MODULE 2-B.

EQUAL PROTECTION

• Political, Economic and Social Equality

a) Art. II, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)
b) Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of women and men)
c) Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service)
d) Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (legal aid to poor)
e) Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates)
f) Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 2 (reservation of marine resources)
g) Art. XII, Sec. 10 (nationalization of business)
h) Art. XIII, Sec. 1 and 2 (social justice)
i) Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (protection to labor)

101) Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, December 2, 2010)
FACTS: After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption
involving third level public officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. All it can do is gather, collect,
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and thereafter submit its findings and make recommendations to the Office of the President,
Congress, and the Ombudsman. It cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to
create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for
specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration.

Biraogo, the petitioner, asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the
President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law and such power cannot be
presumed.

The petitioner adds that the President is only authorized by law (Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987) to reorganize his office, thus, his cannot serve as
the basis for the creation of the PTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of Congress;

2. Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

HELD:

1. The President has the authority to create the PTC, not a public office. Majority of the members of the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC finds basis on the president’s power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that “control” is
essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected the OSG’s
claim that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly,
“restructure” under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This presupposes
an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.

2. The majority members of the Supreme Court held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. Laying down a long line of
precedents, the ponencia reiterated that equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination.

The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is just being used “as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution” and that E.O. 1 is only an “adventure in partisan hostility.” While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was
inspired with noble intentions, the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that “the end does not justify the means.” It
emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds, for “ours is still a government of laws and
not of men.”
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

102) People of the Philippines vs. Jumauan (722 SCRA 108)

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of
December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for
refusing to have sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact,
both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed.
He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her
so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and
instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously
order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not
appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from
where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely
declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully
they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her
hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me
because I’m not feeling well.”
Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the
control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage,
if not consensual, is rape.
Violation of equal protection clause
The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime
and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.
The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been
asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to
withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and
pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.
Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without
her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines
and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

103) Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014)

FACTS: This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service
Act of the Philippines) was passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners. The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC). The law required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the employ of duly licensed
real estate brokers. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clause and infringes the ownership rights of real
estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal protection clause as owners of private properties are
allowed to sell their properties without the need of a licensed real estate broker. The provisions in question are – o Section 29. Prohibition Against the
Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. o Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly substantive due process.

RULING: NO. The requirements for substantive due process are – 1. Lawful government purpose; and 2. Reasonable means necessary for the
accomplishment of the lawful purpose. The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards. The law
recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting national progress.
The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as it merely regulates the conduct of business,
and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.

Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and owners of private who want to sell their private property. Unlike individuals or entities
having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business
which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

MODULE 2-B-1. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (TESTS)

146) Short Title: Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
Full Title: G.R. No. 167614; March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, vs. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc. under a POEA-
approved Contract of Employment. On the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for
the position of Second Officer upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would eventually be made Chief Officer.
However, respondents failed to deliver on their promise to petitioner. Petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months, but at the time of his repatriation, he had served only 2 months and 7 days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims.

Labor Arbiter – rendered a Decision declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits (petitioner’s salary for three months of the
unexpired portion of the employment contract)
o Basis: RA 8042, Sec. 10
Sec. 10.   Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less.

NLRC – Modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision but lowered the money claim of petitioner because overtime pay was removed (still based on the three months
unexpired portion of the contract. CA – affirmed NLRC’s decision

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042 violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in
that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process. Said provision exacerbates the
hardships borne by OFWs by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump sum salary either for the unexpired
portion of their employment contract or for the 3 months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION: The constitutional issue should not be entertained for it was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not
at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.

ARGUMENTS OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995; its provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum
terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.

NLRC – The NLRC corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Motion was denied. Petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.

CA- Dismissed petitioner’s motion due to technicality. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Petitioner raised that the CA erred to not acknowledge the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably,
unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months. The law in question is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 –
Migrant Workers Act, to wit:
 Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas
employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package and; (2) It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats
OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in
case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts?
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected
sector.

RULING:
1. NO.  Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive is not tenable. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.”

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already
perfected. As to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under
Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

2. YES. The subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected
sector. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law” and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits
should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied
the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation;
however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of
the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class. 
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the
deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged
classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and
c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to
Congress in exercising its legislative power. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or  the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution  with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny,
for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs.
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract.
The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to
monetary award equivalent to only three months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. The disparity becomes more aggravating with the fact that
prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire
unexpired portion of their employment contracts. 

