Public Version of HPC PCSR3 Sub-Chapter 19.3 - Radiation Protection Measures

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HPC PCSR3 – Sub-chapter 19.3 – Reference:
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Radiation Protection Measures 100108
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HPC PCSR3:
CHAPTER 19 –
RADIATION PROTECTION
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SUB-CHAPTER 19.3 –
RADIATION PROTECTION MEASURES
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1. RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS OF HPC ................................................. 1
1.1 IRRADIATION HAZARDS ................................................................... 1
1.2 CONTAMINATION HAZARDS ............................................................ 2
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2. PROTECTION AGAINST IRRADIATION ............................................ 3
2.1 DESIGN OF NUCLEAR ISLAND ......................................................... 3
2.2 RADIATION PROTECTION ZONING .................................................. 6
3. PROTECTION AGAINST CONTAMINATION ................................... 14
3.1 CONTAMINATION ZONING .............................................................. 14
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3.2 DECONTAMINATION MEASURES ................................................... 16
3.3 VENTILATION ................................................................................... 17
4. MONITORING .................................................................................... 19
4.1 MONITORING OF ROOMS................................................................ 20
4.2 MONITORING OF STAFF.................................................................. 21
5. REFERENCES ................................................................................... 23
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SUB-CHAPTER 19.3 - RADIATION PROTECTION MEASURES
The aim of this sub-chapter is to provide an overview of the generic measures in place across
the UK EPR to protect personnel on the plant and the public against the radiological hazards of
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irradiation and contamination.
1. RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS OF HPC

Personnel are exposed to radiological hazards on site primarily due to the radioactive circuits,
and the processes associated with them. Radioactive products present in these circuits
ultimately originate from the reactor core, specifically:
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 corrosion products from the internal structure of primary components which are
subsequently activated by the neutron flux in the core, e.g. cobalt-58 and cobalt-60,
 primary coolant activation products, e.g. tritium or nitrogen-16, and
 fission products, which are potentially released through defects in the fuel clad during
operation of the unit.
The two types of radiological hazard are:

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 irradiation: radiation sources external to, and not in contact with, the person’s body (e.g.
an active pipe), and
 contamination: radioactive material which can be loose or fixed to a surface. This can
become attached directly on the person’s skin (external contamination) or become
ingested, injected or inhaled into the person’s body (internal contamination).
1.1 IRRADIATION HAZARDS

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There are four types of radiation:
 Alpha: This is a very low penetrating radiation. This usually only penetrates a few
centimetres of air, or a few micrometres in water or the human body. For the irradiation
hazard, alpha radiation protection is covered by gamma radiation protection.
 Beta: This is a low penetrating radiation. It usually penetrates a few meters of air, or a
few millimetres in water. For the irradiation hazard, beta radiation protection is normally
covered by gamma radiation protection1.
1 There are some circumstances, such as in laboratories, where pure beta shielding is used. Care must also be
taken when shielding high-energy beta radiation as there is a possibility of secondary x-rays being produced
(Bremsstrahlung Radiation) if high-density shielding, such as lead, is used.

 Gamma: This is highly penetrating radiation and easily passes through the human body.
Hazards linked to gamma radiation exist in all states of the reactor unit. It is taken into
account by design rules for equipment, layout, installation, etc. and by the radiological
zoning scheme for the rooms within the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA).
 Neutrons: This radiation is also highly penetrating; it passes easily through large volumes
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of air and penetrates deep into the human body. Hazards due to neutron radiation are
present only in the Reactor Building (HR [RB]) during Plant-at-Power states and during
some operations involving handling of used fuel. It is taken into account for the radiation
zoning of the HR [RB] and by design requirements specific to that building. Neutron
radiation can cause activation in certain materials.
1.2 CONTAMINATION HAZARDS
Contamination is generally due to deposition of particles on the internal and external surfaces of
components or structures.
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Floors and walls of rooms can be contaminated.
The greatest hazard is due to airborne contamination and inhalation of radioactive particles by
workers in contaminated areas inside of the controlled area (internal contamination). Therefore
the risk of airborne contamination must be taken into account in the design of areas, particularly
heating and ventilation systems.
By touching contaminated surfaces, some particles may be transferred onto a person’s skin or
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onto clothes or tools (external contamination). This can also present a secondary risk of internal
contamination by accidental ingestion or through cuts in the skin. For certain nuclides such as
tritium, there is also a risk of direct absorption through the skin.
Internal or external contamination hazards exist for every state of the plant and are mainly linked
to the locations where workers need to go and the tasks they need to perform. These hazards
are taken into account during the design phase by the design contamination zoning, the
ventilation principles (air flow rates, direction of air flow), and decontamination measures applied
in terms of surface finishes, design rules and maintenance regimes (see section 3 of this sub-
chapter).
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Other risks are also taken into account:
 Iodine risk: This risk mainly exists during outage in the HR [RB] and in the Fuel Building
(HK [FB]) during primary system openings. This is managed with ventilation procedures
(air renewal rates and pressure differentials) [Ref. 1]. At power, this risk is managed with
dedicated airlocks and filtration. This risk is further limited by monitoring iodine activity
(e.g. two iodine and aerosol sampling lines are located at the Nuclear Auxiliary Building
(HN [NAB]) stack for laboratory analysis, see further details in Sub-chapter 9.6).
 Aerosol risk: This risk is linked with unfixed contamination with the potential to become
airborne and mainly exists during outage, particularly during maintenance activities on
the Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS]) and its connected systems. This is managed
with ventilation procedures (air renewal rates) [Ref. 1], monitoring, and if necessary
respiratory protection.
 Alpha risk: This risk may exist in case of fuel clad failure and if the opening of the primary
circuit or the auxiliary circuit is needed. This risk, when there is fuel clad failure with
unfixed contamination, is generally managed with dedicated airlocks and monitoring.
Filtration is not generally effective against alpha risks from noble gases.

