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Herman-J. de Vleeschauwer - The Development of Kantian Thought (1962, Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD.) PDF
Herman-J. de Vleeschauwer - The Development of Kantian Thought (1962, Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD.) PDF
Originally published as
L'Evolution de fa pensee Kantienne
Presses Universitaires de France, 1939
English translation
© A. R. C. Duncan 1962
Author's Preface
This book is not an original work in the strict sense of that
term. Between 1934 and 1937 I published an extensive
study of the Critical philosophy under the general title of
La Diduction transcendantale dans l' CEuvre de Kant. This three-
volume work had a dual purpose. First, it was intended to
offer a textual commentary on that part of the Critique ofPure
Reason known as the Transcendental Deduction of the Cate-
gories. Secondly, it sought to trace the development of the
whole Critical problem which comes to a central point in the
Transcendental Deduction. The kind reception accorded
to this work made it impossible for me to ignore the
suggestion made by several colleagues that I should give a
general account of the evolution of Kantian thought.
The use of the historical method makes an author
cautious about a priori schemas in any attempt to determine
historical reality; it also forbids him to be guided in his
researches by any preconceived idea of the nature of the
Critical philosophy. An almost religious respect for the
documentary evidence is for the historian a matter of pro-
fessional duty. Twelve years devoted to the study of the
Kantian corpus, to the comparison of Kant's letters with his
published works, to cautious use of his Nachlass, to inquiry
into the cultural state of Germany in the eighteenth century,
constituted a powerful defence against any temptation to a
priorism. Close personal study of the facts led the writer to
pay attention to the lesson of the facts themselves.
From my willing acceptance of the demands of tIle
historical method has come a new conception of some aspects
of Kant's intellectual career, and consequently I have been
forced to contradict some of the critical cliches to be found
in many of the textbooks. The interest in the exact sciel1ces
shown by Kant at the beginning of his career no longer
appears to have the mysterious and revealing cllaracter
commonly attributed to it. The recognition of the admir-
able unity which can be traced in Kant's thought, in spite of
vii
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
IX
Writings by Kant
referred to by de Vleeschauwer
In his account of the development of Kant's thought, de Vleeschauwer
refers to three different classes of writings by Kant:
A. PUBLISHED WORI<S
In the following list the abbreviation or descriptive phrase usually adopted
by de Vleeschauwer is given first in italics: then follow the full German
or Latin title, date of publication and English translation of the title.
Where an English translation of the book, partial or complete, is avail-
able, this is added. The works are listed under the Chapter sections in
which they are either first n1entioned or explicitly discussed.
Chapter I Section 2
Chapter I Section 3
The essay on the syllogism. Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllo-
gistischen Figuren erwiesen, 1762 (The Mistaken Subtlety of the Four
Syllogistic Figures).
Translated by T. K. Abbott in Kant's Introduction to Logic (Longmans,
Green & Co., 1885).
/vegativen Grossen. Versuch den Begriff der Negativen Grossen in die
Weltweisheit einzufuhren, 1763 (An Attempt to Introduce Negative
Quantities into Philosophy).
Beweisgrund. Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration
fur das Dasein Gottes, 1763 (The only possible Foundation for a Proof of
the Existence of God).
Beobachtungen. Beobachtungen tiber das Gefuhl des Schonen und
Erhabenen, 1764 (Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the
Sublime).
Deutlichkeit or Preisschrift (Prize Essay). Untersuchung tiber die Deut-
lichkeit der Grundsatze der naturlichen Theologie und der Moral, 1764
(An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology
and Morals).
Translated by L. W. Beck in Critique of Practical Reason and other writingS
in Moral Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 1949).
Chapter I Section 4
Nachricht. Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem
Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-66, 1765 (Programme of Lectures for
Winter Semester 1765-6).
Triiume. Traume eines Geistersehers erHiutert durch die Traume der
Metaphysik, 1766 (Dreams of a Spiritseer explained through the Dreams
of Metaphysics).
Translated by E. F. Goerwitz (Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London,
1900).
Chapter I Section 6
The little dissertation or essay on space. Von dem ersten Grunde des U nter-
schiedes der Gegenden im Raume, 1768 (On the First Ground of the
Distinction of Regions ~n Space).
Sections translated by Handyside (in volume quoted above).
Dissertatio. De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis
dissertatio, 1770 (Inaugural Dissertation on the Form and Principles of
the Sensible and Intelligible World).
Translated by Handyside (in volume quoted above).
xiii
WRITINGS BY KANT
The theoretical Critique. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. First edition, 1781.
Second edition, 1787 (Critique of Pure Reason).
Translated by Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan, 1933).
Prolegomena. Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Metaphysik die als
Wissenschaft wird auftreten kennen, 1783 (Prolegomena to any Future
Metaphysics) .
Translated by Lewis \Vhite Beck (Liberal Arts Press, 1951).
Anfangsgrunde. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft,
1786 (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science).
Translated by E. B. Bax in Kant's Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations
of Natural Science (Bell & Sons, 1883) (This includes the important
footnote referred to on page I 14) .
Chapter IV Section I
Entdeckung. Ueber eine Entdeckung nach der aIle neue Kritik der reinen
Vernunft durch eine altere entbehrlich gemacht werden soIl, 1790 (On
a discovery according to which any new critique of pure reason is
rendered unnecessary on account of an earlier one).
Chapter IV Section 2
Chapter IV Section 3
The Declaration against Fichte. ErkHirung in Beziehung auf Fichte's
Wissenschaftslehre, 1799 (Declaration concerning Fichte's Doctrine of
Science).
xiv
WRITINGS BY KANT
Chapter IV Section 4
Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793
(Religion within the Limits of Reason alone).
Translated by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1960).
Perpetual Peace. Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795. Translated by Lewis White
Beck (in volume quoted obove).
Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797 (The Metaphysics of Morals).
The first part of this work, the section on law, has been translated by
W. Hastie in Kant's Philosophy of Law. (T. and T. Clarke, 1887). Parts
of the second half, the section on ethics, have been translated by Lewis
White Beck (in the volume quoted above).
B. LETTERS
These include both letters written by Kant to his friends and letters
written to Kant. The page references are to Volumes X and XII of the
Prussian Academy edition. The letters are listed under the Chapter
sections and in the order in which they are referred to in the text.
