Collective Memory, Violence, and the Effects of Intractable Conflict:

The Case of Israel-Palestine

Laurette Hanna

Political Science Honors Cohort 2020

Advisor: Liora Halperin

Second Reader: James Long

Introduction

Perhaps one of the most famous intractable conflicts is that of the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict. Starting officially in 1948, the conflict has continued to this day with no end in sight

and very little hope for lasting resolution. The seemingly irreconcilable grievances encompassed

in this conflict include legitimacy issues, histories of victimization and demands for recompence,

belonging in the territory, and statehood and statelessness. Largely, the reason as to why these

grievances seem irreconcilable is that the two sides have vastly different understandings of the

history of their conflict with each other. In fact, the narratives seem to be directly opposing one

another, effectively delegitimizing the other. This realization has led to narrative studies

exploring the differences between the Israeli and Palestinian narratives, specifically around the

founding event of this conflict – the 1948 war. One limitation of this scholarship is that much of

the studies and reports have focused solely on 1948, with little done to study narrative

developments over time, and how narrative has continued to contribute to the conflict. This paper

seeks to explore the development of these opposing narrative through the combination of the

Symbolic Politics Theory of ethnic conflict, its interactions with the unique characteristics of

intractable conflict, and the Ethos of Conflict that arises to explore how narratives can contribute

to the creation and maintenance of conflict over time.

Symbolic Politics theory was synthesized by Stuart Kaufman in his book titled Modern

Hatreds. Kaufman had issue with how theories of ethnic conflict focus on looking past narratives

of conflict to find the “true reason” for the outbreak of violence. He believed that conflict

narratives were key to understanding how and why conflict breaks out among ethnic groups.

Kaufman found psychological studies that showed how myths and symbols appeal to negative

emotions in human, and that emotions, and negative emotions particularly, evoke stronger and
faster reactions than rational appeals (Horowitz, 1985). These negative emotions are critical to

facilitating an environment of hostility through the creation of in-group/out-group dynamics that

portray one’s own group as good, and any action taken by their group as just, and the other as

bad, and any action taken by the other as unjust (Horowitz, 1985). This in-group/out-group

psychology can build prejudice, hostility, suspicion, and distrust, between the two groups, which

can snowball into ethnic violence if gone unchecked and allowed to build to an extreme

(Kaufman, 2001). Through his research, Kaufman found three conditions that predict ethnic

conflict: 1) myths justifying ethnic hostility, 2) anxiety-laden ethnic fears of extinction, and 3)

opportunity to mobilize and fight (Kaufman, 2001). If these are present and are present in great

magnitude, conflict will erupt between the two sides (Kaufman, 2001).

For Kaufman, the interaction between these three conditions is explained thusly: ethnic

conflict would not erupt unless people used narrative, symbols, and myths to create an

environment that would allow for ethnic based violence to occur. This environment is built by

people using hostility justifying myths and fears of extinction to code any action taken by the

other side as hostile. These myths and symbols can start to be salient within a society for many

reasons: economic hardship, targeted violence, change in leadership - anything that creates a

sense of insecurity or grievance among a population. It is important that the causes of these

insecurities are coded by the public as ethnic in nature for the conflict to fall along ethnic lines

(Kaufman, 2001). Due to the specific ethnic codification of the conflict, in-group/out group

psychology would begin to take hold along ethnic lines in the population (Kaufman, 2001). This

further entrenches the hostile narratives espoused by leaders of communities so that when an

opportunity to mobilize and fight presents itself, either through the lifting of a barrier or through

a catalyzing event, violence will break out. Not only does violence result from these narratives
and symbols, but violence further reinforces these narrative: people point to violent actions by

the ‘other’ as proof of their fears and suspicions, creating new narratives to incorporate new

evidence created in the conflict into the existing narrative. Thus, a violence-narrative feedback

loop begins to take shape.

The three conditions described by Kaufman are not only met by the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict, but the narratives they create are compounded by the intractable nature of the conflict

and the resulting violence-narrative feedback loop. Daniel Bar-Tal and Nadim Rouhana have

explored the psychological effects of intractable conflict in their studies, specifically focusing on

Israelis and Palestinians. Their findings on the psychological outcomes of intractable conflict fit

well within the narrative conditions of ethnic conflict posed by Kaufman and serve to expand his

theory in regard to Israel-Palestine. They found that the following components of intractable

conflicts are critical to understanding their outcomes: perception of exclusive legitimacy over the

land, history of victimization, perception of power asymmetry, and length of conflict. Combining

the two theories, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, myths justifying ethnic hostility stem from a

perception of exclusive legitimacy over the land (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Ethnic fears of

extinction come from a history of victimization of both sides and the perception of asymmetry of

power (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).For Israelis, their history of victimization was that of the

European victimization of the Jewish populatiom and the rise of anti-Semitic pogroms

culminating in the traumatic events of the Holocaust (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). For

Palestinians, al Nakba, or the Catastrophe, begins their history of victimization with the cruel

expulsion and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their homeland (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998)

Both events are tied to fears of further victimization. For Zionist and their followers in the Israeli

public, the memory of life in exile and the anti-Semitic violence enacted against the Jews in
Europe is translated into the fear that the same might happened to the Jews in Israel at the hand

of the surrounding Arab countries. For Palestinians, their expulsion from their homeland the

harsh realities of life in exile and under occupation signifies a continuation of al Nakba and their

victimhood. The continued refusal of statehood heightens the fear that this vulnerable position

they are in will continue without end.

When these fears are paired with perceptions of an asymmetry of power, these fears become

heightened. For Israelis, the conflict is not only between Israel and Palestine, but between Israel

and the entirety of the Arab nation, painting the picture of a Jewish Israel fighting for survival

against the much larger, stronger coalition of Arab states (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).

Palestinians, on the other hand, see the conflict not in the wider Arab-Israeli lens, but in the more

local Israeli-Palestinian lens, in which a stateless people fight for freedom from a stronger

oppressor (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Each side sees the other as more powerful, and

themselves as the disadvantaged side. This heightens each side’s sense of vulnerability and

victimization (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).

