Constitutional Law II as the “highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the C.
most exact idea of property remaining in the C. Power of Taxation - It is the inherent power of the state to
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
II. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
A. Police Power - is the power of the state to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare.
It is the power of the government to regulate behaviors and
enforce order within its territory, often framed in terms of
public welfare, security, health, and safety. The exercise of
police power can be in the form of making laws, compelling
obedience to those laws through physical means with the aim of
removing liberty, legal sanctions, or other forms of coercion and
inducements.
The basic purposes of Police Power are:
1. To serve the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the
people;
2. To promote and preserve public health;
3. To promote and protect public safety;
4. To maintain and safeguard public order;
5. To protect public morals; and
6. To promote the economic security of the people.
B. Power of Eminent Domain - It is an inherent power of the
state that enables it to forcibly acquire private property, which
is intended for public use, upon the payment of just
compensation. It is based on political necessity; it is inseparable
from the state unless it is denied to it by its fundamental law.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the
public good character. It is the courts of law that have the
power to determine whether there is necessity therefore. Also
called the power of expropriation, eminent domain is described
government” that may be acquired for some public purpose
through a method “in the nature of a compulsory sale to the
state”.
Who may exercise the Power of Eminent domain?
1. The Congress
2. The President
3. The local legislative bodies
4. Certain public corporations (e.g. Land Authority and the
MWSS)
5. Quasi-public corporations (e.g. PLDT and MERALCO)
What are the requisites in exercising the power of eminent
domain?
1. The property taken must be private property;
2. The taking must be within constitutional sense;
3. The taking must be for public use
4. Just compensation must be paid;
5. There must be due process of law.
The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU
can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power of
eminent domain;
2. It is exercised for the public use, purpose and welfare;
3. There must be payment of just compensation; and
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property south to be expropriated.
raise revenues to defray the expenses of the government or for
any public purpose. This can be done through the imposition of
burdens or imposition on persons, properties, services,
occupations or transactions.
The importance of taxation derives from the unavoidable
obligation of the government to protect the people and extend
them benefits in the form of public projects and services.
Taxation is based on necessity and the reciprocal duties of
protection and support between the state and those that are
subject to its authority.
Who may exercise the power of taxation?
- It is the Congress who exercises the plenary power to
tax. However, it may be delegated by congress to local
government units under such terms and conditions as
may prescribed by law.
The following are the requisites or limitations on the power to
tax:
1. Public purpose;
2. Territoriality;
3. Uniformity;
4. Due process and equal protection clause;
5. Constitutionally exempt properties cannot be taxed;
6. In the assessment and collection of certain kinds of taxes,
notice and opportunity for hearing must be provided.
These powers are inherent and do not need to be expressly
conferred by the constitutional provision on the state. They are
supposed to co-exist with the state. The moment the state
come into being, it is deemed invested with these three powers
as its innate attributes.
Similarities:
The three inherent of the state are similar in the following
respects:
1. They are inherent in the state and maybe exercise by it
without need of express constitutional grant.
2. They are not only necessary but indispensable. The state
cannot continue or effective unless it is able to exercise them.
3. They are methods by which the state interferes with private
rights.
4. They all presuppose an equivalent compensation for the
private rights interfered with.
5. They are exercise merely by legislature.
Differences:
The three inherent powers of the state differ from each other in
the following ways:
1.Police Power (regulates liberty and property, exercised by
govt, property taken is destroyed for being noxious and
intended for noxious purposes, compensation is the altruistic
feeling that he has contributed to the general welfare)
2. Power of Eminent Domain ( affects property rights only, may
be exercised by both the govt and private entities, property
taken is intended for public use, compensation is more
concrete, to wit, a full and fair equivalent of the property
expropriated or protection)
3. Power of Taxation (affects property rights only, property
taken is intended for public use, exercised by the govt,
compensation is more concrete, a full and fair equivalent of the
public improvements for the taxes paid)
Limitations:
1. The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are
found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1. (1) No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
(Article III, Phil. Constitution)
2. The presumption of libertarian societies is in favor of private
rights and against attempts on the part of the State to interfere
with them.
3. The exercise of these fundamental power is subject at all
times to the limitations and requirements of the Constitution
and may in proper cases be annulled by the courts of justice.
III. ART 3 – BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the
public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason
of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall
exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological,
or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with
by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
IV. ART 4 – CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section
1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.
V. ART 5 – SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and
the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons.
Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and
such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.
VI. ART 8 – SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use, and disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty
God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law
and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
ART 1 – NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with
all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around between, the connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, from part of the
internal waters of the Philippines.
ART 2 – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATEMENT POLICIES
Principles
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of
the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of
the State and the integrity of the national territory.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the people
to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens
may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.
Sec. 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
State Policies
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states the paramount consideration
shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national
interest, and the right to self- determination.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons
in its territory.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social
order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that
provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living,and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science
and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism
and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based,or sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare of the nation.
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication
and information in nation-building.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic

force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and

independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the

private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.
CASES:
A. Police Power
A Ph Assoc of Service Exp v. Drilon, G.R. L-81958, June 30, 1988
FACTS: Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right
to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on
behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed
the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it
is an exercise of police power.
RULING: “[Police power] has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty
or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the Issue: Whether the Department Order of the Respondent is in
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Discriminatory
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract against Sexes
workers,” but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
Held: No, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
workers,” but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
law” under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity
they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
equally to all members of the same class.
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
preference for female workers — rests on substantial they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
distinctions. equally to all members of the same class. The Court is well
aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor
Fact: The petitioner, engaged principally in the recruitment of
force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No.
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment,
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,” in this petition for certiorari and
the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
“discrimination against males or females;” that it “does not
sustains the Government’s efforts. The State through the labor
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
Secretary Exercise the police power which is a power
females with similar skills;” and that it is violative of the right to
coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
the “law of overwhelming necessity.” It may be said to be that
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing
society.”
for worker participation “in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided C Ichong v. Hernandez, GR L-7995, May 31, 1957
by law.” 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of
in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be
other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships adversely
in violation of the Charter’s non-impairment clause, in addition
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to
to the “great and irreparable injury” that PASEI members face
should the Order be further enforced.
Regulate the Retail Business,” filed to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process
of law;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in
the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines;
(4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens
of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity
to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there
public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is
the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature’s purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that
we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the
law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. And if distinction and classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of
fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or
the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by
any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
D Lutz v. Araneta, GR L-7859, Dec 22, 1955
Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from J.
Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of
money paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar
Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on
the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the
cultivation of sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the
collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of
the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose
is not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for
that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of First Instance
dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar
Adjustment Act (Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional.
Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is
constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory
purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar
production is one of the great industries of our nation, its
promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds
greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act
is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what
is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If
objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no
reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds
for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made
with the implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is
only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will
directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under the
Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.
M Assoc of Small Land Own v. Sec of Agrarian Reform, GR
78742, July 14, 1989
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common
legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the
several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that
no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no
such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of
the constitutional provision that no private property shall be
taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department
of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power
or eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police
power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the same time on the same
subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the
verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public
safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the
interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is
not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power
of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as
the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent
that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power
for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands
they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent
domain
A Lozano v. Martinez, GR L-63419, Dec 18, 1986
FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the
Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a person “who makes or
draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank.”. It is aimed at putting a stop to the
practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes injury
to the public interest. Contentions on the law are that: 1) it
offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the
equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and
executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed because the
Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the
Third Reading
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)
HELD: The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check, not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation can pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is
a valid exercise of police power and is not in conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22
impairs freedom of contract since contracts which contravene
public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal
protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check
and not the payee. Additonally, BP 22 does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to the
contention, the power to define the offense and to prescribe
the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On the last
contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and
reported that the clause in question was an authorized
amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the
constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.
C DepEd, Culture & Sports v. San Diego, GR 89572, Dec 21,
1989
Facts: Private respondent San Diego thrice flunked the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Upon application again, herein
petitioner rejected the application due to MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972 which contains the rule: “A student shall be
allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the
NMAT for the fourth time.” Private respondent went to the RTC
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the
test. Respondent Judge granted the petition, and held that the
petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
Issue: Whether there was improper exercise of police power
Held: No.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
The court found no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin
case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be
gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with
more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be
regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the
medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State.
Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper
exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession
is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.yno
The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court
dated January 13, 1989, is reversed.
D Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR 74457, Mar 20,
1987
Facts: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of said EO. The
trial court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. The IAE
affirmed the same.
Petitioner contends that the EO is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that
the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise
of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
Issue: Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries
Held: Yes. E0 626-A is unconstitutional.
While it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that
presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new
rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was
issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the
legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter
that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As