Chapter I Section 5
Prussian Academy
Edition
Lambert to Kant 13 November 1765 Vol. X p. 48
Chapter I Section 6
Kant to Garve 21 September 17g8 Vol. XII p. 254
Chapter I Section 7
Lambert to Kant 13 October 1770 Vol. X p. g8
Sulzer to Kant 8 December 1770 p.l06
Mendelssohn to Kant 25 December 1770 " p.l08
Kant to Herz "
7 June 177 1 p. 116
Kant to Herz 21 February 1772
"
p. 123
"
Chapter II Section I
c. THE NACHLASS
Under this general heading may also be included two other important
works:
(a) a compilation of notes taken at Kant's lectures between 1775 and
1780, referred to as the Vorlesungen tiber Metaphysik (Lectures on Meta-
physics). Two editions of these have been published. The first by
Politz in 182 I is incomplete and unreliable: the second is by Heinze
and is available in a volume entitled, Konigliche Sachsische Gesell-
schaft der Wissenschaften. Philosophische Historische Klasse.
Abhandlung v. 14. Published in Leipzig in 1894.
(b) Kants Opus Postumum dargestellt und beurteilt von Erich Adickes,
Berlin, 1920. Referred to as the Opus Postumum.
2,491) XVI
Chapter I
1
THE PHILOSOPI-IICAL CLIMATE
Praise for the superhuman genius of Kant conjoined with
the claim that he changed his mind every decade like a
dizzy fool who cannot master the direction of his own
thought is surely evidence of a fundamental contradiction.
The majority of biographies devoted to him, however,
appear content to accept a contradiction of this nature.
I-lis numerous publications, the hundreds of letters which
are still accessible, the resolutions which he formed through-
out an eventful career, make us realise to what extent
Kant was hostile to the type of intellectual flirtation which
charmed many of his contemporaries, and yet how sensi-
tive he was to signs of spiritual activity in. l1is in1nlediate
surroundings. This explains to a great extent the variety
of his rn.editations, the breadth of his interests, and the
encyclopedic character of his lectures. It is nevertheless
possible to detect certain unmistakable converging lines in
this disconcerting variety. Kant steadfastly pursued a
unique and precise objective which it is essential to clarify
before beginning a full study of the history of his thought.
Unfortunately this is not to be found where it has been
custon1ary to look for it. The nineteenth-century fashion
of allowing Cartesianism to take the place of the historical
Descartes has been matched by a tendency to substitute the
Critical philosophy and its later developments for the real
11istorical Kant. Positivism found it advantageous to claim
philosophical patronage for th.e scientific methodology
which resulted in a limitation of knowledge to the realm of
(2,491) I 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
phenomena, and it was not unaware that the Critique of Pure
Reason could be represented as its own justification avant la
lettre. There is indeed no real need to find fault with this
choice when it is remembered how Kant never ceased to over-
whelm metaphysics with biting sarcasm. It certainly cannot
be denied that Kant criticised many things, metaphysics
included. 011 the other hand, if we look a little more
closely, we see that a constructive effort accompanied the
activity of destruction. For fifty years Kant dreamed and
planned to establish the future of metaphysics, and for l1im
to proclaim its downfall amounted to discrediting it tem-
porarily in order to lay secure foundations for it. His
complaints are directed against a particular metaphysics
and a particular method. At the same time he himself
constructed, at least in rough outline, a different meta-
physics and elaborated another method. To discover
ultimately the correct philosophical method and by means
of it to construct an eternal metaphysics were the aims
cherished by Kant.
In seeking to achieve both these ends, however, Kant
did not follow a straight line. The constant search for the
methodological foundation of metaphysics gives his career
its unity and overall harmony, and reveals the intellectual
stability which continued to characterise him through the
vicissitudes of his life. This search, however, demanded the
destruction of a particular historical metaphysics as its pre-
liminary condition. The drama of Kant's intellectual life
lies in the fact that it was his painful duty to destroy the
Wolffian metaphysics so that he could construct an eternal
metaphysics. Kant never placed himself under the tutelage
of Hume. This is the first conclusion which will be drawn
from our investigation.
Our second general conclusion will also separate us from
our predecessors. Since Kant did not seek either his method
or his metaphysics in one uniform direction, we must trace
the curve which illustrates the developn1ent of the supreme
problem. The great caesura in this evolution is to be found
in 178 I with the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Nevertheless, when it is realised that this work itself marks
a stage on the way to the discovery of a possible foundation
2
THE PREPARATION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
2
THE FIRST PHYSICO-METAPHYSICAL
ESSAYS
cf. La Deduction I, 87-92, 105-8, 117-22, 130-4, 190-3
When Kant as a young man of sixteen placed himself in
the hands of his bellefactor Schultze, the University of
Konigsberg was going through a period of relative calm.
Schultze had conlbined in his own person elenlents of both
W olffianism and Pietism, and Wolffian rationalism had
begun to undermine the weak Aristotelianism which had
so far reigned there. In 1734 he llad called Martin Knutzen
to the chair of philosophy and physics. Kant had the good
fortune to find in this young man of twenty-one a daring
teacher who was hard-working, well informed, and sym-
pathetic to the enthusiasms of the new generation. In 1735
Knutzen had defended a thesis entitled Systema causarum
e.fJicientium which was devoted to the refutation of the doctrine
ofpre-established harmony. Leibniz was very nluch attached
to this doctrine, Wolff very much less so, and !(nutzen not
at all. At Konigsberg he had in any case been anticipated
in this field by a man called Marqllardt. Just at the time
when Knutzen was attempting to bring the interminable
debate to an end, the last blows were directed at the Leib-
nizian myth by Reuss and by Gottschedt (who sometinles
dabbled in philosophy). However, Knutzen not merely
refuted it, but developed a new system of physical influxioll
which departed considerably from the Aristotelian notion of
the efficient cause to which the physicists had already givell
the coup de grace. It was not surprising that mechanism,
space, and idealism-Foucher had even objected that the
external world is unnecessary on the Leibnizian hypothesis-
were all to play some part ill the debate. The substance of
Knutzen's thesis had no doubt been passed on in his teaching,
and in 1756 Kant was to nlake use of it in the Monadologia
Physica.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
It was th.is far-sighted and liberal Wolffian whose task it
was to teach Kant the first principles of Wolffian meta-
physics, and to introduce him to the teaching of Newton.
