JOURNALOF MATHEMATICAL BEHAVIOR, 17 (2), 167-181 ISSN 0364-0213.

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A Comprehensive Theory of
Representation for Mathematics Education
GERARD VERGNAUD

CNRS Paris

Representation is a difficult concept. Behaviorists wanted to get rid of it; many researchers prefer
other terms like “conception” or “reasoning” or even “encoding;” and many cognitive science
resarchers have tried to avoid the problem by reducing thinking to production rules.
There are at least two simple and naive reasons for considering representation as an important
subject for scientific study. The first one is that we all experience representation as a stream of
internal images, gestures and words. The second one is that the words and symbols we use to com-
municate do not refer directly to reality but to represented entities: objects, properties, relation-
ships, processes, actions, and constructs, about which there is no automatic agreement between
two persons. It is the purpose of this paper to analyse this problem, and to try to connect it with an
original analysis of the role of action in representation. The issue is important for mathematics
education and even for the epistemology of mathematics, as mathematical concepts have their first
roots in the action on, and in the representation of, the physical and social world; even though there
may be a great distance today between that pragmatical and empirical source, and the sophisticated
concepts of contemporary mathematics.

1. THEOREMS-IN-ACTION AND CONCEPTS-IN-ACTION

Young children have reliable intuitive knowledge about space, quantities, order relation-
ships, and characteristics. That knowledge is the root of mathematics as a rational enter-
prise. But intuition must be analysed. Moreover, this analysis must be made in
mathematical terms, as there is no way to reduce mathematical knowledge to any other
conceptual framework. For this purpose 1 will use two main concepts: those of “theo-
rem-in-action” and “concept-in-action.”
However, before I do this, I need to say that representation is not a static thing but a
dynamic process, that borrows a lot from the way action is organized. This leads to strong
objections to the metaphor of the triangle (Figure l), on which many authors have com-
mented, in one way or another, since Aristotle. It is too static, and does not offer any insight
for the representation of relationships, while most scientific concepts are relational.
In this paper I present an alternative view, based on both action and language. I
shall analyse later the concept of a “scheme,” as the invariant organization of behavior
for a certain class of situations. I need only say now that theorems-in-action and con-
cepts-in-action are operational invariants and, as such, essential components of schemes.

Direct all correspondence IO: Gerard Vergnaud, CNRS, 3638 rue de la Goutte d’Or 77018 PARIS.

167
168 VERGNAUD

the thing

the representation of the thing the symbol associated with the thing

FIGURE 1. The metaphor of the triangle.

Why do we need such concepts? Because they enable us to characterize the main cog-
nitive differences between two different competences: either between two situations, or
between two ways of dealing with the same situation, especially when those ways are
unequally powerful, general, natural.

Definitions

1. A scheme is the invariant organization of behavior for a certain class of situations.

2. A theorem-in-action is a proposition which is held to be true;
3. A concept in action is an object, a predicate, or a category which is held to be relevant.

Let me illustrate with an example.

A train is running at a constant and high speed. It takes 16 minutes to go from Axis
to Berlof. The distance between Axis and Berlof is 40 km. From Berlof to Cadillac, it
takes 36 minutes. What is the distance between Berlof and Cadillac?

Let us analyse two different students’ protocols, among others that may occur.

Student A: 40 x 2 = 80
80 + 10 = 90

Student B: 40: 16 = 2,5

36 x 2,5 = 90

Student A

36 minutes is decomposed into 2 times 16 minutes plus 4 minutes, and 4 minutes is

considered as l/4 of 16 minutes. Therefore the corresponding distance is 2 times 40 km
plus l/4 of 40 km
The procedure can also be written as a sequence of equivalent expressions:
 A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 169

duration distance
16 40
x2 x2
$
x l/4 32 cl x l/4
\

4 4 cl
;

36 0

f(36) =f(2 x 16 + ; 16) = 2A16) +; f(16) = 2 x 40 + $ 40 = 80 + 10

One can easily see the implicitly held theorem

f(2r + ; 0 = 2f(r) + ; f(r)

which is a particular case of the more general theorem

f( ht + 3L’r)= hf(t) + h’f (t)

wheref(t) refers to “the distance corresponding to duration t.”

Student A uses spontaneously, for simple values, a strong theorem concerning linear
combinations, but without having been taught anything of the kind. There is no better way
to analyse his procedure.

Student B

There are two different ways to analyse student B’s protocol.

