Week 2: Objectives

1. To enumerate the two systems of registration under PD 1529;

2. To identify the laws governing land registration in the Philippines;
3. To explain the nature of land registration as a proceeding in rem;
4. To identify who are qualified to apply for ordinary land registration under Section 14, PD 1529;
5. To enumerate the different requisites under each of the grounds in Section 14, PD 1429. (MEMORIZE SECTION 14)
 
Mandatory Reading (for Recitations)
1. Chapter 3, Agcaoili, 2018 Ed.
2. Section 14, PD 1529 (MEMORIZE)

 CHAPTER III
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

I
ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

A. APPLICATIONS

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however,
that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee
a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

Case List (for Digesting and Recitations):

1. Republic v. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, G.R. No. 55289, 29 June 1982, 11 SCRA 875

G.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole,
represented by ERAÑO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister, respondents-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

Like L-49623, Manila Electric Company vs. Judge Castro-Bartolome, this case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area".

Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by
the Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church (Exh. D).

The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as
alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said
land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. N).

On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an
application for the registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years. It invoked
section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, which provides:

Chapter VIII.—Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under the Land Register Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter." (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Direct/r of Lands, opposed the application on the grounds that applicant, as a private corporation, is
disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public domain, that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation and that the
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945.

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 (Exh. E), in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a
corporation sole, represented by Executive Minister Eraño G. Manalo, with office at the corner of Central and Don Mariano Marcos Avenues, Quezon City,
From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal should be sustained.

As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable
lands of the public domain, like the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said church is not
entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of
English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds
vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).

The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in
Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of land possessed by a
Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to
be registered in this case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that
the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest. "

In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section 48(b)
of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo"and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the
true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of the Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Plana, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623.

DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:

Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-
established doctrine that lands of the public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the State to the occupant is
presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the
prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares." 2

I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an
incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect
title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such judicial
title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to
another form of disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in which
case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the
option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-
applicant by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except
possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents.

It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title
that some statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be public land. What
these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of
Lands, under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act
has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong
implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for
confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the
evidence.

The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We
consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that "save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. " As previously stated, by express provision of the Constitution, no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited
section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the
New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land. Although it may further be
observed that supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in
question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not. If its possession is not
from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more
reason, it may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and
supported by applicable authorities. I as impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of  Herico vs.
Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been
stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice
Teehankee's position a bit.

FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting:

It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, 1 where I had a brief concurrence and dissent, I am constrained to dissent in the
ably-written opinion of Justice Aquino. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before us be viewed
solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a corporation sole, then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the
land be considered public, its registration would have to be denied. For me, that is not the decisive consideration. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on
religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, [being] forever ... allowed."  3 This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our
hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise
and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the
registration. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is therein located. It is
that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when
two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the
registration. 5 There is for me another obstacle to a partial concurrence. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao to register land
purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration.  6As I view it, therefore, the
decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7 Hence this brief dissent.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting:

Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni
Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for judicial
confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or
exchange from private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications).

This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the
1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallenged
possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22,
1957), the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property."
Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no
applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their
predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.

The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (2) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay,
Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941.
Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the
Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had
been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly
agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable
or disposable portion of the public domain.

The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a
total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in
exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not
included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly
paid thereon.

Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application, holding that under both the provisions of the new
Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the
public land.

On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on
the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the
name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.

Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as
enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands  1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that
the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to
registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be
reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may
thus be stated:

It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June
22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged
occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by
respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and
the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of title?

1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as
first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an
effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property.

(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged
possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period
of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court applied section
45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is
reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application. ")

Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant
from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at
least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was
void and of no effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any
right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that:

... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:

In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is
deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874
(reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer
be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does not apply here because the property involved is
allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain,  we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without
giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."

In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi
doctrine.

In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan,  9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.

If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is
lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.

In Miguel us. Court of Appeals,  10 the Court again held that where possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner,
there is a presumption juris et de jure  that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of
law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon,  48 Phil. 424).

In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar,  11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi  doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding
that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void, and has become absolute and
indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as
provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: ... As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a grant, a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent."

3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par.
(b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and
unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for
registration of the private property duly acquired by it.

4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in- interest
had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world
war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until
they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land
Act a Government grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private
property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires
ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law." The law does I not provide that one acquires
ownership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cariño vs. Insular Government,  13 wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather
obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title."

5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant
Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justification for denying the
Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by
acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of
purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban
under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for
confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land but had become
private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by
acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being
transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring
the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the
certificate of title to them.

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a
technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded
that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 )

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia
application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had
ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee
of its predecessors-in-interest.

8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an
"anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the consumer public, and
of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the
letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and
in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.

9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at
page 1) from the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary
pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice
it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot
overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in several
cases .....the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application
for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. "

It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the
discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idle exercise, if We
consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its
acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New
Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to
the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and
section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to
own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application
and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623.

DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:

Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-
established doctrine that lands of the public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the State to the occupant is
presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the
prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares." 2

I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still
"an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or
imperfect title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure
such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is
limited to another form of disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in
which case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have
the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a
citizen-applicant by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title,
except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents.

It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title
that some statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be public land. What
these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of
Lands, under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act
has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong
implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for
confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the
evidence.

The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We
consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that "save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. " As previously stated, by express provision of the Constitution, no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited
section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the
New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land. Although it may further be
observed that supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in
question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not. If its possession is not
from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more
reason, it may not.

This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and
supported by applicable authorities. I was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of Herico vs.
Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been
stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice
Teehankee's position a bit.

FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting:

It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, 1 where I had a brief concurrence and dissent, I am constrained to dissent in the
ably-written opinion of Justice Aquino. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before us be viewed
solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a corporation sole, then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the
land be considered public, its registration would have to be denied. For me, that is not the decisive consideration. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on
religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, [being] forever ... allowed."  3 This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our
hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise
and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the
registration. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is therein located. It is
that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when
two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the
registration. 5 There is for me another obstacle to a partial concurrence. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao to register land
purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration.  6As I view it, therefore, the
decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7 Hence this brief dissent.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting:

Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni
Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for judicial
confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or
exchange from private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications).

This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the
1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallenged
possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22,
1957), the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property."
Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no
applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their
predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.

The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (2) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay,
Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941.
Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the
Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had
been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly
agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable
or disposable portion of the public domain.

The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a
total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in
exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not
included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly
paid thereon.

Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application, holding that under both the provisions of the new
Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the
public land.

On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on
the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the
name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as
enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands  1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that
the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to
registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be
reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may
thus be stated:

It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June
22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged
occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by
respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and
the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of title?

1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as
first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an
effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property.

(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged
possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period
of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court applied section
45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is
reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application. ")

Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant
from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at
least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was
void and of no effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any
right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that:

... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:

In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is
deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874
(reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer
be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does not apply here because the property involved is
allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain,  we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without
giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."

In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi
doctrine.

In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan,  9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.

If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is
lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.

In Miguel us. Court of Appeals,  10 the Court again held that where possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner,
there is a presumption juris et de jure  that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of
law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon,  48 Phil. 424).

In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar,  11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi  doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding
that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void, and has become absolute and
indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as
provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: ... As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a grant, a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par.
(b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and
unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for
registration of the private property duly acquired by it.

4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in- interest
had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world
war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until
they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land
Act a Government grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private
property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires
ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law." The law does I not provide that one acquires
ownership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cariño vs. Insular Government,  13 wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather
obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title."

5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant
Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justification for denying the
Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by
acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of
purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban
under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for
confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land but had become
private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by
acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being
transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring
the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the
certificate of title to them.

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a
technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded
that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 )

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia
application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had
ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee
of its predecessors-in-interest.

8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an
"anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the consumer public, and
of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the
letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and
in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.

9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at
page 1) from the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary
pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice
it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot
overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in several
cases .....the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application
for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. "

It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the
discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idle exercise, if We
consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its
acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New
Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to
the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and
section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to
own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application
and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application.

2. Albano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144708. August 10, 2001

G.R. No. 144708      August 10, 2001

RAFAEL ALBANO, VENANCIO ALBANO and EDWIN PATRICIO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE assisted by BISHOP JUANITO FERRER, FR. BEN VILANUEVA,
Vintar Parish Priest and AMADOR LEANO, Layman's Vice Chairman, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

WITH A THOUSAND AND ONE INQUIETUDES then besetting the Roman Catholic Church, Monico Albano and Nemesio Albano strayed away from its
flock and joined Bishop Gregorio Aglipay in his newly-founded congregation - the Iglesia Filipina Independiente ("IFI"). To express their piety and devotion
to their new faith, sometime in 1908 the Albanos allowed the IFI to construct a small iglesia within a 1,854-square meter unregistered property in Vintar,
Ilocos Sur, which their family had been occupying for years. In due time, a modest structure of sawali and cogon rose beside the Albanos' ancestral brick
house.

In 1909, Fr. Platon de Villanueva, parish priest of Vintar, pleaded with the Albanos to donate to the congregation the property occupied by the iglesia. The
pleas of Fr. Platon did not fall on deaf ears. On 21 June 1909 Vicente, son of Nemesio Albano, executed an instrument granting the assiduous priest with
its administration. But Fr. Platon wanted more. He pursued the Albanos until the latter eventually transferred ownership in his favor.

Thus on 1 May 1910 Monico Albano and Vicente Albano executed a new document whereby they agreed, in exchange for a parcel of land, to transfer
ownership of the Vintar property in favor of Fr. Platon. They agreed to give him sufficient time after the harvest to look for an arable land which could yield
five (5) "uyones a pagay." It was further agreed that in the event Fr. Platon failed to deliver the parcel of land after the harvest and a new priest was sent
over to manage the Vintar congregation, their agreement would be considered revoked.

Two (2) years later Fr. Platon de Villanueva passed away.

