RED SALUTE – INDIA’S MAOIST MAELSTORM

“One Mahsud tribesman aptly described to me their tactics as being like that of the hawk. The hawk flies
high in the sky, out of danger; he flies round and round until he sees his prey and then he swoops down
on it for one mighty strike and when he has got his prey, he does not wait around, he flies off at once to
some far off quiet place where he can enjoy what he has got 1.”

It was a usual summer afternoon in the dense tropical forests of Jheeram Ghati(valley) of Darbha

Division in Chhattisgarh; hot and humid with thick canopy of trees blocking the sunlight, making

it appear already like dusk*. Kiran, along with his other comrades had been sitting on an ambush

site for the last seven days. Just a day ago they had received information about some senior

members of Indian National Congress, a prominent political party, who would be travelling

through Darbha, on their way back from electioneering. The Maoists usually avoid targeting

political leaders unless directed by top leadership, the Central Committee. But one name would

drive Kiran and his comrades to take matters in their own hand and launch an attack. The name

was Mahendra Karma, a former minister in Chhattisgarh Government and the founder of Salwa

Judum. Salwa Judum was a pro state, tribal auxiliary defense militia, which few years ago, had

become an important part of state’s counterinsurgency(COIN) strategy and tactics. Salwa Judum

meaning ‘Purification hunt’ was raised by Mahendra Karma in 2005 by drawing in local tribal

youths and surrendered Maoists. Their arrival on the COIN scenario was seen by many as a

game changer and the tide had started to turn against the Maoist. There were how ever large

scale accusations of murders, rapes and extortion of local tribals by the Salwa Judum members 2.

A view upheld by Supreme Court of India, when it banned the Salwa Judum in 2011.3 Though
1
*I reached the site the same night as a part of National Investigation Agency team.
Khan, M Akbar (1975). Raiders in Kashmir. National Book Foundation — Islamabad. Second Edition. Maj Gen Akbar
Khan,commader of Pakistani irregular offensive in Kashmir describing mindset of a Mahsud irregular warrior,
2
Kumar, Abhishek, and Meghna Pattnaik. "Salwa Judum and Violations of Constitutional Mandates." SSRN Electronic Journal
SSRN Journal (n.d.)
3
"No More Salwa Judum." The Indian Express. N.p., 13 June 2015. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

1
the ambush as a part of annual ‘Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign’ of Communist Party of

India(Maoist) was originally planned to attack the security forces, the opportunity to target

Mahendra Karma, was enough for Maoists to quickly recalibrate their strategy 4. On May 25th

2013, Kiran and his comrades attacked the convoy killing around 28 people including Mahendra

Karma. To the surprise of Maoists there were other senior party leaders also in the convoy,

including Nand Kumar Patel, former Home Minister of Chhattisgarh and Vidya Charan Shukla

former union minister, all of whom were killed in the attack.

The attack was perhaps the single most devastating strike that Maoists had carried out against

political leaders, killing almost the entire top brass of Congress leadership in Chhattisgarh 5. The

attack was carried by skillful use of guerrilla tactic, first by initiating IED blasts to blow the front

vehicles. Once the convoy was immobilized, the insurgents swooped down from the nearby hills

firing at the convoy. None amongst the two dozen security personnel accompanying the convoy

could react or was given a chance to react6.

The Darbha attack, as it was revealed later, was not a pre planned attack on the political

leadership. The opportunity to strike at Mahendra Karma, led to a quick yet successful

recalibration of the strategy. The attack was planned and executed by the local Darbha Division

of the CPI(Maoist). There were around 40 to 50 insurgents aided by around 100 men and women

belonging to local tribal militia7. After the attack the insurgents like true guerrilla hawks quickly

retreated back into the jungles and left the area. The members of the militia went back to their

daily routine. The attack again reinforced certain key strengths of the insurgents which include i)

robust and efficient intelligence network ii) devolution of authority to the local committees iii)

4
Indian Express, May 25 2015, ‘Darbha attack on Congress leaders not Planned’
5
Talbot, Ian. Modern South Asian History: Politics, States, Diasporas. Yale University Press, 2016.
6
First Post , May 31 2013 , Chhatisgarh Attack Live
7
Indian Express, May 25 2015, ‘Darbha attack on Congress leaders not Planned’

2
ability to quickly readjust their strategy iv) extensive support from local tribes and ability to

organize them into tribal militia for short term tactical purposes and v) domination of local

landscape.

The Darbha attack was an appropriate reminder of why the Maoist insurgency has repeatedly

been called India’s biggest internal security challenge8. This paper is an an attempt to understand

this very challenge. The paper intends to trace back the origins of Maoist movements in India

which would help in putting the current stream of insurgency in perspective. This is followed by

understanding the current insurgency with its strategy and tactics. An attempt has been to

understand the socio economic dynamics of the insurgency. Besides delving deep into the COIN

strategies adopted by Indian security forces and the raging debates about it, I have also made an

attempt to analyze a success model in the form of Andhra Pradesh’s COIN campaign. I have

concluded with a brief analysis of the problem.

Guerrilla On the Scene- History of Maoism in India

The early Maoist hawks emerged around the same time when Mehsud tribes were hunting their

prey in Kashmir. The initial Maoist strands can be traced back to a peasant rebellion in Telegana

in the erstwhile Nizam state of Hyderabad in 1947.There is widespread belief that Left Wing

Extremism in India started with Naxalbari, in West Bengal in 1960s. It was however, what

scholars have called the second wave of insurgency, the first being some twenty years ago in

Telangana9. In April 1948, a dissident faction of the Communist Party of India (CPI) was

responsible for organizing the peasants in the Telangana region and adopted Maoism as both its

goal and strategy10. The Telangana movement was a result of acute agrarian stress caused by

exploitation of poor peasants and tribals by the landlords (Jagirdars and deshmukhs). The
8
PTI. "Naxalism Remains Biggest Internal Security Challenge." India Today. N.p., 24 May 2010. Web. 27 Apr. 2016
9
Guha, Ramachandra. "Two Indias." The National Interest No. 102 (2009): 31-42. JSTOR. Web. 27 Apr. 2016
10
Kennedy, Jonathan, and Sunil Purushotham. "Beyond Naxalbari: A Comparative Analysis of Maoist Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in Independent India." (2012): 832-62. Web

3
peasants and tribals were perpetually in debt and many committed suicides when the harassment

of Jagirdars and Deshmuks became intolerable11. This movement laid down the framework of

principals and strategies which the future communist insurgencies would also adopt. The CPI, in

1950, laid down the principles insurgency in India which I will discuss later in the paper. Suffice

to say that Indian communists very early in their struggle had adopted the Mao’s idealogy of

‘People’s War’ as their mode of struggle. There was widespread violence both by the rebels and

the state. The movement resulted in deaths of thousands of tribals and peasants. This movement

ended in early fifties partly as a result of strong government action and also the decision of CPI

to take part in the first electoral process of the independent India12.