The continued violence and length of the conflict compounds these fear and hostile

narratives, deeply embedding the myths and symbols associated with them into the psyche of the

actors on both sides. Historical narrative becomes intertwined with recent conflicts, and personal

memory become embroiled with collective memory (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). An ethos of

conflict (EOC) begins to emerge out of the prolonged struggle (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). This

ethos “provides a clear picture of the conflict, its goals, conditions, and requirements, as well as

an image of one’s own group, and of the rival group.” (Bar-Tal Salomon). The EOC is a readily

accessible world view of the conflict that allows those directly experiencing the conflict to make

sense of the world around them (Sharvit, 2014). Conflict becomes the status quo in intractable
conflicts, and EOCs maintain the status quo by justifying the groups goals and role in the

continuation of the conflict (Sharvit, 2014). It is important to note here that EOCs do not always

arise purposefully, nor is it necessarily the intention of either side for the conflict to continue.

EOCs are a psychological protective mechanism against the daily horrors and distress

experienced by those living in these intractable conflict – it provides people on each side with

meaning to their suffering (Sharvit, 2014). For this reason, EOCs are often hard to detect within

oneself and even more difficult to dismantle in a population (Sharvit, 2014). Understanding how

intractable conflicts can manipulate myths and symbols to create an ethos of conflict can help to

understand, in line with the conditions presented by Kaufman, when violence will escalate in

intractable conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This paper will explore these concepts – symbolic politics, nature of intractable conflicts, and

ethos of conflict – in the context of the Israeli Palestinian conflict to show how the foundational

myths and narratives created in 1948 have become compounded by the ongoing violence, and

have continued to effect both populations’ perception of the conflict. This paper will specifically

be focusing on the years 1982-2008. These years contain many critical moments that have tested

the salience of each sides’ narratives and their hold on the public. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon

had rippling and divisive effects on how the Israeli public viewed the conflict. The First Intifada

(1987-1991) brought the Palestinian cause to central attention. The Oslo accords (1993) that

would shortly follow would redefine the parameters of the conflict, and its downfall and the

second intifada (2000-2008) would re-evaluate the prospects of peace. With each event, the

narratives of each side were challenged or reaffirmed, adjusted or repurposed by each side,

providing a great case study for the effects of an intractable conflict on narratives of each side.

Nationalist Narratives Emerge

 It is important first to understand how the Palestinian and Israeli identities came to be

before attempting to understand the conflict between the two peoples. Israel began first with

Zionism, which began to take shape among Jewish scholars in the early 1900s as rise in anti-

Semitism and violence against Jewish citizens begins to shake the Jewish community.

Intellectual elites in Europe came to believe that the Jewish people would never be truly safe

from violence until they had their own Jewish national home (Khoury, 2016). Theodore Herzl is

credited with the success of the early Zionist movement. He believed that the Jews were a nation

and that they should seek out a national homeland (Gelvin, 2014). Herzl believed that this Jewish

homeland should be established in Palestine, as this was what he believed was the historic Jewish

homeland. He derived this historical component from religious links to an ancient Jewish

community in the holy lands that was cast out in exile (Khoury, 2016). Herzl gained a following

with this idea in the Eastern parts of Europe where the Jewish Community was particularly

suffering (Pappe, 2004). This group constituted the first wave of immigrants to Palestine

following some particularly harsh pogroms (Gelvin, 2014). As Anti-Semitism continued to rise

in Europe and as violence continued to grow, Zionism began to grow as a reaction to the Jewish

condition in exile. It is very important to note that Palestinians and Arabs as a whole were not a

part of the national narratives at the outset of Zionism (Porat, 2006). In fact, Arabs were mostly

absent from the Zionist narrative entirely, and were seldom referred to or discussed – they were

little more than an afterthought (Fierke, 2008). In fact, the slogan of early Zionism was “A land

without people for a people without land” (Suleiman, 1984). This implies that even though they

knew that there were people living on the land at the time of their arrival, they did not consider

these natives, the Arabs, to be a people – a nation with connections to the land (Suleiman, 1984).
 The real issue in the establishment of a Jewish national identity, the real other, were the

lives of those in the Jewish Diaspora (Porat, 2006). Zionists began positioning themselves

against Jews in diaspora in order to effectively distinguish themselves from the suffering

experienced in diaspora (Porat, 2006). Zionist leaders began attributing heroic and brave

characteristics to those who immigrated to Palestine while attributing the opposite to those who

remained in diaspora (Greenberg, 2005). Zionism, as in the words of David Ben-Gurion, was

“the fruit of the revolt of pioneering youth against the misery of the Jewish way of life, the

wretchedness of existence in the Diaspora”. As more and more Jews began immigrating into

Palestine following WWI, Zionists gained a strategic win for their cause– support for the

establishment of a Jewish national home from Britain, one of the world’s great powers (Gelvin,

2014). Britain had conquered Palestine during WWI and had claimed control of the area through

the creation of a Palestinian Mandate State. Since the British government had already issued the

Balfour Declaration in 1917 outlining their support for the establishment Jewish national home

in Palestine, Zionists saw these developments as an assurance that their goal would soon be

achieved (Gelvin, 2014).

The experience of the Holocaust further exemplified the difference between the

experiences of Jews in Palestine versus the Jews in Diaspora. The Holocaust was seen by

Zionists and many Jews in Europe as proof that the predictions of a life of suffering in Europe

made by early Zionists were true (Zerubavel, 1994). For the Jews who had immigrated to

Palestine before and had been struggling to create their new life, this knowledge justified the

struggles they experienced during their migration (Zerubavel, 1994). The creation of an Israeli

state seemed imminent in the aftermath of WWII as the Holocaust proved that a Jewish revival

would not be accomplished in Europe (Zerubavel, 1994). Instead this revival seemed more
possible and promising in the Land of Israel (Zerubavel, 1994). For Zionists, the Holocaust

marked the end to the suffering in exile and the beginning of redemption Eretz Yisrael, and this

was the narrative they would begin to absorb into their larger narrative and reasoning for a

Jewish homeland (Zerubavel, 1994). Simultaneously, the Arab other finally began to emerge

onto the scene of Zionist collective consciousness. Even though Arab resistance had been present

since rural settlements began, the sharp increase in their resistance in the 1930s was starting to

prove to Zionists that Palestinians could no longer be ignored (Fierke, 2008). As this resistance

became more violent, the consideration of Arabs and Palestinians as an enemy began to take

form (Porat, 2006). Palestinians and Arabs went from being a part of the scenery to “ an

underdeveloped society that refused to benefit from Jewish innovations, and of cruel killers of

women and children” (Porat, 2006).