1. It may be interpreted as calculation of the constant coefficient between the two vari-
ables: distance and duration

k= f(16)
16

followed by multiplication of the other duration (36 minutes) by k

f(36) = k 36
170 VERGNAUD

duration distance

16 X 40

i-+
cl

The implicit theorem is obviously

f(r) = kt

Second, it may be interpreted as calculation of the distance f (1) corresponding to 1 minute,

by using the scalar operator “16 times less,”

f(l)= f*

followed by multiplication of this value by 36, using the scalar operator “36 times as
much’

f(36) = 36f (1)

These calculations use special cases of the theoremf@t) = hf (t)

duration distance

I16 I16

x 36 x 36

Protocol B does not allow us to decide between the first and second interpretations,
but one can sometimes elicit more explicit explanations from students. These generally
show that both interpretations are possible, and that the second one is more frequent.
These two interpretations are not conceptually equivalent. Isomorphic properties of the
linear function are more naturally used by students than the constant coefficient prop-
erty.
 A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 17 1

There are other ways to solve this problem, among which are the cross product and the
rule of three procedure:

40x36
dx 16=40x 36 ,d=
16

This procedure is very rarely used, and most students consider that there is no meaning
whatsoever in multiplying 40 km by 36 minutes. Are they not right?
Students are usually unable to explain or even express in natural language the theorems
I have mentioned above. And yet there is no other way to give a consistent account of what
they are able to do.
The choice of the data to be operated on, and the sequence of calculations that take
place, rely upon theorems-in-action. They also presuppose the identification of different
kinds of elements: durations, distances, scalar ratios (between magnitudes of the same
kind), constant coefficients (between magnitudes of different kinds, since k is a quo-
tient of dimensions: distance divided by duration), linear combination, proportion and
function. Most of these concepts remain totally implicit, but they may also be explicit,
or become explicit: it is one of the aims of mathematical education to build up explicit
and general concepts and theorems from such local intuitions.

2. WHAT ARE SCHEMES MADE OF?

Let us start from the concept of algorithm, as algorithms are special cases of schemes.

Definition:

An algorithm is an effective rule or an effective set of rules to solve a certain class of prob-
lems. This set of rules makes it possible to find a solution to any problem of the class in a finite
number of steps, if such a solution exists, or to show that there is no solution.

This definition, in terms of rules, hides the fact that the effectiveness is due to the rela-
tionships between the characteristics of the problems (of the class to be addressed) and
those of the set of rules. The effectiveness of algorithms can usually be proved. The proof
relies upon establishing bounds of necessity between the properties of the objects to be
dealt with, and those of the operations performed on these objects. In other words the effec-
tiveness of algorithms relies upon concepts and theorems.
Schemes are not usually algorithms; only some of them are. Most schemes are not effec-
tive but only efficient; one is never sure of reaching the goal, and certainly not able to prove
that one will reach it in a finite number of steps. Still most of our physical and mental activ-
ity is made up of schemes.
Gestures are a good prototype of what schemes are like. There is an invariant organisa-
tion of behavior in many kinds of gestures.
172 VERGNAUD

?? walking, running, sitting down;

?? catching a small object on a table, or on the floor;
?? dancing a specific dance like a waltz or a tango;
?? high jumping.

These perceptive-gestural schemes are not stereotypes: it is not the behavior which is
invariant, but the organization of behavior. In other words, a scheme is a universal that is
efficient for a whole range of situations, and it can generate different sequences of action,
information gathering or control, depending on the specific characteristics of each particu-
lar situation.

There are many perceptive-gestural schemes in mathematics :

?? counting a set of objects;

?? drawing the symmetric image of a plane figure made of straight lines with cross-ruled
paper;
?? drawing the symmetric image of any plane figure with the ruler and the compass only;
?? drawing a graph, or a diagram.

It is obvious that mathematical concepts and theorems are involved in such schemes.
Counting a set of objects involves at least the concept of one-to-one correspondence and
the concept of cardinal number. Using the set square and the compass involves at least the
concept of right angle and the theorem that symmetry conserves lengths.
But the concept of scheme is more general and is relevant to several other kinds of activ-
ities. I will mention examples of only two other important categories, verbal schemes and
social schemes:

?? wording relevant sentences about some matter; telling a story; making a political
speech;
?? speaking a foreign language fluently with some specific errors and some specific
accent;
?? dialoguing with a certain category of persons in certain situations;
?? cooperating and managing conflict;
?? seducing the teacher or any other partner.

