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CASE 1

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CHIAO LIONG TAN V. CA
228 SCRA 75; 19 November 1993
NOCON, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle (Isuzu Elf van) which he purchased in March 1987 and
avers that he has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of said vehicle until it was taken from him
by his brother, respondent Tan Ban Yong. Petitioner contends that the vehicle is registered under his name,
that he purchased it at Balintawak Isuzu Motors for P100,000. He claims that he sent respondent to pay
for the van using his money; thus, the receipt for payment was placed in his name and that the latter is
working for his company, CLT Industries and that respondent refused to return the van and appropriated
the same for himself.

Respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family business and was just placed in petitioner’s name
because he is the remaining Filipino in the family residing in the country. When said business needed a
vehicle, he asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the down payment (P5,000) for the van
which would be available in about a month. Respondent paid the whole price after a month out of a loan
(P140,000) which he obtained from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Respondent then allowed the registration of the
vehicle under petitioner’s name as they were still on good terms and it was also their understanding that
he would keep the van for himself because the company was not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the
time of the purchase, he had been in possession of the van including the original registration papers but
allowing petitioner to use the van from time to time for deliveries of machinery. Tan Pit Sin as well as the
employee of Balintawak Isuzu Motors corroborated with respondent’s claim.

After hearing, the trial court found for private respondent. CA affirmed. Petitioner now seeks the reversal
of CA’s decision in his suit for replevin and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can decide the issue of ownership in a replevin case.

RULING:

YES. It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of possession.
Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determined nothing more than the right of
possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant's
plea and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties
to the possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved
in the same proceeding.

Since replevin is only a provisional remedy where the replevin plaintiff claims immediate delivery of personal
property pending the judgment of the trial court in a principal case, the petitioner should have filed in the
trial court as a main case an action to recover possession of the Isuzu Elf van which was in the possession
of the private respondent. Logically, the basis of petitioner's cause of action should have been his ownership
of said van.

Furthermore, a replevin action is primarily one for the possession of personalty, yet it is sufficiently
flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising or growing out of
the main controversy. Thus, in an action for replevin where the defendant is adjudged to possession,
he need not go to another forum to procure relief for the return of the replevied property or secure
judgment for the value of the property in case the adjudged return thereof could not be had.

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CASE 2

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CALUB v. CA
FACTS:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber
after the drivers failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thereafter, a criminal complaint
against Abuganda for violation of Section 68 [78) of the Revised Forestry Code.
The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR,
prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and
Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor
For the second time, one of the two vehicles was again apprehended. It was again loaded with forest
products and a criminal complaint was again filed against private respondents but the same was dismissed
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The vehicle owner and the driver filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded
vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial
court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court who referred said petition to respondent appellate court for
appropriate disposition but the same was dismissed by the latter. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
w/n the sieved motor vehicle can be subject of a replevin suit?
RULING:
NO. The subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. Thus, it could not be subject to an action
for replevin.
Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize subject property. This provision
makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents
unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-
310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products
at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load
of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there
was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, the
subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin.
In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff agumun, we elucidated further: ". . . the writ of replevin has been
repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding
judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid
seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...".

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CASE 3

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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, BR. 34, and NILDEFONSO MONTANO
G.R. No. 105760, July 7, 1997, FRANCISCO, J. (84 SCAD 209)

FACTS:

In 1978, spouses Crisanto de la Cruz and Pepita Montano mortgaged two parcels of land to
petitioner PNB for a loan of P24,000.00. In 1984, PNB extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage and was the
only bidder at the public auction sale. On the same day, a Certificate of Sale over said lots was issued in
favor of PNB and was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title. In 1986, for the failure of the
mortgagors to redeem the property within a period of one year, PNB filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The RTC granted granted the
petition and issued the writ.

Before implementation of the writ, petitioner Montano filed a Motion for the Dissolution of the Writ of
Possession alleging that he was instituted as tenant on the subject property even before 1972 by the former
owners of the land; the two lots are the subject matters of CAR Case before the Regional Trial Court of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija which he instituted in 1983 against the mortgagors; after the foreclosure of the subject
land, his counsel wrote PNB of the pending case; the issuance of said Writ would violate his rights; he was
issued a certification by the Cabiao-San Isidro Agrarian Reform Team that he is an agricultural lessee in
the subject landholding and another certification that he is an active member of the Samahang Nayon; and
in line with the ruling in "Clapano vs. Gapultos" that possession of property is given to a purchaser in Extra-
Judicial foreclosure unless a third-party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor,
he is to be considered a "third person". The RTC granted Montano's motion to dissolve the writ of
possession. PNB appealed but the case was referred to the Court of Appeals which initially rendered
judgment in favor of PNB but eventually reversed itself upon motion by Montano.

ISSUE:

Whether PNB is entitled to a Writ of Possession of the land in question.

RULING:

PNB is not entitled to a Writ of Possession. The Court ruled that, granting that PNB’s title over the subject
property has been consolidated or confirmed in its favor, it is not still entitled to a Writ of Possession, as
the same may be issued in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage only if the debtor is in
possession and no third person had intervened. Such requisite is evidently lacking in the case at bar as it
has been established that Montano has been in possession and finally adjudged as the tenant of the subject
landholding.

Even if the fact of tenancy had not been reflected on the title, PNB admitted that before they consented to
the mortgage, an ocular inspection was conducted on the landholding on the occasion of which, PNB’s
Credit Investigator already found Montano staying on the land and even interviewed the latter. It cannot
be denied therefore, that PNB had been put on notice by its actual knowledge of another person possessing
the land, no matter what the given reason may have been for Montano’s occupancy of the properties in
question.

Under Art. 428 of the NCC, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than
those established by law. As an incident of ownership, therefore, there is nothing to prevent the landowner
from donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant.

Petition is denied.

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CASE 4

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GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V. CA

177 SCRA 209

FACTS:

Spouse Jose are residents of Philadelphia, USA and the owners of parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing the herein petitioner to develop their land
into residential subdivision. Some part of this property developed was occupied by private respondents and
twenty others.

Private respondents filed an action of forcible entry against the petitioner with MTC of Antipolo, alleging
that they have been occupying and tilling the land they are holding twelve to fifteen years ago prior to the
promulgation of PD 27 and that they were deprived of due process of law.

MTC dismissed the complaint. Private respondents then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
CA. CA reversed the decision of MTC and RTC

Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property, private
respondents have a right of commerce an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by CA.

Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents are entitle to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.

RULING:

YES being the actual possessor of the property. Private respondents can commence a forcible entry case
against petitioners because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate.

Private respondents were already in peaceable possession of the property twelve to fifteen years prior to
petitioner’s entry. The title presented by petitioner may validly claim ownership, but such evidence does
not address the issue of prior actual possession nor there is evidence that Spouses Jose were ever in
possession of the subject property.

Moreover, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character
of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.

