1. Pedro L. Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino – AC No. 6672 Sept.

4, 2009

CANON 1.03, 2.03 , 3, 8.02 and 16.2

Facts:
This is a complaint for disbarment by Linsangan against Atty. Tolentino. Complainant (Petitioner) alleged
that Atty. Tolentino convinced his clients to transfer representation by promising them financial assistance and the
expeditious collection of their claims. Linsangan (Petitioner) presented the affidavit of James Gregorio, his client
(petitioner’s client), stating that the respondent tried to entice Gregorio to change his counsel by offering a loan
amounting to P50,000.00. Moreover, the respondent’s calling card contains his services specifically offered
(“specialty”) and included therein is the term “with financial assistance” in his calling card.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of Atty. Tolentino constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

Respondent violated 1.03, 2.03, 3, 8.02 and 16.2 because of the following reasons:

Canon 1.03 in relation to 2.03

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty. Complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals suits. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was used to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. 

Canon 8.02

A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having
these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied
Labianos connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

2. Jesus Ma Cui vs Antonio Ma Cui, et.al – GR No L-18727, August 31, 1964

Facts:

Jesus (Plaintiff) and Antonio (Defendants) are brothers. This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de
Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the
defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

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 The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27
November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations,
principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." One of
the conditions of the deed of donation is that the priority in being the administrator of the Hospital who is a
descendant of Pedro Cui is that he should have a titulo abogado.

In the present case, the siblings are the next in line to succeed as administrator. Plaintiff holds a degree in
law but not a member of the bar while defendant is a member of the bar but was disbarred by later on reinstated
two weeks before he assumed the Administrator position. Hence, this quo warranto.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is indeed entitled to hold the position of administrator.

Ruling:

Yes. The plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made
to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required
for his admission to the Bar in the first place. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

3. Financial Audit Conducted on the books of accounts of Raquel Kho – AM No. 06-4-268 RTC

RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO,
CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR . Subject: Canon 1 and Rule 1.01

Facts: Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar. He was found guilty of gross misconduct for
his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody. She was fined P10k. Since his malfeasance
prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court ordered
him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. In his explanation,
Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He
maintained, however, that he kept the money in the court’s safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.

Issue: Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

Held: Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating,
cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the
mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission is a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the
forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of
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emulation. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. By
definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the element of criminality
although it is broad enough to include it. Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential
in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful conduct. Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For
this, he must be called to account. Atty. Kho is ordered to pay FINE of P5,000.00.

4. Rosaura P. Cordon vs Jesus Balicanta, AC No. 2797, Oct. 4, 2002

Canon 1, Rule 1.01

Facts: Complainant Rosauro Cordon, the widow of Felixberto Jaldon, inherited properties which amounted to 21
parcels of land. The lawyer who helped her settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Atty. Jesus
Balicanta.
Respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a corporation that would develop the said real
properties into a high-scale commercial complex with a beautiful penthouse for complainant, which led to the
establishment of Rosaura Enterprises. Balicanta was simultaneously the President/General Manager/Treasurer. He
made them sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement plus an SPA to sell and mortgage
some of the parcels of land which he transferred the titles of to a certain Tion Suy Ong. Respondent never
accounted for the proceeds of said transfers. Using a spurious board resolution, he obtained a loan from Land bank
in the amount of 2.22M php secured by 9 of the parcels of land.  The respondent ostensibly intended to use the
money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for brevity).  Complainant later on found out that the
structure was made of poor materials such as sawali,  coco lumber and bamboo which could not have cost the
corporation anything close to the amount of the loan secured. He failed to pay a single installment on the loan and
therefore LBP foreclosed. He did not attempt to redeem, and sold the rights to redeem said property.
Complainant’s daughter discovered that their ancestral home had been demolished and that her mother was
detained in a small nipa hut. With the help of an attorney Lim she found her mother. They terminated respondent’s
services and threatened him with legal action.
Issue: Whether respondent should be disbarred
Held: Yes. Respondent committed grave and serious misconduct that casts dishonor on the legal profession.   His
misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit
properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes (Canon 1). Specifically, he is forbidden
to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01).  If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in
the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.  This must
be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.
Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer “to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.” He is bound “to account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.” The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature.  Thus, lawyers

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are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do
so constitutes professional misconduct.

