Republic of the Philippines ISSUE:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant,  RULING:
vs.
JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole,
represented by ERAÑO G. MANALO, as Executive
Minister,respondents-appellees.
 AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
1. January 9, 1953 – INC acquired from Andres
Perez Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio
Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313
square meters and an assessed value of
P1,350. This is in exchange for a lot with an
area of 247 square meters owned by the church.
2. The said lots are already possessed by Perez in
1933. They are not included in any military
reservation. They are inside an area which was
certified as alienable or disposable by the
Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted
to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A
chapel exists on the said land. The land had
been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty
taxes had been paid therefor.
3. September 13, 1977 – INC filed with the CFI of
Bulacan, an application for the registration of the
2 lots under section 48(b) of the Public Land
Law. It alleged that INC and its predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the land for more than
thirty years.
4. Republic opposed the application on the
grounds that applicant, as a private corporation,
is disqualified to hold alienable lands of the
public domain, that the land applied for is public
land not susceptible of private appropriation and
that the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest have not been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land
since June 12, 1945.
5. CFI granted INC’s application.
6. Republic appealed.
1
Whether or not the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV
of the Constitution that "no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area" applies to applicant Iglesia ni Cristo as
a private corporation.
The Supreme Court (SC) sustained the appeal. The
CFI’s judgment is reversed and set aside. The
application for registration of Iglesia ni Cristo is
dismissed.
The SC held that the INC, as a corporation sole or a
juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold
alienable lands of the public domain:
1. Because of the constitutional prohibition, and
2. Because INC is not entitled to avail itself of the
benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to
Filipino citizens or natural persons. A
corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English
law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic
Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See
Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97
Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo
(its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are
private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs.
Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct.
What was considered private land in the Susi case was
a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since
time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular
Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935
and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this
case do not fall within that category. They are still public
lands. A land registration proceeding under section 48(b)
"presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA
641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890,
"all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the
right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a
confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo" and that
before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant
is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land
since it still pertains to the State.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982  a. The said land, after having been
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-
appellant,  spouses for more than thirty years, had
vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch
XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  corporation from acquiring alienable
respondent-appellees.
 AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
1. Meralco, a domestic corporation, more than 60%
of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino
citizens, in its application filed on December 1,
1976 in the Makati branch of CFI of Rizal,
prayed for the confirmation of its title to 2 lots
with a total area of 165 square meters, located
at Tanay, Rizal (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC
No. N-50801).
2. The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos
before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941.
On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the
spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio
who constructed a house thereon. Because
Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its
steel post on the land, Piguing spouses sold the
2
lot to Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had
been declared for realty tax purposes since
1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid
thereon.
3. Republic opposed the application on the
grounds that the applicant, as a private
corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable
public lands and that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have not been in the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing
of the application.
4. CFI dismissed the application because Meralco
is not qualified to apply for the registration of the
said land since under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural
persons can apply for judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco
is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that
the land which it seeks to register is public land.
5. Meralco appealed to SC under Republic Act No.
5440.
6. Meralco contends that:
possessed in the concept of owner by
Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing
become private land in the hands of the
latter, and, therefore, the constitutional
prohibition, banning a private
public land, is not applicable to the said
land.
b. It has invoked section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law, not for itself, but for
the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino
citizens, could secure a judicial
confirmation of their imperfect title to the
land.
ISSUE:
This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article
XIV of the Constitution that "no private coporation or
associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed on ethousand
hectares in area". * That prohibition is not found in the
1935 Constitution.
* The same issue is involved in the following fourteen
pending cases. (1) G.R. No. 51756, Iglesia ni Cristo vs.
Director of Lands, et al.; (2) G.R. No 54045, Director of
Lands vs. Dynamarine Corporation, et al.; (3) G.R. No.
54276, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, et al.; (4)
G.R. No. 54952, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Gabriel
Valley, Jr., et al.; (5) G.R. No. 55171, Director of Lands
vs. Hon. Job B. Madayag, et al.; (6) G.R. No. 55289.
Director of Lands vs. Hon. Candido Villanueva, et al.; (7)
G.R. No. 56025. Republic vs. Hon. Arsenio Gonong, et
al.; (8) G.R. No. 56613, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni
Cristo, et al.; (9) G.R. No. 57272, Director of Lands vs.
Valenzuela Tannery Corporation, et al.; (1) G.R. No.
57461, Director of Lands vs. Manila Electric Company,
et al.; (11) G.R. No. 58077, Director of Lands vs.
Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., et
al.; (12) G.R. No. 58089, Director of Lands vs.
Continental Leaf Tobacco (Phil.), et al.; (13) G.R. No.
58117, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Emmanuel Cleto, et
al., and (14) G.R. No. 58906, Director of Lands vs.
United Church of Christ in the Phil., et al.
RULING:
SC affirmed CFI’s judgment dismissing Meralco's
application.
As between the State and Meralco, said land is still
public land. It would cease to be public land only upon
the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still
public land and Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section
48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course
or has to be dismissed.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which
rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a
pervasive principle of public land law and land
registration law, that "all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain.” An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-
interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest."
(Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed.
594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132).
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and
Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of
the public domain from time immemorial by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the
land ceases to be public" and becomes private property.
3
That ruling is based on the Cariño case which is about
the possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors
since time immemorial or even before the Spanish
conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was
possessed before 1880 or since a period of time
"beyond the reach of memory". That is not the situation
in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the
Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in
possession of the land since time immemorial.
In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act
No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section
48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894
gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the
occupant had complied with all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a
certificate of title.
On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508,
510-11, it was held that while occupants of public land,
who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "teian
asimismo a su favor la presuncion juris et de jure de que
habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias
para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se
expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los
verdaderos dueños del terreno in este dejo de
pertenecer a los terrenos publico del Estado
susceptibles de enajenacion."
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a
piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to
be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in
the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached
by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his
application for confirmation of his imperfect title was
pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution
sale of the land were void.
For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title
is sought to be confirmed are governed by the Public
Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the
Public Land Law if they were already private lands. The
occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the
Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but
asderecho dominical incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if
the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of
their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the
Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to
register the said land in its name, there being no legal
prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land
to the Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same
contention in the Oh Cho case said:
The benefits provided in the Public Land
Act (meaning the confirmation of an
imperfect title under section 48[b]) for
 applicant's immediate predecessors-in-
interest are or constitute a grant or
concession by the State; and before they
could acquire any right under such benefits,
the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-
interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had
been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This the applicant's immediate
predecessors-in-interest (meaning the
Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed
to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to title which was transmissible
to the applicant. The only right, if it may
thus be called, is their possession of the lot
which, tacked to that of their predecessors-
in-interest, may be availed of by a qualified
person to apply for its registration but not
by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified. (75 Phil. 890, 893.)
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand)
alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an
occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we
should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a
Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the
land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535,
July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
Note: Justice Teehankee, in his dissenting opinion,
voted for reversal of respondent court's judgment in
the Meralco case and for the entry of a new
judgment granting Meralco's application and for
affirmance of judgment in the second case granting
the Iglesia application.
Facts of INC case based on Teehankee’s narration:
The land covered by the Iglesia application of
September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots
located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total
area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value
of ₱1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on
January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot
owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters.
The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933.
Admittedly also it is not included in any military
reservation and is inside an area which was certified
4
since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion
of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on
the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax
purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes
were regularly paid thereon.
Republic presented no evidence in support of its
opposition but expressly submitted the case for decision
on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant.
Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the
application for registration of the land in the name of the
Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily
established that applicant Iglesia and its predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and
adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona fide
claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to
the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to
the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as
amended.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Involved in these two cases are the applications of
petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation,
in the first case and respondent Iglesia in Cristo, a
religious corporation sole, in the second case (both
admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and
own private lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles
to small parcels of land, residential in character as
distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by
them by purchase or exchange from private
persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30]
years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to
adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case
of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980
case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as
amended, that where a possessor has held the open,
exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable
public land for the statutory period provided by law (30
years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942
approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that
the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and "by
legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the
public domain and has become private property."
Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and
of the Public Land Act against private corporation
holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in
the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have
acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property at the time of the sale to them and
therefore their applications for confirmation of title by
virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and
title may be duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of
November 26, 1976 consists of two (2) small lots with a
total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal
with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land was
possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which
broke out in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the
land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and
Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon.
But because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy"
of its steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold
the land to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land
had been declared for realty tax purposes since
1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is
residential in character as distinguished from strictly
agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not
included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it
had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable
portion of the public domain.
The land covered by the Iglesia application of
September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small
lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with
a total area of 313 square meters and with an
assessed value of ₱1,350.00. The land was acquired
by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez
in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an
area of 247 square meters. The land was already
possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not
included in any military reservation and is inside an
area which was certified since 1927 as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had
been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the
name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly
paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the
Republic's opposition and dismissed the application,
holding that under both the provisions of the new
Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a
corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to
apply for the registration of title over the public land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic
presented no evidence in support of its opposition but
expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis
of the evidence submitted by the applicant." Respondent
judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding
that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant ]
Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the
land . . . under a bona fide claim of ownership for more
than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application"
5
and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for
under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold
that both applications for registration should be granted
by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since
the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to
the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in
question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be
lands of the public domain upon completion of the
statutory period of open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the
applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified
natural persons and entitled to registration by right of
acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public
Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the
Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment
entered granting Meralco's application, while the
judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed.