 Tritium risk: This risk mainly exists in the HR [RB] during Plant-at-Power states (A to F),
in the HK [FB] and HR [RB] pool areas. This risk is managed by dedicated ventilation and
monitoring. It may also require dedicated impermeable protective clothing.
It should be noted that iodine and aerosol risks are decoupled from the contamination zoning
and instead identified as separate, specific risks as part of the radiological zoning (see Sub-
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chapter 19.0).
2. PROTECTION AGAINST IRRADIATION

The irradiation hazard is taken into account at the design stage by radiation protection design
rules [Ref. 2], and is managed by the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) radiological zoning. This
enables the dose rates inside rooms of the buildings to be known in advance, and the plant
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design to be checked regarding protection of workers and compliance with requirements. The
radiological zoning also allows the potential needs for shielding to be more easily identified.
The dose uptake optimisation detailed in Sub-chapter 19.4 also contributes to the optimisation of
radiation protection.
This sub-chapter details specific shielding provisions for the HR [RB], HK [FB], Safeguard
Buildings (HLs), HN [NAB] and Effluent Treatment Buildings (HQ [ETB]). Further work is
ongoing for other buildings and areas that may require additional shielding.
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2.1 DESIGN OF NUCLEAR ISLAND
2.1.1. Radiation Protection Rules at the Design Stage
Design and installation rules for equipment and design rules for rooms ensure that radiation
protection is taken into account during the design stage [Ref. 2] and [Ref. 3].
2.1.1.1 Design Rules for Equipment

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The main equipment design rules are the following:
 systems likely to be active are designed to avoid the occurrence of hot spots (avoidance
of particle traps, use of sufficiently large pipework gradients etc.),
 the main primary (up to the second isolating valve) and secondary systems pipework
located in the controlled area are fitted with heat insulation which can be installed and
removed rapidly,
 use of cobalt-based hard coatings in valves is minimised,
 the use of socket-welded connections is minimised, lowering the number of hot spots
near valves,
 pump bearings made of antimony alloys are to be avoided,
 the use of flexible hoses is minimised and replaced with fixed pipework when reasonably
practicable, and

 equipment located in elevated dose rate areas (orange and red zones) is designed, so
far as is reasonably practicable, so that it can easily and quickly be disassembled and
removed.
2.1.1.2 Equipment Installation Rules
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The main rules for equipment installation applied at the design stage are the following:
 as far as reasonably practicable, active equipment should be physically separated from

inactive equipment,
 heat exchangers and tanks are installed in separate rooms from other equipment; note
that the area dose rate of a room containing a tank (or a heat exchanger) can be high
(>2 mSv/hour) and may influence the dose rate in adjacent rooms; this influence should
be kept As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP),
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 pumps and valves are installed in separate rooms; generally, such equipment is not
installed near tanks or heat exchangers,
 Instrumentation and Control (I&C) equipment (sensors) are separated from other
equipment that could become contaminated,
 equipment installed in a controlled area is made easily accessible in order to reduce

exposure time during maintenance, inspection and repair operations,
 network cables are separated from potentially contaminated equipment,

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 equipment and materials installed off the ground are designed to allow maintenance to
be carried out easily,
 worksite ergonomics, safety and Human Factors (HF) are considered for equipment
installation, operation, maintenance, inspection and repair, and
 the layout of equipment installed inside a room takes account of the dose rate expected
in that room.
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2.1.1.3. Design Rules for Rooms
The rules followed for the design of the rooms are the following:
 rooms such as a hot workshop or decontamination room are separated from corridors
where practicable,
 good accessibility is provided to rooms containing equipment requiring regular

maintenance,
 access areas of rooms likely to contain high dose rate sources are designed in the form
of labyrinths, or fitted with shield doors, in order to minimise their influence on adjacent
rooms,
 access to rooms containing highly active tanks and heat exchangers should be via
protected access (e.g. labyrinths), via the rooms containing the associated valves
and / or pumps,

 active pumps are accessed via protected access routes (labyrinths),
 access areas for service rooms are designed in such a way that the equipment can be
easily removed,
 storage areas for logistics equipment (thermal insulation, shielding devices, scaffolding
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etc.) are foreseen at the design stage and should be located near to the point of work,
 a sufficiently large space is allowed for,
 work preparation and monitoring from low dose rate zones,
 equipment maintenance inside the rooms,
 mobile and temporary protection devices,

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 the dismantling of radioactive equipment,
 a hot cell is designated for maintaining equipment which cannot be maintained in-situ,
 the influence of a room on the dose rate of adjacent rooms should be made ALARP, and
 access controls (e.g. locked doors) must be implemented for R4 (orange) classified
areas at dose rates >0.5 mSv/hour; access to R5 (red) classified areas at dose rates
>100 mSv/hour is prevented by means of doors with a double lockout operated by keys
held under strict administrative controls.
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2.1.2. Provisions in the Design for Radiation Protection
Physically, RCA access and egress areas play a key role in the Radiation Protection of a NPP.
They are the areas where the main, first set of dose controls are placed. In normal operational
use, the main goal of the Radiation Protection facilities is to ensure workers can be controlled
and protected, so far as is reasonably practicable. The functions that the HPC design for the
RCA access / egress areas satisfies are presented in the table below [Ref. 4].
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Radiation There must be provisions for the issue, collection and control of dosimetry to
Control support dose monitoring. This should be linked to the Radioactive Work Permits
(Protection (RWPs) and the individual’s identity pass to ensure appropriate dose limits are
against the adhered to, by adjusting settings on Electronic Personal Dosimeters (EPDs).
external
hazard) Access controls must ensure that only appropriately trained, qualified and where
necessary classified persons can access the RCA. Provision of means to
supervise / oversee the access controls to ensure they are being used correctly
is also required.
There must be adequate space for the storage and issue of tools, equipment
and monitoring instrumentation to ensure radiological protection controls can be
deployed within the RCA.
In some areas, some special conditions to detect discrete particles have been added (e.g. in
Fuel Building Hall (HKH) and Intermediate Level Wastes (HHI) buildings, some gamma portal
monitors are foreseen).

2.2 RADIATION PROTECTION ZONING
UK Regulatory control procedures require the Operators of Nuclear Licensed Sites to ensure
that adequate protection measures are in place to restrict the radiation exposure of site radiation
workers, workers on site whose primary occupation is not radiation work, and members of the
public. In the UK the primary statutory instrument to regulate radiation exposure to persons is
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the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999, SI3232 (IRR99) [Ref. 5] which enacts EC Euratom
Directive 96/29 [Ref. 6].
Established within the regulatory framework of IRR99 (Regulation 8(2)) is a hierarchy of