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CASE 5
SARMIENTO V. CA|CRUZ, 250 SCRA 108

FACTS: Cruz acquired by purchase a parcel of land. The adjacent lot of Sarmiento is still owned by the
family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is being used and occupied by the Sarmiento where a house
was constructed thereon. It was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that Sarmiento’s fence is encroaching
Cruz lot for about 71 square meters.

When the Cruz talked to the Sarmiento that she would like to remove the old fence so that she could
construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her property, Sarmiento refused to let Cruz remove
the said fence and alleged that if Cruz remove the said fence to construct a new one, she would take action
against the Cruz legally or otherwise;

That by virtue of the willful refusal of Sarmiento to allow Cruz to have the fence dismantled and/or to be
removed, Cruz is deprived of the possession and she was forced to hire the services of counsel and filed a
case for ejectment.

MTC decided for Cruz. Sarmiento appealed in the RTC, assailing the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC decided
for Sarmiento and held that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. CA reversed RTC and reinstated
the MTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not MTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment case? No.

RULING: A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals
that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary
dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71
square meters involved.

To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as the proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as when it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

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CASE 6
Bongato vs. Malvar

FACTS:
"The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner Teresita
Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200
belonging to the said spouses and erected thereon a house of... light materials.

The petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied; it being
proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of hearing. With a
new counsel, Atty. Viador C. Viajar, petitioner filed an... answer which the MTCC disregarded, the same
having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Later, with still another counsel, Atty. Jesus G.
Chavez of the Public Attorney's Office, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which the MTCC denied as being
contrary to the

Rule on Summary Procedure.

"Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question, and to pay
rentals, attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration

"On March 4, 1994, respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration 'only insofar
as to determine the location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether
they are located on one and the same lot or a lot different... from that involved in the criminal case for
Anti-Squatting

"The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by private respondents Malvar against
petitioner Bongato. The case is still pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City.
The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy was different from that involved in the anti-
squatting case.[6] It further ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that
it did not err in rejecting... petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned that the MTCC had
passed upon the issue of ownership of the property merely to determine possession -- an action that did
not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.[
ISSUES:

1. "Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one-year period from date of alleged
entry;

2. "Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to
Dismiss was a prohibited pleading.

RULING:

On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed by respondents
had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992.[45] Hence, even if
Severo Malvar may be the owner of... the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary
action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year.[46] Respondents
should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion... reivindicatoria, not
before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry.[47] Their cause of action for forcible entry
had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[48]

Second Issue:

Motion to Dismiss

Petitioner further argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is
not a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[49]
We agree.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve "an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases."[50] The speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public
policy,[51] and the Rule... should equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession

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of the premises is already illegal from the start.[52] For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and
prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time.

Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio,
upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.[53] However, as forcible
entry and detainer cases are summary in... nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural
technicalities should be carefully avoided[54] and should not be allowed to override substantial justice.[55]

Pursuant to Section 36[56] of BP 129,[57] the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the Rule on Summary
Procedure in Special Cases.[58] Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading.

Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however,[59] a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings:

"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;... x x x x x x x x x"
Further, a court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by
their silence, acquiescence or even express consent.[60] A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court
over the action at any stage of the... proceedings and even on appeal.[61] That the MTCC can take
cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly
filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino:[62]

"The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed
after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no
provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It... must likewise be pointed out that
MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception
to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed
under paragraph (a) thereof, x x... x."

In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously
holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.[63] Because the Complaint
for forcible entry was filed on July 10,... 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was
applicable.

Finally, the MTCC should have taken into account petitioner's Answer,[64] in which she averred that she
had been "in constant occupation on said land in question since birth on March 17, 1941 up to the present,
being an heir of the late Emiliana

Eva-Bongato, who inherited said property from her father Raymundo Eva with considerable improvements
thereon." It should have heard and received the evidence adduced by the parties for the precise purpose
of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the subject... matter.[65] And after such
hearing, it could have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[66] In this way, the long, drawn out
proceedings that took place in this case could have been avoided.[67]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint
for forcible entry is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

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CASE 7

EUGENIO DE LA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and CRISTINA VILLANUEVA

Petitioner Eugenio De La Cruz claims to be the owner and actual possessor of a residential lot, having
possessed and occupied it openly, publicly, notoriously, adversely against the whole world, and in the
concept of an owner, for more than 30 years. Private respondent Cristina Villanueva is a purchaser of the
same lot from the Ramos brothers, who claim to be successors-in-interest of a previous possessor of the
same.

FACTS:

Petitioner contracted a loan from the parents of private respondent Villanueva, mortgaging the
disputed land as security. Thereafter, the land became subject of an application for registration under the
Land Registration Act by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that, under said Act, they had a better claim
than petitioner, being successors-in-interest of a previous possessor of the land. Petitioner opposed the
application which was denied on the ground that the land, not having been reclassified for other purposes,
remained part of the forest reserve, hence, alienable.
Shortly thereafter, the brothers successfully pursued the reclassification of the land and were granted
ownership of the same and the same was registered in their own name as owners, and they later sold the
land to Villanueva. Upon learning of the said sale, petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance claiming
ownership of the said land for more than 30 years but it was dismissed.
The persistent petitioner opined that the decision of the trial court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Miguel Marcelo, where it ruled that the primary right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated
the land in good faith, much prior to its classification, must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by
after-events which could not have been anticipated. He relies on the equitable principle of estoppel, alleging
that, by virtue of the contract of mortgage, private respondent and her parents thereby tacitly
acknowledged him as the true and lawful owner of the mortgaged property. As such, they are estopped
from claiming for themselves the disputed land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is vested with a better right over the residential lot to which he possessed and
devoted time, effort and resources.

RULING: NO.

Unfortunately for him, Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, is inapplicable in the present
case. In the present case, petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the
Government as part of the forest zone. In fact, the land remained part of the forest reserve until such time
that it was reclassified into alienable and disposable land at the behest of the Ramoses. As succinctly stated
by this Court in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, a positive act of Government is needed to declassify
land which is classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for other purposes. Until
such lands have been properly declared to be available for other purposes, there is no disposable land to
speak of. Absent the fact of declassification prior to possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner,
the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired
by prescription.

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CASE 8
GACDC AND SPS. RENATO AND DELIA LEGASPI v. CA
GR NO. 163735, November 24, 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:

On June 8, 1995, petitioner Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation (GACDC), represented
by its president, petitioner Renato Legaspi, obtained a loan of P2,600,000 from private respondent PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCILFI).

As security, GACDC, represented by petitioner spouses Renato and Delia Legaspi, executed a real estate
mortgage for P450,000 in favor of PCILFI. The mortgage covered three parcels of land located in Barrio
Balibago, Angeles City. When GACDC failed to pay the loan on maturity, the mortgage was foreclosed
extrajudicially. PCILFI was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. A certificate of sale dated February
3, 1998 was accordingly issued to PCILFI and duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City.
On April 12, 2000, PCILFI filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City which was granted. Consequently, GACDC filed an urgent omnibus motion in which
the trial court issued the first assailed order denying for lack of merit the aforesaid motion. GACDC elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the assailed orders of the trial court. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER APPEAL IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY IN ACTIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF

POSSESSION PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3135, AS AMENDED.

