FERNANDO v. CA, GR No.

92087, 1992-05-08
Facts:
From the evidence presented we see the following facts: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta,
market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property
of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in
Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon,
Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was
notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on
November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia,
William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia,... was taken out by
his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City
Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank
without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent... of the market master. In fact,
the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones
who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in
his reports, put the cause of death of all five... victims as 'asphyxia' caused by the diminution of
oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst,
swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case,
was sulfide gas produced from the... waste matter inside the septic tank
Issues:
1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar?
2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims
hereof?
Ruling:
Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the period of
19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They
contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no warning... sign of the
existing danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render
harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public respondent's gross negligence
was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.
We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the public respondent has been
remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing
one
Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to... clean the septic tank
of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by
issuing invitations to bid for such service.
Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon
The public... respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the
situation.
It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the
septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their...
personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
Principles:
The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without
authority... from the public respondent opened the septic tank.

Villanueva v. Castañeda (G.R. No. L-61311. September 21, 1987)

FACTS:
The case involved a strip of land near public market on which stands a conglomeration of
vendor stalls known as talipapa. Said vendors was authorized by Sanggunian resolution to
operate. This was protested in a civil case causing an injunction. Pending case, municipal council
adopted a new resolution which declared the subject area “the parking space and as the public
plaza of the municipality”. The CFI made the injunction permanent. However, the decision
apparently was not enforced because the occupants were never evicted. Stall owners were
even made to enter a lease agreement with the municipal government. After some time,
clamor was raised to restore the area into its public use. The office of the mayor attempted to
demolish the stalls. The stall owners filed petition for prohibition but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stall owners may validly invoke the non-impairment clause as against the
action to restore the area for public use.
HELD:
No. Petition must be denied because the non-impairment clause does not apply here.
RATIO:
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any
other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Applying this well-settled doctrine, the
Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed
premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease
contracts. The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered
by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. In fact,
every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an
implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power
can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it
entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

G.R. No. L-44485 June 27, 1988

HEIRS OF SANTIAGO PASTORAL and AGUSTIN BATO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS and COMMUNICATIONS, THE CITY ENGINEER OF
DAGUPAN CITY and LEONARDO ESPANOL, respondents-appellees.
Paulino S. Cabugao for petitioners-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Sections 17 and 21 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended in relation to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court on the ground
that the issues raised are pure questions of law. The main issue centers on the authority of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications under Republic Act 2056 to declare the
construction of dikes encroaching into public navigable waters as a public nuisance and to order
their removal.

Sometime in October 1958, residents of Bacayao Norte, Caranglaan, and Mayombo Districts of
Dagupan City led by Leonardo Espanol filed complaints with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications (hereinafter referred to as Secretary) denouncing the heirs of Santiago
Pastoral and Agustin Bato for "alleged encroachments into the Tulao River ... to the prejudice of
public interest." The complaints were docketed as Cases Nos. RA-2056-26 and RA-2056-37
respectively.

The Secretary designated the City Engineer of Dagupan City to conduct hearings in the two
cases. All the parties were notified of the hearings set for both cases.

Based on the evidence submitted by the parties, the Secretary rendered two separate decisions
ordering the removal of the encroachments complained of within thirty (30) days from receipt
of notice. Thus, in Case No. RA-2056-26, the heirs of Santiago Pastoral were ordered to remove
the fishpond dikes indicated as Encroachments Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Exhibit "A" while in Case
No. RA-2056-37, Agustin Bato was ordered to remove the fishpond dikes indicated as
Encroachment No. 5 in Exhibit "A." The Secretary ruled that encroachments Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
in Exhibit "A" had been illegally constructed within the channel of Tulao River. The Secretary
declared the encouragement croachments as public nuisances under Republic Act 2056.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Secretary, the respondents filed in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary, the City Engineer of Dagupan City and
Leonardo Espanol. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-833.
The petitioners (respondents in the administrative cases) alleged "... that respondent City
Engineer informed petitioners that the 30-day period given them to remove the fishpond dikes
has expired and that his office will proceed to demolish the dikes on orders from the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications; that they have title over the alleged encroachments and
a fishpond permit issued by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, through the
Bureau of Fisheries, authorizing them to construct a fishpond on an adjoining parcel of their
property not covered by title." The petitioners sought the annulment of the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the
issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the respondents to desist absolutely and
perpetually from further molesting in any manner the petitioners and interfering with the
exercise of their rights over the lands in question.

In his answer, the Secretary invoked his authority to remove the encroachments under Republic
Act No. 2056 and stated that he had acted lawfully and justly and within the sound limits of his
authority and jurisdiction thereunder.