controls. First and foremost is the removal of operators from the need to interact with high dose
rate items, or to be within high dose rate areas. Then there is control of the sealing of systems
and the minimisation of radiological hazards by design, such as the provision of adequate
shielding, interlocks and trapped key systems. Additionally there is the provision of appropriate
safety features and measuring and warning devices. Only after these have been applied can
procedural controls such as zoning and special precautions be used to control exposure. Finally,
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where it is reasonably practicable to do so, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (including
Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE) if required) can be provided if it is appropriate to the
nature of the work being carried out.
The primary procedural control measure employed is the designation and establishment of
controlled and supervised areas. Under Regulation 16(1) of IRR99, there is a clear requirement
for a Radiation Employer to designate an area as controlled on the basis of a projected, or
potential, dose to a worker in excess of 6 mSv in a calendar year. This limit is taken from the
European Basic Safety Standard (BSS) in Euratom Directive 96/29.
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Further to the definition of a controlled area in IRR99, there is also a separate definition of a
supervised area. This is defined as an area in which workers are projected to potentially receive
a dose in excess of 1 mSv per year but less than 6 mSv per year. There is a definition of a
further area which is neither controlled nor supervised, where projected doses are less than
1 mSv per year. Whilst this is the statutory definition and basis for a supervised area, in actual
practice, a NPP will normally have a single, overall designated area generically known as the
RCA to encompass all the main radiation sources of the plant. In the UK, an area outside the
RCA where work with ionising radiation is being carried out on a temporary basis, may be
designated as a supervised area in line with the requirements of the IRR99. Designation is
usually done on the basis of worst case measured or calculated external dose rates, although
dose uptake due to a worst case possible internal dose is also considered where applicable.
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Provision of washing and changing facilities is also a regulatory requirement under Regulation
18(7) of IRR99. The areas within the NPP that will require designation as contamination
controlled areas have been identified and it is ensured that these areas are adequately
supported by changing room facilities. Centralised washing facilities are also provided near to
the main RCA exit. See section 3 of this sub-chapter for further information about contamination
controlled areas.
The controlled area is composed of rooms in the following buildings : HR [RB], the HK [FB], the
HN [NAB], the Access Tower (HW) (from the control point for controlled area workers), the HL,
the HQ [ETB], and the HPC site-specific buildings such as the Hot Laundry (HVL), the Hot
Workshop (HVD), the Discharge and Storage Tanks Building (HXA), the Interim Spent Fuel
Store Building (HHK [ISFS]), the Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) Store Building (HHI) and some
underground galleries (Effluent Gallery (HGQ) and HN-HXA Liaison Gallery (HGV)). Within the
EPR design, the access to a controlled area is mainly performed by designated Category A or B
workers as defined in Article 21 of the Euratom Directive 96/29 - Categorisation of exposed
Workers. Under Regulation 20(1)-(2) of IRR99, there is a direct alignment between Category A
workers and Classified workers, and Category B workers and Non-classified workers.

Both categorisations are based on risk assessments of the projected, or potential, radiation dose
an individual worker may receive in a calendar year; this is the 6 mSv threshold, above which a
worker must be classified under the European BSS. Regulations 20(1)-(2) of IRR99 also
requires that a classified radiation worker must be over 18 years of age and judged as being fit
for work with ionising radiation after having successfully completed a medical examination. A
Radiation Employer must have in place additional restrictions for female employees who have
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declared their pregnancy, as there are further restrictive dose limits in this case, as described in
Sub-chapter 19.1.
Active systems and radioactive materials, or those likely to become so, are installed in radiation
controlled areas.
In order to assess the required radiation protection provisions for a room, the area dose rate is
estimated from calculations and / or from operational data. The required shielding provisions
and the room’s accessibility restrictions are thus defined and justified. This is in line with the
requirements of Part IV of IRR99. OV
The following information is specified for each room:
 Radiological zoning: non-controlled area, supervised area (R1), or controlled area (green
(R2), yellow (R3), orange (R4) or red (R5)). The colour code of the radiation protection
zone provides information on the overall dose rate range and on the room accessibility
restrictions.
 Classification of the rooms using alphanumeric coding (see Sub-chapter 19.0). For
example, in the yellow (R3) zone the dose rate may be between 25 μSv/hour and
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0.1 mSv/hour, known as B, between 0.1 mSv/hour and 0.2 mSv/hour, known as 2B, or
between 0.2 mSv/hour and 0.5 mSv/hour, known as 5B. These additional sub-divisions
are only used for design (not operation) and are particularly for determining what
systems may be present in a room.
Designation is usually done on the basis of worst case measured or calculated external dose
rates, although dose uptake due to a worst case possible internal dose is also considered where
applicable.
A diagram defining the radiation protection zoning and classification of rooms is provided in
Sub-chapter 19.0 – Table 1.
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It is standard UK practice for areas with a significant potential for surface or airborne
contamination to be separately identified (see section 3 of this sub-chapter).
One classification has been defined and is used as a design parameter: Biological Protection
Design Source Value Classification.
These values are used to design shielding provisions. Calculations are carried out 50 cm from
the surface of equipment (normal working distance) and 150 cm above the floor or platform
(chest height), assuming normal operating conditions of the unit.
The dose rate of a room may vary widely over specific operating phases, requiring a different
classification to be specified for a given room over time. For example, during refuelling the
transfer tube compartment is classified as a red zone, whereas during normal working
conditions it is classified as a green or yellow zone. These temporary classifications will be
noted on the radiological zoning drawings [Ref. 9] to [Ref. 68] with the reason for the temporary
classification specified. There will be operational processes in place to control the temporary
re-designation of areas.

2.2.1. Objectives
A room containing high activities / dose rates should be sufficiently shielded so as to reduce the
effect on the dose rates in adjacent rooms to ALARP levels.
There are individual specifications regarding the shielding design:
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 Corridors, floors, stairwells and elevators: frequently used passageways are shielded so
that they do not exceed a dose rate criterion of 10 µSv/hour.
 Secured corridors, control rooms and emergency stairwells: such compartments are
shielded so that they do not exceed a dose rate criterion of 25 µSv/hour.
 During fuel handling operations, the area dose rates at the side of the pool must be
<25 μSv/hour. OV
Particular attention has been paid to the design of shielding provisions in the HR [RB] rooms
that require accessibility during at power operation [Ref. 7]. The operating floor and the annular
zone above +1.50 m are designed to be accessible in operation, particularly in the period seven
days before shutdown and three days after restart. Due to this, these zones are designed to
have low dose rates when the reactor is operating (total dose rate (gamma and neutron) lower
than 25 µSv/hour), and to contain no detectable airborne contamination. This also concerns
accessible stairwells and elevators (which have a specific dose rate limit of 10 µSv/hour).
2.2.2. Shielding Provisions

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The required parameters for sizing shielding provisions are:
 the normal state of the reactor unit, and
 the geometry and nature of equipment, rooms and radioactive sources.
Depending on the complexity of the above parameter specifications, detailed calculations and
modelling may be required for a given configuration.
The shielding provisions have been derived for normal operation source terms in most cases.
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Post-accident source terms, based on anticipated inventories after a Loss Of Coolant Accident
(LOCA) or Severe Accident (SA), have only been considered in shielding dimensioning for
rooms / areas where post-accident inventories might arise, or where post-accident access is
required, as specified further in Sub-chapter 19.5.
2.2.3. Modelling and Dose Rate Calculation
2.2.3.1. Calculation Methods
The design of the room shielding provisions and the establishment of the design radiological
zoning [Ref. 4] are carried out using computer codes recognised in the radiation protection field
(e.g. the PANTHERE and MCNP codes described below).
In some cases, the design is established by analogy with other areas (similarity of rooms and
systems), or on the basis of feedback from the French NPPs.