RULING:

After serious consideration of the arguments raised by the parties, the Court find the petition without merit.

Section 8 of Act No. 3135 states:

SEC. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty
days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession
cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was
not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in
accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered
Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor
of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal
from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-
six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.

Clearly, the remedy of petitioners from the assailed Orders of the trial court was to file a petition to set
aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession. Under the aforequoted provision, the aggrieved party may
thereafter appeal from any disposition by the court on the matter.

We note, however, that what petitioners filed with the trial court were an urgent omnibus motion and a
supplement to the urgent omnibus motion to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession. In the
said motions, petitioners alleged there was no basis for the extrajudicial foreclosure because the mortgage
was void.

Note that the nullity of the mortgage is not covered by the remedy outlined under Section 8 of Act No.
3135. The said provision specifically lists the following exclusive grounds for a petition to set aside the sale
and cancel the writ of possession: (1) that the mortgage was not violated; and (2) that the sale was not
made in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135.

Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing
the issuance of a writ of possession. Indeed, regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession.
Petitioners should have filed a separate and independent action for annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure. The remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 is inapplicable in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

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CASE 9

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAMERTO NARVAEZ

GR NO. L-33466-67, APRIL 20, 1983

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of South Cotabato in Criminal Cases for murder,
which after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8,
1070.

That at the time the crime of murder took place, Graciano Juna, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez
with the two deceased Flaviano Rubia and Davis Fleischer were fencing the land of Davis’ father George
Fleischer. The place where the fencing took place was at the house and rice drier of Mamerto Narvaez. At
that time he was taking arrest and when he heard people working on the fence, chiselling the walls of his
house, he then addressed the group to stop the activity but then the deceased Fleischer replied in a not so
respective manner that made the accused Narvaez lost his equilibrium, got his gun and shot Fleischer first.
Thereafter, Rubia ran towards the jeep, knowing that there was a gun inside the vehicle; accused Narvez
shot him as well. As a result both of the victims died.

It appears that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the
Fleischer and Co. Inc. of which Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and the deceased Rubia was the
assistant manager, on the one hand, and land settlers of COtabato, among whom was appellant.

Narvaez, the appellant, was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to
Mindanao in 1937 and settled at Maitum, South Cotabato. He established his residence there, built his
house, cultivated the area and was among those who petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to order
the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2000
hectares for distribution among the settlers.

Fleischer and Company, headed by George Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros Oriental,
filed sales application on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes
Plantation Company covering 1,017.2234 hectares.

Meanwhile in 1941, the subdivision was ordered and a public surveyor did the actual survey
but the report was not submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the second world war. According
to the survey, only 300 hectares were identified and were set aside for Sales Application while the rest
were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares to be distributed among the settlers.

The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open
for disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. And the same company was the only bidder
for P6,000.00.But because of the protest from the settlers, the corresponding award in its favour was held
in abeyance while an investigator was sent by the Director of Lands with an amicable settlement signed
by the representative of the settlers. The amicable settlement was later repudiated by the settlers, but
the Dir. Of Lands, acting upon the report of his investigator, approved the same and ordered to formal
award the land in question to Fleischer and Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, however, it affirmed the decision in favour of the company.

The settlers filed a Civil Case for the purpose annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources that affirms the awarding of the contested land to the Fleischer Company. They
also appealed the decision to the CA but then it affirmed the decision of the CFI in favour for the company.

This resulted to the ouster of the settlers by the order of the CFI from the land they have been
occupying for 30 years. In order to avoid trouble the appellant Narvaez dismantled and built his house
near the highway which is not far from the site of the dismantled house. The second house is not far from
the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor was rented. He also transferred his store from his former
residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15
meters eat of the house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house which is used as
drying grains and copra.

On November 14, 1966, the settlers through their representative Jose Gamboa filed a Civil Case to
obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of ward with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the
pendency of the case, Narvaez entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he agreed to to

11
lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 sq.m. from the Lot 38 of the company for a consideration of
P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still
uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the question of ownership could be decided. He ever paid the
agreed rental, though he alleges that the milling job they did with Rubia was considered payment.

On August 21, 1968, both the deceased, together with their laborers started the fencing until the day the
incident happened.

Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction. That the court erred in convicting him that he
acted in defense of his rights.

Issue:
Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant’s house and
to shut off his ingress and egress (enter and leave) to his residence and the highway?

HELD:
In Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or
tenements. However, at the time of the incident, the Civil Case filed for the annulment of the order of
award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in Court. The parties could have not known that the
case would be dismissed over a year after the incident on the ground of res judicata by the Court of Appeals
of the Civil Case filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the company, between the same parties,
which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent repudiation by
the settlers of said compromise agreement and that such supplemental petition filed by the Rep. of the
Philippines on November 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate of title
issued to the company, on the ground that the Dir. Of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due to
his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government’s
supplemental petition was premised on the ground that after its filing on November 1968, nothing more
was done by the petitioner Rep. of the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and arguments of
plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.

Hence it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favourable judgement in
the Civil Case filed in November 1966 and his execution of the contract of lease on February 1967 was just
to avoid trouble.

In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 within which to vacate the land.
He should have allowed the appellant to peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of
chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant’s entrance and exit to the highway.

The Civil Code provides in Article 536:

In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor
who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of
a thing mist invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

Article 539: Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed there in he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the
laws and the Rule of Court.

Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage
to appellants; house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleasing them to stop and
talk things over with him. The assault on appellant’s property amounts to unlawful aggression as
contemplated by law.

Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent
kind.

In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant’s property which he had the
right to resist pursuant to the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
Article 429: The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
to reply or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

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Case 10

Villafuerte vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Spouses Villafuerte, herein petitioners, owned a Gasoline station located at the land owned by
private respondents De Mesa, Daleon and Mrs Vilafuerte’s mother. Upon expiration of the lease, the
private respondents expressed their intention to the spouses to vacate the land. However, despite
this, the spouses refused to vacate the land. As such, the private respondents with the aid of
several others and without the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of the Gasoline
station through building of fence on the same property.
The petitioners filed a complaint for damages and preliminary mandatory injunction seeking
vindication for the alleged malicious and unlawful fencing of the plaintiffs' business premises. The
trial court ruled that with the expiration of the lease on the defendants' property, the plaintiffs have
no more right to stay thereon and, therefore, cannot pretend to have a clear and unmistakable right
to an injunctive writ and accordingly denied their application. After this dismissal, the petitioners
amended their complaint and allege a claim for damages amounting to P2.1 Million — based on
their submitted amounts for alleged damges, and to grant them just and equitable remedies under
the law. The Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners but when elevated to the CA, the claim for
damages was reduced.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in substantially reducing the amount of damages earlier awarded to them by
the trial court.

