Case 001: Republic vs Sandiganbayan and Marcos or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham
or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
G.R. No. 152154
Subject: Propriety of Certiorari when Remedy of Appeal is Available; Propriety of Summary Judgment; Marcoses failed to specifically
deny allegations; Negative pregnant; Motion for Summary Judgment allowed at any stage of the litigation;Republic not Guilty of Estopppel
by Laches; Admissions remain binding even if document which contained it is declared defective; Judicial Admission; Admission by
Privies; Non-Joinder of Indispensible Party Does Not Deprive Court of Jurisdiction to Try the Case; Failure to submit authenticated
translations of the Swiss decision not fatal to Republic's cause;
FACTS:
In December 1991, Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Republic Act 1379. The petition sought the declaration of the amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be
more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family. The funds were
previously deposited in Swiss banks under the name of various foreign foundations. Before the case was set for pre-trial, the Marcos
children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo executed a “General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements”
(hereafter “Agreements”), dated December 28, 1993, for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. The Agreement specified
in its whereas clause that the Philippine government had "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990,
that the US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met...”
Subsequently, the Marcos children filed a motion for the approval of said Agreements. While hearings were being conducted on the said
motion, the Republic filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. The Sandiganbayan initially granted
Republic's motion for summary judgment on the ground that “there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.”
However, it later reversed itself and denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated
Swiss decisions and their "authenticated translations" have not been submitted to the court.
HELD:
Propriety of Certiorari when Remedy of Appeal is Available
1. This case was treated as an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan
are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20] But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest,
public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of
appeal.
2. In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely
serve to delay or impede judicious resolution.
Propriety of Summary Judgment
3. The respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motionof petitioner Republic, summary
judgment should take place as a matter of right.
4. Summary judgment is a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court
upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in
turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties
with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them. (See Auman vs. Estenzo)
5. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, to wit: SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
6. Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory of summary
judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions
summary judgment for petitioner.
7. It is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when
there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to
raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by
the
rules must ensue as a matter of law.
Marcoses failed to tender any genuine issue in their answer
8. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
9. The Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the
petition for forfeiture. Their defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago"
or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent
Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues. Since no genuine issue was raised, the
case became ripe for summary judgment
Marcoses failed to specifically deny allegations
10. In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner
required by the rules. As to Mrs Marcos, her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired is unaccompanied by any factual support
which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family
11. It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is “without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint.” The question, however, is
whether the kind of denial in respondents'answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. If an allegation
directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do,
perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. (see Morales vs. Court of Appeals)
12. It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs.
Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their knowledge. How could respondents
therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five
groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and participated in the formation and control of
said foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
13. When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial. An unexplained
denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective
denial. Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or means of
knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. Respondents' ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the averments
contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them
Negative pregnant
14. The denial of respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer was worded as follows: “Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23
insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers
of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.”
15. This particular denial is in the nature of a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise,
a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable
to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
16. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that
"Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and
corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial
facts: (1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and (2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
17. Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million,
not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure: “Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.”
Motion for Summary Judgment allowed at any stage of the litigation
18. Petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for presentation
of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial
conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment.
19. The phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure
means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the
defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go
against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the
expense and loss of time involved in a trial."
20. Petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents' answer was filed or, for that matter, at
any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for
summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.
Republic not Guilty of Estopppel by Laches
21. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert
it. In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing
the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-interest".
22. Records show that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every remedy
available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.
23. In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to
them might result unless the action is barred.
24. But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when
the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public
policy.
Propriety of Forfeiture
25. The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is
manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. (See Sections 2 and 6 of
Republic Act No. 1379)
26. The total accumulated salaries of Mr and Mrs Marcos amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the
corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had
an equivalent value of US$304,372.43. Since the President and his family were constitutionally prohibited from receiving any other
emolument during their tenure, their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for
determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Admissions remain binding even if document which contained it is declared defective
27. The General and Supplemental Agreements were declared by the court to be null and void. Respondent therefore insist that nothing
in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them.
28. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of
criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG's commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to
be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the government's undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases
filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons
relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents' admission with respect to
their ownership of the Swiss funds.