5. Jon De Ysasi III vs NLRC, GR No. 104599, March 11, 1994

Rule 1.04

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm

administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. He suffered various ailments
and was hospitalized on two separate occasions. He underwent fistulectomy,
was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis.
During the entire periods of petitioner’s illnesses, private respondent took
care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However,
without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter’s salary. Petitioner made oral and
written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.

Petitioner then filed an action with the NLRC for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and payment of full backwages, thirteenth month pay,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Said complaint for illegal
dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC holding that petitioner abandoned his work. On appeal, said
decision was affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Jon de Ysasi III abandoned his work.

2. W/N respective counsel for both parties have faithfully observed their duty to encourage
amicable settlement and avoid litigation.

HELD:

1.   In order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of
two elements, the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such
intent we find dismally wanting in this case.

Private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son;s plans of returning to work. The
absence of petitioner from work was not without valid causes of which private respondent had
full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no

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longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any
reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover,private respondent’s claim of abandonment cannot begiven credence as even when pri
vate respondent supposedly “became convinced” that petitioner would no longer work at
the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as
farm administrator. Furthermore, petitioner’s numerous requests for an explanation regarding
the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery
and readiness to go back to work and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegaldismissal
are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.

2. The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties sorelydisappoints the court and invites

reproof. Both counsels may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their
clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients’ respective causes in court. It is just
as much their responsibility to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and
specially in consideration of the direct and immediateconsanguineous ties between their clients.
The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible
by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator
for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that “a lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.” On
this point, we find that both counsels herein fell short of what was expected
of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.

6. Teodoro R. Rivera vs Atty. Sergio Angeles, AC No. 2519, August 29, 2000

Canons Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01

Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-
plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the defendants in the
case as partial fulfillment of the judgment against the latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the
amount he had received and never remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own.
Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.

Issue:
WON Atty Angeles is guilty of deceit AND malpractice.

Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to serious misconduct.
The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s
equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious
of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be
exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an
instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing
with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.

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 7. Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. vs Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon – AC No. 4690, August 29,
2000

Facts:
Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held the position of
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents helped conduct
and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents
tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement
of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an
administrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest
mistake, oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated
them from any offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.

Held:
GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig
City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to
honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who
prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to
fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honest
mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just
a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the
subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain
senatorial candidates at the expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election
returns. A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In
addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” The Court found the
respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warning that similar conduct
in the future will be severely punished.

8. In Re: Vicente Y. Bayan, AC No. 5307, August 9, 2000

Facts:
Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal case. He failed to submit his proof of
service in his appellant’s brief which subsequently caused the inability of the appellee to file his own brief. The IBP
was order to investigate on the matter and despite repeated notices, Bayani failed to submit the proof of service
and his answer to the IBP’s query. Hence, this administrative complaint.

Held:
GUILTY. Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit proof of service of appellant’s brief and his failure to submit the
required comment manifest willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the
canons of professional ethics. It appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen short of the circumspection required of a
member of the Bar. A counsel must always remember that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. A
lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. Further, lawyers are
expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure and anyone who deals with them has the
right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to
his client’s cause. Having been remiss in his duty to the Court and to the Bar, Atty. Bayani was suspended from the
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practice of law for 3 months and until the time he complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the
required proof of service.

Applicable Rule:

18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

9. Elpidio Sy. Vs Edgar Espon – AM No. P-06-2261, Dec. 11, 2013

Lawyers Oath, Canon 10, 10.01 CPR

FACTS:
Jaime Ang Tiao and Maria Gagarin paid supersedeas bond and monthly rentals to Branch 32 of Manila RTC upon
appeal of the decision of the Manila MeTC to eject them. Ang Tiao and Gagarin likewise deposited P264,000 in
monthly rentals to Branch 54 following the filing of a case contesting the validity of the Deed of Sale executed
between Systems Realty Development Corp. and BPI.
Atty. Walfredo Bayhon, Ang Tiao and Gagarin’s counsel, filed an ex parte motion to withdraw the rental deposits
made in Branch 54 since a (sufficient) supersedeas bond was already posted in the ejectment appeal, rendering the
deposit superfluous and (duplicitous), Judge Hermogenes Liwag approved the motion.

