Olivier D’Jeranian Relativity in Ancient Philosophy

Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne Durham, 20-22th, April 2016

The problematic status of the Stoic fourth category : the “πρός τι πῶς ἔχον”

Thinking the Relative disposition from its significance for ethics

First, I would like to thank Doctor Matthew Duncombe for this conference on "relativity",
to which I am extremly pleased and glad to participate.
Today, my task will be a bit ambitious. I’ll try to clarify the status of the stoic relative
disposition, linking the ontological and the moral aspects, trying to enlighten the ethics developed
by the Roman Stoics with the fourth category conceived by the Hellenistic Stoics: the πρός τι πῶς
ἔχον. If the importance of the relation with others in the Stoic’s imperial ethics is no longer in
doubt, we still have to find out wether this relation could ground itself on the ontology developed
by the Stoics of the Hellenistic period. More simply, I will ask myself if the Stoics were able to
think the status of relation on an ontological level as the foundation of morality, giving it a ground
on the analysis of the body as a “being”. If there is nothing there to prove this hypothesis directly,
it will have at least the merit to reassess the interpretation made by the scholars and commentators
(from Simplicius onwards) in the fourth category, questioning its presence and function.

The relation : ontological level

The Stoics are known for having developed a special materialism called “corporeism”, in
order to distinguish it from classic atomism. For them, indeed, only the body (σώματα) exists,
they are “being” (ὄντα)1, as for the incorporeals (ἀσώματα : time, space, sayable) they do not
exist (μὴ ὄντα)2 in the true sense of the term, altough they are “something”. Thus, the Stoics have
added a theory of supreme genre (γενικώτατον)3, called by the French scholars “tinologie” which
is the “something” (τί)4, genre whose bodies and incorporeals would be species. Finally, they
would have completed their ontology by the theory of “categories”, which would serve as an
analysis inspired by Aristotle as a generic quadripartition (according to one interpretation of
Plotinus)5 : substance / οὐσία, or rather, substrate / ὑποκείμενον, quality / ποιόν, disposition /
somehow disposed (πῶς ἔχον), and relative disposition / somehow disposed in relation to
something (πρός τι πῶς ἔχον)6.
Today, I shall particularly focus on the categories, starting by defining each of them
(following the definitions reported by the ancient commentators), although some scholars have

1
Cf. Plut., Not. Comm. 1073E4 (= SVF II, 525) : « ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα ». ; Plot., Enn. VI, 1, 28, 6-7 (= SVF
II, 319) : « Τὰ γὰρ σώματα νομίσαντες [sic. The Stoics] εἶναι τὰ ὄντα » ; Alexand. Aphr. In arist. Cat., 301, 22 (=
SVF II, 329 = LS 27 B) : « ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι [sic. The Stoics] νομοθετήσαντες αὑτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων ».
2
See for example Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. X, 218 (= SVF II, 331).
3
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Hyp. II, 86-87. Sextus use this term for the τί although, in Adv. Math. VIII, 32, ss., it is
strangely used for « τὸ ὂν » (i. e. for the body, only « being ») : « Τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ γενικωτάτου τοῦ
ὄντος ἐπάγουσιν ἀπορίαν. ».
4
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., X, 234 (= Adv. Phys. II, 234).
5
This idea is attribuated to Plotin., Enn. VI, 1, 25 (= SVF II, 371) ; cf. Simpl., In Arist. Cat., 66, 32-67, 2 (= SVF II,
369 ; = LS 27 F) ; f 42 E (= SVF II, 403) ; Plut., Not. Comm. 1083A-1084A (= LS 28 A) ; Plut., Stoic. Rep., 43 (SVF II
49).
6
See Jacques Brunschwig, (2003), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood, page 228, Cambridge
University Press: « I am a certain lump of matter, and thereby a substance, an existent something (and thus far that is
all); I am a man, and this individual man that I am, and thereby qualified by a common quality and a peculiar one; I
am sitting or standing, disposed in a certain way; I am the father of my children, the fellow citizen of my fellow
citizens, disposed in a certain way in relation to something else. »

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Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne Durham, 20-22th, April 2016

doubted the existence of Stoic “categories”7. Furthermore, the categories clearly divided scholars,
between those who think that the first two groups relate to the body (i.e. substance and quality),
the second two groups relating to the incorporeal (i.e. absolute and relative dispositions)8.
We can say the following things about the categories, according to the Ancient reports:
1) Substance (οὐσία-ὑποκείμενον) is, according to Zeno, the “raw material” (“Οὐσίαν
δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην”)9. It is “unqualified” (ἄποιος) without definite
form, but it is eternal and incorruptible, it is the “substrate” in the Aristotelian sense of the term. It
is limited, though an entirely passive body too, because it has no dynamism but is totally pervaded
by God, as an active pneuma10.
2) Quality (ποιόν) has a corporeal nature11. A piece of metal, for example, can not “be”
without being solid12. First qualities act or react with each other13. The “qualified” is therefore a
substance designed to have a quality, its counterpart would be a “qualified person” (the phonesis
for the phronimos, for example).
3) The “disposition” / or to be “somehow disposed” / (πῶς ἔχον) in its current form, is a
disposition of the “being in a place” type, affects something already qualified – in contrast to the
“quality”, which differentiates a substrate.
4) Finally, the “relative disposition” / or to be somehow disposed in relation to something
(πρός τι πῶς ἔχον) does not affect the intrinsic differentiation but the relations between different
objects, either on correlative manner (relative that can be reversed – left-right), or irreversible (as a
son in regard to his father)14.
By following the scholars who interpret the categories as the quadripartition analysis of the
only “existing”, that is to say, the body15, and not following those that divide them into categories
related to body (categories 1 and 2) and incorporeal (categories 3 and 4), I will make the
assumption that the first two types refer to being16 - while the last two (πῶς ἔχον and πρός τι πῶς
ἔχον) designate incorporeal modality but only towards body they express (in a near Spinozist
sense)17 – see Brunschwig [Text 1].