As for Palestinian Nationalism, it’s historical narrative of continuous presence began to

take form following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Post-WWI, Palestinians could no longer

refer to Ottoman nationalism to identify themselves (Gelvin, 2014). A new nationalism was

needed, and it was unclear which nationalism would take precedence. At first, an appeal to a

pan-Arab nationalism seemed to be taking place, then Syrian nationalism became the next best

option (Khalidi, 1997). Unfortunately for Palestinians, the separation of the Middle East into

mandate states with separate world powers controlling Palestine and Syria meant this nationalism

would not come to fruition (Gelvin, 2014). This should not be misunderstood as an absence of

Palestinian nationalism, as there had always been an attachment to the land (Khalidi, 1997).

What this shows is the complications of establishing nationalism in Palestine Post WWI in a new

colonial reality (Khalidi, 1997). It is believed that much like other Middle Eastern countries, if

given the chance and the space to develop on its own, Palestinian nationalism would have come
about naturally, but the influx of immigrants expedited the process, complicating the normal

pace of nationalistic development by adding an anti-Zionist reactionary component (Khalidi,

1997). This Zionist element brought out the need to identify the Palestinian story of a continuous

presence on the land and the danger of its disruption (Khalidi, 1997). As the Jewish National

Fund continued to buy land from absentee landowners, kicking out the Palestinian residents, the

fear of disruption and loss became crystalized (Gelvin, 2014).

Here we can see pieces of conflict narrative coming together. In Israeli collective

consciousness, there was a fear of returning to the horrors of life in exile, connected to a fear of

ethnic extinction. The continuing resistance from Arab population in Palestine provided the

foundation for myths justifying hostility, and the British endorsement of the establishment of a

Jewish homeland provided an opening for conflict to break out. Palestinians began to experience

the same fear of extinction with the influx of immigrants in the 1930s, which also justified

hostility in the form of resistance and protest. In addition, due to steps taken by the Zionist

community to work with the British authorities and establish their own systems, Jewish citizens

seemed to be thriving while there was increasing impoverishment and landlessness for

Palestinians as they were pushed out of work and out of their homes (Gelvin, 2014).

When the British discovered weapons headed for a Zionist community, Palestinians

became concerned these weapons were meant for them (Gelvin, 2014). They then began to plan

a counterattack. Lead by a popular preacher named Izz al-Din al-Qassam, they went to confront

the Zionists, but were stopped by the British who killed al-Qassam in the encounter (Gelvin,

2014). This sent Palestinians into rebellion, as they saw this as proof that the British would not

support their cause (Pappe, 2004). Zionists emerged from the Great Revolt of 1936 fortified in

their opposition to the Arab population with confirmation of Arabs as the enemy. The British’s
use of force to extinguish the revolt would inspire a particular brand of Zionism to adhere to a

policy of force against Arabs (Pappe, 2004). For Zionists, their fears of extinction were now

transposed onto the Arab population as the perpetrators of a potential new extinction. The Revolt

then added to the myths justifying hostility against Arabs, feeding the violence narrative

feedback loop, and creating the beginning of an ethos of conflict. With the already present

support of the British, and their apparent desire to withdraw from the area, the opportunity to

strike was in sight.

1948 and It’s Divergent Narratives

After WWII, Britain found itself in a considerable amount of debt to the United States

(Pappe, 2004). In addition, it found itself heavily involved in Palestine and often in the middle of

violent clashes between Palestinians and Jewish settlers or Jewish Settlers and their own British

army (Pappe, 2004). They found they could not longer afford to hold on to their Palestinian

territory, and in February of 1947, Britain announced it would hand over Palestine to the UN by

May of 1948 (Pappe, 2004). The UN took to devising a plan to deal with their new problem,

specifically with the issue of the rising conflict between Arabs and Jews. In November of 1947, a

partition plan was announced that would give 43% of the land to an Independent Arab state, and

57% to an Independent Jewish State (Jawad, 2006). This plan was rejected by both sides (Gelvin,

2014).

Zionist militant groups, with the knowledge of the coming of the British withdrawal,

began to preform expulsions of Palestinians at an escalated rate (Jawad, 2006). The chief of staff

of the proposed Jewish state began move these militant Zionists groups to the north and south of

Palestine prior to the announcement of the partition plan (Pappe, 2004). These troops were to be

ready to respond to demonstrations by Palestinians following the announcement of the UN’s

plan. This presence was seen as threatening by the Palestinians, and they were attacked by the

local Arab youth (Pappe, 2004). This violence increased following the announcement of what

was deemed by Arab as an unacceptable partition plan (Pappe, 2004). The civil war had begun.

Things continued to escalate until the civil war reached its peak in May 1948. With Britain’s

official withdrawal from the territory, Israel declared itself an independent state and was

admitted to the UN (Gelvin, 2014). Israeli forces then continued their policy of expulsions and

began a more concerted effort to drive out Palestinians from what they perceived was their

territory (Pappe, 2004). This began the second phase of the war, as Arab nations sprang into

action to defend Palestinians from losing their land (Gelvin, 2014). This second phase of the war

- the war of 1948 - lasted until the spring of 1949, and in that time 700,000 Palestinians were

expelled from their land.

This presents a classic example of how in-group/out-group dynamics can create a

security dilemma that creates an opportunity to fight. The Zionists, fearing retaliation and

violence from the Palestinian population they believed was hostile, began mobilizing troops as a

defensive move. Palestinians interpreted this as an offensive move – as in-group/out-group

psychology conditions individuals to think any suspicious action by the other side is hostile –and

attacked first, escalating the conflict. The injection of further fears of extinction by the creation

of the partition plan further drove this violence, and the uncertainty of the transition to a new

division of the land provided ample opportunity for violence to break out.

The narratives and stories told about this clash inform narratives and stories told about

every clash following. For the new nation of Israel, 1948 was their War of Independence.

Zionists in Israeli government began to draw on old stories to contextualize this now ended war.

One of these stories was the story of the fall of Masada. The story of ancient Masada and
mythologization of its downfall was used to create and ethos of bravery in the defense of ones

country that was tied to the new land of Israel (Zeruvabel, 1994). The mass suicide of ancient

Jews rather than submitting to the Romans attempting to take their land represented the spirit of

fighting for ones country until the bitter end, rather than submitting to occupation (Zerubavel,

1994). The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) reinforced the interpretation of the Masada episode as a

heroic battle in line with the heroic battle for independence following the events of 1948, and the

story and its connection to independence was ingrained into collective memory with the phrase

“Never again shall Masada fall” (Zerubavel, 1994). By doing this, the IDF heightened feelings of

alertness and anxiety and imbued a sense of constant fear that the downfall of Israel could be just

around the corner. This was necessary because while the war had ended, there needed to be

vigilance and willingness to fight among the Israeli population as peace had not yet been

attained. Since the violence had only ended in a ceasefire, there was still the possibility for future

attacks. This narrative, while stoking fears and anxiety of extinction, also served the purpose of

creating an environment of vigilance – and thus the ethos of conflict emerges.

