, because the chain of custody of the
evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case. As correctly
found by the appellate court, the drug confiscated from Alcala was properly accounted for
and forthrightly submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for its extensive examination. The
CA further ruled that nothing invited the suspicion that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized articles were jeopardized.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO

G.R. No. 196315, July 28, 2014, J. Leonardo- De Castro
AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the
assault in her testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when
she was asked at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as we
have ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been
raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and,
as is more applicable in the case at bar, immaturity are generally badges of truth.
Page 1510 of 1553

Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the physical examination were
consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional corroboration to the testimonies
of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was stipulated upon by the prosecution
and the defense.
Facts:
BBB (mother of AAA) left AAA in their house to look for BBB’s youngest daughter.
Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge, Lito, told her that there was a problem,
and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused appellant Leonardo
Cataytay were already at the outpost. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy,
ni-rape po ako." BBB asked her who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to Cataytay.
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution
manifested that by merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate.
AAA, who was crying while being asked questions, testified that she was raped by accused-
appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite her protestations. After the deed, she was
given money by accused-appellant. She knew the accused-appellant before the incident as
a shoe repairman.
Cataytay was charged of the crime rape in an Information. RCT convicted Cataytay
the crime. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, is correct in
convicting Cataytay.
Ruling:
AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of
the assault in her testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same
when she was asked at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However,
as we have ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has
been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth
and, as is more applicable in the case at bar, immaturity are generally badges of
truth. Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the physical
examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional
corroboration to the testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was
stipulated upon by the prosecution and the defense.
Page 1511 of 1553

We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution
witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former
is generally held to prevail. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be sufficiently
convincing as to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the
accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant and his brother, second defense witness Jose, claim that the
former was taking care of his daughter in his house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7,
2003. He then went out and proceeded to a videokebar, which was merely 20 meters away
from his house. Accused-appellant and his brother admitted that their house was merely
50 meters away, or around a one-minute walk, from the house of AAA, where the alleged
incident occurred. Accused-appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity of the
locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellant’s
defense of alibi must fail.
The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of
deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand,
the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those
suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was
clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is
"deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the
mental capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense agreed to
stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that the "mental age of the victim whose
chronological age at the time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old is
that of a seven (7) year old child." Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape
under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN vs. ATTY. CASAN MACABANDING

A.C. No. 7919, October 8, 2014, J. Reyes
The respondent questions the credibility of the NBI officer as expert witness as the said
officer was not expert in Arabic Language. The Court explains that a handwriting expert does
not have to be a linguist at the same time. To be credible, a handwriting expert need not be
familiar with the language used in the document subject of his examination. The nature of
his examination involves the study and comparison of strokes, the depth and pressure points
of the alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or original handwriting or signatures.
Page 1512 of 1553

Facts:
Domado Disomimba Sultan (Sultan) ran for the position of Mayor for the
Municipality of Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur in 2007. Sultan filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) dated March 29, 2007 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
for the May 14, 2007 elections. Thereafter, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of
Candidacy for Municipal Mayor (Affidavit of Withdrawal) dated April 10, 2007 was
notarized and submitted by the Atty. Casan Macabanding (Atty. Casan) to the COMELEC,
withdrawing the complainant’s candidacy without the latter’s knowledge or authorization.
When the Sultan learned of this, he wrote a letter dated April 18, 2007 and submitted an
Affidavit to the Acting Election Officer of the COMELEC in Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del
Sur alleging that he neither executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody
to prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal be ignored and
that his name be retained on the list of candidates.
On May 16, 2007, Sultan filed a petition with the COMELEC to count the votes cast
in his favor. The COMELEC Second Division found merit in Sultan’s petition and ordered
the reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates for the position of mayor in its
Resolution dated June 12, 2007. All votes cast in favor of the complainant were also counted.
Thus, Mariano elevated the matter to the COMELEC en banc, which issued a subpoena
requiring the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to study the signature appearing on
the Affidavit of Withdrawal. Subsequently, the NBI stated that the signature in the Affidavit
of Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant were not written by one
and the same person. Hence, Sultan filed the present administrative complaint against the
Atty. Casan with prayer for his disbarment.
On the other hand, Atty. Casan countered that the administrative case was filed
against him as political harassment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation.
After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner issued a report recommending

"that the respondent be suspended from the active practice of law for six (6) months and
two (2) years as notary public," which the IBP Board of Governors adopted in a resolution
suspending Atty. Casan from practice of law doe six (6) months and from notarial practice
for two (2) years. The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP Board
of Governors denied.
Page 1513 of 1553

Issue:
Whether the examination made by the NBI officer should be given weight noting
that he was not an expert in Arabic Language.
Ruling:
The respondent maintained that the NBI officer who examined the complainant’s
signature is not an expert in Arabic language and thus, could not give an expert opinion
regarding a signature written in Arabic language.
The Court refers to Mayor Abdulmojib Moti Mariano v. Commission on Elections and
Domado Disomimba Sultan, wherein the Court resolved with finality the dismissal of
Mariano’s petition before the Court alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the complainant’s reinstatement in
the list of mayoralty candidates.
Mariano’s petition challenged the issuances of the COMELEC which were anchored
on its finding that the affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy imputed to the complainant was
forged. It was dismissed by the Court in the Resolution dated August 19, 2008. On October
9, 2008, Sultan was then proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor of Buadiposo Buntong,
Lanao del Sur, having obtained the highest number of votes (4,078). Mariano filed a motion
for reconsideration claiming that the COMELEC’s failure to avail of the services of an
Arabic expert was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The Court denied the motion
and addressed the issue raised in this wise:
Contrary to petitioner’s basic stance, a handwriting expert does not have to

be a linguist at the same time. To be credible, a handwriting expert need not be
familiar with the language used in the document subject of his examination. The
nature of his examination involves the study and comparison of strokes, the depth
and pressure points of the alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or original
handwriting or signatures.
OFFER AND OBJECTION
RODOLFO LABORTE and PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY

vs. PAGSANJAN TOURISM CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE and LELIZA S. FABRICIO
G.R. NO. 183860, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. REYES
Page 1514 of 1553

Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is clear that the court
considers the evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and
strictly on the evidence offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of
paper without probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the
purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the
chance to object to the presentation of an evidence which may not be admissible for the
purpose it is being offered. However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing
rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted, provided, the same must have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and the same must have been incorporated
in the records of the case.
The records of the case show that the petitioners were able to present evidence that
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded, and these were also on the records of
the RTC. The respondents had the chance to object to the documents that were identified and
marked, but no objections were raised causing the documents to be admitted by the court.
Facts:
PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation that used to operate the Philippine
Gorge Tourist Zone (PGTZ) Administration Complex (PTA Complex), a declared tourist
zone in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Respondent PTCC is a cooperative organized since 1988 under
RA 6938.
In order to help the PTCC as a cooperative, PTA allowed it to operate a restaurant business
located at the main building of the PTA Complex and the boat ride services to ferry guests
and tourists to and from the Pagsanjan Falls, paying a certain percentage of its earnings to
the PTA. Soon PTA implemented a re-organization and reshuffling in its top level
management, wherein petitioner Laborte was designated as Area Manager, CALABARZON
area with direct supervision over the PTA Complex and other entities at the Southern
Luzon.
Subsequently, Laborte notified respondents to cease the operations of the restaurant and
boat ride services because of the rehabilitation project of the PTA Complex. Consequently,
the PTCC filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages praying
for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Laborte from causing
the PTCC to cease the operations of the restaurant and boat ride services and from evicting
the PTCC’s restaurant from the main building of the PTA Complex. The RTC issued the
TRO but Laborte opposed to such, averring that PTCC does not own the restaurant facility
because it was merely tolerated by PTA as a form of assistance. Later, PTCC filed a Petition
Page 1515 of 1553

