FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1943,

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, EASTERN EUROPE, THE FAR EAST, VOLUME

III

701.0090/3366

Report by Mr. Karl L. Rankin 23

[At Sea,] November 25, 1943.

Introduction

Under Japanese military occupation the Philippine Islands have been governed

very largely under the same laws and by much the same men as under the

Commonwealth. There were two fundamental changes. The first was symbolized by the

immediate conversion of the United States High Commissioner’s residence into the

official Headquarters of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief. The second was the

abolition, at least temporarily, of the popularly elected legislature. Behind the scenes, of

course, Japanese activities and influence affected all phases of Philippine life. But in a

governmental sense the outward changes introduced were less striking than the very

general continuance of old forms.

It seems probable that the policies pursued by Japan in governing the Philippines

were determined well in advance. Subject to such modification as military security might
require, there were compelling practical reasons for preserving the machinery of the

Commonwealth Government. It had enjoyed popular support, and had functioned

efficiently on the whole. The invaders’ immediate purposes were to gain military control

and to redirect all economic activity as quickly as possible toward the further prosecution

of the war. Practical considerations quite evidently outweighed any ideological objections.

Even for the more distant future, it would not much matter what form of government

obtained in the Philippines as long as external relations and vital phases of economic life

were under Japanese control.

It remained to find a means of taking over the machinery of the Commonwealth

Government. This was facilitated at the outset by arrangements made for the surrender

of Manila, The High Commissioner and President Quezon were already at Corregidor,

and the latter’s Secretary, Jorge B. Vargas, had been left at Malacanan with the

unenviable assignment of obtaining the best treatment he could for the city.

Communication ceased between the High Commissioner [Page 1109] and his Executive

Assistant in Manila, Claude A. Buss, while the President and General MacArthur’s26

Headquarters continued to maintain contact with Vargas as the ostensible representative

of whatever authority remained in the capital.27

The invaders were not slow to see the opportunity offered them. Judged by

Oriental standards, the Japanese were on their good behavior when the city was

occupied. Whether or not this was due in part to leaving Vargas in charge, the fact

remains that the United States had abdicated its authority in Manila before the Japanese

arrived. “Collaboration”, probable in any case, became inevitable.

 The immediate establishment of a Japanese Military Administration in Manila was

soon followed by the creation of an Executive Commission, composed of leading Filipino

politicians and fulfilling the functions of the former Cabinet. Both of these organizations

obviously were transient in character. It is understood that the Commission was told to go

ahead and run the country until a permanent form of government could be worked out,

but with an admonition not to revive ante-bellum politics. After the emergencies of the first

few weeks had been met, the chief end of the Military Administration was to direct the

Philippine Executive Commission.

Next came the introduction of the one-party system, in the Japanese form of a

National Service Association, followed by preparations for the establishment of a

Philippine Republic. The program of creating a puppet state was complete.

[Here follow sections on the Japanese Military Administration, the Philippine Executive

Commission, and the Neighborhood and National Service Associations.]

Independence

With the work of the Military Administration and the Executive Commission well in

hand, with “mopping-up operations in the Philippine Islands practically completed,”

according to a Japanese communiqué of December 2, and with the National Service

Association one-party idea thoroughly embodied in the new Kalibapi, Premier Tojo29

found it opportune in January, 1943, to issue a formal pledge of independence for the

Philippines. In the same speech before the Imperial Diet, independence was promised to

Burma “within the year” and to the Philippines “at the earliest possible moment.” This

[Page 1110] pledge provided a theme for countless political speeches throughout the
Philippines, by both Japanese and Filipinos, during the succeeding months. On one hand

it was cited as final proof of Japan’s true intentions and the other as implying a threat that

independence would not be granted until all guerilla activity had ceased and whole-

hearted collaboration had become general.

The Philippines began to receive a series of visits from prominent Japanese.

Among these, ex-Ambassador Nomura30 stayed only long enough to predict the eventual

defeat of the United States and to evade questions put to him by the press as to American

treatment of Japanese internees.31

On May 5, 1943, Premier Tojo arrived in Manila. He appears to have been satisfied

with the attitude of the Filipinos,* as voiced by Vargas† and others, or at least to have

found no reason for further delay in fixing an approximate date for Philippine

independence. Greater East Asia Minister Kazuo Aoki, visited Manila a few days after his

chief and apparently confirmed his findings. On June 16, not long after his return to Japan,

Tojo declared before the Diet that the Philippines would be given independence within

the course of the year. In the visitors’ gallery at the time was a group of Filipinos, headed

by Mayor Guinto,32 who were enjoying a junket to Japan. Four days later a Preparatory

Commission for Philippine Independence, consisting of twenty members headed by José

P. Laurel,33 was set up in Manila.

Great attention was given in the press to the activities of the Preparatory

Commission,‡ which included all of the members of the Philippine Executive Commission.

