RULE 70 + PARTITION CASE DIGESTS
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW Held: Wilfredo had been in prior physical possession of the property; the petitioners deprived
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G.R. No.171555               April 17, 2013
EVANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN vs. WILFREDO RIVERA, et. al.
BRION, J.:
Facts: Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels of land in Lipa
City, Batangas. When Loreto died, his heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her one-half
share of the conjugal estate. All the properties were adjudicated in favor of the spouses’
daughters while Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary
rights during his lifetime, such fact being annotated on the certificate of titles.
Almost a decade later, Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. claiming he
lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land with a building used for his furniture
business. Taking advantage of his absence due to his hospital confinement, the petitioners and
Star Honda, Inc. took possession and caused the renovation of the building on the property.
Petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred him from entering the
property. Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced
his usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights and that another action
between the same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (an action for the
annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo).
The MTCC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, the latter affirmed the
MTCC’s findings for lack of cause of action. However, upon reconsideration, the RTC ordered the
eviction of the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc finding Wilfredo’s renunciation of his usufructuary
rights could not be the basis of the complaint’s dismissal since it is the subject of a pending
litigation and upheld Wilfredo’s prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property.
However, the RTC again modified its decision by absolving Star Honda, Inc. from any liability
finding no evidence that Star Honda, Inc. participated in the dispossession. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s findings.
During the pendency of the case, however, Wilfredo died and was substituted by his
second wife.
Issue: Who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior physical possession of the
property?
him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth.
Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto. Ejectment
cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved.
The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession
de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable."
Possession in ejectment cases "means nothing more than actual physical possession,
not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law." In a forcible entry case, "prior
physical possession is the primary consideration." A party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him." The party in
peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.
The recovery of possession of real property is a real action that is not extinguished by
the death of a party. The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is
enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased. This judgment entitles the winning party to:
(a) the restitution of the premises, (b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and (c) attorney’s fees and costs.
Wilfredo was holding the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure
possession was also disputed before his death, along with the de facto possession. Without need,
however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the
death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This
development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of
the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution. What actually survives under the
circumstances is the award of damages, by way of compensation, that the RTC originally awarded
and which the CA and this Court affirmed. The heirs of Wilfredo shall succeed to the computed
total award under the rules of succession, a matter that is not within the authority of this Court to
determine at this point.
G.R. No. 183858               April 17, 2013
HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONvs. SPOUSES CARLOS AND
ELIZABETH ABACAN
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SERENO, CJ.:
Facts: Petitioner Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired a parcel of
land located in Malolos City. HTRDC commenced a complaint with the DARAB for cancellation of
emancipation patents against some of the occupants of the land which was granted by the
provincial adjudicator and affirmed by the DARAB. During the pendency of the DARAB case, the
occupants’ possession was tolerated.
HTRDC then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTCC of
Malolos against the occupants alleging that despite both verbal and written demands to vacate the
property, the occupants have failed to do so. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of HTRDC
and later ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Meanwhile, the provincial agrarian reform
officer (PARO) filed an action for annulment of sale against HTRDC. Respondents’ motion to stay
execution on the ground that a supervening event had transpired was denied by the MTCC.
The MTCC issued an Alias Writ of Execution and an Alias Special Order of Demolition.
Respondents moved to quash both writs on the ground that the Emancipation Patents had been
issued in their favor during the pendency of the case. As such, they argued that they had now
acquired ownership of relevant portions of the subject property. The MTCC denied their motion.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction  and held
that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents’ subsequent acquisition of ownership was a
supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment
Held: No, the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the
execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. It is well-settled that the sole issue in
ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property, independent of any
claim of ownership by the parties. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the parties
respecting title to the land or building. (Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
G.R. No. 185518 April 17, 2013
SPS. FELIX AND ROSITA CHINGKOE vs. SPS. FAUSTINO AND GLORIA CHINGKOE
SERENO, C.J.:
Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a real property covered by a transfer
certificate of title. They claim that sometime in 1990, out of tolerance and permission, they allowed
respondent Faustino’s brother, Felix, and his wife, Rosita, to inhabit the subject property at Ayala
Heights, Quezon City. Faustino agreed to sell the property to Felix on condition that the title shall
be delivered only after Felix and Rosita’s payment of the full purchase price, and after
respondents’ settlement of their mortgage obligations with the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC). However, Faustino later agreed to deliver in advance an incomplete draft of
a Deed of Absolute Sale, which had not yet been notarized. While respondents themselves
drafted the deed, the parties again agreed that the document would only be completed after full
payment.