There were growing debates within the CPI that being part of the democratic process was

deviating the party from achieving its ultimate goal of a communist revolution. With the Indo

China war of 1962, communist faced a severe credibility issue within the Indian masses. With

the result the Communist movement in India split during 1964 into two groups which later came

to be known as Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India-Marxist

(CPM)13.The extremists within the CPM favored an immediate launch of revolutionary armed

struggle, this resulted in further split of CPM with the extremists forming their own CPI

(Marxist-Leninist) on 22 April 1969. CPI(ML) wanted to launch ‘People’s War’ advocated by

Mao Zedong. It is this wing of Communists which gradually evolved into what is today known

as the CPI (Maoist), the flag bearer of Maoist Insurgency in India.

Naxalbari Rebellion: In 1967, CPI(ML) headed by Charu Majumdar, took the cause of

agricultural laborers and sharecroppers against the repressive policies of ‘Jotedars’ (non

agricultural landlords) and started an armed insurgency in Naxalbari district of West Bengal. The

11
ibid
12
ibid
13
Singh, Prakash. "Joint Special Operations University 7701 Tampa Point Boulevard MacDill AFB FL 33621." (2012).

4
widespread ideological appeal of the Naxalbari movement, is the reason, why the name ‘Naxal’

has survived till today and is commonly used in addressing the Maoist insurgents. The

exploitative policies of these ‘Jotedars’ had resulted in chronic indebtedness of the share

croppers and agricultural laborers. The insurgency with its growing ideological appeal soon

spread to other areas including Calcutta(Kolkata) where the university students took the cause of

these laborers and started an urban armed insurgency against the state government. The Naxalite

movement began to spread both vertically amongst sections of students/educated middle class

and horizontally across other states. The movement caught the imagination of intelligentsia and

press which started comparing it with the Huk rebellion of Philippines and the Shining Path of

Peru. There were insurgent leaders who aspired to create liberated zones and what they called

‘turning India into little Vietnams’14.The aim was to start a prairie fire as envisaged by Mao,

which would spread to entire India setting it ablaze with revolutionary war. The success of

movement seemed imminent to the communists as one Chinese Newspaper reported in July 1967

“Although the course of the Indian revolutionary struggle will be long and tortuous, the Indian

revolution guided by great Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s Thought, will surely triumph”15.

However the aim and aspirations fell flat as insurgents failed to create a mass support for the

movement. The leaders of the movement had assessed that the insurgency, in Mao’s words,

would act as a spark which would set the entire prairie in flames 16. The leaders of the movement

failed to appreciate that the success of Mao’s movement was predicated on the support of the

population.

The government responded with heavy use of force. Leaders of the movement were arrested. The

tactics adopted by rebels were anything but guerrilla. These minimally trained revolutionaries

14
Ibid 10
15
Gupta, Bhabani Sen. "A Maoist line for India." The China Quarterly 33 (1968): 3-16.
16
Ibid 15

5
were no match to the government forces17. The movement was slowly marginalized and was all

but crushed in 1972 by a concerted COIN campaign by West Bengal police with the help of

central government. The fire had been doused but embers remained. These embers in the form of

Charu’s supporters travelled to other parts of country in a bid to ignite the next prairie fire.

Spreading Prairie Fire-Buildup to Next Phase: The Naxalbari movement was to inspire future

generations of Indian left wing extremist. The ideology of ‘People’s war’ spread to other states.

Though the Naxalbari uprising was a localized affair but it “marked an advance for the people of

India as the Paris Commune had marked an advance for the world proletariat18.”

Some of the comrades of Charu Mazumdar took the revolutionary ideas of Naxalbari movement

with them to Telangana region in Andhra Pradesh and started mobilizing the masses for an

impending struggle. These comrades realized the importance of mass mobilization, which the

Naxalbari leaders had neglected. They formed a ‘Central Organizing Group’(COG) for this

purpose. Telangana had a history of left inspired struggles which started with Telangana

movement of 1948. There was another communist backed peasant uprising in Srikakulam district

in 1960s. It was a fertile land for growth of communist revolutionary ideas. The tribals and

sharecroppers were for centuries exploited by the forest contractors and the landlords. They were

kept under perpetual bondage towards repayment of a small debt supposedly taken generations

ago. The economic dimensions were aggravated by the sickening social exploitation of tribal

womenfolk. It was common for a poor tribal woman to accompany the rich bride as part of the

dowry. As V R Raghavan writes “She had to be at the disposal of the master and his guests and

had to satisfy just about any male in the master’s household 19.” Naxalite songs are replete with

17
Sen, Samar, and Debabrata Panda, eds. Naxalbari and After: A Frontier Anthology. Vol. 2. Kathashilpa, 1978.Pg-45
18
Pravat Jana, The Main Danger, Naxalbari and After, Vol II, Pg-143
19
V.R.Raghavan,The Naxal threat: Causes State Response and Consequences

6
references to rape by landlords and to girls growing up with the knowledge of the inevitability of

rape that awaited them20.

In 1980 Kondapalli Seetharamaih broke away from COG and formed CPI(ML) People’s War

Group(PWG). He started amass mobilization campaign which included setting up of ‘Forest

Committees’ which would mobilize tribals in the jungle areas and ‘Regional Committees’ for the

plains areas. Every armed unit (dalams) comprising of six to ten members were formed. There

were about 50 such dalams in the Telengana area of Andhra Pradesh21. By mid eighties the PWG

cadres indulged in large scale violence and started targeting the government machinery. This

period also saw recruitment of women into the insurgent cadre. Women insurgents started taking

part in attacks on government forces and kidnapping of Government officials. On 27 December

1987 a group of 10 insurgents which included three women guerrillas kidnapped six senior

bureaucrats the Andhra Pradesh government. This incident caused major embarrassment to the

government and it had to release eight Naxalites from jail to secure the release of the officials.

The PWG got tremendous propaganda mileage out of the incident22.

The state responded with escalating its counter insurgency operations. The state government

banned PWG in 1992. In two years more than 350 insurgents were killed and around 3000

members and sympathizers were arrested. PWG was also marred by internal strife and there was

a split in the party with Kondapally Seetharamaiah being replaced by Mupalla Laxmana Rao

alias Ganapathy, as general secretary. How ever the low period of the movement was not to

remain for long, it would make a comeback few years later and this time more sinister than ever.