The parties agreed to submit the case for judgment on the pleadings and were allowed by the
lower court to submit their respective memoranda.

The trial court then rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners-appellants prompting the
Secretary to interpose an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The Secretary assigned a single assignment of error, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HAVING ANNULLED THE DECISIONS

RENDERED BY THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, IN
CASES JURISDICTION, AND IN PERMANENTLY ENJOINING SAID SECRETARY FROM
IMPLEMENTING THE ORDER TO REMOVE THE ENCROACMENTS PLACED BY THE
APPEALLEES ON THE TULAO RIVER. (At p. 17, Rollo)

In support of this lone assignment of error, the petitioner raised the following arguments:

1) The Secretary was duly vested with jurisdiction both over the parties and
subject matter of the controversy.

2) The Secretary duly conformed to the requirements of due process in the

exercise of his authority under Republic Act No. 2056.

3) The Secretary did not, as concluded by the court a quo, rule on the validity of
appellees' titles over the lots in question.

4) The issuance of fishpond permits by the Bureau of Fisheries did not preclude
the Secretary from conducting due investigation and in ruling upon the same.
 5) The Secretary's findings of fact are entitled to respect from the courts. (At pp.
17-18, Rollo)

As stated earlier, the main issue hinges on the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications under Republic Act 2056 to declare that the construction or building of dams,
dikes or any other works which encroach into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters
and any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the construction or building of
dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared as communal fishing grounds is prohibited and
to order their removal as "public nuisances or as prohibited constructions."

The lower court concluded that the Secretary abused his authority under Republic Act No. 2056
on the following points: (1) The Secretary passed judgment on the validity of the titles of the
petitioners over Encroachments 3, 4 and 5 when he declared such titles as null and void; and (2)
the dikes denominated as Encroachments Nos. 1 and 2 were constructed by virtue of a permit
legally issued in favor of the late Santiago Pastoral by the Bureau of Fisheries on July 19, 1948
because the area was deemed fit by said Office of fishpond purposes, and the construction of
such dikes would not impede the flow of the river. The lower court opined that in constructing
the dikes, the petitioners were only exercising a right legally granted to them and that "they
shall remain to enjoy the privilege until such time that their permit shall have been cancelled."

The petition is impressed with merit.

The records belie the lower court's finding that the Secretary passed judgment on the titles of
the lots in question.

In connection with Encroachments Nos. 3 and 4, the Heirs of Santiago Pastoral presented a
certified true copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 9 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Dagupan City to show that the encroachments are within their titled lands. The Secretary,
however, stated in his decision:

As regards the last two encroachments, the evidence shows that the southern
boundary thereof is the original bank of the Tulao River. The properties in
question, titled as they are, are clearly within the bed of the river. Even the
testimony of Aniceto Luis, a representative of the Bureau of Lands in the
investigation, shows without doubt, that the encroachments are within the river
bed as may be gleaned from the following:

Q As it appears in the record, title was granted to Santiago

Pastoral on this alleged encroachment No. 3 and 4 which falls
squarely on the Tulao River and during the ocular inspection by
the undersigned, the fact became evident that the river is highly
navigable. Now, what explanation can you make as to why title
was issued over a portion of a river, public river at that, which is
highly navigable?
 A So far, our record does not show that it is a navigable river, but
it is just stated that "the area applied for is a part of the Tulao
River and therefore it is covered by water." (From the report of
the Deputy Public Land Inspector E. Ventura dated March, 1954 in
connection with the Sales application of Santiago Pastoral.)

Q So in the report, it was stated that the land applied for by

Santiago Pastoral is entirely covered by water and part of the
river?

A Yes, sir,

The propriety of the title over the last two encroachments is beyond the
jurisdiction of this Office to inquire into, much less question, although it seems
worth looking into by the proper authorities. Be that as it may, the fact remains
that the dikes and other works therein are encroachments into the Tulao River
and, as such, are public nuisances within the contemplation of Republic Act No.
2056. (pp. 1-2, Decision in RA-2056-26)

Petitioner Agustin Bato also submitted a verified copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 2 to
show that encroachment No. 5 was privately owned.

Anent this argument, the Secretary said:

xxx xxx xxx

... It has been found, however, that the land in question, although titled, is within
the bed of the Tulao River. Even the representative of the Bureau of Lands
bolstered such finding as may be gleaned from the following portion of his
testimony:

Q But you stated that the technical description falls squarely to

the Tulao River. What I am after is the condition of the land when
the application was made. Do you have that in your records? "

A Yes sir.

Q Now, if I show the certificate of title that covered the portion of

this land, will you agree with me that the technical description is
the same as that appearing in your record?