RULING:
The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA. The Court have exhaustively perused the records of
this case and thus conclude that petitioners have miserably failed to proffer evidence capable of
sustaining their plea for actual damages.
Evidently, in establishing the amount of actual damages for the merchandise inventory, office
equipment, and materials, petitioners relied solely on their own assessment of the prices of these
items as well as the damage thereto purportedly occasioned by the fencing of the gasoline station.
This is clearly demonstrated by the inconsistent stance of petitioner Pertlita with regard to the
percentage of damaged merchandise stored in the gasoline station. Mere speculations cannot be
relied with. It is required to depend upon competent proof that the claimant had suffered and on
evidence of the actual damages.

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CASE 11
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), petitioner, vs. HON. RUMOLDO R.
FERNANDEZ, Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54); and the Heirs of the
Deceased Spouses JUAN CUIZON and FLORENTINA RAPAYA, respondents.

FACTS:
The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the Opon Cadastre situated in Lapu-Lapu City,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2537 (May 19, 1982) and registered in the names of
Florentina Rapaya et al.

On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in
which they declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of the aforesaid lot.
Consequently, they were issued TCT No. 12467 on July 8, 1982.

Considering that the said lot was among the objects of expropriation proceedings, the RTC rendered a
partial Decision on August 11, 1982. In that Decision, the RTC approved the Compromise Agreement
entered into between the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered owners of Lot
No. 4673; namely, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon. In accordance with the approved
Compromise Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation for the expropriation of the subject
property.

Petitioner acquired title over Lot No. 4673 and the corresponding TCT No. 12788 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on October 13, 1982.

On July 29, 1996, private respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and Damages
against petitioner and Jorgea-Igot Soroño et al. The Complaint alleged that herein private respondents
had been excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It likewise sought the nullification of
several documents, including TCT No. 12788 dated October 13, 1992, issued in the name of herein
petitioner.

On February 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of prescription.
This Motion was denied by respondent judge on January 12, 1998. A Motion for Reconsideration thereof
was likewise denied on March 31, 1998.

On April 30, 1998, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed
the Petition. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUES: Whether reconveyance lies against the expropriated property in this case. -- NO

HELD:
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the
fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the
four-year period shall be counted therefrom. Clearly then, private respondents’ action for reconveyance
based on fraud has already prescribed.

Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust would have already
prescribed just the same, because such action prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The imprescriptibility of an action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. Undisputedly, private respondents are not in possession
of the disputed property.

Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a remedy of those whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed
of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to
prosper, the property should not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

We find that the property has already been conveyed to the government in appropriate
expropriation proceedings, the regularity or validity of which has not been questioned. Petitioner should,
therefore, enjoy the security afforded to innocent third persons under our registration laws. Equally
important, its title to the property must be rightfully preserved.

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CASE 12
G.R. No. 161028 January 31, 2005

TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE
GUZMAN and HON. JOSE G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon City, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Teresita V. Idolor obtained a loan from respondent-spouses Gumersindo and Iluminada
De Guzman secured by a real estate mortgage over a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
25659.
Upon default by petitioner in the payment of her obligation, respondent-spouses instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings against the real estate mortgage. During the auction sale, respondent-spouses
emerged as the highest bidder and were issued a Certificate of Sale.

The sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint
for annulment of the Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
a writ of preliminary injunction.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari filed by respondent-spouses, annulled the same for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner was entitled to a writ of injunction

HELD: NO. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests.6
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be
aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting
of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either
the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction
or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends
to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling
reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated.9 It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to
speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. Petitioner had
one year from the registration of the sheriff’s sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her
right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession
of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against private
respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to
show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already
expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for
denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought – in other words, that she shows no equity.11 The possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction.

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CASE 13

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCLAI)

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA)
254 SCRA 220

FACTS:

A parcel of timber land (12.82 has) located in Cagayan De Oro City was released as an alienable
and disposable public land on Sep 4, 1956. Subsequently, COCLAI was authorized to survey the
land for the purpose of subdivision into residential slots. COCLAI filed for a Sales Patent Application
for the lot but it was held in abeyance by the Bureau of Lands because there was a pending
annulment case against a certain Benedicta Macabebe Salcedo who has an original certificate of
title over the said property. Meanwhile, the NHA filed an expropriation proceeding to acquire a
vast area, including the land in this case but was also suspended due to the pending Salcedo case.
Then, the court decided against Salcedo annulling her OCT and declaring the same land as public
land.

Subsequently, the Director of Bureau of Lands ordered for the inventory of the lands involved in
expropriation proceeding. There it was found out that COCLAI members occupied the said land by
virtue of the survey authorization. As per Presidential Proclamation this parcel of land became the
subject of a Slum Improvement and Resettlement project of the NHA and subsequently, the Bureau
of Lands rejected the subdivision survey and Sales Patent Application submitted by the COCLARI.

NHA demolished the structures erected by COCLAI. In turn, COCLAI filed a complaint for forcible
entry (Civil Case 11204) and damages against NHA employees and police officers. After due
hearing, the MTCC ruled in favor of COCLAI and ruled for the restoration of their portions of the
land. The RTC affirmed the ruling (July 23, 1990).

Meanwhile, while the civil case is pending, an original certificate of title for the land in question
was issued in the name of NHA (January 3, 1990). NHA filed for a suit for “Quieting of Title with
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction” against COCLAI. Additionally, the RTC also issued
a TRO, stopping COCLAI from enforcing the results of the civil case (11204) but this was later
dismissed. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the NHA has a better right to the possession of the lot as a necessary consequence of
ownership

RULING:

YES, NHA has a better right. Apart from mere administration as petitioners argue, the certificate
of title vested not only ownership but also the right of possession as a necessary consequence of
the right to ownership.

Furthermore, on the issue of forcible entry – the only issue involved is mere physical possession
(possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership. Since the
case filed by COCLAI to the MTCC was merely that of forcible entry, the legal title is not in question.
The judgment rendered is effective only with respect to possession of the land. BUT after the
denial of its Sales Patent Application, COCLAI’s occupation/possession of the land has become
illegal. The members have become mere squatters whose continuous possession is considered
bad faith. They will acquire no legal right over the land.

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CASE 14

JULIO LUCERO, vs. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.,

FACTS

The order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, now on appeal before this Court, speaks to this effect:
"Regarding the writ of possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of possession
is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is
no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has
already been entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered owner."
Accordingly, it granted a writ of possession in favor of movant, now appellee, Julio Lucero. There was an
opposition on the part of oppositors, all surnamed Loot, now appellants. The lower court failed to see merit
in the opposition interposed. It explained why: "The opposition interposed by the oppositors to the effect
that there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion is not under oath is trivial in
its nature and consequently untenable." Accordingly, the writ of possession, as prayed for, was issued.
There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession filed by the oppositors due to 1) They were
not oppositors and defeated parties in the previous land registration proceeding and 2) there is pending
case between the parties for reconveyance, but their motion was denied, such order of denial “This Court
adheres to the previous ruling that inasmuch as no writ of possession has been issued in this case, it is the
ministerial duty of this Court to issue one in compliance of the provisions of Act 496 as amended." as well
as their numerous subsequent motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law

HELD: YES, the order granting the writ of possession was based on a decision promulgated on a land
registration case in 1938, which became a final decree on October 29, 1941.