Both through personal instruction and the loan of books he
accorded Kant the generous support of his own youthful
enthusiasm. The teaching of Knutzen prepared Kant for
botll a philosophical and a scientific career. The degree of
maturity and the breadth of knowledge shown by Kant in
this double domain on the occasion of his first published
work indicate that his teaching must have been of a very
high quality. After following punctiliously a somewhat
curious plan of studies under the supervision of Schultze
with the willing collaboration of Knutzen, Kant left l'Alber- .
tine in 1746 with a dissertation On the Estimation of Living
Forces, which he was to publish ill 1749 with the help of
benefactors generous enough to ulldertake the cost of print-
ing. There we have Kant at the age oftwenty-two, launched
upon the world, burdened by the poverty of his material
circumstances yet possessed of great scientific ambitions. In
these days ambition could not easily be reconciled with
poverty. In order to secure that preliminary easing of his
circumstances, which was a condition of independence and
liberty, Kant resigned himself to the work of family tutor,
spending the years between 1747 and 1755 in several aristo-
cratic and upper-middle-class houses in East Prussia. This
self-chosen withdrawal, however, did not have the character
of a period of exile. On the contrary, the evidence shows
that Kant still maintained his connections with scientific
circles in his native town and that he remained in permanent
contact witll the scientific life of Germany. However, there
is some uncertainty about the kind of occupation which
engrossed him and about the objects which attracted his
attention during th.ese nine solitary years. If from what we
know took place in 1755 it is legitimate to draw any inference
about the immediately preceding years, we can form a
general, ifvague, idea about what was happening.
In all probability Kant followed first and foremost his
bent for physical studies. In 1749 he published his doctoral
dissertation on living forces, but immediately afterwards
decided to develop it in new directions. First, he included
16
THE PREPARATION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTliESIS
A METAPHYSICS IN GESTATION
cf. La Deduction I, 92-100, 108-16, 119-30, 135-6,
139-4 1 , 142-6, 193-201
After qualifying in 1755 as a university teacher, Kant took
no part in philosophical discussion until 1763. Here we
have a first period of silence, lasting for eight or nine years,
about which we know almost nothing. The only pointer
which we have, and it is vague enough, is to be found in
the Beweisgrund: 'I give here the outcome of long medita-
tions but their exposition is still imperfect and incomplete
because other preoccupations have not left me enough time'.
If this text is to be trusted-and there is no reason why we
should not trust it-Kant must have ruminated in silence
over the subject-matter of the Beweisgrund where, it is true,
we see coming to the surface all the problems which had
been left in suspense in the Dilucidatio of 1755. Hence it
seems pointless to search for foreign influences on his thought.
Having discovered, after Crusius, the error of Cartesian onto-
lagism, Kant owes to his continued reflection on this problem
what it is customary to call his empiricism. There is no
question then of revolution, but there is rather a slow and
in some ways even painful evolution. But the silence and
26
THE PREPARATION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
the complete plan of the real world just as later the table of
categories will constitute the con1plete schema of our think-
ing activity. There is no pOil1t in searching for the key to
this change of attitude in some foreign influence to be
detected in the Preisschrift. It should simply be noted that
Kant once again follows the line adopted by German
thought in the international conflict between Descartes and
Newton. With praiseworthy perspicacity Crusius had per..
ceived the role of definition in the structure of the different
sciences; he had posed the problen1 of the Elementarbegrijfe ;
he had seen the inevitability of some measure of empiri-
cism in any factual science with any claims to realism.
It is he vvho inspired K.. ant. And Crusius was not alone in
this. In 1755 the memoir of Beguelin on the first prin-
ciples of metaphysics (the very subject of the Kantian
treatise) distinguished the method of mathematics from that
of philosophy in a manner very similar to that of Kant.
The Neues Organon of Lambert (1764) discussed exactly the
same problems which Crusius had left to the meditations of
his successors, and his Architectonik of 1772 proceeds a little
farther along the same path just at the time when Kant was
preparing to exchange Newtonianism for Critical idealism.
There is really no need to invoke I-Iume in all this.
The whole affair would be simple and straightforward if
an embarrassing remark by Kant had not once again made
it necessary to reopen the whole problem. On the basis of
the indications in the Deutlichkeit we understand the distinc-
tion between the methods of mathematics and metaphysics
as well as the domain which circumscribes their application,
and we should reasonably conclude that they cannot be
assimilated nor in any way interchanged. But Kant takes
the ground from under our feet by adding that the analytic
method is provisional in character because the moment has
not yet arrived when we can proceed synthetically in meta-
physics. This means, if the words have any sense, that the
synthetic method will once again reclaim its rights when
analysis has completed its clarificatory work. The scientific
ideals envisaged by mathematicians and philosophers fuse
together and their destinies are common. The distinction
between them depends simply on the stage which they
35
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
happen to have reached. This amounts to saying that
despite the empiricism which is evident in Kant at this
moment, the ideal of an a priori construction of universal
science retains for him all its attraction and force. In spite
of everything, the ideal of Descartes and of Hegel remains
the Kantian ideal. And this dream, great both in hopes
and in disappointments, renloves Kant from the Newtonian
and positivist orbit. If we set aside this distant ideal, how-
ever, the actual condition of the science, and perhaps even
of man, demands that metaphysics should follow the path of
Newton. Kant is not an empiricist. For an empiricist,
experience is not only the point of departure but also forms
part of the very texture of science. Kant sees in experience
a point of departure but claims that science goes beyond
experience after the manner of a rational science. The
concepts of science do have objective validity owing to the
fact that they are given to us in experience. Their objective
character is indissolubly linked to the given character of
their objects.
It is quite understandable then that Kant is going to get
closer and closer to Newton in the last problem which formed
part of the Descartes-Newton dispute, namely, the problem
of space. In 1755, we have already pointed out, Kant was
exactly midway between. t11e two antagonists. In the writings
which constitute our first group, space is not explicitly dis-
cussed but Kant studies its nature and its principal pro-
perties, using them as examples to illustrate his researches
in the field of methodology. He based the ideas which he
was forming about space on his epistemological ideas. The
orientation of his epistemological ideas does not lead him to
any radical modification of the positions which he had earlier
adopted. In fact, the space discussed is geometrical space,
therefore mathematical space, and consequently not neces-
sarily affected by the movement towards experience charac-
teristic of this period. Despite that, his hesitation is pro-
nounced. In the Beweisgrund he forbids himself to give a
definition of it, and there is in its pages a powerful Ahnung
of its absolute character. Although in the treatise about
God no final position is sketched, it is quite different in the
treatise on method. Kant comes closer to Newtonian space.
