SELVAM VENGADASON v.
PP The Court of Appeal had the occasion to consider the effect of sections 282 and 292 of
HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM
FACTS (Sessions Court)
In the Sessions Court the respondent pleaded guilty to a charge under section 392 read with section
397 of the Penal Code for committing robbery armed with a pistol. He was sentenced to six years’
imprisonment to run from the date of sentence and two strokes of rattan. About a week earlier the
respondent was convicted of a similar offence and was ordered to serve ten years’ imprisonment
with effect from 30.8.2017 and one stroke of rattan. The SCJ ordered the six years imprisonment
to run concurrently with he ten years imrpisonment.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The prosecution filed an appeal based on the following grounds:
i. The sentence is manifestly inadequate in view of the seriousness of the charge and
does not reflect the element of public interest;
ii. The learned SCJ failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the rampancy of
the same;
iii. The sentence ought to run consecutively after the current sentence which the
appellant is serving;
iv. The sentence does not have any deterrent effect on the appellant and would-be
offenders.
JUDICIAL REVIEW (High Court)
 The offence of armed robbery carries a maximum term of fourteen years’ imprisonment
and shall be liable to be whipped. The previous conviction( bearing 10 years
imprisonment & 1 stroke of rattan) and current conviction are separate and distinct
offence and were not committed in the same transaction. The learned SCJ however, did
not order a consecutive sentence as she was of the view that the six years’ imprisonment
imposed was almost half of the maximum term of imprisonment and that was sufficient.
 Section 292(1) CPC:
“When a person who is an escaped convict or is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment
is sentenced to imprisonment, such imprisonment shall commence either immediately or
at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, as the
Court awarding the sentence may direct.”
the CPC in Saizaitumuhiddin Bin Abd Rashid v. Public Prosecutor [2014] held as
follow:
The principles governing the imposition of concurrent or consecutive sentences have
been succinctly stated by this Court in the case of Bachik Abdul Rahman v. Public
Prosecutor [2004]:
 Ooi Sim Yim v. Public Prosecutor [1990]: The combined effect of s. 282 and
s. 292 is that unless the court imposing a sentence says anything to the
contrary, the sentence runs from the date on which it was passed.
 R v. Saleem [1964]; R v. Walsh [1965]: The exercise of the discretion to
determine the date of commencement of the sentence of imprisonment is
dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. In deciding whether the
terms of imprisonment should be consecutive or commence at another date,
the court will be guided by the one transaction rule and the totality principle.
Pursuant to the one transaction rule where two or more offences are committed
in the course of a single transaction, all sentences in respect of these offences
should be concurrent rather than consecutive. For there to be one transaction
four elements must be present, that is to say, proximity of time, proximity of
place, continuity of action and continuity of purpose or design (Jayaraman &
Ors v PP [1979]).
However, in the instant case, there was clear misdirection on the order to run the
sentence concurrently because both the offences differed in time and place. In
principle, such offences should be sentenced separately. Thus, in our judgment the
concurrent sentences of imprisonment imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge
was wrong when the offence committed by the accused failed to satisfy the test of
proximity of time, place and continuity of action, purpose and design.
HELD
I find that the learned SCJ had misdirected herself in failing to consider the
provisions of sections 282 and 292 of the CPC and also the sentence imposed did
not reflect the principles of sentencing which she discussed in her judgment.
Therefore, I allow the appeal by the Public Prosecutor and enhance the sentence of
six years to ten years’ imprisonment and to take effect after the appellant has served
his sentence in the other case.