Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Obligation is something (such as a formal contract, a promise, or the demands of conscience or custom)
that obligates one to a course of action
Sources of obligation
Law is a system of rules created and enforced by the government to regulate social conduct.
Contractsis a legally binding agreement that recognizes and governs the rights and duties of the parties
to the agreement.
Quasi Delicts is a French legal term used in some civil law jurisdictions, encompassing the common law
concept of negligence as the breach of a non-willful extra-contractual obligation to third parties.
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code
or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes
them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. (1090)
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith. (1091a)
Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title
XVII, of this Book. (n)
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to
the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. (1092a)
Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
XVII of this Book, and by special laws. (1093a)
Passive subject is the person who is bound to the fulfillment of the obligation.
Active subject is the person who is entitled to demand the fulfillment of obligation.
Concept of obligation
FACTS
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo Lauron and
Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called to render medical
assistance to the defendant's daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth. After the consultation of Dr.
Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr.
Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and also removed the afterbirth. The
operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed the defendants
the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which defendants refused to pay. In answer to the
complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a special defense, that
their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived
with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and
that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was
accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved
of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE
RULING
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in
special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force
between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090
and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every
obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound
to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness
should be in need of medical assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from
the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable
for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the face of the
above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff
for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter- in-law of the defendants during her
childbirth, was the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants
herein.
FACTS
- Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., operated a movie house in Laoag and plaintiff DOMINGO DE LA
CRUZ, hired as a special guard whose duties were to guard the main entrance of the cine, to maintain
peace and order and to report the commission of disorders within the premises.
- One Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the
refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked
him with a bolo. De la Cruz defended himself as best he could until he was cornered, at which moment
to save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter's death.
- De la Cruz was charged with homicide, after a re-investigation conducted by the Provincial Fiscal the
latter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the court in January 1943. On July 8,
1947, De la Cruz was again accused of the same crime of homicide, of the same Court.
- After trial, he was finally acquitted of the charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases De la Cruz
employed a lawyer to defend him. He demanded from his former employer reimbursement of his
expenses but was refused. He filed the present action against the movie corporation and the three
members of its board of directors, to recover amounts he had paid his lawyers and also moral damages
said to have been suffered, a total of P15,000.
- Court of First Instance after rejecting the theory of the plaintiff that he was an agent of the defendants
and that as such agent he was entitled to reimbursement of the expenses incurred by him in connection
with the agency found that plaintiff had no cause of action and dismissed the complaint without costs.
ISSUE
Whether an employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the performance of the task assigned
to him, performs an act which eventually results in his incurring in expenses, caused not directly by his
master or employer or his fellow servants or by reason of his performance of his duty, but rather by a
third party or stranger not in the employ of his employer, may recover said damages against his
employer.
HELD
We agree with the trial court that the relationship between the movie corporation and the plaintiff was
not that of principal and agent because the principle of representation was in no way involved.
-Plaintiff was not employed to represent the defendant corporation in its dealings with third parties. He
was a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as special guard and
staying at the main entrance of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order
within the premises.
- The plaintiff was innocent and blameless. If despite his innocence and despite the absence of any
criminal responsibility on his part he was accused of homicide, then the responsibility for the improper
accusation may be laid at the door of the heirs of the deceased and the State, and so theoretically, they
are the parties that may be held responsible civilly for damages and if this is so, we fail to see how this
responsibility can be transferred to the employer who in no way intervened, much less initiated the
criminal proceedings and whose only connection or relation to the whole affairs was that he employed
plaintiff to perform a specific duty or task, which task or duty was performed lawfully and without
negligence.
FACTS:On April 1987 Vicente HerceJr. rendered the services ofJacinto Tanguilig to construct a windmill
system for himfor P60,000with a one-year guaranty from the date of completion. Pursuant to the
agreement Herce paid a down payment of P30,000and an installment payment of P15,000 leaving a
balance of P15,000.00.
On 14 March 1988, due to the refusal and failure of Herce to pay the balance, Tanguilig filed a complaint
to collect the amount.Herce denied the claim saying that he had already paid this amount to the San
Pedro General Merchandising Inc. (SPGMI) which constructed the deep well to which the windmill
system was to be connected. According to Herce, since the deep well formed part of the system the
payment he tendered to SPGMI should be credited to his account by Tanguilig. Moreover, assuming that
he owed a balance, this should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which caused the
structure to collapse after a strong wind hit their place.
Tanguilig denied that the construction of a deep well was included in the agreement to build the
windmill system. The trial court held that the construction of the deep well was not part of the windmill
project as evidenced clearly by the letter proposals submitted by Tanguilig to Here. It noted that if the
intention of the parties is to include the construction of the deep well in the project, the same should be
stated in the proposals. With respect to the repair of the windmill, the trial court found that "there is no
clear and convincing proof that the windmill system fell down due to the defect of the construction.”
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It ruled that the construction of the deep well was
included in the agreement of the parties because the term "deep well" was mentioned in both proposals
Issue: (1) Whether or not the installation of the deep well was part of the contract and (2) Whether or
not the windmill collapsed soley due to a fortuitous event?
HELD: Nowhere in either proposal is the installation of a deep well mentioned, even remotely.
Court has consistently held that in order for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of
fortuitous event under Art. 1174 of the Civil Code, the event should be the sole and proximate cause of
the loss or destruction of the object of the contract. Tanguilig failed to show that the collapse of the
windmill was due solely to a fortuitous event.
Tanguilig's argument that private Herce was already in default in the payment of his outstanding balance
of P15,000.00 and hence should bear his own loss, is untenable. In reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is
incumbent upon him.
Herce is directed to pay Tanguilig the balance of P15,000 with interest at the legal rate from the date of
the filing of the complaint. In return, Tanguilig is ordered to "reconstruct subject defective windmill
system, in accordance with the one-year guaranty and to complete the same within three (3) months
from the finality of this decision.
Reference
https://www.wattpad.com/32964302-oblicon-reviewers-case-digests-pelayo-vs-lauron
https://www.scribd.com/document/116042655/Dela-Cruz-v-Northern-Theatrical-Digest
https://www.scribd.com/document/248551223/Tanguilig-vs-CA