The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:
It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22,
1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons who have occupied lands of the public domain
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed
may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the
certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration
Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by
operation of law converted into private land upon
completion of the 30th year of continuous and
unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter
as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and
owned by private corporations or does such land, as
held by respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain
part of the public domain and does not become private
land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings
and the formal court order for the issuance of the
certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court
since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of
cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held
therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the
time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a
private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public domain and becomes private property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession
was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in
section 45(b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926; whereas at present, as provided
for in the corresponding section 48, par.(b) of the later
and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on
June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open
and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated
that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court applied section 45 (b)
of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now
section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26,
1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the
occupant had complied with all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to
a certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding
section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to
is reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's
opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of
open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period,
acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from
the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the
land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property at least by
presumption" as expressly provided in the Act.
Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands
of the same land to another person was void and of no
effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover
the land as his private property from the supposed
vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had
ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus
specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts
of the case, that:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b)
of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,
that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through
his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
6
domain, openly continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said
Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in
her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of
the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal function, Valentin Susi had acquired
the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land
over which he had no longer any title or control, and the
sake thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela
Razon did not thereby acquire any right." 6
2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed
and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of
cases, as follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, the Court held that "(I)n
the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was
observed that where all the necessary requirements for
a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed
to have already acquired by operation of law not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an
application therefor being sufficient under the provisions
of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section
50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)." and "(C)onsidering
that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on
a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is
already barred by the statute of limitations, which
apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of
registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of
fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the
decree, which theory does not apply here because the
property involved is allegedly private in natural and has
ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the
opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his
claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, the Court stressed that
by force of possession, the land in question became
private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, the Court quoted with
favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and
its ratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the land
in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession
of which is in dispute, had already
become, operation of law, private property,
there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his
title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an
action to recover the possession thereof and
hold it.
In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, the Court again held that
where possession has been continuous, uninterrupted,
open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a
presumption juris et de jure that all necessary conditions
for a grant by the State have been complied with and he
would have been by force of law entitled to the
registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs.
Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48
Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, the Court once
more reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious
error of the respondent Court in holding that after one
year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same
can no longer be reopened to be declared and void, and
has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . Secondly,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself
and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent.
This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took
effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: . . . As
interpreted in several cases when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine,
the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable
public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of
7
the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and
the public land is converted to and becomes private
property upon a showing of open and unchallenged
possession under bona fide claim of ownership by the
applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory
period of thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed
up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et
de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the
applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a
corporation from filing the application for registration of
the private property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in
the Meralco case expressly finds as established
facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had
possessed and occupied as owners the land in question
for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed the same since the last world war in 1941
and then having sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the
Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and
continuously possessed the same until they sold the
same in turn to the Meralco on August 13,
1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore
acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a
Government grant to the property, as well as acquired
ownership thereof by right of acquisitive
prescription over the land which thereby became private
property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil
Code provides that "By prescription one acquires
ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in
the manner and under the conditions laid down by law."
The law does not provide that one acquires ownership of
a land by prescription only after his title thereto is
judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling
in Cariño vs. Insular Government 13, wherein the U.S.
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held
that
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5
attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do
not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that
an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it.
The words"may prove" (acrediten), as well, or
better, in view of the other provisions, might
be taken to mean when called upon to do so in
any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none
 sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and
Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not
obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his
certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple
title."
5. Since the public land because private property upon
completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and
unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's
predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing
spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there
is no justification for denying the Meralco's application
for registration of its duly acquired title to the land.
Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired
ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as
provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code.
The land became private property and Meralco duly
acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's
application to register the property because it is not a
natural person is unjustified because neither the new
constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against
private corporations owning lands of the public domain
or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of
application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of
the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land
had long ceased to be public land but had become
private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks
confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land
which had become private property of its predecessors-
in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and
unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years
acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself.
There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title
being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase
and traditio — for it is not claimed that there is any legal
prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the
ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons
or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even
before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to
them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not
having filed the application for registration in the name of
the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against
their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither
is there any prohibition against the application being
8
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the
end result of their application being granted, because of
their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation
of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided
in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all
the rituals as the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco
vs. City of Davao 14)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the
names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the application for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and
sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with
equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already
stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application
was granted because the Republic presented no
evidence in support of its opposition and respondent
judge held in effect that the property had ceased to be
land of the public domain and had become private
property, the title to which could be duly issued in the
name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its
predecessors-in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here
are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the
Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for
its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a
nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical
service to the consumer public, and of 313 square
meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church
built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its
members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of
the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against
corporations "holding alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue
control and exploitation of our public lands and natural
resources by corporations, Filipino and foreign-
controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the
granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations
in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land
at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use
and benefit of the public.
9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the
"supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1)
from the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi
down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to
11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr.
Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State
and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would
cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under
section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5),
suffice it to cite his own pronouncement
in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing
doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it
cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the
unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is
"conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr.
Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court
that "As interpreted in several cases . . . the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The and, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent."
In only remains to point out, in order to avoid
misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De
Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the
discussion of the question of whether the land involved
is still public or already private land, is, however,
entirely pointless or an idle exercise, if We consider the
provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution
which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides
that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain'" (at page 2)
that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case
is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its
acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly
are ‘corporations or associations' within the meaning of
the aforecited provisions of the New Constitution. This
observation should end all arguments of the issue of
whether the land in question is public or private land"
(idem) might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that
corporations with 60% Filipino ownership
may not own private lands when the express provisions
of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by
himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935
Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-
owned corporations to own private lands, and the only
change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11
which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to
own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
9
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's
judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new
judgment granting Meralco's application and for
affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the
Iglesia application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56025 November 25, 1982 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE ARSENIO M. GONONG and
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Tapalla, Cruz, Peren & Associates for respondents.
FACTS:
1. July 20, 1953 – INC acquired a parcel of land
from Gregorio Gamet who was in possession for
more than 30 years. The property is situated in
Bo. Binacag, Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, with an area
of 922 square meters. The lot was declared for
realty tax purposes in 1954 and taxes paid
thereon since then. A chapel stands on the land.
2. March 17, 1980 – INC filed with the CFI of Ilocos
Norte an application, under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law, for registration of the subject
parcel of land.
3. Republic, through the Director of Lands, filed an
opposition on the grounds that the INC, as a
private corporation, is disqualified to hold
alienable public lands and that the applicant and
its predecessor-in-interest had not been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.
4. November 21, 1980 – CFI granted INC’s
application.
 5. Republic filed MR on the sole ground that the
applicant, as a private corporation, is
disqualified to hold lands of the public domain.
Respondent Judge Artemio Gonong denied
reconsideration.
6. Republic appealed stressing INC's
disqualification to hold lands of the public
domain except by lease pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
7. INC argues that it does not suffer from any
disqualification because a corporation sole is
not the owner but a mere administrator of the
property titled in its name for the benefit of its
members; and that the constitutional ban is
inapplicable to it because the property sought
to be registered is not alienable public land but
private property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition in Section 11, Article XIV
of the 1973 Constitution that "no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area" applies to applicant Iglesia ni Cristo as
a private corporation.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic. The
respondent Judge's Decision, dated November 21, 1980
is SET ASIDE and INC’s application for registration
dismissed.
It held that:
1. The subject property is a public land; and
2. INC, as a corporation sole, is disqualified to
acquire or hold alienable lands of the public
domain.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
We find for petitioner, following our Decision in Republic
of the Philippines vs. Judge Candido P. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875 (June 29, 1982), penned by Mr. Justice
Ramon C. Aquino, and which is squarely on all fours
with the Petition under consideration. In so far as the
nature of the property involved is concerned, our
categorical pronouncement therein is that the same is
public land:
10
“The contention in the comments of the
Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file
any brief) that the two lots are private
lands, following the rule laid down in
Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands,
48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was
considered private land in the Susi case
was a parcel of land possessed by a
Filipino citizen since time immemorial as
in Carino vs. Insular Government, 212
U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935
and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be
registered in this case do not fall within
that category. They are still public lands.
A land registration proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land
is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20
SCRA 641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of
Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 'an lands that were
not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish
conquest.'
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was
noted that the right of an occupant of
public agricultural land to obtain a
confirmation of his title under section
48(b) of the Public Land Law is a
'derecho dominical incoativo' and that
before the issuance of the certificate of
title the occupant is not in the juridical
sense the true owner of the land since it
still pertains to the State.”
And in respect of the disqualification of the Iglesia as a
private corporation, which overrules the view of the Trial
Court that it is a natural person, we explicitly held:
“As correctly contended by the Solicitor
General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a
corporation sole or a juridical person, is
disqualified to acquire or hold alienable
lands of the public domain, like the two
lots in question, because of the
constitutional prohibition already
mentioned and because the said
church is not entitled to avail itself of
 the benefits of section 48(b) which
applies only to Filipino citizens or
natural persons. A corporation sole (an
'unhappy freak of English law') has no
nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic
Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil.
596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung
Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49
of the Public Land Law).”
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease.”
2. Whether the subject lands are private lands
as contended by INC citing Susi vs. Razon.
RULING:
The Supreme Court set aside the appealed decisions of
the lower courts and dismissed INC’s applications for
registration.

Republic of the Philippines 1. The lands applied for may not be registered in
SUPREME COURT the name of INC.
Manila
2. The subject lands are not private lands.
FIRST DIVISION
RATIO DECIDENDI:
[G.R. No. L-59447 December 27, 1982]
1. It was held that the INC, as a corporation sole or
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or
Director of Lands and the Director if Forest hold lands of the public domain because of the
Development), Petitioner, constitutional prohibition, and because INC is
vs. not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Section 48 (b) which applies only to Filipino
represented by its Executive Minister ERAÑO G. citizens or natural persons. It cited Meralco vs.