29. The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of
the respondents contained therein. The admissions made in said agreements remain binding on the respondents
30. A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document which is not itself effective for the
purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed
or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable.
Judicial Admission
31. An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by
the adverse party or not.
32. In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is binding
on them.
Admission by Privies and Admission by Co-Parties
33. Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides: “ Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former”
34. The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and the party,
the term "privity of estate" generally denoting a succession in rights. Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the
record is competent. Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are
jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.
Non-Joinder of Indispensible Party Does Not Deprive Court of Jurisdiction to Try the Case
35. Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the
suit. However, failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensable parties
is founded on equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even in
the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party. 36. There are two essential tests of an
indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its
merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party;
this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.
37. The foreign foundations were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in
the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them.
38. As to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct – in
other words, the companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof - there is no need to implead
them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any
other particular wrongdoing on their part
39. Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them was a curable
error. The Rules of Court prohibit the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment
of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Failure to submit
authenticated translations of the Swiss decision not fatal to Republic's cause
40. The presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de rigueur for the
Sandiganbayan to make findings of fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on the
determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Court's.
41. The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong
to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner
Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the
evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.
42. The respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be
considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379
Case 002: Estrada v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738
FACTS:
Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be
filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case,
praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of
Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for
a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA, I involves the exercise of the people
power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject
to judicial review. EDSA, I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to
give up the presidency even at that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to
clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am
very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said “x Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit.” “Ayoko na” are words of resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period.
His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not
say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.
Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE
SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND
EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court.
FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted because he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is
Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The
debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of
the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.
The SC also ruled in in re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the
petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-
to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant because of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
Case 003: Cruz vs COA
G.R. No. 138489
FACTS:
The NHA Resident Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance on October 23, 1997 disallowing the payment to the petitioners, who are the
members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority (NHA), of their representation allowances and per diems for the
period from August 19 199 to August 31, 1996 in the total amount of P276,000.00. Such disallowance was pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA, directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to
cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately
cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b) effect
the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court  En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated
on February 22, 1991. The COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and executory on
August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants
to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor. The petitioners appealed from the Notice of
Disallowance to the COA, claiming that the aforementioned Supreme Court decision applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants and does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant
Secretary. They added that NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions
lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.
On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98-38 denying petitioners' appeal, stressing that the petitioners “were not sitting in
the NHA Board in their own right but as representatives of cabinet members and who are constitutionally prohibited from holding any
other office or employment and receive compensation therefor, during their tenure (Section 13, Article VII, Constitution; Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317).”
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to their representation allowances and per diems as members of the NHA Board of Directors.
RULING:
NO. Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing agencies,
defining its powers and functions, providing funds therefor, and for other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides that the persons mandated
by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, (2)
the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5)
the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of the NHA.  While petitioners are not among those
officers, however, they are alternates of the said officers, whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals.
On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-
officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official’s office. The term ex-officio means
from office, by virtue of office. It refers to an authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or because of office,
and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member
by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary
of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving extra (additional)
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that
petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a
better right than their principals.
We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
National Amnesty Commission vs. Commission on Audit
GR 156982
FACTS:
The National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on 25 March 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through
Proclamation 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their
representatives who were paid honoraria beginning 12 December 1994. However, on 15 October 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia
disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period 12 December 1994 to 27
June 1997, pursuant to Commission on Audit (COA) Memorandum 97-038.
On 1 September 1998, the National Government Audit Office (NGAO) upheld the auditor's order and notices of disallowance were
subsequently issued to (1) Cesar Averilla, Department of National Defense [P 2,500.00]; (2) Ramon Martinez, Department of National
Defense [P73,750.00], (3) Cielito Mindaro, Department of Justice [18,750.00]; (4) Purita Deynata, Department of Justice [P 62,000.00]; (5)
Alberto Bernardo, Department of the Interior And Local Government [P71,250.00]; (6) Stephen Villaflor, Department of the Interior and
Local Government [P26,250.00], and (7) Artemio Aspiras, Department of Justice [P 1,250.00].
Meanwhile, on 28 April 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No.