On 7 April 1916 Elena, Eulogia and Benigno Villanueva, sisters and brother of the deceased, as his surviving heirs, executed a document donating the
Vintar property to the IFI. In December 1916 they executed another document bequeathing several properties of their deceased brother in favor of
the Comite de Caballeros quen Damas of the IFI. In return, they asked that services be offered for the soul of their departed brother on the 22nd of July,
November and December of every year.

Sometime in 1957 Fr. Loreto Balbas who took over as parish priest spoke before IFI devotees and inspired them to improve the condition of their chapel.
Before long, through the efforts of the faithful under the leadership of Antonina Albano, Vicente's wife, the chapel was renovated and a convent was
constructed nearby. Antonina capped the iglesia's expansion by donating a new bell.

Thereafter, Antonina appealed to Fr. Balbas that she be allowed to stay in the convent together with one Jovencia Foronda. Inasmuch as Antonina was an
"important member of the church" and a devotee who had spent much for its improvement, she was given lodging within church premises. A few months
thereafter, Antonina and Jovencia put up a small sari-sari store inside the ruins of the old brick house.

A decade later, Venancio Albano, son of Vicente and Antonina, appealed to the IFI to allow his brother Rafael to stay within the old brick house. Upon
consultation with church elders, Bishop Lagasca readily acceded to Venancio's request. Forthwith, Rafael repaired the crumbly brick house and made it
habitable. Years later, his son-in-law, Edwin Patricio, came and occupied the northwestern portion of the lot. Together, they constructed a pig pen within
the premises and extended Rafael's banana plantation which unfortunately destroyed the fence surrounding the property. Alarmed by the situation, the IFI
summoned its elders and decided to write a letter of protest to Venancio Albano, Rafael Albano and Edwin Patricio telling them to desist from interfering
with the structures built by the IFI.
1

In his reply, Venancio requested for a dialogue "reminding the church" that the property belonged to them and was never donated by their predecessors in
favor of their church. Upon hearing such reply, IFI was compelled to file an action for quieting of title against them, asserting that the disputed property
2 

belonged to the IFI by virtue of a donation from Elena, Eulogia and Benigno Villanueva, and that the donors, in turn, inherited the property from Fr. Platon
de Villanueva who acquired the property from the Albanos in exchange for a parcel of land and an undetermined amount of money. Since the time of the
donation, the IFI had been in possession of the property and had the lot declared in its name for taxation purposes. 3

Venancio, Rafael and Edwin denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that their ancestors had been occupying the property since the
1800's. Their great grandfather Rafael built a brick house within the property and it was in this house where his children and his children's children were
4 

born. In 1909, upon the proddings of Fr. Platon de Villanueva, Monico and Nemesio Albano allowed the IFI to establish a small chapel within the property.
They averred that although Monico and Vicente indeed donated the property in favor of the church, the donation was never realized as Fr. Platon failed to
comply with its terms. According to Venancio, Rafael and Edwin, there was no document to support the claim of IFI that Fr. Platon delivered the riceland
that could yield five (5) uyones a pagay in favor of their predecessors as promised. They also declared that a violent earthquake rendered the house unfit
for habitation in 1922 and forced them to transfer to a new residence. Despite such misfortune, Florentino Espejo, Antonina's brother, stayed within the
premises. After Florentino left, Antonina built a convenience store within the property which she herself tended until the outbreak of the Pacific War. After
the war, they occasionally visited the brick house to check on its condition.

In 1955 Rafael decided to settle in Vintar and with the consent of his siblings repaired the dilapidated house and made it his home. Sometime in 1967 the
Supreme Bishop of the IFI conferred with Venancio and pleaded that the property be donated t o the congregation. But Venancio turned down the request,
saying that he was not the sole owner of the property whose consent alone to the donation should be sought.

Meanwhile, Vicente Albano, brother of Rafael and Venancio, had a 487-square meter portion of the property declared in his name for taxation purposes.
Prior thereto however it appeared that none of the Albanos paid taxes on the property except that in 1905 Monico had the entire property declared in his
name for purposes of taxation and paid the corresponding taxes thereon.

After trial on the merits, including an ocular inspection of the premises, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the IFI owner of a portion of the disputed
5 

property "from the south running up to 55 meters to the north, more or less, at a point where the southern wall of the brick wall stands, including the
convent and its immediate yard," and the Albanos "owner of the portion of the property actually occupied by the ruins of the brick house including the
vacant space in front of the house." The court ratiocinated that since Monico and Venancio Albano had failed to revoke their agreement with Fr. Platon de
6 

Villanueva, a presumption arose that the condition embodied in their contract had already been fulfilled. According to the court, such abstention on the part
of the Albanos as well as Antonina's devotion to the church despite the alleged invalidity of the donation was a strong indication that the exchange and sale
referred to in the agreement had really taken place. Furthermore, inasmuch as IFI had been in the possession of the property where the chapel and the
convent stood in the concept of an owner for more than sixty (60) years, it acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription. Insofar as the Albanos were
concerned, the court opined that their proprietary right over the disputed property covered only the area where the brick house stood, measured at roughly
462-square meters, since they had possessed such portion for many years.

Apparently dissatisfied, both the IFI and the Albanos sought recourse in the Court of Appeals through a petition for review on certiorari. But the Court of
Appeals in its Decision of 22 February 2000, affirmed the trial court thus -
 In the case at bar, the inaction of defendants-appellants with regard to the donations from 1910 to 1972 or a span of 63 years will surely constitute
laches. The failure of Fr. Platon Villanueva to deliver the riceland should have been the proper time to revoke said donation. But defendants-
appellants never lift(ed) a finger to enforce their rights. 7

On 8 May 2000 the Albanos filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration praying that their Motion for Reconsideration be
admitted into the records despite its being filed out of time. Atty. Juanito F. Antonio, counsel for petitioners, explained that although a copy of the Decision
8 

was sent to his old address and received by a reliever guard on 3 March 2000, he was not notified thereof. However, according to his collaborating
counsel, Atty. Edwin Patricio, he heard rumors in Vintar that an unfavorable decision had been rendered against them. This prompted Atty. Patricio to
verify the veracity of the information with the Court of Appeals. Upon inquiry with the appellate court, he was informed that a copy of the Decision had
already been sent to his collaborating counsel Atty. Antonio; he nevertheless demanded for and was accordingly furnished by the appellate court with a
copy of the Decision on 26 April 2000. Despite their plea for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied their motion and held that the "failure of the
counsel for the defendants-appellants can never be considered or would constitute excusable negligence considering that [a] lawyer[s] should so arrange
matters such that judicial communications sent by mail will reach him promptly and should he fail to do so, not only he but his clients as well must suffer the
consequences of his negligence. 9

Undaunted, the Albanos moved for a second reconsideration but were once again rebuffed. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court where petitioners pray that their Motion for Reconsideration be admitted into the records and the decision of the trial court awarding a portion of the
property in favor of private respondent IFI be declared a nullity.

Petitioners contend, as a first assignment of error, that the Court of Appeals acted without authority and jurisdiction in dismissing their Motion for
Reconsideration despite its having been filed on time. Petitioners argue that since one of their lawyers was served with a copy of the Decision on 26 April
2000 then their Motion for Reconsideration, which was received by the Court of Appeals on 10 May 2000, was seasonably filed. In support of their position,
petitioners assert that their counsel on record are entitled to separate service of the court's decision. It is further urged by petitioners that assuming Atty.
Antonio had indeed been inattentive to their case then his negligence should not prejudice their "substantial or property rights" nor should it prevent them
from fully exhibiting their cause. 10

Lastly, petitioners reiterate their stand in the Court of Appeals and stressed that the judgment of the trial court awarding a portion of the disputed property
in favor of private respondent IFI should be nullified since private respondent is disqualified from holding lands of the public domain pursuant to Sec. 3, Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners invoke the ruling of the Court in Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo where we held that a religious corporation sole, which
11 

has no nationality, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. In support of their position, petitioners admit that
12 

the disputed property "has not been titled under any law." 13

With regard to their first assignment of error, petitioners are on extremely shaky grounds when they argue that counsel on record are entitled to separate
notices of the court's decision. This argument is obviously inconsistent with Sec. 2, Rule 13, of the Rules of Court which explicitly provides that if a party
has appeared by counsel, "service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them" (underscoring supplied). Clearly, notice to any one of the
several counsel on record is equivalent to notice to all and such notice starts the time running for appeal notwithstanding that the other counsel on record
has not received a copy of the decision.

It appearing in the present case that a copy of the Decision of the appellate court was received by Atty. Juanito F. Antonio on 3 March 2000, then
petitioners had until 18 March 2000 within which to move for reconsideration. As earlier stated, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration only on 10
May 2000 or fifty-three (53) days from the expiration of the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period provided under the Rules of Court. 14

There is also much discussion by petitioners as to the merits of their petition. For one, they argue that as between the State and the IFI, the disputed
property is still public land and the latter, as a corporation sole, is disqualified to own the property in view of the prohibition imposed by the Constitution. Be
that as it may, there is still an obstacle to the view advanced by petitioners which must be recognized. If it is petitioners' opinion that ownership of the
disputed parcel of land is still vested in the State, then it is the State, and the State alone, that is entitled to question the occupation by IFI of the subject
property. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that an opposition against a party's claim over a property must be based on the right of dominion,
whether it be limited or absolute; and if the oppositor claims no right over the property, whatever it may be, then certainly he has no basis to question such
claim.15

WHEREFORE, the petition is. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV 31630 which in turn affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Br. 13, Laoag
City, in its Civil Case No. 6821 "declaring the IFI owner of a portion of the diputed property 'from the south running up to 55 meters to the north, more or
less, at a point where the southern wall of the brick wall stands, including the convent and its immediate yard,' and the Albanos 'owner of the portion of the
property actually occupied by the ruins of the brick house including the vacant space in front of the house,'" is in effect SUSTAINED insofar as the parties
therein are concerned.

SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

3. Republic vs. IAC & ACME, GR No. 73002, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 509

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the
appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles
of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962,
from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
 4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came
into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking
the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already
considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or
within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements,
said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning
this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect,
the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of
the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those
lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48
of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified
to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of
the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still
part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al,   where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case,
1

Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay,
Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since
prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person,
was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it
under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section
48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as
to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect
title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public
lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public'
(Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909   thru Susi in 1925   down to Herico in
2 3

1980,   which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
4

prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes
evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5   attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook
5

the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
 application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands,   Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza,   Manarpac vs.
7 8

Cabanatuan,   Miguel vs. Court of Appeals   and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
9 10

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:  11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.  12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself   that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed
13

to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not
to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their
favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at
the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right
already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition   has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it
14

had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows
private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is
barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment
or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question
had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public
domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director
of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919). <äre||anº•1àw> 
15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of
the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be
binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer
in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines
who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming
that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition
against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of
Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e.
as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after
issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the
same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-
established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in
this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases,   which is herein upheld,
1

"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino   through the 1925 case
2

of Susi   and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico   that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse
3 4

and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription   ]) by a private individual personally and through his
5

predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I
hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. "  6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the
Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words
'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a
certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by
qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the
Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from
time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
(which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting
of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the
deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31,
1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31,
1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged."   Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
8

dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco
v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the
Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability."   Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result,
9

likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. "  10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public
lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of
juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical
persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on
them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed
in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the
transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights
to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
 To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that
there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded
court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the
public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v.
Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may
not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of
extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases
may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general
everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456,
143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner
the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases,   which is herein upheld, 1

"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino   through the 1925 case 2

of Susi   and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico   that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse
3 4

and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription   ]) by a private individual personally and through his
5

predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I
hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. "  6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the
Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words
'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the
<äre||anº•1àw> 

established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior
issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the
Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from
time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
(which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting
of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the
deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31,
1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31,
1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged."   Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
8

dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco
v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the
Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability."   Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result,
9

likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. "  10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public
lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of
juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical
persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on
them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed
in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the
transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights
to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that
 there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded
court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the
public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v.
Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may
not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of
extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases
may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general
everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456,
143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner
the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

4. Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008)

G.R. No. 154953             June 26, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-
635.

The Antecedent Facts

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-
04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007
hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the
Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794, 4 and in the 18 October 1999 issue of People’s Journal Taliba, 5 a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the
Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land. 6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices
concerned were notified of the initial hearing. 7

On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of
the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order 8 of General Default
against the whole world except as against petitioner.

During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November
1999 within which to file his written opposition. 9 Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order 10 dated
13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.

During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondent’s
Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.

The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession
of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27
September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however,
Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated
to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). 11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the
concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private property.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical
to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas,
Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at 19 th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.

Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear
evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner
alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses
should have been presented to corroborate Evangelista’s testimony.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked
there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelista’s failure to mention the name of his uncle who
continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he
testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato’s relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not
affect Evangelista’s statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy’s death. The Court of Appeals
further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small
community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole
witness’ testimony.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the
application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.

Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:

The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:

1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and

2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land. 13

The Issues

The issues may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the
concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Respondent Failed to Prove

that the Land is Alienable and Disposable

Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain.
Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. 14 The onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 15

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997
Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, 16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification 17 in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that
the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices
within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO
No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates
of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands
covering over 50 hectares.20 In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares
(564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of
1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20,
the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
 2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and

4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;

3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications
were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of
the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that
the land is alienable and disposable.

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the
official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have
attached an official publication21 of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence
of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries
made by the Civil Registrar22 in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook. 23 The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents.24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. 25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. 26 Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima
facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the
certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value. 28 The contents of the
certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications. 29 Torres did not prepare the
certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area
classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.

Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on
Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states
that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.

We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent
alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in
any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved." 30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the
land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s classification. 31 However, respondent should
have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the
documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the
Geodetic Engineer’s certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates.
Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications
submitted by respondent.

There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious

Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista’s statement
that the possession of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general
conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest
had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.

We agree with petitioner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.
Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy’s land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge
of Kabesang Puroy’s possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically
neighbors."32 The Court of Appeals observed:

In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that people in the said community
knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter,
of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them. 33

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between
Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and
Porting. In fact, Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by
Fortunato who was one of Antonio’s children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista’s testimony.

The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find
Evangelista’s uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept
of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of
respondent’s acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did
not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim
that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that
the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

Land Application by a Corporation

Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this case.

We agree with petitioner.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress
shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of
the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable
lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. x x x x

[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in
preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit
shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and
smaller plots from one generation to the next.

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of
alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means
would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public
domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually
decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or
sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban. 37

In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land
with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether
the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land
was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution,
private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares. 39

In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
 Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm
such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.

x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation’s holding or owning private land. x x x. 40 (Emphasis supplied)

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x
x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to
have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired
the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.

For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the
land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of
the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared:

Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been converted to private ownership
through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the
confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.

Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands
of the public domain but private property.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the
land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The
length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an
individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public
domain.

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA
9176) further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:

Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within
which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve
(12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this
Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of
said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.

Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as having been filed in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a
private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an
individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application
for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any
right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding
12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the
land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

5. Republic vs. Diloy, GR No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413 (2008)

G.R. No. 174633             August 26, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIA L. DILOY, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated 7
February 2006 and Resolution2 dated 30 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75028. The Court of Appeals Decision denied the appeal filed
before it by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and affirmed the Decision 3 of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Silang-Amadeo, Silang, Cavite,
dated 5 May 1999 in LRC Case No. 97-063, granting the application for registration of title filed before it by the herein respondent Gregoria L. Diloy over a parcel of
land located in Barangay Dagatan, Municipality of Amadeo, Province of Cavite, covering an area of 22,249 square meters. The Resolution denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Republic.

The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

As early as 1948, Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject property for taxation purposes under his name, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (T.D.) No.
2708.4 He was then succeeded by his son, Eusebio Leaban, who filed the following T.D. Nos. 5 4501, 3710 and 2855 in his name from the period covering the
years 1951-1969. Thereafter, in 1974, the subject property was transferred to Eusebio Leaban's daughter, Pacencia Leaban, who, in turn, declared the same for
taxation purposes under her name. It was evidenced by T.D. Nos. 8672, 7282 and 6231. 6 On 15 June 1979, the subject property was then conveyed by Pacencia
Leaban to her daughter, herein respondent Gregoria L. Diloy, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. 7

In 1997, respondent Gregoria L. Diloy, now married to Joselito C. Espiritu, filed an Application 8 for Registration of Title over the subject property under Section 14
of Presidential Decree No. 15299 before the 2nd MCTC of Silang-Amadeo, Silang, Cavite. The subject property was particularly described as Lot No. 2280, Cad-
482-D, Amadeo Cadastre, Ap-04-010073, with an area of 22,249 square meters located in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite.

To establish the jurisdictional requirements required by the aforesaid law, the respondent submitted and marked the following documents, to wit: (1) Application
for Registration as Exhibits "A"; "A-1" to "A-4";10 (2) Notice of Initial Hearing dated 17 July 1997 as Exhibits "B" and "B-1";11 (3) Certificate of Publication12 by
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) as Exhibit "C" and Certificate of Notification13 by the LRA as Exhibit "C-1"; (4) Certificate of Publication issued by the
National Printing Office (NPO) as Exhibit "D"14 and a copy of the Official Gazette (O.G.), Volume 93, No. 39, 29 September 199715 as Exhibits "D-1" to "D-3";
(5) Affidavit of Publication16 issued by the We Forum newspaper17 as Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "E-1-A"; (6) Registry Receipts sent to the government agencies
concerned as well as to the adjoining owners as Exhibits "F," "F-1" to "F-16," inclusive; and (7) Certificate of Posting 18 as Exhibit "G."

Since the Public Prosecutor did not interpose any objection, the court a quo admitted the aforementioned Exhibits.19

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the Republic, filed an Opposition 20 to the aforesaid Application for Registration of Title. It filed a
Notice of Appearance,21 but in a letter22 dated 18 November 1997, deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Silang, Cavite, to represent its interest therein.

During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title, respondent presented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos as witnesses to strengthen her
claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of the subject property.

Rustico Diloy testified that the first time he came to know of the subject property was in 1952 when he was twenty years old, because he used to work on the said
property. When he married Pacencia Leaban, the owner of the subject property was Eusebio Leaban, the father of Pacencia Leaban. Said property was inherited
by his wife from her father. It then came to the possession of the respondent by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between her and her mother, Pacencia
Leaban. According to him, from the time he came to know of the subject property up to the present, it was continuously declared for taxation purposes. He also
affirmed that the subject property has an area of 22,249 square meters, and it is located in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite. He came to know of said
information because he was the one who had it surveyed. The survey of the land was made and approved by the Director of Lands and reapproved by the Bureau
of Lands. The subject property was fenced with barbed wire and shrubs. 23

To corroborate the testimony of Rustico Diloy, Armando Ramos, 81 years old and presently residing in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite, stated that he was the
owner of the land adjoining the subject property, and that he knew the previous owners of the same. He disclosed that he knew the subject property even before
the Japanese Occupation because he became the husband of one of the heirs of the owner thereof. Prior to the Japanese Occupation, he said the owner of the
subject property was his father-in-law, Narciso Leaban. Then, in 1948, Crispin Leaban came into the possession of said land. From Crispin Leaban, he confirmed
that the subject property was inherited by Eusebio Leaban, the son of Crispin Leaban. Eusebio Leaban, in turn, transferred the same to his daughter, Pacencia
Leaban. Then, in 1979, Pacencia Leaban conveyed the subject property to her daughter, the respondent, who is the present owner of the subject property where
she plants coffee.24

The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the respondent, thereby granting her application for registration over the subject property. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby APPROVES the Application for Registration filed by [respondent], married to Joselito C. Espiritu. Thus, Lot 2280,
Amadeo Cadastre, Ap-04-010073 is placed under the operation of Act. 141, Act 495 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law.
Which property is situated in Barangay Dagatan, Municipality of Amadeo, Cavite, with an area of 22,249 square meters, and the same is covered by an
approved Technical Description and Subdivision Plan AP-04-010073. These documents form part of the records of the case, in addition to other proofs
adduced by herein [respondent].