for Contempt with Motion for early resolution alleging that Laborte defied the TRO, which
however, Laborte denied.
Subsequently, the individual respondents who are employees and boatmen of the PTCC,
filed a Complaint-in-Intervention against defied the TRO. With this, PTCC filed an
Amended Complaint to include PTA as defendant, but PTA alleged that PTCC has no cause
of action against PTA as PTA is the owner of the complex and no contract binds it and
PTCC. RTC decided in favour of PTCC and intervenors, prompting Laborte and PTA to
appeal to CA, which however, affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether the evidence not formally offered may be considered.
Ruling:
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit:
Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence. – The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is
formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court
to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the
parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless
and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is
offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the
presentation of an evidence which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered.
However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v.
Mate, the Court in Heirs of Romana Saves, et al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et
al., enumerated the requirements for the evidence to be considered despite failure to
formally offer it, namely: "first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case." In
People v. Vivencio De Roxas et al., the Court also considered exhibits which were not
formally offered by the prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial
by the counsel of the accused.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the
relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can
Page 1516 of 1553
be seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity of a
person or a thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person, subject
or article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be.
Undeniably, these pertinent evidence that Laborte identified, were also found in the
records of the RTC, i.e. : (a) the letter informing the Chairman of PTCC about the decision
of PTA main office regarding the repair works to be conducted; (b) Office Order No. 1018-
93 from a person named Mr. Anota, relative to the suspension of the boat ride services at
the Complex; (c) the letter to PTCC informing it of the repair at the Complex; (d) the
certificates of availability of funds for the guesthouse of the PTC Complex and for the
repainting, repair works at the Pagsanjan Administration Complex respectively; (e) the
program of works dated July 22, 1993 for the renovation of the Pagsanjan Complex and of
the swimming pool at the guesthouse respectively; (f) the program of works referring to
the repainting and repair works at the Complex dated August 6, 1993; and (g) a
memorandum from Mr. Oscar Anota, Deputy General Manager for Operation of the PTA,
dated December 8, 1993 addressed to the security office of the Pagsanjan Administration
Complex, instructing the same not to allow the entry of anything without clearance from
the main office in Manila into the Pagsanjan Complex. In all these, the respondents had all
the chance to object to the documents which Laborte properly identified and marked and
which are found in the records of the trial court. Considering that no objections were made
by the respondents to the foregoing documents, the Court sees no reason why these
documents should not be admitted.
HEIRS OF SERAPIO MABBORANG: LAURIANO MABBORANG, DOMINGO

MABBORANG, ENCARNACION MABBORANG, FELIX MABBORANG, FAUSTINA
MABBORANG, ELIAS MABBORANG, ALBERTA MABBORANG; HEIRS OF REGINO
MABBORANG: JOSE MABBORANG, DIONICIA MABBORANG, SOTERA
MABBORANG, MARIANO MABBORANG; HEIRS OF SUSANA MABBORANG:
CECILIA UBIÑA-OCAB and CANDIDA U. TAGUIGA; SEGUNDA MABBORANG;
HEIRS OF VICTORINO MABBORANG: JUAN MABBORANG, JR., SERVANDO
MABBORANG; AND HEIRS OF VICENTE MABBORANG: MARIANO MABBORANG,
MARTIN MABBORANG, LUZ MABBORANG- CARILLO, vs. HERMOGENES
MABBORANG and BENJAMIN MABBORANG
G.R. No. 182805, April 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.:
The trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and
exclude the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked
Page 1517 of 1553

as exhibits during pre- trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in
any manner be treated as evidence.
Facts:
Respondents filed an action a Judicial Partition of Realty with damages before the RTC
against the heirs and children of Sps. Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung. They
alleged that they are the heirs of one of the 9 children of the spouses and tat they are
entitled to the share in several parcels of land left by the latter which are already in the
possession of the petitioners. However, the petitioners alleged that there are only 8
children of the spouses and that Rufino was a grandson of the spouses being the son of the
spouses’ daughter Sofronia and further alleged that they can no longer claim from the
estate since Sofronia had already received her share which share was sold to the petitioners
and other third parties.
The RTC dismissed the case for partition contending that since Rufino is not the spouses’
child, their supposed shares could have been inherited by their father Rufino or
grandmother Sofronia. This decision was reversed by CA due to the absence of any
documentary or testimonial evidence to support petitioner’s allegation that the estate had
already been partitioned and that Sofronia had already received her share.
Issue:
Whether the transfer of Sofronia’s share in the estate can be considered by the court
without formally offering any evidence to support it and thus making petition for partition
unnecessary.
Ruling:
NO. The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered." This is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes
for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. Also, it allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. A formal offer is necessary because
judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and judgment strictly and only upon the
evidence offered by the parties at trial. Consequently, review by the appellate court is
facilitated for it will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the
Page 1518 of 1553

trial court. Hence, strict adherence to this basic procedural rule is required, lest evidence
cannot be assigned any evidentiary weight or value.
Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must
be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of
the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. In
certain instances, however, this Court has relaxed the procedural rule and allowed the trial
court to consider evidence not formally offered on the condition that the following
requisites are present: (1) the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and (2) the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. None
of the conditions are present in this case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R.

TANTOCO, JR., DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA
MARCOS, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., GLICERIA R. TANTOCO, AND MARIA
LOURDES TANTOCO–PINEDA
G.R. No. 188881, April 21, 2014, J. Sereno
It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue–fully
and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him,
suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the
facts within his knowledge. Republic’s failure to offer a plausible explanation for its
concealment of the main bulk of its exhibits even when it was under a directive to produce
them and even as the defendants were consistently objecting to the presentation of the
concealed documents gives rise to a reasonable inference that the Republic, at the very outset,
had no intention whatsoever of complying with the directive of this Court.
Facts:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),

commenced a complaint for “reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages” against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco), Dominador R. Santiago (Santiago),
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda, R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco,
and Maria Lourdes Tantoco–Pineda.
Tantoco and Santiago subsequently filed both an “Amended Interrogatories to

Plaintiff” and a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents. When the PCGG elevated the issue to the Supreme Court, this
Page 1519 of 1553
Court, through then Justice Narvasa, affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan finding that
there is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject of the
motion. Matters such as these are precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end
that the parties may adequately prepare for pre–trial and trial.
During the pre–trial, the PCGG produced documents pre–marked as Exhibit “A” to
“LLL”. The pre–trial was declared closed and that the temporary markings of Exhibits “A”
to “LLL,” together with their sub–markings, were adopted. However, over the objections of
respondents Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and caused the pre–marking of
additional documents, Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA.”
Tantoco and Santiago filed a “Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court,” claiming
that the additional documents were never produced at the discovery proceedings and
praying that petitioner Republic be sanctioned for contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied
the motion (First Resolution). Trial proceeded; however, new documents not shown at
discovery were still being marked. The Petitioner Republic filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan ruled that with the exception of some
documents, “all Exhibits... are denied admission. On petitioner Republic’s Motion for
Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan partly relented and admitted Exhibits “MMM” to
“AAAAAAA.”
Respondents, in turn, filed their Motion for Reconsideration, to which the graft
court issued the assailed Resolution, stating that the Court is convinced that it is fair and
just to grant defendants’ Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court and to sanction the
plaintiff Republic for its deliberate refusal and failure to comply with the directive of this
Court which was confirmed no less (sic) by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff Republic must
be prevented from offering in evidence all the documents that were not produced and
exhibited at the time the plaintiff Republic was under a directive to do so, i.e. Exhibits
“MMM” to “AAAAAAA”.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

excluding the documents due to petitioner Republic’s own failure to produce them at the
pre–trial.
Ruling:
No.
Page 1520 of 1553