A Yes, they are the same.

 Q Mr. Luis, we have the technical description appearing in the
certificate of title which you admitted to be the same as
appearing in your record plotted, and it appears that the same
land covered by the description falls squarely on the river? Is it
still on the side of the river or in the river itself? I am referring to
the encroachment No. 5 by Agustin Bato.

A No, if this encroachment made by Agustin Bato is the same land

as described in the technical description from the title, then it is
within the river."

Moreover, Section 39 of Act No. 496, in defining the scope and efficacy of a
certificate of title under the Torrens System, established some exceptions which
the force of said title does not reach or affect. Among them are properties of the
public domain. Since the portion appropriated is of public dominion, registration
under Act No. 496 did not make the possessor a true owner thereof. (Celso
Ledesma v. The Municipality of Iloilo, Concepcion Lopez, Maximo M. Kalaw and
wife, and Julia Ledesma, defendants, 49 Phil. 769). (pp. 1-2, Decision in RA-2056-
37)

In effect, the Secretary passed judgment only to the extent that, although the encroachments
were inside titled properties, they are within the bed of a river. With this factual finding, he
declared the encroachments, converted into fishponds within the Tulao River, as prohibited and
ordered their removal pursuant to his authority under Republic Act 2056. He never declared
that the titles of the petitioners over the lots in question were null and void.

The Secretary's authority to determine questions of fact such as the existence of a river even
inside titled properties was recognized in the cases of Lovina v. Moreno, (9 SCRA 557)
and Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (20 SCRA 69). We stated that the
fact-finding power of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications is merely "incidental
to his duty to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized constructions and, hence its grant did
not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power. ... that although the titles were silent as
to the existence of any stream inside the property, that did not confer a right to the stream, it
being of a public nature and not subject to private appropriation, even by prescription." In the
instant cases, the residents along the Tulao River complained about obstructions on the river.
From a width of 70 to 105 meters, the river had been reduced to a width of only 10 to 15
meters. The river was navigable and even at low-tide was two to three meters deep.

As regards the lower court's finding that the dikes designated as Encroachments Nos. 1 and 2
were constructed under the petitioners' Fishpond Permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries in
1948 and, therefore, must be respected, the Secretary counters that such issuance of fishpond
permit did not preclude him from conducting due investigation pursuant to his authority under
Republic Act 2056.
We agree.

Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of dams, dikes ... which encroaches into
any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or
waterways ... shall be ordered removed as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as
herein provided ... The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit was issued in 1948
while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more specific authority to
remove dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede the free passage of
any navigable river or stream or would cause inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2,
Republic Act 2056) takes precedence. Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public Works to
investigate and clear public streams from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was
granted as early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this Court
in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v. Commonwealth (69
Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supra) Santos etc., et al. v. Secretary
of Public Works and Communications (19 SCRA 637).

All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion or an illegal exercise of authority on the part of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in ordering the removal of the
encroachments designated as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Exhibit "A".

The rules of due process were observed in the conduct of investigation in the two cases. The
parties concerned were all notified and hearings of the two cases were conducted by the
Secretary through the City Engineer of Dagupan City. All parties were given opportunity to
present evidence to prove their claims after which the Secretary rendered separate decisions
pursuant to Republic Act 2056.

The factual findings of the Secretary are substantiated by evidence in the administrative
records. In the absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, none of which were
proved by the petitioners in the instant case, said findings should be respected. (Lovina v.
Moreno, supra; Santos, etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, supra; See
also Borja v. Moreno, 11 SCRA 568; Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
20 SCRA 69).

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decisions of the then Secretary of
Public Works and Communications in Cases No. RA 2056-26 and No. RA-2056-37 are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to
the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was
voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-
opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action
for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to
maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their
respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said
dismissals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in
opening the Jupiter street for public use.
HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
RATIO:
Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a
“[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged
continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections.
Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning
ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not
shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-impairment”
guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general
welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to
warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

Dacanay v. Asistio [G.R. No. 93654. May 6, 1992.]