there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of
that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason,
indeed, to question the validity of the executive order
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing
that “no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another.” The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
M City Govt of QCi v. Ericta, GR L-34915, June 24, 1983
Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition to annul
Section 9 of “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF”, which stated that “At least six (6) percent of the
total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The
area so designated shall immediately be developed and should
be open for operation not later than six months from the date
of approval of the application.” Respondent alleged that the
same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter,
the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent’s property is
a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the
land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial
ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City
Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local
police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions
not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and
such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the
use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property. The respondent also stresses that the general
welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the
taking of the property in this case because it refers to “the
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.” The respondent
points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright
under the State’s police power, the property is generally not
taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in
order to promote the general welfare.
Issue: Whether there is, according to respondent, a taking or
confiscation of property
Held: Yes. There is, according to respondent, a taking or
confiscation of property.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit
(People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of
Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but
also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery,
because under Section 13 of said ordinance, ‘Violation of the
provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment
and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.’ The
confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one
from operating a memorial park cemetery.
Petitioner’s contention that the taking is justified by the exercise
of valid police power is untenable since the same is “usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use
of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare.
It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with
the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose
of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare.”
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries
for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people It seems to the court that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a
person of his private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537,
the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper
place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city
owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice
in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however,
requires payment of just compensation.
B. Eminent Domain
D City of Manila v. Chinese Com of Manila, GR 14355, Oct 31,
1919
FACTS: Plaintiff sought to expropriate a part of a private
cemetery devoted for public use to make an extension of Rizal
Avenue. Defendants contend that expropriation is not necessary
because it will disturb the remains of the dead. Moreover,
adjoining and adjacent lots were offered to the city free of
charge for the planned public improvement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a private property devoted for public use
can still be expropriated.
HELD: Yes, private property devoted for public use is still subject
to expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national
legislature or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate.
In addition, there must be a necessity for the expropriation. In
the case at bar, evidence shows that there is no proof of the
need of converting the cemetery.
C Rep v. PLDT, GR L-18841, Jan 27, 1969
FACTS: Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American
corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US
and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.
The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after
having set up its own Government Telephone System, by
utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting
trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for
a joint overseas telephone service.
Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified
the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a
case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to
execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of
PLDT’s telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant to restrain the severance of
the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.
The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity
exercising government powers through one of its branches, the
Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a
public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates
and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT
set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own
appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines
of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT
entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for
joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey
overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT
complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of
their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the
use of government offices but even to serve private persons or
the general public in competition with the business of PLDT.
Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking
the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a
contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the
facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country
under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable.
The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel
PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the
Government Telephone System can be a valid object for
expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to
permit interconnection as the needs of the government service
may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The
use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection
between the both telephone systems, through expropriation
can be a subject to an easement of right of way.
“x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate
a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.”
A People v. Fajardo, GR L-12172, Aug 29, 1958
M Rep v. VDA. De Castellvi, GR L-20620, Aug 15, 1974
Facts: Petitioner, as a lessee, occupied the property of Castellvi
in 1947 on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June
30 of the succeeding year.) Before the expiration of the contract
of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the
same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the
leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July
11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the
latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue
leasing the property. Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief
of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was
difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000 that were erected and already established on the
property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of expropriation
proceedings would be recommended to the President.
Petitioner Republic stated that the “taking ” of Castellvi’s
property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of the
lease agreement.
Respondent argued that the two essential elements in the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor
must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from
the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not
present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
property in 1947.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s contention that the taking occurred
in 1947 (and not in 1959, is correct
Held: No. The following must be present in the “taking” of
property for purposes of eminent domain: 1) The expropriator
must enter a private property. 2) The entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period. 3) The
entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority. 4) The property must be devoted to a public use
or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. 5)
The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
The “taking” of Catellvi’s property for purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. The Court finds merit in the contention of Castellvi that
two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and
occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public
use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its
beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just
compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the
property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine
National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In
the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court,
on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for
the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid
must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed.
D Amigable v. Cuenca, GR L-26400, Feb 29, 1972
C Ph Press Institute v. Comelec, GR 119694, May 22, 1995
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free print space of not less than ½ page
for use as “Comelec Space” from 06March1995 to 06May1995.
COMELEC Commissioner sent letters to publishers informing
them of the same. PPI seek to declare the resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground of taking private
property w/o just compensation. TRO was enforced. SocGen
argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its
implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the
same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police
power of the State. COMELEC Chair stated that they will clarify
the resolution that the letter was intended to solicit and not to
compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was promulgated.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of
deprivation of use w/o compensation of newspaper?
Decision: To compel print media companies to donate
“Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private personal
property for public use. The extent of the taking or deprivation
is not insubstantial measured by the advertising rates ordinarily
charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-
urban areas.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private personal
property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal
authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the
taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not
been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell
print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. It has not been suggested that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of
“just compensation.”
A Sumulong v. Guerrero, GR L-48685, Sept 30, 1987
Fact: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority
(NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land
covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo,
Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and
Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that they had been deprived of the possession of their property
without due process of law. This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge
and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as
amended. Petitioners argue that:
Issue: Whether “socialized housing” as defined in Pres. Decree
No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not “public use” since it will benefit only “a
handful of people, bereft of public character?
Held: No, “socialized housing” fans within the confines of
“public use”. It is, particularly important to draw attention to
paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities
inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance,
relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize
the public purpose of the project. The use to which it is
proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites
of “public use”. The lands in question are being expropriated by
the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to
provide housing facilities to low-salaried government
employees.
M Manosca v. Court of Appeals, GR 106440, Jan 29, 1996
D EPZA v. Dulay, GR L-59603, Apr 29, 1987
C Muni of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., GR 127820, July 20,
1988
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of
1993, Municipality of Parañaque filed Complaint for
expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint
was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of
the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project."
Acting on petitioner's motion, said court issued an Order,
authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property
upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to
15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax
declaration private respondent filed its Answer containing
affirmative defenses and a counterclaim trial court issued its
August 9, 1994 Resolution nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order
and dismissing the case.
Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and transfer of venue
were denied by the trial court. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the trial court's Decision. Denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issues:
WON A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has
the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive
an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
WON The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of
case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
case “substantially complies with the requirements of the law”
because the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are
synonymous for “the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the
local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the
expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which provides: “If the LGU fails to acquire a
private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a
resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
initiate expropriation proceedings.”
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public
utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed
“through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an
LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise
the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the
municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms
“resolution” and “ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law,
but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution
is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress
did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires
that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.[35]
Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language --
from “resolution” under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 --
demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of
the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an
LGU is in reality not eminent but “inferior” domain, since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court,
all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present
in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a
prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject
matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res
judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the
State might need for public use whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right
of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to
specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the
State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished
by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to
be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the
parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently
exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal
requirements are complied with.
C. Taxation
A Pascual v. Sec of Public Works, GR L-10405, Dec 29, 1960
M Punsalan v. Muni Board of Manila, GR L-4817, May 26, 1954
FACTS: Ordinance 3398 was enacted pursuant to paragraph 18
of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, imposing a
municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various
professions in the city. Various professionals filed suit to annul
the ordinance and the provision of law authorizing the
enactment of the ordinance and to call for the refund collected
taxes under the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection
clause
RULING: No. The legislature may, in its discretion, select what
occupation shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion
it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and
leave the other untaxed. Manila, as the seat of the National
Government and with a population and volume of trade many
times that of any other Philippine City or municipality, offers a
more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it
is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a
higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.
The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person “exercising”
or “pursuing” any of the occupation named in the ordinance,
and does not make any distinction between professionals
having offices in Manila and outsiders who practice their
profession therein. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of a
profession in the city is a matter of judicial determination.
Thus, the ordinance does not violate the equal protection
clause.
D Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Rev, GR L-19201, June 16,
1965
C Abra Valley College v. Aquino, GR L-39086, June 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of
higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and
declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of
its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment
of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said
“Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and
Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the
satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and
embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial
court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of
the building is being used by the director for residential
purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by
Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment,
and thus the property is not being used exclusively for
educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal,
petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari
with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively
for educational purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935
Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty
taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been
made that the exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of
the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by
any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the
purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is
the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution.
indispensable’ therefor but extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of said purposes. But it must be stressed however, that while
the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational
purposes”, reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot
for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence, The lease of the first floor thereof to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of
education.

The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the

modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the
ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and
the second floor being used as incidental to education
(residence of the director).

Issue2: Whether the Educational Institution Properties which is

not exclusively used for educational purposes is not eligible for
tax exemption.

Held: Yes, Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly
arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the
lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second
floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for
residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being
used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is
used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the school involved. Moreover, the
exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or
educational purposes is ‘not limited to property actually