36
THE PREPARATION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
4
THE PSEUDO-SCEPTICISM OF THE TRAuME
cf. La Deduction I, 101-4, 200-2
5
INTIMATIONS OF SYSTEMATISATION
cf. La Deduction I, 100-4, I 16-17, 145-6
While the analytic method remained Kant's panacea, a
profound modification of the object of metaphysics may be
discerned in the Triiume. The object ofWolffian speculation
is mercilessly condemned, and the metaphysics which,
objectiv erwogen, retains its value, according to Kant, is that
which examines the limits inlposed on reason by the experien-
tial character of the given. The problem of the limitation
of reason is coming into view and for Newtonianism there
is imperceptibly substituted the theme which heralds pheno-
menalism. A kind of inventory of the pre-Critical period
can now be made under the three following heads:
(I) Things reveal their presence and their nature in the
43
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
given of experience; there is therefore no real knowledge
without such a given. (2) Real knowledge is limited to
the content of experience. (3) Reason is 110t lin'lited in
itself, but it is limited in its content by experience. A
science with any transcendent import is limited to the
content furnished by experience. It follows that there is
no ground for considering metaphysics as a source of real
or transcendent knowledge. In so far as it is a priori, it is
pure analysis of concepts. Can it have any object other
than the transcendent? If it does not discover the external
world, it can discover the conditions which a real science
must satisfy. These are reached as the result of an analysis
of the conditions imposed on reason by the demand that it
be limited to experience.
Hence there is no a priori knowledge of things; such
knowledge is always a posteriori. This raises a very grave
problem. The true foundation of objective science is a
posteriori. But this does not satisfy the demands of science,
which only becomes science when the necessity and uni-
versality of its constituent elements is made clear. But
experience is not the organ of the necessary and the uni-
versal. On the other h.and, the rationalist solution is also
deficient. It takes account of necessity but it cannot claim
any validity in reality. Kant did not know how to get out
of this difficulty. He did not even see it as clearly as we
might desire. '!\Then he did eventually see this difficulty,
it was going to be necessary for him to surmount it by
distinguishing in the datum of knowledge both a rational
and an irrational element. But we have not yet reached
that point.
The Critical philosophy connects phenomenalism with
the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic judg-
ment. It was consequently tempting to locate the discovery
of this distinction at just this point in Kant's development.
Adickes, followed by Cassirer, appealed to an impressive
number of Reflexionen to show that in his thinking about
causality Kant was converted to the equation: empirical
equals synthetic. I cannot accept this makeshift solution
because the texts and fragments are positively undatable.
In any case, in the Traurae, despite the opportunity it
44
THE PREPARATION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
7
THE POSING OF THE CRITICAL PROBI~EM
61
Chapter II
SYNOPSIS
cf. La Deduction I, 164-87
The problem which Kant proposed to solve by Critical
idealism had just been formulated in the celebrated letter
to Herz of 21 February 1772. We must now concentrate
our attention on studying the development and the solution
of the problem. Unfortunately, our information becomes
more and more scanty just at the point where our curiosity
begins to grow. As inevitably happens when documentary
evidence is lacking, speculative hypotheses luxuriate on all
sides. The state of our documentation is notoriously insuf-
ficient and does not allow us to retrace the progressive
development of the Critical standpoint with absolute con-
fidence and certainly not with anything like completeness.
In a case of this kind it is preferable to reduce to a mini-
mum all recourse to hypotheses, and I think that the reader
will be grateful if I reject all hypotheses which are not
themselves founded on some indubitable piece of evidence.
The sources consist of a series of letters, most of which are
more enigmatic than instructive, thereby multiplying rather
than solving the problems. In addition to these we are
fortunate in having in the Duisburg'sche Nachlass a document
of the first importance, which is an excellent source of
information about the stage which the Critical synthesis
had reached towards 1775. We have also the Vorlesungen
uber Metaphysik (not the course published by Politz, but the
manuscripts studied by M. Heinze), which throw a vivid
light on the period which comes immediately after the
62
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
88
Chapter III
but the recognition that space and time are a priori forms of
intuition and that the categories are functions of judgment
applied to this intuition. It immediately follows that all
representations are knowledge of phenomena and that the
categories have no other function but to determine a sensible
content.
The very text of the note indicates why Kant decided on
such a change offront. The motive for it was the imperfect
state of the deduction. In 178 I he had indeed takell great
pains to underline the inlportance of the deduction in which
the whole question of Critical objectivity is at stake. But
now, by placing the limitation thesis in the foreground, he
shows himself ready to modify his teaching and to diminish
the importance of the deduction. The problem of tIle limita-
tion really involves two sub-problenls, which he refers to as
the problem that and the problem how. In the problem that,
the plan was to show that the categories can have no objec-
tive use except when limited to phenomena. The problem
how concerns the manner or the process according to which
the categories make possible the object of experience. In
178 I the whole deduction gave a detailed account of this
process. If the Critical philosophy is to be given a solid
foundation, this is both necessary and sufficient. To be able
to give an account of the second problem would undoubtedly
be most desirable, but it is not indispensable to the validation
of the Critical philosophy. Kant admits that he would like
to be able to solve the second problem, although he does not
see how this would be possible. The problem that is easily
solved by showing the relations between the categories and
the general form of sensible receptivity, nanlely, time.
Although the problem how was more complex, Kant had
just discovered an equally simple way of solving it through
the definition of judgment itself. He does not expatiate at
large on this discovery, a general master-key in the discus-
sion of objectivity, but simply substitutes this brief suggestion
for the original deduction. Th.is argument is too indeter-
minate to be clear, and we must await the recasting of the
deduction in 1787 before attempting to deal with it.
Kant's chief concern at this period, however, is not the
deduction. On the contrary, he developed the critique of
99
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
practical reason which we shall discuss in the next section.
In 1786 the first edition of the theoretical Critique was
rapidly becoming exhausted. The publisher wanted a new
edition. This provided an excellent occasion for Kant to
effect the changes which he himself wislled to make and
also those wllich his readers were pressing on him. The
second edition appeared in the course of the year 1787.