7
Polhenz [1959] pp. 129 sqq. note 1 ; Gould [1970], p. 107 ; Sandbach [1985], p. 40 ; Mates [1953], p. 18. As remarks
Long and Sedley, LS [2001], p. 23, genres “have never called by that name [categories] in ancient sources, but they
are treated explicitly as passing through the most basic categorical division which was in favor in the antiquity, that
between 'per se' and 'relative' (the 'relative' is cut in half and split between the second and fourth Stoic genera).”
8
Scholars who think that the two first category are body and two last category are incorporeals : Bréhier [1971], p.
133 ; Robin [1948], (« L’Evolution de l’Humanité » XIII), pp. 414-5 – scholars who thinks that the four category are
bodies only : Pasquino [1978], pp. 375-86 ; Rieth [1933], p. 90 ; Goldschmidt [1953], p. 21 note 5 ; Hadot [1968], vol.
I, p. 161, note 1 ; Long et Sedley [1987] vol. I, pp. 163-6.
9
Stob., Ecl., I, 11, 5a, p. 187 = SVF I, 87 ; II, 317.
10
According to Rist, Rist [1971], pp. 40-42 sqq., the ὑποκείμενον, as designated by the broadest category, amounts
simply to ὂν in general.
11
Cf. Plut., Comm. Not. 1085E = SVF I, 380.
12
Cf. Plut., Stoic. repugn. 43, 1053F = SVF II, 449. Each body therefore has a first quality, the first four being : the
cold for air, heat for fire, drought to earth and moisture for water – see Galen. In Hipp. de nat hom., lib I, vol. XV, p.
30K = SVF II, 409.
13
Cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. 271, 20-22 = SVF II, 383 = LS 28 K ; et 217, 32-218, 1 = SVF II, 389 = LS 28 L).
14
Cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. f 42 E = SVF II, 403.
15
As Pasquino suggests [1978], pp. 375-86 ; Rieth [1933], p. 90 ; Goldschmidt [1953], p. 21 n. 5 ; Hadot [1968], p.
161, n. 1 ; Long et Sedley [1987] vol. I, pp. 163-6. See Menn [1999] too : according to him, the first two categories,
substance and quality, were recognized by Zeno. The fourth category somehow disposed in relation to something
seems to have been developed by the time of Aristo. The third category, somehow disposed is first seen in Chrysippus.
16
The material is corporeal as it is the passive principle, and the quality is corporeal as it is the active principle. Cf.
Simplicius, in Arist. Cat. f 69Γ (SVF II, 383) ; Plut., Comm. Not. 1085e (SVF II, 380).
17
Goldschmidt [1953] n. 5, p. 21 : « il n’est nullement contradictoire que, d’une part, les manières d’être soient
incorporelles (sans grossir pour autant la liste des incorporels, où, du point de vue, non plus de la physique, mais de la
logique, elles pouvaient être comptées parmi les exprimables) ; et que, d’autre part, les recherches sur les incorporels
aient été obligées d’employer des termes tels que ‘qualité’ […] ou ‘essence’ […], sans que pour autant les catégories
cessassent de se rapporter seulement à des êtres. Car ce qui tombe sous les deux dernières catégories est bien

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The ironic statement made by Plutarch is at least interesting, because it reminds us that the
last two relative modality must be thought in relation to specific individuals:

[Text 2] “I will make their [i.e. the Stoics] argument easier : because they create four substrates for each of us, they
multiply each of us by four.”18

This suggests that the individual is, for the Stoics, definable by his disposition, the one he
holds by himself (πῶς ἔχον) or in relation to other beings (πρός τι πῶς ἔχον). Now, these
“dispositions” (as phronesis), are not pure incorporeal in addition to the famous list of
incorporeal19, but on the contrary, the body-causes, like qualities are (or “qualified substrates”),
and their effects (the fact to act or walk phronimôs) are intangible in that they “do not exist” but
“subsist” and that precisely because they are inseparable from the qualified substance they
express.
Time does not allow me here to address here the problems inherent to the status of πῶς
ἔχον, and the problem of existence and subsistence. I will make my remarks particularly on the
category of relative disposition, the “πρός τι πῶς ἔχον”.
While it is true that the status of the relationship between the Stoic categories is not
unanimous among commentators20, the fourth category appears to give precise indications as to
what it means to “exist” for a “being”. Apparently, the Stoics think the existence for a body as a
disposition (πῶς ἔχον), but also as a relational disposition (πρός τι πῶς ἔχον)21. This point
appears to be fundamental to the ethics of the Stoics, especially for the imperial period, deeply
concerned about dealing with others. Then, the fourth category, of relative disposition, provides
additional information about the space-time description provided by the third category22. We can
also say that the fourth category completes, by determination’s growth, the three previous
categories23. In this communication I will go further and assume that the fourth category adds a
decisive element for understanding the existence of the individual, implying his basic (and
therefore moral) responsibility, through the interactions with others.
In this sense, the real interest of the πρός τι πῶς ἔχον must be the understanding of a
“being” thought by the mean of the presence of another “being”, understanding that it gives the
analysis an extra determination, which we might almost call “existential”. In other words, it is
because they are related to other beings that beings “exist” as practical individuals, and it is
precisely these relations that express their essential qualities and give real meaning to their
disposition. The πρός τι πῶς ἔχον indicates that bodies are located in the cosmos and connected
to other beings-body, those existential relations letting us the possibility to define their “roles”24,
one of the most important theme for Stoic ethics.
The reference text for the Stoic relative disposition – πρός τι πῶς ἔχον – is found in
Simplicius’s work on Aristotle’s categories :