These categories of schemes are important in education, even in mathematics education,

as students usually enter a mathematical situation in the classroom with the whole reper-
tory of schemes they have developed before, and they may also develop new schemes on
the spot or improve their former ones in many other domains beside mathematics. For
instance, when three students work together on a problem involving proportionality, they
may develop their social and verbal schemes as much as their mathematical ones.
The concept of scheme is the most important concept for cognitive psychology if psy-
chology is at all interested in theorizing about action and activity.
Most of our cognitive activity is made up of schemes. Thinking is a gesture, metaphor-
ically, with the broad meaning of producing a sequence of actions or operations under cer-
tain circumstances; with goals, subgoals, information gathering and processing, control,
 A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 173

pleasure or displeasure. Schemes are functional dynamic totalities. This overall organiza-
tion of behavior is essential. Nevertheless students are often faced with situations for which
they do not have any scheme available. Therefore they have no other way but to call
schemes in the neighborhood, to try to decompose and recombine them, in order to form
new schemes, with or without the help of the teacher or other students.
The concept of scheme is likely to be fruitful, not only for describing familiar behaviors,
but also for describing and understanding problem solving processes.
For this purpose we need to analyse the different components of schemes. Some of them
can be detached from the situations in which they have been developed, in order to be
decomposed and recombined in an original fashion. I can see four different kinds of ingre-
dients in a scheme:

1. goals and anticipations;

2. rules of action, information seeking, and control;
3. operational invariants;
4. possibilities of inference.

Today, it is not too difficult for psychologists and mathematics education researchers to
agree that, in a mathematical activity, there is usually a goal to be reached and some gen-
erating system for actions and operations to take place. One even finds that few researchers
still consider goals to be straightforward, and trial-and-error processes to be predominant
in the behavior-generating process. On the contrary, as we will see in a later section, goals
may have to be negotiated through teacher-student interactions, and a major part of stu-
dents’ behavior, in problem-solving, is generated by hypotheses, analogies, metaphors,
extensions of former knowledge, or reductions. The theoretical consequence is that one
needs to consider the problem of conceptualization as the keystone of cognition. Not many
researchers do this today. Some of them have even developed an approach that tries to
avoid the problem by opposing procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge to each
other, and emptying procedural knowledge of concepts and theorems. I see this attempt as
a schizophrenic view of cognition. We need to go in the opposite direction.
This is the very reason why I have introduced the ideas of concepts-in-action and theo-
rems-in-action.
Concepts-in-action: In every action, we select a very small part of the information avail-
able. Nevertheless we need a wide variety of categories for this selection to take place, if
one takes the word “category” to figure the wide meaning of object, class, predicate, con-
dition, etc. Concepts-in-action are relevant, or not relevant, or more or less relevant, to
identifying and selecting information. But relevance and non-relevance are different from
truth and falsehood: there is no meaning in saying that the concepts of triangle, or number.
or symmetry or scalar operator, or transformation are, in themselves, true or false; and still
these concepts are relevant mathematical concepts to characterizing representation and
action in mathematical tasks.
Theorems-in-action can be true or false. This is a strong property, as it offers the only
possibility of making more concrete the idea of computability and computable representa-
tion. If a theory of representation is to be at all useful, it must contain the idea that repre-
sentation offers possibilities for some inferences to take place. Representation enables us
 174 VERGNAUD

to anticipate future events, and to generate behavior to reach some positive effect or avoid
some negative one.
We have computable representations for gestures and actions on the physical world, for
verbal behavior and for social interaction. These representations may be true or wrong,
vague or precise, explicit or totally implicit; they work in any case as computable substi-
tutes for reality, and therefore are made up of theorems-in-actions: propositions which are
held to be true.
There is a dialectic relationship between concepts-in-action and theorems-in-action, as
concepts are ingredients of theorems, and theorems are properties that give concepts their
contents. But it would be misleading to take the one for the other. An example taken from
additive structures, will help me illustrate this point:

A: Janet had 7 marbles. She wins 5 marbles. How many marbles does she have now?
B: Paul had 12 marbles. He loses 5 marbles. How many marbles does he have now?
C: Hans had 9 marbles. He plays marbles with Ruth. He now has 14 marbles. What has
happened during the game?
D: Ruth has just played marbles with Hans, and has lost 5 marbles. She now has 7
marbles. How many marbles did she have before playing?