Petitioner Republic conveniently disregards the basic rule of evidence, namely, that
the issue of the admissibility of documentary evidence arises only upon formal offer
thereof. This is why objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered, and not earlier. Seasonable objection to the subject “Exhibits” can only be
properly made upon formal offer. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Tantoco and
Santiago had been consistent in reiterating their objections. The court even clarified in its
First Resolution that their “Motion Filed Under Rule 29,” was but in pursuance of their
continuing objection to the marking of evidence not produced at discovery.
Now what ultimately tipped the scales against petitioner Republic in the view of the
graft court was the former’s lack of forthrightness in complying with the Supreme Court
directive. The Sandiganbayan said that it did not take long in the process of the
presentation of petitioner Republic’s evidence before it became apparent that the latter
exhibits consist mostly of documents which have not been exhibited during the discovery
proceedings despite the directive of this Court as confirmed by the Supreme Court.
Republic’s failure to offer a plausible explanation for its concealment of the main bulk of
its exhibits even when it was under a directive to produce them and even as the defendants
were consistently objecting to the presentation of the concealed documents gives rise to a
reasonable inference that the Republic, at the very outset, had no intention whatsoever of
complying with the directive of this Court.
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court
the facts in issue–fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant
facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by
clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also
presenting all the facts within his knowledge. The truth is that “evidentiary matters” may
be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and
policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre–trial
— should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only
those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries.
LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, J. Peralta
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived. According to Corpuz, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting
in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although
the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records
show that Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly
Page 1521 of 1553
pointed out that Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.
Facts:
Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of
jewelry on commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to
Corpuz the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced
by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that Corpuz shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold,
to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without Corpuz
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tangcoy was
able to meet Corpuz, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus, an Information was filed against Corpuz for
the crime of estafa.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. After trial, the
RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
According to Corpuz, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its
submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence
rule.
Issue:
Whether or not the exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as Corpuz failed to
object to their admissibility
Ruling:
Yes, Corpuz failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, hence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Page 1522 of 1553

The records show that Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that Corpuz also failed to raise an objection
in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having
signed the said receipt.
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection
to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered
as waived.
EMERITU C. BARUT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167454, September 24, 2014, J. Bersamin
Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could
consider only the evidence that had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party
must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered. In the case at bar, The
RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas’ extra-judicial
sworn statement containing the declaration had not been offered and admitted as evidence
by either side. The CA stressed that only evidence that was formally offered and made part of
the records could be considered; and that in any event, the supposed contradiction between
the extra-judicial sworn statement and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the
latter.
Facts:
It appears that at around 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of September 24, 1995 SPO4
Vicente Ucag was coming from a picnic in Laguna and returning home to Taguig, Metro
Manila on board a passenger jeepney driven by his brother Rolando on the South Luzon
Expressway. Ucag’s wife and 16 year-old son Vincent were then riding an owner-type jeep
driven by Rico Villas on the same route. When the latter vehicle exited at the Sucat
Interchange ahead of Ucag’s passenger jeepney, PNCC guards Conrado Ancheta and Barut
stopped Villas and directed him to park his vehicle at the road side. After informing Villas
that his vehicle had no headlights, Ancheta asked for his driving license, but it took a while
before Villas produced the same apparently waiting for his companions in the passenger
jeepney to arrive. Nonetheless, Villas ultimately surrendered his driving license, and
Ancheta issued to him a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket. Right about then, the
passenger jeepney carrying Ucag stopped where Villas’ jeep had parked. Ucag and Danilo
Fabiano, a co-passenger, alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire what the
matter was. Apprised of the reason for the stoppage of Villas’ jeep, Ucag requested the
return of Villas’ driving license. But Ancheta refused because he had already issued the TVR
Page 1523 of 1553

ticket. Ucag argued with Ancheta and Barut. Later on, however, Ucag turned around in
order to avoid further argument, and simply told Villas to return for his driving license the
next day. This apparently irked Ancheta, who dared Ucag to finish the issue right there and
then. Ancheta suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fired it several times, hitting
Ucag on both thighs. Ucag fired back and hit Ancheta. Fabiano and Villas witnessed the
exchange of gunshots between Ucag and Ancheta. Vincent Ucag rushed towards his father
to go to his succor but Barut fired at Vincent in the chest. Vincent was rushed to the
hospital where he expired while undergoing emergency surgery.
The RTC sentenced Barut to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17 years and eight months of
reclusion temporal, as the maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Vincent Ucag in the
total amount of P250,000.00, inclusive of the actual and moral damages. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of Barut.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA misapprehended, overlooked or neglected facts that were

favorable to him.
2. Whether or not Villa’s extrajudicial sworn statement should be admitted
Ruling:
1. No. To start with, the CA held that it could not find from its review of the records
any compelling reason to set aside the factual findings of the trial court. It ruled that Villas
and Fabiano had clearly and consistently testified that Barut had been the person who had
shot Vincent; and that Barut’s bare denial of firing at Vincent did not prevail over their
positive and categorical identification of him as the perpetrator.
Although the record of the trial is laid bare and open during every appeal in a
criminal case, the credibility of witnesses is a factual issue that the Court cannot disturb in
this appeal. We reiterate that the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great
respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA. This great respect for such findings
rests mainly on the trial judge’s access to the witnesses while they testify in her presence,
giving the trial judge the personal and direct observation of their manner and decorum
during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, thereby enabling her to see if the
witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or were sincere and trustworthy.
Page 1524 of 1553

Noting that neither Ucag nor Ancheta had shot Vincent, the RTC explained that the
former could not anymore fire his gun at Vincent not only because Vincent was his own
son but also because he himself had already been lying on the ground after being hit in his
lower extremities; and that Ancheta could not have fired at Vincent at all because he, too,
had been already wounded and lying on the ground and profusedly bleeding from his own
gunshot wounds. The RTC further noted that the slug extracted from the body of Vincent
had come from a .38 caliber revolver, not from Ucag’s .45 caliber firearm.
2. No. The RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because
Villas’ extra-judicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been offered and
admitted as evidence by either side. The CA stressed that only evidence that was formally
offered and made part of the records could be considered; and that in any event, the
supposed contradiction between the extra-judicial sworn statement and the court
testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.
The CA’s negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas’ extra-judicial

sworn statement was in accord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section
34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could consider only the evidence
that had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party must specify the
purpose for which the evidence was being offered. The rule would ensure the right of the
adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise, the adverse party would not be put in
the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as to properly counter the impact of
evidence not formally offered. As stated in Candido v. Court of Appeals:
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked
for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an
opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it.
A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and
judgment only— and strictly—upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To
allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider
it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived
of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The rule that only
evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed where two
requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated in the records of the case. Furthermore,
the rule has no application where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial
admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section
4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of
witnesses, determines their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as evidence.
Page 1525 of 1553

FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider
any evidence that has not been formally offered. This rule, however, admits of an exception.
The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence
not formally offered to be admitted. Jurisprudence enumerated the requirements so that
evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been
incorporated in the records of the case. In the present case, we find that the requisites for the
relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As it is correctly observed, Godofredo identified
the Certification to File an Action during his cross-examination. Although the Certification
was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit “1” and attached to the records
of the case.
Facts:
While Sabay and his daughter Erlinda were busy laying wood and water pipes in the
yard of Godofredo Lopez, the latter confronted Sabay about Sabay’s alleged intrusion into
Godofredo’s property. A verbal altercation ensued between them.
In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard
object. Sabay joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s
eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy. Sabay and Erlinda then
shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him. Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez
came and pacified the three. But in the course his efforts, he was hit in the hand with a
bolo. The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the parties.
The Medico Legal Certificates dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered a
contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while Jervie
sustained a wound in his right palm. On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a
complaint against Sabay before the barangay. The parties agreed to settle the complaint
based on the recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in
their Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated June 20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not
implemented because the building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation
to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties. Thus, the Office of
the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action.Sabay was accordingly charged
with the crime of Physical Injuries under two (2) Informations before the MTC. Sabay,
together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light Threats for allegedly
uttering threatening words against the private complainant, Godofredo.
Page 1526 of 1553

Sabay denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in self-defense. He
narrated that on the date of the incident while he was putting a monument on his lot,
Godofredo suddenly hit him with an iron bar in his right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus
Lopez, Godofredo’s son, went out of their house and with a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at
him. To defend himself, he got a stone and threw it at Godofredo.
Issue:
Whether or not the Certification to File an Action in court be admissible as

evidence despite absence of its formal offer in court.
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot
consider any evidence that has not been formally offered. Formal offer means that the
offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into
evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their admissibility in case the adverse party
objects. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even
if this has been previously marked and identified.
This rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has
relaxed the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.
Jurisprudence enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can
be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer
rule are present. As it is correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File
an Action during his cross-examination. Although the Certification was not formally
offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit “1” and attached to the records of the case.
Significantly, Sabay never objected to Godofredo’s testimony, particularly with the
identification and marking of the Certification. In these lights, the Court sees no reason
why the Certification should not be admitted.
Page 1527 of 1553

Forum Shopping
NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. Nos. 153745-46, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza LOURDES PASCUAL, et al.vs.
NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT
G.R. No. 166573, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza
The trial court, upon Pascual, et al.'s motion, allowed the execution of its decision
pending Nemencio Pulumbarit's appeal of the same with the CA. When the CA, in another
case, issued writs against said discretionary execution, Pascual, et al. filed a motion seeking
to do exactly that what the court has already enjoined, albeit this time, before the CA in the
first case. This act, according to Pulumbarit, constitutes "a species of deliberate and willful
forum-shopping" which should not be countenanced by this Court.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1982, San Juan Macias Memorial Park, Inc. (SJMMPI), through Lourdes
Pascual, et al., sold the San Juan Memorial Park for P1.5M to Nemecio Pulumbarit, with the
latter issuing eighteen (18) checks in the name of SJMMPI’s secretary-treasurer. Pulumbarit
and/or his lawyer took charge of reducing the agreement into writing and Pascual, et al.
requested for a copy of the same through a letter. In another letter, they also asked
Pulumbarit to reissue new checks to replace the previous ones. Failing to get a favorable
response, Pascual, et al. filed a complaint for rescission of contract, damages and
accounting with prayer for preliminary injunction or receivership against Pulumbarit. The
trial court rendered a default judgment in Pascual, et al.’s favor. This judgment was reversed
by the CA and remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence of Pulumbarit.
Durings its pendency, the application for appointment of receivership of Pascual, et al. was
denied. The remanded case was decided in Pascual, et al.’s favor. Pulumbarit filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA to nullify the writs of execution and injunction issued by the
trial court, as sought for by Pascual, et al. The CA, in CA G.R. SP No. 61873 (first CA case),
issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, while in CA-G.R. SP No. 69931 (second
CA case), Pascual, et al. filed a motion for the execution of the trial court’s decision pending
Pulumbarit’s appeal. Meanwhile, the two cases were consolidated.
Page 1528 of 1553

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pascual, et al’s filing of an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of
the second CA case, despite knowledge of the pendency of the first CA case, constituted
forum-shopping.
RULING:
Yes. A comparison of the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on 14 September 1993 with the
urgent motion to declare failure of auction sale of the Wack Wack properly filed on 18
August 1994 discloses that the latter motion merely echoed the allegations found in the
former motion. Furthermore, both motions prayed for the same relict: namely, the
annulment of the auction sale conducted on 7 September 1992. In effect, respondents asked
the trial court in the 18 August 1994 motion to resolve an issue which has been settled by
the same court as early as 3 November 1993, affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 31 January
1994, and by this Court on 11 July 1994. Equally disdainful is the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of the 11 July 1994 ruling was still pending before this Court when
respondents filed the 18 August 1994 motion.
The foregoing actuation demonstrates defiance of the authority and dignity of this Court
and disrespect of the administration of justice. Here, the CA in the first CA case issued the
TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction against the discretionary execution on January
26, 2001 and March 28, 2001, respectively. On April 16, 2001, Pulumbarit posted the required
bond amounting to P500,000.00. Pascual, et al., on the other hand, filed their motion for
execution pending appeal in the second CA case on May 11, 2001, nearly four (4) months
after the issuance of the TRO, two (2) months after the writ of injunction and almost a
month from Pulumbarit's posting of the bond. Said motion is clearly an attempt on Pascual,
et al.'s part to undermine the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued in the
second CA case in Pulumbarit's favor. (Notably, Pascual, et al. do not appear to have sought
the reconsideration of the issuance of said injunctive orders.) Not unlike Ducat, therefore,
Pascual's filing of the motion in the second CA case demonstrates defiance of, if not lack of
due respect for, the authority of the CA which earlier issued injunctive writs against the
execution by the trial court of the appealed Decision.
Aniceto Uy v. Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station, Cagayan De Oro City,

Carmencita Naval-Sai, represented by her Attorney-In-Fact Rodolfo Florentino
G.R. No. 173186 September 16, 2015, Jardeleza, J.
Page 1529 of 1553

The requirements of certification against non-forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, and not his counsel
Facts:
Carmencita Naval-Sai (Naval-Sai) filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale against
AnicetoUy (petitioner). Naval-Sai later on amended his complaint. Due to such
amendment, petitioner raised an affirmative defense of non-compliance with the requisite
certification against non-forum shopping. The petitioner asserted that the certification
against forum shopping in the Amended Complaint was defective, for having been merely
signed by Naval-Sai's counsel. With this, the RTC dismissed the complaint for non-
compliance with the requisite certification against non- forum shopping thus the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. The CA however reversed the RTC decision saying that there
was substantial compliance with the requirement of certification against non-forum
shopping. It noted that the original complaint has a proper verification and certification of
non-forum shopping signed by Naval-Sai herself. What was signed by Naval-Sai's counsel
was the amended complaint. Furthermore, although an amended complaint supersedes the
pleading that it amends, it is not an initiatory pleading contemplated under the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the requirements of certification
against non-forum shopping
Ruling:
No, there was no substantial compliance with the requirement on certification against non-
forum shopping. A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal
responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are
no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It
must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. Under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, the original complaint and its verification and certification ceased to
exist.
Page 1530 of 1553

Eduardo Bandillion, et al. v. La Filipina Uygongco Corporation

G.R. No. 202446 September 16, 2015, Peralta, J.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase
his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.
Facts:
Eduardo Bandillion, et al. (employees) filed a case against La Filipina Uygongco