For the HR [RB] during reactor operation in the primary compartments and foreseen access
areas, the calculations are performed for direct neutron and gamma contributions (also including
secondary gammas arising from neutron capture), and other reflected contributions.
2.2.4. Computer Codes
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Different radiation protection computer codes are used to calculate the shielding thickness. The
choice of shielding code is based on the operating conditions, the geometry of the rooms, and
the radioactive sources involved. The computer codes and mathematical models used to
perform the shielding design are:
 PANTHERE – developed by EDF and used for gamma radiation propagation modelling
to calculate equivalent dose rates or radiation flux from radioactive sources. The code
can model complex 3-D geometries. Data and results can be visualised directly on these
3-D models. OV
 MICROSHIELD – used to evaluate shielding and to estimate exposure from gamma
radiation. This code is used for simple geometries with single sources, e.g. a tank behind
a wall containing a homogeneously distributed source, or a single hot spot (point source).
 MCNP – used to perform gamma and neutron calculations around the reactor vessel (in
the reactor pit out of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and at the level of the primary
pipes). It is based on the Monte Carlo method. The dose rate around the Steam
Generators (SG) and the main coolant pumps are determined by 3-D calculations. This
code may also be used for detailed penetration calculations or geometries requiring
consideration of multiple reflections, which are outside of the validation region of
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PANTHERE.
For the EPR, the reference calculation point for general area dose rate modelling is located
50 cm from the source and 150 cm from the ground, i.e. worker chest height at a normal working
distance. The choice of a standard calculation reference point gives consistency to calculation
results obtained using different codes.
2.2.5. Requirements Compliance

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Results from these shielding codes enable the dose rate for every room of the buildings of HPC
to be calculated. These results are analysed in order to check that Radiation Protection
objectives defined in section 2.2.1 of this sub-chapter are fulfilled. If this is not the case then
additional shielding, or other design changes, are considered to ensure that dose rates are
ALARP and the objectives are met.
2.2.5.1. Shielding Materials
Standard concrete aggregate is the main shielding material. Other materials of higher density or
of different properties (e.g. neutron absorbing materials) are also used.
For shielding calculations, a density of 2.35 g/cm 3 is used for standard concrete aggregate. This
density is a conservative value: operational feedback indicates that achieved values are closer
to 2.4 g/cm3 (with reinforcing steel not taken into account).
The secondary shielding material is water (primary pipework, SGs, spent fuel pool, etc.).
The water density assumed at a pressure of 155 bar, is as follows:

 SG inlet (330°C): 0.651 g/cm 3, and
 SG outlet (292.5°C): 0.741 g/cm 3.
Other materials may be used:
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 steel (assumed density 7.8 g/cm 3), is used for the shielding of glove boxes or small cells.
The reinforced shield doors and specific shielding around pipes may also be made of
steel. In exceptional circumstances, if there is not sufficient space available in a room,
steel may replace concrete,
 lead (assumed density 11.34 g/cm 3) may be used for room shielding, in the form of thin
sheets (as shielding measure) or in the form of bricks. The reinforced shield doors may
also be made partially of lead. However, lead cannot be used in the HR [RB] and is
prohibited in elements that may be in contact with the primary coolant, and in elements
constituting the primary system,

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anti-radiation shielding glass (density between 2.5 and 4.5 g/cm 3) is used when a worker
is required to directly observe an operation in a highly radioactive room, and
 a neutron shield material, e.g. a hydrogenated material such as polyethylene or a boron-

doped material, is used for shielding where a neutron hazard is expected to exist. The
material density is assumed to be around 1 g/cm3.
2.2.5.2 Shielding Measures for the Reactor Building

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Under normal operating conditions, the systems expected to be active that are present in this
building are:
 the Steam Generator Blowdown System (APG [SGBS]),
 the Extra Boration System (RBS [EBS]),
 the Chemical and Volume Control System (heat exchangers) (RCV [CVCS]),

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the Nuclear Sampling System (REN [NSS]),
 the Safety Injection System (RIS [SIS]),
 the RCP [RCS], and
 the Nuclear Island Vent and Drain System (RPE [NVDS]).
The HR [RB] shielding is designed based on the assumption that working in the accessible zone
of the HR [RB] during at power operation is allowed. The HR [RB] accessible zone consists
mainly of the operating floor, the annular zone (levels from +1.50 m and above) and the polar
crane.
The first protective measure is to isolate the accessible zone from atmospheric contamination
(see section 3.3 of this sub-chapter).
The second protective measure achieves satisfactory radiological conditions (i.e. total gamma
plus neutron dose rate <25 µSv/hour and neutron dose rates ALARP):

 neutron shields around primary pipework, implemented near the reactor pit penetrations
(hydrogenated material),
 labyrinths and shield doors (neutron and gamma shield doors) at the exits of the SG and
primary coolant pump bunkers,
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 shield walls sized to allow accessibility during power operation in the required rooms
(annular spaces and operating floor),
 use of thick concrete slabs above primary equipment, for example 120 cm above the HR
[RB] pool,
 shield walls of the reactor instrumentation room: 80 cm,
 shield walls of the fuel transfer compartment: from 80 cm to 140 cm,

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 use of access controls (such as locked doors) to areas affected by fuel movements, and
 use of gamma or neutron shielding in specific areas of the building.
2.2.5.3. Shielding Measures for the Fuel Building
Under normal operating conditions, the systems expected to be active that are present in this
building are:

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the RCV [CVCS] (pumps, tanks and valves),
 the Reactor Boron and Water Make-up System (REA [RBWMS]),
 the Fuel Pool Cooling (and Purification) System PTR [FPCS/FPPS],
 the REN [NSS],
 the RPE [NVDS], and