MANALO, Respondents.
Bartolome 114 SCRA 799 and Republic vs.
Villanueva 114 SCRA 875.

[G.R. No. L-60188 December 27, 1982] 2. What was considered private land in Susi vs.
Razon was a parcel of land possessed by a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Filipino citizen since time immemorial. The lots
Director of Lands, Petitioner, sought to be registered by INC are still public
vs. lands. A land registration proceedings under
JUDGE DOMINADOR S. CENDAÑA of CFI-La Union, Section 48(b) “presupposes that the land is
Branch II and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Respondents.
public”.
Solicitor General for Petitioner.
The SC held, citing Oh Cho. Vs. Dir. of Lands,
Eliseo M. Cruz for Respondents. that “all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the
PLANA, J.: rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his
FACTS: predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the
1. These are 2 land registration cases instituted presumption that the land had never been part
by INC, a corporation sole, under Section 48 of the public domain or that it had been a private
(b) of the Public Land Act. property even before the Spanish conquest.”
2. The applications were granted by the lower
courts. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Republic appealed. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
ISSUE: Manila

1. Whether the lands applied for may be FIRST DIVISION

registered in the name of INC in the light of
the Constitutional provision that “no private G.R. No. L-35273 July 25, 1983
11
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, petitioner,  RULING:
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE, BRANCH I COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA and
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
1. Subject property is a parcel of land located in
Sagana, Laur, Nueva Ecija, with an area of 19
hectares. It is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302
in the name of Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in
the name of INC.
2. DBP acquired the property in a foreclosure sale
on April 2, 1952 from Emilio Libunao in whose
name the same was previously registered on
January 10, 1938 by virtue of a homestead
patent of June 19, 1937.
3. INC acquired said property from Victoria
Maravilla who was the registered owner of a
parcel of land including the land in question
under O.C.T. No. O-918 by virtue of a
decree/decision Rec. No. 55018, Reg. Case No.
3244 of the CFI of Nueva Ecija on March 24,
1954 and registered in the Register of Deeds on
June 1, 1954.
4. The land covered by O.C.T. No. O-918 was
subdivided into 4 lots with separate titles; that
the lot in question falls within Lot B-2, Psd-
47351 which INC acquired from Victoria
Maravilla on November 5, 1964, and now
covered by T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in INC’s name.
5. DBP filed an action against INC before CFI of
Nueva Ecija.
6. CFI declared INC’s title (NT-53573) to be null
and void and ordered the Reg. of Deeds to
cancel said title. INC was ordered to deliver the
possession of the property to DBP.
7. INC filed MR but CFI denied.
8. INC filed instant petition.
ISSUE: Which of the 2 titles is superior, an earlier title
secured administratively or a later title secured thru
judicial proceedings?
12
SC affirmed CFI decision. It ruled that a Torrens title
earlier secured administratively is superior to a later title
secured thru judicial proceedings.
Emilio Libunao (DBP’s predecessor-in-interest) was
given a homestead patent in 1937 and the Torrens Title
in 1938. Victoria Maravilla (INC’s predecessor-in-
interest) registered her supposed title to the property
only in 1954 or 17 years later. It is therefore, the title of
Maravilla which should be declared a nullity. She filed an
application for land registration over property which had
already been awarded by the State to Emilio Libunao 17
years earlier and a title to which had already been
registered, 16 years before the registration of Maravilla’s
title.
SC followed the general rule that where two certificates
of title are issued to different persons covering the same
land in whole or in part, the earlier date must prevail as
between the original parties, and in case of successive
registration where more than one certificate is issued
over the land, the person holding under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person
who relies on the second certificate.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Maravilla could not legally claim that she owned the lot as her
private property prior to its registration in her name in 1954 and
even prior to 1938 when title was registered in the name of
Libunao pursuant to a homestead patent.
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the
two lots are private lands, following the rule laid
down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands,
48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was
considered private land in the Susi case was a
parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen
since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular
Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41
Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be
registered in this case do not fall within that
category. They are still public lands. A land
registration proceeding under section 48 (b)
"presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao
vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967,
20 SCRA 641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil.
890, "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part
 of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest."
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted
that the right of an occupant of public
agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his
title under section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law
is a "derecho dominical incoativo and that
before the issuance of the certificate of title the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State. (Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875
and Republic v. Gonong, 118 SCRA 729)
There is absolutely no showing in this case that the exceptional
circumstances mentioned in Cariño v. Insular
Government and Oh Cho v. Director of Lands are present.
Even assuming that the land was not yet registered in
another's name when Maravilla filed the registration
proceedings, the land would have been public land in the strict
legal sense before 1954 as far as she was concerned.
The petitioner cannot assail the validity of the title of
respondent Bank's predecessor after 29 years from its
registration. Our Land Registration Law provides that upon the
expiration of one year from and after the date of the entry of
the decree of registration, the said decree and the certificate of
title shall become incontrovertible and indefeasible (P.D. 1529,
Section 32). This provision is equally applicable to titles
acquired through homestead patents. In the case of Lahora v.
Dayang-hirang (37 SCRA 346; see also Lopez, et al. v. Padilla,
et al.; 45 SCRA 44; Ramirez v. CA 30 SCRA 297) this Court
held:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public
patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is
that where land is granted by the
government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor, is recorded,
and the certificate of title is issued to the
grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically
brought within the operation of the Land
Registration Act, the title issued to the
grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of said
Act. In other words, upon the expiration of
one year from its issuance, the certificate of
title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible
like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding.
In the case of Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, et al. (39 SCRA
676) we held that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to
Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of
said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the
Land Registration Act. We should add that the Director of
Patents, being a public officer, has in his favor the presumption
of regularity in issuing the questioned homestead patent.
As a ground for setting up the second assignment of error, the
petitioner refutes the relevancy of the above rule to the case at
bar asserting that where the action is not for the revision of the
13
decree of registration on the ground of fraud but rather for the
cancellation of the patent and certificate of title on the ground
that they are void because the Bureau of Lands had no
jurisdiction to issue the patent, the one-year period provided for
in section 38 of Act 496 does not apply. It cites Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 71-76). It adds that
a certificate of title based on a patent is still subject to certain
restrictions even after the expiration of one year from its
issuance pursuant to our resolution in Nieto v. Quinez (6 SCRA
74).
Petitioner forgets that it was the defendant in this case. In other
words, what was sought to be cancelled was its Torrens Title
and not that of the respondent Bank. In raising such an
argument, the petitioner relies on the premise that the
homestead patent and its corresponding title are void for lack
of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to issue the said patent
for the main reason that the land covered by the homestead
patent was already of private ownership when it was issued. In
fine, petitioner belatedly attacks the validity of the respondent
Bank's title after it had become incontrovertible for twenty eight
(28) years already. To reiterate, the rule on the
incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title after one
year from entry of the decree of registration does not sanction
this procedure.
Considering the circumstances of this case, we follow the
general rule that where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part,
the earlier date must prevail as between the original parties,
and in case of successive registration where more than one
certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under the
prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who
relies on the second certificate. (Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, (102 SCRA 370); Pajomayo et at v. Manipon et al.
(39 SCRA 676); Legarda v. Saleeby (31 Phil. 590); De Villa v.
Trinidad (22 SCRA 1167,1174); Hodges v. Dy Buncio (6 SCRA
287); Register of Deeds v. PNB (13 SCRA 46); Alzate v.
PNB (20 SCRA 422); Garcia v. Court of Appeals (95 SCRA
380); Gatioan v. Gaffud (27 SCRA 706).
The resolution of the first and second assignments of errors
disposes of the third alleged error. We apply the ruling
in Pajomayo, et al v. Manipon et al. (39 SCRA 676) that where
the same parcel of land is covered by two titles, necessarily
when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other,
the latter should be declared null and void and should be
cancelled. Petitioner claims that it is an innocent purchaser for
value and as such is entitled to the protections provided by law
particularly the guarantee of indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of a Torrens Title after the expiration of one
year within which to file a petition for review. The respondent
Bank is the innocent purchaser for value in this case and is
more entitled to the protection claimed by the petitioner. The
rule on successive registration controls. The Land Registration
Court had no jurisdiction to decree anew the registration of a
land already decreed and titled. It had no power to bestow
validity upon the second decree. (Singian v. MRR Co. (60 Phil.
192, 203); Mabuhay Development Co. v. Ronquillo (38 SCRA
439); Lahora v. Dayanghirang (37 SCRA 346)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-32521. September 2, 1983.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. HON.
GUARDSON R. LOOD, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, and the QUEZON CITY
DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING
CORPORATION, Respondents.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Arsenio G. Velasquez for Private Respondent.
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS:
1. January 13, 1970 – Quezon City Development
(QCD) filed an application with CFI-Rizal, seeking
the registration of title under Act 496 claiming
to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
(Plan Psu-226726) in Taytay, Rizal, containing an
area of 8,840 square meters.
2. QCD claimed that it acquired said property from
Aurelia del Rosario and Fidel del Rosario and
that QCD and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, exclusive, peaceful, adverse and
continuous possession and enjoyment of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial.
3. July 27, 1970 – Director of Lands opposed on
the ground that QCD has no sufficient title to
the land, not having acquired the same either
by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title
pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894; that applicant and its predecessors have
not been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in question for
at least 30 years, and that the land is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic.
4. August 6, 1970 – respondent Judge granted the
application.
14
ISSUE:
Whether or not applicant QCD, being a juridical person,
is disqualified to apply for registration under Section 48
(b) of Public Land Law.
RULING:
SC set aside lower court’s decision and dismissed the
application for the registration of title filed by QCD.
Applicant, being a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for registration under Section 48 (b) of Public
Land Law.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
HOWEVER, WE take note of the fact that in its
application for registration of title, private respondent
invoked the provisions of Section 48, Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 107, as amended
by Republic Act 1942, and further amended by Republic
Act 2061, as the latter itself and its predecessors in
interest have been in possession of the land since time
immemorial. The Public Land Law provides:
"CHAPTER VIII. — Judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles.
x       x       x
"SEC. 48. The following described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lauds or am interest
therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x       x       x
"(b) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors interest
have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the
 public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
approved on June 22, 1957.)
x       x       x
"SEC. 49. No person claiming title to
lands of the public domain not in
possession of the qualifications
specified in the last preceding section
may apply for the benefits of this
chapter."
Applicant-private respondent Quezon
City Development and Financing
Corporation, being a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply subject property
for registration under Section 48 (b). In
G.R. No. L-49623, entitled: Manila
Electric Company v. Judge Floreliana
Castro-Bartolome, et al., promulgated
on June 29, 1982, this Court held that:
"As between the State and the Meralco,
the said land is still public land. I t
would cease to be public land only upon
the issuance of the certificate of title to
any Filipino citizen claiming it under
Section 48(b). Because it is still public
land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its
registration under Section 48(b),
Meralco’s application cannot be given
due course or has to be dismissed."
TEEHANKEE, J.,dissenting:
In line with my consolidated dissenting opinion in
the Iglesia ni Kristo and Meralco cases (G.R. No.
55289 and G.R. No. L-49623, both promulgated on
June 29, 1982), which is hereby reproduced by
15
reference for brevity’s sake, I concur with the
dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar. I join his
call therein for reexamining the ruling in the
aforesaid cases, considering that the acquisition of
the small parcels of land therein for well-nigh
public purposes was long before the prohibition of
the 1973 Constitution and therefore was still
governed by the 1935 Constitution which allowed
acquisition by corporations of public lands up to
1,024 hectares.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
The 1935 Constitution should govern the instant
case. The facts show that the Quezon City
Development and Finance Corporation (QCDFC),
100% owned by Filipino citizens, filed on January
13, 1970 an application for registration of title
under Act No. 496, as amended, claiming to be the
owner of a parcel of land of about 8,840 sq. m.
situated in sitio Malaking Bundok, barrio Dolores
of Taytay, Rizal, which it purchased on December
20, 1969 from Amelia del Rosario and Fidel del
Rosario, who inherited the same from Macario del
Rosario, who owned and possessed the said parcel
since 1892 until his death during the Japanese
occupation; and that its possession, together with
that of its predecessors-in-interest, has been
peaceful, continuous, open and adverse in concept
of an owner also since 1892.
The applicant further prays that, should the
application be not favorably considered, he invokes
the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act,
otherwise known as CA No. 141, as amended by
R.A. Nos. 107, 1942 and 2061 (pp. 6-7, rec.).
On July 17, 1970, the Director of Lands, through
the Solicitor General, filed an opposition on the
ground that:
"x  x   x
"2. That neither the applicant(s) nor its
predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to said parcel(s) of land
the same having been acquired by them
either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory
information title under the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894;
"3. That neither the applicant(s) nor its
predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question for at least thirty
 (30) years immediately preceding the
filing
of the present application;
"4. That the aforementioned parcel(s) of
land is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines" (p. 8, rec.).
The decision of the lower court which was promulgated
on August 6, 1970 was received on August 14, 1970 by
the Solicitor General, who filed the instant petition for
review practically reiterating the same grounds of his
opposition adding one more ground, thus:
"1. It is admitted that neither the
applicant nor its predecessor-in-interest
had any title or grant from the Spanish
sovereignty — not even an imperfect or
incomplete title — the only basis of its
claim of ownership is possession (since
time immemorial) which, however, as
found by the lower court, was placed at
1892.
"2. The application for registration of
title was filed only on January 13, 1970,
long after the expiration of RA 2061 on
December 31, 1968. Thus, the applicant
can no longer avail of the benefits of
Section 47, et seq. of Public Land Act,
CA 141, as amended by RA 2061.
"3. On the other hand, the nature of the
land applied for as established by the
very evidence of the applicant, is that it
is "montañoso" and hence, must be
presumed to be part of the public
domain.
"4. Consequently, the decision subject of
this appeal which applied an expired
law, was rendered by the Court without
jurisdiction and as such, null and void"
(p. 4, rec.).
It should be stressed that the application was filed
on January 13, 1970 and the decision of the trial
court was rendered on August 6, 1970 — both
before the adoption of the new Constitution on
January 17, 1973.
The majority opinion is predicated solely on the
fact that under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, only a Filipino citizen, not a juridical
person, can file an application for a judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title
over alienable public land, relying on Our ruling in
the case of Manila Electric Co. v. Judge Floreliana
Castro-Bartolome, etc., Et Al., promulgated on
June 29, 1982 (G.R. No. L-49623).
16
The pertinent provisions of Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution read
thus:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural . . . lands of
the public domain . . . belong to the
State, and their disposition
exploitation, development or
utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines, or to corporations
or associations at least 60% of the
capital stock of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the
inauguration of the government
established under this Constitution.
. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
"Sec. 2. No private corporation or
association may acquire, lease or
hold public agricultural lands in
excess of one thousand twenty-four
hectares, nor may any individual
acquire such lands by purchase in
excess of one hundred forty-four
hectares, or by lease in excess of
one thousand twenty-four hectares,
or by homestead in excess of
twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted
to grazing, not exceeding two
thousand hectares may be leased to
an individual, private corporation or
association" (Emphasis supplied).
It should be noted from the
aforequoted provision of Section 1 of
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
that the disposition, exploitation,
development or utilization of
agricultural lands of public domain,
was limited to Filipino citizens or to
corporations or associations at least
60% of the capital stock of which is
owned by Filipino citizens.
It should likewise be emphasized
that by virtue of the clause "subject
to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the
inauguration of the government
(Commonwealth) . . .," a mining
claim of an American corporation
already perfected prior to the
inauguration of the Commonwealth,
was protected against such
nationalization provision in the case
of Gold Creek Mining Co. v.
Rodriguez (66 Phil. 259), even if
such perfected mining claim was not
yet covered by a torrens title.
It should also be underscored that
the aforequoted Section 2 of Article
XIII allows a qualified private
corporation or association to acquire
or hold public agricultural lands of
not more than 1,024 hectares in
area.
It is therefore patent that the
provision of Section 48(b) of C.A.
141, as amended, limiting the
acquisition of public agricultural
lands only to Filipino citizens was
unconstitutional before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution;
because as aforestated the 1935
Constitution does not prohibit
qualified corporations or
associations from acquiring
agricultural lands of the public
domain as long as the area does not
exceed 1,024 hectares. The area
involved in the instant case is only
8,840 sq. m. — less than a hectare.
The 1935 Constitution did not
authorize Congress to totally and
completely disqualify private
corporations to acquire public
lands.
The right to apply for a judicial
confirmation of an incomplete or
imperfect title was already vested
prior to the 1973 Constitution as
the applicant acquired the same on
December 20, 1969. Furthermore,
the applicant corporation succeeded
to the same vested right of its
predecessors Amelia del Rosario and
Fidel del Rosario who inherited such
vested right from their late
predecessor, Macario, who owned
and possessed the same land since
1892 until he died during the
Japanese occupation.
This right long vested in the
applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest prior to the 1973
Constitution, cannot be impaired by
Section 11 of Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution, which totally and
absolutely bans private corporations
17
or associations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not
exceeding 1,000 hectares in area.
As heretofore stated, the 1935
Constitution permits such
acquisition by private organizations
or associations of alienable public
lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares
in area.
The general rule is that
constitutional provisions should be
given prospective, if not retroactive,
effect unless retroactivity is
expressly provided or necessarily
implied (See Magtoto v. Hon.
Manguera, Et Al., L-37201-02;
Simeon, Et. Al. v. Hon. Villaluz, etc.,
Et Al., L-37424; People v. Hon.
Isnani, etc., Et Al., L-38929, March
3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4; 16 Am. Jur.,
2nd Ed., pp. 283-85; Black’s
Constitutional Law, 2nd Ed., p. 69).
There is nothing in the 1973
Constitution expressly giving
retroactive effect to Section 11 of
Article XIV thereof. Neither such
retroactivity is necessarily implied
by the said Section 11 of Article XIV
or from any other provisions of the
1973 Constitution. Nor is there any
intimation in the journals of the
proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971-72 indicating
such retroactive effect or any
intention to deprive qualified
persons, natural and juridical, of
any right already vested under the
1935 Constitution and long before
January 17, 1973.
The recent case of Meralco v. Judge
Floreliana Castro Bartolome, etc., Et
Al., decided on June 29, 1982 is not
decisive of the case at bar; because
in said case, the land was possessed
by one Olimpia Ramos before the
Pacific War which broke out in 1941
(without specifying the exact date
when the possession of Ramos
began). On July 3, 1947, Ramos
sold the land to the spouses Rafael
Piguing and Minerva Inocencio, who
in turn sold the same lot on August
13, 1976 to Meralco, which filed its
application for registration on
December 1, 1976. It should be
noted that on August 26, 1976, the
sale of the Piguing spouses to
Meralco and the application of
Meralco on December 1, 1976 was
effected over three years after the
effectivity of the new Constitution
which absolutely prohibits private
corporations or associations from
holding or acquiring alienable land
on the public domain except by
lease (Sec. 11, Art. XIV, 1973
Constitution).
In Republic v. Honorable Arsenio M.
Gonong, etc. and Iglesia ni Kristo,
decided on November 25, 1982, the
Iglesia ni Kristo acquired on July
20, 1953 the land of about 922
square meters in Barrio Pinacag,
Espiritu, Ilocos Norte from Gregorio
Gamet who allegedly possessed the
same for more than thirty (30) years.
Since 1954, the Iglesia ni Kristo
declared the same for taxation
purposes, paid the corresponding
taxes and built a chapel thereon. On
March 17, 1980, the Iglesia applied
for the confirmation of its title over
the said parcel of land under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Law.
In Republic v. Judge Villanueva,
etc., Et. Al. and Iglesia ni Kristo, etc.
(G.R. No. 55289, June 29, 1982),
the combined area of the lots
involved is 313 square meters which
lots were acquired on January 9,
1953 by the Iglesia from Andres
Perez in exchange for a lot with an
area of 247 square meters owned by
the said church. Perez have
possessed the lot since 1933. After
its acquisition of the said two lots,
the Iglesia constructed a chapel
thereon and declared the same for
realty tax purposes. On September
13, 1977, the Iglesia filed an
application for registration of the
two lots under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law.
It seems there is a need of re-
examining the doctrine in the
aforesaid two cases, considering
18
that the acquisition by the Iglesia
was also long before the 1973
Constitution and therefore was still
governed by the 1935 Constitution
which allowed such acquisition by a
qualified juridical entity of an area
not exceeding 1,024 hectares (Sec.
2, Art. XIII, 1935 Constitution).
It should be stressed that in the
aforesaid two cases of Iglesia ni
Kristo, the constitutional question
was not raised and therefore was
never discussed. It was assumed all
along that the prohibition under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act is
valid because it was not challenged
as unconstitutional under Section 2
of Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND
DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-61145. February 20, 1984.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of
Lands), Petitioner,
v. IGLESIA NI CRISTO and JUDGE DOMINGO M.
ANGELES, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Respondents.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Joaquin Ortega and Cruz, Esguerra, Tafalla Peren &
Associates for Respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
1. November 6, 1976 – INC filed an application for
confirmation and registration of its title over 2
parcels of land located at Barrio Calabaca and
the poblacion of Capalonga, Camarines Norte
with areas of 300 and 599 square meters used
as sites of its chapels.
2. The town lot was purchased by INC on May 30,
1955 from Josefina Diezmo who in turn
purchased it from Esteban Arcea who had used
 the lot for residential purposes since 1920. The
realty taxes had been paid up to the time
Diezmo possessed the lot.
3. The Calabaca lot was purchased by INC on July
18, 1973 from Basilio Parale who inherited it
from his father Simeon. It used to be coconut
land. Simeon possessed the lot since 1920 and
used it for residential purposes. He paid realty
taxes on the land.
4. Director of Lands opposed the application.
5. April 30, 1982 – Trial court granted the
application.
6. Republic appealed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not INC, as a corporation sole, is
entitled to register lands under section 48(b) of
the Public Land Law.
2. Whether or not INC is disqualified under section
11, Article XIV of the Constitution to hold
alienable public lands except by lease.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the trial
court’s decision and dismissed INC’s application.
It held that:
1. INC is not entitled to register under section 48(b)
of the Public Land Law.
2. INC is disqualified under section 11, Article XIV
of the Constitution to hold alienable public lands
except by lease.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Iglesia and its predecessors claimed to have actual,
public, peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the two lots in the concept of an owner for
more than thirty years preceding the filing of the
application. No realty taxes were paid by the Iglesia
because it is an exempt corporation.
The Republic appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 in
relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court
found, and it is a matter of judicial notice, that the Iglesia
"is a duly registered corporation sole" (Exhs. E and F).
As the application is for confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title, that
19
application is necessarily subject to the following
provisions of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act
No. 141.
"SEC.48. The following described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
unless the Land Registration Act, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this
chapter." library
(c) . . .
"Sec.49. No person claiming title to
lands of the public domain not in
possession of the qualifications
specified in the last preceding section
may apply for the benefits of this
chapter.”
The Iglesia is not a Filipino citizen. The lands in question
are still public lands until registered (Heirs of Pelagio
Zara v. Director of Lands, 127 Phil. 8). Moreover, under
the aforecited section 11 of Article XIV, it is disqualified
as a corporation to hold lands of the public domain
except by lease. (Manila Electric Company v. Castro
Bartolome, L-49623, June 29, 182, 114 SCRA 799;
Director of
Lands, v. Lood, L-32521, September 2, 1983, 124
SCRA 460).
The Iglesia in its appellee’s brief has not shown that it is
not covered by the said constitutional and statutory
provisions. Its statement on page 2 of its brief that it "is
not a religious corporation" when it
filed its application is belied by the facts.
It contends that it is entitled to register the lands as a
trustee. This contention is erroneous. The unarguable
fact is that it is a corporation sole governed by section
109 et sequitur of the Corporation Code. It did not apply
for registration as a trustee. As stated at the outset, the
matter is subject to the governing principle of stare
decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents
and do not disturb
what has been settled).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND
DIVISION
[G.R. No. 54952. March 5, 1984.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the
Director of Lands), Petitioner,
v. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, with its Executive Minister
ERAÑO G. MANALO as CORPORATION SOLE and
HON. GABRIEL O. VALLE, JR. as Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch
II, Respondents.
4. July 23, 1980 – CFI rendered decision
adjudicating the land applied for registration in
favor of INC. CFI stated that INC is not within
the contemplation of Section 11, Article XIV of
the Constitution but said corporation sole can
qualify as applicant pursuant to the provision of
Section 14 of Presidential Decree 1529.
5. Republic appealed stressing INC’s
disqualification to hold lands of the public
domain except by lease pursuant to Section 11
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
6. INC argues that Section 11, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution is inapplicable to the land
involved herein because the land sought to be
registered is a private property or has ceased to
be part of the alienable public domain by reason
of acquisitive prescription for more than thirty
(30) years, and its adverse, continuous
possession in the concept of an owner; that INC
is but a mere administrator of the land titled in its
name for the benefit of its members, creating
thus, a trust relationship in its favor; that as
trustee or authorized representative of its
members, INC can exercise their right to have
the questioned land titled in its name under PD
1529.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the INC, as a corporation sole, is
qualified to apply for registration of a 614 sq. meter
parcel of land in its name in the light of the prohibition in
Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
RULING:

The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Tafalla, Cruz, Gagarin & Associates for Private
Respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
1. August 7, 1979 – INC filed with the CFI of Ilocos
Norte an application under PD 1529 for
registration of a 614 sq. meter parcel of land
situated in San Pedro, Vintar, Ilocos Norte.
2. INC acquired the property by virtue of a deed of
sale dated April 10, 1978 from Carmen Racimo
whose predecessors-in-interest possessed the
same for more than thirty (30) years.
3. Republic opposed the application.
The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition. It
set aside respondent Judge’s decision and dismissed
INC’s application for registration.
It held:
1. INC, as a corporation sole or a juridical person,
is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands
of the public domain because of the
constitutional prohibition.
2. INC is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of
Section 48 (b) which applies only to Filipino
citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole
has no nationality.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
We agree with petitioner’s stand, following our decision
in Republic v. Judge Candido Villanueva, et. al., 114
SCRA 875 (June 29, 1982) to which We have made

20
reference at the threshold of this decision as well as the
subsequent cases of Republic v. Hon. Arsenio Gonong,
et. al. G.R. No. L-56025 (Nov. 25, 1982); Republic v.
Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 59447, and its
companion case of Republic v. Judge Dominador
Cendaña, et. al., G.R. No. 60188 (Dec. 27, 1982).
All that has been stated by this Court in the
aforementioned cases in interpreting Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Law (C.A. 141, as amended by R.A.
1942) applies with equal force in the instant case where
the application for registration of the herein parcel of
land was, in essence, sought on the basis of the alleged
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the said land by respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
registration on August 7, 1979.
Records reveal that no application for confirmation of
incomplete or imperfect title had been filed by
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Law. Under the law, the
questioned land retains its public character. The
application for registration under Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) which, among
others, recognizes possession of alienable lands of the
public domain in the manner and for the length of time
therein required as basis for registration of title to the
land, did not remove the land from the operational effect
of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. It nevertheless
strengthens the conclusion that the land never ceased to
be part of the public domain. xxx
As indicated earlier, the issue raised is already a settled
matter. In Republic v. Judge Candido Villanueva, et. al.,
supra, this Court made the following categorical
pronouncement:
"As correctly contended by the Solicitor-
General the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a
corporation sole or a juridical person is
disqualified to acquire or hold alienable
lands of the public domain, like the two
lots in question, because of the
constitutional prohibition already
mentioned and because the said church
is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits
of Section 48 (b) which applies only to
Filipino citizens or natural persons. A
corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of
English law") has no nationality (Roman
Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. v.
Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil.
596. See Register of Deeds v. Ung Siu Si
Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and Section 49 of the
Public Land Law).
"The contention in the comments of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any
brief) that the two lots are private lands,
21
following the rule laid down in Susi v.
Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil.
424, is not correct. What was considered
private land possessed by a Filipino
citizen since time immemorial as in
Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S.
449, 531 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7
Phil. 132. The lots sought to be
registered in this case do not fall within
that category. They are still public lands.
A land registration proceeding under
Section 48 (b) `presupposes that the land
is public’ (Mindanao v. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20
SCRA 641, 644).
xxx
Moreover, it may be observed that respondent relies
strongly on the doctrine laid down in the 1925 case of
Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424, reiterated in Balboa v.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, Mesina v. Vda de Sonza, 108
Phil. 361, Manarpaac v. Cabanatan, 21 SCRA 743,
Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760, Herico v. Dar,
95 SCRA 437, to the effect that lands of the public
domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation
for such a length of time, a grant by the State to the
occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to
form part of the public domain, but is segregated
therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose under the public land
laws or statutes. As pointed out in the separate opinion
by the herein ponente in the cases, of Meralco v. Hon.
Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. 49623 and
Republic v. Hon. Candido P. Villanueva, G.R. No. 55289
(June 29, 1982). x x x
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58077 January 7, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 
vs.
HERMANOS Y HERMANAS DE STA. CRUZ DE
MAYO, INC., and JUDGE JESUS M. ELBINIAS, Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Sta. Maria
Branch, respondents.
 AQUINO, C.J.:
FACTS:
 1. Alejandra Santiago-Zalamea was the possessor
of a residential lot with an area of 281 square
meters located in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
After she died in 1960, the land was inherited by
Nicanor Zalamea who transferred it to his
brother Macario.
2. After Macario's death in 1974, the land was
inherited by his widow and two children who in
1976 sold it to Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta.
Cruz de Mayo, Inc. which erected a chapel
thereon.
3. On December 6, 1977 the corporation filed an
application for registration. It prayed that if the
Land Registration Law is not applicable, then it
should be given the benefit of the Public Land
Law since the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the land
since 1900.
4. The trial court granted the application.
5. The Director of Lands appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent-corporation is
disqualified from registering the subject property.
RULING:
SC reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial
court. The application for registration of the respondent
corporation was dismissed.  predecessors in interest have been in open,
The appeal was sustained because the matter of the
disqualification of respondent-corporation from
registering the lands of the public domain is res judicata.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
This is another land registration case filed by a
corporation. We have dismissed land registration cases
filed by corporations, particularly by Iglesia ni Cristo, in
the following cases:
(1) Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, L-
49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799; (2) Republic
vs.Villanueva, G.R. No. 55289, June 29, 1982, 114
SCRA 875; (3) Republic vs. Gonong and Iglesia ni
Cristo, G.R. No. 56025, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA
729; (4) Republic vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, G.R. No. 59477;
(5) Republic vs.Cendaña and Iglesia ni Cristo, G.R. No.
60188, both decided on December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA
449; (6) Director of Lands vs. Lood, L-32521, September
2, 1983, 124 SCRA 460; (7) Republic vs. Iglesia ni
Cristo, G.R. No. 61145, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA
22
687 and (8) Republic vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, G.R. No.
54952, March 5, 1985, 128 SCRA 44.
One reason for the dismissal is that such a land
registration proceeding is not allowed by section 11,
Article XIV of the Constitution which provides that "no
private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease". A land
registration proceeding presupposes that the land
sought to be registered is a part of the public domain
(Heirs of Pelagio Zara vs. Director of Lands, 127 Phil. 8,
12).
Another reason is that a corporation cannot invoke the
Public Land Law whose provisions on judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles are
available to private individuals only, not to juridical
persons. That law provides:
“Sec. 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who themselves or through their
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 49. No person claiming title to lands of
the public domain not in possession of the
qualifications specified in the last preceding
section may apply for the benefits of this
chapter.”
Here, the land in question is still a part of the public
domain. Consequently, it is covered by the constitutional
ban against juridical persons acquiring such lands. The
fact that the possessory rights thereto have been owned
by private persons (see section 14, Presidential Decree
No. 1529, Property Registration Decree), does not make
the land private land. It ceases to be a part of the public
domain only after it becomes registered land.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD
DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56613 March 14, 1988
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,  did not sufficiently identify the land as it failed to
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Cruz, Esguerra, Tafalla, Peren Castillo & Associates for
respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
FACTS:
This is one of the several cases1  involving the
qualification of private respondent Iglesia ni Cristo, a
corporation sole, to have an alleged alienable piece of
public land registered in its name under the 1973
Constitution.
1. November 28, 1973 – INC filed an application
with CFI of Cavite for registration of parcel of
land with an area of 379 square meters located
at Poblacion, Municipality of Amadeo, Cavite.
2. INC acquired the land thru Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in 1947 by Aquelina de la Cruz.
3. INC alleged actual, continuous, public, peaceful
and adverse possession and occupation of said
land in the concept of owner for more than 30
years.
4. Republic opposed on 2 grounds: 1] INC and its
predecessors-in-interest did not possess
sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple
2] neither INC nor its predecessors-in-interest
1 the land in question since it bore the approval of
The other cases are: Director of Lands v.Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875;
Director of Lands v. Gonong,118 SCRA 729; Republic v. Cendana,
119 SCRA 449; Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 127 SCRA 687; Republic
v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 128 SCRA 44 and Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, 123 SCRA 516.
23
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land
and, 3] subject land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic not subject to
private appropriation.
5. CFI granted the application. Court found 40
years continuous, open and adverse possession
of the property by applicant and predecessor-in-
interest. It declared the land to be within the
proposed alienable or disposable block of the
proposed LC Project No. 5-A of Amadeo, Cavite.
6. Republic appealed to CA on 2 grounds: 1] INC
submit the original tracing cloth plan thereof, 2]
INC was disqualified from holding, except by
lease, alienable lands of the public domain
under Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution.
7. CA affirmed CFI decision.
8. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not INC is disqualified from
holding alienable lands of public domain.
2. Whether or not INC sufficiently established
the identity of the subject land by certified
true copy of the white paper plan.
RULING:
SC denied the instant petition for review on certiorari and
affirmed in toto CA decision in CA-G.R. No. 63498-R.
1. INC is not disqualified from acquiring subject
land. Majority ruling in Meralco vs. Castro-
Bartolome et. al., 114 SCRA 799 is no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct
rule is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for 30 years is converted to
private property by mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure.
2. Yes, INC sufficiently established the identity of
the land by certified true copy of white paper
plan. The true certified copy of the white paper
plan was sufficient for the purpose of identifying
the Land Registration Commission, and was re-
verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands
on April 25, 1974 pursuant to P.D. No. 239
 withdrawing from the Land Registration
Commission the authority to approve original
survey plans.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the
appellate court in ruling that Exhibit "O", the true certified
copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for the
purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O"
was found by the appellate court to reflect the land as
surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of
the Land Registration Commission, and was reverified
and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25,1974
pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing
from the Land Registration Commission the authority to
approve original survey plans. It contained the following
material data: the barrio [poblacion], municipality
[Amadeo] and province [Cavite] where the subject land
is located, its area of 379 square meters, the land as
plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural
boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the
Technical Descriptions signed by a geodetic surveyor
and attested by the Land Registration Commission. In
fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information
necessary for a proper and definite Identification of the
land sought to be registered, thereby serving the
purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is
required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan
was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth
should not detract from the probative value thereof. As
observed by the appellate court:
Now, just because the law requires the
filing of a tracing cloth of the plan, that
We should be too technical about it that
the submission of the certified copy of
the white paper plan instead of the
original of the tracing cloth of the plan
would compel Us to deny the
registration? The object of the law in
requiring the submission of a tracing
cloth of the plan duly approved by the
Bureau of Lands is to establish the true
identity—the location —of the land, in
terms of degrees and minutes in order
that there is an assurance that it does
not overlap a land or portion of land
already covered by a previous land
registration, or that there will be no
possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent survey of any adjoining
land.
In the case at bar, such Identity can be
well-established by the white paper
plan. To Us, it would not matter if the
plan introduced to establish the Identity
24
of the land is made of cloth or is made
of paper. For one thing, a tracing cloth
of the plan is required to be submitted to
the Bureau of Lands. It must have a file
copy of the same. 
Petitioner's heavy reliance on the case of Director of
lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, is misplaced. The original
tracing cloth plan was deemed essential in that case as
the lands involved were vast tracts of uncultivated,
mountainous and thickly forested lands which were
necessarily difficult to Identify, unlike the land subject
matter of the instant registration case which is more
readily Identifiable by reason of its location, its
comparatively smaller size of 379 square meters as well
as the chapel constructed thereon by private respondent
in 1968. Moreover, the documentary evidence presented
therein consisting in the blue-prints of two [2] survey
plans were not approved by the Director of Lands unlike
Exhibit "O" which bore the approval of the Land
Registration Commission at the time it was empowered
by law to approve original survey plans and which was
re- verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands when
the authority to approve original survey plans was
withdrawn from the Land Registration Commission by
P.D. No. 239.
As observed at the outset, had this case been resolved
immediately after it was submitted for decision, the result
may have been quite adverse to private respondent. For
the rule then prevailing under the case of Manila Electric
Company v. Castro-Bartolome et al., 114 SCRA 799,
reiterated in Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 as
well as the other subsequent cases involving private
respondent adverted to above', is that a juridical person,
private respondent in particular, is disqualified under the
1973 Constitution from applying for registration in its
name alienable public land, as such land ceases to be
public land "only upon the issuance of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under section 48[b]" of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended. These are precisely the cases
cited by petitioner in support of its theory of
disqualification.
Since then, however, this Court had occasion to re-
examine the rulings in these cases vis-a-vis the earlier
cases of Carino v. Insular Government, 41 Phil.
935, Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 and Herico v. Dar, 95
SCRA 437, among others. Thus, in the recent case
of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146
SCRA 509, We categorically stated that the majority
ruling in Meralco is "no longer deemed to be binding
precedent", and that "[T]he correct rule, ... is that
alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period [30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended] is converted to private property by mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure." 6 We further
reiterated therein the timehonored principle of non-
impairment of vested rights.
The crucial factor to be determined therefore is the
length of time private respondent and its predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land in
question prior to the institution of the instant registration
proceedings. The land under consideration was acquired
by private respondent from Aquelina de la Cruz in 1947,
who, in turn, acquired by same by purchase from the
Ramos brothers and sisters, namely: Eusebia, Eulalia,
Mercedes, Santos and Agapito, in 1936. Under section
48[b] of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
"those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure" may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act. Said
paragraph [b] further provides that "these shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." Taking the year 1936 as the reckoning point,
there being no showing as to when the Ramoses first
took possession and occupation of the land in question,
the 30-year period of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation required by law
was completed in 1966. The completion by private
respondent of this statutory 30-year period has dual
significance in the light of Section 48[b] of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended and prevailing
jurisprudence: [1] at this point, the land in question
ceased by operation of law to be part of the public
domain; and [2] private respondent could have its title
thereto confirmed through the appropriate proceedings
as under the Constitution then in force, private
corporations or associations were not prohibited from
acquiring public lands, but merely prohibited from
acquiring, holding or leasing such type of land in excess
of 1,024 hectares.
If in 1966, the land in question was converted ipso jure
into private land, it remained so in 1974 when the
registration proceedings were commenced. This being
the case, the prohibition under the 1973 Constitution
would have no application. Otherwise construed, if in
1966, private respondent could have its title to the land
confirmed, then it had acquired a vested right thereto,
which the 1973 Constitution can neither impair nor
defeat.7
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25
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54276 August 16, 1991
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 
vs.
IGLESIA NI KRISTO and HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo, Br. III, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
1. On May 23, 1946, INC acquired a parcel of land
from Gregorio Rolls and Romualdo Rolls (both
of San Marcelino, Zambales). It is situated in
Barrio Consuelo Sur, San Marcelino, Zambales,
containing an area of 280 sq.m.
2. INC declared the land for taxation purposes. The
latest tax declaration started with the year 1974.
The land is exempt from payment of Realty Tax
being devoted primarily for religious purposes.
3. INC filed an application for the registration and
confirmation of title over the property. It was
docketed in the CFI of Zambales & Olongapo,
Branch III (presided by respondent Judge) as
LRC No. N-187-0.
4. Republic opposed the application on the ground
that INC is a private corporation, and that under
Art. XIV, sec. 11 of the Constitution, private
corporations cannot acquire lands of the public
domain but can only hold them by lease in an
area not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
5. CFI rendered judgment on June 2, 1980
decreeing the registration of the land in the
name of INC.
Trial court did not pass upon the Government's
contention that INC was disqualified from
acquiring the land. The decision made findings
that since acquiring the land, INC “has been in
open, public, adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession in the concept of an owner thereof to
the present time," having in fact "put up a chapel
made of concrete materials and galvanized iron
for its roofing;" and that the land is not also
within any military or naval reservation.
 6. Republic appealed. (The weight of authority is) that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period
ISSUE: Whether or not INC was disqualified from prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
acquiring the land in question, whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the
RULING: need of judicial or other auction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property.
Petition is DENIED and the judgment of the respondent
Court dated June 2, 1980 in LRC No. N-187-0 Herico (supra), in particular, appears to
be squarely affirmative:
entitled, "Iglesia ni Kristo, etc. v. Director of Lands, et
al.," is AFFIRMED.
... Secondly, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1942, which the
In ruling that INC was not disqualified from acquiring the respondent Court held to be
land in question, SC applied the doctrine laid down in inapplicable to the petitioner's case,
1986 in Director of Lands v. I.A.C. (146 SCRA 509, 521- with the latter's proven occupation
522, citing Ayog v. Cusi, 118 SCRA 492). and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and
over the lands has vested on
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the petitioner so as to segregate the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction land from the mass of public
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite land. Thereafter, it is no longer
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other disposable under the Public Land
auction, ceases to be public land and becomes private Act as by free patent. ...
property.
As interpreted in several cases
when the conditions as specified in
the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is
RATIO DECIDENDI: deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law a right to a grant, a
The petition will have to be denied in accordance with the government grant, without the
judgment of this Court en banc in Director of Lands v. necessity of a certificate of title
Intermediate Appellate Court handed down on December 29, being issued. The land, therefore,
1986, involving substantially similar facts. That judgment ceased to be of the public domain
reconsidered and declared "no longer ... binding and beyond the authority of the
precedent," Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome, et Director of Lands to dispose of. The
al., promulgated on June 29, 1982, and instead adopted the application for confirmation is a
dissenting opinion therein (based on a line of cases beginning mere formality, the lack of which
with Carino v. Insular Government in 1909 thru Susi v. does not affect the legal sufficiency
Razon in 1925 down to Herico v. Dar in 1980.  of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title
In that case, Director of Lands v. I.A.C. a private corporation, to be issued upon the strength of
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. purchased a tract of land in said patent.
1962 from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, two members of the
Dumagat tribe, but applied with the Court for registration of its Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the
title over the land under the Torrens Act only in July, 1981, logical inevitability of considering possession
long after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution-which inter of public land which is of the character and
alia prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands duration prescribed by statute as the
of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 equivalent of an express grant from the State
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution, in than the dictum of the statute itself (Section
force in 1962 when Acme purchased the land in question). 48 (b) of C.A. No. 141) that the possessor(s)
There being no question that Acme and its predecessors-in- "... shall be conclusively presumed to have
interest had possessed and occupied the land for more than performed all the conditions essential to a
the required 30-year period prescribed in Section 48 of the Government grant and shall be entitled to a
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as certificate of title. . ." No proof being
amended), the question presented to the Court en banc was admissible to overcome a conclusive
whether or not the title that Acme had acquired in 1962 could presumption, confirmation proceedings
be confirmed in its favor in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 would, in truth, be little more than a formality,
when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in at the most limited to ascertaining whether
mind the prohibition therein against private corporations the possession claimed is of the required
holdings lands of the public domain. That question the character and length of time; and registration
Court en banc answered in this wise: thereunder would not confer title, but simply

26
 recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already effected
by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Carino, '...
(T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law.
xxx xxx xxx
... The purely accidental circumstance that
confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution
which forbids corporations from owning
lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came
into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has
already held, in analogous circumstances,
that the Constitution cannot impair vested
rights.
The substantial identity of the facts and issues between the
case at bar and Director of Lands v. I.A.C. being undeniable,
and being cited to no persuasive reason to decline to apply the
doctrine in the latter to the former, the Court, as aforesaid, has
no alternative except to rule adversely to the petitioner.
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180067         June 30, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  alienable only after June 12, 1945?
vs.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with
its Executive Minister ERAÑO MANALO as
Corporate Sole, Respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
1. November 19, 1998 – INC filed an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title before
MCTC, Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte. Subject
of the application is Lot No. 3946 of the Curimao
Cadastre known as Plan Swo-I-001047, situated
27
in Bo. Baramban, Currimao, Ilocos Norte, with
an area of 4,201 square meters.
2. Republic filed an opposition.
3. MCTC granted INC’s application finding the
essential requisites for confirmation of imperfect
title over the property to have been complied
with.
The court appreciated the continuous
possession by INC and its predecessors-in-
interest of the property for over 40 years. The
court gave weight to the following evidence:
sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-I-001047,
technical descriptions of the lot, GE certificate,
and CENRO report showing the lot to be within
alienable and disposable public zone. (Note: It is
undisputed that Lot No. 3946 was certified as
alienable and disposable on May 16, 1993 or a
little over five years before INC filed its
application on November 19, 1998.
4. Republic appealed to CA. It contends that INC’s
possession fell short of the 30-year period
required under Section 48(b) of CA 141
considering that prior to May 16, 1993, the lot
remained to be of public dominion incapable of
private appropriation and that “any period of
possession prior to the date when the lot was
classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded in the
computation of period of possession.”
5. INC argued that what is merely required by
Section 14(1) of PD 1529 is that the property is
already alienable and disposable at the time of
the filing of the application for registration.
6. CA affirmed MCTC’s decision.
ISSUE: May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
prosper when the subject property has been declared as
RULING:
SC denied instant petition and affirmed in toto CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348.
Yes, a judicial confirmation of imperfect title may prosper
when the subject property has been declared as
alienable only after June 12, 1945. Section 14(1) of PD
1529 merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed.
The SC noted the conflicting rulings in Herbieto and
Naguit cases. Herbieto ruled that reckoning of the
possession of an applicant is counted from the date
when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable,
and possession before such date is inconsequential and
must be excluded in the computation of the period of
possession. In Naguit, the reckoning point is the actual
possession of the property and it is sufficient for the
property sought to be registered to be already alienable
and disposable at the time of the application for
registration of title is filed.
The issue was laid to rest in Heirs of Mario Malabanan
vs. Republic where the SC upheld Naguit and
abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto. It held that
“since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since
12 June 1945 and does not require that the land should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.”
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Court’s Ruling
May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper
when the subject property has been declared as
alienable only after June 12, 1945? This is the sole issue
to be resolved.
The petition is bereft of merit. The sole issue raised is
not novel.
The Republic’s Contention
The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946 was
certified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying on Republic v.
Herbieto,13 it argues that prior to said date, the subject
lot remained to be of the public dominion or res
publicae in nature incapable of private appropriation,
and, consequently, INC and its predecessors-in-
interest’s possession and occupation cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights and "any period of
possession prior to the date when the lot was classified
as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded in the computation of the period of
possession."14
The Republic maintains further that since the application
was filed only on November 19, 1998 or a scant five
years from the declaration of the subject lot to be
alienable and disposable land on May 16, 1993, INC’s
possession fell short of the 30-year period required
28
under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. (CA)
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
The Argument of INC
Respondent INC counters that the Court has already
clarified this issue in Republic v. Court of
Appeals (Naguitcase), in which we held that what is
merely required by Sec. 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, is that the "property sought to be
registered [is] already alienable and disposable at the
time of the application for registration of title is
filed."15 Moreover, INC asserts that
the Herbietopronouncement quoted by the Republic
cannot be considered doctrinal in that it is merely
an obiter dictum, stated only after the case was
dismissed for the applicant’s failure to comply with the
jurisdictional requirement of publication.
Necessity of declaration of public agricultural land
as alienable and disposable
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government, and it is indispensable that the
persons claiming title to a public land should show that
their title was acquired from the State or any other mode
of acquisition recognized by law.16 In the instant case, it
is undisputed that the subject lot has already been
declared alienable and disposable by the government on
May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the
application for registration was filed by INC.
Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and Naguit
It must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings
in Naguit and Herbieto, relied on by the parties’
contradictory positions.
Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the
possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was
classified as alienable and disposable, and possession
before such date is inconsequential and must be
excluded in the computation of the period of possession.
This ruling is very stringent and restrictive, for there can
be no perfection of title when the declaration of public
agricultural land as alienable and disposable is made
after June 12, 1945, since the reckoning of the period of
possession cannot comply with the mandatory period
under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in
the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the
reckoning for the period of possession is the actual
possession of the property and it is sufficient for the
property sought to be registered to be already alienable
and disposable at the time of the application for
registration of title is filed.
A review of subsequent and recent rulings by this Court
shows that the pronouncement in Herbieto has been
applied to Buenaventura v. Republic,17 Republic v.
Diloy,18 Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority,19 and Preciosa v. Pascual.20 This Court’s ruling
in Naguit, on the other hand, has been applied
toRepublic v. Bibonia.21
Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic (Malabanan),22 the Court upheld Naguit and
abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto.
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional
Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1)
of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, the
Court ruled that "the more reasonable interpretation
of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed."
The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a citizen to
own alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
as granted under CA 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended by PD 1073, and PD 1529. The
Court observed that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec.
14(1) of PD 1529 are virtually the same, with the latter
law specifically operationalizing the registration of lands
of the public domain and codifying the various laws
relative to the registration of property. We
cited Naguit and ratiocinated:
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property
Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position
that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-
29
in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and
disposable character of the property must have been
declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed
in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable
and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section
14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim
of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which
they are immediately associated, and not those distantly
or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.lavvphi1.net
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would
result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the
OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and
even precludes the government from giving it effect even
as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there
is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of
Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The
contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out
in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision
to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to
12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long
before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail
of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what
would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is
void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite
publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no
need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the
Court’s acknowledgment that the particular line of
argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is
indeed obiter.
Naguit as affirmed in Malabanan more in accord with
the State’s policy
Moreover, we wish to emphasize that our affirmation
of Naguit in Malabanan––as regards the correct
interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 relative to the
reckoning of possession vis-à-vis the declaration of the
property of the public domain as alienable and
disposable––is indeed more in keeping with the spirit of
the Public Land Act, as amended, and of PD 1529.
These statutes were enacted to conform to the State’s
policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of
alienable public lands to spur economic growth and
remain true to the ideal of social justice. 23 The statutes’
requirements, as couched and amended, are stringent
enough to safeguard against fraudulent applications for
registration of title over alienable and disposable public
land. The application of the more stringent
pronouncement in Herbieto would indeed stifle and
repress the State’s policy.
Finally, the Court in Malabanan aptly synthesized the
doctrine that the period of possession required under
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from the time of
the declaration of the property as alienable and
disposable, thus:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as
follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
30
Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period
of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47
of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot
With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in
the findings of the courts a quo that INC had indeed
sufficiently established its possession and occupation of
the subject lot in accordance with the Public Land Act
and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right
to judicial confirmation of imperfect title over subject lot.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when
affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive on, and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as
they are borne out by the record or are based on
substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law
that may have been committed by the lower
courts.24 This is applicable to the instant case.
The possession of INC has been established not only
from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective
halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the
possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio
and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way
before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of
which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents.
These possessions and occupation––from Sabuco,
including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco
to Badanguio to INC––had been in the concept of
owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as
attested to by respondent’s witnesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179155               April 2, 2014
NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, Petitioner,  RTC-Las Piñas had no jurisdiction over a
vs.
EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL,
ESTELLITA BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL,
JOHN BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC
BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF GEORGE
BRACEWELL, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
1. December 10, 1976 – Petitioner (Lozada) filed
an application with RTC- Makati City for
registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land, situated in Las Piñas City,
covered by Plan PSU-129514.
2. February 23, 1989 – RTC-Makati City granted
the application.
3. July 10, 1997 – Land Registration Authority
(LRA) issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name
of Lozada who later obtained OCT No. 0-78
covering the land.
4. February 6, 1998 – within a year from the
issuance of the decree, James Bracewell, Jr.
(Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree
of registration before the RTC-Las Piñas. He
claimed that a portion of Plan PSU-129514
(identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598) of
which he is the absolute owner and possessor –
is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036.
Bracewell alleged that he filed on September 19,
1963 an application for registration and
confirmation of Lot 5, as well as of Lots 1, 2, 3,
and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las
Piñas City, which was granted by the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 58, on May 3, 1989.  City.
5. July 31, 2003 – RTC-Las Piñas decided in favor
of Bracewell finding Lozada to have obtained
Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78 in bad
faith.
31
RTC-Las Piñas directed LRA to set aside
Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and
ordered Lozada, among others, to cause the
amendment of Plan PSU-129514 and to
segregate therefrom Lot 5 Plan of PSU-180598.
(Note: Bracewell died during the pendency of
the case and was substituted by Eulalia
Bracewell and his heirs - herein respondents).
6. Lozada appealed to CA, arguing mainly that
petition for review of a decree of registration
under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should be
filed in the same branch of the court that
rendered the decision and ordered the issuance
of the decree (RTC-Makati City).
7. May 23, 2007 – CA affirmed decision of RTC-
Las Piñas, finding respondents to have
substantiated their claim of actual fraud in the
procurement of Decree No. N-217036. It held
that, since the petition for review was filed within
one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned
decree, and considering that the subject lot is
located in Las Piñas City, the RTC of said city
had jurisdiction over the case.
8. Lozada filed an MR but was denied.
9. Hence, the instant petition for review challenging
primarily the jurisdiction of RTC-Las Piñas which
set aside and nullified the judgment rendered by
the RTC- Makati City that had not yet become
final and was still within its exclusive control and
discretion because the one (1) year period within
which the decree of registration issued by the
LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC-Las Piñas has
jurisdiction over the petition for review of Decree No. N-
217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment
rendered by the RTC- Makati City.
RULING:
The petition is DENIED, CA Decision AFFIRMED.
RTC-Las Piñas has jurisdiction over the petition for
review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a
result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Supreme Court noted the following circumstances:
1. When Lozada filed his land registration case in
December 1976, jurisdiction over applications
for registration of property situated in Las Piñas
City was vested in the RTC of Makati City in
view of the fact that there were no RTC
branches yet in Las Piñas City at that
time. Bracewell’s own application over Lots 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in
Las Piñas City, was thus granted by the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 58.
2. The RTC of Las Piñas City was established "in
or about 1994" as part of the National Capital
Region pursuant to BP 129 (Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980). Understandably, in
February 1998, Bracewell sought the review of
Decree No. N-217036 before the RTC-Las Piñas
considering that the subject lot is situated in Las
Piñas City.
3. The case of Joson vs. Busuego cited by Lozada
does not apply. The only issue in Joson was
which court should take cognizance of the
nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral
court that had issued the decree, or the
competent CFI in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction.
The SC held that with the passage of PD 1529,
the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it as a cadastral court was
eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear
and determine all questions, even contentious
and substantial ones, arising from applications
for original registration of titles to lands and
petitions filed after such
registration. Accordingly, and considering further
that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an
issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only
a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with
the question of jurisdiction, Lozada cannot now
rely on the Joson pronouncement to advance its
theory.
4. It further held that:
While it is indeed undisputed that it was
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134
which rendered the decision directing the
LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and
should, applying the general rule as
above-stated, be the same court before
which a petition for the review of Decree
No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must
consider the circumstantial milieu in this
case that, in the interest of orderly
32
procedure, warrants the filing of the said
petition before the Las Piñas City-RTC.
Particularly, the Court refers to the fact
that the application for original
registration in this case was only filed
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch
134 because, during that time, i.e.,
December 1976, Las Piñas City had no
RTC. Barring this situation, the aforesaid
application should not have been filed
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch
134 pursuant to the rules on venue
prevailing at that time. Under Section 2,
Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, which took effect on January 1,
1964, the proper venue for real actions,
such as an application for original
registration, lies with the CFI of the
province where the property is situated.
As the land subject of this case is
undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the
application for its original registration
should have been filed before the Las
Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact
that the said court had yet to be created
at the time the application was filed. Be
that as it may, and considering further
that the complication at hand is actually
one of venue and not of jurisdiction
(given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction
over review of registration decree cases
pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the
Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the
situation, holds that the Las Piñas City-
RTC has the authority over the petition
for the review of Decree No. N-217036
filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the
petition for review before the Las Piñas
City-RTC was only but a rectificatory
implementation of the rules of procedure
then-existing, which was temporarily set
back only because of past exigencies. In
light of the circumstances now prevailing,
the Court perceives no compelling
reason to deviate from applying the
rightful procedure. After all, venue is only
a matter of procedure and, hence, should
succumb to the greater interests of the
orderly administration of justice.