Interesting additions included Vicente Madrigal, the shipping magnate, Manuel A. Roxas,

who had thus far refused to collaborate in any way and had spent some time in Fort

Santiago as a result, and Alaoya Alonto Sultan Sa Ramain, the sole representative of the
Mohammedan Moros. As their work progressed, Laurel announced that the Commission

had agreed upon a republican form of government as best suited to the Philippines. At a

plenary session of the Commission on September 3, 1943, the new constitution was

adopted.

[Page 1111]

Laurel is credited with most of the redrafting of the Commonwealth Constitution to

meet the new conditions imposed by Japanese conquest. In the preamble the Filipino

people “proclaim their independence.” In fact the constitution contains no reference either

to Japan or to the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The most striking feature, however, is the

virtually dictatorial power given to the President of the Republic. Elected by a majority of

all the members of the unicameral National Assembly for a term of six years, he appoints

not only the Cabinet Ministers and Vice-Ministers, Ambassadors, bureau heads, the

higher officers of the armed forces and the advisory Council of State, but also all judges,

provincial governors, city and municipal mayors and all other officers of the government

whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

The full significance of the presidential appointive powers becomes apparent when

it is noted that the approval of the legislature is in no case required, and that one-half of

the National Assembly itself is made up of presidential appointees, the provincial

governors and mayors of chartered cities being members ex-officio. The remaining half

of the Assembly is to be elected in a manner that “shall be prescribed by law, which shall

not be subject to change or modification during the Great East Asia War.” It appears that

such “elections” are to be in Kalibapi hands, and it will be recalled that the governors and

mayors who are members of the legislature also head the local branches of the Kalibapi.
Directly or indirectly, therefore, the entire membership of the National Assembly will be

made up of presidential appointees.

With the Assembly so completely under presidential control, the concurrence of

the required majority of all its members in concluding treaties should not be difficult to

obtain. Even this requirement is dispensed with in the case of executive agreements with

a foreign nation for the utilization of natural resources and the operation of public utilities

for the duration of the Greater East Asia War. The veto power of the President is made

all but final by a provision that he may disapprove a bill for the second time, if repassed

over his veto by a two-thirds vote, and that in such case the Assembly may not during the

same session reconsider the measure. A unanimous vote of the Supreme Court is

required to declare unconstitutional a law, executive order, ordinance or regulation.

After incorporating most of the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution, such

as a bill of rights and the requirement that 60 percent of the capital of a corporation

exploiting natural resources must belong to citizens of the Philippines, the new document

ends with several transitory provisions. The new constitution was to be “ratified by the

people” in a manner to be provided by law. The departments of the Executive Commission

were to become ministries [Page 1112]of the Republic automatically, while existing courts

and laws were to be taken over and continued in force except where inconsistent with the

provisions of the constitution. All property rights and privileges acquired since the

outbreak of the war were made subject to adjustment and settlement at the termination

of hostilities. Finally, within one year after the end of the war, the National Assembly is

required to provide for the election by popular suffrage of delegates to a constitutional

convention which shall formulate a new constitution to be submitted to the people “at a

plebiscite.”

In making public the text of the constitution, Laurel stated that it did not agree in all

respects with Japanese ideas, but that the Preparatory Commission had been given a

free hand in the drafting. Some days later the constitution was ratified by a Kalibapi

Convention in Manila, presumably as provided by law in the form of an order issued by

Chairman Vargas. On September 15, the various Kalibapi chapters selected their

delegates to the new National Assembly. Within two weeks the Assembly had convened

and elected José P. Laurel President of the Republic of the Philippines, permitting him to

leave at once for Tokyo accompanied by Vargas and Aquino.34 Laurel was expected to

sign treaties providing for the continuance of Japanese military occupation and the

regularizing of various economic questions. Vargas would open the first Philippine

Embassy in Tokyo. Laurel and Aquino would return to Manila, where they would obtain

the National Assembly’s approval of the new treaties with Japan and take part in the

formal inauguration of the Philippine Republic on October 15, 1943.

Public Opinion

In its general conception the Japanese plan for winning over the people of the

conquered Philippines scarcely could have been improved. It was of the same high order

as the strategy of their general staff during the first six months of the war. Yet despite

their important initial success in gaining the collaboration of so many Filipino leaders, the

plan as a whole has been a failure. The people referred scornfully to independence “made

in Japan,” and to the “peace of the carabao” which Japanese military protection would

afford them. Leading Filipino collaborationists were spoken of as “military objectives.” The
United States was never more popular among the people of the Philippines than at the

moment Japan was giving them independence.