In addition to connecting their War of Independence to moments of uprising in the

biblical past to create a continuous narrative of defense for Israel’s future, Zionists used biblical

narrative to create legitimacy for the 1948 war. The 1948 war is often characterized as a David

vs. Goliath struggle in which “numerically smaller but technologically and culturally superior

power, faced down a larger but inferior one.” (Fierke, 2008). Zionists perceived an asymmetry in

power, as they saw themselves facing down all of the Arab world rather than just the Palestinians

(Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). This symbolism not only contributes to a sense of bravery and

pride, reinforces the notion that Israel will always be in danger from the larger powers that

surround it, maintaining fears of ethnic extinction (Rotberg, 2006). Within the symbolism of a
David and Goliath battle, there is the image of Righteous Israeli Soldiers who fought with a

purity of arms (Said, 1984). The symbolism of a purity of arms is in reference to the story told by

Zionists that Israeli soldiers were peace-loving people who were compelled to engage in violent

conflict in order to protect themselves from the onslaught of Arab aggression and hostility

(Rotberg, 2006). This righteous soldier narrative casts actions against the Arab population as

defensive and reluctant, therefore justifying hostility towards Palestinians and other Arab

countries. There is a strong narrative of Arab intransigence and unwillingness to come to peace

with Israelis. Israelis see themselves as having been ready and willing to negotiate peace where

Arabs refused to listen to any resolution offered (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). This narrative

propagates the justification of ethnic hostility in conjunction with the view that since Arabs

refuse peace, they will only respond to force (West, 2003). Regardless of its truth, through the

Purity of Arms narrative, Zionists construct the expulsion of Palestinians as voluntary. In fact,

the dominant narrative was that Israeli soldiers begged Palestinians to stay and that it was Arab

leaders that told Palestinians to leave. Later this would be used to show that Palestinians must

have had a shallow attachment to the land as they were willing to leave it so readily (Gelvin,

2014).

Palestinian narratives diverge from this perception of 1948 as it identifies this period as

al Nakba or the Catastrophe. Contrary to the story told by the Israelis post-1948, the Palestinians

saw their displacement as involuntary and the result of a policy of ethnic cleansing in which

700,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homes (Fierke, 2008). This narrative is the most

dominant in Palestinian historiography as 1948 is a source of humiliation at the loss of a

homeland and the beginning of a painful existence in exile or under oppressive occupation

(Greenberg, 2005). This ethnic cleansing narrative and the violence propagated against
Palestinians during this time contribute to ethnic fears of extinction as it created an intense sense

of insecurity and terror among Palestinians (Pappe, 2004). Further contribution to this fear is the

Palestinian perception of an asymmetry in power favoring Israel (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). For

Palestinians the fact that Israel has statehood and the support of Western countries (as evidenced

by the Balfour Declaration and continued military and international support) proves this

asymmetry (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). While Israelis see the support of other Arab countries as

a strength in favor of the Palestinian cause, Palestinians believe that Arab countries are too

disorganized and self-interested to provide any real advocacy or help (Rouhana & Bar-Tal,

1998).

While Palestinians mostly remember al Nakba as a tragic and traumatic event in

Palestinian history, heroic narratives were also derived from 1948. These heroic narratives

mostly spoke to Palestinians who resisted bravely in the face of occupation. Palestinians

incorporated stories of resistance during the 1948 war into historical moments of revolt, creating

an ancestry of revolution (Khalili, 2007). This ancestry reached “into ancient times, assimilates

the defeat of the Crusaders as its own victory, and traverses deep into ancient/mythico-history, to

the time of the Canaanites” (Khalili, 2007). Resistance was a form of pride for those who had

been cast out and torn down in exile or under occupation (Rouhana, 2006). This pride and

glorification of moments of resistance, whether violent or not, contribute towards myths

justifying ethnic hostility. Kaufman notes that “if the group's identity includes a warrior ethos …

that group is likely to be more prone to ethnic violence”, and a glorification of a culture of

resistance against an oppressor certainly propagates a warrior ethos.

A Note on Narrative Studies

 While there is a stark difference in the stories told on each side of the conflict, there is

also a difference in the amount of documentation contributing to the narrative on each side. The

Israeli narrative is by far more robust in its documentation. It relies on physical documentation,

military papers, speeches recorded throughout history, and up until the 1980s, academic studies

to support the claims made by Zionists. Palestinians do not have this luxury, as the Palestinian

archives were destroyed or confiscated in the initial conflict and continually restricted and

censored in the years following by the Israeli government (Fierke, 2008). In addition, the

displacement of Palestinians and destruction of their original cities contributed to the erasure of

the Palestinian narrative:

The cities were the custodians of a cultural identity that was in the midst of being
formulated. Israelis destroyed or confiscated all public libraries, printing presses and
publishing houses, the land registry, the archives of municipal councils, hospitals,
schools, and cultural centers (Jawad, 2006)
Israel continued to confiscated large numbers of Palestinian documents from the refugee

community and Palestinian research Center in Lebanon during the invasion of 1982. This is

predominantly why oral history becomes a crucial tool for understanding the Palestinian

narrative and observing its shifts over time. In a way, Palestinian oral history has been a way of

asserting Palestinian nationalism as individual accounts of the lives of Palestinians in times of

revolt and displacement as well as stories of survival and heroism effectively fight against the

total disappearance of the Palestinian story and identity (Masalha, 2008).

Unfortunately, for many years, oral history was discounted and rejected as unreliable by

historians (Jawad, 2006). Only recently has more attention been paid to the importance of oral

history, especially surrounding the history of 1948. In the studies that have emerged since, it has

become clear that central issue in the Palestinian narrative is that of the expulsion of the
population in 1948, and the return of refugees to their homeland (Rouhana, 2006). In contrast,

the Zionist narrative includes multiple different myths and symbols as discussed above. There

seems to be a lot more narrative work put into the creation of an Israeli nation and Jewish

national identity. For example, while it was clear that Palestinians were from the land in which

they were cast out as evidenced by their existence on the land at the time of the Zionist arrival,

Zionists had to account for years of history, and establish a relationship, between the biblical

record of the last known Jewish nation in Palestine and the current group of immigrants. In

addition, because Zionism was established first in Europe as an opposition to anti-Semitism, the

original fear of extinction was the result not of Arab aggression but of European aggression, yet

Zionist aggression was taken out on Arabs. There had to be a significant amount of narrative

work done in order to explain this projection. Taking into consideration the violence of this clash

and the refugee problem created by its displacement of the Palestinian people, a lot of work had

to be done by the Israeli elite to justify their actions in the eyes of the international community as

well as their own. As the victor in the conflict, the tools necessary to construct these narratives

were abundant in the form of government records, school textbooks, and international news

sources.