We are interested only in the additions made to the Critical
doctrine. These include the following points:
had found its way to the public and that the practical
Critique was ready to appear, so that Kant had firm views
about the possibility of the metaphysics of morals. In the
thesis of the dogmatists the rational a priori is considered to
be some kind of representation of the transcendent. The
Critical thesis on the other hand rests on the distinction
between thinking and knowing. In itself thought is freed
frOlll the limiting conditions imposed by experience. Know-
ledge however must conform to experience. Hence, if the
mind does not set itself to know an object, the path of
thought is free. Ethics aims not at scientific knowledge, but
at the a priori regulation of morality. Hence the condemna-
tion of moral knowledge amounts to saving moral thinking.
With regard to the metaphysics of nature, Kant insists on
the propaedeutic character of the Critical synthesis. The
latter studies the organic conditions of a scientific structure
of theoretical metaphysics, the supreme condition of which
is the limitation of knowledge to phenomena. Hence, by
condemning transcendent and dogmatic metaphysics, the
Critical philosophy saves the truly scientific part of meta-
physics.
The great· Critical lesson seems to be embodied in the
phenomenalist empiricism. While in 1781 the transcendent
figured most ofte11 as a fundamental unexpressed postulate,
the recasting of his teaching is distinguished by direct and
frequent reminders of the necessity for the thing in itself as
the condition of the intelligibility of phenomena. Further-
more, in view of the claim in the Garve-Feder review, in
which Erscheinung is interpreted as Schein, that henceforward
knowledge must keep to the pure appearances of things,
Kant added a whole section to the Critique in order to
eliminate any such lamentable confusion. In a vigorous
ad hominem argument he accuses his opponent of committing
this same error in holding that space and time are both
conditions of things in themselves when considered as forms
and also that they are things in themselves when considered
as objective realities. He explains again how the Critical
philosophy saves the necessity of experimental knowledge.
A similar thesis dominates the structure of the reorganised
deduction, as we shall see presently.
101
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
Since phenomenalism was exposed to the danger of being
interpreted as a kind of disguised scepticism, the a priori
formalism was bound to raise a general cry of indignation
from the dogmatic realists who read it as subjective idealism,
and we know that Kant's teaching was commonly interpreted
in this way. To counteract this unjustified assimilation of his
teaching to that of a Berkeley, Kant had to take certain pre-
cautions which are evident in the new edition. In the
Analytic of Principles he added both an explicit Refutation
of Idealism and a General Remark with the same purpose.
Suppressing some parts and adding others, he also recast
the particularly dangerous passage dealing with noumena
and phenomena. In this cOl1nection the anti-idealist reply
takes in general two forrns: ( I) the demonstration of the
existence of the transcendent, and (2) the delimitation of
the use of the categories.
The refutation of idealism, which demonstrates the
necessity of a transcendent existent, is not an absolutely
new section, bllt rather a section which has been moved
to a new place. The formal idealism professed by Kant
is not aimed at all at the transcendent. The debate must
therefore centre around material idealism, within which
two separate types must be distinguished: the dogmatic
type of Berkeley which denies the existence of the 'in
itself' since the very idea of it is false, and the Cartesian
or problematic form which simply doubts the existence of
an external 'in itself'. The Critical theory of sensibility
is itself a sufficient refutation of dogmatic idealism. The
Cartesian form Kant finds plausible and worthy of careful
treatment. The lines of his argument are well known: he
shows that the existence of the self, tll0Ught by Descartes
to be privileged, presupposes the existence of an external
transcendent. Knowledge of our existence is possible on
the basis of a permanent object of perception distinct from
the self. The second form of the Kantian reply consists in
limiting the employment of the categories to phenomena,
an employment which is determined by the distinction
between knowing and thinking. The doctrines of sensi-
bility and of understanding, Kant says, converge to a
single point: the necessary limitation of the a priori to
102
THE COMPLETION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
but when his acts are considered outside this temporal con-
ditioning, there is no reason why the causality exercised by
the subject in the order of phenomena should be any longer
physically conditioned. It can be free on condition that
this freedom is not taken to be a knowledge of the essence
of the subject, but simply the voluntary power of determining
the acts of a subject according to ideas.
The deduction of the moral principle is very brief despite
its double character. The principle is a basic undeniable
fact. Now this principle cannot be a fact except on the
condition that the will is supposed to have the power offree
causality. Therefore freedom shares in the factual nature
of the moral principle. However, the recognition offreedom
does not involve any positive determination of a transcendent
subject but is a pure condition of the intelligibility of the
moral act or of practical reason. An object of practical
reason is a representation in so far as it is the effect of a
free causality. But let us be clear about this. To perform
an act is a physical operation: only the willing of an act
can be the effect of this kind of causality. Therefore the
practical object is to will or not to will all act. Now, in
this case good and evil are the only objects of practical
reason, or the orlly practical categories as Kant sometimes
calls them. These categories subject the diversity of our
inclinations or of our desires to the unity of the practical
consciousness governed by the moral principle, and this is
the only deduction which we are capable of giving for it.
The category of the good is a necessary but abstract rule
which must be applied in concreto to sensible mechanical
actions. How is this application to be made? It is a
matter of determining the will to a concrete act made
possible by the rule of the good. We do not seek a schema
which permits the subsumption of a concrete case under
the general law, but rather the schema of the law itself, if
this improper expression may be allowed. The meeting of
the rule of the good and understanding in the practical
conditioning of an act is equivalent to asking the question:
can the maxim which inclines us towards this concrete act
be clothed with the form of a natural law? Natural
law does not determine the will, but, by the form of law
121
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
which it includes, it furnishes the type of judgment which
we direct on the motives of our conduct.
However, the problen1 is more complex. The moral law
is the sole foundation of the apriori detern1ination of the will.
However, this determination is not purely formal, does not
consist solely in conferring the form of a universal constraint
without any reference to matter. We find in ourselves a
collection of inclinations which all manifest the form of
happiness, but in varying degrees. The formal object of
the moral law is the good, wllile that of inclination is happi-
ness. As we belong to both the intelligible and the sensible
worlds, the unity of practical reason depends on the discovery
of a superior principle which goes beyond the regions
of the good and of happiness. This principle is called
the supreme good interpreted in the sense of the complete
good
How is this union of morality and happiness to be
realised? This union would be perfectly intelligible if the
notion of morality coincided with that of happiness or if
there were some synthetic bond between them. Now a
deduction is all the more necessary for the supreme good,
because practical reason seems to engender an internal
rational conflict in consequence of the difficulty of harmonis-
ing these two constituents of the practical order. Their
harmony is not in fact determined either by identity or by
a synthetic bond. Happiness does not determine moral
reason and moral reason does not produce happiness.