incorporel, mais ce sont les manières d’être des corps ; alors que les incorporels proprement dits, le temps, par
exemple, et le vide, n’ont initialement aucun support corporel ; ils sont, si l’on peut dire, irréels ‘par essence’ ». Long
and Sedley (op. cit., p. 23) holds with Simplicius (In Ar. Cat. 217, 32-218, 1 = SVF II, 389 = LS 28 L) that the scheme
of genre could have been conceived in order to being applied for the incorporeals too, even if we don’t have any proof
of it.
18
Plut., Comm. Not. 1083E (= LS 28 A6) : « ἁπλούστερον δὲ ποιοῦμαι τὸν λόγον· ἐπεὶ τέσσαρά γε ποιοῦσιν
ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέσσαρ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν. »
19
The list is, indeed, closed by Sextus, to four incorporeals (see Adv. Math. X, 218 ; = Adv. Phy. II 218).
20
Stoic categories are indeed interpreted either as a progressive determination process (see Goldschmidt [1953], pp.
23-25; Mates [1953], p. 18 or, methodologically, as principles helping answer as to the status of specific things (cf.
Rist [1971] including p. 55; Christensen [1962], p. 51; De Lacy, tapha lxxvi, p. 18).
21
Cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. (CAG VIII) p. 165, 32-166, 29 (= fr 42E;. = SVF II, 403 partial extract; LS = 29 C).
22
Rist [1971], p. 54.
23
Mates [1953], p. 18; Goldschmidt [1953], p. 18.
24
See Long and Sedley [trans. fr. 2001], pp. 49-51.

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[Text 3] To put what I am saying more clearly, they [the Stoics] call ‘relative’ (πρός τι) all things which are
conditioned according to an intrinsic character (κατ' οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα) but are directed towards something else
(πρὸς ἕτερον) ; and ‘relatively disposed’ (πρός τι πως ἔχοντα) all those whose nature it is to become and cease to
be a property of something (πέφυκεν συμβαίνειν τινὶ) without any internal change or qualitative alteration, as well
as to look towards what lies outside (πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς). Thus, when something in a differentiated condition (κατὰ
διαφοράν) is directed towards something else, it will only be relative: for example tenor (ἕξις), knowledge, sense-
perception. But when it is thought of (θεωρῆται), not according to its inherent differentiation (κατὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν
διαφοράν) but merely according to its disposition relative to something else, it will be relatively disposed. For son
and the man on the right, in order to be there (πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν), need certain external things. Hence without any
internal change a father could cease to be a father on the death of his son, and the man on the right could cease to be
the man on the right if his neighbour changed position. But sweet and bitter could not alter qualitatively if their
internal power (ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις) did not change too. If, then, despite being unaffected in themselves they
change because of something else’s disposition relative to them (κατὰ τὴν ἄλλου πρὸς αὐτὰ σχέσιν), it is clear that
relatively disposed things have their existence in their disposition alone and not through any differentiation.25

According to Simplicius, the Stoics would have made the distinction between, on one
hand, the relatives, on which we understand that they have an “inherent power” (ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ
δύναμις) that they hold from their own qualifications (κατ' οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα) differentiating
an external object (πρὸς ἕτερον), and, on the other hand, the dispositions which, devoid of
intrinsic powers, do not “exist” with the aid of external things, and whose special relations
(σχέσις), rather than the specific differentiation, determine the fact of being (τὸ εἶναι). Again,
these dispositions are “accidental”, they “naturally arrive at something” (πέφυκεν συμβαίνειν
τινὶ), although this time, the accident no longer expresses a body. However, the father-son
relationship, or simply space (left-right, up-down), should not be assumed as superfluous with on
ontological perspective. It is, indeed, the contrary, and I will assume that this add a new
determination for the individual being, as the existence of this implies the ability to interact
“accidentally” with other beings, according to some spacial and temporal data.
What could we conclude now from the present definition that the πρός τι πῶς ἔχον holds
its existence from a “simple relation to another being” (ψιλὴν τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν), except
that the relation, instead of expressing one being, expresses at least two at a time ? Indeed, the
father is (that is to say, “remains as”) father as long as his son exists, and vice versa. There is a
circle, and one might wonder from where derives this father-son relationship, if it can not logically
belong to one or to the other. The first solution is to say that the relationship is only “thought”.
This is the option chosen by Simplicius, who considers the category as a simple way to “think”
(θεωρεῖν) objects in the world, the πρός τι πῶς ἔχον differing only from the πρός τι by external
source of its justification.
But Simplicius is clearly not a fair reader of Stoicism, and we assume that he sees the
categories as mere intellectual tools. For the Stoics, however, the father-son relationship, as it
defines a social interaction, has a reality in the economy of the whole Nature. When the relative is
an intrinsical differentiation towards an external object made by a proper character, the relative
disposition is extrinsically differentiated by an external relation to another object (the father is
father regarding his son, just as his son makes him father). One could say that with the πρός τι
πῶς ἔχον everything is outside, as the quality of father, for example, is a quality of the
relationship itself (which unites the father to his son) and not a quality of the being ; unlike the
relative who still holds a strong link to the interiority, the sweet is sweet in virtue of an “own
character” (sweetness). This would confirm Simplicius’s interpretation, which is that the πρός τι
πῶς ἔχον does not exist anywhere but in the mind. But it might be missing the fundamental
interest of this category for the ethics, that the Stoics could use.
Indeed, we found that the Stoics derive ontologically the πρός τι πῶς ἔχον from a “simple
relation”, leading to a circle. It is the father-son σχέσις that produces the father and the son
25
Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. (CAG VIII) p. 165, 32-166, 29 (= fr. 42E ; = SVF II, 403 ; = LS 29 C).