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 the Gaseous Waste Processing System (TEG [GWPS]).
The zones requiring special shielding provisions are:
 the spent fuel pool, and
 the fuel transfer compartment.
The thicknesses of the most representative shield walls are:
 the walls of the RCV [CVCS] tank room: from 70 cm to 80 cm,
 the walls of the spent fuel pool: from 120 cm to 150 cm,
 the walls of the transfer compartment: from 120 cm to 150 cm,
 the walls of the loading pit: from 110 cm to 150 cm, and

 the walls of the flask loading hall: 80 cm. In addition, there is the capability to implement
access controls (such as locked doors) to areas affected by flask loading.
2.2.5.4. Shielding Measures for the Nuclear Auxiliary Building
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According to radiochemistry data provided in Sub-chapter 9.6, under normal operating
conditions, the systems expected to be active that are present in this building are:
 the PTR [FPCS/FPPS] (filters and demineralisers),
 the RCV [CVCS] (filters and demineralisers),
 the Coolant Storage and Treatment System (TEP [CSTS]) (tanks and demineralisers),
 the TEG [GWPS] (exchangers),

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 the REN [NSS]: Nuclear Sampling System,
 the RPE [NVDS],
 the Waste Sampling System (TEN [WSS]),
 the Solid Waste Treatment System (TES [SWTS]), and
 the APG [SGBS].

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 around the PTR [FPCS/FPPS], TEP [CSTS] and RCV [CVCS] filter demineraliser rooms:
between 80 cm and 100 cm,
 between the rooms containing the TEP [CSTS] storage tanks and the corridor: 80 cm,
 between the TEP [CSTS] storage tank rooms and the outside: 90 cm,
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 between the filter rooms and the adjacent rooms (classified green zone or supervised
area): 90 cm and 110 cm,
 around the TES [SWTS] temporary storage room: from 40 cm to 50 cm, and
 around the REN [NSS] sampling lines: from 40 cm to 50 cm.
2.2.5.5. Shielding Measures for the Safeguard Buildings
A large part of each HLs division consists of a normally non-controlled area. The main
components of the Component Cooling Water System (RRI [CCWS]) are located in this area,
and are expected to be inactive in normal conditions. The rooms where this equipment is
located are arranged in such a way that they can become a controlled area in the case of a
radioactive leakage into the system.
Each HL division also contains a controlled area, which is physically segregated from the non-
controlled area, which contains systems that are expected to be active under normal operating
conditions.

According to radiochemistry data provided in Sub-chapter 9.6, under normal operating

conditions, the systems expected to be active that are present in this building are:
 the PTR [FPCS/FPPS] (filters and demineralisers),
 the REN [NSS],
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 the RPE [NVDS],
 the TEG [GWPS] (exchangers),
 the Containment Heat Removal System (EVU [CHRS]),
 the APG [SGBS], and

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the Safety Injection System (RIS [SIS]) (which includes the Low Head Safety Injection
(LHSI) and Medium Head Safety Injection (MHSI) systems).
 in Divisions 1 and 4, between the rooms housing the RIS [SIS] (LHSI) and EVU [CHRS]
pumps: 40 cm,
 between the EVU [CHRS] rooms and the corridors: 110 cm,
 in Divisions 1 and 4, between RIS [SIS] (LHSI) pump room and the RIS [SIS] (MHSI)
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pump room: 60 cm.
During normal operation within the HL only the RIS [SIS] (LHSI) trains of the RIS [SIS] can be
active at a relatively high dose rate. These parts of the system will also be used for reactor heat
removal during regular shutdowns.
The other parts of the RIS [SIS] (including the MHSI) as well as the EVU [CHRS] could be active
during normal operation only due to test operation with In-containment Refuelling Water Storage
Tank (IRWST) water.
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2.2.5.6. Shielding Measures for the Effluent Treatment Buildings
Under normal operating conditions, the systems expected to be active that are present in these
buildings are:
 the RPE [NVDS]: Nuclear Island Vent and Drain System,
 the TEU [LWTS]: Liquid Waste Treatment System,
 the TEN [WSS], and
 the TES [SWTS].
The definition of the HQ [ETB] shielding provisions considers the analysis of operational
feedback from the best operating units (see section 2.3.2.7 of Sub-chapter 19.4).

 around the TES [SWTS] resin holdup tank: from 100 cm to 110 cm,
 around the TES [SWTS] encapsulation cell: from 70 cm to 110 cm,
 around the TES [SWTS] temporary ILW cask stores: from 50 cm to 70 cm,
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 around the filter compartments: 70 cm,
 around the TEU [LWTS] demineraliser: from 80 cm to 100 cm,
 around the TEU [LWTS] concentrates tank room: from 50 cm to 80 cm, and
 around the resin transfer pipework rooms in the basement: from 70 cm to 80 cm.
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3. PROTECTION AGAINST CONTAMINATION
3.1 CONTAMINATION ZONING
A major goal of contamination zoning, particularly in a new installation, is to limit the transfer of
contamination. Zone boundaries are therefore a very important issue and require particular
attention [Ref. 8].
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Contamination zoning applies to normal operating conditions and is based on the principle of
classification of the rooms and areas of a NPP in the following manner:
 NC – This means that the room (or area) must be free of loose (unfixed) contamination.
Air supplied is clean air, any items or waste stored or transiting the room are clean or
correctly packaged, and all active systems, pipes, equipment, etc. are sealed. Fixed
contamination should not normally be present on surfaces.
 C1 – This means that it is impossible to demonstrate that there are no potential

contamination sources in the room. In practice C1 at the design stage applies to rooms
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where there are a lot of contaminated system components that have the potential to leak
(e.g. pumps and valves). However, a C1 room should contain only sealed active systems
(e.g. covered floor drains). These rooms have the potential for contamination in the
range of 0.4 to 4.0 Bq/cm2 /
 C2 – This applies to rooms that have a high risk of contamination. In practice C2 at the
design stage applies to contaminated sumps and pools, and to decontamination and hot
workshops. These rooms have the potential for contamination of >4.0 Bq/cm 2 /.
A diagram defining the contamination zoning and classification of rooms is provided in

Sub-chapter 19.0 – Table 2.
The goal for HPC is for “entry in blue” into the Nuclear Island (NI). There are five goals sought
by this “entry in blue” approach. The “entry in blue” concept is closely related to the
contamination zoning. These goals are:
 to facilitate access to the controlled area and limit the time lost during a full RCA
changing process,

 to meet international levels of best practice,
 to reduce the amount of waste generated and sent to radiological waste streams,
 to reduce decommissioning impacts, and
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 to ensure that contamination is controlled at source.
“Entry in blue” concerns access to the RCA. Visitors may enter in ordinary clothing with a coat,
safety shoes and a hard hat, plus any other specific PPE required (e.g. eye protection, ear
defenders, etc.), whereas workers enter in industrial overalls (“blues”, hence the name “entry in
blue”). Note that this clothing will not necessarily be blue, but the naming distinguishes from the
principle of “entry in white” used on many French plants, where a full change to protective
clothing (“whites”) is required for all access to the RCA.
Entry to the RCA therefore does not require passing through a full RCA changing room. Instead
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one enters directly, fulfilling only the obligation of wearing a dosimeter, initialising it and having
an appropriate radiological work permit [Ref. 7]. One then exits simply by passing through the
body contamination monitor. Tools and other items must be monitored separately.
In the RCA, it is possible to go “in blue clothing” to all parts of the installation classified as clean
in the contamination zoning scheme (i.e. NC rooms), without having to travel through higher
contamination classification rooms.
3.1.1. Transition between Contamination Zones