Sy, however, disputes the withdrawal saying there is no duplication because the deposit in Branch 32 was for rental
fees from September 30, 1994 to January 3, 1997 while the one in Branch 54 was June 30 1989 to August 5, 1994.
Sy also claims he was not given a copy of the ex parte motion and it was never set for hearing.
The assailed ex parte motion, however, cannot be found in the records of Branch 54. Sy accuses Branch 54,
assistant clerk of court, De la Cruz-Buendia and officer-in-charge Esponilla for conspiring to conceal the file.

Further, probing by OCA reveals that Judge Liwag’s order allowing the release of the deposit was prepared by the
Branch 55 stenographer, redirecting the investigation to former Branch 55 officers. One officer testifies Atty.
Bayhon actually filed the motion in Branch 55 not in Branch 54.
Bayhon snubbed several orders of the Supreme Court to explain. When he finally did, he merely rehashed his old
excuse that he has turned over the case to Ang Tiao and Gagarin following his resignation as their attorney, hence,
he has access to the case documents. The Supreme Court ordered the current officers Branch 54 and the CA which
handled the appeal on July 11, 1996 to produce the questioned motion to no avail. Furthermore, OCA reports that
the motion was not attached to the disbursement voucher for the rental fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyer’s oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
Yes.
Bayhon has attempted to mislead the court and his non-compliance with the resolutions of the court ordering him
to explain on March 2009, December 2010, and August 2011 shows nothing but an indifference to court directives
which cannot be taken lightly specially that it has affected and protracted the investigation and resolution of an
administrative matter where his explanation and assistance is a crucial factor.
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with
promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character but
also disrespect for the court’s lawful order and directive.
Atty. Bayhon’s unsubstantiated claim that the deposits withdrawn were replaced by a supersedeas bond is a legal
incredulity. It is a preposterous excuse that does not only attempt to mislead the court. It was proffered in an
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attempt to evade the directive of the court to produce a copy of the ex parte motion which may open a can of
worms. The order clearly states that the attachments to the motion showed that there was already a supersedeas
bond posted with Branch 32 in the amount of P250,000, that is why Judge Liwag ordered and authorized the
withdrawal of the same amount from Branch 54.
It is precisely the claim of hearin complainant that it was fraudulent representation on the part of Atty. Bayhon to
make it appear that Branch 54 deposits were superfluous because the deposits made with Branches 32 and 54
were separate, distinct and covered different periods – a false claim that Atty. Bayhon has continuously denied
making in the ex parte motion. But instead of producing and submitting to his court a copy of the motion to
conclusively prove that he did not make such false averment. Bayhon hides behind the rules of evidence claiming
that without the motion, this allegation about him is but hearsay.

Atty. Bayhon is suspended from the practice of law for 6 months for violations of the Lawyer’s oath and Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

10. Felipe C. Dagala vs Atty. Jose Quesada, et.al – AC No 5044 December 2, 2013
CANONS & RULES: Canon 1 Rule 1.01, Canon 10 Rule 10.01, Canon 17 and Canon 18 Rule 18.03

FACTS:
Complainant, assisted by Atty. Quesada, filed before the NLRC-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San
Fernando City, La Union (NLRC-RAB) Complaint for illegal dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay, damages and
attorney’s fees against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport, and owner and General Manager, Lourdes Gutierrez, as
well as its Personnel Manager, Joseph G. De Jesus. The said case was, however, dismissed without prejudice, for
failure of complainant and Atty. Quesada to appear during the two (2) scheduled mandatory conference hearings
despite due notice. Thereafter, complainant engaged the services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter of the
NLRC-RAB, who re-filed his labor case. Similarly, the case was dismissed without prejudice, this time due to the
parties' failure to submit their respective position papers.
Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case for a third time. During its pendency, the representative of
Capitol purportedly offered the amount of ₱74,000.00 as settlement of complainant's claim, conditioned on the
submission of the latter’s position paper. Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of
the complaint "for lack of interest and failure to prosecute" as stated in an Order. Atty. Adquilen and complainant
received notice of the said order. Complainant – this time assisted by Atty. Imelda L. Picar – filed a motion for
reconsideration, however, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in a Resolution for having been filed out of time,
adding that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters to
respondents, informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative cases against them
before the Court. Nevertheless, as complainant remains open to the possibility of settlement, respondents were
invited to discuss the matter at Atty. Picar’s office. Only Atty. Quesada responded to the said letter and
subsequently, through a MOA, undertook to compensate the damages sustained by complainant in consideration
of the non-filing of an administrative complaint against him. Atty. Quesada, however, reneged on his promise, thus
prompting complainant to proceed with the present complaint. In a Resolution, the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from notice. However, despite notices and the extension granted,
Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive and the subsequent show-cause resolutions. Accordingly, a fine in
the amount of ₱500.00 was imposed against him, which he duly paid. On the other hand, Atty. Quesada, in his
Comment, admitted having accepted and filed the initial labor case for complainant. He, however, explained that
he was unable to file the required position paper due to complainant's failure to furnish him with the employment
records and other relevant documents. He also claimed that when he was informed of the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, he advised complainant to re-file the case with the assistance of another lawyer as he had to
attend to his duties as Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of La Union
Province. Anent to the MoA, Atty. Quesada alleged that he was merely prevailed upon to sign the same for fear of
losing his means of livelihood and license to practice law, and that he had no intention of reneging on his promise
to pay. Nonetheless, despite earnest efforts, he still failed to come up with the agreed-upon amount. The Court
resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for evaluation, report