Facts: On 5 January 1979, MMC Ordinance 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for
flea markets. Pursuant thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up 7 flea markets in that city.
One of those streets was the “Heroes del ’96" where the Francisco Dacanay lives. Upon
application of vendors Rodolfo Teope, Mila Pastrana, Carmen Barbosa, Merle Castillo,
Bienvenido Menes, Nancy Bugarin, Jose Manuel, Crisaldo Paguirigan, Alejandro Castron, Ruben
Araneta, Juanita and Rafael Malibaran, and others, the city mayor and city engineer, issued
them licenses to conduct vending activities on said street. In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city
mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del ’96, V. Gozon
and Gonzales streets.
To stop Mayor Martinez’ efforts to clear the city streets, Teope, Pastrana and other stallowners
filed an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City
Engineer and/or their deputies before the RTC Caloocan City (Branch 122, Civil Case C-12921),
praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to
discontinue the demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action. The court issued
the writ prayed for. However, on 20 December 1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction which it had earlier issued. However, shortly after the decision
came out, the city administration in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Macario Asistio,
Jr. did not pursue the latter’s policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets. Invoking the
trial court’s decision, Francisco Dacanay wrote a letter to Mayor Asistio calling his attention to
the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del ’96 street and asked for demolition on 7 March
1988, wrote a follow-up letter to the mayor and the city engineer on 7 April 1988, and without
receiving any response, sought the intervention of President Aquino through a letter. These
letter was referred to the city mayor for appropriate action.
On 3 April 1989, Dacanay filed a complaint against Mayor Asistio and Engineer Sarne (OMB-0-
89-0146) in the Office of the Ombudsman. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman rendered a final evaluation and report on 28 August 1989, finding that the
Mayor’s and the City Engineer’s inaction is purely motivated by their perceived moral and social
responsibility toward their constituents, but “the fact remains that there is an omission of an
act which ought to be performed, in clear violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019.” The
Ombudsman recommended the filing of the corresponding information in court.
As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del ’96 Street, through the tolerance of the city
officials, and in clear violation of the decision in Civil Case C-12921, Dacanay filed a petition for
mandamus on 19 June 1990, praying that the city officials be ordered to enforce the final
decision in Civil Case C-12921 which upheld the city mayor’s authority to order the demolition
of market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del ’96 Streets and to enforce PD 772 and
other pertinent laws.
The Supreme Court established that Dacanay and the general public have a legal right to the
relief demanded and that the city officials have the corresponding duty, arising from public
office, to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose (Enriquez vs.
Bidin, 47 SCRA 183; City of Manila vs. Garcia et al., 19 SCRA 413 citing Unson vs. Lacson, 100
Phil. 695), and thus ordered the City Mayor and City Engineer of Caloocan City or their
successors in office to immediately enforce and implement the decision in Civil Case C-1292
declaring that Heroes del ’96, V. Gozon, and Gonzales Streets are public streets for public use,
and they are ordered to remove or demolish, or cause to be removed or demolished, the
market stalls occupying said city streets with utmost dispatch within 30 days from notice of the
decision; the decision being immediately executory.
1. Jurisprudence applicable to property of public dominion
 The streets, being of public dominion must be outside of the commerce of man.
Considering the nature of the subject premises, the following jurisprudence
co/principles are applicable on the matter: (1) They cannot be alienated or leased or
otherwise be the subject matter of contracts. (Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil.
602); (2) They cannot be acquired by prescription against the state (Insular Government
vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even municipalities can not acquire them for use as communal
lands against the state (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327); (3) They are
not subject to attachment and execution (Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49
Phil. 52); (4) They cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Captain
520; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. Vol. II, 1983 Ed. pp. 29-30).

2. Context of the ordinance of the Metropolitan Manila Commission as to the

establishment of flea markets on municipal streets, roads and open spaces
Ordinance 2, s. 1979 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is an ordinance
“authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and
open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas,
under certain terms and conditions, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, and for other purposes.” Section 2 of said ordinance provides that “the
streets, roads and open spaces to be used as sites for flea markets (tiangge) or vending
areas; the design, measurement or specification of the structures, equipment and
apparatuses to be used or put up: the allowable distances: the days and time allowed
for the conduct of the businesses and/or activities herein authorized; the rates or fees
or charges to be imposed, levied and collected; the kinds of merchandise, goods and
commodities sold and services rendered: and other matters and activities related to the
establishment, maintenance and management and operation of flea markets and
vending areas, shall be determined and prescribed by the mayors of the cities and
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila where the same are located, subject to the
approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission and consistent with the guidelines
hereby prescribed.” Section 6(m) of said ordinance provides that “in the establishment
operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and vending areas, the
following guidelines, among others, shall be observed: xxx (m) that the permittee shall
remove the equipment, facilities and other appurtenances used by him in the conduct
of his business after the close or termination of business hours.”

G.R. No. L-41958

Donald Mead  vs. Hon. Manuel Argel, CFI
July 20, 1982
Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an
information against him for his alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National
Water and Air Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air
Pollution Control Commission created under the said law has the authority to hear cases
involving violations under the same.

The Court ruled that the filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the
findings of the Commission on the matter.

Petitioner was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway
canal)(Sec 9). The Court held that the exclusive authority to determine whether or not
‘pollution’ did exist is vested in the Commission, who is in better position to determine the
same for such requires specialized knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not
ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice (Sec 8).