After the final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only a ministerial duty of the court if no
writ has been issued to the registered owner yet. The final decree, in effect, immediately empowered the
court to enforce the order/judgment/decree. This automatic process is to avoid further delay and
inconvenience to a successful land registration litigant if he were compelled to commence another action
to secure possession.Furthermore, there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession.The writ may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration
case, but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion of the land during land
registration proceeding. the issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration
proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently, any person
unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be
subject to a judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration
court to issue said writ when asked by the successful claimant

As to the questions of fact raised by the Loots, Nothing is better settled than that where the correctness of
findings of fact of lower court are assailed, The CA is the proper forum. If resort directly to SC then appellant
must be deemed to have waived the opportunity to question the correctness of the findings otherwise, his
to inquire into such finding and to limit himself to disputing the correctness of the law applied.

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CASE 15

VENCILAO V. VANO

FACTS:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of land in question.

1) In the first case, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the subject
parcel of land, which resulted in an OCT. After the heirs tried to take possession of the property, a
reconveyance of property was filed against them by Vencila et al., asserting that:

a. They have acquired the land by purchase or inheritance – and in OCEN possession for 30 years
b. The parcels of land that they own were by mistake part of Juan Reyes’ estate

2) The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owners/heirs of the land.
After her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in the name of
several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against petitioners.

3) The third case involved one of the registered owners of the land who filed a petition for complaint
against the occupants who refused to vacate the land and sign the Sheriff’s return.

The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case of reconveyance stating that the other parties had no
cause of action and that they were barred by prior judgement already.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, then set aside the same order, and then reversed itself
partially (some cases were dismissed, some were not -- since there were several petitioners). The parties
whose cases were dismissed appealed to the SC.

These petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said
land registration case, as their names don’t appear in the amended application for registration. They
argue that they have occupied the parcels of land for more than 30 years which began long before the
application for registration and that even after registration, they continued to possess the land.

ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not res judicata is applicable in an action for reconveyance
2) Whether or not the writ of possession may be issued against them considering that the petitioners
were not the defeated parties in the registration case

RULING
1. No. Res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral
proceedings. A final judgment is conclusive even in subsequent cases involving the same parties and their
successors-in-interest as long as the ff. requisites are present:

a. The former judgment must be final

b. Rendered by a court having jurisdiction on the subj matter and of the parties (CFI Bohol had
jurisdiction)
c. The judgment was based on the merits
d. There is identity of parties, subj matter, and cause of action between the first and second actions
(Land registration and action for reconveyance)
2. Yes. A writ of possession may be issued not only against a person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.
Note: In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its
registration in his name necessarily carries with it the right of ownership (right to possess-may be
obtained through writ of possession).

On the issue of contempt, the court ruled that the occupants were not guilty. Contempt only applies
when after the sheriff dispossess or eject the occupants, they enter/attempt to enter the property. It was
the sheriff’s and not the petitioners’ fault that there was delivery of possession was unsuccessful.

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CASE 16
Caisip v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17 Concepcion, C. J.

FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of
Hacienda Palico situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, the same land used to be tenanted by Cabalag’s father
when he was still alive. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia, administered by Antonio Chuidian, and
supervised by the overseer, Felix Caisip. Prior to the incident involved, Guevarra sought recognition as a
lawful tenant of Royas y Cia from the Court of Agrarian Relations but his action was dismissed. Thereafter,
Roxas y Cia filed an action against Guevarra for forcible entry with prayer that Guevarra be ejected from
the premises of Lot 105-A. The Justice of the Peace of Court of Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia
and on June 6, 1959, a trouble between Cabalag and Caisip occurred regarding the cutting of sugarcane.

A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Caisip. Due
to Cabalag’s tenacious attitude, Caisip sought the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu. The Deputy
Sheriff, however, informed Caisip that his request to eject Cabalag cannot be acted upon without a proper
court order. Nevertheless, the Chief of Police assigned Sergeant Ignacio Rojales and Corporal Frederico
Villadelrey to Haciendo Palico. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding a portion of Lot 105-A which
was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do so. So, Caisip went to
Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey and brought them to Cabalag. Rojales told Cabalag to stop weeding but
she insisted on her right to stay in the said lot. While in squatting position, Cabalag was grabbed by Rojales
who twisted her right arm and wrested the trowel she was holding. Villadelrey held her left hand and
together Rojales forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation while Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn
gun. Cabalag shouted, “Ina ko po! Ina ko po!” and was heard by some neighbors. Zoilo Rivera, head of
the tenant organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went with them on their way to the municipal
building. Upon arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales and Villadelrey to the policemen on duty, who
interrogated her. But upon representations made by Rivera, she was released and allowed to go home.
Cabagan then filed a complaint charging Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the crime of “grave coercion.”

The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as charged. On appeal, The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others, in the exercise of his right granted by
Article 429, is reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property.

HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429. This is totally inapplicable to
the case, for, having been given 20 days from June 6th within which to vacate the lot, Cabalag did not, on
June 17th and within said period, invades or usurps the said lot. She had merely remained in possession
thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor by reason of the prior order
of the Justice of Peace Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an actual or threatened
physical invasion or usurpation. They expelled Cabalag from a property which she and her husband were
in possession, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in
said property up to June 26th, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them without a judicial
order. It is clear, therefore, that Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of violence, and without legal
authority, had prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited by law (weeding and being
in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something against her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said
lot), whether it be right or wrong, thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the
Revised Penal Code.

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CASE 17
HEIRS OF VENCILAO V. CA

One may not acquire property by prescription when that property is titled to another under the Torrens
System. It does not even matter whether occupation by the adverse claimant was open, notorious and
continuous. As long as the TCT is in someone else’s name, the property belongs to person who holds the
TCT

FACTS:

On Feb 12, 1990, the heirs of Vencilao filed a complaint to quiet the title and recover a piece of land against
spouses Gepalgo.

Said heirs asserted that they acquired the land from their father who was in open, peaceful and notorious
enjoyment of the same. They presented tax declarations to prove said ownership
On the other hand, the Gepalgo spouses denied the claim and for proof as registered owners, presented
TCT No. 16042 which they acquired on public auction from the PNB.

RTC ruled in favor of Vencilao because the latter had been in possession, cultivation and enjoyment for
more than 30 years- long before a title was ever issued to the Gepalgos.

Upon appeal, the CA reversed and awared the property to Gepalgos because the latter were buyers in good
faith and holders in due course. Furthermore, they held a Torrens Title. That was the gold standard of
ownership for registered land. Naturally, the heirs of Vencilao trooped to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Gepalgos had better right to the land.