What were the causes of Japanese political failure in the Philippines? The first was

the impossibility of persuading any important number of Filipinos that the United States

could lose the war. Certain victory was the central theme of Japanese propaganda, and

[Page 1113]it was well presented on the whole. That it did not succeed in the Philippines

was the fruit of 43 years of intimate contact with Americans. The attitude of the average

Filipino with some education differs in no important way from that of the average American

as regards the issues of the war. He is just as certain that the Axis is in the wrong, just as

sure of a United Nations’ victory. In agreement with certain American radio commentators,

the Filipino is inclined to be over-optimistic as to the time required to defeat Japan, despite

the overwhelming Japanese military successes of which he was an eyewitness. If the war

does not last too long, it appears improbable that the Japanese will make much headway

in changing his opinion.

The second cause of Japan’s political failure in the Philippines may be found in the

repetition of the worst mistakes made by Americans. At his best the invader was

condescending and patronizing to the Filipino; at his worst he was grasping and brutal. In

the beginning Japanese propaganda laid emphasis on the disappearance of the color line

which Americans and British had drawn. It was a good point and worth following up. But

the Filipinos found that in actual practice the Japanese soon monopolized the best clubs,

hotels and apartments to a greater extent than the Americans had ever done. They

demanded and got the best of everything. Equally objectionable to many was the
Japanese assumption of superiority in medicine and other professions where Filipinos

take legitimate pride in their own accomplishments.

And the Japanese were unnecessarily brutal. It has been mentioned that they were

on their good behavior when Manila was occupied, judged by Oriental standards. This

was less true in the provinces, where executions and looting are reported to have been

much more general. The Filipino knows the meaning of martial law, and when taking part

in a guerrilla raid he realizes the risk involved. But after nearly half a century of American

rule he was not accustomed to torture. Certainly he was not used to seeing innocent men

tortured simply for the purpose of extracting information.

The Filipino did not care for public floggings or the dislocating and breaking of limbs

in punishment for minor offences. Americans were rough at times, particularly in the early

days, but such cases were exceptional and did not represent a policy. With the Japanese

it was a simple routine; they evidently considered that they were being very easy with the

troublesome Filipinos. Certainly they were much harder on the Chinese in the Philippines,

from the Consul-General in Manila,35 who appears to have been executed, to the simple

junk man who was beaten up by a guard at the Consular Internment Camp, apparently

just to show off.

[Page 1114]

What then was the attitude of the typical Filipino toward the native collaborationist

government? It followed the same pattern as that of the average American citizen in the

Philippines: almost no one really approved of collaboration, but beyond that opinions

varied widely. At one extreme, many felt that shooting was too good for men who played
the Japanese game to the extent indicated in their speeches. Others felt that in an

exposed position, such as that of Vargas, there was no alternative to collaboration. In

between there was support for a policy of reserving judgment until after the war when all

the facts would be known. There promised to be strong opposition to any proposal for a

general amnesty. The extremists will be out for blood, while many of the so-called

collaborationists will prefer an opportunity to clear themselves in a public investigation.

It is a common belief in the Philippines that if President Quezon and Vice President

Osmeña had remained behind they too would have been compelled to collaborate.

Certainly the Japanese would have put forth extraordinary efforts to bring this about. On

December 30, 1941, three days before the occupation of Manila, General Homma

addressed a persuasive letter to President Quezon,|| calling upon him to collaborate. A

year later the Japanese were still dealing gently with him, as illustrated by an editorial in

the Manila Tribune of December 15, 1942¶ on Mr. Quezon’s “tragedy”. His subsequent

radio speeches, however, appear to have gotten under Japanese skin, and in the same

newspaper, on August 25, 1943, the semi-official “Commentator” expressed himself in no

uncertain terms on President Quezon’s hyprocrisy, threatening him and other Filipino

refugees with charges of high treason.**

After nearly two years of Japanese occupation the spirit of the Filipino people

remained high. Despite the one-sided military campaign, which cost the lives of some

30,000 of their sons and for which the help promised by America never arrived, they are

loyal to the United States. American civilians interned in the Philippines were all but

unanimous in praising the extraordinary solicitude shown them by Filipinos at every

opportunity. The red armband, prescribed for Americans and other United Nations
nationals when they went outside of an internment camp for any reason, was a badge of

honor not of disgrace in Filipino eyes. A strange Filipino greeted an American on the street

soon after the armbands were introduced. “That’s a good idea,” he said, “now we know

whom we can talk to safely.”