These observations should lend to the conclusion that there is an imbalance in narrative

record keeping that is prevalent when studying Israeli-Palestinian collective memory – made

even more evident by the total absence of empirical studies of Palestinian collective identity in

the West Bank and Gaza until the 1990s. It is for this reason that much of the studies of narrative

between the two societies has been done by Israeli scholars – some who have found to be in

favor of Palestinians, and others who have not.

Violence begets violence - History’s compounding effects on narrative

 Continued violent clashes are a critical to understanding why the myth-symbol complex

is especially hard to deconstruct in the collective memories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

During the 1960s-1970s, continued conflict between Israel and other Arab countries continued to

exacerbate the Israeli perception of insecurity. Israelis still defined the conflict as an Arab-Israeli

conflict rather than an Israeli-Palestinian during this time (Gelvin, 2014). The war of 1967 with

Egypt and Syria served to help Zionists confirm this narrative of an Arab-Israeli understanding

of the conflict. From this conflict, Israel’s narrative of riteousness was enforced through the

positive outcome in which they gained the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Golan Heights, and East

Jerusalem (the occupied territories), as well as the Sinai Peninsula (Gelvin, 2014). In the

Khartoum Arab Summit following the 1967 war, the “Three No’s” issued by leaders of the Arab

world– no to peace, no to recognition, no to negotiation – while symbolic in some regards,

further enforced the Zionist narrative of Arab intransigence and the threat of Arabs nations, even

after they had won a decisive battle (Tessler, 2006).

For Palestinians, the period of the 1960s to early 1970s was the full adoption of the

Thawra or revolution. For many, the failure of the 1967 war showed Palestinians that they

needed to take charge if they wanted to defend their right to their homeland (Gelvin, 2014). The

Battle of Karameh became an important proof of that fact, as Palestinian forces were able to

successfully drive away an invading force three times their size, something the Arab armies had

not been able to accomplish themselves (Gelvin, 2014). This Palestinian force was commanded

by a man named Yassir Arafat, who was a member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization

(PLO) (Gelvin, 2014). The PLO, which had emerged earlier to represent the Palestinian national

movement, would gain much credibility from their engagement in this victory, and Yassir Arafat
would be elected the head of the PLO for his role in leading the guerilla group – a role he would

hold until he died (Gelvin, 2014).

With the emergence of a new focus on distinctly Palestinian nationalism and a new

organization and leader to direct its trajectory, the Palestinian narrative began to fully emerge,

and with it, a more fully formed Myth-Symbol complex. The PLO first began to project armed

struggle as the primary means of resistance to Israeli occupation (Khalili, 2007). Battles were

seen as iconic heroic moments, and the fida’yi guerrilla as the heroic actor and personification of

honor in resistance (Khalili, 2007). The fida’yi, often pictured wearing a keffiyeh scarf, is an

especially potent symbol as it means “one who redeems a captive” or “one who self-sacrafices”

(Khalili, 2007). The PLO mobilized this symbol as a way to justify participation in ethnic

violence and “actively recruit in the Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Arab world”

through the depiction of armed resistance as the heroic way to fight for one’s country and people

(Khalili, 2007). The PLO also began to mobilize the rhetoric of sumud or steadfastness, first in

Palestinian refugee camps, and then in the occupied areas of Palestine (Rijke & van Teeffelen,

2014). The PLO began to glorify the samadin – those whose steadfastness was tested to the

extremes – encouraging people to stay strong for their country and continue to fight (Rijke &

van Teeffelen, 2014). For those in the occupied territories, the PLO mobilize sumud to plea for

them to stay where they were and maintain their homeland, often through the metaphor of an

olive tree with strong roots in the ground, whose work would bear friend in the coming years

(Rijke & van Teeffelen, 2014). Martrys are also glorified under the umbrella of samadin.

The importance of the PLO in the propagation of the Palestinian Myth-Symbol complex

should not be underemphasized. It is true that before the establishment of the PLO, Palestinian

narrative was present. As stated before, a distinct Palestinian identity had been developing before
1948, but the PLO provided a channel for the narratives of Palestinian nationalism to crystalize

into a mainstream narrative. In shifting the focus of Palestinian nationalism to interpreting the

current crisis in exile, they began propagating nationalist sentiments and symbols in earnest

(Khalili, 2007). The presence of the PLO in refugee camps in Lebanon contributed noticeably to

the wellbeing of the refugees, allowing these camps to become central hubs for the national

movement in the diaspora (Khalili, 2007). Yassir Arafat and the PLO would continue to play a

dominant role in Palestinian nationalism through 2000s.

In 1973, another war between Egypt, Syria, and Israel began, this time with more

negative consequences on the Israeli population than positive (Gelvin, 2014). Thousands of lives

were lost in the war, and although Israel won, it was at great cost (Gelvin, 2014). It shook the

foundations of the Israeli ideology, and many began to question Zionism (Resnik, 2003). This

triggered a shift in Zionist narrative, with more focus on past victimhood and the image of Israel

as a ‘state for a persecuted nation’ in order to regain the hearts and minds of it citizens and

recommit them to the cause (Resnik, 2003). The Holocaust began to more prominently feature in

Israeli Collective memory at this time (Resnik, 2003). The story “From Holocasut to Rebirth”

began to permeate public discourse, creating “a sense of unity between Israeli Jews and the

victims of the Holocaust…[and] providing symbolic meaning to the hardship of life in Israel”

(Resnik, 2003). While this served to quell the concerns that emerged from the 1973 war, the

1982 Invasion of Lebanon brought these concerns forward once more and with more force.

Regardless, by that time “from Holocaust to rebirth” had gained a foothold in the Israeli Myth-

Symbol Complex.

The Invasion of Lebanon rocked the Israeli world as well as the international community.