347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada on 19 October 1999. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that the NAC shall
be composed of 7 members: (a) A Chairperson who shall be appointed by the President; (b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall be
appointed by the President; (c) Three (3) Ex-officio Members: (1) Secretary of Justice, (2) Secretary of National Defense, (3) Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government.
The Administrative Order further provided that the ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said
Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. NAC thus invoked
Administrative Order 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to
the ex officio members' representatives, to no avail.
Hence, on 14 March 2003, the NAC filed the petition for review. Hence, the petition for review sought to annul the two decisions of the
COA dated 26 July 2001 and 30 January 2003, affirming the 21 September 1998 ruling of the NGAO; which upheld Auditor Ernesto C.
Eulalia's order disallowing the payment of honoraria to the representatives of NAC's ex officio members, per COA Memorandum 97-038.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there is legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official
representatives.
2. Whether Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order 2, providing that "The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law."
can be the basis of the representatives' claim for per diem.
HELD:
1. No. In Civil Liberties Union, the Court elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the
government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government
employees against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and
(2) the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office, profession,
business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution. The NAC ex officio members'
representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.
First, the NAC ex officio members' representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative
order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional compensation therefor. Sections 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code of
1987 reiterate the constitutional prohibition against multiple positions in the government and receiving additional or double compensation.
RA 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, also bars the receipt of such additional emolument.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio
members who were themselves also designated as such. Second, the ex officio members' representatives are also covered by the strict
constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his official family. Again, in Civil Liberties Union, the Court held that cabinet
secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in
the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra
compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, the Court upheld COA's disallowance of the payment of honoraria and per
diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better
right than his principal, the ex officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with
equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position
held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.
2. No. First, the administrative order itself acknowledges that payment of allowances to the representatives must be authorized by the law,
that is, the Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. However, the payment of such allowances is not allowed, prohibited even.
Second, the administrative order merely allows the ex officio members to designate their representatives to NAC meetings but not to
decide for them while attending such meetings. Thus, although the administrative order does not preclude the representatives from
attending the NAC meetings, they may do so only as guests or witnesses to the proceedings.
They cannot substitute for the ex officio members for purposes of determining quorum, participating in deliberations and making
decisions. Lastly, the Court disagrees with NAC's position that the representatives are de facto officers and as such are entitled to
allowances, pursuant to the pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because
they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such.
Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given
the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of such allowances.
Case 004: Laurel vs Garcia
G.R. No. 92013
FACTS:
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of
the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development
loans.  The procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector... and those for private parties in projects as the then
National Economic Council shall determine.  Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to
one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities... in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading
"Government Sector”, ... As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy... until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July
22, 1976when the Roppongi building needed major repairs.  Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the
Roppongi... property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the
property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation - which shall construct two (2)... buildings in
Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai.  The consideration of the
construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the... buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2)
buildings in Nampeidai.
The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery.  At the end of the lease period, all... the three
leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government.  No change of ownership or title shall occur.  (See Annex "B"
to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period... and thereafter.  However, the
government has not acted favourably on this proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties.  Instead, on August
11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the... disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and
Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
ISSUES: The petitioner in G. R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1)  Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government? and
(2)  Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
RULING:
Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article
420 of the Civil Code
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above
provision.  He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even by the
State.
The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other
improvements"... he respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by
our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located.  They rely upon the rule of Lex... situs which is used in determining
the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man.  It cannot be alienated.  Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction... of collective needs, and resides in the social
group.  The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and
cannot be the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property.  Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal
declaration on the part... of the government to withdraw it from being such. A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in
1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose.  Even the failure by the government to repair the building in
Roppongi is not... abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government funds.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale
of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector.  The executive order does not... declare that the properties lost
their public character.  It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or
other... disposition.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable
government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail.  The Japanese law -- its coverage... and effects, when
enacted, and exceptions to its provisions -- is not presented to the Court.  It is simply asserted that the Lex loci... rei sitae or Japanese law
should apply without stating what that law provides.  It is assumed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.  There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines.  The
issue is the authority of the respondent... officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State.   And the validity of the procedures
adopted to affect its sale.  This is governed by Philippine law.  The rule of... Lex situs does not apply.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its
sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property.  It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of
Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of... widows and orphans who lost their loved
ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war.  The Tokyo properties are a monument to
the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the... monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes,
we do not expect economic or financial benefits from them.  But who would think of selling these monuments?  Filipino honour and
national dignity dictate that we... keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered.  Even if we
should become paupers, we should not think of selling them.  For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our...
countrymen.