[Page 1115]

When thousands of American prisoners were marched through the streets of

Manila after the fall of Corregidor, the Japanese hoped that it would impress the Filipinos

as final evidence of the downfall of American power in the Far East. But the reaction was

simply one of sorrow and of sympathy for the men who had endured five months of hell

on “The Rock” and were so obviously in a state of exhaustion. Cigarettes and food were

handed to them whenever the attention of the guards relaxed. Much later several hundred

American prisoners appear to have been taken through the streets barefooted, many of

them dressed only in makeshift g-strings. Again all Manila was talking, not of Japan’s

triumph but of Japan’s inhumanity. Then in the summer of 1943 a propaganda picture,

“Down with the Stars and Stripes,” was being filmed in Manila, with American prisoners

and tanks in one of the shots. Some Filipino and Spanish girls among the onlookers are

reported to have used the occasion to throw cigarettes to the Americans and were taken

to Fort Santiago as a result.

A political evaluation of the Philippines under Japanese rule necessitates at least

brief reference to guerrilla activities. A traditional avocation of many Filipinos, it received

new emphasis with the hatred engendered by Japanese occupation and ruthlessness. It

is easy to exaggerate the military importance of guerrillas, but as an expression of public

opinion they are decidedly significant in the Philippines. Outside the chief military centers,
mostly in Luzon, the Islands were lightly held by the Japanese. In many regions the so-

called guerrillas were all but supreme. Some units were headed by USAFFE36 officers,

American and Filipino, while in at least two cases they were being led by former provincial

governors.‡‡ There were reports almost every week of the killing of Japanese soldiers

within the city limits of Manila, and they were forbidden to go out singly at night. Leading

collaborationists realized that the guerrillas regarded them as military objectives and took

what precautions they could. The attempt on Laurel’s life was only the most spectacular

of a series. Great efforts were made to conceal such occurrences in most cases, but a

number of rather prominent Filipinos are known to have been assassinated. In parallel

action, the Chinese in Manila disposed of one of their well known businessmen for

cooperating with the Japanese.

Guerrilla activity in the provinces was a major factor in increasing the population

of Manila to a point where housing, food and unemployment problems, difficult enough in

any case, added fuel to Filipino [Page 1116]hatred of the Japanese. Local stocks of

textiles and clothing were virtually exhausted at the end of the first year. The invaders did

not concern themselves with supplying manufactured articles to the Philippines; probably

they had neither goods to spare nor ships to carry them. The urban Filipino found that he

could buy almost nothing except food, which rose continuously in price, while the farmer

gradually lost interest in supplying the city markets in return for paper money which would

no longer obtain for him even the few items he was accustomed to buy. Rationing and

price control measures in general did not work smoothly and the cost of living rose to

unprecedented heights. Business was all but stagnant. The public made no mistake in

blaming everything on the invaders, and their opinion was not diverted by the enforced
observance of Japanese holidays, with parades, homage to the Imperial Palace and free

street-car rides.

Japan has failed to win Filipino support and sympathy. Even the idea of

independence, prostituted by the Japanese, has lost its appeal for the time being. “We

would rather be slaves under the Americans,” a prominent Filipino insisted. But signs of

discouragement were beginning to appear, particularly in the provinces where American

radio news is less generally heard than in the cities. Also it is just possible that after the

granting of nominal independence to the Philippines the invaders may try to mend their

ways. Many of them appear to like the Filipino; they secretly admire his Occidental

accomplishments, his good English. But the Japanese seem not to realize that an Oriental

differs in outlook and reactions from an Occidental only in so far as his cultural inheritance

has been different, and that in most respects an educated Filipino is more like an

American or a Spaniard than a Japanese. If the invaders should become aware of this

fact, resulting in a more intelligent approach to winning Filipino friendship, and if the war

should last long enough, the enthusiasm of the Filipino people for America might well

become blunted.

The people of the Philippines are still convinced that the Americans will come back

and give them real independence. But they may be more modest than in earlier years.

They know now that complete independence is possible only for the strongest nations,

perhaps no longer even for them. Protection against future aggression they must have.

In return they must be ready to accept some degree of American or international

supervision over their foreign relations, and perhaps over their handling of minorities. But

as the most advanced of the southern Oriental peoples their sensibilities must be
respected. The Americans returning to Manila after the war must not expect to find things

as they were. The “white man’s” privileges, symbolized by the exclusiveness of the Army

and Navy Club, must be a thing of the past. Modesty will become Americans as well as

Filipinos. In [Page 1117]Bataan they went down to defeat together and under Japanese

rule the people of the Philippines remained the faithful friends of Americans in adversity.

They will be partners in victory.

[In a letter of December 13 to the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs

(811B.50/39), the Secretary of State indicated the Department’s “sympathy with the

general purpose of the resolution to create a joint United States–Philippine Commission

to investigate and make recommendations concerning the post-war economy, trade,

finance, economic stability, and rehabilitation of the Philippine Islands.” The resolution

was H. J. Res. 183, introduced in the House of Representatives on November 4.

Legislation establishing the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission was enacted as Public

Law 381, approved June 29, 1944; 58 Stat. 626.]

SOURCE: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v03/d984