JUDICIAL NOTICE – WHEN MANDATORY

SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, as represented by LYDIA CO HAO and LILIBETH

MANLUGON, petitioner, vs. HON. LOLITA GAL-LANG, as Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Manila, Branch 44; ANITA CO NG in trust for ROCKEFELLER NG; and the COURT OF
APPEALS, SPECIAL 13th DIVISION, respondents.
Facts:

 Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari allegedly on the 60th day from their receipt
of the March 23, 2000 Order of Branch 44 of the Manila Regional Trial Court
denying their motion for Reconsideration of said court’s Order dismissing, on
motion of private respondent, their complaint.
 CA dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari for being filed out of time. Court
issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC. a Resolution dated August 1, 2000 approving the
amendment to the following provision of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS
IT WAS MADE WITHOUT TAKING PRIOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT A.M.
NO. 00-2 - 03 SC WHICH RESOLUTION TOOK EFFECT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, AND
WHICH AMENDED THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Ruling:
Yes. Under SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for
reconsideration before it, the Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of
this Court’s resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The resolution did not have to specify
that it had retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter. Contrary to private
respondent’s allegation that the matter was no longer pending and undetermined, the issue of
whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration when the
amendment took effect on September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its retroactive application.
 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, represented herein by
its Secretary, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES,
represented by BAGUIDALI KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region 12
Chapter), Respondents.
Facts:

 Regional Executive Director of DENR issued a Memorandum directing the

immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR
Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
 Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the
employee’s association, "COURAGE" filed with the RTC petition for nullity of
orders with prayer for preliminary injunction.
 RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from implementing
the assailed Memorandum. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Dismiss.
 The trial court issued ordering the respondents herein to cease and desist from
enforcing their Memorandum Order dated November 15, 1999 relative to the
transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from Region 12 to Region 11 at
Koronadal, South Cotabato for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Ruling:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the
acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
 NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, assisted by her husband ALFREDO CANDIDO, and
VICTORIA C. RUMBAUA, assisted by her husband AMOR RUMBAUA, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU, respondents.
Facts:

 Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-

class irrigated riceland with an area of 21,193 square meters located in Orion,
Bataan. Respondent Sofronio Dabu served as their agricultural tenant.
 Petitioners lodged a complaint against respondent Dabu for termination of
tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid rentals from crop-year 1983 plus
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
 A team from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had fixed a provisional rental of
twenty-six (26) and twenty-nine (29) sacks of palay for the rainy and dry seasons,
respectively, which respondent failed to pay beginning the crop-year 1983 dry
season up to the filing of the complaint.
 Private respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and claimed
that until 1983 their sharing system was on a 50-50 basis; that his share in the
crop year 1983 dry season was still with petitioner Natividad Candido who
likewise retained his water pump. He denied any provisional rental allegedly fixed
by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and at the same time maintained that only a
proposal for thirteen (13) cavans for the rainy season crop and twenty-five
percent (25%) of the net harvest during the dry season was put forward.
 He claimed that he paid his rentals by depositing thirteen (13) cavans of palay for
the 1984 rainy season crop, thirteen (13) cavans for 1985 and eight (8) cavans
representing twenty-five percent (25%) of the dry season harvest.
 The case was referred to DAR for a preliminary determination of the existing
relationship between the parties and for certification as to its propriety for trial.
Thereafter the DAR certified that the case was proper for trial but only on the
issue of non-payment of rentals and not on the ejectment of respondent Dabu.
 After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove the provisional
rental alleged to have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the lower
court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court also found that no evidence
was introduced to prove the expenses incurred by the parties for planting and
harvesting hence the amount of the net harvest was never determined. Only the
transfer certificate of title of the property and its corresponding tax declaration
were offered in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the verified complaint and the affidavit presented by petitioners to the
DAR are proofs of the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was error for the trial court not to
have taken cognizance of these documents.
Ruling:
No. It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally
offered. The affidavit of petitioner Natividad Candido mentioning the provisional rate of rentals
was never formally offered; neither the alleged certification by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Not having been formally offered, the affidavit and certification cannot be considered as
evidence. Thus, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly disregarded them.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to
object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is
necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Petitioners would insist that we take judicial notice of the affidavit of petitioner Natividad
C. Candido despite absence of any formal offer during the proceedings in the trial court. This is
futile since this is not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires to be taken judicial
notice of; neither can we consider it of public knowledge, or capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Petitioners definitely failed to establish their cause of action. They never proved that
respondent Dabu failed to pay his rentals starting 1982. Neither were they able to competently
confirm the provisional rate of rentals allegedly fixed by the team of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
 RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner, vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA
SIOSON, Respondents.
Facts:

 Private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center for a check-up.
Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro
Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however,
that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent
kidney operation in September, 1999.
 Romeo Sioson filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence
before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful
kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo
Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
 Gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including
petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
 After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent
Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence.
 Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s formal offer of
exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are
mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to
establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent
to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE
ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT
BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A
PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE’S LIVELIHOOD.
Ruling:
No. The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12,
1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s
medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the
examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter
affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the
criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the
exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at
the time" of her operation.
 The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved
as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
The rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a
matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be
proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of
nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that
Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in
their proper anatomical locations.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right,
of Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area. In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such
as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.
JUDICIAL NOTICE – WHEN DISCRETIONARY
STATE PROSECUTORS V. JUDGE MURO
Facts:

 Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54,
was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno
V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
 The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda
Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the
Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely
on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge
believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
 The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed
the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the
pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
 The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a misapplication or
erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in
altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written
comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due
process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
 Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of
discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the President in
the newspaper (Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) which is a matter
that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published
in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling:
YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for
respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB
Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of
dismissal was issued.
When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge
admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to
take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not
based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such
fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge
of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge
of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that
involves unquestioned demonstration.
This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very
act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without
even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on
oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is
palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge
is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as
a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in
the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the
arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court
notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.
The SC cited several cases where judges were ordered dismissed from the government
service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law and the Court after considering such
premises, it thus, finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with its cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.
 EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN
AIRLINES, respondent.
Facts:

 Korean Airlines is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of

South Korea and licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its general manager
in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario
Aguinaldo and his law firm.
 KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint against ETI for the collection of
the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorney’s fees and exemplary
damages. The verification and certification against forum shopping were signed
by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and
legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.
 ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo
was not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
 Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through
a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting
held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days
within which to submit a copy of the said resolution. The trial court granted the
motion. Atty. Aguinaldo subsequently filed other similar motions, which the trial
court granted.
 Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit of even date, executed by
its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors conducted
a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo
attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of
directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also
alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid
resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not teleconferences should be taken as judicial notice.
Ruling:
Yes. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found
in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part
of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business
transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is
interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an
electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof
even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group communication may
be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing – television-
like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing – printed communication
through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the
telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of
directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and
Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001,
providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences. Thus, the Court
agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of
persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
 EDDIE HERRERA, ERNESTO T. TIJING, and CONRADO BOLLOS, petitioners, vs.
TEODORA BOLLOS and RICO GO, respondents.
Facts:

 Teodora Bollos commenced before the MCTC for forcible entry, solely against
Eddie Herrera alleging that the latter, sometime in the second week of 1993,
through stealth and strategy and taking advantage of the absence of Teodora,
entered and occupied her Sugarland known as Lot 20 in Negros Oriental.
 Defendant, Eddie Herrera, denied the allegations against him maintaining that he
entered and occupied not Lot No. 20, as claimed by Teodora, but Lot No. 21,
GSS-615, which is owned by Conrado Bollos, a brother of Teodora’s father,
Alfonso. Further, Herrera said that his occupation of the property was not through
stealth or strategy but by virtue of a contract of lease executed between Conrado
Bollos, as lessor, and Ernesto Tijing, as lessee. Herrera is Tijing’s overseer on
the land.
 The case was dismissed and the RTC reversed the decision of the lower court.
CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the municipal trial court vested with jurisdiction over a second amended
complaint impleading a new defendant filed beyond one year from dispossession alleging a
case of forcible entry in the original action?
Ruling:
Yes. Basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are
the ones to be consulted.
Thus, we find that the complaint alleged prior physical possession de facto which the
defendants disturbed by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, against the will or without
the consent of the plaintiffs, sufficient to constitute a cause of action for forcible entry.
In fact, defendants admitted the truth of the foregoing facts in their answer and first
amended answer. The thrust of their defense was that they had occupied Lot No. 21, not Lot
No. 20, which is the land in question.
JUDICIAL NOTICE – MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
CITY OF MANILA vs GARCIA
Facts:

 Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area,
bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and
covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558.
 Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these
premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-
class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the
necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the
present.
 Mayor Fugoso give the Respondents a written permit labeled "lease contract" —
to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. For
their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.
 City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city
property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his
construction or improvement on the premises for the purpose of expansion of
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. Trial court directed defendants to
vacate the premises and to pay the rentals.
Issue:
Whether or not the houses and constructions by the respondent were public nuisance.
Ruling:
Yes. In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute
public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the
property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the
land. They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its
constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system
of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction". The public
nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even
without the aid of the courts.
 FLORENTINO GALLEGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:

 Appellant and his companions were about to hold a meeting of the Jehovah's
Witnesses in front of the public market of Lambunao, Iloilo. The chief of police,
Avelino Larrosa, approached appellant and inquired of him whether he had a
permit to hold said meeting.
 As appellant could not produce any, the chief of police enjoined him from so
proceeding with the meeting but instead of desisting in obedience to the chief of
police's intimation, appellant, in a challenging vein, addressed his followers, "You
must continue that, we will see what they can do for us.
 The chief of police warned appellant if he continued with the meeting, he was to
place him under arrest. However, appellant, disregarding the warning, continued
the meeting for at least 30 minutes more — whereupon, he was arrested and
charged accordingly.
 Petitioner the contends that he cannot be convicted of light disobedience
because, according to him, there is no proof of the existence of an ordinance in
force on requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting. For this purpose,
petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for taking judicial notice of Ordinance No.
2, series of 1957 of Lambunao, Iloilo, when the trial court itself allegedly did not
take cognizance of the ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or not the judicial notice may be used by the court.
Ruling:
No. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court, like the Court of Appeals, from
taking cognizance of a municipal ordinance. Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice
of matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the Court of
Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to appellant's (petitioner's) contention, there
was an existing municipal ordinance at the time providing for a previous permit for the holding of
religious meeting in public places." It is also contended that the order of the chief of police was
illegal and, therefore, not entitled to obedience because the ordinance applies only to meetings
held in places where the traffic is heavy. Here, it is claimed, there is no proof that the traffic
where the meeting was held was heavy. Petitioner adds that he was given a permit by the
mayor although at the time he could not produce it because it was given. It should not be lost
sight of that this is a prosecution for slight disobedience, not for violation of the ordinance.
Although petitioner may have legitimate reason to protest the order of the chief of police, he was
not justified in disobeying him and in assuming a bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to
proceed with their meeting, as in fact the latter did. As justice Malcolm once said, "To authorize
resistance (also disobedience) to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must
be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case
of excessive violence to enforce defendant's idea of a debatable legal question." The ordinance
in this case is reasonable regulation of the use of public streets.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON, Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the
City of Manila, Respondent.
Facts:

 Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent

mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on
December 28, 2001, after its publication.
 Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local
government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals and general welfare of the society.
 Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
 City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the
scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option."
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling:
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because
the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on
the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF RIVERS AND LAWS OF NATURE
DOMINGO BANATAO, DOROTEO BANATAO, FRANCISCO BANATAO, and ARSENIO
BANATAO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SALVADOR DABBAY, and JACINTO TULIAO,
defendants-appellants.
Facts:

 Forty or fifty years ago a new island made its appearance in the Cagayan River at or
near the spot where the land in question is situated. This island was called Fugu. Soon
after this island appeared, an ancestor of the plaintiffs, named Juan Banatao,
established himself upon its northern end, while one Quienes and others
respectively took possession of separate strips extending across the island but
lying further south.
 As a result of the formation of this island the Cagayan River was divided into two
branches. The change of the river has thus operated to destroy the character of Fugu as
an island; and it has thereby become connected terrestrially with the land lying on the
eastern bank of the Cagayan River; but the old name remains and the place is now
known as the sitio of Fugu.
 After the island of Fugu was formed changes of importance occurred in its location and
shape, owing to the shifting of the course of the Cagayan River. As a result of this action
of the river the island very slowly moved northward from the place of its first appearance
in the river, and slowly increased in size north wardly and west-wardly.
 On the other hand, the process of accretion, which was going on at the northern and
northwestern end of the island, continually added to that portion of the island where Juan
Banatao had planted himself.
 In this action the plaintiffs seek to obtain a judicial determination of the ownership of
certain land situated in the sitio of Fugu, barrio Malabbad, in the Province of Cagayan,
and to recover possession thereof from the defendants, with damages and costs. From a
judgment rendered in the Court of First Instance in favor of the plaintiffs the defendants
have appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are the owners of the land in dispute.
Ruling:
The possession of the plaintiffs, by their predecessors in interest, datesfrom before the
year 1881 and has continued, without interruption except as tothe part now occupied by the
defendant Salvador Dabbay. In the latter part of the year 1894 Jacinto Banatao, the son of Juan
Banatao, caused a possessory information to be drawn up and inscribed in the property
register, showing his occupation of that portion of the island then in his possession.
 The circumstance that this document was drawn up within a year after February 13,
1894, would indicate that the title thereby acquired pursuant to the provisions of the royal
decree of that date, was equivalent to that which would have been obtained byc omposition with
the State. And as such it was treated by the court below.
Whether this possessory information actually combined all the requisite
essentials to constitute a title equivalent to a composition title is immaterial, since the long
duration of the possession and cultivation of the property by the plaintiffs and their predecessors
in interest has perfected their title, whatever may have been the character of the document
referred to. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that the Cagayan River is a navigable
stream. This is assigned as error by the appellant. The circumstance that section 275 of the
Code of Civil Procedure does not especially mention the navigability of rivers as a matter
concerning which courts may take judicial notice is of no moment, as this subject is one which in
our opinion is clearly within the general principle there stated. After mentioning numerous
matters proper to be judicially noticed by the court, among which are the territorial extent of the
several islands, forming the Philippine Archipelago and its geographical divisions, said section
states that all similar matters of public knowledge shall be recognized by the courts
without the introduction of proof.
In conformity with the principle thus stated the courts may take judicial notice of the
existence and location within the territory over which they exercise jurisdiction of great rivers
and lakes, and their relation to the national or provincial boundaries, of the navigability
of streams constituting highways of commerce and other notorious facts concerning the
same. The presumption of general knowledge weakens as we pass to smaller and less
known streams; and yet, within the limits of any state the navigability of its largest rivers ought to
be generally known and the courts may properly assume it to be a matter of general knowledge,
and take judicial notice thereof. It will thus be seen that the arguments in favor of ownership in
the plaintiffs proceed upon the idea that the island of Fugu was originally property of the State,
that the plaintiff’s ancestor acquired title from the State by occupation and by virtue of the
possessory information recorded in his name, and that all the
accretion to said property belongs, under the provisions above cited, to him and his heirs. We
are of the opinion that the case is one which falls more properly under article366 of the Civil
Code and article 84 of the Law of Waters than under article 373of the Civil Code and that the
plaintiffs therefore have the better right. As was well observed by the trial judge the plaintiff’s
predecessors were the first to appropriate the new island; there is no evidence as to the width of
the eastern and western branch of the river at the time the island was formed; nor as to who
were the opposite riparian owners. Nor does it appear that any person claimed Fugu or any part
of it, as of the public domain, and the plaintiffs are therefore to be considered as having
acquired their title form the government.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MENESES
Facts:
 Herein accused-appellant, Roman Meneses was charged with the murder of
Cesar Victoria. The information provides that at around three o'clock in the
morning, victim was stabbed to death while sleeping by his seven-year old son
Christopher Victoria in a rented makeshift room in Tondo, Manila.
 The Prosecution presented four witnesses, one of which is the victim's son.
He testified that he was awakened from sleep and saw his father being stabbed
in the heart with a veinte nueve and after the assailant ran away, he cried.
 SPO3 Mendoza, one of the police officers who conducted the investigation,
testified that Christopher could not identify nor describe the attacker, but
the child said he could identify him because he knew his face.
 SPO3 Gonzales, on the other hand, testified that they arrested appellant based
on the report of Angelina Victoria, the appellant's wife, who implicated appellant
in the crime. The judgment of the lower court upon appellant's conviction is
anchored entirely on the testimony of the single eyewitness, Christopher Victoria,
who identified appellant as the one who he allegedly saw stab his father.

Issue:
Whether or not the child is a credible eyewitness.

Ruling:

No. The Court finds that the trustworthiness of the identification of appellant by
Christopher Victoria is dubious, raising reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as to
appellant's culpability. In the case at bar, the crime took place in a makeshift room. It is highly
improbable that a young boy, just roused from sleep and his eyes adjusting to the unit room,
could identify the attacker. Christopher could not name his father's attacker nor give a
description when he testified, but when he saw the appellant during a "show up"
investigation by the police, he identified Roman Meneses, as the perpetrator.
Thus, he knew the appellant prior to the crime, being his uncle, whom he stayed
with for some time, but failed to point appellant as the attacker when questioned by the
police immediately after the incident. The Court explicitly explained that when a person has
been a victim of the crime committed by a friend, relative, or other person previously familiar to
him, and decides to make a complaint to the police, it is to be expected that he would
immediately inform them of the name of the person they should arrest. The occasional failure of
a complaint to do this is a danger signal of which the courts have sometimes taken note.