RULING:

Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code or until there is a ruling by the
Commission on the alleged act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8).

Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission that the provisions of the subject
law had been violated, the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against
petitioner.

SPOUSES ARCANGEL GENOBLAZO and ELISA NANTES and ARELI DE FIESTA, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 79303. June 20, 1989.]

255 Phil. 832

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals (1) dismissing their petition
for, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and (2) upholding the order of the
respondent Judge Natividad G. Adurru-Santillan of the Regional Trial Court denying petitioners'
motion for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The antecedent facts, as found by the respondent court, are as follows:
***
Civil Case No. 84-26196 was filed by plaintiffs (petitioners herein) on a claim of ownership by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription of lots no. 2520 and 2512 located at
Felix Huertas St., Sta Cruz, Manila, and the improvements thereon.  The plaintiffs also sought to
enjoin the defendants (private respondents herein) from further demolishing or destroying the
remnants of the structures built on the land, and sought recovery of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and determination of the issue of ownership over the land.  The
defendants claimed absolute ownership of the lots in question as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 160694 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, and relied on the regularity
and lawful issuance of the Demolition Order No. 014 S-1984 dated June 11, 1984 issued by the
City Engineers' Office, Lands and Building Official.  Defendants made a counter-claim for moral
damages and attorney's fees.
Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the respondent Judge issued on December 1, 1984 a restraining
order to prevent defendants from the commission of acts that will dispossess plaintiffs of their
temporary shelter, and enjoining plaintiffs from introducing additional improvements on the
land and/or expanding the facilities existing thereon.
On January 2, 1985, defendant Reyeses, manifesting that the aforesaid Order has been violated
by plaintiffs through expansion of the makeshift "barong-barong" by about two (2) meters of its
frontage, moved to cite plaintiffs in contempt of court.  Plaintiffs' did not challenge the merit of
the motion, but instead filed an urgent motion on January 10, 1985 for immediate issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction in reiteration of their prayer in the complaint.   A hearing was
conducted, at which the parties orally argued their respective positions and sought for the filing
of respective memoranda after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.  The
respondent Judge in an Order dated July 1, 1985, found that the evidence submitted by
plaintiffs to support the claim of continuous and uninterrupted residence in the premises since
1947 could not be given probative value, and upheld the claim of defendant on the basis of a
Torrens Certificate of Title in its favor.
On the issue of physical possession, the Court held that defendant City Engineer and Building
Official of the City of Manila had acted within the scope of his authority under the National
Building Code and the applicable.  Ordinances of the City of Manila ordering the demolition of
structures found to be dangerous or ruinous and detrimental to the life, health and safety of
the community and its members.
The respondent Judge ruled that the ownership of the defendants over the lots in question as
proven by the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160964 of the Registry of Deeds for Manila "is
hereby confirmed", the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is denied, and the case set
for pre-trial on the unresolved issues on the physical possession of the questioned lots, and the
claim for damages and attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs did not file any motion for reconsideration of the said order, but instead filed on
August 16, 1985 an urgent ex-parte motion for disqualification on the ground of partiality, bias
and prejudice, preference and pre-judgment against plaintiffs.  On September 15, 1985,
plaintiffs filed a manifestation that until after the question of disqualification shall have been
finally determined, petitioners shall not attend any hearing or trial.
On November 11, 1985, petitioners filed the instant petition, claiming that respondent court
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or
excess of jurisdiction when it (1) issued the Order of July 1, 1985 "without      any evidence,
documentary or testimonial, formally offered, had virtually decided the case leaving only the
question of damages and attorney's fees unresolved"; and (2) issued its subsequent orders
setting the case. For pre-trial despite two motions for disqualification filed against her; and (3)
ignored the two motions for inhibition.
*  *  *
[CA Decision, pp.  1-3; Rollo, pp. 11-12-A.]
As earlier stated, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the special civil action filed by
petitioners and held that (1) any error committed by the trial court in its factual or legal findings
is correctible by appeal and not by certiorari; (2) the trial court committed no whimsical or
capricious error in arriving at the legal conclusion that the city engineer acted within the scope
of his authority in issuing the demolition order; and (3) the failure of the judge of the trial court
to resolve the motion for her disqualification did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
continue hearing the case.
As petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, recourse was sought in this Court.  The
instant petition for review specifically points out the following as errors allegedly committed by
the respondent court:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN THE MANILA CITY ENGINEER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DESTROY AND
DEMOLISH PETITIONERS' HOUSES, CARRIED OUT IN BAD FAITH, DECEIT, AND IN UTTER
DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS-- ALL THESE BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF DEMOLITION AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION WERE LEGAL AND PROPER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER
REMEDY IN THIS CASE.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INHIBITION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
WAS NOT CALLED FOR UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.  [Rollo, pp. 87-88.]
I.  On the first assigned error, petitioners contend that there was a conspiracy between the
public respondents City Engineer and Building Official of Manila and the private respondents
Carmen Vda. de Reyes and Jaime de los Reyes, who are mother and son, as shown by the
alleged deceptions committed by the latter in:  1) making it appear that private respondents
Carmen Vda. de Reyes and Jaime de los Reyes were the owners not only of the lots but also of
the houses; 2) sending the order of demolition not  to the petitioners who claim to be the
owners of the houses but to "Jaime de los Reyes, et al." [Rollo, p. 4.]; and, 3) alleging in their
answer to the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the disputed properties
that Petitioners were legally and validly given notices to vacate the premises in view of the
demolition order.  Petitioners insist that because of the failure of private respondents to notify
them of the order of demolition, they were rendered "helpless and unknowing of what was
going on about them" and they were not able to resort to the remedies accorded to them by
the National Building Code Rules and Regulations [Rollo, p. 5.]
Petitioners' contention of a conspiracy between the private respondents and the Manila City
Engineer to demolish their houses involves a factual matter.  The well-established rule is that
findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed except
for strong and cogent reasons [Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45898, December 18,
1987, 156 SCRA 597; Vda. de Roxas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64728, July 22,
1986, 143 SCRA 77; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70594, October 10,
1986, 144 SCRA 705.] Here, the petitioners' claim that private respondents committed
deception in failing to notify them of the order of demolition was not given any credence by the
trial court which found that "what happened was their houses had been demolished' through
their inaction" (Rollo, p. 47.] This is borne out by the evidence on record.  Hence, although the
demolition order was addressed to "Mr. Jaime de los Reyes, et al." as owner of the property,
the affected tenants including, the petitioners were duly furnished with a copy of said order
(See Original Records, p. 77.] Since the demolition order which was dated June 11, 1984 was
carried out only on July 9, 1984, petitioners therefore had ample time to contest the said order
and resort to the remedies available to them under the National Building Code (Presidential
Decree No. 1096) but this they failed to do.  The Court therefore finds no compelling reason to
warrant setting aside the trial court's findings, which were affirmed by the appellate court.
II.  The next issue revolves around the order of demolition dated June 11, 1984 issued by the
respondent City Engineer and Building Official of Manila on the subject buildings or structures
standing on the lots now in dispute, which were condemned as not fit for human
habitation.  According to petitioners, the demolition order was illegal since the Building Official
was not authorized to issue the same.  Petitioners' position is that since the houses were also
considered as nuisances, it is the district health officer, not the Building Official who decides on
the propriety of abatement or demolition in view of the provision of Article 702 of the Civil
Code which states:
Article 702.  The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without
judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
This contention is untenable.  The issue presented before the court, a quo is not really whether
the structures can be considered a nuisance under the Civil Code but whether there has been a
violation of the National Building Code so as to warrant an order for the demolition of said
structure.  Here, the Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned demolition order
in view of his finding that the disputed structures are dangerous buildings and structures within
the meaning of the National Building Code (See Rule VII, Section 3, Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the National Building Code.] This factual finding will not be disturbed by the
court absent a showing of a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction [Sagun et al. v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. 44738, June
22, 1988.]
Contrary to petitioners' position, the fact that the buildings in question could also constitute
nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official from issuing the assailed
demolition order.  Indeed, the National Building Code itself provides that:
When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building
Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to
life, health or
safety.  This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Ar
ticles 482 and 484 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines [Second paragraph of Section 214.]
III.  The third issue deals with the propriety of certiorari as the remedy resorted to by the
petitioners from the questioned order of the trial judge. Petitioners brought a special civil
action for certiorari to the appellate court on the ground that the respondent trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order denying the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for.
It must be borne in mind that the action of the court a quo in denying the writ was premised on
the failure of the petitioners to show that they have a right to be protected and preserved
during the pendency of the case.  The trial court found without any probative value the
evidence adduced by petitioners to support their claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription
through continuous and uninterrupted residence in the premises.  On the other hand, the trial