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and recommendation or decision. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) set the case for mandatory
conference on August 25, 2006 and required the parties to submit their respective briefs.
Complainant was duly represented by his counsel at the hearing, while respondents filed separate motions
to reset, only to subsequently waive their respective appearances. Atty. Adquilen attributed the waiver to his
medical condition; on the other hand, in a complete turnaround, Atty. Quesada denied the existence of any lawyer-
client relationship between him and complainant. The Investigating IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. issued
a Report and Recommendation, finding that respondents were grossly negligent in handling complainant's case in
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that each of
them be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, Atty. Quesada was directed to
comply with his undertaking under the December 5, 1998 MoA to pay the amount of ₱68,000.00, with legal
interest from January 20, 1999 until fully settled; while Atty. Adquilen was ordered to pay the amount of ₱6,000.00,
representing the difference between the ₱74,000.00 settlement offered by Capitol and the above-stated
settlement amount, with legal interest from date of notice of the order of dismissal on March 25, 1997 until fully
paid. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the afore-stated report and recommendation finding the
same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules. Consequently, it directed
respondents to pay complainant the total amount of ₱74,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. In a Resolution
dated September 12, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBP’s November 19, 2011 Resolution, and thereafter
sent notices to the parties as well as the IBP-CBD, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Public Information Office.
However, the notice sent to Atty. Adquilen was returned unserved with the notation "Return to Sender, Deceased."
Thus, the IBP filed its compliance,40 attaching therewith the Certificate of Death of Atty. Adquilen which
indicates that the latter passed away on June 22, 2008 due to cardiac arrhythmia. In view of Atty. Adquilen's death
prior to the promulgation of this Decision, the Court, bearing in mind the punitive nature of administrative
liabilities, hereby dismisses the case against him. Hence, what is left for resolution is the complaint against Atty.
Quesada.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Quesada should be held administratively liable for gross negligence in handling
complainant’s labor case.

HELD:
Yes. The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent Atty. Quesada’s administrative
liability, but deems it proper to delete the recommended order for the return of the amount of ₱74,000.00. The
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost
trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and
accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles
are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code
In the present case, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules and Canons. Primarily,
Atty. Quesada failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s case by his failure to justify his
absence on the two (2) mandatory conference hearings in the case, which thus resulted in its dismissal. It bears
stressing that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence and not to sit idly by
and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty. To this end, he is oblige to attend scheduled hearings or
conferences, prepare and file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and
urge their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. Atty. Quesada’s
failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper justification,
exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Moreover, Atty. Quesada acted with less candor and good faith in the proceedings
before the IBP-CBD when he denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant,
and claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer, despite his previous admission before the Court of
having accepted complainant's case. While the IBP-CBD is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part
of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its
9|Page
officers or an examination into his character. Under the premises, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that Atty.
Quesada had indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the prescriptions under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code. In Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr., a lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year for inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and for
misrepresentations committed before the CA, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. In the cases of Cheng v. Atty. Agravante and Perea v. Atty. Almadro, respondent-
lawyers were similarly punished for their negligence in the discharge of their duties to their client and for
misrepresentation committed before the Court, in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the IBP and
accordingly suspends Atty. Quesada for a period of one (1) year. The Court must, however, clarify that the
foregoing resolution should not include a directive to return the amount of ₱74,000.00 as ordered by the IBP in its
November 19, 2011 Resolution which represents the settlement initially offered by Capitol in the dismissed labor
case. The return of the said amount partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with
during an administrative-disciplinary proceeding such as this case. Respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repitition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. On the other hand, the administrative complaint respondent Atty. Amado Adquilen is
hereby DIMISSED in view of his supervening death.