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but
more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos - veterans and civilians alike.  It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which
Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur.
Case 005: Funa vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 184740
FACTS:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006171 dated October 23, 2006.
Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office
of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity
as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation,
which is prescribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants
to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T.
Suazo,Jr. and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent
positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as interpreted and
explained by this Court in Civil Liberties. Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista’s appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA
was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition, citing the rationale in
Achacoso v. Macaraig.
Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution does not enumerate temporariness as one (1) of the exceptions thereto. Since a temporary
designation does not have a maximum duration, it can go on for months or years. Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility
between the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA Administrator.
Finally, petitioner contends that there is a strong possibility in this case that the challenge herein can be rendered moot
through the expediency of simply revoking the temporary appointment/designation.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s appointment as MARINA OIC is valid.
RULING:
No. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio
capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held
inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other
office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials.
Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA,
respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary
functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the
Authority, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an
imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the Marina Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members:
Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary,
Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just a "designation," and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never
really "appointed" as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a person to a specified public office.
 That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this
sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person
named.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held
inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other
office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials.
Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA,
respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary
functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that
respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of
the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman,
and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of
National Défense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry
Secretary.
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just a "designation," and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never
really "appointed" as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or
temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held
inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other
office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when
she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as
required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that
respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of
the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman,
and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of
National Défense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry
Secretary.
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just a "designation," and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never
really "appointed" as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or
temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Case 006: Ocampo vs Medialdea
G.R. No. 225973
FACTS:
During 2016 presidential campaign, Duterte publicly announced he would allow the burial of Marcos in LNMB. After winning the elections,
through Sec. of National Defense Lorenzana, a Memorandum was issued to Chief of Staff of AFP, Gen. Visaya, for the interment of
Marcos, in compliance with the verbal order of the President to implement his election campaign promise. AFP rear Admiral Enriquez
issued directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General to provide services, honors, and other courtesies for the late Former
President Marcos. Dissatisfied with the issuances and directives, various petitioners filed petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
- Saturnino Ocampo, et. al., in their capacity as human rights advocates and human rights violations victims
- Rene Saguisag and his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers
- Edcel Lagman, as member of Congress
- Loretta Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of CHr, as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during martial law
- Heherson Alvarez, former Senator, as concerned citizens and taxpayers
- Zaira Baniaga, as concerned citizens and taxpayers
- Algamar Latiph, former chairperson of regional human rights commission ARMM, on behalf of Moros who are victims during
martial law
- Leila De Lima, as Senator
ISSUES:
PROCEDURAL
1. Whether Pres. Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at LNMB poses a justiciable controversy
NO. The Court agrees with the OSG that Pres. Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political
question that is not a justiciable controversy. It is also under the Constitution and EO 292 (Admin Code of 1987) to allow the interment in
LNMB which is a land of public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes. It is based on his wisdom that
it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. It is outside the ambit of judicial review.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct or personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB. The interment of Marcos would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life
considering that more than 27 years since his death and 30 years after his ouster have already passed. Petitioners failed to demonstrate
a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts
YES. Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. They should seek
reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense and give them the opportunity to
correct themselves, if warranted. If petitioners are still dissatisfied with the Secretary’s decision, they could have elevated it before the
Office of the President which has control and supervision of the DND.
Even though there are exceptions that would warrant a direct resort to the Supreme Court under exceptional cases, the petitioners cannot
brush aside the doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC which are not only trier of
facts but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone.
SUBSTANTIVE
1. Whether the issuance and implementation of the memorandum violates the Constitution, domestic and international law
NO. The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Laws and Constitutional provisions cited by petitioner:
Art. II: Sec. 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27, and 28 – not self-executory
Art. VII: Sec. 17 – Faithful execution clause, it is consistent with President Duterte’s mandate, the burial does not contravene RA 289, RA
10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioner
Art. XIV: Sec. 3(2) – reliance in this provision is misplaced it refers to duty of educ institutions to teach values of nationalism and
patriotism and respect for human rights
Art. XI: Sec. 1 – not self-executory but RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), RA 7080
(Penalizing Plunder), RA 9485 (Anti-red Tape Act) was enacted pursuant to this
Art. XVIII: Sec. 26 – transitory provision and freeze order to recover ill-gotten wealth
RA 289 –authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as a burial place for Presidents, National Heroes, and Patriots for the
perpetuation of the memory and for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn.