The invasion was originally presented as a security measure against the PLO, Menachem Begin,
the prime minister at the time, had previously stated in his 1977 election manifesto that “The so-

called Palestinian Liberation Organization is not a national liberation movement but a murder

organization which serves as a political tool and military arm of the Arab States… The Likud

government will take action to exterminate this organization” (Shlaim, 1996). Yet it soon

became clear the true goals were a bit more insidious: the invasion of Lebanon was motivated by

a desire to reduce the Palestinian existence as much as possible (Perlmutter, 1982). Many Israeli

leaders admitted this later in the conflict, including Rafael Eitan who stated, “to destroy

Palestinian nationalism and institutions in Lebanon would make it easier to destroy them on the

West Bank and in Gaza” (Said, 1984). The particular methods used to enact this war and the

violence resulting from it disenchanted the Israeli population and reduced the power of the myth

of purity of arms, especially following the massacre at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. In

fact, the end of the 1982 invasion brought the beginnings of a change in consciousness towards a

more conciliatory attitude (West, 2003). A study conducted by Gloria Falk in 1985 provides

proof for the shift of the Israeli public to a conciliatory attitude. She found in her interviews and

surveys that Israeli opposition to new settlements rose from 30-52 per cent between 1982-1985.

This is an unprecedented shift from previous trends according to her research. Another sign of

this change in attitude was the emergence of a group of Israeli scholars called The New

Historians. In addition to the disenchantment with Zionism, the declassification of archival

material from the 1948 war provided the opportunity for reexamination of Israeli history

(Shapira & Wiskind-Elper, 1995). As a generation who had only witnessed the war of 1973 and

1982, they were free of personal memories of 1948 and therefor in apposition to be more critical

(Bar-On, 2006). Still, it wouldn’t be until the first Intifada that this conciliatory attitude became

more prominent, and the New Historians were taken more seriously.
 The 1982 war also had effects for the perception of the Palestinian narrative. After the

quagmire of the invasion in Lebanon, the narrative of sumud became stronger, as did its

contribution to the myths justifying ethnic hostility, and a continued propagation of honorable

resistance was becoming deeply ingrained through continued experience of violence. During the

1988 Palestinian National council, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence was presented.

This documented had proof of the prevalence of the honorable resistance narrative in its

statement: “For what has been the unbroken chain of our people’s rebellions but the heroic

embodiment of our will for national independence”. This was particularly salient as the

conditions in the territories had deteriorated under continued occupation. Following the Israeli

victory in 1967 and the expansion of settlements, Prime Minister Dayan sough to temper the

nationalist interests of Palestinians to stabilize Israel’s new conquests (Gelvin, 2014). He

believed integrating the economy of Israel with the economy of the occupied territory would

accomplish this goal (Gelvin, 2014). Unfortunately, that would not be the case. The economic

integration in practice resulted in little to no investment in the Palestinian areas while the Israeli

economy thrived (Pappe, 2004). This was most evident in the disparity between Israeli and

Palestinian workers:

It was seen by the Palestinian workers comparing their wages with those of their Jewish
colleagues (they were paid half as much). It was also painfully evident to independent
professionals who had to pay taxes at a rate bureaucrats are free to impose on an occupied
population. Finally, it was driven home to thousands of villagers who were forced to
leave their farms. This micro-economic understanding explains best why revolutionary
discourse on the need to rebel, to protest, to say ‘enough is enough’ was so compelling
(Pappe, 2004).

This began to ware on the consciousness of the Palestinian people. There was a growing sense of

resentment and frustration among the residents of the occupied territories. The relevance and

magnitude of sumud and honorable resistance was on the rise.

The First Intifada

Tensions were rising as the prevalence of conflict narratives relating to each nations’

myth-symbol complex began to grow again. As these narratives continued to take hold of the

population, in-group/out-group dynamic began to color the perceptions of events so that

everything was interpreted through prejudices and assumptions driven by the narratives – a key

consequence of ethos of conflict activation (Sharvit, 2014). As small skirmishes increase, the

negative interpretations of each side increase so that a seemingly small event to the outside world

can be interpreted as having major implications to those embroiled in the conflict (Sharvit,

2014). When an Israeli truck hit a car of Palestinian workers, killing four, it was perceived by

Palestinians as a purposeful attack (Gelvin, 2014). The narrative began to spread that this

accident was an act of retaliation for the stabbing of an Israeli citizen, and the population in the

occupied territories revolted (Gelvin, 2014). Riots and protests broke out across the territories,

and were met with violent force from IDF soldiers:

This included mass arrests without trial, torture during interrogation, assembling all the
men in reoccupied villages and in some cases subjecting them to merciless beatings, and
above all, a new measure, cordoning off villages as ‘secure military areas’, preventing
entry and exit for days on end. (Pappe, 2004)
Despite the violence, the intifada lasted for as long as it did due to its properties as an organized

mass-led revolution. Narratives of sumud kept the population going, and continued to justify

violence and resistance. Bolstered by the warrior ethos of the Palestinian narrative, the first

intifada lasted from 1987-1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords.

The ongoing violence of the Intifada also halted the Zionist policy of settlement

expansion due to its effects on Israeli consciousness. The burnout from constant conflict and the

duration of the Intifada was starting to wear on the Israeli population (Pines, 1994). The New
Historians, who were largely dismissed by the Israeli public when they first began publishing

their work, began to emerge into popular discourse two years into the Intifada (Pappe, 2006).

Although they never gained the following of a majority of the population, the fact that their new

account of 1948 had entered mainstream discussion and media is proof of a shifting

consciousness (Pappe, 2006). In fact, Israeli society seemed to be toying with the idea of

withdrawing from the occupied territories (Pappe, 2004), shown by their election in 1992 of

Prime Miner Rabin, elected in part due to his promise to find a way out of the Palestinian

Quagmire (Gelvin, 2014). In addition, the Intifada had persuaded the international community of

the legitimacy of their narrative and story (Pappe, 2006). This set the stage for the push for a

peace process and the rise of Oslo.

The Oslo Accords

In an attempt to capitalize off the Intifada and gain some of the credibility it had lost over

time, the PLO entered peace talks with Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel at the time.

The PLO had been surprised by the Intifada, having been pushed out to Tunis, their legitimacy

and respect in the occupied territories was waning (Gelvin, 2014). With living conditions

continually decreasing, this was a moment to regain some control for the PLO and attain positive

gains from the attention drawn by the Intifada (Gelvin, 2014). Two major changes in policy were

solidified in this meeting. First, the PLO was recognized as the ‘Representative of the Palestinian

People’ (Gelvin, 2014). This was no small gesture, as this changed the image of the PLO from

an antagonist in Israeli narrative, to a potential partner in peace (Khoury, 2016). Shimon Peres,

the Prime Minister following Rabin, went so far as to say to Arafat, “You were a terrorist, today

you are an ex-terrorist” (Khoury, 2016). Second, the PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist

in peace and renounced acts of terrorism against the state (Gelvin, 2014). Both committed to the
peace process in the signing of a Declaration of Principles. These Principles outlined the

parameters of withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho areas, as well as the establishment of the

Palestinian Authority, and the blueprint for negotiations on the issues not resolved by the

Accords: Right of return, settlements, refugees, and security (Gelvin, 2014).