11. Jocelyn De Leon vs Atty. Tyrone Pedreña – AC No. 9401, Oct. 22, 2013
CANONS & RULES: Canon 1 Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 Rule 7.03

FACTS:
Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in her complaint-
affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, De Leon
went to the PAO in Parañaque City, in order to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDREÑA about the status of her case
for support of two minor children against her husband, which case is being handled by Atty. Pedreña. Atty. Pedreña
was at a court hearing, so De Leon waited at his office until he arrived at about 11:45 a.m. Atty. Pedreña and
directed her to go ahead to Tita Babes Restaurant so they could take our lunch together and to talk about said case.
Atty. Pedreña then asked many personal matters rather than discuss said case but complainant still answered out
of respect. Complainant was asked by respondent to return on February 1, 2006 at 10:00AM, stating that the case
was difficult and prompted more time to study. Complainant stated that Atty. Pedreña asked her to ride with him
and he would just drop her by the jeepney station, she refused but the former persistently convinced her to get in
the car, and so she acceded to his request so as not to offend him. However right after they left the parking lot and
not yet too far from the City Hall, Atty. Pedreña immediately held complainant’s left hand with his right hand, and
insisted her to get closer with him and laid her on his shoulder. Complainant immediately responded by saying
"AYOKO HO!" But he persisted in trying to get a hold of her hand and also tried very hard to insert his finger into
her firmly closed hand. Complainant got scared and at the same time was offended due to the lack of respect of
Atty. Pedreña. Despite the resistance, Atty. Pedreña continued rubbing the complainant’s left leg, prompting the
latter to attempt and remove his hand on her leg but then he grabbed her hand and forced it to put on his penis. De
Leon continued to wrestle and struggle as they were approaching her drop off point in the 7-11 store, but the
lawyer made another move by pressing his finger on her private part. De Leon tried to unlock the car’s door in the
hopes of getting out of the car but the traffic light was on green so instead of stopping, he accelerated a bit more,
but sensing the insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed De Leon to get off. He then reminded
complainant of their February 1, 2006 appointment for the continuation of her case. On February 1, 2006,
complainant brought her five-year-old child to avoid another incident. In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De
Leon’s allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a complaint would open the gates to those who
had evil desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the complaint was premature and should be dismissed
on the ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the
Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office; and that he had also filed a complaint for theft against De Leon. Attached to
Atty. Pedreña’s answer were his counter-affidavit in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness and his complaint-
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affidavit for theft. In his counter affidavit, Atty. Pedreña admitted giving a ride to De Leon, but he vehemently
denied making sexual advances on her, insisting that she had sat very close to him during the ride that even made it
hard for him to shift gears, and that the ride had lasted for only two to three minutes. He claimed that De Leon was
allowing herself to be used by his detractors in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) after he had opposed the practice
of certain PAO staff members of charging indigent clients for every document that they prepared. In his complaint
affidavit for theft, he stated that he had another passenger in his car at the time he gave a ride to De Leon, who did
not notice the presence of the other passenger because the ride lasted for only two to three minutes; and that the
other passenger was Emma Crespo, who executed her own affidavit attesting that she had witnessed De Leon’s act
of taking Pedreña’s cellphone from the handbrake box of the car. Only De Leon appeared during the hearing.
Hence, Atty. Pedreña was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings. Thereafter, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the striking off of his name from
the Roll of Attorneys. Holding that a disbarment case was sui generis and could proceed independently of the
criminal case that was based on the same facts; and that the proceedings herein need not wait until the criminal
case for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedreña was finally resolved, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. Pedreña had made sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty.
Pedreña suspension from the practice of law for three months. Atty. Pedreña filed a motion for reconsideration
with the IBP, which adopted and approved Resolution denying the motion and affirming with modification its
Resolution by increasing the period of suspension to six months. On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
transmitted to the Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pedreña should be held liable for sexual harassment.