HELD:

No. The RTC erroneously found for the petitioners. True, the Vencilaos enjoyed the property for more than
30 years. However, prescription does not run against registered land. No one may acquire by prescription
or adverse possession land that is titled and registered even if occupation is adverse, open and notorious.
A Certificate of Title is absolute and unbeatable evidence of ownership in favor of the person whose name
appears upon it. It binds the whole world.

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CASE 18
Heirs of Juan Oclarit vs. CA
Facts:

Juan Ocalrit purchased an unregistered land in Bohol for P100 from Macalos. This particular land did not
have specified boundaries, as it was only indicated that the borders were a brook, land of Gales, and
another of Baja. He subsequently purchased 5 more unregistered parcels of land from Gales, one of which
was an irrigated rice and coconut lands, which is now the subject of the action.

Balasabas apparently entered the land about 15 years later and replaces the J.O. labels on top of the trees
with F.G (Felipa Gales, his mother). The heirs of Oclarit then filed an action for the quieting of the title and
damages against Balasabas, averring that Oclarit exercised dominion and ownership openly, peacefully,
adversely and uninterrupted. The deceased even planted coconut trees and other crops on the land,
enjoyed their fruits and even paid realty tax on the land.

RTC initially found for Balasabas after having a Commissioner survey the lands and discovered the
discrepancy between the boundaries indicated in the Deed of Sales and the one written on the tax
declarations. The CA, however, reversed the decision, and ruled that Oclarit is the rightful owner of the
land.

Issue:
WON the lands claimed by Balasabas are actually – foreign and alien to the lands claimed by
Oclarit, making these lands actually his property.

Ruling:
The court held that that while it is true that tax declarations are not strong proof to claim one’s
property as his, it will stand in court should these tax declarations be coupled with one’s exercise of
ownership, such as those proven by Oclarit’s heirs.
Furthermore, although what defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its descriptions,
but the boundaries laid down, in cases such as this one, where the boundaries are unclear, the actual size
of the land gains importance.

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CASE 19
DOMINICA CUTANDA, SEBASTIAN CUTANDA, JUANARIO CUTANDA, SOTERO CUTANDA,
CRISPIN CUTANDA, FLORENCIO CUTANDA, TRINIDAD CUTANDA, NICANOR CUTANDA,
GABINA CUTANDA FLORES, and CLAUDIO CUTANDA, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ROBERTO
CUTANDA, namely, GERVACIO CUTANDA, SOPRONIO C. CUTANDA, JORGE CUTANDA, and
CRISPIN G. AVENIDO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts of the Case:

On August 4, 1988, private respondents brought an action for recovery of possession, accounting and
damages against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. They alleged 1 that in the 1900’s,
their grandfather, Roberto Cutanda, 2 parcels of land in Bohol, and upon his death, his children became
owners of said land by inheritance. They left Bohol and established residence in Leyte. In 1988, they
returned to Bohol hoping to work on the land that was left to them. However, they discovered that these
lands were already in the possession of their relatives—heirs of their uncles and aunts.

Contending that private respondents had no cause of action, petitioners denied that private respondents’
predecessor-in-interest, Roberto Cutanda, was the original owner of the lands in question. Instead, they
claimed that the owner was their uncle and predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Cutanda. It was alleged that
Anastacio Cutanda died without children and that the real properties in question were inherited by his
brothers and sisters whose children are the present petitioners. Claiming a better right to possess the
subject properties, petitioners alleged that while they occupied the shares which their parents inherited
from Anastacio Cutanda, some of them also worked as tenants cultivating the lands of their co-petitioners.
Furthermore, they claim rightful ownership of the land as they have been in open, contiguous, adverse,
and uninterrupted possession of these for about 55 years.

The trials court found for the Petitioners. However, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights of the heirs of Roberto Cutanda have already prescribed, thus, giving rightful
ownership to the Petitioners?
HELD: The action brought by the respondents to the court was one of accion publiciana to recover the
right to possession and to be declared rightful owners of the land. Since the complaint actually put in issue
the ownership of the land, it should thus be treated properly as an accion reinvindicatoria.

Nevertheless, both have already prescribed as these rights are extinguished if not brought within 10 years
from dispossession. Therefore, the petitioners have indeed acquired possession and ownership of the land
in question by prescription, as the respondents failed to bring this action only 55 years later.

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CASE 20
G.R. NO. 145470 December 9, 2005
SPS. LUIS V. CRUZ and AIDA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ALEJANDRO FERNANDO, SR., and RITA FERNANDO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Luis Cruz and Aida Cruz (petitioners) are occupants of the front portion of a 710-square meter
property located in Sto. Cristo, Baliuag, Bulacan.

On 21 October 1994, Spouses Alejandro Fernando, Sr. and Rita Fernando (respondents) filed before the
RTC a complaint for accion publiciana against the petitioners, demanding the latter to vacate the premises
and to pay the amount of P500.00 a month as reasonable rental for the use thereof. Respondents alleged
that they are the owners of the property having bought the same from Spouses Clodualdo and Teresita
Glorioso pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated 9 March 1987. They also alleged that the Gloriosos offered to
sell to the petitioners the rear portion of the property to which the sale was embodied in a Kasunduan in
August 6, 1983 but the transaction did not materialize due to the latter’s failure to exercise their option and
for this reason, the Spouses Fernando were able to buy the whole property.

However, despite repated demands, petitioners refused to vacate the property. Petitioners argued that the
Kasunduan dated 6 August 1983 they made with the Gloriosos is a perfected contract of sale and that the
agreement has already been “partially consummated” as they already relocated their house from the rear
portion of the lot to the front portion that was sold to them. They also alleged that respondents are buyers
in bad faith fo having bought the property knowing that it was previously sold to them by the Gloriosos.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents and ordered the petitioners to vacate the property
and pay the rent beginning from 2 October 1994 when the case was filed before the RTC.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed RTC’s Decision. Hence the instant
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Spouses Cruz , petitioners have a right of ownership over the property. -- NO

HELD:
The SC held that the terms and conditions of the Kasunduan show that it is a contract to sell and that a
contract of sale is yet to be consummated and thus ownership of the property remained in the Gloriosos.
The SC also held that the Spouses Cruz have no superior right of ownership or possession to speak of.
Their occupation of the property was merely through the tolerance of the owners. Evidence on record
shows that the Spouses Cruz and their predecessors were able to live and build their house on the property
through the permission and kindness of the previous owner, Pedro Hipolito, who was their relative, and
subsequently, Teresita Glorioso, who is also their relative. They have no title or, at the very least, a contract
of lease over the property. Based as it was on mere tolerance, the Spouses Cruz possession could neither
ripen into ownership nor operate to bar any action by the Spouses Fernando to recover absolute possession
thereof.

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CASE 21
G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required
the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots
in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-
64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They
further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police
power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein.”