Apart from Telengana , the Naxalite movement post Naxalbari had spread to other states. In the

state of Bihar, Maoist Coordination Committee(MCC) was the most prominent naxal group. The

20
Ibid
21
ibid 13
22
Singh, Prakash. The Naxalite Movement in India. Rupa, 1995.

7
MCC was formed in 1975 as a break way group of CPI(ML). The unique feature of naxal

violence was attacks on the caste lines. Between 1987 and 1992, MCC killed more than 300

people belonging to upper castes23. MCC tried to project this caste based violence as class

conflicts. It is true that in a highly stratified caste based society of Bihar, the caste invariably

reflects the class but not always. What began as a fight for socioeconomic justice, degenerated

into inter-caste clashes in Bihar.

The Naxal movement also spread to Chhattisgarh which has a large tribal population. The Bastar

region, which today is the hotbed of Maoist insurgency is a mineral rich region. These minerals

which include coal and iron have for decades proved to be a bane for the tribals. The big

industrial houses over the years have displaced tribals from their forest habitat without giving

them proper compensation. A lopsided socio-economic development caused by indirect

exploitation through environmental destruction and direct exploitation through cheating and

duping provided an ideal setting for the Naxalites to take roots in the area 24. There were number

of violent incidents in Chhattisgarh in 90s

Present Phase- The Big Challenge: During the decade of 80s and 90s, left extremist parties

always tried to keep their armed component subordinate to the political wing. This had resulted

in poor mobilization of armed insurgents. Rampant factionalism within the Maoists in the 90s

also impacted their capability. The ‘people’s war’ could be fought only with a properly equipped

People’s Liberation Army. The PWG realized this shortcoming and started laying emphasis on

militarization of its armed component. The first step towards adoption of Mao’s strategy was

taken by PWG in 2000 when they decided to set up a People’s Guerrilla Army. The aim was “to

23
Ibid 22
24
Ibid 22

8
strengthen the political power of the people and to defeat the efforts of the State and the Central

Governments to check the revolutionary movement25.”

In 2004 the insurgents took a monumental decision which changed the course of Maoist

insurgency in India and transformed it into India’s biggest internal security challenge. The PWG

and MCC merged and formed CPI(Maoist) with Muppala Lakshman Rao alias Ganapathy as its

General secretary. A year before the official announcement of the merger, the Maoists had

started coming together and launching attacks on the police and security forces. The formation of

CPI(Maoist) saw the party undertake comprehensive reassessment of its strategies and tactics

which shall be discussed in the next section. The convergence of resources and efforts on one

hand boosted party’s ability to mobilize the masses and on the other it enhanced the striking

capability of its armed wing. The result was quantitatively massive upsurge in the Maoist

violence. In the last 12 years more than 2000 security force members have been killed26.

In the year of their merger, Maoist launched one of their most daring attacks in Koraput district

of Orissa. A group of 300 Maoist staged a meticulous attack on several government

establishments including police stations, the district jail and the office of the Superintendent of

Police. The insurgents killed about 30 people and decamped with a huge cache of arms and

ammunitions. Some 1100 weapons were looted from the police armory which included AK-47s

and Self Loading Rifles thus translating Mao’s idea of “state’s armory is our armory27.”

The Maoist influence has gradually extended over large parts of the country. Addressing the

police chiefs of the country on 15 September 2009, the Indian home minister stated that ‘Maoist

ideology had its pockets of influence in 20 states across the country, and that over 2,000 police

25
k balasubramanayam,”world is revolution”, the pioneer, August 31,2002
26
Government of India website mha.nic.in
27
Ibid 15

9
station areas in 223 districts in these states were partially or substantially affected by the

menace’28.

Nexus- Over the past decade, Maoist have been able to forge ties with North East(NE)

insurgents and few terror outfits operating out of Pakistan. There has been increasing evidence of

Maoist nexus with the NE insurgents. The arrest of some of the prominent Maoists from the

North East regions has revealed that Maoists are getting training from NE insurgents 29. In one

such case a group of NE insurgents travelled to Jharkhand to provide training to Maoists.

Evidence has also come to fore of increasing attempts by Inter-Services Intelligence agency to

reach out to the Maoist. If this happens then the problem may get more complex with sinister

outcomes. Mohammed Umer Madani, an important operative of Lashkar-e- Taiba was tasked to

recruit Maoists and help them with money and firearms. Madani on his arrest admitted that his

plan included recruiting Maoists and then sending them to Pakistan for further training30. He had

gathered detailed information about the methods and training techniques of Maoists during his

visits to Ranchi, Bokaro and Dhanbad in Jharkhand. It would be interesting to see whether

Maoist are willing to engage with ISI or not. The revolutionary character of Maoist may suffer in

such a tie up as it would rob Maoists of their revolutionary appeal. This may dent their credibility

and their appeal to the masses.

Biggest Internal Security challenge-Various Dimensions

Maoist violence has spread to more than one third of the country. Government data reveals that a

total of 802 members of security forces have been killed in various insurgent related incidents in

last five years where as the number of insurgents killed by security forces in the same period

stands at 49431. This shows a better kill ratio in favor of insurgents. The number of civilian
28
Times of India,20th September 2010, www.indiatimes.com
29
Bhalla, Abhishek. "Maoists Are Getting Training and Funds from North East Militants." Dailymail.com. N.p., 22 Dec. 2013.
30
Anand, Jatin. "Police Unearth Links between Naxals and LeT."www.hindustantimes.com/., 27 Jan. 2013. Web. 27 Apr. 2016
31
http://mha.nic.in/naxal_new

10
casualties were 2162 between 2010 and 2015. There were more than 6500 Maoist related

incidents in the same period32. These are huge numbers. Adding to these grim statistics are the

worrying trends of spread of the movement. Maoist activities were witnessed in 203 Districts of

20 States in 2011, the latest government figures of 2015 show Maoist incidents in more than

dozen states, which does give the impression that a third of the country’s area is under some sort

of Maoist influence. Apart from their traditional strongholds in Central India, Maoists are

seriously involved in mobilization activities in parts of Assam, Punjab and the southern states.

An interesting perspective is provided by this map (CRPF document) which shows the areas of

influence vis-a-vis areas reporting violence. The blue area indicates the extent of Maoist

influence in terms of capability of their cadres to carry out armed action.

Maoist violence over the last decade has witnessed increased sophistication both in strategy and

tactics. They have been able to upgrade their arsenal both quality and numbers. Their arms match

those of counter insurgents, in fact are similar as majority of these have been looted from the

state armories. One dictum of Mao, which his revolutionary followers in India have operationally

translated with increasing success is that “state’s armory is our armory”. The attacks as a result

have become sinister, well organized and large scale. The targets are not any more the individual

class enemies, it is the state itself. The security forces have suffered heavy casualties both in

numbers and looting of arms. The insurgency with its vertical and horizontal proliferation is

proving to be India’s biggest internal security challenge.