Corporation (LFUC) for underpayment of wages, in violation of the labor standard laws
with the DOLE. The DOLE ruled in favor of the employees in its order dated August 28,
2006, this order includes the amount required to be paid by LFUC. By virtue thereof, the
employees sought a writ of execution to enforce payment by LFUC to the employees. When
LFUC received the writ of execution, it filed a petition for certiorari and injunction with
the CA saying that the DOLE should first issue an Order for the proper computation of
monetary awards. Apparently LFUC was not served the order dated August 28, 2006. When
it received the order, LFUC filed an appeal with the DOLE which was denied; due to the
denial LFUC filed a motion for reconsideration. The DOLE denied the motion for
reconsideration so the order dated August 28, 2006 became final thus a writ of execution
was issued. Meanwhile the CA, because of the petition for certiorari and injunction of
LFUC, ordered that the case be remanded to the DOLE for proper reception of evidence for
the computation of the monetary awards. The employees contend that the filing of LFUC’s
petition for certiorari and injunction in the CA and the filing of motion for reconsideration
in the August 28, 2006 order constitutes forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedies availed by the LFUC constitutes forum shopping.
Ruling:
Yes, the remedies availed by LFUC constitutes forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act
of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
Page 1531 of 1553
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. This is clearly
exemplified in the case at bar where, as one court stops execution and instead remands the
case for the reception of evidence for all the parties and a re- computation of monetary
awards, another tribunal orders execution since, according to it, the only thing left to be
done is the payment of the already computed monetary awards to the winning parties. The
two rulings are clearly inconsistent and cannot be performed at the same time.LFUC clearly
committed the abhorrent practice of forum shopping when they availed of two remedies
before two courts or tribunals by raising the same causes and praying for substantially the
same relief, against the same opponent, thus causing the likelihood and eventual issuance
of two conflicting rulings. The CA decision therefore is reversed and set aside, and the
DOLE may proceed with the execution of its order.
ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR. v. HON. AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, PRESIDING

JUDGE, RTC-PASIG CITY, BRANCH 268, and LEONARDO S. UMALE [deceased]
substituted by his spouse, CLARISSA VICTORIA UMALE, G.R. No. 171247, July 22,
2015, BRION, J.
Forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse judgment in

one forum, seeks another opinion in another court other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari.
Facts:
The case stemmed from the complaint filed by respondentUmale against

petitionerVillamar, Jr. and others with the RTC. The complaint sought to compel the
petitioner to account for, pay, and deliver to the respondent the rental payments allegedly
in the petitioner's possession. The respondent argued that the petitioner engaged in forum
shopping when he availed of three separate remedies, namely: (1) the MR with Motion to
Lift Default Order filed with the RTC; (2) the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA; and
(3) the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case, also filed with the RTC;
praying for the same relief, i.e., the inhibition of Judge Manalastas from hearing the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is engaged in forum shopping.
Page 1532 of 1553

Ruling:
Yes. As a rule, forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse
judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion in another court other than by appeal or the
special civil action of certiorari. Conceptually, forum shopping is the institution of two or
more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs.
Try as the petitioner might to characterize and label these remedies as separate,
independent, and distinct from each other, the unavoidable reality is that their ultimate
aim is the same, they involve the same parties, and they rely on the same grounds. In short,
all the badges of forum shopping are present.
In Montes v. Court of Appeals, the Court found that the petitioner therein engaged in
forum shopping when he filed with this Court a petition for prohibition while his motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending in the CA.
Although the purpose of a petition for prohibition is different from that of a petition for
certiorari, we ruled that there was forum shopping because the reliefs sought were the same
— to restrain a government official from implementing the same order.
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND

DEPORTATION and its COMMISSIONERS and LUIS T. RAMOS
G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Facts:
A complaint-affidavit for deportation of petitioner Go was initiated, by Luis T. Ramos,

before the Bureau of Immigration. BI Board of Commissioners issued a Decision dated April
17, 2002, ordering the apprehension and deportation of petitioner Go. Petitioner Go and
Go, Sr. subsequently filed before the Pasig RTC a supplemental petition to declare the
nullity of the Board's April 17, 2002 Decision. The Pasig RTC issued a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the BI from
Page 1533 of 1553
enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however, it dissolved the writ. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied. Petitioner Go and Go, Sr. then questioned
before the CA the RTC's Decision and Order by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Go sought to nullify the Decision and Resolution of the CA in CAG. R. SP No.
88840 ruling that the April 17, 2002 Decision had already become final and executory in
view of the SC Decision in Go, Sr. To note, after filing G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 before
the SC, petitioner Go still appealed the same April 17, 2002 Board Decision to the Office of
the President. Unfortunately, the OP also denied his appeal and motion for
reconsideration. With the denial, he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA,
which, as aforesaid, sustained the BI Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Go is guilty of forum-shopping.
Ruling:
Yes. There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
The SC ruled in Tze Sun Wong v. Kenny Wong that from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration by the BI Board of Commissioners, the aggrieved party has three (3)
options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that
any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions,
he may exhaust the available administrative remedies within the executive machinery,
namely, an appeal to the Secretary· of Justice and then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal
the OP's decisions via Rule 43; or (c) he may directly resort to certiorari before the CA
strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the aforementioned
remedies cannot be taken as "adequate and speedy." Petitioner Go availed of remedies (b)
and (c) above in his desire to obtain a favorable judgment. In Go, Sr., petitioner Go,
together with his father, elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65 petition. In this case, he
immediately appealed to the OP, by-passing the Secretary of Justice.
Page 1534 of 1553

SURENDRA GOBINDRAM DASWANI v. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK and

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 190983. July 29, 2015. Second Division.Brion, J.
In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur.
Facts:
A complaint for the declaration of nullity of foreclosure proceedings and the cancellation
of the certificate of sale's registration was filed by Surendra Gobindram Daswani against
BDO before the Makati City RTC Br. 133. Later, Daswani amended his complaint (first
complaint) to include a prayer for the cancellation of BDO’s new CCTs since the Register
of Deeds of Makati City cancelled their CCTs and issued new ones to BDO. The RTC Br. 133
dismissed Daswani’s amended complaint without prejudice due to non-payment of dockets
fees for the amended complaint. Daswani, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration,
filed a motion to admit the amended complaint alleging that he already paid the additional
docket fees. However even before the RTC Br. 133 could render its decision on his motion
to admit, Daswani filed a motion to withdraw his amended complaint for he opts to just
re-file his original complaint. Daswani gave notice to RTC Br. 133 of his intention to
abandon his motion to admit. Later, Daswani re-filed his complaint and the same was
raffled to Makati City RTC Br. 61. BDO moved for the dismissal of the complaint arguing
that Daswani committed forum shopping when he filed another action identical to that
pending in the RTC Br. 133. RTC Br. 61 ruled in favor of BDO and dismissed Daswani’s
second complaint because of the pendency of the first case in the RTC Br. 133. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, the RTC Br. 133 granted Daswani’s motion
to withdraw his amended complaint.Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Daswani committed forum shopping.
Ruling:
No. In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur, namely: "(a)
there is identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both
Page 1535 of 1553

actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) that the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in
the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case."
Res judicata exists when the former judgment or order had already been final; the judgment
or order had been on the merits; it had been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; and because of the concurrence of the first three
requisites, there is now between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action." All the stated elements of res judicata are present in
this case except for the second requirement. The dismissal order in Daswani’s first
complaint did not touch on the merits of the case. Civil Case No. 04- 1075 was dismissed
merely because of Daswani’s failure to fully pay the required docket fees.Notably, the RTC
Br. 133’s dismissal order categorically provided that it was a dismissal without prejudice. In
other words, Daswani was given the option to re-file his complaint, provided that it had
not yet prescribed, and that the defect which caused its dismissal had already been cured.
In this case, the defect was the nonpayment of the required docket fees, which Daswani
already addressed in his second complaint.
ROBERTO STA. ANA DY, et al. v. BONIFACIO A. YU, et al.