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property
was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On
the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would
justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot
be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other
business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate
does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but
also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use
but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover
from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue
of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest
interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and

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society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied
liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to
the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property in the state is
held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations
in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and
regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is
possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of
the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that
such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive
wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of a private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t)
of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place
subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod
may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance”
it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties
to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from
laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities
of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of
the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-
owners. Petition for review is dismissed.

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Case 22
Spouse Custodio and Spouses Santos vs CA
GR No. 116100
February 9, 1996
Regalado, J

Facts:
Pacifico Mabasa, the original plaintiff died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his
surviving spouse Ofelia and children.

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment situated in Taguig, Metro Manila. He acquired
the property through a contract of sale last September 1981. Said property is surrounded by other
immovable properties, and there were tenants occupying the property.

Sometime in 1982 when one tenant vacated the apartment, there had been an adobe fence constructed
by the Santoses along the passageway, which Moratorium later on constructed an extended fence which
enclosed the entire passageway.

RTC rendered a decision ordering Custodio and Santos to give permanent ingress and egress and ordering
Mabasa to pay Custodio and Santos the sum of 8,000 as indemnity for permanent use of passageway.

CA affirmed with modification, grant of damages to Mabasa.

Issue:

WON Mabasa has the right to demand for right of way.

Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and
enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is
usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon
his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an
unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property
makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or
enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience
arising from said use can be considered a mere consequence of community life.

SC reversed CA decision and reinstated RTC ruling.

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CASE 23

Northern Motors Inc. vs Herrera Facts:

Facts:

Nothern Motors filed a complaint against Ralph Taguba and other person named as John Doe, alleging that
Taguba executed in favour of NM a promissory note which bound Taguba to pay NM the sum of 18,623
php in monthly instalments. As security on payment of the PN, Taguba on the same date executed in favour
of NM a chattel mortgage over a 1966 Impala Sedan. The register of mortgage shows that upon default in
the payment of any instalment or interest due the total principal sum remaining unpaid, with accrued
interest shall at once become due and demandable and the mortgaged car, shall on demand, be delivered
by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, otherwise the mortgagee is authorized to take possession of the car
wherever it may be found and have it brought to Manila at the expense of the mortgagor. Taguba failed
and refused several instalments making the entire unpaid balance of the PN in the sum of P17,659 due and
demandable with accumulated interest. Of the options available in the mortgage, the petitioner elected to
avail extrajudicial foreclosure. NM demanded delivery of said vehicle pursuant to terns of the chattel
mortgage, but Taguba failed and refused to make such delivery. Judge Herrera denied the petition for
replevin instituted by NM because the rules require that an affidavit be submitted alleging that the Nm is
the owner of the property claimed or that he is entitled to such possession. Hence this action for certiorari.

Issue:
WON a replevin suit would prosper without surrendering the property to a sheriff.

Held:

Yes. The rules do not require that in action for replevin, the plaintiff should allege that the mortgagee has
asked or directed a public officer to foreclose the mortgage and that the mortgagor has refused to surrender
the mortgaged chattel to such public officer. What Section 2 Rule 60 requires is that upon applying for an
order for replevin, the plaintiff must show that he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant with an allegation on the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for any tax
assessment or fine levied pursuant to law nor seized under any execution, or attachment against the
property of such plaintiff or if so seized that it is exempt from seizure, the affidavit must also gate the
actual value of the property. In determining the sufficiency of the application for writ of replevin, the
allegations thereof and the recitals of the documents appended thereto and made part thereof should be
considered. Thus it is alleged in the complaint that "it is also expressly agreed between the parties that in
case of default on the part of defendant, as mortgagor therein, the mortgaged motor vehicle shall be
delivered, on demand, to plaintiff, as mortgagee therein, free of all charges, and should the mortgagor not
deliver the same as aforesaid, the mortgagee is authorized to take possession of said property wherever it
may be found. There is nothing from the provisions of Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508)
that would justify the trial court's insistence, that after default by the mortgagor and before the mortgagee
can file an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattel, the mortgagee must first ask the sheriff
to foreclose the mortgage and it is only when the mortgagor refuses to surrender the chattel to the sheriff
that the action of replevin can be instituted. As early as the case in Bachrach Motor Co. v. Summers supra,
that, while Section 14 of Act 1508 places upon "a public officer" the responsibility of conducting the sale of
the mortgaged chattel, there is nothing in said statute which would authorize the officer to seize the
mortgaged property; and that for the recovery of possession of said property, where the right is disputed,
"the creditor must proceed along the channels by action in court."

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CASE 24
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO. INC. vs. CA
Topic SURETYSHIP
Case No. G.R. No. 89020 / May 5, 1992
Case Name STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO. INC. vs. CA
Ponente PARAS, j.

RELEVANT FACTS
• Northern Motors Inc. and Macronics Marketing entered into a lease agreement wherein Northern
Motors leased certain premises to Macronics.
• Macronics failed to pay its bills to Northern Motors so the latter was forced to terminate the lease.
Northern Motors was forced to sell off Macronics’ properties in an auction sale to cover for unpaid
liabilities. Northern Motors was the buyer. Macronics was duly notified of the sale.
• On March 21, 1985, Leisure Club Inc., sister company of Macronics, filed a case for replevin and
damages against Northern Motors. It sought the recovery of certain office furniture and equipment.
• Lower court ordered the delivery of the subject properties to Leisure Club subject to the posting of
the requisite bond under Rule 60, Sec 2 of ROC.
• Leisure Club posted a replevin bond in the amount of P42,000 issued by Stronghold Insurance.
• The lower court issued the writ of replevin. Leisure Club then took possession of the properties.
• Northern Motors filed a counterbond for the release of the properties. However, Leisure Club was
never heard of again. The latter failed to appear in the pre-trial and was declared non-suited.
• Lower court decided in favor of Northern Motors, dismissing Leisure Club’s complaint and ordering
it to pay for damages.
• On July 3, 1986, Northern Motors filed a Motion for Issuance of Execution Against Bond of Plaintiff’s
Surety, which was treated by the lower court as an application for damages against the replevin
bond.
• Stronghold Insurance opposed arguing, among others, that:
o The motion for a writ of execution is not the proper remedy; it should have been an
application against the bond.
o It is not a party to the case and that the decision clearly became final and executory and,
therefore, is no longer available on the bond.
• Lower court held Stronghold liable under its surety bond for damages awarded to Northern Motors.
• CA affirmed.