Respondents later sent a demand letter to petitioners asking them to vacate the
premises but petitioners refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a complaint for unlawful
detainer with the MTC of Quezon City. In their Answer, petitioners presented a copy of a
completed Deed of Absolute Sale claiming that respondents had sold the property for P3,130,000,
which petitioners had paid in full and in cash on the same day. Due to respondents’ refusal to
surrender the title to them as buyers, petitioners were allegedly constrained to file an action for
specific performance with Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC.
The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by petitioners and dismissed the
Complaint. The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC while the CA later reversed the lower courts
and rules that a mere plea of title over disputed land cannot be used as sound basis for
dismissing an action for recovery of possession.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it ruled on the validity of a
notarized Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment action
Held: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of
ownership in unlawful detainer cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who
would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these
cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions
of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality and would not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the
unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties’ respective evidence
deserves more weight. Trial courts must necessarily delve into and weigh the evidence of the
parties in order to rule on the right of possession.
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G.R. No. 172588               March 13, 2013
ISABEL N. GUZMAN vs. ANIANO N. GUZMAN
BRION, J.:
Facts: Petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City a complaint for
ejectment against her children Aniano N. Guzman and Primitiva G. Montealto. The petitioner
alleged that she and Arnold N. Guzman owned the 6/7th and 1/7th portions, respectively, of a
1,446-square meter parcel of land in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan; the respondents occupied the
land by tolerance; the respondents did not comply with her written demand to vacate the
property; and subsequent barangay conciliation proceedings failed to settle the differences
between them.
Respondents countered that the petitioner transferred in a document all her property
rights in the disputed property, except her usufructuary right, in favor of her children, and that the
petitioner engaged in forum shopping since she already raised the issue of ownership in a petition
for cancellation of adverse claim against the respondents, pending with Branch 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
The MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right to its
possession and that the petitioner committed no forum shopping. The RTC ruled for the
respondents and set aside the MTC ruling. Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the petition on
technical grounds and also held that the petitioner cannot validly claim that the respondents
occupied the properties through mere tolerance since they were co-owners of the property as
compulsory heirs of Alfonso Guzman, the original owner.
Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioner’s petition for
certiorari
Held: No; the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the petitioner’s
transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire record of the MTC
proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Nonetheless,
even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon
which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent. The
matter of the petitioner’s transfer of rights, which was in the records of the case, was the basis for
the RTC’s decision.
Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means
of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, hence, it is
a special civil action with a special procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is
the question of entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession
de facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made solely for the
purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Accordingly, any ruling on the
validity of the petitioner’s transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a proper
proceeding.
G.R. No. 174436               January 23, 2013
JUANITA ERMITAÑO vs. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Respondent and petitioner, through her representative, lsabelo R. Ermitaño, executed a
Contract of Lease wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336 square meter residential
lot and a house standing thereon located at Doña Vicenta Village, Davao City. The contract period
is one (1) year, which commenced on November 4, 1999, with a monthly rental rate
of P13,500.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent paid petitioner P2,000.00 as security deposit
to answer for unpaid rentals and damage that may be cause to the leased unit.
Subsequently, respondent received information that petitioner mortgaged the subject
property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap (Yap) and that the same was already foreclosed with
Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered.