G.R. No. 202632, July 08, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
Facts:
The subject Lot 1519 was inherited by the Dy children, including petitioner Roberto, from
their parents. Since Carlos and Lilia sold their respective shares over the properties to their
brother pursuant to an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, Roberto was issued OCT No. 511
over Lot 1519. Roberto filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against
Susana and Sixto Tan. He alleged that the occupation of Rosario, and later Susana, of the
property was by mere accommodation, but Susana contended that Roberto’s father,
Adriano Dy Chiao, donated the subject land to Rosario. Susana also attacked the validity of
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as Roberto’s OCT No. 511.The RTC dismissed
Roberto's complaint and declared Rosario as the lawful owner of the subject lot. Pending
Page 1536 of 1553
appeal to the CA, Roberto and his wife, executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their
children petitioners over Lot 1519. The CA then reversed the ruling of the RTC and ruled
that Rosario's defenses attacking the validity of OCT No. 511 on the ground of fraud
amounted to a prohibited collateral attack on Roberto's title. Rosario's motion for
reconsideration and petition for review were denied. Thus, the decision attained finality.
Prior to the resolution of Rosario's motion for reconsideration in the Recovery Case,
Rosario filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against Roberto before the RTC
Branch 26, which was dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
Rosario also filed a complaint for the annulment and/or rescission of the Deed of Donation
with damages against petitioners before the same RTC branch.
Issue:
Whether Rosario committed forum shopping.
Ruling:
YES. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. If a
situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a party's commencement of a
judicial remedy identical to one which already exists (either pending or already resolved),
then a forum shopping infraction is committed.
Litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. The requirements of litis
pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests
in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Page 1537 of 1553

BENJAMIN GUERRERO vs. DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU,

FLORANTE EDWARD R. BENITEZ, PROJECT EVALUATION OFFICER III, LEGAL
DIVISION; and HEIRS OF MARCELO BUSTAMANTE, Represented by CORA Z.
BUSTAMANTE
G.R. No. 183641, April 22, 2015, Peralta J.
An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining whether a litigant violated
the rule against forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
Facts:
Petitioner Benjamin Guerrero obtained a miscellaneous sales patent and, eventually, an

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) over a parcel of land located at Pugad Lawin, Quezon
City. The issuance of the title, however, became the subject of a Protest by Angelina
Bustamante, the wife of Marcelo Bustamante before the then Director of Lands on the
ground that the title encroached an area subject of Marcelo’s own patent application. The
protest was dismissed all the way up to the Office of the President (OP). However, upon
reconsideration, the OP remanded the case to DENR for ocular inspection and ordered the
agency to make a correction of the technical description of the property in question.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of basis and merit which decision
was affirmed by the Director of Lands and the CA. Thereafter, the case was brought to this
court which affirmed the decision of the CA and RTC in dismissing the petition of the
government based on the protest filed by Bustamante holding that there was no proof that
the titleholder (Guerrero) employed fraud in obtaining his title. Undeterred by the final
decision of this Court, however, herein private respondents heirs of Marcelo Bustamante,
this time represented by Cora Bustamante, on February 1, 2007, filed another Protest with
the Land Management Bureau (LMB), DENR, to again question Guerrero's title.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents committed forum shopping in filing the petition again for
the second time with LMB and hence they could be held liable for indirect contempt.
Ruling:
Page 1538 of 1553

Yes. For the case at bar, res judicata finds relevance considering that the protest filed by
private respondents is subsequent to a final judgment rendered by this Court. The time-
honored principle is that litigation has to end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become
final, the issue or cause therein should be laid to rest. Public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The Latin maxim is: Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
Similarly, under the basic principle of res judicata – which means "a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment" – the rule is
that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit. Res judicata applies by way of, either (1) "bar by prior
judgment" or (2) "conclusiveness of judgment." For res judicataas a "bar by prior judgment"
to apply, four (4) essential requisites must concur, to wit: (a) finality of the former
judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO and

DOLORES V. MOLINA
G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the
RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions
of the records as would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the
petition. The refusal of petitioner Molina to concede defeat, manifested by her unceasing
attempts to prolong the final disposition of these cases, obstructs the administration of
justice and, therefore, constitutes contempt of Court.
Facts:
There are 4 consolidated cases herein which involve a dispute regarding the ownership of
a parcel of land. In TMBC and Reyes v. Molina, TMBC and Reyes argued that ownership
over the properties has been decided and passed upon with finality by the court. Despite
these Decisions, Molina still filed a Complaint for quieting of title and an Amended
Complaint. TMBC and Reyes also point out that Molina submitted a false verification and
Page 1539 of 1553

certification in her Complaint and Amended Complaint. Molina never informed this court
of the previous Decisions declaring her titles null and void.
Issue:
Whether Molina committed forum shopping.
Ruling:
YES. When Molina actually filed an action for quieting of title, in clear violation of this
court’s ruling in other cases, constitutes deliberate forum shopping. All the elements of
forum shopping are present in this case. The parties in are the same: Molina and TMBC.
For the second element, the two cases involved relitigating her claim of ownership over the
properties covered by the nullified title. Further, the ruling in those cases is res judicata on
this case. The former judgment, Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, is final
and executory. This court had jurisdiction over the former case, and the judgment was on
the merits. Further, although the causes of action may appear to be different, the end result
would be the same: to determine the validity of Molina’s claim of ownership over the
properties covered by the nullified title.
Molina has had more than her day in court. She was accorded more than ample opportunity
to present the merits of her case. Her every argument was heard and considered. The Court
cannot countenance defiance of its authority on repetitious assertions of the
meritoriousness of a party’s cause, no matter how sincerely or genuinely entertained. There
has been a final determination of the issues in these cases and petitioner has been
repeatedly directed to abide thereby. Her deliberate violation of the orders of the Court are
unjustified and inexcusable.
Compliance with the Rules of Procedure
EMELIE L. BESAGA v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND

DIGNA MATALANG COCHING
Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required
by law. However, if the gravity of the violation of administrative rules of procedure is such
Page 1540 of 1553

that due process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the
rules are liberally construed.
Facts:
Besaga applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) with DENR Regional Office. Spouses
Acosta also applied for a SLUP. They also challenged the petitioner's application before the
DENR. Meanwhile, the DENR Regional Executive Director issued the order giving due
course to the petitioner's SLUP application and rejecting the respondents' SLUP
application. Consequently, respondents filed an Appeal Memorandum to the Office of the
DENR Secretary, copy furnished the petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED.
Petitioner now insists that the appeal was in violation of Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87 which
requires that appeal shall be taken by filing with the Regional Office which adjudicated the
case a notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of
a Notice of Appeal to the Regional Director was fatal to respondents’ appeal.
Ruling:
NO. Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required
by law. Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote
their object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of their respective claims and defenses. However, if the gravity of the violation of
administrative rules of procedure is such that due process is breached, the rules of
procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.
In the case at bar, there is no violation of due process. The petitioner was furnished copies
of the Memorandum of Appeal, a fact that the petitioner did not deny. The petitioner
subsequently filed her opposition thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor
of the respondent spouses, the petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision. Moreover, the Memorandum of Appeal had the same practical effect had a Notice
of Appeal been filed, i.e., to inform the RED that his order is sought to be appealed to the
DENR Secretary. Clearly, petitioner’s right to be heard was not compromised despite the
wrong mode of appeal.
Page 1541 of 1553

Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. vs. Agham Party List

G.R. No. 209165, April 12, 2016
Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that
the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition. Agham, in
failing to prove any violation of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine
Mining Act, shifted its focus and then claimed that petitioner allegedly flattened or leveled a
mountain.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. It embarked on
a project to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
Meanwhile, the DENR Environmental Management Bureau in Region III (DENR-EMB R3)
received a letter from the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales inquiring if the ECC the DENR
issued in favor of petitioner allowed it to cut trees and level a mountain. Meanwhile,
respondent Agham Party List (Agham) filed a Petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan against petitioner, DENR, the Philippine Ports Authority and the Zambales
Police Provincial Office (ZPPO) alleging that petitioner violated: (1) Section 6823 of PD No.
705,24 as amended by Executive Order No. 277,25 or the Revised Forestry Code; and (2)
Sections 5726 and 6927 of Republic Act No. 7942,28 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
(Philippine Mining Act), and petitioner cut mountain trees and flattened a mountain which
serves as a natural protective barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the residents of
Zambales but also the residents of some nearby towns located in Pangasinan.
In a Decision, the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner and found that
the government, through the CENRO, authorized petitioner to cut trees and petitioner
strictly followed the proper guidelines stated in the permit. The appellate court also stated
that there can be no flattening of a mountain when there is no mountain to speak of. Thus,
for failing to comply with the requisites necessary for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan,
the Court of Appeals resolved to deny the petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision
state
Page 1542 of 1553

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in denying the petition for a Writ of Kalikasan
RULING:
No, the CA did not err in denying the petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.
1. As between the too general and very hypothetical allegation of large-scale

environmental damage at one hand, and the remarks of government experts on the
other, more credit is given to the latter. Here, the fact that the "remarks and
recommendation" of the composite team from EMB R3, MGB R3, and PENRO
Zambales were made in the exercise of their government function, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of such official duty stands. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to prove otherwise, a task which it failed to do here.
2. Respondent did not give proper justifications for citing Sections 57 and 69 of the
Philippine Mining Act. It only alleged in very general terms that LAMI was
destroying the environment and leveling a mountain without conducting any
scientific studies or submitting expert testimonies that would corroborate such
allegations. The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden
to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that
the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for
the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.
Agham, in failing to prove any violation of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended,
and the Philippine Mining Act, shifted its focus and then claimed that petitioner
allegedly flattened or leveled a mountain.
HON. JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL REOURCES vs. HON. TEODORO A. CASINO, ET
AL/ REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC. vs. TEODORO CASINO, ET AL/ HON.
TEODORO A. CASINO, ET AL vs. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC. /
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. HON. TEODORO A. CASINO, ET AL
Page 1543 of 1553

G.R. No. 207257/G.R. No. 207256/G.R. No. 207282/G.R. No. 207366, February 3, 2015, J.
Del Castillo
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this
extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
(3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces. The Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage
but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage,
so as tocall for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage
sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis. Hence, we sustain
the appellate court’s findings that the Casiño Group failed to establish the alleged grave
environmental damage which will be caused by the construction and operation of the power
plant.
Facts:
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Taiwan Cogeneration Corp (TCC) entered
into a MOA expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would
supply reliable and affordable power in Subic Bay Industrial Park.
Subsequently, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook
to build and operate a coal-fired power plant. In the said MOU, TCC identified 20 hectares
of land as the suitable area for the project and another site of approximately 10 hectares to
be used as an ash pond.
TCC intends to lease the property from SBMA for a term of 50 years.
SBMA Ecology Center issued Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) favor of

Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the
construction, installation, and operation of Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant.
TCC later assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU to Redondo Peninsula
Energy, Inc. (RP Energy), corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines with the primary purpose of building, owning, and operating power plants in
the Philippines, among others.
Accordingly, an Addendum to the said MOU was executed by SBMA and RP Energy.
Page 1544 of 1553

Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued resolution

expressing the city government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy
source and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic
Bay.
DENR later issued an ECC for the proposed 2 x150-MW coal-fired power plant.
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales issued same resolution opposing
the establishment of coal-fired power plant.
Thus,Teodoro A. Casiño, et al, (Casiño Group) filed before the Supreme Court a
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje,
in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR. The petition was later raffled to a division in the
CA.
In the petition, the Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant
project would cause grave environmental damage; that it would adversely affect the health
of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City
of Olongapo. CA rendered a decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the
application for an environment protection order due to the failure of the Casiño Group to
prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or
threatened.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in not granting the Petition of Writ of Kalikasan prayed
for by the Casiño Group.
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the appellate court.
This case affords us an opportunity to expound on the nature and scope of the writ
of kalikasan. It presents some interesting questions about law and justice in the context of
environmental cases, which we will tackle in the main body of this Decision. But we shall
first address some preliminary matters, in view of the manner by which the appellate court
disposed of this case.
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, was issued by the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules
Page 1545 of 1553

for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the individual’s
right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The writ is categorized as a special civil action
and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial
relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and
territorial boundaries.
It is intended “to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through

judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation and
legislation have fallen short and seeks “to address the potentially exponential nature of
large-scale ecological threats.”
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this
extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity;
and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. The Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental
damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such
damage, so as tocall for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of
environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case
basis.
Prescinding from the above, the DENR, SBMA and RP Energy are one in arguing
that the reliefs granted by the appellate court, i.e invalidating the ECC and its amendments,
are improper because it had denied the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan upon a finding that
the Casiño Group failed to prove the alleged environmental damage, actual or threatened,
contemplated under the Rules. Ordinarily, no reliefs could and should be granted. But the
question may be asked, could not the appellate court have granted the Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan on the ground of the invalidity of the ECC for failure to comply with certain laws
and rules?
This question is the starting point for setting up the framework of analysis which
should govern writ of kalikasan cases.
But the issue presented before us is not a simple case of reviewing the acts of an
administrative agency, the DENR, which issued the ECC and its amendments. The
challenge to the validity of the ECC was raised in the context of a writ of kalikasan case.
Page 1546 of 1553

The question then is, can the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan? We
answer in the affirmative subject to certain qualifications.
As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or

threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which
involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or
irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection
between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology ofthe magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action re-filed before.
Be that as it may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case
and those which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the exceptional character
of this case. We take judicial notice of the looming power crisis that our nation faces. Thus,
the resolution of all the issues in this case is of utmost urgency and necessity in order to
finally determine the fate of the project center of this controversy. If we were to resolve
only the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case and dismiss those not proper therefor,
that will leave such unresolved issues open to another round of protracted litigation. In any
case, we find the records sufficient to resolve all the issues presented herein. We also rule
that, due to the extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present case is an exception to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
As we have often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can suspend the rules of procedure
in order to achieve substantial justice, and to address urgent and paramount State interests
vital to the life of our nation.
Indeed, the three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts on the
CFB technology or on environmental matters. These witnesses even admitted on cross-
examination that they are not competent to testify on the environmental impact of the
subject project. What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical knowledge of the
project design/implementation or some other aspects of the project, even those not
requiring expert knowledge, vis-à-vis the significant negative environmental impacts which
the Casiño Group alleged will occur. Clearly, the Casiño Group failed to carry the onus of
proving the alleged significant negative environmental impacts of the project. In
comparison, RP Energy presented several experts to refute the allegations of the Casiño
Group.
Page 1547 of 1553

Hence, we sustain the appellate court’s findings that the Casiño Group failed to
establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by the construction
and operation of the power plant.
REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION vs. ARTURO LOO PO

Section 6 of the Rules of Summary Procedure is clear that in case the defendant failed to file
his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s
motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert the claim
against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.
Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation except to render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period
provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the
court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
FACTS:
In a complaint for unlawful detainer filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the
owner of Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement. From March 2011, Po had
continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the lease
agreement anymore.
On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding that he pay the rental
arrears, and that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to
comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises. Thus,
on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer
before the MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do so.
Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.
Page 1548 of 1553