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs
based on their employment periods, in the process   singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and
subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for three months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of
one year. There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a
 strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means. In the present case, the Court dug
deep into the records but found no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the
subject clause. The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates
not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23
days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042. The 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

MODULE 3. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

• Art. III, Sec. 3(1)

• Concept, Basis and Aspects

147) Whalen vs. Roe [429 US 589 (1977)]

148) Morfe vs. Mutuc (G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968)

149) Disini vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)

• Zones of Privacy

150) In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio vs. Senator Gordon

(G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006)

• Exclusionary Rule

• Art. III, Sec. 3(2)

151) Silverthorne Lumber vs. US [251 US 385 (1920)

152) People vs. Aruta (G.R. No. 120915, April 3, 1998)

153) People vs. Rondero (G.R. No.125687, December 9, 1999)

• Art. III, Sec. 2

154) Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)

155) Nacague vs. Sulpicio Lines (G.R. No. 172589, August 8, 2010)

• Art. III, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 17 (Penumbra)

156) Griswold vs. Connecticut [381 US 479 (1965)]

157) Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998)

• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

158) Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998)

159) Pollo vs. Constantino-David (G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

160) Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong [160 SCRA 861 (1988)]

• R.A. 1405 Secrecy of Bank Deposits

162) Republic of the Philippines vs. Eugenio (G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008)

• R.A. No. 4200 [Anti-Wire Tapping Law (1965)]

• Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299. Revised Penal Code

163) Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General NEDA (G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006)

164) Sps. Hing vs. Choachuy (G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

165) Gaanan vs. IAC [145 SCRA 113 (1986)]

• R.A. No. 1017 [Data Privacy Act (2012)]

• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24

• Privileged Communications

170) In Re: Laureta [148 SCRA 382 (1987)]

171) People vs. Albofera, [152 SCRA 123 (1987)]

172) Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [253 SCRA 699 (1996)]

• Writ of Habeas Data [A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (January 22, 2008)]

175) Lee vs. Ilagan (G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014)

• Art. 26, Civil Code

• Art. 32, Civil Code, Liability for Damages

176) Aberca vs. Ver [160 SCRA 590 (1989)]

• R.A. 8293 Intellectual Property Code

• Art. 723, Civil Code

MODULE 4. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

• Art. III, Sec. 4

• Art. III, Sec. 18(1)

• Nature, Scope, Basis and Purpose

177) Chaves vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)

179) US vs. Bustos [37 Phil. 731 (1918)]

180) Burgos vs. Chief of Staff [133 SCRA 800 (1984)]

181) New York Times vs. Sulliven [380 U.S. 51 (1964)]

182) Abrams vs. US [250 U.S. 616 (1919)]

• Freedom from Prior Restraint, Censorship, Obscenity and the Right to Privacy

186) Ejercito vs. COMELEC (742 SCRA 210)

187) GMA Network Inc. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

204) Miller vs. California [413 U.S. 15 (1973)]

205) US vs. Bustos [37 Phil. 731 (1918)]

208) Soriano vs. Laguardia (G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)

209) Fernando vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006)

211) FCC vs. Pacifica Foundation [438 U.S. 726 (1978)]

212) Kingsley Books vs. Brown (354 US 436)

213) Near vs. Minnesota [283 US 697 (1931)]

• Freedom from Subsequent Punishment

218) Thornhill vs. Alabama (310 US 880

• Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions, Libel, and National Security

222) Espuelas vs. NBI [132 SCRA 316 (1984)]

226) Texas vs. Johnson [491 U.S. 397 (1989)]

231) Newsweek Inc. vs. IAC (G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986)

232) MVRS Publication Inc. vs. Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils. (G.R. No. 135306, January 28,

2003)

233) US vs. O’Brien [391 U.S. 367 (1968)]

• Administration of Justice

234) Cabansag vs. Fernandez (102 Phil. 152)

235) People vs. Alarcon [69 Phil. 265 (1939)]

236) In Re: Ramon Tulfo (AM 90-4-1545-0, April 17, 1990)

• Government Speech, Parliamentary Immunity and Libel

240) Osmena vs. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960)

241) Jimenez vs. Cabangbang (G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966)

• Balancing of Interest Test

• Dangerous Tendency Test

• Clear and Present Danger Test

• Grave-but-Improbable Danger Test

• Direct Incitement Test

• Intermediate Review

242) Chaves vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)

245) Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.147571, May 5, 2001)

246) ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000)

247) Sanidad vs. COMELEC (G.R. 90878, January 29, 1990)

254) Schenck vs. US [249 U.S. 47 (1919)]

255) Yates vs. US [354 U.S. 298 (1957)]

256) Dennis vs. US [341 U.S. 494 (1951)]

257) Brandenburg vs. Ohio (395 US 444)

258) Reno vs. ACLU (D-96-511, June 26, 1997)

260) David vs. Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

MODULE 5. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

• Art. III, Sec. 4

• Art. III, Sec. 5

• BP Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)

261) IBP vs. Mayor Lito Atienza (G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010)

262) Primicias vs. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71 (1948)]

272) De Jonge vs. Oregon [229 US 353 (1937)]

273) Evangelista vs. Earnshaw (57 Phil 255)

MODULE 6. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

• Art. III, Sec. 8

• Art. IX, Sec. 2 (5)

• Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 2

• Art. XIII, Sec. 15

274) Ang Ladlad LGBT vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

275) SSS Employees Association vs. CA (G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989)

276) United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) vs. Laguesma (G.R. No. 122226, March 25, 1998)