Petitioners failed to provide legal and historical bases that LNMB and National Pantheon is one and the same. LNMB is distinct from the
burial place envisioned in R.A. 289. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. Also, to apply the standard that LNMB is reserved
only for the decent and brave or hero, it will put into question all the mortal remains therein. The name of LNMB is a misnomer, interment
of Marcos remain does not confer upon him the status of a hero.
RA 10368 – (compensation for Human rights violations victims during Marcos regime) recognizes the human rights violations committed
and gives them reparation. However, the court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s logic that the reparation includes the prohibition of Marcos’
interment when it is not provided. It is undue to extend the law beyond what it contemplates. Legislators could have easily inserted a
provision prohibiting Marcos internment as reparation, but they did not. The law is silent and should remain to be so. We cannot read into
law what is simply not there. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – these are principles that call for an enactment of legislative measures. The PH is
compliant with its international obligations evident by the various RAs, exec issuances, and even in the Constitution
Our nation’s history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners
admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present
generation of Filipinos.
2. Whether the Sec. of National Defense and AFP rear admiral committed grave abuse of discretion when they issued the
memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of Pres. Duterte to implement his election campaign promise of
Marcos interment in LNMB
3.
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over the petitioners allegation of Duterte’s utang na loob or
bayad utang to the Marcoses. Petitioners should establish such claims but failed to do so. Then again, the court is not a trier of facts.
4. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his cronies, and pronouncement of SC,
nullifies his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB
National Shrines are governed by NHCP, military shrines are not. They are governed by PVAO of DND. LNMB is a military shrine.
Magsaysay issued EO 77 – orders remains of war dead interred at Bataan to be reinterred in McKinley to minimize expenses and
accessibility to widows.
Magsaysay issued Proc. 86 – changing the name to LNMB
Garcia issued Proc. 423, Marcos issued Proc and General Orders, Cory issued EOs too. The point is the PVAO manages military shrines
which is under DND which is under the Office of the President
AFP Regulations G 161-375 – who may be interred
a.) Medal of Valor awardee
b.) Presidents or Commander-in-Chief, AFP
c.) Sec. of National Defense
d.) Chief of Staff, AFP
e.) General/Flag Officers, AFP
f.) Active and retired military personnel
g.) Gov dignitaries, statesman, national artists and off-C, Congress or Secifnal defense
h.) Widows of former presidents
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and C-i-C, legislator, Sec. of National Defense, veteran, medal of valor
awardee.
Marcos does not have any disqualification. He was not convicted of moral turpitude nor dishonorably discharged.
Marcos rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
THOSE WHO Are NOT QUALIFIED:
a.) Personnel who are dishonorably discharged
b.) Convicted of final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude
Moral Turpitude – conduct that is contrary to community standards of justice, honesty, or good morals.
5. Whether the Marcos family waived the burial of remains of Marcos in LNMB when they entered into agreement with Gov. of PH
as to the condition and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the PH.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution nor its
exercise be limited by legislature. As the incumbent President, Duterte is not bound by the 1992 Agreement between Ramos and the
Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Ilocos Norte, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered
into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most
effective in carrying out his mandate.
In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was grave abuse of discretion which would justify the Court to
interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. The President through respondents
acted within the bounds of law and jurisprudence. The Court must uphold what is legal and just and that is not to deny Marcos of his
rightful place in LNMB
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily, the Status Quo Ante Order is hereby LIFTED.
Case 007: Banda vs Ermita
G.R. No. 166620
FACTS:
The petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office.
They challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo which amended Sec. 6 of
Executive Order No. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies
and instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO contending that it is beyond the
executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO No. 285 issued by former Pres. Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative
powers and that EO No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petition is indeed qualified as a class suit.