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, the [LRA], the Land Management Sector, Regional (sic) IV, Manila, the Register of
Deeds of Cavite, the [Community Environment and Natural Resources Office] CENRO, Trece Martires City, Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Department of Public Works and Highways, as well as the party and counsel. 25

From the aforesaid Decision, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration 26 arguing that the respondent failed to prove her possession as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. In an Order27 dated 27 March 2001, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

As a result thereof, the Republic appealed the Decision of the MCTC to the Court of Appeals assigning the following error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPLICANT PROVED A REGISTRABLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. 28

On 7 February 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the Republic and affirmed the Decision of the MCTC granting the application for registration of the
subject property.

Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied in a Resolution dated 30 August 2006.

Hence, this Petition.

The Republic now comes before this Court with the sole issue of: whether or not the respondent has acquired a registrable title.29

The Republic persistently argues that the respondent's Application for Registration of Title should have been denied because the latter failed to comply with the
period of possession required by law, i.e., Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. 30 The Republic reveals that the subject property was only declared alienable
and disposable on 15 March 1982 per Forestry Administration Office (FAO) No. 4-1650. From 1982 when the property was declared alienable and disposable to
1997, the respondent had only been in adverse possession of the subject property for a period of 15 years. Thus, there was no compliance with Section 14,
Presidential Decree No. 1529 because the subject property was not yet alienable and disposable on 12 June 1945, and respondent's possession lacked the
required number of years (30 years) for her to acquire the same through prescription. Hence, respondent did not acquire an imperfect title, which may be
confirmed through a judicial proceeding.

In her Comment, respondent firmly holds that the MCTC and the Court of Appeals did not commit any error or grave abuse of discretion in rendering their
Decisions granting her Application for Registration of Title over the subject property. She avows that she has satisfactorily established that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable land under
a bona fide claim of ownership over the subject property for more than 30 years. To prove the same, she tacked her own possession, commencing on 15 June
1979 up to the time of the filing of her Application for Registration of Title, onto the prior possession of her predecessors-in-interest of 31 years. Adding these
periods, respondents and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for more than 50 years now in the concept of an owner. Moreover, the
realty taxes thereon have been religiously paid, and there is no tax delinquency incurred by her. The subject property has also been devoted to agriculture,
particularly, coffee plantation. Similarly, she presented her father and one Armando Ramos as witnesses to prove that she, indeed, was able to satisfy the manner
and length of possession required by law so as to grant her Application for Registration of Title over the subject property.

The Petition is meritorious.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for registration of land. The said provisions of law refer to an original registration through
ordinary registration proceedings.31 It specifically provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Based on the aforesaid provisions, the three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under the first category are: (1) that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.32 In effect, the period of possession - open, continuous, exclusive and notorious - must at least be 30 years computed
from 12 June 1945 to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1529 on 11 June 1978.

Section 14(1) of the aforesaid law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.33

In the case at bar, it is beyond question that the subject property was already an alienable and disposable land at the time the Application for Registration of Title
over the same was filed by the respondent. The Application for Registration of Title over the subject property was filed by the respondent in the year 1997.
The Report,34 dated 27 July 1998, submitted by the Director of Lands and the Certification, 35 dated 4 May 1998, issued by the CENRO, clearly established that
the subject property was already within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 3013 as early as 15 March
1982 per Forestry Administration Order No. 4-1650.36 Even the parties to this case, particularly the OSG, did not refute the fact that at the time the Application
for Registration of Title was filed, the subject property had already been classified as alienable and disposable land.

Both lower courts upheld that the respondent was able to prove that her possession of the subject property was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious for
more than 30 years. Here we quote the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals, thus:

The trial court committed no error in ruling that [respondent] has a registrable title. It is undisputed that [respondent] came into possession of the subject
[property] by means of a [D]eed of [S]ale executed in her favor by Pacencia Leaban in 1979. Prior to the sale, Pacencia Leaban inherited said property
from her father, Eusebio Leaban, who possessed the same since 1951. Testimonial evidence showed that Eusebio Leaban devoted the land to agriculture
and that shrubs and barbed wire enclosed the subject property. At the time of filing of the application for registration, the crop found therein is coffee.

x x x. Rustico Diloy testified that he worked on the land under the supervision of Eusebio Leaban indicating that there were necessary farm works to be
done thereon. The owner of the adjoining land stated that said land is a coffee plantation. There is also showing that the subject land was fenced,
signifying a public and adverse possession thereof. Likewise, [respondent] with the aid of Rustico Diloy, caused the survey of the subject [property]. These
are apparently acts of ownership. x x x.

Together with her predecessors-in-interest, [respondent] was in actual and adverse possession of the subject land for more than 30 years, thereby
satisfying the period required under P.D. 1529. Coupled with the cultivation or possession is the regular payment of realty taxes on said land since 1948
up to the filing of the application for registration of title thereto. 37

While this Court agrees with the lower courts that, indeed, respondent's possession of the subject property was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
however, we hold that respondent failed to prove that she or her predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of the subject property under a
bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, which is the reckoning period specifically provided in Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.

As can be gleaned from the records, respondent's possession of the subject property started only in the year 1979 when her mother executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the same in her favor. There was also no showing that her predecessors-in-interest had already been in possession or had already exercised acts of
ownership over the subject property since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, as her predecessors-in-interest declared the subject property for taxation purposes only in
the year 1948. What was clearly established by the respondent was possession of the subject property by her predecessors-in-interest beginning 1948, which was
short of three years from 12 June 1945. What is more telling is that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982. Prior to its
declaration as alienable land in 1982, any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession requirement. 38 The
period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have started in 1979, when the same was conveyed to her by her mother.
Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-interest, even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same
since 1948, because during those periods, the subject property had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private
appropriation. Possession of the subject property could only start to ripen into ownership on 15 March 1982, when the same became alienable and
disposable. Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and, unless the land has been classified as
alienable and disposable, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.39 The adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. There can be no imperfect title to
be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until
released therefrom and open to disposition.40 Possession of the land by the respondent under the circumstances, whether spanning decades or centuries, can
never ripen into ownership.41

From 1982 up to 1997, the year the respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title over the subject property, the respondent was in possession of the
same for only 15 years, which was short of another 15 years from the 30-year-period possession requirement. Thus, this Court is constrained to abide by the Latin
maxim "Dura lex sed lex."42

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 2006 and
30 August 2006, respectively affirming the Decision of the MCTC dated 5 May 1999, which granted the respondent's Application for Registration of Title over the
subject property, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent's Application for Registration of Title over the subject property is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

*ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

6. Malabanan vs. Republic, GR No. 179987, 29 April 2009 and the resolution on the MR, 3 September 2013

G.R. No. 179987               September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009,
whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-
A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his
title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which
reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay
Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. 2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property
involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be
counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and
disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in
fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into
private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of
the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to
convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real
owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration
on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application
had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land
registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. 11 Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for
public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of
the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. 17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19 Section 10, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. 20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution,
but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President
declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands,
can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly
requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to
clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the
coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind
such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid
down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the
full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of
Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the
plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or
incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation
of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title
be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens
by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind
that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33 in order
to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject
to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or
the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is
no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. 35 As such,
prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are
not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under
Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided
the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I submitted my vote joining the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion In the Result: See Separate Opinion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERLATA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring and dissenting opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

7. International Hardwood and Veneer Inc. vs. UP, GR No. G.R. No. L-52518, 13 August 1991.

G.R. No. L-52518               August 13, 1991

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with
injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose
Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against the respondents:

(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding
forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and

(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.

respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.

After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the
case to this Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not
disputed by the parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1

Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June 1966.  Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent
2

University of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other
forest products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or impose
any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full
ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that respondents be
required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.

Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967,
respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987,  wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the
3

petition states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and
felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue
Code.

Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4

On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for Judgment,  which reads as follows:
5

COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the
Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of timber
land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite
and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government through the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on January 11, 1960. ... ;

3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the
Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;

4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling
cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;

5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government on June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other improvements and installations of the
aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License
Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;

6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the
Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE
PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES
OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND
OF LUZON.

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P.
Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of the
Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public
domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon,
Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found therein
shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:

x x x           x x x          x x x

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the
Philippines, the sixteenth.

(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA

President of the Philippines

x x x           x x x          x x x

7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960,
Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines, which Republic Act
provides as follows:

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its
research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences.

SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of
Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.

SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 18, 1964.

8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded,
verbally as well as in writing to plaintiff-.

(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof
be paid to the University of the Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and

(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act
No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the University of the Philippines.

9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer
addressed to the President of the University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.

10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to
the Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling
any such timber cut and felled prior to removal

11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the implemetation of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent
the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:

x x x           x x x          x x x

February 8, 1966

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Manila

Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant

Dear Sir:

Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership
by the government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the
name of the University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the University of the Philippines gives the university full
rights of dominion and ownership, subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines.
Under the terms of this law all forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The
purpose of giving this land grant to the University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and establish a research and
experimental station for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.

I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following matters:

1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should be remitted in
favor of the University of the Philippines pines;

2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly

3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest charges and royalties due from any logging concession at the
land grant.

May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester of Laguna about this matter. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR.

Business Executive

12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the
following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:

x x x           x x x          x x x
 March 11, 1966

U.P. Paete Land Grant

University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City

Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Business Executive

Gentlemen:

This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products
Regulations, forest products, cut, gathered and removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must
be invoiced when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete
Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is manifestly to be considered registered, no forest
charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges purportedly to be paid by any
concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be considered not as the charges
contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the
timber resources of the land grant.

Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:

1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges payable by concessionaires of the land grant.

2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a
formal claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date of payment. The proper claimant shall be International
Hardwood and not the University.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated April
18, 1 966:

April 18, 1966

The District Forester

Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect
forest charges from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land
containing some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in
June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over said land be recognized and that the existing
concessionaire, International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest charges directly to the University
instead of to the national government.

Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to the following points raised by the University:

1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.

2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the
University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore paid
by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.

On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land
Grant as scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal
Revenue taxes.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Business Executive

14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18, 1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of
Laguna to the Director of Forestry.

15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:

Sirs:

This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of
the Philippines.