HELD:
Yes. Complainant was able to prove her case against the Respondent. During the clarificatory hearing, she
was straightforward and spontaneous in answering the questions propounded on her. Her account of the incident
that happened on 30 January 2006 was consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint and Verified
Position Paper. On the other hand, Respondent’s defenses are not credible enough to rebut the claims of
Complainant. His defenses are replete with Decision 5 A.C. No. 9401 inconsistencies and his actuations in the entire
proceedings show lack of integrity in his dealings with both the Complainant and this Commission. There is no merit
at all in the defenses put forth by Respondent. The Theft case filed by Respondent is a mere afterthought on his
part. Such criminal complaint hinged on a claim that there was another person during that incident who allegedly
saw Complainant stealing Respondent’s mobile phone. Yet, in Respondent’s Position Paper and in his Counter-
Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was executed after the institution of the criminal complaint for
Theft, Respondent never mentioned anything about a third person being present during the incident. If the
presence of this third person was crucial to prove his case against herein Complainant, there is no reason why this
allegation would be omitted in his Position Paper and Counter-Affidavit to at least support his defense. The records
show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly
closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private
part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but
repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it
bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the Legal Profession.
Members of the Bar are clearly duty- bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to
safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, is sufficient
to warrant the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Towards that end, we have not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar to live up to the standards and norms
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of the Legal Profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide
free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a client. He also disregarded his
oath as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of
her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance. The recommended penalty of suspension
for six months was not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed. Verily, the determination
of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the Court’s discretion. In Advincula v. Macabata, the Court
held that the errant lawyer’s acts of turning his client’s head towards him and then kissing her on the lips were
distasteful, but still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the
respondent lawyer was merely reprimanded but reminded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealings with
clients. In Barrientos v. Daarol, the respondent lawyer was disbarred, but the severest penalty was imposed not
only because of his engaging in illicit sexual relations, but also because of his deceit. He had been already married
and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage to a 20-year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of her,
and made her pregnant. He not only suggested that she abort the pregnancy, but he also breached his promise to
marry her, and, in the end, even deserted her and their child. In Delos Reyes v. Aznar, the Court adjudged the
respondent lawyer, a married man with children, highly immoral for having taken advantage of his position as the
chairman of the College of Medicine of his school in enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to have
carnal knowledge with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects should she refuse. The
respondent was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct. Without diminishing the gravity of the complainant’s sad
experience, however, we consider the acts committed by Atty. Pedreña to be not of the same degree as the acts
punished under the cited judicial precedents. Neither did his acts approximate the act committed by the
respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller, whereby we disbarred the respondent lawyer for raping his neighbor’s wife
notwithstanding that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal prosecution for the crime.
We further note that, unlike in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos Reyes where there were threats and
taking advantage of the respondent lawyer’s position, Atty. Pedreña did not employ any scheme to satiate his lust,
but, instead, he desisted upon the first signs of the complainant’s firm refusal to give in to his advances. In view of
these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years is fitting and just.
The Court suspended ATTY. TYRONE PEDREÑA from the practice of law for two years effective upon receipt
of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

12. Atty. Oscar Embido et al vs Atty. Salvador N. Pe Jr., et.al., AM No. 6732,, October 22, 2013

FACTS:
Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya received two written communications from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt. The letter requested
a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one
Shirley Quioyo. Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that
the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court
files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration
of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria. Informed that the
requested decision and case records did not exist, Mr. Hunt sent a letter attaching a machine copy of the purported
decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. After comparing the two
documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court
document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation. The discovery of the falsified decision
prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of
the falsification. Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit wherein he stated that it was the
respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the

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respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo. The NBI invited the
respondent to explain his side but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent.

ISSUE: WON Pe should be disbarred.

HELD: YES. In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross immorality,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent
was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. It
then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any way
or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity. The Court will not hesitate
to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring
demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to: x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x
x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of
their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x. No lawyer should
ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only
to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect
the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities.

13. Mary Ann Mattus vs Albert Vilasesa – AC No. 7922, October 1, 2013

Facts: this is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty. Albert T. Villaseca
for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02.
the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was often absent during court hearings but still
collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask
the RTC to direct a National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and
Zuraida Porter[2] in the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite having been
granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only
filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of the dates of the presentation of defense evidence and
the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case number in the notice of appeal.
According to the complainant, Atty. Villaseca's negligence in handling the case resulted in her own and her
husband's conviction.

Issue: whether or not Atty. Vilasesa is guilty of negligence in handling his case.