Upon closer inspection of the Oslo accords and the letters of recognition, the power

imbalance between the two sides becomes very clear. The Letters of recognition themselves

provides ample proof, as the letter from the PLO is about four paragraphs long, and recognizes

Israel’s right to existence, while the Israeli letter is a single paragraph, and only recognizes the

PLO, not the right of Palestine to exist as a whole. The Principles themselves also expose this

imbalance, as it tables issues of great importance to Palestinians – Refugees and Right of Return

– while only recognizing a conditional path to self-governance for Gaza and Jericho areas

(Gelvin, 2014). These imbalances would be referenced by Palestinians as reasons to question the

actual progressed the Oslo Accords would achieve towards attaining peace (Pappe, 2004).

Palestinians were quick to question the motives for the Oslo accords, especially

considering the Israeli Governments continued policy of settlement expansions (Pappe, 2004) in

light of Article 31 Clause 7: “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the

status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status

negotiations”. The Oslo Accords were signed in September of 1993, but from 1994-1996, “the

settler population had increased by 48 per cent in the West Bank and 62 per cent in the Gaza

Strip. All this made the settlers’ eviction less realistic than ever” (Pappe, 2004). Border closures

and restrictions on movement of those in Gaza further signaled that hostility toward Palestinians

would not be brought to an end by these negotiation (Pappe, 2004). What Palestinians were

experiencing was a stark contrast between the discourse of peace and the actual conditions on the
ground (Pappe, 2004). This was the ultimate show of bad faith and was interpreted as one

through Palestinians narrative (Gelvin, 2014). By 1995, many had labeled Oslo as a failure and a

secondary form of occupation (Pappe, 2004). In interviews conducted with Palestinians in the

occupied territories during the 2000s, many made claims stating that “The Oslo agreements seem

to be guarantees for continued Israeli Occupation, rather than guarantees for establishing a viable

Palestinian state in the interest of peace” and that “Israel continues to be above the law without

any interruptions. International law has not been able to protect Palestinian lives and basic rights

in decades” (Barakat, 2001). It seemed as is myths justifying ethnic hostility were on the rise

again, as were fears of extinction. The hope of Oslo was beginning to crumble.

Oslo Opposition

It could be said that both sides entered the process with hesitancy. As each side moved

forward with Oslo, they were testing the other, looking for confirmation of their own biased

stereotypes (Tessler, 2006). By the 2000s, both sides had their confirmation, for Palestinians, it

was the continued expansion of settlements and the creation of a separation wall which displaced

a new generation of Palestinians (Tessler, 2006). For Israelis, it was the continued violence from

the Palestinian side despite their attempts at peace, confirming their beliefs of Arab Intransigence

(Tessler, 2006).

In addition, Palestinians never fully accepted the Oslo accords. Arafat was fighting for

legitimacy against a new opposition group within the Palestinian community – Political

Islamists. As the reputation of the PLO continued to decrease over time as they were pushed

farther and farther from actual Palestine, Islamic organizations stepped in to fill the gap. The

Egyptian Muslim brotherhood re-emerged in Palestine in the 1980s and gained popularity in

large part due to the social welfare and assistance programs they provided to refugees and to
those in the occupied territories (Gelvin, 2014). It did not help that PLO leaders were

squandering money meant for Palestinians on villas and lavish lifestyles while those in the

territories were struggling (Gelvin, 2014). Although this was not the practice of Arafat, these

leaders accomplished much in the way of discrediting the PLO (Gelvin, 2014). As conditions in

the territories worsened, Palestinians began to look for other ways to gain a foothold against

Israel, and with the reputation garnered from their social welfare programs and participation in

the first intifada, supporting Hamas became a viable option (Gelvin, 2014). Hamas and they

fought the Oslo accords wherever they could. They fed an altered the narrative of heroism and

bravery in resistance to promote the continuation of the violent fight against occupation and

attacked Arafat for being weak. Their additional strategy of suicide bombings did little to

convince Israelis that Yassir Arafat could be trusted to follow through on his side of the bargain

(Gelvin, 2014).

On the Israeli side the Likud party was beginning to regain its following after the initial

fall from grace after the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Led by Benjamin Netanyahu, the party

fought the Oslo process any chance they were able (CNN). There were deep divisions within

Israeli Politics throughout the entire peace process, most evident by the assassination of Rabin in

1995 – less than a month after signing Oslo 2 (Gelvin, 2014). The assassin’s reasoning was that

Rabin “wanted to give our country to the Arabs” (HISTORY). This assassin, a member of the

orthodox community, also claimed he was acting on order from God (NYT). He reflected the

growing opposition to the peace process in the Orthodox community, as well as the fears of those

living in the Israeli settlements (NYT). In the next election, Benjamin Netanyahu, who appealed

to both these communities, was able to secure a slim margin and earn his first Prime Minister

term.
The Second Intifada and the Fall of Oslo

Benjamin Netanyahu was beaten in the next election by Ehud Barak and the Labor Party

regained power. Still, Netanyahu’s 3 year term had done its damage, and Barak and his

ambitions for peace had come too late. The growth of settlements and increased ill-treatment of

Palestinians in the territories had disillusioned the Palestinian people – Oslo was dead. Narratives

of resistance and steadfastness had fully resurfaced again, and Palestinian and Islamist groups

had begun to use the worsening conditions to revive myths and narratives justifying hostility

against Israelis and fear of extinction. This revival was partially made possible due to the real

fear stoked by increasingly harsh Israeli policy, and secondarily due to the encroachment of

settlements and rise in homelessness, landlessness, and expulsion. As the hopes of Oslo

shattered, underlying frustration bubbled to the surface – first with a rebellion to the opening of a

tunnel under Haram al-Sharif, a sacred Muslim religious site, and again, in 2000 after the Camp

David Summit (Pappe, 2004).