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Keeping rooms free of radiological contamination is dependent on the confinement of activity

within structures, equipment and pipework. If radiological material leaks or spreads, then
propagation of contamination may occur via two principle methods: fluid transfers and physical
movements of equipment and / or personnel. Contamination barriers are one of the
countermeasures employed against dispersion of contamination by physical transfer.
The function of a contamination barrier is to separate two areas with different contamination
levels where it needs to be possible for personnel to pass from one area to the other. Installation
of a contamination barrier for an opening in a wall will not be foreseen if it is not planned that
personnel shall pass through this opening under normal conditions (except for emergency
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evacuation). In practice, access to a room that is classified R5 (radiation protection zoning) is

normally forbidden and consequentially there will be no contamination barrier leading into these
rooms, even if they are classified C1/C2 and accessed from an NC area. The same applies for a
retention tank in which no human movement occurs (e.g. the spent fuel pool).
A contamination barrier will therefore be present at the following transition locations:
 NC ↔ C1 (except for permanent R5 areas), and
 NC ↔ C2 (except for permanent R5 areas).
A contamination barrier is actually a set of measures fulfilling the following criteria:
 to signal a change in contamination level from one side of the barrier to the other (in both
directions),

 to prevent the transfer of contamination by the clothing of the person exiting a

contaminated area. The recommended solution is to use over-clothing during the time
spent in the contaminated area, which is then carefully removed on return to the non-
contaminated area,
 to allow a suitable check for contamination for the person, their clothing and any item
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leaving a contaminated area,
 to mark the change in contamination level with a surmountable, solid barrier designed to
help those leaving the contamination area to undress,
 to allow storage of over-clothing for use by personnel entering the contaminated area,
 to allow the collection of used over-clothing intended to be treated or discarded on exit

including, where possible, the ability for technicians to easily remove used laundry from
bins,

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to allow space for operators to get dressed and undressed from the over-clothing, and
 to allow implementation of a body contamination monitor for specific, high contamination

risk areas.
3.2 DECONTAMINATION MEASURES
The rooms and areas of the plant are all classified according to the contamination zoning rules.
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The presence of clean rooms on the NI must never be assumed. Supposedly clean rooms must
constantly be the subject of monitoring, and corrective actions by the operator if required.
Consequentially decontaminable paints are used for most of the walls and floors in the NI,
including in areas classified as NC. Wherever possible, practices that keep the installation as
clean as possible are used such as:
 limit floor obstacles in rooms that must be cleaned regularly (principally C1/C2 rooms),
and
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 install a rounded shell / floor join in order to remove or mitigate contamination traps in
grooves or corners (principally in C1/C2 rooms).
In areas where there is a risk of leakage of active fluid from equipment or pipework the above
measures are particularly important, as is the provision of adequate drainage to the RPE
[NVDS] and the avoidance of areas on the floor where contamination could become trapped
(depressions, seams, etc.). The use of bunding to prevent the propagation of any leaked fluid
outside of the area where the leak has occurred, to avoid the further spread of contamination, is
also required.
Contamination zoning induces no specific requirements for air flow rates of ventilation, but it
does dictate the direction of air transfers between rooms in most cases (i.e. from lower
contamination to higher contamination zones).
Physically, RCA access and egress areas play a key role in the set of controls for
contamination. The functions that the HPC design therefore satisfies are presented in the table
below [Ref. 4].

Contamination There must be suitable means to control, monitor and prevent the potential
Control spread of contamination on exit from the RCA, on tools, equipment, waste
(Protection and people. Supervision and surveillance should ensure that all provisions
against the are being correctly used by workers.
internal
hazard) Suitable ventilation arrangements must be provided to ensure that air
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cannot flow from contaminated areas into the non-controlled area.
Adequate space for the storage and issue of tools and equipment to ensure
radiological protection controls can be used in the RCA.
Facilities and equipment provision to enable decontamination of people,
tools and equipment prior to exit from the RCA.
Suitable means to control, monitor and prevent the potential spread of
contamination on exit from higher risk areas to the low risk areas within the
RCA, which is achieved through the installation of monitoring equipment as
described in section 4 of this sub-chapter.
3.3 VENTILATION
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The ventilation systems are designed to guarantee a low working exposure to contamination.
The systems are described in Sub-chapter 9.4.
3.3.1. Fuel Building, Nuclear Auxiliary Building, Safeguard Buildings, Effluent

Treatment Buildings
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Two of the objectives of the design of the ventilation systems for the HN [NAB] (see section 2 of
Sub-chapter 9.4), the HK [FB] (see section 2 of Sub-chapter 9.4), the mechanical part of the HL
(see section 6 of Sub-chapter 9.4) and the HQ [ETB] (see section 6 of Sub-chapter 9.4) are:
 to limit aerosol and radioactive gas concentrations in the atmosphere by ensuring the
necessary air renewal rate, and
 to ensure, under normal operating conditions, that the direction of air transfer is from the
potentially less contaminated rooms towards the potentially more contaminated rooms
(and specifically to avoid the opposite airflow occurring).
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Some rooms are considered to be iodine risk rooms. The specific ventilation requirements for
these rooms are described in section 1 of Sub-chapter 9.4.
3.3.2. Reactor Building
Radiation exposure arising from access to the HR [RB] during at power operation is influenced
by airborne activity levels.
The containment airborne concentration of radioactive nuclides when the reactor is in operation
is based on the concentration of these nuclides in the primary coolant and by the primary
coolant leak rate. The production of argon-41 by neutron activation near the reactor vessel also
contributes to airborne contamination.
In order to limit internal exposure, the HR [RB] is divided into an equipment compartment
(enclosing the main primary system elements) and a service space where the atmosphere is
compatible with the presence of personnel during operation (this is known as the “two-room
concept”).