FUNDING: While the rebels in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir receive massive funding

from the external sponsors, the Maoist funding was comparatively sedate and lower in

comparison. How ever the funding has shown steep hike in past few years. The primary sources

of Maoist party funding are a) membership fees, b) local contribution c) levy and taxes which
32
Ibid

11
includes extortion and d) collections during Tendu(Betel) leaves collection33. Maoists have been

measured on the expenditure front. They have been able to restrain their expenditure as they have

still not indulged in outright purchase of arms and ammunition.

Motilal Soren, an arrested Central Committee

CPI (Maoist)
member, revealed in 2009, that most of the resources
Budget Allocations
Military
are spent on running and maintaining military units
10% Education
Mass
10% Organisations like PGLA (CRPF document). The distribution of
Misc
20% 60% allocations in the adjoining chart highlights how a

considerable proportion of the Maoist resources are

used by its military component. Certain documents

recovered from Maoists in 2011 provide clues about the scale and method of the collection. The

total annual collection made by the party based on this document was less than 300 Crores

(45Million USD) in 2011. There are however intelligence reports that suggest that collections

through extortions from industrial houses and mining alone account for Rs 500 Crores

( 80million USD) every year(CRPF Document). A glimpse of the pattern of Maoist funding is

provided by the data on the targeting of economic infrastructure. There has been a significant

decline in such targeting with the figures dropping to 293 in 2011 to 127 in 2015 34. It is believed

that this drop is because of increasing level of ‘understanding’ between Maoists on one side and

industrial houses, contractors, officials on other side.

Evolution of Maoist Strategy and Tactics:

Very early in their evolution, the Indian communist parties recognized the appeal and

applicability of Maoist doctrine to Indian settings. Mao’s ‘Protracted People War’ carried more

33
Tendu collection is a major source of forest income. Maoists extort millions of dollars from tendu contractors.
34
www.mha.nic.in/naxal

12
currency than the Lenin’s urban class revolution. As mentioned earlier, CPI in 1950, laid down

the Maoist principles of strategy in India35. ‘Our revolution, in many respects, differs with the

classical Russian Revolution; but to a great extent similar to that of Chinese Revolution. The

perspective is likely not that of general strike and armed uprising, leading to the liberation of the

rural side; but the dogged resistance and prolonged civil war in the form of agrarian revolution,

culminating in the capture of political power.... Backward communication system, topographic

and terrain conditions are exceptionally suited for prolonged guerrilla battles (Chinese way)

which lead to the establishment of liberation bases.... The path is that of Chinese liberation

struggle under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, the practical, political and theoretical

leader of the mighty colonial and semi-colonial revolution’36.

The present Maoist strategy is based on the doctrinal document, it released in 2004 after the

creation of CPI(Maoist). The document named, Strategy & Tactics of The Indian Revolution in

emphasized on the efforts build a ‘people’s army’, a critical component of Mao’s “protracted

people’s war”37. The protracted war, as per the document, would pass through three stages: first

the ‘guerrilla warfare’, followed by ‘mobile warfare’, where the guiding principle would be

“fight when you can win, retreat when you can’t” and the third stage of ‘positional warfare or the

conventional war’, which would be waged face to face with the enemy.

The document underlined that a ‘people’s war’ was inconceivable without a ‘people’s army’.

There fore the effort of the party, says Prakash Singh, to build and develop a ‘people’s army’

was to be of vital significance in the revolutionary movement 38. The armed component, People’s

Guerrilla Liberation Army(PGLA) was to remain subservient to the Centre Committee(CC), the

highest decision making body of CPI(Maoist). The PGLA would consist of three types of forces,
35
Ibid 8
36
Asish Kumar. The Spring Thunder and After: A Survey of the Maoist and Ultra-leftist Movements in India, 1962-75. Columbia.
37
www.satp.org-strategy & tactics of the indian revolution. n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.
38
Ibid 15

13
1. Main Forces: These include Companies, Platoons, Special Action Teams which could move any

where to participate in the war under instructions of CC. Main Forces were supposed to be

better armed and include members with political consciousness and superior fighting skills.

2. Secondary Forces: These are local guerrilla squads, special guerrilla squads, division level

Action Teams who will operate in a specific area and target the enemy forces. The aim was to

harass and tire the enemy forces by constant attrition.

3. Base Forces: These are people’s militia which will include tribal militias, which should have the

capacity to harass the enemy forces continuously.

On the operational front insurgents have been quick to learn from their mistakes. During the last

decade, the insurgents in order to cripple the state machinery, disrupted the train services by

blowing up the tracks or by high jacking trains. Having realized that disruption of such essential

services was turning public opinion against them, the insurgents in the last 5 years have

generally refrained from it. The attacks on railways have dropped from 31 in 2011 to just 1 in

first three months of 201639.

Changing Maoist Tactics. While guerrilla warfare in form of ambushes and other shoot and

scoot methods still dominate their warfare tactics, insurgents over the years have gained

considerable operational momentum across various bands of tactical spectrum. The Maoist have

achieved high level of precision and sophistication in the use of IEDs and landmines. IEDs have

accounted for a large chunk of security force casualty. More than 50 percent of the security

force casualty is due to IEDs and landmine blasts. In a recent incident last month, 7 CRPF

personnel lost their lives in a landmine blast in Chhattisgarh 40. The Indian official machinery has

acknowledged the improvement in Maoist weaponry and operational tactics41. These improved

39
www.mha.nic.in/naxals
40
7 CRPF Men Killed in Landmine Blast by Naxals." Http://www.newsnation.in. N.p., 30 Mar. 2016
41
ibid www.mha.nic.in

14
tactics have enabled Maoists to inflicted heavy costs on the government. They have achieved

some spectacular successes against security forces using an array of tactics. Maoists have

indulged in deliberate attacks in the form of a) Camp Attacks b) Entrapment Tactics b) Mobile

Warfare.

Camp Attacks: In the last one decade Maoists have launched audacious attacks on the security

force(SF) camps. Most of the attacks have been on the camps which the SFs have established

deep in the Maoist territory. Though Maoists have not shied away from attacking jails and

district police lines, camps in remote areas have bore the brunt of such attacks. SF camps in

Chattisgarh and Jharkhand have witnessed a number of such attacks.

Entrapment Tactics: Maoist have been using this novel tactic with fair amount of success. A

small incident is used to lure the security forces to rush to an incident side. Any lapse in

following the SOPs(Standard Operating Procedures) is exploited by Maoist to target the forces.

In 2000, a party of 30 police personnel including an Additional Superintendent of Police were

killed in Chhattisgarh when they were rushing to a site of an alleged Maoist incident. They

travelled without clearance from the ‘road opening parties’ and all the members of the party were

killed in a landmine blast. In May 2011, a deliberate intelligence was provided to the troops to

lure them into a 4 km-stretch laid with a series of mines. Along with the simultaneous blasting of

explosives, a multiple formation conventional ambush was also undertaken on the troops.