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simultaneously. The “accidental” death of the son, a theme also dear to Epictetus, removes the
accidental sustenance of the father as father, sending his “paternity” to the past. Moreover, this
relationship does not seem neutral from an ontological perspective and, then, from a social
perspective. In this case, it allows us to give an account of the emotional ties between two people
(it is the φιλοστοργία of Epictetus), whose existence lets us define in return roles and duties
(famous ethical theme in imperial Stoicism).
Note that we could not doubt however the abstraction that characterizes the spatial
relations (left-right, up-down, East-West), and that the family relationships, which are the same
kind, must be thought on the same mode. But again, I am not convinced. Indeed, the space-time
coordinates can also find, in a Stoic cosmos characterized by rational order, a different resonance
than the one Simplicius wants us to hear. It seems clear that the Stoic “πρός τι πῶς ἔχον” may be,
through Aristotelian eyes, a “πρός τι” of second class, a new linguistic sophistication made by the
Stoics (inherent to their micrologia), shaped to express a simple relation established by thought,
which Aristotle, in Metaphysics Δ, already called accidental relativity (“relative by accident” : τὸ
πρός τι κατὰ συμβεβηκός), as when [I quote] “it accidentally arrives for a man to be double in
relation to something, because 'double' is a relative.”26
I quote The Categories : “Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of
something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing.”27
Knowledge and the thing known are relatives. But knowledge could be something existing in its
subject (in the wise, for example), and it is not the case for the relative “being known”. That’s
maybe why Aristotle says in Metaphysics N that the relative is a mere predicate, and not a
substance neither a being, because [I quote] “In respect of relation there is no proper change; for,
without changing, a thing will be now greater and now less or equal, if that with which it is
compared has changed in quantity.”28
In the case of knowledge, a relative term can be said to be something in its subject. In the
case of being known, it can not. Thus, Aristotle himself could think another kind of relative, the
somehow disposed in relation to something (the Stoic πρός τι πῶς ἔχον), in order to explain how
one thing can be relative to another without the presence of anything corporeal in a subject. Then,
the Stoic πρός τι πῶς ἔχον should be interpreted like Aristotle could have done and Simplicius
after him, as a relative of “second class” ?
It is clear that this interpretation does not suit the Stoic “πρός τι πῶς ἔχον”, firstly,
because the Stoics could not consider an “accidental event” as superfluous from the perspective of
the individual being29, even if this event was only “sayable” (a lekton) [Here I won’t follow the
classic french deleuzian theory30 which considers the Stoic event as only superficial, because the
sayable is “on the surface of the being”, “on the edge of language and reality”, a theory grounded
on the interpretation made by Emile Bréhier31 in his Theory of incorporeal in Ancient Stoicism].
Indeed, if a man is in a certain disposition in relation to another being, this disposition
commits him totally, immediately and necessarily, in the answer he gives to the situation. So it
would describe for him the initial data of his interaction. [Moreover, this answer and the action he
makes will have a real determination in the Fate, as confatalia].

26
Metaph. Δ15, 1021b8-10.
27
Cat. 6a 37–38.
28
Metaph. 1088a 33-35.
29
See on this Gourinat = [2013].
30
Deleuze, dans Logique du sens, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1969, p. 233 : « Une des plus grandes audaces de la
pensée stoïcienne, c’est la rupture de la relation causale : les causes sont renvoyées en profondeur à une unité qui leur
est propre et les effets entretiennent à la surface des rapports spécifiques d’un autre type. Le destin, c’est d’abord
l’unité ou le lien des causes physiques entre elles ; les effets incorporels sont évidemment soumis au destin, dans la
mesure où ils sont l’effet de ces causes. »
31
Bréhier [1905], p. 20.

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On the other hand, against the underestimation of “πρός τι πῶς ἔχον” made by
Simplicius, one could point out that Seneca affirms the constitutio of the soul arranged in a certain
way in relation to the body32. But more generally, to become accidentally a father, to be born
emperor or slave, in Athens rather than in Rome, or, to arrive accidentally on a battlefield by the
right flank of the enemy, all of that are accidents defining the initial coordinates of an
interrelational commitment, which give to the wise the opportunity to express his wisdom through
many actions. The fourth category is then essential because it lets us think that the man's
coordinates, his field of action is always situated towards others by anchoring his existence as an
“outside” in the cosmos, in the interactions’s game.