The HR [RB] ventilation systems are designed to maintain a dynamic containment between the
equipment compartment and the service space by a pressure barrier that forbids transfer of
activity from the equipment compartment to the service space.
This design avoids any contamination inside the accessible areas of the HR [RB] during at
power operations.
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The internal filtration system (see section 4 of Sub-chapter 9.4) is permanently operational to
limit the activity level in the HR [RB]. It maintains a dynamic containment between the
equipment compartment and the service space when the EBA [CSVS] is not operating. It also
reduces aerosol and iodine contamination in the equipment compartment via the use of High
Efficiency Particulate in Air (HEPA) filters and iodine traps.
While preparing access to the HR [RB] during at power operation and during the access period,
the HR [RB] purge ventilation system EBA [CSVS] low flow system (see section 5 of Sub-
chapter 9.4), maintains a dynamic containment between the equipment compartment and the
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service space. This enables airborne activity levels due to noble gases (in particular krypton-85
and xenon-133) and tritium (steam from water containing tritium) to be reduced.
Air extracted from the equipment compartment is discharged via the stack after passing through
HEPA filters and iodine traps.
During an outage, the high flow rate system of the HR [RB] purge ventilation system EBA
[CSVS] (see section 5 of Sub-chapter 9.4), carries out a purge and ventilation of the equipment
compartment in order to reduce the airborne concentration of fission and activation products.
Then, access is allowed under optimum safety conditions and no containment is required
between the equipment compartment and the service space.
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The Containment Continuous Ventilation System (EVR [CCVS]) (see section 3 of

Sub-chapter 9.4) does not have a dynamic containment function. It contributes however to limit
workers' radiation exposure by circulating air independently in the equipment compartment and
the service space, thus reducing the amount of airborne tritium by condensing atmospheric
humidity in its cooling coils.
3.3.3. Iodine / Aerosols Risks

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Iodine and aerosol hazards have been identified in specific zones and the specific requirements
for new plants have been described (see section 1 of Sub-chapter 9.4). Historical data is also
available from existing Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) on areas in the plants that are
designated on the basis of iodine and aerosol hazards. Various isotopes of iodine are produced
during the fission process, which exist mainly in dissolved form in the primary coolant circuit.
Iodine and other aerosol hazards are normally only considered to present an elevated hazard
requiring additional controls during outage.
The room classification for the RCA has been defined under the assumption that external
radiation protection considerations and shielding provisions provide the main protection
measures. These are complimented by the contamination classification, which aids in controlling
the spread of contamination. Finally, the iodine and aerosol risk rooms are defined, which allow
potential internal dose uptakes to be kept to ALARP levels by use of ventilation measures (air
renewal rates and pressure differentials).
The areas at risk from iodine have been identified as follows:
 Rooms with installed equipment which could contain iodine in a gaseous form.

 Rooms containing active liquids if they meet both the following criteria simultaneously:
o the fluid temperature in normal operation is above 60°C, and
o the specific activity of the liquid is greater than 1% of that of the primary coolant.
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A room is defined as an aerosol risk room if there is a possibility that it contains, or will contain,
aerosols with an activity higher than 37 Bq/m 3. This value comes from examining good practice
in France and the UK, where the values used are 37 Bq/m3 and 40 Bq/m3 respectively, with the
slightly more conservative value from French good practice selected for HPC.
The aerosol hazard is also heightened during an outage, particularly due to more aggressive
works being performed on contaminated systems. The areas at risk from aerosols have been
identified as follows:
 primary system openings and opening of connected systems, accessed during outage,
 tools in contact with fuel,

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 any maintenance linked with the primary circuit or connected systems,
 maintenance and logistics near the HR [RB] and HK [FB] pools and associated systems,
and
 work in the HR [RB] pool when drained.

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Specific engineering controls such as ventilation and monitoring may be required for these
zones, designated on the basis of iodine or aerosol hazards.
Regulation 19 of IRR99 requires that operators of a facility routinely check the effectiveness of
engineered controls, and monitor all of their designated areas to ensure that they continue to be
appropriately designated / zoned. These survey data are an important component of ongoing
ALARP assessments based on operational experience feedback. Establishing an adequate
monitoring regime is a requirement of Regulation 19(1) of IRR99.
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4. MONITORING
Radiological monitoring systems are important in the protection of personnel on the plant from
the irradiation and contamination hazards. There are two main systems that perform this
function.
The Plant Radiation Monitoring System (KRT/9KRT [PRMS]) is an instrumentation system

designed to supply information to the operator in order to diagnose the radioactivity levels of the
unit in normal, transient, accidental and post-accidental operating conditions.
Sub-chapter 9.5 presents the monitoring of the unit performed by the KRT/9KRT [PRMS]
system.

The Body Contamination and Dosimetry Control System (KRC) is an instrumentation system
designed to supply information for the protection of personnel during normal operations. KRC
monitors the ambient dose rate in some rooms, monitors airborne activity levels for iodine,
aerosols and noble gases, and monitors gamma and neutron dose rate for the rooms of the HR
[RB] that are accessible at power. The system also monitors personnel for contamination on the
exit from the RCA, and provides dosimetry systems for tracking individual doses.
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4.1 MONITORING OF ROOMS
The monitoring devices measure the equivalent dose rate values in a room or a working zone.
They are used to produce survey maps and measure the equivalent dose rate at locations
where work is to be carried out, in particular to ensure it is in line with predicted levels.
4.1.1 Rooms in the Reactor Building

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The devices in the HR [RB] are used to monitor:
 the atmospheric contamination of the service floor (reactor in operation),
 the neutron dose rate in the area that is accessible to personnel (reactor in operation),
 the gamma dose rate in the area that is accessible to personnel,
 the gamma dose rate in the reactor instrumentation room,

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 the atmospheric contamination of the area around the reactor cavity, and
 the EVR [CCVS] activity.
4.1.2. Rooms in the Fuel Building
The devices in the HK [FB] are used to monitor:
 the dose rate at the edge of the spent fuel pool, and
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 the atmospheric contamination of the area around the spent fuel pool.
4.1.3. Rooms in the Nuclear Auxiliary Building
The devices in the HN [NAB] are used to monitor:
 the gamma dose rate on RCV [CVCS] filters,
 the gamma dose rate on PTR [FPCS/FPPS] filters,
 the gamma dose rate on RPE [NVDS] filter, and
 the gamma dose rate in the low-level waste monitoring room which leads into the TES
[SWTS] process rooms in the HQ [ETB].