In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of the Philippines is claiming the right:

(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the area covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;
 (b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;

(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and

(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting, removal and disposition of the
timber from said area, and the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the measurement and scaling of the logs and
the collection of the corresponding forest charges and other fees in connection therewith.

This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the University of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We
believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of number License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the timber inside
subject area is still binding and should therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we sent your client our letter
of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment on the application of the State University for a Special Timber License over the said area.

16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June
30,1966:

x x x           x x x          x x x

June 30, 1966

District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna

(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)

Sir:

This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not
you shall turn over the scaling work for logs cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines in the
Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of the University of the Philippines.

In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete Land Grant, which embraces the area of the International
Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the University of the Philippines and
therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said
Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be
entered into by the U.P. are to be considered not as the charged contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the
royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant, you may turn over the scaling work
therein to the scalers of the U.P.

However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of
smuggling forest products from the neighboring public forests.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA

x x x           x x x          x x x

On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the case, and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the
parties, the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on
the following issues:

1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due and payable under its timber License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and

2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, telling and removal of timber within the
Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.

Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.

Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is
quoted at the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:

... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of
land referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the
petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the Philippines
will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property
to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership thereof only
upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the property donated. In
the second place, the respondents' demand cannot be valid unless the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code
regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in
order to include therein such amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised Administrative Code, but they failed
to convince the Court, not only because of the first reason above stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is not intended
in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the end. In the third
place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes other than those
therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions,
particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of the
petitioner's timber concession, the University of the Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of land
or over portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling
and measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code.

Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:

... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.

II
 ... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN
LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY
THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES
PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.

1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment granting
full and appropriate remedy on the following issues:

1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due and payable under its Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the
Philippines; and

2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether
or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of
timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled

These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless
the appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al.  that declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for
6

all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the
complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:

SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial by these issues. ...

The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination. 7

There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui
juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.
8

2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic
may effect such collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in
question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the
concession of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded property but covered by the concession of
petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license. To deny it such charges
would render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A.
No. 3990 expressly provides:

All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the
Philippines. (emphasis supplied for emphasis).

(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment station; since this law does not provide for
appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or
income from the area, which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle
that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e)
Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by
R.A. No. 3990 have issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and to supervise petitioner's logging operations.

Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect
forest charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession affected by said Act.

The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be
included in the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to
the measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of
the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry.  The supervision and regulation of the use of forest products
9

and of the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry.  R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the
10

UP any authority to collect from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the Government under the
Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders thereof; (b)
The cession in full ownership of the land in question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's concession would
continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1
February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power to interpret the law, which is
primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the
Bureau of Forestry.

There is merit in the second assigned error.

Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is
the very parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as
experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production studies of said college, subject however to
private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and
regulations.

The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.

Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was
"ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."

When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in
respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto
and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That the law
intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or
possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality.  The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All
11

that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as
the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence
of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or
income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it
were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the
proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law.  The right to enjoy includes
12

the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use.  As provided for in
13

Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this rules, as
where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits.  In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as
14

licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I
February 1985.  However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as
1âwphi1

provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and
jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due thereon.

The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the
operations of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its
concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound
under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for
a strict interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the license, which is
nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.

It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on
3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment)
within the area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines;
DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber
within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

8. Diaz-Enriquez vs. Director of Lands, GR No. 168065, 6 September 2017

G.R No. 168065

TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ represented by her Attorney-in-fact, JOSE MARCEL E. PANLILIO, substituted by MONTESOL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, COURT OF APPEALS, GERONIMO SACLOLO, JOSEFINO SACLOLO and RODRIGO SACLOLO, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 168070

GERONIMO SACLOLO, JOSEFINO SACLOLO and RODRIGO SACLOLO, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari   seek to reverse and set aside the 26 May 2004 Decision  and 13 May 2005 Resolution  of the Court
1 2 3

of Appeals (CA) in CA - G.R. CV No. 53838, which nullified the 6 July 1995 Decision  and the 30 January 1996 Order  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
4 5

15, Naic, Cavite (RTC), in LRC Case No. TM-95, a case for application of registration of title.

THE FACTS

On 27 December 1974, Geronimo, Josefino, and Rodrigo, all surnamed Saclolo (the Saclolos) filed before the then Court of First Instance, now Regional
Trial Court, Naic, Cavite, a joint application for registration of title over three (3) parcels of land (subject lands), with a total area of 3,752,142 square meters
(375.2 hectares) and located at Sitio Sinalam, Bario Sapang, Ternate, Cavite.  The Saclolos averred that they had acquired title to the subject lands
6

through purchase and that together with their predecessors-in-interest, they had been in actual and exclusive possession, occupation, and cultivation of the
subject lands since time immemorial.  7

The government, thru the Director of Lands, Abdon Riego de Dios, and Angelina Samson filed oppositions to the application.   The Director of Lands
8

argued that the subject lands are not alienable and disposable because: they are located within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, segregated from
the public domain by Proclamation No. 307, dated November 20, 1967; that by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6236, the right to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law, with respect to lands having an area of more than 144 hectares, has expired; that the Saclolos had
not acquired title over the subject lands through any recognized mode of acquisition of title; that the Saclolos and their predecessors-in-interest had not
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lands for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of
the application; and that PSU 68, 69, and 70, the plans which cover the subject lands, have not been verified by the Bureau of Lands as required by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 239. 9

On 27 December 1993, Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez (Enriquez) filed a motion for intervention alleging that the Saclolos had sold to her all their interests and
rights over the subject lands on 19 September 1976. The RTC allowed Enriquez's claim to be litigated.  10

The RTC Ruling

In its Decision, dated 6 July 1995, the RTC ruled that the subject lands are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain because Proclamation No.
307 itself stressed that the segregation of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation was subject to private rights. It opined that the pieces of evidence
presented by the Saclolos proved that their rights over the subject lands, being private in nature and character, were excluded from the reservation for
military purposes. The fallo reads:
Wherefore, finding the evidence of applicants sufficient, their titles to the parcels of land applied for are hereby confirmed. The Land Registration Authority
is hereby Ordered to issue the corresponding decrees of registration and certificates of title in the names of the applicants subject to the intervenor's rights
upon finality of judgment. 11

In its Order, dated 30 January 1996, the RTC modified its earlier decision by ordering the issuance of the decree of registration to Enriquez. 12

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated 26 May 2004, the CA declared that the subject lands are all within the Calumpang Point Naval Resevation, as testified to by
Eleuterio R. Paz, Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands-Region 4; thus, the said lands could not be privately titled. It held that even if
Proclamation No. 307 qualifies the reservation as being subject to private rights, the Saclolos have not established by adequate proof their open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession over the subject lands.

The appellate court observed that the informacion possessoria, upon which the Saclolos heavily rely to support their claim, did not at all indicate the area
covered by the claim. It added that the tax declarations, technical descriptions, sketch plans, tax receipts, deeds of sale, and surveyor's certificates did not
show the nature of the Saclolos' possession.

The CA stated that the trial court disregarded the fact that judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act with respect to
lands having an area of more than 144 hectares had lapsed pursuant to R.A. No. 6236, approved on 19 June 1971. It further noted that the trial court's
jurisdiction to entertain the application was not established since the plans had not been verified by the Bureau of Lands as required by P.D. No. 239 and
the alleged verifications in the plans were not authentic. The appellate court concluded that the subject lands could not be registered because they lie
within a naval reservation and most of them are forest and foreshore lands. It disposed the case thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 30, 1996 order of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered
DISMISSING the applications for registration of title to the subject three (3) lots in LRC Case No. TM-95 for lack of jurisdiction and failure to prove
acquisitive prescription.
13

Aggrieved, the Saclolos and Enriquez moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution, dated 13 May 2005.

Hence, these consolidated petitions.

THE ISSUES

In G.R. No. 168070, the Saclolos raised the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE (CA- G.R. CV NO. 53838 (LRC CASE NO. TM - 95 OF
RTC, BRANCH XV, NAIC, CA VITE) IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN MAKING ITS FINDING, WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND
THE SAME IS CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS OF BOTH APPELLANTS AND APPELLEES.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY
THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DECLARED
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE AND WHETHER OR NOT IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
DATED MAY 26, 2004, AND IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, DATED MAY 13, 2005 THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OFF ACTS.

V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
RESOLVE THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONERS AS APPLICANTS- APPELLANTS IN CA- G.R. CV NO. 53838 OF THE RESPONDENT COURT. 14

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 168065, Enriquez submits the following assignment of errors:

I. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT VIOLATED AND CONTRAVENED SECTION 3,
RULE 41 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT INTERVENOR HAS NO
REGISTRABLE TITLE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY AND WHIMSICALLY FOUND THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD
NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THECASE. 15

In sum, the issues are: 1) Whether the appellate court may declare that the lands sought to be registered are not alienable and disposable notwithstanding
the failure of the Director of Lands to appeal from the decision of the trial court decreeing the issuance of certificates of title; 2) Whether the appellate court
may resolve issues which are not raised as errors on appeal; and 3) Whether the applicants for registration of title have sufficiently proved that the subject
lands are alienable and disposable.

In G.R. No. 168070, the Saclolos argue that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the R TC decision, thus, the facts pertaining to the registration of
titles are already final and settled; and that Proclamation No. 307 even strengthens their rights over the subject lands for the same proclamation expressly
recognizes the rights of private parties.

In G.R. No. 168065, Enriquez, citing Carrion v. CA,  avers that the appellate court committed a reversible error when it modified the decision of the trial
16

court and granted to the Director of Lands, who did not appeal from such decision, affirmative reliefs other than those granted to them by the trial court's
judgment; that Proclamation No. 1582-A excluded the private occupants from the coverage of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation; that based on
uncontroverted evidence, it has been established that the Saclolos' predecessors-in-interest have declared the subject lands for taxation purposes as early
as 1945; and that the Director of Lands should have raised the plans' lack of verification during the trial of the case.