court found private respondents' claim of ownership based on a deed of sale executed in their
favor on February 22, 1984 by Pilipinas Bank tenable [See Rollo, p. 15 et seq.] In the aforesaid
contract of sale, Pilipinas Bank conveyed to private respondents the ownership of the disputed
lots, Lot Nos. 2520 and 2512, among other lots, and "all the buildings and improvements
existing thereon and belonging to the VENDOR" [Id. at p. 17.] Accordingly, the trial court held
that:
 Rather, it is defendants (private respondents herein) who have demonstrated the attribute of
ownership through the registration of the deed of conveyance over the lots and subsequent
issuance of transfer certificate of title in favor of defendants which could not have been made
without first paying the real estate taxes by them.  The jus disponendi as an element of
ownership was never questioned by the plaintiffs.  These negate the claim of plaintiffs that their
possession of the lots would ripen into ownership by prescription.  The title of defendants
obtained under the Torrens System is indefeasible and no title to registered land in derogation
to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
*   *   *
[Order of the RTC; Rollo, p. 46.]
Petitioners however insist that the following allegations in the answer (to the complaint) dated
September 26, 1984, prepared and filed by the same counsel for the private respondents, Atty.
Manuel M. Maramba, constitute "judicial admissions" [Section 2, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
of Court) and therefore do not require proof:
*   *   *
2.  That defendants hereby specifically deny the allegations in paragraph III of
the complaint, the truth of the matter is that plaintiffs' structures are not of strong materials as
alleged x x x.  (page 1, lines 31-34; underscors supplied).
*  *  *
[Brief for the Petitioners, p. 8; Rollo, p. 94.]
Petitioners' contention is untenable.  The phraseology used by the respondents does not at all
connote that they are acknowledging the petitioners as owners of the demolished
structures.  On the other hand, petitioners, as tenants of the former owner of the property
which was Pilipinas Bank, cannot deny the title of the private respondents which passed to the
latter by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated February 22, 1984 [Rule 131, Section 3
(b), Revised Rules of Court.] Contrary to petitioners' stand, the negation and avoidance of
warranty contained in said deed does not refer to ownership but only to physical possession as
can be gleaned from its clear terms:
The VENDOR does not warrant absolute and complete physical possession of the premises.  It is
understood and agreed that the VENDEES accept the premises subject to any and all lease
contracts, verbal and otherwise, which may be outstanding.  . . .  A list of tenants or persons
staying on the premises is hereto attached and marked Annex "A" and made part hereof;
*  *  *
[Rollo, p. 17; Underscoring supplied.]
Among the tenants listed in said annex to the deed are petitioners Elisa Nantes, wife
of Arcangel Genoblazo and Areli de Fiesta.  A review of the records shows that petitioners were
formally notified by Pilipinas Bank of the change of ownership of the subject premises in a letter
which states:
*  *  *
We wish to inform you that the property which you are presently occupying is now owned by
Mr. Jaime de los Reyes and Carmen Vda. de Reyes in view of the Deed of Absolute Sale which
the Bank executed in favor of the new owners.
Your rentals on the premises due and/or to become due beginning February 1984 shall
therefore now be paid directly to the new owners. . .
*  *  *
[Record, p. 157.]
Clearly, petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject premises was totally unfounded.
It is a settled rule that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or
preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case rests upon the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case.  The exercise of sound judicial discretion
by the lower court in injunctive matters should not be interfered with except in case of
manifest abuse [Yaptinchay v. Torres, G.R. No. L-26462, June 9, 1969, 28 SCRA
489.] Consequently, since the petitioners failed to make a clear showing that the trial judge
gravely abused that discretion in denying the writ on the basis of her findings, the appellate
court correctly denied the petition for certiorari before it [Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court; Tabil v. Ong, G.R. No. L-46773, July 16, 1979, 91 SCRA 451.]
IV.  Finally, petitioners' contention that the respondent trial judge was disqualified from
proceeding with the trial of case is not well taken.  The sole ground for disqualification of the
respondent trial judge invoked by petitioners, i.e., the alleged partiality and prejudgment of the
merits of the complaint is not among the legal grounds for disqualification enumerated under
Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Section 1.  Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
While it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a just or valid reason for the trial
judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case, it is not enough that the same be
merely alleged.  It is now settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties
to the case is not enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge [Beltran V. Garcia, G.R.
No. L-30868, September 31, 1971, 41 SCRA 158.] In this case, no such proof of partiality and
prejudgment has been adduced.
Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it for pre-trial
since it is within her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own competency, to
either proceed with the trial or refrain from acting on the case until determination of the issue
of her disqualification by the appellate court [Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 76.]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals being in conformity with
settled law and jurisprudence, is AFFIRMED and the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 RESTITUTO CALMA,  vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) and PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 78447 August 17, 1989

FACTS:

In 1975, the spouses Restituto and Pilar Calma purchased a lot, built a house and established residence
in respondent Pleasantville. Fabian and Nenita Ong also purchased from PLEASANTVILLE a lot fronting
that of the Calma spouses and constructed their own buildings where they resided and conducted their
business. Calma complaint about the utilization of Ongs residence as a lumber yard and that a
"loathsome noise and nervous developing sound" emanating therefrom disturbed him and his family and
caused them and their son to suffer nervous tension and illness. The Calma spouses filed a complaint for
damages against the Ong spouses and PLEASANTVILLE before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.

Petitioner also filed with the National Housing Authority (NHA), a complaint for "Violation of the
Provisions, Rules and Regulations of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree under
Presidential Decree No. 957. Petitioner prayed that PLEASANTVILLE be ordered to abate the alleged
nuisance and recover damages for their medical problems purportedly caused by the nuisance.

The COMMISSION (which had in the meantime taken over the powers of the NHA,)*rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint of the petitioner for lack of merit, but included a portion holding
PLEASANTVILLE responsible for the abatement of the alleged nuisance on the ground that it was part of
its implied warranty that its subdivision lots would be used solely and primarily for residential purpose.

Aggrieved, PLEASANTVILLE filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with this Court
assailing the portion of the COMMISSION's decision. PLEASANTVILLE asserted that since the
COMMISSION had found that it did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 957, the COMMISSION
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered PLEASANTVILLE to prevent/abate the alleged nuisance
complained of.

The Court of Appeals rendered judgment holding that the COMMISSION "acted capriciously and in
excess of its jurisdiction in imposing an obligation upon the petitioner after absolving it of the complaint
filed against it".

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied his motion. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Ongs property
constituted a nuisance.

RULING:

Yes. The COMMISSION's conclusion that the activities being conducted and the structures in the
property of the Ongs constituted a nuisance was not supported by any evidence. The Solicitor General
himself, in his comment filed in the Court of Appeals, admits that the decision of the COMMISSION did
not make any finding of a nuisance. Apparently, on the basis of position papers, the COMMISSION
assumed the existence of the nuisance, without receiving evidence on the matter, to support its order for
the prevention or abatement of the alleged nuisance.

Moreover, the spouses Ong, were not even party to the proceedings before the COMMISSION who would
be directly affected by a decision favorable to petitioner. To declare their property or the activities being
conducted therein a nuisance, and to order prevention and abatement, without giving them an opportunity
to be heard would be in violation of their basic right to due process.

Hence, no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it nullified the assailed portion of
the COMMISSION's decision, the order granting the writ of execution, and any writ of execution issued
pursuant thereto.

But all is not lost for petitioner and his family. There is still a pending civil case instituted by petitioner. In
said proceeding the factual issues can be fully threshed out and the Ong spouses, the parties who shall
be directly affected by any adverse judgment, shall be afforded the opportunity to be heard as they had
been impleaded as defendants therein together with PLEASANTVILLE.

RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN v. CA, GR No. 97477, 1992-05-08

Facts:
petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Domiciano E. Real filed... with the Regional
Trial Court... a complaint denominated as "Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages" against respondents Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff (petitioner municipality herein) is the owner of a parcel
of residential land... that the parcel of land was reserved for public plaza... that... the
municipality leased an area... to the defendants... subject to the condition that they should...
vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes... that the incumbent mayor discovered
that the defendants filed a "Cadastral Answer" over said lot;... that the defendants refused to
vacate the place despite efforts of the municipality
Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court, since the complaint is for illegal detainer which is within the
original jurisdiction of the municipal court and the pendency of a cadastral case... between the
parties over the ownership of the same parcel of land.
the petitioner Judge issued two (2) orders. The first order denied the motion to dismiss. The
second order granted the petitioner municipality's motion for a writ of possession "with the
ancillary writ of demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on... the land subject of this case,
to the end that the public construction thereon will not be jeopardized.
the petitioner municipality implemented the writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition
issued by the petitioner Judge resulting in the dispossession of the private respondents from
the parcel of land and the demolition of structures and buildings... thereon owned by the
respondents.
the private respondents filed their answer to the complaint alleging therein that the subject
parcel of land has been owned, occupied and possessed by respondent Vicente Medina since
1947 when he bought the subject parcel from a Subanan native... that the respondents were
never lessees of the petitioner municipality... and, that a case is pending before the... cadastral
court between respondent Medina and petitioner municipality as regards the ownership of the
subject parcel of land.
the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals... the petition
was given due course and a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the petitioner
Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the case
Issues:
Prescinding from the finding that the complaint is for recovery of possession the appellate court
concluded that the trial court did not have authority to issue a writ of possession and a writ of
demolition... whether or not the petitioner municipality is entitled to a writ of possession and a
writ of demolition even before the trial of the case... starts.
Ruling:
The appellate court rightfully upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case
based on the allegations in the complaint.