MODULE 7. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

• Art. III, Sec. 5

• Art. II, Sec. 6 (Separation of State and Church)

• Free Exercise Clause, Benevolent Neutrality Doctrine, Clear and Present Danger Test and

Compelling State Interest

288)Fonacier vs. CA [96 Phil. 417 (1955)]

289) Imbong vs. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

290) Ronulo vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014)

296) Swaggart Ministries vs. Cal Bd. of Equalization [493 U.S. 378 (1990)]

297) Torcaso vs. Watkins [367 U.S. 488 (1961)]

298) Cantwell vs. Connecticut (310 US 296)

299) West Virginia Board of Education vs. Barnette [319 U.S. 624 (1943)]

• Non-Establishment Clause

302) Ang Ladlad LGBT vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

303) Garces vs. Estenzo (104 SCRA 510)

304) Glassroth vs. Moore 229 [F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002)]

305) Epperson vs. Arkansas [33 U.S. 27 (1968)]

306) Lemon vs. Kurtzman [403 U.S. 602 (1971)

308) Schools District of Abington vs. Schempp [374 U.S. 203 (1973)]

309) Board of Education vs. Allen (392 US 236)

310) Tilton vs. Richardson (403 US 672)

311) Newdow vs. US Congress (328 F.3D 466)

312) Engel vs. Vitale [370 U.S. 421 (1962)]

314) Stone vs. Graham [449 U.S. 39 (1980)]

• Tax exemption

• Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3)

• Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)

• Public aid to religion

315) In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano (A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

316) Aglipay vs. Ruiz [64 Phil. 201 (1937)]

317) Islamic Da ‘wah Council vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003]

318) Mueller vs. Allen [463 U.S. 388 (1983)]

319) Wallace vs. Jaffree [472 U.S. 38 (1985)]

• Religious Test

320) Torcaso vs. Watkins [367 U.S. 488 (1961)]

321) In Re: Summers (325 US 561

322) People vs. Zosa (38 OG 1676)

• Art. VI, Sec. 5(2)

• Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(5)

• Religious instruction in public schools

• Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3)

• Operation of Sectarian schools

• Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2)

• Civil Code, Art. 359(1)

MODULE 8. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

• Art. III, Sec. 7 (Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern)

• Art. II, Sec. 28 (Policy of Full Public Disclosure

• Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016 (Freedom of Information Program)

• Scope, Restrictions and Limitations

• Access to Court Records

• Canon II - Confidentiality Code of Conduct for Court Personnel (A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC)

323) IDEALS vs. PSALMS (G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)

324) Antolin vs. Domondon (G.R. No. 165036 & 17505, July 5, 2010)

325) Baldoza vs. Dimaano [71 SCRA 14 (1976)]

326) Tanada vs. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985; G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986)

MODULE 9. LIBERTY OF ABODE

• Art. III, Sec. 6

340) OCA vs. Macarine (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012, formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-2255-MTJ)

341) Salonga vs. Hermosa [97 SCRA 121 (1989)]

342) Caunca vs. Salazar [82 Phil. 851 (1940)]

343) Manotok vs. CA [142 SCRA 149 (1986)]

MODULE 10. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

• Art. III, Sec. 20

• Debt and Poll Tax

354) Ganaway vs. Quillen (42 Phil 805)

355) Ajeno vs. Inserto (71 SCRA 166)

356) Flores vs. Tatad (96 SCRA 676)

MODULE 11. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

• Art. III, Sec. 18 (2)

• Art. II, Sec. 4

• Art. 311, Civil Code

• Art. 247, Revised Penal Code

367) Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao [39 Phil. 660 (1919)]

368) US vs. Pompeya (31 Phil 245)

369) People vs. Zosa (38 O.G. 1676)

375) Pollock vs. Williams (322 US 4)

376) Hodges vs. US [203 U.S. 1 (1906)]

377) Robertson vs. Baldwin (165 US 24)

MODULE 12. CITIZENSHIP

• Art. IV, Sec. 2

378) Valles vs. COMELEC (337 SCRA 543, August 9, 2000)

379) Maria Jeanette Tecson vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004)

380) Republic vs. Chule Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004)

• Naturalization

383) Bengzon III vs. HRET and Cruz (G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001)

384) Republic vs. Batuigas (G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013)

385) Limkaichong vs. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009)

• Full and Complete Compliance with Naturalization Laws

387) Edison So vs. RP (G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007)

388) Republic vs. Huang Te Fu (G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015)

389) Republic vs. Kerry Lao Ong (G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012)

• R.A. 8171 (Repatriation of Filipino Women and Natural Born Filipinos)

• R.A. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003)

390) Tabasa vs. CA (G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006)

391) Maquiling vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

392) Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

• Citizenship, Dual Allegiance, Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship

394) Mercado vs. Manzano (G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999)

395) Calilung vs. Datumanong (G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007)

396) Lopez vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008)

MODULE 13. SUFFRAGE

• Art. V, Sec. 1 and 2

407)Macalintal vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003)

408)Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006)

409)Velasco vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008