In his Comment,  the Director of Lands, citing Baquiran v. CA, counters that issues, though not specifically raised in the pleadings in the appellate court,
17

may, in the interest of justice, be properly considered by the said court in deciding a case, if there are questions raised in the trial court and are matters of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; that Delfin Buhain, the alleged
caretaker of the Saclolos and the husband of the Saclolos' alleged predecessor-in-interest Pasencia Ruffy, testified that since he came to know of the land
and up to the time it was sold to the Saclolos, his parents-in-law, his wife, and brother-in-law Roman Bernardo Ruffy had possessed the same in the
concept of a true and legal owner, though he could not remember when the Saclolos bought it from his wife and brother-in-law; that the deed of sale
between the Ruffys and Geronimo Saclolo covers only 170 hectares, 156 of which are mountainous areas and only 14 hectares are planted to rice and
com; that the informacion possessoria on which the Ruffys rely to prove that they had inherited the land from their parents does not even mention the area
subject thereof; that no effort was ever taken by the Saclolos to reconcile the glaringly disproportionate areas allegedly occupied by them and their
predecessors-in-interest, and the area being applied for, i.e., 325.1 hectares; that Marte Saclolo, son of Geronimo Saclolo and the alleged administrator of
the whole property, could only account for about 150 hectares devoted to rice, bamboo, mangoes, bananas and other fruit-bearing trees while admitting
that the rest of the area applied for are forest, foreshore, and mountain lands; and that the subject lands fonn part of the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation, thus cannot be privately titled.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petitions are without merit.

The subject lands may still be

declared public lands
notwithstanding the Director
of Lands' failure to appeal
from the RTC decision.

In Laragan v. Court of Appeals,  petitioners therein averred that the appellate court could not declare the parcel of land in question as public land, because
18

the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration of said parcel of land in their favor, had already become final and executory
for failure of the Director of Lands to appeal therefrom. The Court found such argument untenable, viz:

x x x While it may be true that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his failure to so appeal did not make the decision of
the trial court final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other oppositors, Teodoro Leafio, Tomas Leafio, Francisco Leafio, and
Consolacion Leafio, who also seek the confirmation of their imperfect title over the land in question.

Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court from declaring the land in question to be public land,
since the oppositors and the herein petitioners are both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Law where the presumption always is that the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors claim an interest in the
same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership for the required number of years. Thus, in their application for registration, the petitioners alleged that they "hereby apply to have the land
hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have the title thereto registered and confirmed." The petitioners are
deemed to thereby admit that, until such confirmation, the land remains public.  (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
19

In addition, an applicant is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title
and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute
owner, in fee simple.20

Consequently, the appellate court may still determine whether the subject lands are indeed alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
notwithstanding the Director of Lands' failure to appeal from the RTC decision.

The appellate court may

reverse the decision of the trial
court on the basis of grounds
other than those raised as
errors on appeal.

As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided. - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

The exceptions to this rule have been enumerated in Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals: 21

[T]he appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. It is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider
grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, the Court of Appeals
may, with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal. We have applied this
rule, as a matter of exception, in the following instances:

(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;

(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to
serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;

(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;

(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and

(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. 22

In this case, there is no doubt that the application for registration of title hinges upon the determination of whether the subject lands are alienable and
disposable. Further, this is consistent with the appellate court's authority to review the totality of the controversy brought on appeal.
23

Applicants failed to prove that

the subject lots are alienable
and disposable.

The application of the Saclolos was filed on December 27, 1974. Accordingly, the law governing the application was Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as
amended by R.A. No. 1942, particularly Section 48 (b) which provides that:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant of an application for land registration are the following:

1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and occupation of the subject land;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application;
and

4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain. 24

Among these requirements, the question of whether the subject lands were declared alienable and disposable is of primordial importance because it is
determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first determining the
nature and character of the land, all the other requirements such as the length and nature of possession and occupation over such land do not come into
play. The required length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.  25

In Republic v. Heirs of Fabio,   the Court similarly tackled the issue of whether certain parcels of land located within the Calumpang Point Naval
26

Reservation are alienable and disposable, to wit:

The three proclamations cited reserving the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation for the exclusive use of the military are the following: (1) U.S. War
Department Order No. 56 issued on 25 March 1904, (2) Proclamation No. 307 issued on 20 November 1967, and (3) Proclamation No. 1582-A issued on 6
September 1976. Such proclamations state:

U.S. War Department General Order No. 56

U.S. War Department General Order No. 56
Washington, March 25, 1904.

For the knowledge and governance of all interested parties, the following is hereby announced:

The President of the United States, by the Order dated March 14, 1904, which provides that the reservations made by Executive Order of April 11, 1902
(General Order No. 38, Army Headquarters, Office of the Adjutant General, April 17, 1902), at the entrance of Manila Bay, Luzon, Philippine Islands, are
arranged in such a way that will include only these lands as later described, whose lands were reserved by the Order of March 14, 1904 for military
purposes, by virtue of Article 12 of the Act of Congress approved on July 1, 1902, entitled "Act providing for the Temporary Administration of Civil Affairs of
the Government of the Philippine Islands and for Other Purposes" (32 Stat. L., 691 ); namely:

1. In the northern side of the entrance to Manila Bay, in the province of Bataan, Luzon (Mariveles Reservation), all public lands within the limits that are
described as follows:

"Starting from the mouth of the Mariveles River in the eastern border and from here straight North to a distance of 5,280 feet; from this point straight to the
East to intercept a line, in a straight direction to the South from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 4); from there straight from the North until the
aforementioned Station 4; from here straight to the East to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 5); from here straight
South to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 6); from here straight to the East to a distance of 8,910 feet until a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 7); from here straight to the South to a distance of 7,730 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 8), situated at
the northwest comer of the second creek to the east of Lasisi Point, 30 feet North of the high-tide mark; from there in the same direction until the high-tide
mark; from here towards the East following the shoreline up to the starting point."

2. In the southern side of the Manila Bay entrance, in the province of Cavite, Luzon (Calumpang

Point Reservation), all public lands within the limits that are described as follows:

"Starting from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 1) situated in the cliff on the Eastern side of Asubig Point, 20 feet above the high-tide
mark and about 50 feet from the edge of the cliff and continuing from there to the South 28° 10' West, a distance of up to 22,000 feet until a
stone monument marked U.S. (Station 2); from here to North 54° 10' West at a distance of 5,146 feet until a stone monument marked U.S.
(Station 3); from here towards South 85° 35' 30 "West, at a distance of 2,455 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 4), situated on the
beach near the Northeast corner of Limbones Bay, about 50 feet from the high-tide mark and following in the same direction until the high-tide
mark; from here towards North and East following the shoreline until North 28° 10 ' East from the starting point and from there encompassing
more or less 5,200 acres. The markers are exact."

3. The islands of Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles
Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpang Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance. aETDic

4. The jurisdiction of the military authorities in the case of reservations in the northern and southern beaches of the entrance to Manila Bay and all the
islands referred to in paragraph 3, are extended from the high-tide marker towards the sea until a distance of 1,000 yards.

By Order of the Secretary of War:

GEORGE L. GILLESPIE,

General Commander, Chief of Internal General Staff,

Official copy.

W.P. HALL, Internal Adjutant General. (Emphasis supplied)

Proclamation No. 307

. . . do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for military purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Temate, province of Cavite,
Island of Luzon, more particularly described as follows:

Proposed Naval Reservation

Calumpang Point

A parcel of land (the proposed Calumpang Point Naval Reservation), situated in the municipality of Temate, province of Cavite. Bounded on the NW., N.
and E., by Manila Bay; on the SE. and S., by municipality of Temate; and on the W., by Manila Bay. Beginning at a point marked '' 1" on the attached
Sketch Plan traced from Coastal Hydrography of Limbones Island.

thence N. 54 deg. 30' E., 750.00 m. to point 2;

thence N. 89 deg. 15' E., 1780.00 m. to point 3;

thence N. 15 deg. 10' E., 6860.00 m. to point 4;

thence N. 12 deg. 40' W., 930.00 m. to point 5;

thence S. 77 deg. 20' W., 2336.00 m. to point 6;

thence S. 49 deg. 30' W., 4450.00 m. to point 7;

thence S. 12 deg. 40' E., 2875.00 m. to point 8;

thence S. 30 deg. 30' E., 2075.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an approximate area of twenty eight million nine hundred seventy three thousand
one hundred twelve (28,973, 112) square meters. CHIEDS

NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future surveys."

Proclamation No. 1582-A

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 307 dated November 20, 1967 and U.S. War Department Order No. 56 dated March 25, 1904 reserved for military
purposes, and withdrew from sale or settlement, a parcel of land of the public domain situated in the Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite,
more particularly described as follows: ...

WHEREAS, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Marines now need that portion of this area reserved under Proclamation No. 307, particularly, Caylabne
Cove, Caynipa Cove, Calumpang Cove and Sinalam Cove, for their use as official station, not only to guard and protect the mouth of Manila Bay and the
shorelines of the Province[s] of Cavite, Batangas and Bataan, but also to maintain peace and order in the Corregidor area, which is now one of the leading
tourist attractions in the country; ...

. . . containing an approximate area of EIGHT MILLION EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY (8,089,990) SQUARE METERS, more or
less.

The portion that remains after the segregation which are occupied shall be released to bona .fide occupants pursuant to existing laws/policies regarding
the disposition of lands of the public domain and the unoccupied portions shall be considered as alienable or disposable lands.

The proclamations established that as early as 1904 a certain parcel of land was placed under the exclusive use of the government for military purposes by
the then colonial American government. In 1904, the U.S. War Department segregated the area, including the Lot, for military purposes through General
Order No. 56. Subsequently, after the Philippines regained its independence in 1946, the American government transferred all control and sovereignty to
the Philippine government, including all the lands appropriated for a public purpose. Twenty years later, two other presidential proclamations followed, both
issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, restating that the same property is a naval reservation for the use of the Republic.  (emphases in the
27

original)

From the foregoing proclamations, four (4) things are clear: first, a parcel of land containing 28,973,112 square meters, located in Temate, Cavite, was
withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes; second, by virtue of Proclamation No. 1582-A, the area reserved for military
purposes was limited to 8,089,990 square meters instead of the original 28,973, 112 square meters; third, the occupied portions, after segregating the
8,089,990 square meters, would be released to bona fide occupants; and fourth, the unoccupied portions were declared alienable and disposable lands.