Mobile Warfare: Maoist in recent passed have exhibited their ability to engage in mobile

warfare. This also has been done to convey their gradual transition towards the second phase of

their struggle, the ‘mobile warfare’. Multiple PGLA companies have attempted to undertake

mobile warfare tactics on SFs formations. While a paramilitary contingent was encircled in

Kanker in Chhattisgarh in June 2011, another para military formation was similarly attacked the

15
same year. These resolute and bold attacks by the Maoists have showed their ability to engage

the enemy on a neutral battlefield.

Dynamics of The Maoist Insurgency:

Insurgency cannot be reduced to guerrilla warfare alone. It has complex socioeconomic and

cultural dynamics. Maoist movements in India have not been monolithic, uniform mass

mobilizations campaigns, these have attracted varied actors who occupy different places in the

insurgency pyramid. I would use three level categorization as laid down by Stathis Kalyvas in

understanding the structural dynamics Maoist insurgency42.

Macro-level, according to Kalyvas is the dominated by elites, ideologues, and grand politics;

through out the history of Indian left wing insurgency, the mantle of leadership has

predominantly been done by upper caste, middle class and well educated people. Thus Ravi

Narayanna Reddy, leader of Telengana rebellion came from a wealthy upper caste landlord

family43.The leader of Naxalbari movement, Charu Majumdar was an upper caste intellectual par

excellence whose books are even today regarded as treatises amongst Maoist cadres. The current

leader of CPI (Maoist) Muppala Lakshmana Roa aka Ganapathy is science graduate belonging to

rich Velama family of Andhra Pradesh. The support from intelligentsia has contributed to these

macro level dynamics44. A number of university professors, journalists, writers and doctors have

either been arrested or accused of being sympathetic to Maoist cause.

Meso-level, is common ground for macro level and micro level actors. It is interface between

leaders and the populations; between the elites and commoners. It is the most critical level which

binds the politicians with the masses.

Micro-level is the base of the pyramid. It is where the small groups and individuals interact.

42
Kalyvas, Stathis N. "The logic of violence in civil war." (2006).
43
Sundarayya, Puccalapalli. Telangana people's struggle and its lessons. Foundation Books, 1972.
44
Succeed, Will They. "Naxalites’ Urban Push." (2010).

16
This is the level where mobilization takes place. This level forms the basic element of the armed

insurgency, the tribal militias. The majority of insurgents’ mass support comes from

predominantly lower castes and tribals. They make up the core fighting strength of the Maoist

insurgency.

Macro and micro level actors are two ends of the spectrum. They have different goals and

objectives and their constituencies are also different. The goal of insurgent leader may be the

overthrow of Government machinery where as a tribal sympathizer at the micro level strives for

delivery of services from a low level government functionary. The interests of the micro and

macro levels coincide at the meso level, where undermining of state power allows both groups to

further their objectives45. Such transaction between macro and micro level actors is one of the

main characteristic of Maoist insurgency. Kalyvas maintains that insurgents provide disparate

groups of supporters with a unified organizational structure, the supporters endow the insurgents

with access to resources needed to sustain the insurgency, such as food, shelter, intelligence, and

recruits46.

INDIA’S COIN DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY: SUCCESSES AND DILEMMAS

India has faced insurgency right from the initial years of its independence. It may be difficult to

pick a year in the last 68 years, when India was not fighting insurgency in some part or some

form. Indian COIN strategies have been dynamically evolving with the context and nature of the

insurgency. These strategies have evoked extreme reactions. The appraisal of Indian COIN

experience varies from being branded as ‘critical failure’ to one that compliments India of “never

having lost an insurgency battle”47. The ‘baiters’ broadly consider ‘India’s one size fits all’

approach key to its failure48. Where as the ‘triumph’ group attributes India’s success to its
45
Ibid 8
46
ibid 42
47
Rajagopalan,“Force and Compromise: India’s COIN Grand Strategy,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30:1 (2007)
48
Praveen Swami, “For a review of counterinsurgency doctrine” 13 April 2010, www.hindu.com

17
resilience in handling the insurgency movements.

India has been blamed for not having a focused COIN strategy against the Maoists. The experts

believe, the fact that Maoist insurgency for a long time, didn’t threaten the Indian urban elite and

was confined to remotest regions of India, explains India’s lackluster approach to this

insurgency49. It is only when the Maoists started to expand into urban centers and began targeting

the political leadership, did India realize the magnitude of this ‘biggest Internal security

challenge’. The efforts in countering Maoist insurgency have given a sense that the initial

vacillation on part of India was responsible for the growth of Maoists from fringe entities to one

directly challenging the state. The problem is still seen as more having socio economic

dimensions than a security threat. Once the fruits of development, it is argued, will trickle down

to the most deprived and marginalized, the raison de etre behind the Maoist struggle will vanish,

thus leaving it rudderless.

COIN Campaigns Against Maoists- Historical Perspective: It is believed that the first wave

of Counter insurgency in Telangana outwardly adopted the classical “double pronged COIN

strategy” of strong police action combined with ‘ameliorative’ development measures to win

hearts and minds of local population50. How ever it is interesting to examine that this rebellion

was not even treated as an insurgency by then government. The available material indicates that

the government at that time came to view this as peasant rebellion, as British Indian history

witnessed many such rebellions 51.Though communist backed movement envisaged a Maoist like

struggle to overthrow the powerful elite , the state response was brutal and followed the path

which a COIN campaign takes. The government forces in Telangana resorted to harsh police

action against the insurgents and their tribal supporters 52. In order to rob insurgents of the local
49
Karl, David J. "Is India Ready for Prime Time?." asia policy 12.1 (2011): 169-178.
50
ibid 10
51
P Singh. The Naxalite movement in India, Rupa ,1995
52
NAI, Ministry of state, file 6(9)-h/51

18
support, the state government tried to forcibly relocate tribals from their forest villages into the

‘state camps’. The idea was to a) minimize the support to insurgents and b) create employment

by giving them work at the new infrastructural projects which the state had started. This forcible

relocation however failed in both its objectives. It is interesting to note that counterinsurgents all

over the world adopt almost similar strategies to contain insurgencies. Decades later French

would resort to such relocation of locals in Algeria to blunt the cross border support for FLN

from Tunisia53. Both the initiatives failed to give any fruitful results. Thousands of tribals died in

Telangana as result of this relocation54. The government also raised tribal militias in the form of

‘home guards’ and Village Defence Committees. These local militias were targeted by the

insurgents and many were killed. On the other hand, members of these militias became a law

unto themselves and killed many suspected insurgents in fake encounters 55. Half a century later

the neighboring Chhattisgarh resorted to creation of such vigilante group in the form of Salwa

Judum which was banned by SC in 2011 on the allegations of human rights excesses against the

tribals. It is interested to note how the COIN efforts, despite absence of a declared doctrine, tend

to follow a course which seems more like pattern. A lot of similarities in strategy and tactics can

be observed when Indian COIN is compared to other COIN models across the world. Colin

Jackson calls it a constraint of ‘limited marbles in a pocket”, those can only be juggled in limited

number of different ways.

