9. G.R. No.

134209             January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

FACTS:

This case involves the application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales by Naguiat.

Defense:

Applicant Naguiat alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who
have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any
person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

Republic:

The Republic contended that neither Naguiat nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12
June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied
for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are
part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation

RTC: Ruled in favor of Naguiat and that the decree of registration shall be issued.

CA: Affirmed

Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondent’s occupation
of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact that
she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber
zone to alienable and disposable property.

Issue: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain

SC: petition is GRANTED.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State – the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the
State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable

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public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or
reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa,
belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court. 14 Needless to stress, the
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant

Respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or
official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. 18 Aside from tax receipts,
respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the
Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 19

The Court has made it a point to stress that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the
case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and
positive act from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership and be registered as title. 22

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20.

G.R. No. 115634             April 27, 2000

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and

NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, respondents.

Facts:

The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles .3

The drivers, Abuganda and Gabon, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR.
However, the drivers refused to accept the receipts. Calub, the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal
complaint against Abuganda for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended
by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. The impounded
vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda. Calub this time to file a criminal
complaint for grave coercion,but it was dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.7

Later, one of the two vehicles was once again apprehended for the same violation. The vehicle
owner Babalcon, and the driver Abuganda, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the
two (2) impounded vehicles. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the
corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992.

The Court of Appeals ruled that since the Department Head of the DENR were unable to submit a
report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle,
no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the
replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the
subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. 15Also, CA also found no merit in
petitioners' claim that private respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia
legis.

(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

Ruling:

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1. Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent
documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure
of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised
Forestry Code.

Note further that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of
the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the
3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took
the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor
vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not
able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the
vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.
The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing
before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with
law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be
subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process
and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. 20

2. Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent.  22 And a
suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose
is to hold the State ultimately liable. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts
in question are clearly official in nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of
the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and
functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no
malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR
is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent.

SC: Petition granted. Writ of replevin is ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle for delivery to the custody
of and appropriate disposition by petitioners.