Hence the very notion of the supreme good is in doubt
unless we can find a means of overcoming this conflict.
Such a means seems to exist for Kant for, if the judgment
which expresses the subordination of the good to happiness
is false, the judgment which makes happiness depend on
the good is not false in an absolute manner. The autonomy
of the will forbids us to make an immediate synthetic con-
nection between the two constituents of the practical nature
of man. It does allow nevertheless a mediate synthetic
connection, an external connection between them, that is,
a connection which does not arise from the very nature of
man but from the intervention of another being who would
have nature within his power, a being which could be no
122
FfHE COMPLETION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
other than God. Thus morality prepares the way for belief
in the existence of God.
It might be objected that the practical order, by making
a rneta-empirical use of the category of cause, runs counter
to the Critical tendency which so carefully limited that cate-
gory in the theoretical order. In order to maintain the two
Critiques side by side in a unified an.d unique synthesis, it is
necessary to find a satisfactory explanation for the apparent
divergence between their conclusions. Kant was obliged on
more than one occasion in his moral work to furnish this
explanation. It always comes back to a form of the argu-
ment which we have already come across in his writings.
Use of causality in the noumenal or meta-sensible dimension
is, objectively considered, impossible. However, reaSOll has
another task than that of knowing an object: it tends also
to realise objects by the will. A subject which exercises this
causality is a causa noumenon. Thus the concept of such a
cause is not cOlltradictory because the category is a form of
synthetic unity. The objective use of the category is limited
to phenomena but, organically speaking, it is not submitted
to this restriction. Its use may therefore be extended to
noumena 011 condition that there is no question of extend-
ing the boundaries of knowledge. If no attempt is made to
penetrate the essence of the being who exercises this causa-
lity, and if its existence is simply affirmed on the basis of
belief in the reality of a principle of a priori determination
of the will, then no obstacle arises from tIle side of the
theoretical restriction already referred to. The same is true
of the regulative Ideas of reason, freedom, inlmortality, and
the existence of God, although Kant has apparently just
given thenl corresponding objects. However, the postula-
tion of these three Ideas does not imply any intention to
enlarge the field of our knowledge. On the other hand,
while the Ideas were purely regulative for theoretical reason,
they are clearly constitutive of objects in the practical use.
But once again we are not trying to know their objects.
We limit ourselves simply to inquiring whether there are
such objects. Practical reason actually imposes the duty of
replying affirmatively to this question. The refusal to pene-
trate the secret of their essence saves the homogeneity of the
12 3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
double Kantian doctrine. The categories are organically
bound up with knowing and with constructing the world of
phenomena on the basis of given intuitions; in addition
they have the function of enabling us to think the meta-
sensible in so far as it is postulated by practical reason.
The theoretical limitation of reason finds its counterpart in
the practical extension of the saUle reason. This is the real
meaning of the Kantian adage which is so often misunder-
stood: 'the suspension of knowledge is the condition of the
installation of moral faith'. Scientific kno"Vvledge and moral
faith form the two poles of the human spirit.
this must be added the fact that from 1784 to 1790 Kant's
activity was principally concentrated on ethics, on philo-
sophy of history, and on the problems of organic life. These
preoccupations were all converging on the organisation by
a priori principles of the domains of the beautiful and the
organic. All the movements in contemporary cultural life
were uniting to test the strength of tIle Critical philosophy.
A possible explanation of the direction of the Kantian
meditations can be developed along these lines although it
will not of course throw light 011 the details. The state of
our information forbids further speculation.
The Critique of Judgment contains a long introduction
which was substituted for one originally even longer but
condemned for this reason. III it Kant defined exactly
the place which the Critique occupies in the whole scheme
of the Critical synthesis and then described the study of
aesthetic teleology and organic teleology. The introduc-
tion fixes the transcendental framework within which the
various forms of teleology are to be found. Its systematic
importance is therefore of the very first order. We know
that the cognitive power of man is divided between under-
standing which is provided with a priori principles govern-
ing the knowled,ge of objects, reason which is the repository
of principles in the order of the will, and judgment in
con11ectio11 with which the questio11 of a priori principles is
actually being raised. The analogy with the other legis-
lative psychological faculties in the order of knowledge and
in the order of will is to be taken as suggesting that the
same will hold for judgment. However, it is hardly neces-
sary to point out that the difficulties ill this case will be so
considerable that the suggestion will force us to undertake
a transcendental examination of judgment, but does not
guarantee in any way the success of this enterprise. The
analogies just cited include the most important of these
difficulties. Indeed, what will be the specific object of a
third faculty when understanding governs knowledge of
objective causes and reason determines their realisation by
a free causality? Moreover, what connection is there
between judgment, generally defined as the power of think-
ing the individual content under the general, and the faculty
12 7
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
of feeling? These two difficulties must be examined in the
light of the nature of judgment.
Understanding is the concept which comprehends the
general laws which, applied to intuitions, produce the
objective representation of phenomena. Judgment is the
function which subsumes impressions under the laws of
intellect. This function is determinating since the qual~ty
it confers is that of a deternlinate object. In this way
understanding includes general laws. Besides the schematic
figures of general objects which express its identical essence
and fundamental structure, the intuitive world also presents
us with an infinity of diverse objects, of particular forms, of
kinds and individualities. Now this infinite diversity cannot
be explained by the activity of the categories; the theo-
retical criticism had to limit itself to their determination
in experience. There is thus no doubt that the explanation
of nature is not perfect unless the specific diversity is
explained in the same sort of way as the generic identity,
and hence it is legitimate to suppose that the. diversity is
also governed by laws which have so far escaped trans-
cendental investigation.
However, judgment does not have the same role to play
in the present problem. In the theoretical criticism the laws
of subsumption were known a priori and it was the function
ofjudgment to find the intuitive diversity to subsume under
them. Here the specific diversity of nature is known a pos-
teriori and ifj udgment has a role to fulfil, this role will consist
in the detection of laws which will explain the diversity. In
the theoretical ord,er there was pre-knowledge of the general
or of laws, while here there is pre-knowledge of the parti-
cular. Kant entitles such a function ' the reflective use of
judgment '.
However, there must be no mistake about the true object
of this judgment. The particular forms of nature are not
explained by the teleological principle: only mechanical
causality contains this explanation. The purpose of the
principle is to guide the mind in the study of these forms.
The laws which govern the reflective judgment are not laws
constitutive of nature but laws of the faculty of judgment.