Towards Ethics : the significance of the relative disposition to others for Epictetus

These few considerations lead us now to the consequences for morality and the very
significance of the idea of the “relation” to others, as Epictetus thought it.
In the third book of Discourses, Epictetus says that the discipline of impulse, concerning the
action complying with Nature (the duty), directly involves what he calls natural or acquired
relations:
[Text 4] The second topic concerns the duties of a man; for I ought not to be free from affects like a statue, but I ought
to maintain the relations natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen. The third topic is that
which immediately concerns those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so
that not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in melancholy.33

For Epictetus, we must distinguish two moments in the “philosophical practice”. The first,
which concerns the beginner in progress, whose opinions are not strong enough, is a process of
responsability still required, in which one is cautious to avoid building relation with anyone (“jug
and stone can not go together”)34. The second, which concerns only the advanced in progress,
consists of a consolidation process through the study of reasoning. For the beginner, philosophical
practice involves a kind of probation, interpreted as a descent into the arena to test strengths and
weaknesses35. This because, like Epictetus suggests, isolation (ἐρημία) is a state of insecurity36
which should not be confused with loneliness (τὸ μόνον εἶναι). The latter, although it is unnatural
under the natural sociability of man37, should nevertheless be the subject of an exercise, and may
be in the contemplation of the divine government and our relation with the rest of the world. The
exercise of loneliness, which trains to do without others38, aims to be “sufficient unto oneself” and
“to live only with oneself” (ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖν, […] ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι)39. It is also the only way to
make a true friend.

[Let me quote my thesis work, pp. 497-8 :] « L’exercice de la solitude n’est donc pas une fin et ne vient pas à
la fin de la vie (comme le soutient Sénèque), mais vise au contraire à retrouver avec autrui une relation positive et
profitable. Sénèque, qui comparait sa villa et son âme en affirmant l’infériorité de la première sur la seconde – parce
qu’elle « confère à toutes choses le prix qu’elles ont pour elle » – considérant que la solitude pouvait paradoxalement

32
Seneca, Ep. 121, 10-18. Although Epictetus (D. IV, 1, 128-131) will dissociate the soul from the body's dispositions
and ways of being (in a single passage in which Epictetus seems to use the vocabulary of the categories).
33
D. III, 2, 1-5.
34
D. III, 12, 12.
35
D. III, 12, 11.
36
D. III, 13, 3.
37
D. III, 13, 5.
38
D. III, 13, 6-8.
39
D. III, 13, 6-7.

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rendre plus présente la société des amis40, choisit de quitter Rome pour s’y retrouver seul avec soi-même41. Mais le
philosophe épictétéen, bien qu’il choisisse ceux qui vivront avec lui42, reste conscient de n’être jamais isolé43 (comme
Caton)44, d’être donc toujours en sécurité, bien qu’à l’instar des enfants, il ne soit jamais embarrassé pour passer son
temps dans la solitude45. Celui-ci ne cherche pas le repli dans les livres46, une solitude barricadée dans la « citadelle
intérieure » de son âme, dans le loisir studieux ou la méditation. Il veut être Socrate, c’est-à-dire assumer pleinement
son rôle d’homme, et les trois topoi philosophiques, qui reposent tous sur la distinction critique, sont faits pour ça. »

Brad Inwood argued that the parent-child relationship was essential for Epictetus, and was
the subject of a personal contribution to Stoicism47. This relationship would be paradigmatic for
him of the “tension” that lies between our personal οἰκείωσις and our social οἰκείωσις48. Because
they are “parts” of ourselves49, our children are loved even by us50, although they are not other
“me”. Symmetrically, Zeus is said to be “the father of men”51. For Epictetus, the reference model
of every relationship is friendship among the sage52. On filial love, Epictetus therefore does not
stand out from Cicero53. The latter concluded that “a man should not be a stranger to a man”54 and
advocated to expand this first relationship by benevolence (benivolentia) and mutual affection
(caritate) to the Republic55, as Panaetius suggested, and Hierocles after him.
But, unlike Panaetius, who considers political career and specialization (fourth role) as
dependent on chance and circumstances56, Epictetus thinks that duties linked to “social relations”
are dependent on “instituted names”.

[Text 5] … we ought to remember who we are, and what is our name, and to endeavour to direct our duties towards
the character (nature) of our several relations (in life) in this manner: what is the season for singing, what is the season
for play, and in whose presence; what will be the consequence of the act; whether our associates will despise us,
whether we shall despise them ; when to jeer, and whom to ridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with whom;
and finally, in complying how to maintain our own character.

Besides, Epictetus gives priority to the good on every kinship (πάσης οἰκειότητος)57 as he
sees this good as a condition of possibility for the conservation of these links. On the other hand,
as he remarks, “we bind ourselves to so many beings : our bodies, our goods, a brother, a friend, a
child, a slave, and as long as we are bounded, we are dragged and bolted.”58
This condition is completed once the good is placed in the prohairesis59. The roles that we
discover with the names that define our social relations (son, father, etc.)60 are therefore entirely
determined by this proper positioning of the “me” and the “mine” in the prohairesis, which

40
Seneca, Ep. 55, 8-11. See too De Tranq. An. XVII, 3.
41
Seneca, Ep. 104, 6-8.
42
See Epictetus, S. VI ; VII ; XLIII (35) ; XLIX (41) ; L (42). See Seneca too, Tranq. An. VI, 7-8 et VII.
43
D. III, 13, 16.
44
Cicero, De Off. III, 1, 1-4.
45
D. III, 13, 18.
46
D. IV, 10, 26.
47
Inwood [1996], p. 257.
48
Inwood [1996], p. 258.
49
See D. L. VII, 159 (= SVF I, 626) and Sextus Empiricus, Adv. IX, 336, XI, 24. See too Epictetus, D. II, 6, 10. See
Laurand [2014], pp. 382-92.
50
Cf. D. III, 24, 60).
51
D. III, 24, 3 et 16.
52
See Epictetus on the Cynic, D. III, 22, 81-82.
53
Cicero, Fin. III, 62.
54
Cicero, Fin. III, 63 : « ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri »
55
Cicero, Off. I, 54.
56
Cicero, Off. I, 115-117.
57
Epictetus, D. III, 3, 5.
58
D. I, 1, 14-15.
59
D. III, 3, 8.
60
D. II, 10, 7-8.

