NATURAL LAW

INTRODUCTION TO LAW

RATIO DECIDENDI

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149375. November 26, 2002]

MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was charged
with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-
accused were sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The case before us concerns only the petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his conviction, and
arguing that the Court of Appeals having increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this Court as the penalty
of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court of Appeals.

In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied
upon by petitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single
indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate court
on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538, which is not considered reclusion perpetua for
purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.

The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v. Omotoy where the Regional Trial Court found the
accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum,
as minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it
was observed -

The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved,
albeit joined to prision mayor in its maximum period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the
appeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains appeals in criminal cases
only where “the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher” (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penalty
is at least reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay
the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the
accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.

Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is
applicable to the instant case considering that the penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless
is a single indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-year period for reclusion
perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code.

More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law
imposes such penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code since those terms
apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special penal laws. This is because
generally, special laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken
from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code.

The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the medium
period of reclusion temporal. However, such technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied
to the penalty for carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of violence
against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30)
years, does not correspond to that in The Revised Penal Code. But it is different when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since this is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death.

Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of “x x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum.” For these
reasons the use of the term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no
basis for the trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum
penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

We see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in Omotoy to affirm the conviction of the accused. The
substance of the Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an important part of the
decision since it enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule is stated in a
Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style.

It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant case since the former involves an appeal from the
Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine is the Constitution itself which empowers this Court
to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of
lower courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least
reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment
thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire records to this Court for review. This will obviate the unnecessary,
pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this
Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals
which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may
be had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only errors or questions of law may be raised.

Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether there was indeed a violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act.
This issue is factual, as we shall find hereunder.

In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-B
Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as a
service vehicle in their joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani
to report its disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately
issued an Alarm Sheet.

On 31 May 1996 Bhagwani’s neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from his daughter, a common-
law wife of accused Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael
Cummins himself stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarez’s daughter however refused to issue any statement regarding the
incident.

In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 “Miling” Flores brought to his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile
Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining witness Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and
Flores admitted that they took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and Baguio. They claimed however
that it was with the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night they took the vehicle, they
invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if they
could borrow the Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even turned over the keys to them.

Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 “Miling” Flores but his co-accused
narrated his participation in the crime.

The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the penalty imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
as maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.

Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that
they merely took the vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves, according to
petitioner, they would have sold the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.

Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law, and
not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may
not be entertained in this appeal. Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. But there is
no ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all over again the evidence adduced by
the parties particularly where as in this case the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.

However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the
penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The evidence in this case
shows that the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it, thus demonstrating that force
was used upon the vehicle; nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the imposition of the full penalty. With the
application of The Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an indeterminate prison
term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the Motion and Manifestation of petitioner Marvin
Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to an
indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Decision penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., RTC-Br. 138, Makati City; Original Records, pp. 160-172; CA Rollo, pp. 32-45.
Sec. 13. Quorum of the court; certification of appeal of cases to Supreme Court. -x x x Whenever the Court of Appeals
finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after
discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and
forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of
this Act, shall irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof (as amended by RA 7659).

Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 7 August 2001 penned by Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., and concurred in by
Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Alicia L. Santos, Former Fifth Division; CA Rollo, pp. 342-343; Rollo, pp. 111-112.

G.R. No. 112719, 29 January 1997, 267 SCRA 143, 152.

People v. Quitorio, G.R. No. 116765, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 196, 219.

People v. Canoy and Gabucan, 92 Phil 1076 (1953).

People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 573.

Id., p. 576.

See Note 3.

Original Records, p. 303; CA Rollo, p. 44.

See Note 5.

Sec. 5, par. (d), 1987 Constitution.

Last paragraph, Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; see Note 2.

People v. Daniel, No. L-40330, 20 November 1978, 86 SCRA 511, 540, reiterated in People v. Ramos, No. L-49818, 20
February 1979, 86 SCRA 511; People v. Traya, No. L-48065, 30 March 1979, 89 SCRA 274; and People v. Centeno, et al.,
No. L-48744, 30 October 1981, 108 SCRA 710.

Id., Sec. 3 (e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure: “Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13,
Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.”

TSN, 22 October 1996, pp. 10-24.

Id., pp. 35-43.

Id., pp. 47-65.

TSN, 10 June 1997, pp. 4-13; 14 July 1997, p. 2; 17 July 1997, pp. 6-8; 29 July 1997, pp. 6-9.
Id., pp. 62-63.

See Notes 1 and 4.

Rollo, pp. 158-159.

Gloria Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, 20 March 2002.

Ibid.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY* and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge,
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:

Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue in this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabel’s petition for appointment
as administratrix of her grandmother’s estate by virtue of her right of representation.

The suit stemmed from the following:

On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married
in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel
Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962,
Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio
Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging
her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their
mother. The suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180.

On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is
hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by
the records that the question of the case and custody of the three children have been the subject of another case
between the same parties in another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated
in this case.

“With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third party defendants are willing to pay
P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for
P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay attorney’s fees in the
amount of P5,000.00.
“SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

“From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the
time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be
under observation and treatment.