Kant explains this directive law as follows: we must assume
128
I THE COMPLETION OF TlIE CRITICAL SYNTlIESIS
137
Chapter IV
THE APOSTATES
cf. La Deduction III, 491-551
The Critical synthesis did not face criticisn1. only from men
like Eberhard, who were rooted in the Wolffian tradition.
Another surprise awaited Kant toward 1790, a surprise
which was to arouse painful echoes in his mind during the
last decade of his life. From the anonymous mass of his
disciples there emerged some outstanding figures who,
despite their admiration for their common n1aster, were
determined to restate the Critical doctrine in an irreproach-
able form. In the pursuit of formal correction, however,
they were unable to avoid making certain doctrinal correc-
tions. Reinhold, Beck, and Fichte are the most noteworthy.
Their bold alterations to the original Critical teaching pro-
duced a number of centrifugal movements. On each
occasion Kant experienced the painful shock of betrayal
and with some bitterness lle watched a wind of apostasy
shake his school.
The attitude of these men towards Kant was not hostile,
for they were his principal lieutenants. Kant had just rU11
up against the heavy opposition of the schools, and the struc-
ture of the Critical philosophy did pres~nt a certain number
of weaknesses which his enemies seized upon. The Kantians
in their turn did not expect the consolidation of the Critical
philosophy to come from the direct refutation of its oppo-
nents, but rather from a clearer focusing of the Critical
philosophy itself. The Critical philosophy, according to the
express desire of the master, was to form a rigorously deduc-
tive and perfectly coherent system. Now, Kant was still of
the opinion that the Critique did not constitute such a system,
but was simply a propaedeutic. This suggested that the
ren1edy for several of the weaknesses was to construct the
complete system of transcendental philosophy. The system-
atic search for the unique principle from which transcen-
dentalism in its entirety would be seen to flow, constitutes
166
THE DEFENCE OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
EPILOGUE
cf. La Deduction III, 552-667
History has rarely seen an old man more studious than Kant.
From 1790 onwards he was constantly engaged in the task of
defending and perfecting his life's work despite the fact that
the end of the eighteenth century was a period of great poli-
tical upheaval. The accession to the throne of Frederick III
had indeed sounded the knell of his predecessor's liberalism.
The consistories were leading a violent counter-offensive
against the liberal peril, and were fighting it both by weeding
out the teaching profession and by a strict control of public
opinion. The crowned heads of all Europe, including
Germany, formed a coalition to protect themselves against
revolutionary expansion and were only too glad to support
the conservative campaign in defence of the spiritual and
political values of the ancien regime. Kant had been. too out-
spoken in the past not to have attracted attention, and, as
one of the spiritual leaders of liberal republicanism, he was
too well known to escape the heavy hand of the reaction.
Right in the centre of this Kulturkampf he was building up,
piece by piece, his doctrine of natural religion, all extra-
ordinarily dangerous doctrine at this moment in history.
His book Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone was a
public confession of deism which the authorities interpreted
at its face value, namely, as a cllallenge to the reactionary
forces in the government. It would really have been
evidence of great naivety on Kant's part if he had shown
any signs of astonishment when the royal thunderbolt
descended upon him in his peaceful retreat on the borders
of Prussia.
This work on religion after all owes its origin and its
strange composition simply to the political circumstances of
the period. However, Kant had a much too systematic
temperament not to seek to integrate it at once with the
(2,491) I 77 13
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
Critical synthesis in the strict sense. To the royal writ
which imposed silence on him in matters of religion, Kant
replied with his Streit der Fakultiiten (Conflict of the Faculties),
in which he clain1ed for philosophers absolute freedom of
thought. At the same time he gave evidence of his coura-
geous loyalty to liberal politics in his brief but extremely
well-known essay On Perpetual Peace, and in his Rechtslehre he
systematised the political philosophy of Frederick II. Mean-
while age began to weigh heavily on his shoulders and in
1796 the moment came for him to resign the teaching post
which he had occupied for about forty-five years. No longer
able to express his thought by word of mouth, he decided
to publish his lecture-courses. He himself undertook to edit
the course on Anthropology, while some friends and col-
leagues were asked to edit his courses on Geography, Logic,
and Pedagogy.
The only works of this period which form part of the
Critical system in the strict sense are the Metaphysics of Morals
(1797) and the Opus Postumum. A metaphysics of morals had
formed part of the original plan from the very beginning,
but the plan had never included the two-part arrangement
which Kant gave to it in 1797. He had th.ought of a meta-
physics of morals but he had had no intention of including
within it a section on natural law. We have l1ad to point
out more than once that after 1787 a different plan was
gradually substituted for the original one. In the inter-
vening years Kant had come to believe that he had furnished
an absolutely complete system of philosophy, in so far as
form is concerned, in the three Critiques, but that the system
was still incomplete from the point of view of its content.
The Metaphysics of Morals undeniably adds to the moral
Critique the matter which was missing from it. However,
the situation with regard to the matter required to complete
tIle theoretical Critique is not so clear. In the Anfangsgriinde
of 1785 Kant had produced not a metaphysics of nature,
but a metaphysics of corporeal nature. He was aware of
this, and for that reason he again promised in 1790 to pro-
duce a general metaphysics of nature. Immediately after
writing the final paragraph of the Critique of Judgment he
turned his thoughts to his metaphysics of morals.. It was
17 8
THE DEFENCE OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
110t the ethical part, but the part dealing with natural law,
and especially the section on the problem of property, which
held up the con1pletion of this work until finally it did
appear in 1797.
Up to this point it may be said then that there are few
difficulties to be solved, but the situation is very different
witl~ regard to the metaphysics of nature. Kant published
110tlling further under this actual title, but fron1 1795 to 1803
he worked ceaselessly on a book about which he himself
expressed very different opinions, calling it his masterpiece
one day and condemning it to the flames on tIle next. In
consequence the book has been even n10re severely judged
by historians. The pile of fragments knowl1 as tIle Opus
Postumum is not made up of a series of ran.dom speculations
attributable to the senility of the master and therefore excus-
able, but is rather the swan-song of a great logician. It is
simply the final stage of the theoretical aspect of the Critical
philosophy which Kant reached in the silence of his old age.