Yap's brother later offered to sell the subject property to respondent for which the latter bought
from Yap for P950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties wherein
it was indicated that the property was still subject to petitioner's right of redemption.
Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a suit for the
declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional certificate
of sale. Pending final resolution of the suit, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in
sustaining the presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject property.The
MTCC, the RTC, the CA, and SC also sustained the validity of respondent's purchase of the
disputed property from Yap.
Issue: Who, between petitioner and respondent, is entitled to possess the subject property?
Held: The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to
the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.  In
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unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In such case, the
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right
to possess; hence, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the
issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to
determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.
The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to
have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not
apply as in the present case.  physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should
Petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered moot when the period
of redemption expired without petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon expiration
of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over the same. Hence, the only remaining right
that petitioner can enforce is his right to the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to
physical possession of the subject property.
G.R. No. 183822               January 18, 2012
RUBEN C. CORPUZ vs. Sps. AGUSTIN
SERENO, J.:
Facts: Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and
Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in
Santa Joaquina, Laoag City. The parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose
name an Original Certificate of Title was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951
to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to
occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives. Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins
refused to leave the premises. Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess
subject property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971
Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute
Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).
The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal. Upon reaching
the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed the appeal ruling that petitioner had knowledge of the
sale of the disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and
respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession
thereof was in the nature of ownership and not anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the
grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
Issue: Who, between the parties, has the right to possession of the disputed properties
Held: One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is
"accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of
be brought in the proper inferior court." In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic
question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in
nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership
over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of Possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession. However, questions as to the validity of
petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an
issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.
The evidence shows that respondents have been in continuous, open and notorious
possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day, which, as such, is in the concept
of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner’s father. Under these circumstances,
petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an
ejectment proceeding. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in
actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial
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remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
G.R. No. 190071               August 15, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES  vs. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.
BRION, J.:
Facts: Union Bank, as seller, and respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. ( Maunlad Homes), as
buyer, entered into a contract to sell involving the Maunlad Shopping Mall for P151 million, P2.4
million of which was to be paid by Maunlad Homes as down payment with the balance to be paid
over a 180-month period. Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take
possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements thereon. The parties also
agreed that if Maunlad Homes violates any of the provisions of the contract, all payments made
will be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the property, and all improvements
introduced on the land will accrue in favor of Union Bank. In the event of rescission due to failure
to pay or to comply with the terms of the contract, Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately
vacate the property and must voluntarily turn possession over to Union Bank.
When Maunlad Homes failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent the
former a Notice of Rescission of Contract, demanding payment of the installments due within 30
days from receipt; otherwise, it shall consider the contract automatically rescinded. Maunlad
Homes failed to comply. Hence, Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a letter demanding payment of
the rentals due and requiring that the subject property be vacated and its possession turned over
to the bank. When Maunlad Homes continued to refuse, Union Bank instituted an ejectment suit
before the Metropolitan Trial Court ( MeTC) of Makati City. Maunlad Homes resisted the suit by
claiming, among others, that it is the owner of the property as Union Bank did not reserve
ownership of the property under the terms of the contract. By virtue of its ownership, Maunlad
Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property.
MeTC dismissed Union Bank’s ejectment complaint. It found that Union Bank’s cause of
action was based on a breach of contract and that both parties are claiming a better right to
possess the property based on their respective claims of ownership of the property and therefore
the appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was an accion reivindicatoria, over which
it had no jurisdiction. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Makati City affirmed the MeTC.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over an ejectment case if the cause of action
is based on a breach of contract
Held: Yes. In any case involving the question of jurisdiction, the Court is guided by the settled
doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded by the
litigant through the allegations in his complaint. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession
of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to expiration or
termination of the right to possess. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the action
must be filed "within one (1) year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession."
Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, "when the defendant raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession." Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, however, states that "the
judgment shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land or building." The authority granted to the MeTC to preliminarily
resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession ultimately allows it to interpret
and enforce the contract or agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. To deny the MeTC
jurisdiction over a complaint merely because the issue of possession requires the interpretation of
a contract will effectively rule out unlawful detainer as a remedy.
The right to possess the property was extinguished when the contract to
sell failed to materialize. While admitting that it suspended payment of the installments, Maunlad
Homes contended that the suspension of payment did not affect its right to possess the property
because its contract with Union Bank was one of sale and not to sell; hence, ownership of the
property has been transferred to it, allowing it to retain possession notwithstanding nonpayment of
installments. The terms of the contract, however, do not support this conclusion. Where the seller
promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of
the price, the contract is only a contract to sell." 
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G.R. No. 170509               June 27, 2012
VIEGELY SAMELO vs. MANOTOK SERVICES, INC.
BRION, J.:
Facts: Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of
land situated at Tondo, Manila. The respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for the
lease of a portion of the lot. The lease contract was for a period of one (1) year, with a monthly
rental of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract, the petitioner continued occupying
the subject premises without paying the rent. The respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok,
sent a letter to the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and pay
compensation for its use and occupancy but petitioner refused.
Respondent did not give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the
lease contract and the latter continued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15 days,
without objection from the respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can be
no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract. An implied new lease was therefore
created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code. Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the
period of lease is considered to be from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the
Civil Code.
G.R. No. 185091               August 8, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRIMO MENDOZA and MARIA LUCERO

ABAD, J.:
The respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Manila.  In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent
Facts: Paninsingin Primary School (PPS), a public school operated by the DepEd, has been
had no right to collect rentals because the subject premises are located inside the property of the
using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school but two lots
Philippine National Railways (PNR). She also added that the respondent had no certificate of title
thereof were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas).
over the subject premises. The petitioner further claimed that her signature in the contract of lease
The Mendozas caused the 2 lots to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots of which the
was obtained through the respondent’s misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she is
Register of Deeds issued new titles for in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo. Lot 2 remained in the
now the owner of the subject premises as she had been in possession since 1944.
name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for
the other lots. Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property.
The MeTC, decided in favor of the respondent. Upon appeal, the RTC set aside the
MeTC’s decision and dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision,
The Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property. When PPS
and reinstated the MeTC judgment ruling that the petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
declined to do so, the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
right of the respondent over the subject property as a tenant cannot controvert the title of his
of Lipa City against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and
landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the
writ of preliminary injunction. The MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on ground
premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves.
of the Republic’s immunity from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lipa City which ruled that the Republic’s consent was not necessary since the action before the
Issue: Who has a better right of possession over the premises
MTCC was not against it. The RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC,  which then dismissed
the case for insufficiency of evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and
Held: Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject premises.
ordered PPS to vacate the property. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
"An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government
any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration
of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." The
consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name
only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
of the City Government and on its permanent improvements thereon.
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved. Thus,
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the
when the relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt
Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school
of the parties to inject the question of ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might
throw light on the right of possession.

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Held: A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the
Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration
or its notice. Title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. No one may acquire it from the
registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. Thus, to a registered owner under
the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is equally
imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its
name cannot defeat the Mendozas’ title. The Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof
of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. Otherwise, there is little evidentiary weight
as proof of ownership.
The RTC has the power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper
expropriation proceeding. It can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented
before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and
damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property
was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for
recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had
taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas’ right to just compensation for it, the
CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their
filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.
G.R. No. 154152               August 25, 2010
LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ARTURO LEDESMA
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) against
private respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite expiration of the contract of lease executed
between them and demands to vacate subject premises and pay rentals therefor, the latter failed
to comply with such demands. Private respondent countered that he had paid the rentals over
subject premises and petitioner no longer had the right to possess the property as it had been
foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Private respondent further pointed
out that subject premises had in fact been in the possession of the DBP since March or April of
1997, so since that time, it was with the DBP that he made arrangements for his continued
occupation of the subject premises.