“It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiff’s mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had
made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually
placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains
bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

“There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiff’s
mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code
which provides:

“Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:

“xxx xxx xxx

“(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife.

“There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of the plaintiff; and
there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to
the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy that in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic). (emphasis supplied)

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is
respondent Isabel’s paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.

Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay which case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her
petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she
be appointed as administratrix of the estate.

On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he
has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the
Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special
proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedent’s
estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to
succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent
Isabel’s father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage
of the respondent Isabel’s parents is “null and void,” the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the
estate of her paternal grandmother – the decedent. On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order
denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order
dated January 9, 1998, petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion
for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents “null and void” must be upheld; and (d) said decision had
long become final and had, in fact, been executed.

On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioner’s motion to dismiss was late having been filed after the
opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his
opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabel’s allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedent’s son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision
and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of
marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing a marriage “voidable” otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly,
that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is “voidable.”

The petition must fail.

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.

A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder. To with:

“The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that
a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as
distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and the
petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a
vital interest in the maintenance of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs
qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.

“xxx xxx xxx

“The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file ad maintain this special
proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body of the decision determines the nature of the action which is for
annulment, not declaration of nullity.

“The oppositor’s contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex “A” – Motion) prevails over the body
thereof is not of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of
interpretation or construction.

“Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be referred to for purposes of
construing the judgement” (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason
is that the dispositive portion must find support from the decision’s ratio decidendi.

“Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex “A” of oppositor’s motion, the
marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil
Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable
marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.).”
The trial court correctly ruled that “a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate.” The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.” The Rules do not
only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
therein provided for.

Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss
filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed
“within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint.” Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or
before the filing of petitioner’s opposition. which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.

Not only was petitioner’s motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after respondent Isabel was
already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The
filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but also dilatory.

The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on this matter, as
petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict
between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the
decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents is
clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code.

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that the
marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents is “null and void” and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the
marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage is illegitimate. Such argument cannot be
sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates
the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special
contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage
from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article 89 which provides that:

“Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction.” (Emphasis supplied)

Stated otherwise, the annulment of “the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by
the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its
continuance.”

Indeed, the terms “annul” and “null and void” have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to
reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas
null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it
subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage,
the court simply declares a status condition which already exists from the very beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which must control as
to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents was void or voidable. Such argument springs from a
miscomprehension of the judgment of the Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict
between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion.

Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in
the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the
questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat
confusing, the same is not without qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final
decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction – which usually is “the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is
not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is based.”

Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must be
made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the
court. In Republic v. delos Angeles the Court said:

“Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that ‘[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.’ This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any
less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.

“x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into
harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part
if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law.
(49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864” [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is
voidable:

“It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiff’s mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had
made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually
placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, he remains
bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

“There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiff’s
mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code
which provides:

“Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

“(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;

xxx xxx xxx

“There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and
there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to
the finding of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic).”
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents based on
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore
governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the
rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3,
1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate
grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation in the estate of their
grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother.
This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether Letters of Administration may be
granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities involved over the
decedent’s estate.

It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro,
emphasized to “all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised in
the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision
becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the
directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be
spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

* Should read Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay.

Allegedly for parricide.

Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City.

Decision dated October 3, 1967 of the CFI of Rizal penned by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, p. 3; Annex “A” of Petition;
Rollo, pp. 37-41.

Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 39-41.

Ibid.

Annex “I” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 111-119.

Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78.

Annex “I”, Petition.

Annex “J”, Petition; Rollo, pp. 116-118.

Motion to Dismiss, Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-36.

Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos Bulacan, Branch 78; Annex “D” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.

Order of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 – Annex “H” of the Petition; Rollo, p. 110.
 Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617 (1996).

Zarate, Jr., v. Olegario, 263 SCRA 1 (1996).

Annex “D”, Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.

Rules 1&3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

February 7, 1996.

Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by male and female respectively, even with the
consent of the parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of killing of the spouse of either of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in Article 82. (n)
Article 81. Marriage between the following are incestuous and void from their performance, whether the relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate;
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether in the full or half blood;
(3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth degree. (28a)
Article 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;
(2) Between adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former,
and between the former and the surviving spouse of the latter.
(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a)
Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouses of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.(29a)

Article 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of the
husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n)

Article 85 of the New Civil Code reads:

“A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was between the ages of sixteen and
twenty years, if male, or between the ages of fourteen to eighteen years, if female, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having authority over the party, unless after
attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in
fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other
husband or wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation, unless the violence or threat having
disappeared, such party, afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(5) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation, unless the violence or threat having
disappeared, such party, afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(6) That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and
such incapacity continues, and appear to be incurable.

Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.

xxx xxx xxx.

See Tolentino, New Civil Code, Vol. I, pp. 244-245.

Sy Loc Lieng, et al., v. Sy Quia, et al., 16 Phil. 137 (1910).

Nuguid v. Nuguid, 123 Phil. 1305 (1966).

Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 (1964).

Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading Corporation, 29 SCRA 397 (1969).

41 SCRA 422 (1971).

Decision, Annex “A”, Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.

Padua v. Robles, 66 SCRA 485 (1975).