The Israeli public was increasingly discouraged by increased violent attacks on Israel

despite Barak’s attempts at peace (Pappe, 2004). A politician and war hero named Ariel Sharon

took advantage of this and began the task of rehabilitating the Likud party’s image among

Israeli’s, positioning himself to run for Prime Minister in the next election (Gelvin, 2014). After

the Camp David Accords, Sharon decided to visit Temple Mount, otherwise known as Haram al-

Sharif, in an effort to embarrass Barak’s government and force Barak to grant him permission to

this historic site (Gelvin, 2014). Palestinians were enraged by this unannounced visit which they

felt violated the sanctity of Haram, and the following day, Palestinians erupted into protests and

demonstrations (Gelvin, 2014). IDF soldiers retaliated by firing at the protestors, killing four

(Gelvin, 2014). The second Intifada had begun.

 The Second Intifada had and compounding and crystalizing effect on previously accepted

Israeli narratives surrounding the occupied territories. The myth of Arab intransigence in the face

of efforts for peace resurfaced as suicide campaigns increased during the second intifada (Gelvin,

2014). The common Israeli perception of Camp David was that Barak offered everything and

that the Palestinians would not even communicate with him (West, 2003). The idea that Arabs

only respond to force has also resurfaced and had been commonly accepted in Israeli society

(West, 2003). With the increased campaign of suicide bombings, the narrative of anti-terrorism

began to feature prominently in Israeli narrative (Gelvin, 2014). While terrorism was used before

to justify violence (Said, 1984), with the emergence of the war on terror in the US, one of

Israel’s critical allies, this narrative garnered more recognition and support (Gelvin, 2014).

President Bush even acknowledged Sharon as an important ally in the war on terror (Gelvin,

2014). Israel and it’s Prime Ministers could now present actions towards Palestinians as anti-

terror measure, therefor justifying almost any action taken. This usage of the terrorism narrative

would have a lasting impact on prospects for peace.

Peacebuilding Prospects

Current narrative studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have emphasized the need to

address conflicting narratives of the past in order to start a process towards real peace (Pappe,

2006). Kaufman identifies peacebuilding rather than peacemaking as the paradigm required for

deconstructing myth symbol complexes, but warns that it is an incredibly difficult endeavor. In

order for peacebuilding to work, the process should include “the parties to the conflict, third

parties (major powers such the United States and the European Union), supranational diplomatic

bodies (the Middle East Quartet), international organizations, NGOs, researchers, journalists, and

members of civil society” (Khoury, 2016). From this description it should become clear how
difficult a peacebuilding process would be to start, let alone follow through. Leaders and

members of each side need to promote an atmosphere that is willing, ready, and open to

changing their narratives and compromising for peace over all else, specifically from the nation

with the most power (Pappe, 2004). This presents some obvious problems for Israel-Palestine

post second intifada considering the rise of the Likud party with their heavy reliance of the war

on terror narrative to support their actions against Palestinians.

Following the second intifada, the spike in violent conflict has further entrenched in-

group/out-group dynamics and deepened the divide, as leaders on both sides have used the

outcomes of Oslo and the second Intifada to prove the hostility of the other and their continued

engagement in conflict rather than peace initiatives, feeding the ethos of conflict. The totality and

perception of irreconcilability has increased again, especially with the re-election of Benjamin

Netanyahu, who at the time of writing this paper remains in office. Israeli narratives as they

stand today continue to push the narrative of anti-terrorism in their efforts against Palestinians as

well as the projection of the myth of intractable and unwavering Arabs. Palestinians on the other

hand have pushed the narrative of ethnic cleansing and a wish to return home in addition to their

campaign of resistance to occupation (Rouhana, 2006).

Neither side seems in a place to meet the parameters of a peacebuilding campaign. This

paper does not attempt to provide steps to achieve this goal, but merely to posit the idea that in

order to fully deconstruct narratives in intractable conflicts, the history of how the foundational

myths and narratives have been used to justify violence throughout the conflict must first be

understood.

Conclusion
 In order to understand and intractable conflict so seemingly unsolvable as the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, it is crucial to understand the full picture of the escalation of violence

between the two groups through the myths and symbols used to create the narratives of conflict

on each side. For Israelis, a fear of extinction in Europe drove Jews to immigrate to Palestine and

Establish a Jewish homeland in what they believed was their historic homeland in Palestine.

Following the trauma of the Holocaust, this need was deemed critical, so that the Arabs who

fought against outsiders in their land became enemies of the Jewish people, justifying violence

against them. As Britain announced their withdrawal from the Palestinian Mandate, and the UN

announced a partition plan for two separate states, Zionists saw their opportunity to mobilize and

fight to ensure the creation of their Jewish homeland without the Arabs who had been violent and

aggressive in what Arabs believed was the defense of their homeland against outside occupiers.

1948 was the splitting point between the two sides, and as Israel claimed victory and celebrated

their independence, Palestinians were cast out – beginning their narrative of tragedy at the hands

of an Israeli scheme of ethnic cleaning, and the following humiliation of life in exile. After the

disappointment of the 1967 war for Palestinians, they began to realize that they would have to

rely on themselves to fight for Palestine, and the PLO emerged with myths and symbols creating

the narratives of heroic resistance and steadfastness in the face of intimidation and oppression.

The continued violent clashes with surrounding Arabs states, and the with the PLO,

constructed the narrative of Arab intransigence, and with continued expansion of settlements and

the worsening conditions under occupation, the PLO and Palestinian public began to construct

the narrative of harmful oppressors and the need for resistance for survival. This Palestinian

narrative peaked in 1987 with the first intifada, which coincided with Israeli demystification of

Zionism following the quagmire of the Lebanon invasion of 1982. As the Intifada began to
devolve and the Israeli public became more open to peace, The Oslo Accords provided the first

experiment in true peace negotiations with the actual parties in the conflict – not the Arabs and

the Israelis, but the Palestinians and Israelis. Unfortunately, the Oslo Accords did very little to

deconstruct the mistrust between the two parties that had taken hold after years of violence and

mistreatment between the two – the ethos of conflict had taken hold.

As oppositions groups in each society rose up in protest of the accords, the lack of

progress following the signing of the accords caused many on both sides to quickly lose faith,

and as Israel continued its policy of settlement expansion, hope for peace was dashed in the

occupied territories and the second intifada began recalling old narrative of Arab intransigence

and terrorism for Israelis, and honor in resistance for Palestinians.

It becomes clear that not only are the differing narratives of 1948 a problem for

reconciliation, as many New Historians and historiographers have claimed, but it is the

progression of the narrative and its entrenchment in the identity and ethos of individuals of both

sides since then that make addressing past narrative so difficult. Again, this paper does not seek

to make recommendations for how to address a solution to this issue, but only to widen the scope

of understanding so that future research may analyze how to best deconstruct such deep rooted

narratives of conflict in order to best achieve an atmosphere ready for true peacebuilding

attempts to be successful.
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