2. Whether or not Pres. Arroyo can amend or repeal EO No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive order.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that an action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the
right to intervene to protect his individual interest. From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive Order and
who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were
about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to
represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing
the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the
desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people "close to the
seat of power." Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a
sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show
that of the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in
the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the
present case.
As to the merits of the case, it is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive
offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been
an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the
Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President (a) to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one
unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive
Branch, and vice versa.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another
agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of
government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now
compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which remains the
exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine. At
most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.
Pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive
Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and
broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in
general appropriations laws.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover
the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision
of Section 62 which evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in
the department or agency concerned.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was re-enacted in 2004 (the year of the issuance of
Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department
or agency in the Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act recognize the power of the President to reorganize even executive
offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments
in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the NPO’s appropriations to its own income under Executive Order No. 378, the same
is statutorily authorized by the above provisions.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under
the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act
well within the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual
assessment that this Court could only but accept.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of
tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever
"abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or
where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No. 378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
Case 008: Sarmiento vs Mison
156 SCRA 549
FACTS:
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and
professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to
the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the
confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the
salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD:
No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission
on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)
groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third,
and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to
the first group hence, he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.
Case 009: Lansang vs Garcia
42 SCRA 448
FACTS:
Two (2) hand grenades were thrown at a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, during the presentation of Liberal Party of the
Philippines’ candidates for the upcoming general elections. The incident caused the death of eight (8) people and the injury of some
others, including practically all said candidates.
Subsequently, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889, which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion as a
result of the incident. Todisco Lansang and Bayani Alcala were some of the persons “invited” by agents of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) to go to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation.
They were detained.
Petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed by Lansang and others who, having been arrested without a warrant and were detained
upon the authority of said proclamation. They assailed its validity, as well as that of their detention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has authority to investigate the constitutionality of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that YES, it has authority. Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks
and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is
merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
Considering that the President was in possession of data regarding the activities of the New People’s Army and the Communist Party —
except those related to events that happened after August 21, 1971 — when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not
prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and
national security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
Case 010: Torres vs Gonzales
G.R. No. 152 SCRA 272
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
FACTS:
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of Estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not violate
any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of Estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali
Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before
the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the
Estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not
subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be
either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
3.  Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been
accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
--
A CONDITION IN THE GRANT OF PARDON THAT THE PARDONEE SHALL NOT VIOLATE ANY OTHER LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE
CONVICTION BEFORE THE PARDON MAY BE WITHDRAWN. It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the
prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather
the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal
with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner
herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must
be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions
of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prison correctional,
minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions
of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Case 011: Abbas vs SET
166 SCRA 651

Subject: This is a petition to nullify the resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal denying a petition for mass disqualification of 22
senators. The Senate Electoral Tribunal is composed of 3 justices and 6 senators. House rules state that the minimum to have a quorum
would be to have at least 3 senators and 1 Justice. All the senators who are members of the tribunal have interest in the case of
disqualification given that they are respondents. The issue is then is if the 3 justices alone, being the only remaining members of the SET,
did not commit grave abuse of discretion denying the petition. The court holds that the SET can render judgement given the unusual
circumstances. Petition Dismissed.

FACTS:
1. This is a petition to nullify the resolution of the SET denying the Motion for Disqualification/ Inhibition against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections.
2. The Petitioners filed with the SET a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senator-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of the case on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Senators Saguisag and Paterno also filed for
disqualification of Senator-Members.
3. Senator Enrile voluntary inhibited himself from performing and the 5 senators were disqualified to be part of the tribunal leaving only the
3 Justices to be part of the Tribunal.
4. Petitioners argue that the SET cannot make a judgement because there are no senator-members.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the SET can render judgement given a lack of Senator-members?

RULING:
Art VI Sec 17 is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators’)
peers in that Chamber are represented The Constitutional provision clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of
a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court. In this situation where senators cannot sit in the tribunal due to the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body
can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. The overriding
consideration is that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In
the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners.
The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Related Provisions: Art VI Sec. 17 1987 Constitution. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24)— requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature—is a
proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three
(3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. The respondent Tribunal was at the time
composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).
Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada (Replaced by Juan Ponce Enrile) ,
Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.