The first phase came to end only when CPI leaders decided to participate in the first general

elections after independence in 1951.

Naxalbari COIN- A Kinetic Approach: The Naxalbari movement was crushed by the state

government with effective support from the federal government. The government decided to take

53
Gortzak, Yoav. "Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962."
54
ibid 10
55
NAI, ministry of state file 6(5)-H/51

19
on Naxalites with full force. The government launched a joint operation by the army and the

police, code named Operation Steeplechase, in the bordering districts of West Bengal, Bihar, and

Orissa. The strategy of the security forces was to surround as large an area as possible and seal

the routes of entry and exit. The army formed the outer cordon and the Central Reserve Police

Force(CRPF) the inner ring. The local police, who were generally accompanied by a magistrate,

carried out a thorough search of the area. Suspected Naxalites were arrested while illicit

weapons, ammunition, and explosives were seized. Wherever possible, simultaneous action was

taken in the neighboring areas thus denying Naxalites any chance to sneak out56. The West

Bengal police targeted committed student insurgents either by killing them or arresting them.

The ‘fence sitters’ were promised jobs and encouraged to join politics 57. Some of the insurgents

were absorbed as home guards with a monthly salary. These ‘home guards’ acted as valuable

informers by identifying other insurgents.

By the end of 1972, almost all the top Naxalite leaders including Charu Majumdar and several

others were arrested by the police. Around 8000 naxal members and sympathizers were arrested.

The poverty alleviation schemes of both centre and state governments also veered away sizeable

section of rural population away from the insurgents. Many experts believe that state’s extensive

and violent measures brought an end to Naxalbari movement58. How ever the inability of state to

wipe out the remaining traces resulted in insurgents moving to other states and with them

travelled the idea of Maoism.

Present COIN Strategy – Kinetic Redux ?

The Government of India essentially treats Maoist insurgency as a ‘Law and Order’ problem

56
ibid 15
57
Krishnaji, N.. “Lessons of Naxalbari”. Economic and Political Weekly 15.36 (1980): 1513–1516. Web...
58
Oetken, Jennifer. "Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India." India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned. New York:
Routledge (2009)

20
which falls under the purview of Police and Public order 59. Police and Public order being ‘state

subjects’ in Indian constitution, entails that the primary responsibility of handling Maoist

insurgency rests with the individual states. The centre can extend assistance in the form of

providing financial resources and deploying Central Armed Police Forces, which would

essentially be in aid to state efforts. The government website lays down its approach to Maoist

insurgency as holistic which involves improving security situation, ensuring rights and

entitlements of local communities, improvement in governanace and public perception system 60.

A first look at governments stated strategy seems to be a population centric of ‘winning hearts

and minds’ but the ground situation reveals a different story.

Various state governments have adopted their own individual strategies, choosing their own path

to COIN. The current COIN strategy is state specific with support from the centre in terms of

manpower and resources. The strategy translates into increasing the troops presence in the

critical areas and then saturate these areas with by maximizing troops presence who then

prioritize kinetic action against Maoists61. The security forces particularly in Chhattisgarh at

present are targeting the insurgents without securing the population 62. This has exposed civilian

population to collateral damage and abuse during the COIN ops. Such a scenario has increased

the Maoist legitimacy and given a fillip to their recruitment.

There is a widespread appreciation that current patterns of insecurity dictate that stabilization

must precede development. This is not an unreasonable view, it is obviously difficult to develop

territory you do not control and Maoists recognize that development can erode their control.

Maoists have targeted 1241 economic targets between 2011 and 2015 including roads, power

59
www.mha.nic.in/naxal
60
ibid
61
ibid 58
62
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/chhattisgarh-bastar-amnesty-international-india-human

21
plants, telephone towers, food storage63 etc. to keep the the population insulated from the relief

and developmental efforts. The government, in 2009, launched a massive stabilization cum

dominance drive by deploying more than 70,000 Central Reserve Police Forces(CRPF) across

Maoist zones in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa. This deployment popularly known

as “ Operation Green Hunt”, a term coined by the media, was a step towards territorial

stabilization which was to be achieved by dominating the area 64. The CRPF and state forces

operate jointly forming concentric circles of responsibility. Once the area is dominated for a

considerable period of time, it is believed, would lead to stability in security situation and

provide opportunity for implementing developmental schemes. These ‘Clear Hold and Develop’

efforts are continuing with government pouring in more forces.

COIN Sans Special Forces: The CRPF has a long but not very successful record of fighting

insurgencies. It has been at the forefront of Maoist COIN operations. It is not a specialized COIN

force and as result has suffered the maximum number of casualties in the past decade. In

December 2010, Maoist ambushed a CRPF patrol in Dantewada killing 76 soldiers of the 62 nd

CRPF Battalion, the single largest loss of life in Indian COIN history 65. The drawbacks of

deploying a non specialized COIN force in the core area of Maoist operations were evident. The

attack also exposed chronic deficiencies in India’s main central forces employed to fight Maoist

insurgency.

Amongst the states fighting Maoist insurgency only Andhra Pradesh has a dedicated specialized

COIN force, ‘Greyhounds’, created in 1989. Other states have been fighting insurgency with

their regular police forces. It is only in the recent years that Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa

have raised their Special Forces66. It would take these forces some more years to reach the level
63
www.mha.nic.in/naxal
64
D’Souza, Radha. "Sandwich Theory and Operation Green Hunt." Monthly Review (2009).
65
"Troopers or Sitting Ducks? 75 Killed in Maoist Ambush www.dna.com N.p., 06 Apr. 2010.
66
http://mha.nic.in/naxal_new

22
of Greyhounds and much depends on the level of training and resources provided to them. While

Andhra Pradesh has done well in containing its insurgent problem, other states like Jharkhand,

Chhattisgarh and Bihar are struggling to overcome this tide. The escalation of threat and inability

of states to raise properly trained special forces pushed Centre to raise counter insurgency

commando battalions called CoBRA (Commando Battalions for Resolute Actions). Ten

Battalions of CoBRA were raised in 2009 and they have been given training in counter guerrilla

tactics and Jungle Warfare at Army’s elite Jungle Warfare school in Mizoram in India 67. The

Cobra battalions were deployed during Operation Green hunt. CoBRA battalions have shown

better performance than other forces in taking on Maoists but their long term efficacy would be

assessed in coming times.