The Opus Postumum would have been a tl~ird edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason if it had been properly edited and
reduced in size. Kant's new preoccupations are announced
for the first time in a letter to Kiesewetter in 1795, but the
text sends us back in all probability to the years 1788 to
1790 as the period in which !(ant discovered the problem
which was to occupy him for the rest of his days. He had
noticed a gap between the metaphysics of nature and physics.
It seems that around 1798 he had made considerable pro-
gress in the task of working out all Ubergang between the
two sciences which would permit their unification. Where
exactly did the gap lie? The theoretical Critique had studied
the general forms of experience but not the particular laws
and still less the infinite variety of particular forn1s to be
found among the things of nature. The Critique of Judgment,
as we have seen, had dealt with this problem. A similar
problem however must be faced in connection with matter;
the Anfangsgrunde is devoted to the general laws of the
behaviour of matter. At the empirical level however there
are further laws and many natural properties to be dis-
covered; matter reveals itself empirically as the source of
the various processes studied by physics. If science is to
179
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT
reflect the systematic unity of nature it must be possible to
construct an a priori science of the particular forms and
properties of nature. This is precisely what Kant set
himself to do in the Ubergang.
At first sight then his intention concerns pure physics.
There is nothing so far to suggest any intention of rewriting
the theoretical Critique or transcendental philosophy. The
fragments of the manuscript however present two groups of
texts; one of these discusses the physical problem, while
the other clearly prepares .a complete transcendental doc-
trine. Furthermore, the two groups give the impression of
having been composed at different times. The two parts
do not interpenetrate but remain simply juxtaposed. With-
out wishing to undertake on my own account any attempt
to date the fragments after the manner of Adickes, it seems
to me beyond doubt that only the physical question inter-
ested Kant between 1790 and 1800 and there is no sign of
any desire to re-examine the Critical philosophy. From
1800 onwards however such a reassessn1ent almost completely
replaces the physical project with which he had started. In
the dozen groups of fragments, tl1erefore, there is no domin-
ating and unifying point of view. Some writers, of whom
Vaihinger is an example, extract from the heterogeneity of
the fragments a proof that Kant really meditated not one
but two distinct works: a physical work and a Critical
work. This does not seem to me to be the case. Indeed
the very text of the fragments of Critical origin reveals how
close were the points of connection between the physical
problem and the Critical problem. The fragments dating
from 179 0 to 1799 (Sections 2 to 3,4,5 to 6, 8 to 9, and 12)
are undoubtedly concerned with the physical problem: the
fragments belonging to 1800 (Sections 10 to I I) do amal-
gamate the deduction of the physical problem with the
Critical process of the transcendental deduction: the frag-
ments belonging to 1800 to 1803 (Sections 7 and I) are of
a frankly epistemological nature. While all this is true, the
conclusion nevertheless seems to be that Kant envisaged
only one work which was to have been devoted to the
problem of the Ubergang. The solution of the problem
embodied a serious attempt to make use of Critical
180
THE DEFENCE OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS
Ig8
Index of Proper Names
Abicht 152 Hegel 36, 1 I I
Adickes 20, 25, 44, 67, 68, 77, 81, Heinze 62, 66
180, 187, I8g, IgO, 191 Herder 27, 39, 46
Aristotle 61, 76 Herz 27, 58, 62, 65
Hurne 2, 12, 28, 3 1, 3 2 , 35, 40,
Baumgarten 1 I 4 2 , 43, 60, 64, 6g, 76, 9 2 , 139,
Bayle 13, 50 14°
Beck 157-60, 166, 168-73, Ig6 Hutcheson 43
Beguelin 7, 12, 28, 35, 47 Huyghens 5
Berkeley 13, go, 92, 102, log
Biester gl Jacobi 167
Bilfinger I I
Boerhaave 6 Kaestner 47
Boscovitch IS, 14, 47 Keill 12
Bradley 17 Kiesewetter 179
Brastberger 140 Knutzen 14-17, 19
Burke 43
Lambert I I, 12, 27, 28, 35, 38, 45,
Cassirer 42, 44 4 6 , 57, 90
Clarke 7, 13, 50 Laplace 20
Collier 13 Leibniz 4, 6, 7, g, la, 13, 15, 19, 20,
Crusius I I, 12, 22-4, 26, 28, 3 I, 32, 21, 24-6 , 28, 3 2, 45, 46, 4 8, 50, 52,
35, 40, 42, 59 53, 77, 140, 14 1-5 1 , 155, 165
Cudworth 13 Lindner 39
Locke 6, 72 , 77, 139
d'Alembert 11,12, Ig, 28
de Maupertuis I I, 12, 28, 47 Maas 141
Descartes I, 4-6, 20, 24, 34, 36, 102 Maimon 139, 157, 168, 173
Malebranche 4, 6, 13
Eberhard 92, 125, 140-51, 154, 166 Marquardt 15
Erdmann 60
l\1eier I I
Euler 7, 14, 28, 47, 48
Mendelssohn I I, 27, 4 1 , 47, 57, 90,
Feder 90, 9 1, 92, 101, 103 92, 1°3
Fichte 112, 160, 166, 167, 172-6, More. 13
18 7, 195, Ig6 Mussenbroek 6
Fischer 38, 106
Newton 5-8, II, 13, 14, 20, 21, 25,
Formey 43
Foucher 14, 15 26, 28, 29, 3 1, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42,
Frederick the Great 9 4 8 , 51, 55
Frederick III 177 Paulsen 60
Garve 49, 90, gl, 101, 103 Platner 139
Gottschedt 15 Plouquet 13, 14, 47
Politz 62
Haering 70 Pope 17
Hamann 68 Pyrrhonism 100, 161
199
INDEX
Raspe 45 '8 Gravesande 6
Reicke 17, 68, 195 Shaftesbury 43
Reinhold 91, 125, 126, 140 , 143, Spinoza 4
152, 166-9, 172-4 Sulzer 12, 57, 90
Reuss 15 Swedenborg 38
Riehl 60
Rink 152 Tetens 69, 85-8
Rousseau 28, 39, 40, 43 Tieftrunk I 72
Royal Society of London 6
Rudiger 12
Ulrich 92, 93, 98, 103, 140
Schelling 173
Schlettwein 173 Vaihinger 180, 196
Schopenhauer 91, 106
Schultze 14, 15, 9 1, 139, 140, 157, Windelband 45
168, 172, 174 Wolff 9, 10-14, 15, 22, 26, 28, 29,
Schutz 9 1 , 92, 143 33, 14 1
Schwab 152, 195 Wright 17, 20
200