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implies a total detachment of all that is unconcerned by it (that is why the Cynic does not marry
except with another wise)61 :

[Text 6] How we may discover the duties of life from names. CONSIDER who you are. In the first place, you are a
man […]. Consider then from what things you have been separated by reason. You have been separated from wild
beasts: you have been separated from domestic animals. Further, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not
one of the subservient, but one of the principal parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration
and of considering the connexion of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise ? To hold nothing as
profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or
foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in
motion nor desire any thing otherwise than with reference to the whole. […] After this remember that you are a son.
What does this character promise? To consider that every thing which is the son's belongs to the father, to obey him in
all things, never to blame him to another, nor to say or do any thing which does him injury, to yield to him in all
things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After this know that you are a brother also, and that to
this character it is due to make concessions […]. Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are
a senator: if a youth, that you are a youth: if an old man, that you are an old man; for each of such names, if it comes
to be examined, marks out the proper duties.62

While some scholars63 assumed that the universal and social attachment should
counterbalance the attachment to the self by moral perfection (and thus by reason), we note that it
is possible to find this idea in wthat Epictetus called the “συγγένεια πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς” (kinship
with the gods). This kinship with God is a kinship of reason64 and it is contrary to the relation we
have with the flesh (D. I, 3, 7), relation that incline some people towards it. In the fourth book of
Discourses (chap. 5, 31), Epictetus said that “nothing is more related to us than good is” (τοῦ γὰρ
ἀγαθοῦ συγγενέστερον οὐδέν)65. But again, this divine relationship (the συγγένεια) is different
from the relationship we share with our loved “parents” (συγγενεῖς), insofar as our commitment
to them must be reassessed66.
Epictetus said67 that the fact that it is reasonable (εὐλόγιστον) to be affectionate
(φιλόστοργος) does not mean that the reason should govern the relationship, but rather proves
that the affection for our children is in accordance with the nature and shows to the father who
abandoned his daughter that he acted irresponsibly and thus by ignorance and lack of education (§
13)68. The φιλοστοργία, i.e. the natural affection (of a parent for his children) implies a
“φυσικῶς” behavior. The abandonment of the girl by her father is not “κατὰ φύσιν” since the act
of the latter was not in accordance with his natural affection (D. I, 11, 26).
This example chosen by Epictetus – against Epicurus, probably – is crucial in order to
understand the real importance of the “relative disposition”, and to point out that the Aristotelian
interpretation of the stoic “πρός τι πῶς ἔχον” made by Simplicius – suggesting that the father-son
relationship is a relative of second class, only in thought – remain distorted. Whatever may be, for
Epictetus, the way we interact with others, as it directly involves our fundamental link with nature
and God, determines us entirely as an existant being in a certain situation [as Sartre would say],

61
D. III, 22, 76.
62
D. II, 10, 1-10 (partial extract).
63
Voelke [1961], p. 112 ; Annas [1993], p. 271, n. 2. Whitlock Blundell [1990], p. 229 (who quotes Sextus Empiricus,
Adv. Math. IX, 131).
64
Epictetus, D. I, 3, 3 ; 9, 1, 11, 23, 25, ; II, 8, 11.
65
D. III, 3, 5.
66
Seneca, Ep. 92, 30. Inwood [1996], p. 261, comments: 'The divine is the paradigm for life on earth; our cosmic
relationships are both the model and the cause of our human relations - and what is more important, the divine helps
us understand that human experience is a rational and coherent system. " Valéry Laurand [2014], pp. 378-9, refers it to
Musonius (D. XVI, p. 84, 11 – 85, 3), thinking this relation as a community of reason.
67
D. I, 11, 18-19.
68
On this question, see Reydams-Schils [2007] and [2011] ; Inwood [2001].

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so much that the telos of the Stoic ethics – to live in harmony with nature – becomes to live in
harmony with others.
To prove it negatively, we could conclude by illustrating the importance of the relation to
the other in Discourses of Arrian, by evocating the case of violence, that paradoxically does not
deteriorate the individual to which it is addressed, but the person who commits it :

[Text 7] But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name.
In the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and
if you have forgotten the brother and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to have
changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man (ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου), who is a tame animal and
social (ἡμέρου ζῴου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ), you are become a mischievous (βλαβερόν) wild beast (θηρίον γέγονας),
treacherous, and biting (ἐπίβουλον, δηκτικόν), have you lost nothing? But, (I suppose) you must lose a bit of money
that you may suffer damage? And does the loss of nothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar
or music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if you shall lose modesty(αἰδῶ)69, moderation (καταστολὴν)
and gentleness (ἡμερότητα)70, do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some
cause external and independent of the prohairesis, and the second by our own responsibility (καίτοι ἐκεῖνα μὲν παρ'
ἔξωθέν τινα καὶ ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν ἀπόλλυται, ταῦτα δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς).71

Paradoxically, the violence towards the indifferent is cause for us of the most serious loss,
because, unlike the loss of a loaned object (such as a coin, a vase, a son, a wife), whose cause is
“external and does not concern our prohairesis” (παρ 'ἔξωθέν τινα καὶ ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν),
the loss of qualities that make our “humanity” are totally “under our responsibility” (παρ 'ἡμᾶς).
For Epictetus, it is the prohairesis which, through a violent behavior towards others, is
destroyed72. This is the case of Medea, “transformed into a viper”73, her “critical faculties are
blinded and mutilated.”74
Marcus Aurelius, for his part, says that what does not damage the city (and thus the law)
does not damage by nature the citizen75, because men are made for each other, to be helpful rather
than to harm each other76.
This way of formulating the responsibility of a man towards his own behavior implies a
duplicitous relation to others: fundamentally indifferent, other can never reach us as we can never
reach him, and thus, he is intrinsically bounded to our fundamental identity, because our way to
interact with him changes us and reaches us, not in our substance (second category), but in our
existence (fourth category). We become more human or inhuman, harmful or helpful, contrary to
our nature or according to it, by violence or gentleness. It is as if the relation to others should be
preserved in its integrity, respected in its perfect autonomy. The essence of the relation to others,
Epictetus would say, is both essential and permanent – all our behaviors aim others, suppose
others, and because they are made according to others, they come down to us as an activity
(ἔργον) changing our own disposition in the world.
Beast-like behavior, contrary to what Aristotle thought, is for Epictetus an immoral
behavior because it contradicts the nature of man, it makes him inhuman. That is why it is rejected
by the wise, who commonly selects things in accordance with Nature. On the other hand, if, as

69
On the natural sense of modesty, see fr. 14. See also D. II, 20, 25 ; 22, 30 ; III, 14, 13-14 ; IV, 3, 3 ; 7 ; 9 ; 9, 9 ; 11-
12 ; Handbook XXXIII ; XXXVI ; fr. 10.
70
On gentleness, see D. III, 18, 5 ; IV, 1, 121 ; 126 ; 5, 10 ; 17 ; fr. 25 ; S. XXIX (21) ; LIII (45) and LXVII (59).
71
D. II, 10, 11-16.
72
D. III, 18, 6.
73
See D. IV, 1, 127 ; S. XVII (9). There are also wolves : D. I, 3, 7-9 ; II, 4, 10 ; Marcus Aur., M. XI, 15; foxes, D. I,
3, 7, and all “beasts”, D. II, 9, 6.
74
D. I, 28, 9.
75
Marc. Aur., M. V, 22 ; 35 ; X, 33.
76
Marc. Aur. M. IX, 1 ; XI, 18. See also Seneca (De otio III, 5) and Epictetus, fr. 1, 5, 7.

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Epictetus shows, the general trend is to despise powerlessness, one is not inclined to applaud
violence rather than utility and beneficence77.
Thus, this is not a paradoxical behavior which the Stoic invites us to, because the common
sense actually considers the enemy as a bad thing, and the friend as a good one78. The difference
lies precisely in the reciprocity of this relation to the friend or to the enemy, and it is here that the
difference between the behavior of the sage and the foolish appears. While the sage does not lose
his dignity by giving blow for blow to a violent man, the fool is able at any time to respond to
beast-like behavior with beast-like behavior. Conversely, the friend and the wise man are good
and useful things79, as the enemy is useless and bad, because friendship and enmity are two ways
to express this natural relation to the others, friendship is the natural relationship that men should
have between them, enmity, its contradiction by violence and inhumanity.
That is why even Socrates, who is invincible to the blows of fate and to the bad behavior of
others (from which he is also able to benefit)80, will always prefer the friend to the enemy, and will
be, towards his fellows, gentle and helpful, useful to them. This explains why friendship is
fundamentally social81 and helpful82, although the sage can only be friend with another sage83,
although only him can love another for himself84, and he will sacrifice his life for his friends85
without being dependent on them, friendship winning on kinship86, because we should love others
only when we are already the friend of gods and “servant of Zeus”.87

I thank you very much for your kind attention88.

77
Epictetus, fr. 7 (Stobaeus, III. 20, 61 ; Musonius fr. XLI Hense).
78
See the critic made by Sextus Empiricus, in Adv. Math. XI, 2, 22 ; Cf. D. L. VII, 104.
79
Adv. Math. XI, 22-24.
80
Xenoph., Econ. I, 14-15 ; D. L. II, 37 ; Epict., D. III, 20, 9-11; Plut., Moralia 86b-92f. On this, see Bénatouïl [2006],
pp. 276-8.
81
Stobaeus, Ecl. II, 109, 10-110, 4 (= SVF III, 686 ; = LS 67W3, p. 561). See Cicero, Laelius de amicitia, VI, 20.
82
Cicero, Fin. III, XXI, 69-71 (= SVF III, 348).
83
D. L. VII, 124 (= SVF III, 631 ; = LS 67P) ; Epictetus, D. II, 22, 37 ; D. L. VII, 23 ; 33 ; 124 (= SVF III, 631 ; = LS
67 P) ; Cicero, ND I, 44, 121 ; Plut., Comm. Not. 22. See Fraisse [1974], p. 365, Morana [1998], p. 86.
84
Cicero, De legibus, I, 17, 49 (= SVF III, 43).
85
D. L. VII, 130.
86
Cicero, Laelius de Amiticia, V, 19, 6. See Seneca, Ben. VII, 12, 2-5.
87
Epictetus, D. III, 24, 58-61 and 65.
88
I would thank specially Charles Arden for helping me translating in english and rewieving this communication.