There are different concepts-in-action implicitly involved in the understanding of these

situations: cardinal number, gain and loss, increase and decrease, transformation and state,
initial and final state, positive and negative transformation, addition and subtraction.
The relevant concepts are the same for problem D, which is failed by many 7- or
8-year-old students, and for problems A, B and C which are more easily solved. What is it
that makes problem D more difficult? The need to go backwards and find the initial state
by adding the 5 marbles lost to the final state of 7 marbles. This reasoning relies upon a
strong theorem-in-action:

I = T(F) =$ I = T-‘(F)

where I = initial state, F = final state, T = direct transformation, T’ = inverse transformation.

This theorem can also be expressed by the following diagram (Figure 2):

0-5

0
7
F

\_-
--
+5

FIGURE 2. A theorem-in-action to find the initial state.

There is no other mathematical way to express the knowledge needed to find the initial
state, knowing the final state and the direct transformation: add what has been lost, or sub-
tract what has been won. This theorem-in-action is not usually made explicit, and is some-
 A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 175

thing more than the concepts-in-action needed to express it: state, transformation and so
on. The theorem used to solve this type of tasks makes richer the meaning of addition and
subtraction.

3. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLS

IN REPRESENTATION

Knowledge is action and adaptation. Therefore the role of schemes in the development of
knowledge is essential, as adaptation consists mainly in facing new situations, new tasks,
new problems, and new challenges. Nevertheless the status of knowledge is very different
when it is made explicit, rather than being totally submerged in behavior. Explicit knowl-
edge can be communicated to others and discussed, whereas implicit knowledge cannot.
Operational invariants can be transformed into categories and sentences. The invariance
itself is more easily recognised when it is associated with the use of the same words and
symbols. Concepts-in-action and theorems-in-action can progressively become real scien-
tific concepts and theorems.
The predicative expression of knowledge consists of sentences and texts. These texts
involve objects and predicates at several levels, and in different kinds of conditions and cir-
cumstances. Whereas concepts-in-action and theorems-in-action usually have a small
scope of relevance and validity, and are poorly related to one another, explicit concepts and
theorems can be developed over wider domains in strongly integrated systems. This idea
was clearly expressed by Vygotsky (1962) while the concept of scheme was clearly
explained by Piaget (Piaget, 1950, 1980).
Linguistic and symbolic expressions play an important part in mathematics and in math-
ematics education. As a consequence, many researchers consider mathematics to be a lan-
guage. This view is misleading: mathematics is a system of knowledge, not a language.
Mathematical truths are independent of the language in which they are expressed. But the
misinterpretation of the role of language in mathematics compels us to try to make things
clearer.
Mathematical objects may have very different status from a conceptual point of view
and from a linguistic point of view. To discriminate between initial and final states, chil-
dren use the opposition past/present or present/future of verbs, adverbs like “now,” prepo-
sitions like “before,” or “after.” Such words do a very useful job, both at the conceptual and
the communication level, but they have the status only of information organizers. There is
one more step to go for students to enunciate the words “state,” “transformation,” or
“increase,” or to understand and use a diagram such as the one above, in which the initial
state and the final state are considered as objects, related to each other.
Along the lines of this idea, one can easily see the difference between the following four
sentences concerning the concept of symmetry:

1. The cathedral is symmetrical;

2. Triangle A’B’C’ is symmetrical to triangle ABC in relation to line A;
3. Symmetry conserves lengths and angles;
4. Symmetry is an isometry.
176 VERGNAUD

From sentence 1 to sentence 2 the conceptual movement is from a one-place predicate

to a three-place predicate. From sentence 1 or 2 to sentence 3, the move consists in the sub-
stantivation of the concept, that makes symmetry a noun instead of an adjective. Symmetry
is now an object that has its own properties (or an argument, instead of a propositional
function). In sentence 4, the story is continued with the substantivation into the word
“isometty” of the conservation properties of several geometrical transformations. The
predicate is now the inclusion relationship.
Many examples of this movement of conceptualization towards higher level objects and
higher level predicates can easily be found. Some of the most difficult ones for young ado-
lescents concern the concepts of function, mapping, variable, independence, and vector.
When operational invariants are expressed and involved in systems of concepts and
symbols, their cognitive status changes, up to the point that schemes can sometimes
become algorithms. When the relevant properties of the mathematical objects and opera-
tions involved in action are made explicit, it becomes possible to analyse their connections,
and eventually to demonstrate that a certain set of rules, for a certain class of situations, is
effective. While algorihms are schemes, not all schemes are algorithms. Moreover, when
algorithms are used to deal repeatedly with the same situations, they become ordinary
schemes, or habits. And control of the conditions that guarantee the effectiveness of algo-
rithms may then be lost.

4. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ARISTOTELIAN TRIANGLE

The present section is aimed at substituting for this triangle a more comprehensive theory
of representation.
The first noteworthy point is that reference to reality may convey two different ideas:
reference to objects, and reference to situations. We do refer to both objects and situations,
but actions and schemes necessarily refer to situations, whereas the predicative form of
knowledge expressed in texts rather privileges objects and their properties, relationships,
and transformations.

@G+) @G&ZZ~

SITUATIONS SCHEMES
OBJECTS SENTENCES and TEXTS

The connection between knowledge-in-action and knowledge-in-texts can only be

established by the concept of operational invariant: concepts-in-action and theo-
rems-in-action. These form the specific parts of schemes that represent objects, predicates,
conditions and theorems. The other ingredients of schemes (rules of action, goals, and
inference possibilities) have no essential value in articulating practice and theory.
The transformation of operational invariants into words and texts is not straightfor-
ward. First of all, it requires the learning and the practicing of natural language (and
several other semiotic systems). Moreover, these linguistic and semiotic systems are
not aimed at expressing exactly what each individual has in mind when he or she is fac-
ing a situation, selecting information and processing it. There are important gaps
 A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION I77

between what is represented in the individual’s mind and the usual meaning of words.
This partial mapping or even mismapping makes communication a kind of miracle, at
least when individuals produce new ideas. And last but not least, the selection of what
is communicated to others is even more drastic than the selection of relevant informa-
tion in action.
Consequently, one cannot just consider that operational invariants are the same thing as
the signified side of language, or any other semiotic system (such as algebraic notation,
graphs, diagrams, . . .)
These considerations lead to a diagram (Figure 3) which goes far beyond the Aristote-
lian triangle:

signifier signified signifier signified

natural language any semiotic system

Arrow 0: the relationship between situations and schemes is the first source of representation, and therefore
conceptualization.
Arrow 1: the formation of concepts implies the identification of objects, with their properties, relationships,
and transformations. This is the main function of operational invariants, which are essential components
of schemes.
Arrows 3 and 3bis: a language is a system of signifier/signified; a semiotic system also The relationship between
signifier and signified is not usually a one-to one correspondence.
Arrows 2 and 2bis: the relationship between operational invariants and the signified side of a particular linguistic
or semiotic instance is not a one-to one correspondence either.
Arrow 4: natural language is a metalanguage for all semiotic systems. Again there is no one-to-one correspondence.

FIGURE 3. An alternative to the triangle.

A concept is not a mere definition. It refers to a set of situations, involves a set of differ-
ent operational invariants, and its properties can be expressed by different linguistic and
symbolic representations.
This theory is far away from the view that an object can be represented unambig-
uously, and that representations are adequately described by symbols. Whatever the
role of symbols may be in thinking (and it is great!) knowledge is not in essence
symbolic. The recognition of invariants in action and perception, and the progressive
construction of higher level objects and predicates, are more essential aspects of
knowledge.
178 VERGNAUD

5. WHAT KINDS OF HOMOMORPHISMS ARE NECESSARY

FOR A COMPUTABLE REPRESENTATION TO WORK?

Representation is certainly not adequate to reality in all respects, but if it were inade-
quate in all respects, it would be impossible to explain the role of representation in ordi-
nary action, in science, in industry, and in social interaction. Along the same idea
linguistic and semiotic symbols cannot be inadequate to operational invariants in all
respects, if we want to account for the role of language and symbols in mathematical
thinking.
I will now use the concept of homomorphism from reality to representation to show how
representation can be a computable system:

reality representation

homomorphism of unary predicates F(x) * pI(x’)

homomorphism of binary predicates Rz (x,Y> * Rz’W,y’)

homomorphism of three-place predicates R3 (-wz) =a R3’(x’,y’z’)

and so on.

A special case of a three-place predicate is the binary law of combination,

z=xJ_y + z’= x’Ty’

If one symbolizes the representation function byJ

x’=f(x) Y' =f(y) z’=f(z)

one@f(z) =fW TfW

andf(x 1 Y) =fW Tf69

One can therefore see how representation can simulate reality efficiently, whatever
the law of combination I may be and whatever x and y may be (objects, predicates,
transformations), provided they have adequate images in representation.
Forming adequate representations of x and y and combining them with the appro-
priate operation T, is equivalent to combining x and y according to the operation I
and form the representation of x I y. For instance counting two sets and adding their
cardinals is equivalent to taking the union first, and counting it afterwards. Quantities
can therefore be represented by numbers (the additive property of numbers is essen-
tial).
The situation is different for binary predicates. For order and equivalence relation-
ships, for instance, there are other kinds of computations (or valid inferences):
 A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 179

transitivity: A<BandB<C*A<C
antisymmetry: A<B=(A>B)
symmetry: A equivalent B j B equivalent to A
mixed combination: A c B and B = C + A < C