In its Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure
to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that although the
complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove that it was entitled
to the possession of the subject property. There was no evidence presented to support its
claim against Po either.
The RTC and, subsequently the CA, affirmed the MeTC ruling.
ISSUE/RULING:
3. Whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of preponderance of evidence.
NO.
Section 6 of the Rules of Summary Procedure is clear that in case the defendant failed to
file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s
motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert the
claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.
Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation except to render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the
period provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead,
the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of summons.
He also failed to provide a sufficient justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer
was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint.
Thus, the lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on the
ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of evidence its ownership over the
subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach
his evidence to the complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has to file his
complaint to establish his cause of action. Here, the court was only tasked to determine
whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and to render
judgment thereon.
Page 1549 of 1553

4. Whether failure to attach annexes to the Complaint is fatal.
NO.
There was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint because the allegations
therein constituted a sufficient cause of action for unlawful detainer. Only when the
allegations in the complaint are insufficient to form a cause of action shall the attachment
become material in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, it is not mandatory to attach annexes to the complaint.
Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
NG MENG TAM v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 214054, August 05, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Resort to the application of a subpoena under Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its
application adverse party and hostile witnesses.
Facts:
A collection suit was filed by China Bank against Ever Electrical Manufacturing Company
Inc. and the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go and petitioner Ng Meng Tam, when
Ever failed to pay the loan obligation backed up by two surety agreements executed by
Vicente, George and Ng Meng Tam. Petitioner alleged that the surety agreements were null
and void since these were executed before the loan was granted in 2004. Petitioner served
interrogatories to parties pursuant to Sections 1 and 6Rule 25 of the Rules of Court to China
Bank and required Mr. George C. Yap, Account Officer of the Account Management Group.
Since Ng Meng Tam found Yap’s answers to the interrogatories to parties evasive and not
responsive, petitioner applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum against Yap. China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to testify in court
because petitioner did not obtain and present Yap’s judicial affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not Yap is excluded from Section 5 of the JAR.
Ruling:
Page 1550 of 1553

Yes. Judicial affidavits take the place of direct testimony in court. Section 5 of the JAR
expressly excludes from its application adverse party and hostile witnesses. For the
presentation of these types of witnesses, the provisions on the Rules of Court under the
Revised Rules of Evidence and all other correlative rules including the modes of deposition
and discovery rules shall apply. Here, Yap is a requested witness who is the adverse party’s
witness. Regardless of whether he unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or
refuses without just cause to present the documents, Section 5 cannot be made to apply to
him.
Since the JAR is silent, the rules on evidence covering hostile witnesses specially Section 12,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is to be followed. Under the said provision, the witness who
is an adverse party may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he
had been called by the adverse party except by evidence of his bad character. He may also
be impeached and cross- examined by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court however should first be complied. Therefore, written interrogatories should first be
served upon the adverse party called to the witness stand. On the case at hand, the parties,
with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered interrogatories to parties pursuant
to Rule 25. They therefore complied with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court.
Longevity Pay for Judges and Justices
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR

ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION
MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, J. Brion
The plain reading of Section 42of BP Blg. 129 shows that longevity pay is not available
even to a judicial officer who is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater
reason, to an officer in the Executive simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or
justice. It cannot also be available to a judge or justice for past services he or she did not
render within the Judiciary as services rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity
pay is not contemplated by law.
Facts:
The petitioners in this case are all justices of the CA who claim longevity pay for services
rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package.
Page 1551 of 1553
Issue:
Whether or not the past service of incumbent justices and judges, rendered at the Executive
Department, be recognized under Sec. 42 of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that their previous
executive positions now carry the rank, salary and benefits of their counterparts in the
Judiciary.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the
monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for
each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary;
Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this
longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. As written,
the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevity pay is
granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous,
efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity pay is
equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay. The plain reading of Section 42 shows that
longevity pay is not available even to a judicial officer who is not a judge or justice. It is
likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer in the Executive simply because he
or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be available to a judge or justice for
past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as services rendered outside the
Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by law.
In the case of the judge or justice now asking for the tacking of his/her past executive
service, the reason for the denial is simple and needs no intricate or complicated exercise
in interpretation: these past services were undertaken outside the Judiciary and are not the
services the law contemplates. The tacking, to put it bluntly, violates the clear purpose and
wording of Section 42 of BP 129. To look at Section 42 from another perspective, if indeed
(as some would argue) the intent is to grant executive officers longevity pay pursuant to
their respective grants of benefits similar to that provided under Section 42 of BP 129, this
presumed grant should be understood to be limited to the executive officer’s continued,
efficient and meritorious service in the Executive Department, to be given while the
executive officer is still with that department.
When the public officer with equivalent rank, salary and benefits transfers to the Judiciary,
the longevity pay to which he may have been entitled under the law applicable to his
Page 1552 of 1553

previous Executive Department position, and which he may have been receiving because
of his continued service in that department, will simply have to be disregarded and
discontinued. At the point of transfer, Section 42 of BP 129 will now apply and operate, and
will require five (5) years of continued and efficient service in the Judiciary before it can
start to be earned. This application may sound hard and illiberal, but this is the logical
consequence of the combined effect of the Judiciary’s BP 129 longevity provision and the
laws granting parity to benefits applicable to the Judiciary.
Page 1553 of 1553

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REMEDIAL LAW DIGESTS 2014-June 2016

RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT

RUFA A. RUBIO, ET AL. vs. LOURDES ALABATA

Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal

Petitioners and respondent were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of

On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of

The petition is granted.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or

No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal.1âwphi1

LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and OMBUDSMAN

The petition is denied.

GRAND ASIAN SHIPPING LINES, INC., EDUARDO P. FRANCISCO AND WILLIAM

Petitioner GASLI is a domestic corporation engaged in transporting LPG from Petron

Meanwhile, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension and after

a. Whether strict implementation of the rules may be relaxed to avoid miscarriage of

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whether law of the case doctrine is applicable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAYMUNDO VIAJE, ET AL.

Whether a liberal application of the rules is proper under the circumstances.

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

Anonymous Complaint Against Otelia Lyn G. Maceda,

An anonymous complainant filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Court

Whether Maceda is guilty of dishonesty

Moreover, proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the

Maceda has knowingly and voluntarily participated in the administrative investigation

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a

Now, we proceed to determining Maceda’s liability for falsification of her DTRs.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. JOSE T. CAPULONG

Meanwhile, the Ombudsman issued an order lifting Capulong’s preventive suspension. On

The petition is denied.

EDGAR BARROSO vs. HON. JUDGE GEORGE OMELIO, et al.

Whether or not Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

Judge Omelio in obstinately issuing an injunction against the orders of a co-equal

DREAMLAND HOTEL RESORT AND WESTLEY J. PRENTICE vs. STEPHEN B.

In an appeal to the SC of a CA decision dismissing a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer

According to Johnson, he contacted petitioners to inquire on the terms for employment

The petition is partially granted.

Again, this statement is wanting of merit.

Since Johnson was constructively dismissed, he was illegally dismissed. An illegally

DIAMOND TAXI AND/OR BRYAN ONG vs. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR.

The petition is denied.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMMANUEL OÑATE

a. Whether the petition raises question of fact.

SPOUSES TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN

However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could

JOSE ROMULO L. FRANCISCO v. LOYOLA PLANS CONSOLIDATED INC.

WILFREDO DE VERA, et al. vs. SPOUSES SANTIAGO, et al.

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession with damages

Whether the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

JESUS VELASQUEZ v. SPOUSES PATERNO C. CRUZ AND ROSARIO CRUZ

Jurisdiction is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and

In 1985, Jesus’ father-in-law relinquished his tenancy rights over the

Calero, Aecaya Christine V. LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO

CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ ,

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) v.

PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action

Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Josephine's complaint

Province of Leyte v. Energy Development Corporation

Province of Leyte issued four separate franchise tax assessments against

YES. Consequently, records reveal that CA served its Resolution indicating