SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149375. November 26, 2002.]

MARVIN MERCADO , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,

respondent.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Accused assailed his conviction for carnapping and argued that the CA, having
increased the penalty imposed by the trial court to a prison term of seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certi ed the case to the Supreme
Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the
last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Court. aEcTDI

The Supreme-Court agreed with the CA in ruling than the provision of Sec. 13, Rule
124 relied upon by the accused was applicable only when the penalty imposed was
reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at least
reclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the CA on the accused was in accordance with
Sec. 14 of RA 6538, which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13,
Rule 124. Generally, special laws such as RA 6538 ( The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 )
provide their own speci c penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not
taken from nor refer to those in the Revised Penal Code. Finally, the Court held that whether
or not the accused was motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the vehicle is a factual
issue which may not be entertained in this appeal.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES; SPECIAL LAWS PROVIDE THEIR OWN SPECIFIC

PENALTIES FOR OFFENSES THEY PUNISH, WHICH ARE NOT TAKEN FROM NOR
REFERRED TO THOSE IN REVISED PENAL CODE; CASE AT BAR. — The crime committed by
petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a
special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise speci ed, if the
special penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for
in The Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only to the penalties imposed by the
Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special penal laws. This is because generally, special
laws provide their own speci c penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are
not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code. The penalty of fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the medium
period of reclusion temporal. However, such technical term under The Revised Penal Code
is not similarly used or applied to the penalty for carnapping. Also, the penalty for
carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of violence against or intimidation of
any person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty
(30) years, does not correspond to that in The Revised Penal Code. But it is different when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
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 the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion perpetua
to death.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; DIRECT CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL BY COURT
OF APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT, WHEN PROPER. — Where the Court of Appeals nds
that the imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion
perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty, refrain from
entering judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire records to this Court for
review. This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal
cases between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire
jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of
Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case. On
the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua,
a review of the case may be had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
where only errors or questions of law may be raised.
3. ID.; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL
COURT, WHEN AFFIRMED BY COURT OF APPEALS, BINDING ON SUPREME COURT; CASE
AT BAR. — Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for review on
certiorari where only questions of law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue
before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not be
entertained in this appeal. Besides, ndings of fact of the trial court, when a rmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule may be disregarded only
when the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the ndings and
conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. But there is
no ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all over
again the evidence adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case the ndings of
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely coincide. SaDICE

DECISION

BELLOSILLO , J : p

MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques
and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-accused were sentenced to
a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. 1
The case before us concerns only the petition for review of accused Marvin
Mercado where he assails his conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals having
increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certi ed the case to this Court as the
penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph
of Sec. 13, Rule 124, 2 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when the
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 penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e., the
penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate court
on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538, 3 which is not
considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124. 4
The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v. Omotoy 5 where
the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to
reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote 16 of
the decision, it was observed —
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision mayor in its
maximum period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually,
the appeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this
Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where "the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher" (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the
penalty is at least reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special offenses).
The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay the disposition of the case. It is of
slight nature, the penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on
the accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.

Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering that the penalty
imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-
year period falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible
penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-year period for
reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of
The Revised Penal Code. 6
More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA
6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised
Penal Code. Unless otherwise speci ed, if the special penal law imposes such penalty, it is
error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code since those terms
apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special
penal laws. 7 This is because generally, special laws provide their own speci c penalties
for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The
Revised Penal Code. 8
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is essentially
within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such technical term
und er The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to the penalty for
carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of
violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does not correspond to that in The Revised
Penal Code. 9 But it is different when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since
this is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. 10
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of ". . . imprisonment of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR
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 (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum." 11 For these reasons the use of the term
reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no
basis for the trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day
since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months.
We see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote i n Omotoy 12 to
a rm the conviction of the accused. The substance of the Footnote may not be the ratio
decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an important part of the decision since it
enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule is stated
in a Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant case since the
former involves an appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the
case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. As enunciated in
Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine is the Constitution
itself which empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or a rm on appeal, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, nal judgments of lower courts in all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. 13
Where the Court of Appeals nds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case
brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it
should impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case and
elevate the entire records to this Court for review. 14 This will obviate the unnecessary,
pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between this Court and the Court of
Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very
inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the
exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case. 15
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion
perpetua, a review of the case may be had only by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 16 where only errors or questions of law may be raised. TADaES

Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether there was indeed a
violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue is factual, as we shall find hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu Trooper
in front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle
was owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their
joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere to be found prompting
Bhagwani to report its disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-Carnapping
(ANCAR) Division which immediately issued an Alarm Sheet. 17
On 31 May 1996 Bhagwani's neighbor, reman Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he
learned from his daughter, a common-law wife of accused Michael Cummins, that the
accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins himself
stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarez's daughter however refused to issue any statement
regarding the incident. 18
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 "Miling" Flores brought to his house Michael
Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining witness
Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and Flores admitted that they
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 took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and Baguio. 19 They claimed
however that it was with the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on the
night they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing to Laguna. But
when Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if they could borrow the Isuzu Trooper.
Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even turned over the keys to them. 20
Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in the house of SPO3
"Miling" Flores but his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime. 21
The Court of Appeals a rmed their conviction but increased the penalty imposed
on the four (4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years. 22
Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun rather than theft in
taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely took the vehicle for a joyride with no
intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves, according to petitioner, they would have
sold the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio. 23
Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for review on certiorari
where only questions of law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue before us
being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not be entertained in this
appeal. Besides, ndings of fact of the trial court, when a rmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding upon the Supreme Court. 24 This rule may be disregarded only when the
ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the ndings and conclusions of the
trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. But there is no ground to apply
this exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all over again the evidence
adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case the ndings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals completely coincide. 2 5
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its imposition of the penalty.
Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The evidence in this
case shows that the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access
to it, thus demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle; nonetheless, we believe
that this does not merit the imposition of the full penalty. With the application of The
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an
indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22)
years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the Motion and
Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to an indeterminate prison term of
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years. No costs. ASDTEa

SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Decision penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., RTC-Br. 138, Makati City; Original Records,
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 pp. 160-172; CA Rollo, pp. 32-45.

2. Sec. 13. Quorum of the court; certification of appeal of cases to Supreme Court. — . .
. Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the
evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall
refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire
record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.

3. Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall irrespective of the value of the motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof (as amended by RA 7659).
4. Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 7 August 2001 penned by Justice Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr., and concurred in by Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Alicia L. Santos,
Former Fifth Division; CA Rollo, pp. 342-343; Rollo, pp. 111-112.
5. G.R. No. 112719, 29 January 1997, 267 SCRA 143, 152.

6. People v. Quitorio, G.R. No. 116765, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 196, 219.
7. People v. Canoy and Gabucan, 92 Phil. 1076 (1953).
8. People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 573.
9. Id., p. 576.
10. See Note 3.

11. Original Records, p. 303; CA Rollo, p. 44.

12. See Note 5.
13. Sec. 5, par. (d), 1987 Constitution.
14. Last paragraph, Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; see Note 2.

15. People v. Daniel, No. L-40330, 20 November 1978, 86 SCRA 511, 540, reiterated in
People v. Ramos, No. L-49818, 20 February 1979, 86 SCRA 511; People v. Traya, No. L-
48065, 30 March 1979, 89 SCRA 274; and People v. Centeno, et al., No. L-48744, 30
October 1981, 108 SCRA 710.
16. Id., Sec. 3 (e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure: "Except as provided in
the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall
be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45."

17. TSN, 22 October 1996, pp. 10-24.

18. Id., pp. 35-43.

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 19. Id., pp. 47-65.
20. TSN, 10 June 1997, pp. 4-13; 14 July 1997, p. 2; 17 July 1997, pp. 6-8; 29 July 1997, pp.
6-9.

21. Id., pp. 62-63.

22. See Notes 1 and 4.
23. Rollo, pp. 158-159.
24. Gloria Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, 20 March 2002.
25. Ibid.

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