Held or Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes
inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients’ cause. Furthermore, Atty.
Villaseca’s failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of
diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his
clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted
efforts to rebut the presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete

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discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense
within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause.  

 we find Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and Canon 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years, effective upon
his receipt of this Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.

14. Nestor Figueras, et. al vs Atty. Diosdado Jimenez – AC No. 9116, March 12, 2014

Facts: Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint[12] for
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his
negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court. respondent denied
administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner's association in CA-G.R.
CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the
case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said
handling lawyer.

Issue: W/n respondent violated the CPR particularly canons 12,17,18,

Held: the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper. lawyer engaged to
represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. In failing
to file the appellant's brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set
forth in Rule 12.04,[20] Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar
not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code

15. Rodrigo Er Tapay et.al vs Atty. Barcolo and Jarder – AC No. 9604, March 20, 2013

CANON 9: A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

FACTS:

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a
harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6
which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of
Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted
standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.

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On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information.
They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the
signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted
by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being
informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and
documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications
be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment
complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao
was employed as secretary of their law office.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder are administratively liable

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty.
Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo's violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.

COURT RULING

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio where we held:

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited

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privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty.
Bancolo's authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel's
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one's
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect
to the document.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even
participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for
him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

16. Ana Marrie Cambaliza vs Atty. Ana Luz Tenorio – AC No. 6290, July 14, 2004

FACTS:
          Complainant is the former employee of the respondent in her law office. The former charged the latter for
malpractice or other gross misconduct in the office for cooperating in the illegal practice of law by her husband. The
complainant submitted the following evidences: 1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office where the name of
Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., husband of the respondent, is listed as a senior partner; and 2.) a Sagip Communication
Radio’s Group identification card signed by the respondent where her husband is identified as “Atty. Felicisimo
Tenorio, Jr.”. She added that respondent’s husband even appeared in court hearings. During the investigation of
the IBP, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint. Respondent now moved for the dismissal of the case
for failure of the complainant to appear in the said case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law.
2. Whether or not a Motion to Withdraw Complaint in a disbarment proceeding, the case may prosper.

HELD:
1.     YES. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is
guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained, otherwise, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

2.     YES. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.

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 17. Alcantara v Pefianco – AC No. 5398, December 3, 2002

Canon 8

Facts:

Atty. Alcantara, complainant, alleged that, while Atty. Salvani was conferring with a client in the Public
Attonerys Office (PAO), a woman in tears approached them, wherein, the former suggested that they talk with her
amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, Atty. Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood
up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, in their language, “Why do you settle that case? Have your
client imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake”. Surprised by Pefianco’s outburst, complainant asked him to
cool off but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Pefianco at first listened, but shortly after, he again
started shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with Pefianco, complainant asked his clerk to put
a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard respondent
Pefianco saying: “Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an idiot,” and upon seeing
complainant, he pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear. He
confronted him and told him to observe civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there, but he started
hurling invectives at him and even took a menacing stance towards him which cause a commotion and when the
guards came to take Pefianco out of the office, he tried to attack complainant and shouted “Gago Ka!”, fortunately,
guards were able to fend off the situation. Complainant also submitted affidavits of six disinterested persons to
corroborate his allegations.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been murdered as she was
pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the money.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
Yes. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the
legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times. Respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the
right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with
the widow. Even when he was being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those
who tried to calm him down. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring
down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness
respondent had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by
another injustice.

18. Camacho vs Pagulayan – AC No. 4807, March 22, 2000

PANGULAYAN INDICTED FOR VIOLATION OF CANON 9: Lawyer should not communicate upon subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. Lawyer must avoid everything that may tend to mislead
party not represented by counsel and should not advise him as to law.

CAMACHO v PANGULAYAN

FACTS:

-9 students of AMA were expelled for having a p p a r e n t l y caused to be published objecti onable features
or arti cles in the school paper. D e n i a l o f t h e a p p e a l t o A M A P r e s i d e n t Aguiluz gave rise to Civil
Case 97-30549. C A MA C H O w a s t h e h i r e d c o u n se l o f t h e e x p e l l e d s t u d e n t s i n a n a c ti o n f o r t h e
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Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injuction in the said civil case. While the civil case was still pending,
letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements were separately executed by the expelled students
w i t h o u t t h e k n o w l e d g e of CAMACHO. CAMACHO filed a complaint against lawyers comprising the
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCI ATES Law F irm (lawye rs of AMA) b e c a u s e w i t h o u t h i s k n o w l e d g e
t h e y procured and effected on separate occasions compromise agreements (letters of apology and Re-
admission Agreements) with 4 of his c li e n t s w h ic h i n e ff e c t r e q u ir e d t h e m t o waive all kinds of claims
they may have with AMA. CA MACHO averre d t hat such an act was unbecoming of any member of
the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension. PANGULAYAN in his defense claimed that the
ag re emen ts were execu ted for the sole purpose of eff ecti ng the sett lement of an administrative
case