Various states have also tried to improvise on the past or existing COIN tools available to

counter the insurgents. Chhattisgarh made one such improvisation in 2005, when it decided to

raise an auxiliary tribal militia, Salwa Judum, to counter Maoists both militarily and

ideologically.

Salwa Judum: Raising a local auxiliary force has been a fairly common COIN strategy. The

outsourcing of security responsibilities to auxiliary non-state militias that operate with little

oversight, training or accountability, has been resorted to by counterinsurgents all over the world

with mixed results. The CIDG in Vietnam, the Malaya Auxillaries, the firqats in Yemen, the

Ikhwanis in Kashmir have been part of such COIN strategies. Again a limited marbles syndrome.

Salwa Judum “Purification Hunt” in Chhattisgarh was such an effort by the state to push war

against Maoists into their own backyards. It was created in 2005 by organizing tribal youth and

surrendered Maoists into well equipped vigilante auxiliary tribal militia, who would take on

67
ibid

23
Maoists on their own turf68. The creation of Salwa Judum was a step towards the efforts of the

state to localize their own forces. It was envisaged that a force comprising of sons of the soil

would a) augment the human intelligence networks and b) provide alternative employment

opportunities to the tribal youth. Salwa Judum camps were set up to provide refuge to tribal

people displaced by Maoists and also act as safe zones. The idea was that Salwa Judum would

act as a force multiplier and would help security forces in bridging the cultural gap between

forces and the tribals. The members of Salwa Judum provided valuable information to forces.

They were at times able to infiltrate Maoist ranks. As a result, government forces were able to

inflict heavy losses on Maoists. How ever all this came at a heavy price. The were allegations of

torture, extortion and rape against Judum members. There emerged ‘warlords’ within the judum

who would vie for control of refugee camps and also the area surrounding the camps 69. They at

time tried to operate independently of the security forces. There were also incidents when Judum

members used violence to settle their individual tribal animosities. These local militias if not

supervised closely tend to operate within the zones of their own self interest and at times cross

purposes with counter insurgent force. The story seems all too familiar. The tribal militia raised

by British in Yemen, ‘the firqats’ started working independently fighting their own little war.

The allegations of excesses on Afghan Local Police, have made their role controversial 70.Salwa

Judum like CIDG and Malayan tribal militias did act as a ‘force multiplier’ but it came at a

substantial cost. Amidst growing allegations of torture, rape and murder, the Supreme Court of

India banned Salwa Judum in 2011 71. Salwa Judum did create an unprecedented pressure on

Maoists in Chhattisgarh and the latter responded by killing Judum members and their families.

The allegations of excesses how ever robbed Judum of its credibility rendering an effective
68
Miklian, Jason. "The purification hunt: the Salwa Judum counterinsurgency in Chhattisgarh, India. (2009): 441-459.
69
ibid
70
" Human Rights Documents Online, http://primarysources.brillonline.com
71
Person, and Gyanant Singh. "Salwa Judum: SC Outlaws Tribal Anti-Maoist Force." India today.2011

24
COIN instrument redundant.

Indian COIN Dilemma- The Debate Rages: There have been raging debates about the utility of

different COIN models in the Indian scenario. Experts believe that Maoist insurgency posturing

itself as a ‘people’s war”, mandates a more classic COIN build on the notions of competitive

state building to address economic and governance deficiencies 72.It requires a population centric

approach of winning hearts and minds rather then a enemy centric approach of highly kinetic

operations73.

Some feel that India’s counter insurgency strategy is strongly influenced by British campaign

against the Malayan Communist Party74. How ever the strategy of winning ‘Hearts and Minds’

has not been at the core of Indian COIN strategy. Even Gerald Templar called “hearts and

Minds” “that nauseating phrase I think I invented” 75. The Indian efforts at winning hearts and

minds have been put into practice only when the successes were first achieved by kinetic

operations.

Indian COIN efforts have invariably preferred trading “hearts and minds” approach with highly

kinetic enemy centric tactics. Though insurgencies have been contained but these have not been

wiped out completely. One western expert thinks that India has done tremendously well in

managing the problem and not allowing them to get out of the hand 76. In spite of substantial drop

in insurgent violence, the insurgency is not dead in Kashmir and NE. The population in these

areas still remains largely unintegrated, a drawback believed to be inherent with the highly

kinetic enemy centric approach.

72
Lalwani, Sameer. "India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem." CTC Sentinel 4.10 (2011): 5-9.
73
ibid
74
ibid
75
Ajai Sahni, “India’s Maoists and the Dreamscape of ‘Solutions,’” South Asia Terrorism Portal, February 2010 .
76
Staniland, Paul. "Counter-insurgency and Violence Management." The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective.
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. 144-155.

25
Indian security leadership feels that an enemy centric approach is best suited for Maoist

insurgency, where the fear of population seceding from India is remote. They cite the success of

Andhra Pradesh in curbing the Maoist problem with enemy centric drives of kinetic operations.

The success Andhra Pradesh COIN campaign without a declared COIN model has allowed

experts draw their own lessons from it. Government of India also advocates that other states

fighting insurgency adopt the Andhra Model77, without really explaining what this model is?

Deciphering Andhra Success

Amidst the grim Maoist landscape of India, one state seems to have charted a completely

different course for itself and thus has a different story to tell. A story of success and optimism.

The state of Andhra Pradesh(AP) seems to have turned the tide against the Maoists. It is today

hailed as the “only success story’ in the Maoist tragedy. AP which in 90s was the hub of Maoist

violence has seen a dramatic drop in Maoist related incidents. The total number incidents in 2015

dropped to just 35 as against over 500 in 200578. AP was the first state to raise a specialized force

to deal with the Maoists. The credit for the turn around is generally given to the elite

‘Greyhound’ force, trained to live and operate in the jungle as the guerillas do, and fight the

Indian jungle equivalent of a “bush war”79. Greyhound was raised in 1989 as a specialized

counter Maoist force, to conduct small unit guerilla counter offensive. It is said that AP drew

inspiration from the infamous Selous scouts of Rhodesia80. The force underwent rigorous training

and was provided with superior equipment (particularly communications technology). It was able

to rapidly deploy and effectively operate in Maoist terrain. The Greyhounds have been extremely

effective, but they did not operate in isolation. Their success was possible by forging synergetic

relationships with district police and intelligence agencies. The coordinated police strategies
77
www.mha.nic.in/naxal
78
ibid
79
Singh, Prakash. The Naxalite Movement in India. Rupa, 1995
80
ibid 65

26
improved the intelligence sharing between the security agencies by deploying cross trained

regular police units with the Greyhounds. The members of the Greyhounds were drawn from

regular state police by following a strict selection process. They were given 60 percent extra

salary in the form of risk allowance. They were also provided with subsidized housing, family

welfare and other attractive benefits. These additional benefits ensured that Greyhounds attracted

the best talent available. They operated in small units for extended periods in remote forests and

hilly regions. These small units were given training in local customs and they had to learn local

language. This proved to be an asset as these unit members were able to forge bonds with the

tribals and villagers. These units were quite akin to “Tribal Engagement Teams” which Major

Gant experimented with in Afghanistan81.