To reiterate, the Director of Lands insists that the subject lands are within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation. This was bolstered by the testimony of
Eleutorio R. Paz, Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands-Region 4.  Thus, it was incumbent upon the Saclolos and Enriquez to prove that the
28

subject lands do not form part of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation because "when a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes
inalienable and outside the commerce of man." 29

Indeed, Proclamation No. 307 recognizes private rights over parcels of land included in the reservation. Further, Proclamation No. 1582-A provides that the
occupied portions which remained after segregating the 8,089,990 square meters shall be released to bona fide occupants. Thus, a mere invocation of
"private rights" does not automatically entitle an applicant to have the property registered in his name. "Persons claiming the protection of private rights in
order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have been
acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands." 30

In this case, however, none of the documents presented by the Saclolos and Enriquez prove that the subject lands are alienable and disposable. 1âwphi1

First, the Investigator's Report even contradicted the claim that the subject lands are alienable and disposable as it noted that these lands are "within the
extensive Calumpang Point Reservation however, the applicants assert their private rights to the subject area." 31

Further, the informacion possessoria upon which the Saclolos heavily rely to support their claim neither states that the subject lands were declared
alienable and disposable nor indicates the area covered thereby. It merely describes it as "capacity of three cavans seed in palay." What can only be
determined from such certificate of possession is that a certain Bernabe Fabio had possessory title over a parcel of land registered in 1895 but was
subsequently lost and that the children of Fabio eventually sold such parcel of land to the Spouses Ruffy.  This, however, does not prove that the subject
32

lands were already legally acquired by the Saclolos and their predecessors-in-interest at a time when such parcels of land were declared alienable and
disposable by the government. Moreover, it is worthy to note that P.D. No. 892 discontinued the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law by
categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish
titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property.
33

Finally, in the Deed of Sale between the heirs of the Spouses Ruffy and Geronimo Saclolo, the parcel of land was described as containing 170 hectares
(1,700,000 square meters).  However, in the Saclolos' application for registration of title, the total area of the subject lands is stated as 375.2 hectares.
34

Further, Marte Saclolo, son of Geronimo, could only account for 150 hectares devoted to rice, bamboo, mangoes, bananas and other fruitbearing
trees.  Thus, the alienability and disposability of the subject lands and even the exact area covered thereof lack factual bases.
35

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,  the Court emphasized that lands of the public domain, unless declared otherwise by virtue of a
36

statute or law, are inalienable and can never be acquired by prescription. No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into ownership over
lands of the public domain. All lands of the public domain presumably belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,  declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
37

land for agricultural or other purposes.  In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
38

delimited and classified.

39

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.  To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
40

evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.  There must still be a positive act declaring land
41

of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.  The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land
42

claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. 43

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that the subject lands were proclaimed by the government to be alienable and disposable. Time and again, it has been held
that matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
44
On a final note, it is worth emphasizing that as early as 1904, a certain parcel of land has already been reserved for military purposes. It behooves the
Court how the Saclolos remained oblivious to such fact despite a considerable lapse of time. Certainly, there would have been several people who knew of
such reservation considering that the same is not confidential information. The Saclolos and even Enriquez failed to exercise such diligence as prudent
men ordinarily would. As such, they only have themselves to blame for their predicament. They should have taken full advantage of the opportunity to
present during trial all pieces of evidence to prove that the subject lands are alienable and disposable especially in the light of the fact that the government
vehemently opposes the registration. Thus, in view of the glaring lack of evidence as regards the alienability and disposability of the subject lands, the
Court is constrained to deny their registration of title.

WHEREFORE, the 26 May 2004 Decision and 13 May 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53838 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

9. City Mayor of Paranaque v. Ebio, GR No. 178411, 3 June 2010, 621 SCRA 555

G.R. No. 178411               June 23, 2010

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ENGINEER OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY
CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A. GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R.
ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M. ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES,
ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA
V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007
Decision1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
CA had reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.

Below are the facts.

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound
in Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an
accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the
said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, 4 Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his
name.5 Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property. 6

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro’s advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In
April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound.7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights 8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.
Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro’s name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name. 9

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 199910 seeking assistance from the City
Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be
eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound 11 traversing the lot occupied by the
respondents. When the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition
thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended. 12

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8)
coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior
and Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor. 13 On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the
construction of the proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the
affected property.14 On November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials from the city government, but no definite agreement was
reached by and among the parties.15
On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be
physically evicted from the said property.16 Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. 17 The request remained unheeded. 1avvphi1

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners.18 In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales
patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 19

On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order20 denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove
successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales
patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. 21

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the
respondents. According to the Court of Appeals--

The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the
accreted portion beside RL 8.

The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291 square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by
TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966 and
which was accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road
lot.

On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March
1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning
the year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO
for the subject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.

Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the
accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant case.

xxxx

The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930,
Appellants together with their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964 had
introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have
acquired ownership of the property in question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. x x
x.

xxxx

Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO
VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. x x x.

xxxx

We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which bolster their right over the subject property. x x x.

xxxx

In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their right over the property in question.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.22

On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN
ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE
FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT … FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT. 23

The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory injunction;
and substantively, whether the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory
injunction.

The petition is without merit.

An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act. 24 It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may issue. 25

In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an
access road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed
along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an
indispensable party to the action.

We do not agree.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being
the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect,26 in relation
to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof,
belong to the owners of such lands. 27

Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.28

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be
no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. 29 Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the
State.30

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, 31 the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court
cannot proceed without their presence.32 In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. 33

In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Parañaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road
construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no
obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any
of its rights infringed.

We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.

A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. 34 A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or
one that is actual or existing.35 It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise. 36

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In
1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966,
Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in
1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to
the local government of Parañaque.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact
that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only
the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. 37 A
decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. 38

Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?

We answer in the negative.

Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant
case, respondents admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.

Respondents’ application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the
subject property. The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they
seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a
property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land. 39

Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the
State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

10. Balais-Mabanag vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, GR No. 153142, 29 March 2010.

G.R. No. 153142               March 29, 2010

CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG, assisted by her husband, ELEUTERIO MABANAG, Petitioner,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the
objecting party had the opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the winning party to acquire
the land was during the trial, not during the execution of a final decision.

Antecedents

As culled from the assailed decision dated December 5, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA), 1 and from the Court’s decision promulgated on October 7, 1996
in G.R. No. 103577,2 the following are the antecedent facts.

On January 19, 1985, Romulo A. Coronel, Alarico A. Coronel, Annette A. Coronel, Annabelle C. Gonzales, Floraida C. Tupper, and Cielito A. Coronel
(Coronels) executed a document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating that they received from respondent Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (Ramona),
through Ramona’s mother, respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz (Concepcion), the sum of ₱50,000.00 as downpayment on the total purchase price of
₱1,240,000.00 for their "inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City."

The receipt of down payment contained other stipulations, as follows:

We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father, Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon our
receipt of the down payment above-stated.

On our presentation of the TCT already in our name, we will immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz shall immediately pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00. 3

On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels’ father (Constancio P. Coronel) was transferred in the name of the
Coronels under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 327043 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to the petitioner for the higher price of ₱1,580,000.00 after the latter
delivered an initial sum of ₱300,000.00. For this reason, the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her downpayment of ₱50,000.00
in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.

On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, through one Gloria P. Noel as her attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint for specific performance and damages in her own
name in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City against the Coronels, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-44134. 4 Concepcion subsequently caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 327403.

On April 2, 1985, the petitioner had a notice of adverse claim annotated on TCT No. 327403 in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner.

On June 5, 1985, TCT No. 351582 was issued in the name of the petitioner.

It is relevant to mention that on May 24, 1985 the petitioner moved to have her answer in intervention admitted in Civil Case No. Q-44134. 5 Her intervention
was allowed on May 31, 1985.6

Earlier, on May 19, 1986, Concepcion sought leave of court to amend the complaint for the purpose of impleading Ramona as a co-plaintiff. 7 The amended
complaint naming both Concepcion and Ramona as plaintiffs was attached to the motion. 8 On June 25, 1986, the amended complaint was admitted. 9

On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision, 10 disposing:

WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering
that parcel of land embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City,
together with all the improvements existing thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances, and once accomplished, to immediately deliver said document
of sale to plaintiffs, and upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the purchase price amounting to
P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby cancelled and
declared to be without any force and effect. Defendants and intervenor and all other persons claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate the subject
property, and deliver possession thereof to plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ claim for damages and attorney’s fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and
intervenors are hereby dismissed.

No pronouncement as to costs.

So Ordered.
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Coronels and the petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which promulgated a judgment on
December 16, 1991, fully upholding the decision of the RTC.

Thus, the petitioner and the Coronels appealed the CA judgment to this Court (G.R. No. 103577), which affirmed the CA on October 7, 1996.

Thereafter, the decision of the RTC became final and executory.

Acting on the respondents’ motion for execution, the RTC issued a writ of execution on October 1, 1997. However, the petitioner and the Coronels filed
their motion to stay execution and supplemental motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on March 10, 1998.

Upon failure of the petitioner and the Coronels to comply with the writ of execution, the RTC approved the respondents’ motion for appointment of suitable
person to execute deed, etc., and ordered on April 8, 1998 the Branch Clerk of the RTC, Branch 83, Quezon City, to execute the deed of absolute sale in
favor of Ramona in lieu of the defendants (i.e., the petitioner and the Coronels).

On May 19, 1998, the petitioner and the Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s orders of October 1, 1997 and March 10, 1998,
but the CA dismissed the petition on July 30, 1998.

On August 21, 1998, the petitioner and the Coronels presented their motion for reconsideration in the CA.

On September 2, 1998, the RTC held in abeyance the respondents’ motion reiterating previous motion to resolve respondents’ motion, whereby the
respondents sought an order to direct the petitioner to surrender her TCT No. 331582, and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the petitioner’s
copy of said TCT for her failure to comply with the earlier order for her to surrender the TCT to the Registrar of Deeds pending resolution by the CA of the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Ultimately, on September 30, 1998, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner thus appealed to the Court, which denied her petition for review for being filed out of time. The Court also denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on April 21, 1999.