The MeTC then rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondent to
surrender possession of subject premises to petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private respondent filed
a supersedeas  bond with the MeTC. The RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment. The RTC granted
petitioner’s motion for the immediate execution of the RTC Decision but the CA subsequently
issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereto.
Issue: Whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the immediate execution
of the RTC judgment is proper
Held: It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that "the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice
to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom." However, on appeal the appellate court may
stay the said writ should circumstances so require. Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer
cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted.
Where the action is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry,
and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. As a rule, the issuance
of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the
case and will not be interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse.
Be it noted that for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court do not
require that the act complained of be in clear violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what
the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Under the Rules, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy. When exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the writ of execution
issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are circumstances necessitating such action.
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change
in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no
compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances,
the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.
G.R. No. 174042               July 9, 2008
CITY OF NAGA vs. HON. ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION
QUISUMBING, J.:
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Facts: Macario A. Mariano and Jose A. Gimenez were the registered owners of a 229,301-
square meter land covered by a transfer certificate of title located in Naga City. The land was
subdivided into several lots and sold as part of City Heights Subdivision (CHS). The officers of
CHS offered to construct the Naga City Hall on a two (2)-hectare lot within the premises of the
subdivision. Said lot was to be designated as an open space for public purpose and donated to
petitioner in accordance with the rules and regulations of the National Urban Planning
Commission. CHS amended its offer to five hectares, which, through Resolution No. 89, the
Municipal Board accepted. Mariano and Gimenez thereafter delivered possession of the lots
described as Blocks 25 and 26 to the City Government of Naga (city government).
Eventually, the contract for the construction of the city hall was awarded by the Bureau
of Public Works through public bidding to Francisco O. Sabaria, a local contractor. This prompted
Mariano and Gimenez to demand the return of the parcels of land from petitioner. On assurance,
however, of then Naga City Mayor Monico Imperial that petitioner will buy the lots instead,
Mariano and Gimenez allowed the city government to continue in possession of the land and
constructed the Naga City Hal. It also conveyed to other government offices portions of the land
which house the NBI, LTO, and Hall of Justice, among others.
After the death of Mariano, Danilo D. Mariano, as administrator and representative of
the heirs of Macario A. Mariano, demanded from petitioner the return of Blocks 25 and 26 to CHS
but to no avail. Respondent thus filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City, Branch 1.The MTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. It ruled that the city’s claim of ownership over the lots posed an issue not cognizable
in an unlawful detainer case. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTC decision and directed
petitioner to surrender physical possession of the lots to respondents with forfeiture of all the
improvements, and to pay P2,500,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the land; P587,159.60 as attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review with Very Urgent Motion/Application
for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with the Court of
Appeals. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion to Issue Writ of Execution which the CA denied.
The RTC issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy to contest the disputed order,
resolution, and notices
(2) Whether petitioner was guilty of forum-shopping in filing the instant petition pending
the petition for review before the Court of Appeals
(3) Whether RTC Judge Montenegro committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
execution pending appeal
(4) Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Held:
(1) Yes. As a rule, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against an RTC
should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Under the present circumstance however, the Court
took cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts for while it has
been held that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the grant of a writ of
certiorari, nevertheless such requirement may be dispensed with where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government.
Under Section 1(c) and (f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken
from an interlocutory order and an order of execution, respectively. An interlocutory order is one
which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Such is
the nature of an order granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction; hence, not
appealable. The proper remedy, as petitioner did in this case, is to file a petition for certiorari
and/or prohibition under Rule 65.
(2) No. Under the Same Objective Standard, the filing by a party of two apparently
different actions, but with the same objective, constitutes forum- shopping. Here, the special civil
action of certiorari is an independent action. The ultimate purpose of such action is to keep the
inferior tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary acts of the
court. In contrast, the petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 involves an
evaluation of the case on the merits.