The Greyhounds model is today treated as success story and other states have followed AP by

raising their own specialized forces. Merely aping creation of a specialized unit may turn out to

be a futile exercise unless the entire institutional environment which contributed to Greyhounds

success is not replicated. The success of the Greyhounds was predicated on the robust

intelligence sharing cycle between three critical units, Greyhounds, district police and Special

Intelligence Bureau(SIB). The raw intelligence collected by district police was further developed

by SIB and once actionable was fed to Greyhounds who would then execute it. After the

execution, the information gathered in the form of seized documents and arrested insurgents, was

passed back to district police and SIB for further exploiting and analyzing it. The arrest of

Maoists was followed by sustained interrogation by SIB and the district police would

simultaneously verify new information collected from the interrogation, on the ground. By this

way the intelligence was reprocessed and again fed to Greyhounds for the next action 82. While

81
Gant, Major Jim. "Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura." Journal Article| June 6.6 (2010): 39am.
82
Sahni, A. 2007. “Andhra Pradesh: The State Advances, the Maoists Retreat.” South Asia Intelligence Review Week
Assessments & Briefings. Vol. 6, No. 10. www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_10.htm

27
General McChrystal, the newly appointed JSOC commander in 2004, was struggling to put in

place the necessary framework for implementation of his Find Fix Finish Exploit and Analyze

(F3EA) strategy, another COIN special force, thousands of miles away, less equipped both

technologically and militarily, was implementing his F3EA strategy with sinister precision and

reaping rich dividends. It seems that Greyhounds were executing General McChrystals plan the

way he wanted, only that the battlefield was Andhra Pradesh not Iraq and the insurgents were

Maoists not Al Qaeda in Iraq. On many occasions Greyhounds acted as a ‘Direct Action” force

by neutralizing top Maoists and conducting raids at Maoists hideouts. These direct actions were

well coordinated actions with operational back up support from the local police and SIB83.

A greater focus on the success of Greyhound (which they truly deserved) has led experts to label

the AP model as an enemy centric kinetic approach. How ever this success was possible only

with a well crafted community development program by the state government. The state

government very early had achieved a fair understanding and appreciation of the Maoist game

plan. It conceived various rural development and empowerment schemes. The focus was not on

big grand projects with long gestation periods but small captive schemes which could deliver in

short duration and thus have an immediate impact. The government between 2004 and2010

implemented various rural developmental schemes like ‘Remote and Internal Areas

Development Projects” (RAID), small irrigation projects and health insurance schemes. These

developmental initiatives undermined the ability of Maoists to recruit and mobilize new

members84. At the same time government engaged with Maoists at political level. The political

engagement was seen by Maoists as a recognition of the political dimension of their movement.

This thaw resulted in a brief ceasefire between Maoists and Government in 2004. The ceasefire

83
Chadha, Vivek. "Left Wing Extremism—Challenges and Approach." for India (2012): 93.
84
Mazumdar, Arijit."Left-Wing Extremism and Counterinsurgency in India: The ‘Andhra Model’." Strategic Analysis (2013)

28
period proved to be a blessing in disguise for the state. It was successfully exploited by the police

and Greyhounds by infiltrating the cadres of Maoists. For the first time in decades Maoists came

out of the jungles. The police and Greyhounds were able to profile Maoists who were earlier

unknown faceless entities with only aliases. Many Maoist cadres were lured towards politics and

some of them joined political parties. The Government had also come up with an elaborate

surrender and rehabilitation package which resulted in surrender of hundreds of Maoists.

The Andhra Government predicated its COIN strategy on the judicious mix of enemy centric and

population centric approaches85.Analysts believe that ceasefire period, though short, played an

important role in turning the tide against the Maoists, when state machinery gathered extensive

information about the Maoists which they later utilized with devastating effects86.

The Greyhound model is viewed as an oasis of success within unsuccessful arid landscape of

Maoist insurgency. Yet some experts are leery of the triumphant claims made by Andhra Pradesh

as well as the potential to model the Greyhound success. These experts see enough reason to

believe that the Greyhounds did not defeat the Maoist insurgents outright but merely displaced

them to neighboring states. This corresponds with data that shows Maoist activity surged in

neighboring Chhattisgarh as it declined in Andhra Pradesh. Second, the gains in Andhra Pradesh

are still new and it is too early to conclude the demise of Maoist activity87.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Individual states facing insurgency had the independence of opting for the COIN strategy best

suited for them. How ever the choices were made less on suitability, more on political

expediency. The mobilization capacities of insurgents created perverse interests among some

85
ibid
86
ibid
87
Gupta, Tilak D. "Maoism in India: Ideology, programme and armed struggle." Economic and Political Weekly (2006)

29
political parties to harness these for electoral benefits. There have been reported incidents where

politician have asked Maoists to issue diktats in their favor88.

Analysts believe that the extensive influence which Maoist exercise over 120 districts across 12

states is a serious blow to the internal legitimacy of Indian state. The fact that Maoist legitimacy

is restricted to the most deprived sections of the society does mandate a serious thinking on part

of Indian state to ameliorate the grievances of this extreme end of Indian societal scale. It is their

support, though at times reluctant, which has transformed the current phase of Maoist “People’s

War” as the strongest and most violent in history.

States have recently started to employ serious efforts to defeat the insurgency. Every state needs

to raise special forces and provide them rigorous training in ‘counter guerilla’ tactics and jungle

warfare. A Maoist guerrilla can only be countered by a state guerrilla. The operating

environment of these special forces has to demonstrate employment of superior tactics to defeat

the insurgents. States need to synergize their efforts by launching coordinated operations thereby

denying Maoists any space for maneuverability. These efforts need to be supplemented by well

crafted development schemes. It is important to segregate the population from the insurgents

both operationally and ideologically. The hawks and the doves need to be viewed and treated

differently.

The federal/central government should strive to seize strategic initiative by putting in place a

well coordinated ‘hub and spoke’ kind of COIN architecture where each state acts as a critical

spoke. The central government as a hub would try to harmonize the individual state interests with

the overall national interest.

Indian counterinsurgency has to work with a dual objective of defeating the insurgents militarily

88
Naxal Diktat-vote for our candidate. http://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/naxal-diktat-vote-for-our-candidates-in-up-
areas/466518

30
and fully quell the insurgent impulses. These would need institutional overhauls. The conflict

over the distribution of resources can be mended with economic development, but the bigger

challenge would be to create a system where the distribution of power is not controlled by the

traditional elite.

31