For unary predicates, the main role of representation is the possibility of categorizing
objects (of any kind) into classes, and operating on these classes in several ways.
Not only is the concept of homomorphism important in understanding how an adequate
or partially adequate representation can give us the ability to compute real effects, but it
also enables us to understand how symbolic systems help us reason and compute. The first
example is the Arabic and modem positional notation of numbers: the writing of the sum
of thirty seven and eighty six can be obtained by applying the addition algorithm to the
writing of thirty seven and to the writing of eighty six, as follows:

numbers positional notation

thirty seven

eighty six
/(
sum addition algorithm

I 0 cl

Another example is the two-entry table to represent the dual proportionality of some
magnitude (or quantity) to two other independent magnitudes (or quantities).

persons

X5
1 5 10 ) 50

The consumption is proportional to the number of persons when the number of days is
held constant (parallel lines). The consumption is proportional to the number of days when
the number of persons is held constant (parallel columns). If one knows the consumption
of 10 persons during 1 day, one can easily understand that it is 4 times more for 4 days and
7 times more for a week (column 10); also that it is 5 times more for 50 persons (line 4 and
 180 VERGNAUD

line 7); also that the consumption of 50 persons over 11 days is the sum of the consumption
over 4 days and 7 days.
The properties of the plane (same direction, orthogonal directions, parallel lines, parallel
columns) together with the symbols used for magnitudes and operators, provide a symbolic
system which is homomorphic to the conceptual ingredients of double proportionality. This
system is really helpful for students who do not understand well. Many other examples could
be mentioned that involve graphs, diagrams, tables and algebras.
The concept of homomorphism also helps us understand the economy offered by higher level
mathematical concepts and procedures when they are introduced and appropriated by students:

?? It is equivalent to multiply
is faster.
?? It is equivalent to take log
to this sum, or to multiply
digits, and logarithms are
362 by 82, or to add 82 repeatedly 362 times; and the former
x and log y and add them, and find the number corresponding
x by y. The economy is important when x and y have many
even more important for powers and roots.

In summary the concept of homomorphism is indispensible to an understanding of how

representation can be efficient, how semiotic systems can be helpful, and how more sophis-
ticated concepts can provide us with better tools for thinking.

6. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE TEACHER’S ROLE?

Teachers are mediators. Their part consists mainly in helping students develop their reper-
tory of schemes and representations. By developing their schemes, students become able to
face more and more complex situations (usually tasks and problems). New schemes cannot
be developed without new operational invariants (concepts-and-theorems-in-action), ade-
quate for wider and better controlled scopes of validity. Language and symbols are impor-
tant. Teachers use words and sentences to explain, ask questions, select information, and
propose goals, expectations, rules and plans.
Nevertheless, one must never forget that the most important mediation act of the teacher
is to provide students with fruitful situations. Furthermore mediation occurs with and without
spoken language: there is a lot of information for students in the teacher’s facial expressions
and gestures.
The following diagram (Figure 4) gives us an idea of the variety of mediation acts that
can be performed by teachers.

SITUATION SCHEME

rules of action

FIGURE 4. Different kinds of mediation acts.

 A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION I8 1

One can observe most of these mediation acts in the classroom. For instance teachers
may have to clarify the goal to be reached, or provide a model for action, or help students
to choose the relevant information and reason with it.
The choice of situations, in a particular order, with particular staging and explanation, is
an essential expertise of teachers. Their most difficult task is to provide opportunities for
children to develop their potential schemes in the zone of proximal development, as
Vygotsky noted, sixty years ago. The long-term process of conceptualization is not specific
to mathematics but concerns all domains of knowledge. The managing of this long-term
process is especially difficult in mathematics, as it implies a large variety of situations, pro-
cedures and symbols.
Neither Piaget nor Vygotsky realised how much cognitive development depends on sit-
uations and on the specific conceptualizations that are required to deal with them. The the-
ory of stages is not by itself useful to teachers, because it does not offer them any concrete
guidelines for teaching. This is the main reason why I have developed the theory of con-
ceptual fields on the basis of both Piaget and Vygotsky’s legacies.

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