ISSUE:

W/N PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES SHOULDBE SUSPENDED/DISBARRED

HELD:

YES. It would appear that when individual letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements were
formalized, CAMACHO was already the r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l o f t h e e x p e l l e d A M A students.
PANGULAYAN and associates having full knowledge of this fact sti ll proceeded to negoti ate with
the expelled AMA students a n d t h e i r p a r e n t s w i t h o u t a t l e a s t communicating the
matter to their lawyer CAMACHO. This failure of PANGULAYAN and associates, w h e t h e r b y d e s i g n o r
o v e r s i g h t , i s a n e x c u s a b l e v i o l a ti o n o f t h e c a n o n s o f profession ethics and in utter disregard
of a duty owing to a colleague. The excuse that agreements were executed for se tt ling the ad minist ra ti ve
case was belied by the Manifestation which states “9s i g n a t o r i e s a g r e e d a m o n g o t h e r s t o
terminate ALL civil, criminal and administrative proceedings they may have aga in st AM A a rising f rom
th eir p rev ious dismissal”. Hence, PANGULAYAN should be suspended for 3 months.

19. Reyes vs Chiong – AC 5148, July 1, 2003

Atty. Ramon P. Reyes vs Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr.

A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003

Facts:
Atty. Ramon Reyes counsel for Zonggi Xu.Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr for Chia Hsien Pan. Xu, a Chinese-
Taiwanese went into a business venture with Pan. Pan was supposed to set up a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and
seafood products factory. He did not establish it, and so Xu asked that his money be returned.Xu then filed a case
of estafa against Pan. Prosecutor Salanga then issued a subpoena against Pan. Atty. Chiong then filed a motion to
quash, but he also filed a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the
dissolution of a business venture against Xu, Atty Reyes, and Prosecutor Salanga.He alleged that Salanga was
impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the
criminal investigation he still filedthe complaint against Pan in spite of Pan’s motions.Atty. Reyes was allegedly
impleaded because he allegedly connived with Xu in filing the estafa case which was baseless.IBP recommended
that Chiong be suspended for 2 years.

Issue: W/N Chiong should be suspended.

Held:
Yes. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.If Chiong believed that the two had conspired to act illegally, hecould have instituted disbarment
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proceedings.As a lawyer, Chiong should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus the filing
of the cases had no justification.Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy,
dignity and civility.Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and
demeanor.

20. Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata– AC No. 7204, March 7, 2007

Facts:
Cynthia Advincula filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto Macabata, charging the latter with
grossly immoral conduct. Advincula sought legal advice from the latter about the possibility of filing a complaint
against Queensway Travel and Tours for not settling their accounts as demanded.
Atty. Macabata offered Advincula a ride on two ocassions. On February 10, 2005, he sent Advincula home
and gave her a kiss on the cheek and embraced her very tightly. On March 2005, Atty. Macabata allegedly kissed
Advincula forcefully while his other hand was holding her breast.
The two texted each other after the said incident, which were used by Advincula as the evidence of guilt against the
latter.
Atty. Macabata admitted that he kissed Advincula on two ocassions because Advincula offered her lips to
him. He also argued that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City, where he dropped her
off was a busy street, makes it impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Macabata committed grossly immoral acts that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law

Ruling:
No, the acts of Atty. Macabata would not suffice to warrant a disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law. The term "grossly immoral" is referred to acts, (1) so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or; (2) so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or; (3) committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Although Atty. Macabata had admittedly kissed Advincula, it is not sufficient as to warrant a grossly
immoral act. Also, Advincula failed to present substantial evidence against Atty. Macabata, proving the latter
showed grossly immoral conduct.
However, the Court found Atty. Macabata guilty of an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Wherefore, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Macabata is hereby dismissed. However, he is hereby
reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a stern warning that a more
severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

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