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The problematic status of the Stoic fourth category : the “πρός τι πῶς ἔχον”

HANDOUT

[Text 1] Jacques Brunschwig : « I am a certain lump of matter, and thereby a substance, an

existent something (and thus far that is all); I am a man, and this individual man that I am, and
thereby qualified by a common quality and a peculiar one; I am sitting or standing, disposed in a
certain way; I am the father of my children, the fellow citizen of my fellow citizens, disposed in a
certain way in relation to something else. »89

[Text 2] Plutarch: “I will make their [i.e. the Stoics] argument easier : because they create four
substrates for each of us, they multiply each of us by four.”90

[Text 3] Simplicius : To put what I am saying more clearly, they [the Stoics] call ‘relative’ (πρός
τι) all things which are conditioned according to an intrinsic character (κατ' οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα)
but are directed towards something else (πρὸς ἕτερον) ; and ‘relatively disposed’ (πρός τι πως
ἔχοντα) all thoses whose nature it is to become and cease to be a property of something (πέφυκεν
συμβαίνειν τινὶ) without any internal change or qualitative alteration, as well as to look towards
what lies outside (πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς). Thus when something in a differentiated condition (κατὰ
διαφοράν) is directed towards something else, it will only be relative: for example tenor (ἕξις),
knowledge, sense-perception. But when it is thought (θεωρῆται) of not according to its inherent
differentiation (κατὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν διαφοράν) but merely according to its disposition relative to
something else, it will be relatively disposed. For son, and the man on the right, in order to be
there (πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν) , need certain external things. Hence without any internal change a
father could cease to be a father on the death of his son, and the man on the right could cease to be
the man on the right if his neighbour changed position. But sweet and bitter could not alter
qualitatively if their internal power (ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις) did not change too. If, then, despite
being unaffected in themselves they change because of something else’s disposition relative to
them (κατὰ τὴν ἄλλου πρὸς αὐτὰ σχέσιν), it is clear that relatively disposed things have their
existence in their disposition alone and not through any differentiation.91

[Text 4] Epictetus : The second topic concerns the duties of a man; for I ought not to be free from
affects like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a
son, as a father, as a citizen. The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are
making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that not even in sleep
any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in melancholy.92

[Text 5] Epictetus : […] we ought to remember who we are, and what is our name, and to
endeavour to direct our duties towards the character (nature) of our several relations (in life) in
this manner: what is the season for singing, what is the season for play, and in whose presence;
what will be the consequence of the act; whether our associates will despise us, whether we shall
despise them ; when to jeer, and whom to ridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with
whom; and finally, in complying how to maintain our own character. »

89
Brunschwig, J. (2003), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood, Cambridge University Press, p.
228.
90
Plut., Comm. Not. 1083E (= LS 28 A6).
91
Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. (CAG VIII) p. 165, 32-166, 29 (= fr. 42E ; = SVF II, 403 ; = LS 29 C).
92
D. III, 2, 1-5.

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[Text 6] Epictetus : How we may discover the duties of life from names. Consider who you are.
In the first place, you are a man […]. Consider then from what things you have been separated by
reason. You have been separated from wild beasts: you have been separated from domestic
animals. Further, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient
(serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine
administration and of considering the connexion of things. What then does the character of a
citizen promise ? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he
were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and
understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire
any thing otherwise than with reference to the whole. […] After this remember that you are a son.
What does this character promise? To consider that every thing which is the son's belongs to the
father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor to say or do any thing which
does him injury, to yield to him in all things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you
can. After this know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due to make
concessions […]. Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are a senator: if
a youth, that you are a youth: if an old man, that you are an old man; for each of such names, if it
comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I say to
you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. […] And if instead of a man, who is
a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have
you lost nothing? […] if you shall lose modesty, moderation and gentleness, do you think the loss
nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the
will, and the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have them nor to lose them is
shameful; but as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is shameful and matter of
reproach and a misfortune. What does the pathic lose? He loses the (character of) man. What does
he lose who makes the pathic what he is? Many other things; and he also loses the man no less
than the other. What does he lose who commits adultery? He loses the modest, the temperate, the
decent, the citizen, the neighbour. What does he lose who is angry? Something else. What does the
coward lose? Something else. No man is bad without suffering some loss and damage. […] What
then, since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing
some unjust act to him?93

[Text 7] Epictetus : But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you, You have forgotten who
you are and what is your name. In the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the
hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother and instead of
a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to have changed one thing for another in
that case? And if instead of a man (ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου), who is a tame animal and social (ἡμέρου
ζῴου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ), you are become a mischievous (βλαβερόν) wild beast (θηρίον
γέγονας), treacherous, and biting (ἐπίβουλον, δηκτικόν), have you lost nothing? But, (I
suppose) you must lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And does the loss of nothing
else do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar or music, would you think the loss of it
a damage? and if you shall lose modesty (αἰδῶ)94, moderation (καταστολὴν) and gentleness
(ἡμερότητα)95, do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some
cause external and independent of the will, and the second by our own responsibility (καίτοι
ἐκεῖνα μὲν παρ' ἔξωθέν τινα καὶ ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν ἀπόλλυται, ταῦτα δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς).96

93
D. II, 10, 1-10 (partial extract).
94
On the natural sense of modesty, see fr. 14. See also D. II, 20, 25 ; 22, 30 ; III, 14, 13-14 ; IV, 3, 3 ; 7 ; 9 ; 9, 9 ; 11-
12 ; Handbook XXXIII ; XXXVI ; fr. 10.
95
On gentleness, see D. III, 18, 5 ; IV, 1, 121 ; 126 ; 5, 10 ; 17 ; fr. 25 ; S. XXIX (21) ; LIII (45) and LXVII (59).
96
D. II, 10, 11-16.

12