Professional Documents
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other agents to take similar actions. but is chronically unable to progress to high-
Complementarities often involve investments income status. Often related to low capacity
whose return depends on other investments being for original innovation or for absorption of
made by other agents. advanced technology, and may be
Economic agent compounded by high inequality.
An economic actor—usually a firm, worker, Underdevelopment trap
consumer, or government official— that A poverty trap at the regional or national
chooses actions so as to maximize an level in which underdevelopment tends to
objective; often referred to as “agents.” perpetuate itself over time.
Coordination failure Deep intervention
A situation in which the inability of agents to A government policy that can move the
coordinate their behavior (choices) leads to economy to a preferred equilibrium or even
an outcome (equilibrium) that leaves all to a higher permanent rate of growth, which
agents worse off than in an alternative can then be self-sustaining so that the policy
situation that is also an equilibrium. need no longer be enforced because the better
Big push equilibrium will then prevail without further
A concerted, economy-wide, and typically intervention.
public policy–led effort to initiate or Congestion
accelerate economic development across a The opposite of a complementarity; an action
broad spectrum of new industries and skills. taken by one agent that decreases the
incentives for other agents to take similar
actions.
Technological externality
Where-to-meet dilemma A positive or negative spillover effect on a
A situation in which all parties would be firm’s production function through some
better off cooperating than competing but means other than market exchange.
lack information about how to do so. If Agency costs
cooperation can be achieved, there is no Costs of monitoring managers and other
subsequent incentive to defect or cheat. employees and of designing and
Prisoners’ dilemma implementing schemes to ensure compliance
A situation in which all parties would be or provide incentives to follow the wishes of
better off cooperating than competing, but the employer.
once cooperation has been achieved, each Asymmetric information
party would gain the most by cheating, A situation in which one party to a potential
provided that others stick to cooperative transaction (often a buyer, seller, lender, or
agreements—thus causing any agreement to borrower) has more information than another
unravel. party.
Multiple equilibria Linkages
A condition in which more than one Connections between firms based on sales. A
equilibrium exists. These equilibria backward linkage is one in which a firm buys
sometimes may be ranked, in the sense that a good from another firm to use as an input;
one is preferred over another, but the unaided a forward linkage is one in which a firm sells
market will not move the economy to the to another firm. Such linkages are especially
preferred outcome. significant for industrialization strategy when
Pareto improvement one or more of the industries (product areas)
A situation in which one or more persons may involved have increasing returns to scale that
be made better off without making anyone a larger market takes advantage of
worse off Poverty trap
Pecuniary externality A bad equilibrium for a family, community,
A positive or negative spillover effect on an or nation, involving a vicious circle in which
agent’s costs or revenues. poverty and underdevelopment lead to more
poverty and underdevelopment, often from
one generation to the next.
O-ring production function • Workers performing the same task earn
A production function with strong higher wages in a high-skill firm than in a
complementarities among inputs, based on low-skill firm.
the products (i.e., multiplying) of the input • Because wages increase in q at an
qualities. increasing rate, wages will be more than
Information externality proportionally higher in developed countries
The spillover of information— such as than would be predicted from standard
knowledge of a production process—from measures of skill.
one agent to another, without intermediation • If workers can improve their skill level and
of a market transaction; reflects the public make such investments, and if it is in their
good characteristic of information (and interests to do so, they will consider the level
susceptibility to free riding)—it is neither of human capital investments made by other
fully excludable from other uses, nor nonrival workers as a component of their own decision
(one agent’s use of information does not about how much skill to acquire. Put
prevent others from using it). differently, when those around you have
Growth diagnostics higher average skills, you have a greater
A decision tree framework for identifying a incentive to acquire more skills. This type of
country’s most binding constraints on complementarity should by now be a familiar
economic growth. condition in which multiple equilibria can
Social returns emerge; it parallels issues raised in our
The profitability of an investment in which analysis of the big push model.
both costs and benefits are accounted for • One can get caught in economy-wide, low
from the perspective of the society as a production-quality traps. This will occur
whole. when there are (quite plausibly) O-ring
Implications of the O-Ring Theory effects across firms as well as within firms.
The analysis has several important Because there is an externality at work, there
implications: could thus be a case for an industrial policy
• Firms tend to employ workers with similar to encourage quality upgrading, as some East
skills for their various tasks. Asian countries have undertaken in the past.
This could be relevant for a country trying to
escape the middle-income trap.
• O-ring effects magnify the impact of local Death rate
production bottlenecks because such The number of deaths each year per 1,000
bottlenecks have a multiplicative effect on population.
other production. Total fertility rate (TFR)
• Bottlenecks also reduce the incentive for The number of children that would be born to
workers to invest in skills by lowering the a woman if she were to live to the end of her
expected return to these skills. childbearing years and bear children in
CHAPTER 6: Population Growth and accordance with the prevailing age-specific
Economic Development: Causes, fertility rates.
Consequences, and Controversies Life expectancy at birth
Doubling time The number of years a newborn child would
Period that a given population or other live if subjected to the mortality risks
quantity takes to increase by its present size. prevailing for the population at the time of the
child’s birth.
Rate of population increase
Under-5 mortality rate
The growth rate of a population, calculated as Deaths among children between birth and 5
the natural increase after adjusting for years of age per 1,000 live births.
immigration and emigration. Youth dependency ratio
death rates through a rapid-growth stage with determine on an equal status with their
high birth rates and low death rates to a husbands and for themselves how many
stable, low-growthstage in which both birth children they want and what methods to use
and death rates are low. to achieve their desired family size.
The theory that family formation has costs from location in cities and towns, which take
and benefits that determine the size of the forms of urbanization economies and
Wage subsidy