Thereafter, the respondents moved in the RTC for the resolution of their pending motion. After the RTC granted the respondents’ pending motion on July
29, 1999, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration against such order, but the RTC denied her motion on September 23, 1999.

Following the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the petitioner commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s action
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 55576). However, the CA dismissed her petition through its decision dated December 5, 2000, Rollo, pp. 61-69, and denied her motion
for reconsideration on April 16, 2002. 11

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner submits that the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale
despite the lack of indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property; and in sustaining the order of the RTC directing the Branch Clerk of
Court to execute the deed of absolute sale without first requiring the defendants to execute the deed of absolute sale as required by the decision.

Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Res judicata barred petitioner’s objection

In the complaint dated February 22, 1985, respondent Concepcion, as plaintiff, categorically averred that she was a Filipino citizen. 12 The petitioner did not
deny or disprove the averment of Filipino citizenship during the trial and on appeal. The petitioner did not also advert to the issue of citizenship after the
complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff, despite the petitioner’s opportunity to do so.

Yet, now, when the final decision of the RTC is already being implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by assailing the directive of the RTC
for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City, on the ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines.

The petitioner’s move was outrightly unwarranted.

First: The petitioner did not raise any issue against Ramona’s qualifications to own land in the Philippines during the trial or, at the latest, before the finality
of the RTC judgment. The petitioner was thereby deemed to have waived the objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court
shall dismiss the claim. (2a)

In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available defenses and objections in order that the matter in issue can
finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contest before the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity. Without the rule, there will be no end
to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply raise "new" or additional issues in order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an
already final and executory judgment. The endlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs for the parties, and can surely contribute to the
unwarranted clogging of court dockets. The prospect of a protracted litigation between the parties annuls the very rationale of every litigation to attain
justice. Verily, there must be an end to litigation.

Second: The petitioner cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle the question of the respondents’ qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. It is
fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. 13 Thus, in Gabuya v. Layug,14 this Court had the occasion to hold that a
judgment involving the same parties, the same facts, and the same issues binds the parties not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat their claims or demands, but also as to any other admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all other matters that could
have been adjudged in that case.

Third: The present recourse has not been the only one taken by the petitioner and her counsel to assail the qualification of Ramona to acquire and own the
subject property. In fact, the Court catalogued such recourses taken for the petitioner herein in A.C. No. 5469, entitled Foronda v. Guerrero,15 an
administrative case for disbarment commenced on June 29, 2001 by Ricardo A. Foronda (an attorney-in-fact of the respondents) against Atty. Arnold V.
Guerrero, the attorney of the petitioner, 16 as follows:

1. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband Eleuterio Mabanag v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, et al. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47710:
 A special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction filed
with the CA, on the ground that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, excess or lack of jurisdiction "in issuing and/or refusing
to stay the execution of its decision." The respondent put forth the argument that Ramona Patricia Alcaraz, being a foreign national, was
incapacitated to purchase the subject property due to the limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

The petition was denied, with the CA ratiocinating as follows:

We are not impressed. We find the trial court’s stand on the matter to be legally unassailable. In the first place, petitioner is not the proper party to
question the qualification or eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz. It is the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, which has the legal personality
and the authority to question the qualification of Ramona Alcaraz to own rural or urban land. In the second place, the decision sought to be
executed has already gained finality. As held by the Supreme Court, when a court’s judgment or order becomes final and executory it is the
ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce its judgment (Rollo, p. 65-66).

2. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, et al. v. Concepcion Alvarez, et. al. docketed as G.R. No. 135820:

This petition was filed by the respondent on behalf of his clients asking the Supreme Court to review the decision of the CA dismissing the petition
for injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710. The petition was denied for having been filed out of time, and the motion for reconsideration therefrom was
denied with finality on April 21, 1999.

3. Spouses Eleuterio & Catalina Mabanag v. Ramona Patricia Alcaraz and the Register of Deeds for Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
97-31268:

A complaint for "Declaration of Inability to Acquire Real Property and Damages" filed in the RTC QC, Branch 83. In its Order dated July 9, 1999, the
court dismissed the case on the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping. The RTC observed that "for failure of the plaintiffs in this case to get a
favorable decision from the earlier case, they tried to prevent the execution by disqualifying the herein defendant Alcaraz"

4. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag v. Emelita L Mariano, Concepcion D. Alcaraz and Ramona P. Alcaraz, et
al. docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43396:

An action for "Annulment of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." In its Order dated March 20, 2001, acting on the injunctive aspect of the case, the RTC denied the injunction prayed for "for failure of
the plaintiff to make at least a prima facie showing of a right to the issuance of the writ." The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondent on behalf of his clients was denied on June 18, 2001. Acting on the defendant’s Special and Affirmative Defenses and Motion to
Dismiss, the court issued an order dated January 16, 2002 dismissing the complaint finding that the decision in Civil Case No. Q-44134 had
already been turned over to complainant as attorney-in-fact of defendants Alcarazes.

5. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag v. Emelita L Mariano, Concepcion D. Alcaraz and Ramona P. Alcaraz, et
al. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783 (Annex "12," Comment)

A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction filed by Atty.
Guerrero on behalf of Catalina Balais-Mabanag. The CA dismissed the petition on June 14, 2002, and pointed out the following:

a) On December 5, 2000, the Twelfth Division of the CA had already affirmed the decision of the RTC that the authority of the Register of
Deeds was confined only to the determination of whether all the requisites for registration are complied with. To authorize the Register of
Deeds to determine whether Ramona Alcaraz was qualified to own real property in the Philippines was to clothe the Register of Deeds with
judicial powers that only courts could exercise.

b) The issue as to whether Ramona Alcaraz was qualified to own real property had been passed upon by the Third Division of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47710.

c) The Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 103577 upheld the RTC and the CA when it ruled on October 7, 1996 that the sale
of the subject land between Alcaraz and the Coronels was perfected before the sale between Mabanag and the Coronels.

6. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, etc. v. Emelita L. Mariano et al. docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75911:

Appeal filed by Atty. Guerrero on behalf of Catalina Balais-Mabanag on February 1, 2003 after Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 for Annulment of Title
and Deed of Absolute Sale and Damages was dismissed by RTC QC, Branch 80.

7. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag v. Hon. Estrella Estrada, The Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
Concepcion D. Alcaraz and Ramona Patricia-Alcaraz docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55576:

A special civil action for certiorari, questioning the order of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-44134, ordering Balais-Mabanag to surrender the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 331582 to the Alcarazes. The CA dismissed the petition on December 5, 2000 with the final note, to wit:

The Supreme Court Third Division as well as in G.R. No. 103577, on October 7, 1996, ruled: "Thus the sale of the subject parcel of land between
petitioners and Romana P. Alcaraz, perfected on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was
correctly upheld by both the lower courts below.["]

Obviously, the lower court’s judgment has become final and executory as per Entry of Judgment issued by the Supreme Court. "It is axiomatic that final
and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land…"

All the aforestated recourses have had the uniform result of sustaining the right of Ramona to acquire the property, which warranted a finding against
Atty.Guerrero of resorting to forum shopping, and leading to his suspension from the practice of law for two years. 17 Such result fully affirms that the
petitioner’s objection is now barred by res judicata.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of cause of action. 18

The guiding principle of the doctrine of res judicata was formulated by Vice Chancellor Wigram in an English case circa 1843, thus:

xxx that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to
that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of
litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because
they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to
points which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the
subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. 19

The doctrine is also known as estoppel per rem judicatam and involves both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. The purpose of the doctrine is
two-fold – to prevent unnecessary proceedings involving expenses to the parties and wastage of the court’s time which could be used by others, and to
avoid stale litigations as well as to enable the defendant to know the extent of the claims being made arising out of the same single incident. 20
Under the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. 21 The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in
law or estate.22

Petitioner lacked the capacity to institute suit

It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualifications to acquire land.

Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185,23 the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Although
the law does not categorically state that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien transferee of land, it is
nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person
to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any
individual; and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous
owner or any other individual.

Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject property, the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership
over the subject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State in accordance with
Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.

Deed of absolute sale executed

by Branch Clerk of Court was valid

The petitioner contends that the RTC did not see to it that the writ of execution be first served on her, and a demand for her compliance be first made;
hence, the deed of absolute sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court to implement the judgment was void.

We do not agree.

The CA found that it was the petitioner who did not comply with the notice of the sheriff of the implementation of the judgment through the writ of
execution;24 and that her non-compliance then justified the RTC’s order to the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the
final judgment rendered in G. R. No. 103577.

The fact that the petitioner and her counsel maneuvered to thwart, or, at least, to delay the inevitable execution of the judgment warranted the RTC’s
directing the Branch Clerk of Court execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the judgment. The RTC’s effort to implement the judgment could not be
stymied by the petitioner’s deliberate refusal to comply with the judgment. Such deliberate refusal called for the RTC to order the Branch Clerk of Court to
execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona, which move of the trial court was precisely authorized by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. — (a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title. — If a judgment directs a
party who execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act in connection
therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other
person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the
Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may be an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force
and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. (10a)

A Word of Caution

In A.C. No. 5469,25 the Court observed as follows:

It has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such numerous petitions in behalf of his client, the respondent thereby engaged in forum shopping. The
essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another,
or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to
claim substantially the same reliefs.

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case
by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.  Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court’s processes and
1âwphi1

improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the
lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to
disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts,
and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.

We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that
they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter, the respondent violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He
also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."

The Court reminds that its foregoing observations on the deleterious effects of forum shopping did not apply only to Atty. Guerrero, but also to the
petitioner as the client whom he represented. Thus, this decision becomes a good occasion to warn both the petitioner and her attorney that another
attempt by them to revive the issue of Ramona’s lack of qualification to own the land will be swiftly and condignly sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision dated December 5, 2000 promulgated in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 55576 is
affirmed.

Costs to be paid by the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate justice
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*

Acting Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD***
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice