G.R. No.

L-54952
March 5, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the
Director of Lands), petitioner,
vs.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, with its Executive Minister ERAO
G. MANALO as CORPORATION SOLE and HON.
GABRIEL O. VALLE, JR. as Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch II,respondents.
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether or
not the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is qualified to
apply for registration of a 614 sq. meter parcel of land in its name
in the light of the prohibition in Section 11, Article XIV of the
1973 1 Constitution the same issues raised in the identical case of
Republic vs. Judge Candido P. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo,
114 SCRA 875 (June 29, 1982), 2 to which this Court has recently
given a negative answer.
We can nave no different answer in this instant case.
On August 7, 1979, respondent Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) filed with
the defunct Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte an application
for registration of a 614 sq. meter parcel of land situated in San
Pedro, Vintar, Ilocos Norte allegedly acquired by respondent by
virtue of a deed of sale dated April 10, 1978 from a certain
Carmen Racimo whose predecessors-in-interest, it was claimed,
possessed the same for more than thirty (30) years. 3The
application was filed, as stated therein, under the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529, July 11, 1978).
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of
Lands, opposed the application, alleging, among others, that
neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto (Section 48 (b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
by P.D. 1073); that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicant who had failedto file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16,
1976 as required under Presidential Decree No. 892; 4 that the
applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the
Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain (Section
11 Article XIV); and that the parcel of land applied for is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
not subject to private appropriation.
On July 23, 1980, the respondent court rendered its decision
adjudicating the land applied for registration in favor of the
Iglesia ni Cristo, but with a reservation for road right of way
purposes. Respondent stated, among others, that the Iglesia ni
Cristo with its Executive Minister Erao Manalo as a corporation
sole is not within the contemplation of Section 11, Article XIV of
the new Constitution but said corporation sole can qualify as
applicant pursuant to the provision of Section 14 of Presidential
Decree 1520.
From the decision, the Republic of the Philippines elevated the
case to this Court in this petition for review which We gave due
course.
Reiterating its stand in the lower court, petitioner stresses private
respondents disqualification to hold lands of the public domain
except by LEASE pursuant to Section 11 Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution.
Private respondent argues that Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution is inapplicable to the land involved herein because
the land sought to be registered is a private property or has ceased
to be part of the alienable public domain by reason of acquisitive

prescription for more than thirty (30) years, and its adverse,
continuous possession in the concept of an owner; that private
respondent is but a mere administrator of the land titled in its
name for the benefit of its members, creating thus, a trust
relationship in its favor; that as trustee or authorized
representative of its members, private respondent can exercise
their right to have the questioned land titled in its name under the
Property Registration Decree (1529) by express mandate of the
law.
We agree with petitioners stand, following our decision in
Republic vs. Judge Candido Villanueva, et. al., 114 SCRA 875
(June 29, 1982) to which We have made reference at the threshold
of this decision as well as the subsequent cases of Republic vs.
Hon. Arsenio Gonong, et. al. G.R. No. L-56025 (Nov. 25, 1982);
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 59447, and its
companion case of Republic vs. Judge Dominador Cendaa, et.
al., G.R. No. 60188 (Dec. 27, 1982).
All that has been stated by this Court in the aforementioned cases
in interpreting Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141,
as amended by R.A. 1942) applies with equal force in the instant
case where the application for registration of the herein parcel of
land was, in essence, sought on the basis of the alleged open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the said land by respondents predecessors-in-interest under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
registration on August 7, 1979.
Records reveal that no application for confirmation of incomplete
or imperfect title had been filed by respondents predecessors-ininterest under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. Under the
law, the questioned land retains its public character. The
application for registration under Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) which, among others, recognizes

possession of alienable lands of the public domain in the manner

and for the length of time therein required as basis for registration
of title to the land, did not remove the land from the operational
effect of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. It nevertheless
strengthens the conclusion that the land never ceased to be part of
the public domain. Apparently, the pertinent provisions of law
relied upon by respondent in invoking Section 14 of P.D. 1529
provide:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:.
1). Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
2). Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
3). Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided by law.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by
the instrument creating the trust.
As indicated earlier, the issue raised is already a settled matter. In
Republic vs. Judge Candido Villanueva, et. al., supra, this Court
made the following categorical pronouncement:
As correctly contended by the Solicitor-General the Iglesia ni
Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person is disqualified to
acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the two
lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already
mentioned and because the said church is not entitled to avail
itself of the benefits of Section 48 (b) which applies only to

Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an

unhappy freak of ENGLISH LAW ) has no nationality (Roman
Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration
Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si
Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and Section 49 of the Public Land Law).
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia ni Cristo (its
lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands,
following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private
land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial as in
Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 531 L. ed. 594, 41
Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this
case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A
land registration proceeding under Section 48 (b) presupposes
that the land is public (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535,
July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands
that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. As exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an
occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of
his title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law is a derecho
dominical incoative and that before the issuance of the certificate
of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of
the land since it still pertains to the State. (114 SCRA 881-882).
Moreover, it may be observed that respondent relies strongly on
the doctrine laid down in the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil.
424, reiterated in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, Mesina vs.

Vda de Sonza, 108 Phil. 361, Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 21 SCRA

743, Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760, Herico vs. Dar,
95 SCRA 437, to the effect that lands of the public domain which,
by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time,
a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land
thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated
therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose under the public land laws or
statutes. As pointed out in the separate opinion by the herein
ponente in the cases, of Meralco vs. Hon. Floreliana CastroBartolome, G.R. No. 49623 and Republic vs. Hon. Candido P.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 55289 (June 29, 1982), to wit:
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described
had become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of
this stage, said to be still an incomplete or imperfect title, has
been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed
procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or
imperfect title. This is the only legal method by which full and
absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a
truly private land. To secure such judicial title, only the courts can
be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the
land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is
limited to another form of disposition of public land, referred to as
administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of free
patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the
issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is
undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land
would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial
confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that
in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the
Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the
area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect
title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old

Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that
set for free patents. .
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of
incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in
many cases, such as those cited to the effect that such land has
ceased to be public land. What these statements, however, really
mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass
of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under
the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however,
would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public
Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its
disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with
public land gives rise to the very strong implication, if not a
positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land.
Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for
confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land,
for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judges decision dated July 23,
1980, is hereby SET ASIDE and the application for registration
of the Iglesia ni Cristo is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:p
This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of
the Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may
hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed on ethousand hectares in area". * That prohibition is not
found in the 1935 Constitution.
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized
under Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital
stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on
December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two
lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters,
located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC
Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801).
The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh application on the
grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified
to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its
prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application (pp. 65-66, Rollo).
After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the
Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application
on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay
cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of
Jose Abad Santos and E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay.

The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war
which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to
the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The
Piguing sapouses constructed a house therereon. Because the
Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the
land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August
13, 1976.
The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in
Tanacy by the Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and
H) and was divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as
to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two
street serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries.

more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of
the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a
private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not
applicable to the said land.
The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of
the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses
who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of
their imperfect title to the land.

In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that

the said land is not private land because the Meralco and its
predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the
Spanish government nor possessory information title or any other
The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and
means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents
taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is residential in
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912, September
character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is
30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, Lnot included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed 27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs. Director of
part of the alienable portion of the public domain.
Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195; Lee
Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA
372, 378-9; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and
After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision dismissing the
Raymundo, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla
application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to
vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu
apply for the registration of the said land since under section
Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603).
48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural
persons can apply for judicial confirmationof their imperfect titles
to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court
The Public Land Law provides:
assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land.
CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of
From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under
imperfect or incomplete titles.
Republic Act No. 5440.
xxx xxx xxx
In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the
concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land
is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming
it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the
Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its
registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be
given due course or has to be dismissed.

SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the

public domain not in possession of the
qualifications specified in the last preceding
section may apply for the benefits of this chapter.

That ruling is based on the Cario case which is about the

possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors since time
immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land
involved in the Susi case was possessed before 1880 or since a

This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs.

Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious
xxx xxx xxx
or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law
and land registration law, that"all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
predecessors in interest have been in open,
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
property even before the Spanish conquest." (Cario vs. Insular
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7
Phil. 132).
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public
of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No. possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial
1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be public" and becomes private property.
xxx xxx xxx

period of time "beyond the reach of memory". That is not the

situation in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the
Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of
the land since time immemorial.
In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. 2874
which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that
the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive
presumption that the occupant had complied with all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled
to a certificate of title.
On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it
was held that while occupants of public land, who have applied
for the confirmation of their title, "teian asimismo a su favor la
presuncion juris et de jure de que habian cumplido con todas las
condiciones necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que
el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los
verdaderos dueos del terreno in este dejo de pertenecer a los
terrenos publico del Estado susceptibles de enajenacion."
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of
land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed,
remains public land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held
that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the
applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect
title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution
sald of the land were void.
For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought
to be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands
would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were

already private lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is

characterized in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple,
but asderecho dominical incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the
Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect
title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their
transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its
name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses
from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing of
that same contention in the Oh Cho case said:
The benefits provided in the Public Land Act
(meaning the confirmation of an imperfect title
under section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate
predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or
concession by the State; and before they could
acquire any right under such benefits, the
applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest
should comply with the condition precedent for the
grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in
possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the
applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest
(meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case)
failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to title which was transmissible to the
applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called,
is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that

of their predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of

by a qualified person to apply for its registration
but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified. (75 Phil. 890, 893.)
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition
makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural
public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and
(on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should
not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies
to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
"presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is
affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER Co. INC., ETC.
146 SCRA 509
DATE: December 29, 1986
PETITIONER: The Director of Lands
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., Etc.
PONENTE: J. Narvasa
FACTS:
The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela ordering the registration in favor of Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring
481, 390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members
of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-inquestion from time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was
accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after the aegis
of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. CastroBartolome (114 SRC 799) should be overturned in light of
jurisprudence.
2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is
recognized.
3. Whether or not the provision barring private companies
and associations from purchasing public alienable lands in
1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively.

RULING:
1. HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v.
Insular Govt, to Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court
overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome,
stating that a possession is said to be prescriptively
acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon
conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary
conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in
question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and
was therefore classified as private property at the moment
of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged
possession of the bona fide right to ownership from
Meralcos predecessors-interest. There being no law
prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held
corporations, the court thus overturned the decision.
2. HELD. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. CastroBartolome, the land held by the Infiels since time
immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the
operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the
sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore,
purchased private property. There being no ruling in the
1935 Constitution prohibiting this sale, this was held to be
valid.
3. NO. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the
1935 Constitution when it purchased the land from the
Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting
the purchase of alienable public lands by private
corporations or associations cannot be retroactively
applied.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of

the Philippines (G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, &
183962) (14 October 2008)
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOAAD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that
creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and
ancestral lands of the Bangsamorodefined as the present
geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as
well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for
inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then
granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own
institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the
GRP and the BJE as associative, characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North
Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish
it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to
hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to
information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition
sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE.

The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4

August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to
cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.
Issues and Ruling:
1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that
would require new legislation and constitutional
amendments.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually
guarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal
framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as
it is inconsistent with the limits of the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments. Because although the
Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly
included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-inChief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may
validly consider implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement
them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if
the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
2. W/N there is a violation of the peoples right to
information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public
consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).
YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional
imperatives and justify the exercise of the peoples right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:

a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and

responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it
is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to
seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to
conduct consultations before any project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein.
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
3. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated
by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process
by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It

illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to The peoples right to information on matters of public concern
perform the duty enjoined.
under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry
with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.
NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very concept The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned demand information, while the policy of public disclosure
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and nobody demands.
implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is
a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective government agency the power to delineate and recognize an
until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing
an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central An association is formed when two states of unequal power
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
Instructions From The President addressed to the government the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and associations represent a middle ground between integration and
the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace independence.
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a The recognized sources of international law establish that the
usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the through internal self-determinationa peoples pursuit of its
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can political, economic, social, and cultural development within the
ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an framework of an existing state. A right to external selfundue influence or interference with that process.
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most
5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.
extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it circumstances.
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of
the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations

with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
does not mean that she has no such authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a
unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are
present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international
community, the state intended to be bound to that community by
its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements
would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse.
Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar
circumstances.