4.1.4. Shielding Measures for the Safeguard Buildings
The devices in the HLs are used to monitor:
 the dose rate in the RIS [SIS] LHSI pump rooms, and
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 the Control Room Air Conditioning System DCL [CRACS].
4.1.5. Rooms in the Effluent Treatment Buildings
The devices in the HQ [ETB] are used to monitor:
 the gamma dose rate in the concrete drum temporary storage,
 the gamma dose rate on TEU [LWTS] filters, and

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the atmospheric contamination (aerosol activity concentration) in the waste processing
area and in the compactor and shredder room.
4.1.6. Rooms in Specific Working Zones
Further monitoring devices will be provided for the different work zones: these are portable
monitors.
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4.2 MONITORING OF STAFF
Radiological monitoring devices check for the absence of contamination on a worker’s body,
clothing and equipment, and so act as successive barriers to prevent the accidental spread of
contamination. The use of these is always required on leaving the controlled area and on
leaving the site, and may also be required on leaving a particular high risk area within the
controlled area. In this way up to three detection barriers exist between the source and the
public domain. They include:
 Check-point monitoring – This detects any potential contamination on the hands, feet
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and some body surfaces, and is typically located near to particular risk areas. These
monitors are usually portable and so can be moved to areas when particular work is
taking place.
 Full-body monitor – The role of this equipment is to detect contamination on clothes and
skin across the whole body. These monitors are usually fixed in place at the exit to the
controlled area, and are installed such that it is not possible to leave the controlled area
without monitoring (but always with a bypass option for fire escape).
 Objects monitor – The Small Tool / Articles Monitor (SAM) checks small objects for
contamination. The Large Articles Monitor (LAM) monitor checks large objects or waste
for contamination. They both use gamma radiation sensitive detectors.
 In areas with no contamination risk but a risk of hot particles, a gamma portal monitor is
added.
 Moreover, a hand-held frisker probe (portable), is used close to the work area and for
checking tools and equipment when they are removed from a C2 area.

 Site exit scanning turnstile – Spread of contamination outside the site is monitored for,
using X-ray and gamma radiation sensitive walk through detectors.
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5. REFERENCES
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UKX-UK1421-AU-ALL-NOT-002004, Revision B, July 2015, Sofinel.
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[5] The Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999, Statutory Instrument 1999 No. 3232, ISBN 0-
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UKX-UK1421-AU-ALL-NOT-002003, Revision B, June 2015, Sofinel.
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6.15 m, HPC-UK1421-AU-HRX-DRW-001331, Revision A, September 2014, Sofinel.
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[47] Hinkley Point C, Radiological Zoning HNX, Plan View Level -9.60 m, HPC-UK1421-AU-
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AU-HNX-DRW-005269, Revision A, January 2015, Sofinel.

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[57] Hinkley Point C, Radiological Zoning HNX, Section A-A, HPC-UK1421-AU-HNX-DRW-
005303, Revision A, January 2015, Sofinel.
[58] Hinkley Point C, Radiological Zoning HNX, Section B-B; HPC-UK1421-AU-HNX-DRW-

[59] Hinkley Point C, Radiological Zoning HNX, Section C-C; HPC-UK1421-AU-HNX-DRW-

[60] Hinkley Point C, Radioactive Waste Building, Radiological Zoning, Plan View Level -
OV
7.50 m, HPC-UK1421-U9-HQB-DRW-005321, Revision A, January 2015, Sofinel.
[61] Hinkley Point C, Radioactive Waste Building, Radiological Zoning, Plan View Level -
3.90 m, HPC-UK1421-U9-HQB-DRW-005322, Revision A, January 2015, Sofinel.
[62] Hinkley Point C, Radioactive Waste Building, Radiological Zoning, Plan View Level
+0.00 m, HPC-UK1421-U9-HQB-DRW-005323, Revision A, January 2015, Sofinel.
PR
[66] Hinkley Point C, Radioactive Waste Building, Radiological Zoning, Section A-A, HPC-
UK1421-U9-HQB-DRW-005327, Revision A, January 2015, Sofinel.
[67] Hinkley Point C, Radioactive Waste Building, Radiological Zoning, Section B-B, HPC-
AP
[68] Hinkley Point C, Radioactive Waste Building, Radiological Zoning, Section C-C, HPC-

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SUB-CHAPTER 19.3 - RADIATION PROTECTION MEASURES

1. RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS OF HPC

 primary coolant activation products, e.g. tritium or nitrogen-16, and

The two types of radiological hazard are:

1.1 IRRADIATION HAZARDS

There are four types of radiation:

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1.2 CONTAMINATION HAZARDS

Other risks are also taken into account:

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2. PROTECTION AGAINST IRRADIATION

2.1 DESIGN OF NUCLEAR ISLAND

2.1.1. Radiation Protection Rules at the Design Stage

2.1.1.1 Design Rules for Equipment

The main equipment design rules are the following:

 use of cobalt-based hard coatings in valves is minimised,

 pump bearings made of antimony alloys are to be avoided,

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2.1.1.2 Equipment Installation Rules

 as far as reasonably practicable, active equipment should be physically separated from

 equipment installed in a controlled area is made easily accessible in order to reduce

 network cables are separated from potentially contaminated equipment,

2.1.1.3. Design Rules for Rooms

 good accessibility is provided to rooms containing equipment requiring regular

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 active pumps are accessed via protected access routes (labyrinths),

 a sufficiently large space is allowed for,

 work preparation and monitoring from low dose rate zones,

 equipment maintenance inside the rooms,

 mobile and temporary protection devices,

2.1.2. Provisions in the Design for Radiation Protection

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2.2 RADIATION PROTECTION ZONING

Established within the regulatory framework of IRR99 (Regulation 8(2)) is a hierarchy of

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There are individual specifications regarding the shielding design:

2.2.2. Shielding Provisions

The required parameters for sizing shielding provisions are:

 the normal state of the reactor unit, and

 the geometry and nature of equipment, rooms and radioactive sources.

2.2.3. Modelling and Dose Rate Calculation

2.2.3.1. Calculation Methods

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2.2.4. Computer Codes

2.2.5. Requirements Compliance

2.2.5.1. Shielding Materials

The water density assumed at a pressure of 155 bar, is as follows:

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 SG inlet (330°C): 0.651 g/cm 3, and

 SG outlet (292.5°C): 0.741 g/cm 3.

Other materials may be used:

 a neutron shield material, e.g. a hydrogenated material such as polyethylene or a boron-

2.2.5.2 Shielding Measures for the Reactor Building

 the Steam Generator Blowdown System (APG [SGBS]),

 the Extra Boration System (RBS [EBS]),

the Nuclear Sampling System (REN [NSS]),

 the Safety Injection System (RIS [SIS]),