(3) No. Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is pertinent: “SEC. 21. Immediate
execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.  – The judgment of the Regional Trial
Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal
that may be taken therefrom.” Thus, the judgment of the RTC against the defendant in an
ejectment case is immediately executory. Unlike Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules, Section 21
does not provide a means to prevent execution; hence, the court’s duty to order such execution is
practically ministerial. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or
unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the RTC and decides to appeal to a
superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to
the appeal taking its due course. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the appellate court   may
stay the said writ should circumstances so require.
(4) Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Status
quo  is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. As a
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rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court do not
require that the act complained of be in clear violation of the rights of the applicant. What the
Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant.
Under the Rules, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy. This situation is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to
establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction. For the Court in which
the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a
petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public
policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior
possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior
claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru
force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
In the present case, the appellate court should have deferred resolution on the
application until the RTC has decided on the motion for execution pending appeal. Moreover,
nothing in the rules allow a qualified execution pending appeal that would have justified the
exclusion of the NBI, City Hall and Hall of Justice from the effects of the writ.
G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION vs. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA
REYES, J.:
Facts: The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May
1958. Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan was originally owned by
Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by an OCT issued in his name. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento
(Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he
remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina
Escabesa (Faustina).
Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of
her niece, Emilia. Soon thereafter, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased
parents and also executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa. Upon
Emilia and her family’s return from the U.S., and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a
house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.
Years thereafter, Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia
who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and
705. The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable
settlement was reached by the parties. Emilia instituted a Complaint for the partition of Lot Nos.
2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and
TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and
damages. The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for partition, reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages is hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of self-
adjudication, deed of sale and the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 were declared null
and void. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707 and
declared Lot No. 707 to be owned by Emilia, ½ pro indiviso share; Felipa, ¼ pro indiviso share;
and Hilaria, ¼ pro indiviso share.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707
(2) Whether or not the respondent’s right to demand for partition is barred by acquisitive
prescription or laches
(3) Whether or not respondent is entitled to the eastern half of Lot No. 707
Held:
(1) Yes. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of
ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property.
In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint
the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition
until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. Placing a parcel of land
under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
Agripina and Carolina, as legitimate heirs of Eulalio, became co-owners of Lot No.
707 upon the death of Eulalio. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became
a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalio’s death. Faustina’s share, however, passed on to her daughter
Carolina when the former died. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not
prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself
an entire property he was not the sole owner of.
A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners – nemo dat qui non
habet. As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only
the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property. In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a
sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the
shoes of the vendor as co-owner.
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 (2) No. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of
the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. The act of
repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a
co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the
other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.
To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was
originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were
apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before
the alleged prescriptive period began to run.
When Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an
implied trust was created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee of the
respondent’s undivided share. As trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration.

(3) Yes. Under the Old Civil Code which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and
Marcela’s marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal property. When Marcela died, one-half of the
lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. Marcela’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child,
Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio.
Under Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled only to the usufruct of the
lot while the naked ownership belonged to Agripina. When he remarried, Eulalio’s one half portion
of the lot representing his share in the conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the
other half were brought into his second marriage with Faustina.
When Eulalio, ¼ portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her share in the
conjugal partnership. The remaining ¼ were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and
Eulalio’s children, Carolina and Agripina. However, Faustina is only entitled to the usufruct
of the third available for betterment. The usufructuary of Eulalio over the ½ portion inherited by
Agripina earlier was merged with her naked ownership. Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in
Lot No. 707 which represents her share in the conjugal partnership and her inheritance from
Eulalio were in turn inherited by Carolina including Faustina’s usufructuary rights which were
merged with Carolina’s naked ownership.
Therefore, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8
pertains to Carolina. Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected
only 3/8 portion of the subject lot. Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the ½ eastern
portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of Agripina’s entire 5/8 share thereof, the
remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by Agripina’s nearest collateral relative, who, records
show, is her sister Carolina.

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