ISSUE AND RATIO DECIDENDI

Issue
W/N Stronghold is liable for
damages awarded to Northern
Motors?
Ratio
YES.
1. Stronghold never denied that it issued a replevin bond. Under the terms
of said bond, Stronghold together with Leisure Club solidarily bound
themselves in the sum of P42,000 –
(a) For the prosecution of action,
(b) For the return of the property to the defendant if the return
thereof be adjudged, and
(c) For the payment of such sum as may in the cause be recovered
against the plaintiff and the costs of the action.
2. In this case, all the necessary conditions for proceeding against the
bond are present:
(a) Leisure Club, in bad faith, failed to prosecute the action, and
after relieving the property, it promptly disappeared,
(b) The subject property disappeared with Leisure, despite a court
order for their return, and
(c) A reasonable sum was adjudged to be due to Northern Motors,
by way of actual and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
costs of suit.
3. Stronghold can’t simply dissociate itself from Leisure and disclaim
liability vis-à-vis the findings made in the decision of the lower court.
Under Sec. 2, Rule 60 of ROC the bond it filed is to ensure “the return
of the property to the defendant if the return thereof be adjudged, and
for the payment to the defendant of such sum as he may recover from
the plaintiff in the action.”

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 4. Moreover, the obligation of Stronghold under the bond is specific, i.e.
the payment of such sum as may in the cause be recovered against the
plaintiff, and the costs of the action.
5. Hence, Stronghold must pay Northern Motors for damages.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

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CASE 25
LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS VS. CA, 209 SCRA 553

FACTS
La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. (La Tondena) manufactures and sells a gin popularly known as "Ginebra San
Miguel," which is contained in 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of ownership "LA TONDEÑA, INC."
and "GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL" stamped or blown-in to the bottles which . . . (it [La Tondeña]) specially
ordered from the bottle manufactures for its exclusive use. The bottles were registered with the Philippine
Patent Office and use of the registered bottles by any one without written permission of the owner is
declared unlawful by Section 2 of R.A. 623. It was likewise alleged that the sale of the gin in the registered
white flint, bottles does not include the sale of the bottles themselves. By virtue of these facts, La Tondena
prayed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila to 1) “issue an order directing the, Sheriff or other proper
officer . . . to take into his custody all the 350 c.c. bottles of the plaintiff in the possession of the defendant
. . . and to dispose of the same in accordance with the rules of court”, 2) to be adjudged the lawful owner
possessor of the said bottles, and 3) for private respondent Tee Chin Ho to be made to pay, actual, nominal
and temperate and exemplary damages in specific stated amounts (aggregating P75,400.00), as well as
attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.

Judge Santillan of the Manila RTC issued the writ of delivery prayed for upon La Tondeña's posting of a
bond in the amount of P40,000.00. In implementation of the writ, Deputy Sheriff RegioRuefa seized 20,250
bottles with the blown-in marks, "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel". The sheriff Mr. Ruefa
executed a handwritten "Receipt" and among others, was signed by Tee Chin Ho as witness. Sheriff Ruefa's
return attests that prior to seizing the bottles, he served summons, copy of the complaint and its annexes,
copy of the bond, and the writ of seizure personally on one “Te Tien Ho” (it was La Tondena’s position the
Te Tien Ho and Tee Chin Ho were one and the same person). The five-day period within which the
sufficiency of the replevin bond might be objected to or the return of the property seized expired without
any person objecting to the bond or seeking the return of the bottles, instead an individual identifying
himself as "Tee Chin Ho" filed on a pleading denominated "ANSWER” alleging 1) all purchases of La
Tondeña's gin necessarily included the bottles containing the gin; hence ownership of the bottles did not
remain in La Tondeña but was transferred to the purchasers; 2) it was from him, Tee Chin Ho, and not
from Te Tien Ho, that the bottles in question had been taken by Sheriff Ruefa, and it was taken from a
different numbered address on the same street (1105 instead of 1005 Estrada Street, Manila); 3) La
Tondeña had "masterminded and caused two instances of seizure against intervenor, first through and by
the Manila City, police, and second through the Court's sheriff.

The sheriff delivered the bottles to La Tondena, however, a TRO was issued to maintain the status quo and
prevent La Tondena from seizing bottles at 1105 Estrada St. La Tondena reiterated its position that Te Tien
Ho and Tee Chin Ho were one and the same person. Judge Santillan ruled in favor of Tee Chin Ho, issuing
writs of preliminary mandatory injunction and preliminary prohibitory injunction, stating “that the seizure
authorized by the Court's writ of replevin is only against the person whose name and address is pleaded in
the complaint namely TE TIEN HO at No. 1005 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila; the two truckloads empty
bottles seized by the Manila Police (Exhibit "4") and by the Sheriff of Manila (Exhibit "5") from intervenor
Tee Chin Ho, is improper and unlawful” and “ordering plaintiff La Tondeña Distillers, Inc., its agents, duly
authorized representatives or other persons acting for and in its behalf to return and restore unto intervenor
Tee Chin Ho at his address at 1105 Estrada St…” La Tondena raised the case to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus but was dismissed for not being the proper subject of a
petition for CPM.

ISSUE (in relation to Replevin):

Whether or not Judge Santillan violated a rule on Replevin that the disposition of a property seized under
a replevin order upon the defendant shall be done only within 5 days from date of seizure?

RULING
YES. A defendant or other party in a replevin proceeding against whom a writ of seizure has the following
alternative remedies set forth in Section 5, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
SEC. 5. Return, of property. — If the defendant objects to the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot require the return of
the property as in this section provided; but if he does not so object may, at any time
before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff require the return thereof, by filing
with the clerk or judge of the court a bond executed to the plaintiff in double the
value of the property as stated in the plaintiff affidavit, for the delivery of the property
to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, for the payment of such sum to him as

30
 may be recovered against the defendant, and by serving a copy of such bond on the
plaintiff or his attorney.

The defendant may avail of these alternative options only within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer. This was made plain albeit impliedly by Section 6 of the same Rule, providing as
follows:

SEC. 6 Disposition of property by officer. — If within five (5) days after the taking of
the property by the officer, the defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the
bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the property as
provided in the last preceding section; or if the defendant so objects, and the
plaintiff's first or new bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires, and his bond
is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond,
the property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any reason, the property is not
delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the defendant.

Thus if a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him,
he should within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property,
and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof both requirements — as well as compliance therewith within the
five-day period mentioned — being mandatory.

Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon;" but if he does so, "he cannot require the return of the property" by posting a counter-bond
pursuant to Sections 5 and 6.

In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of
seizure (or delivery) — on the ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the grounds relied upon
therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or injunction and thereby put at issue the matter of
the title or right, of possession over the specific chattel being replevied, the policy apparently being that
said matter should be ventilated and determined only at the trial on the merits.

On the other hand, a stranger to the action, i.e., a person not a party to the action, or as the law puts it,
"any other person than the defendant or his agent," whose property is seized pursuant to the writ of
delivery, is accorded the remedy known as terceria, a third party claim, to wit:

SEC. 7. Third-party claim. — If the property taken be claimed by any other person
then the defendant or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title
thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title,
and serves the same upon the officer while he has possession of the property, and a
copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff or his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnifies him against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the
value of the property, and in case disagreement as to such value the same shall be
decided by the court issuing the order. The officer is not liable for damages for taking
or keeping of such property, to any other person than the defendant or his agent,
unless such claim is so made and the action upon the bond brought within one
hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of filing of the said bond. But nothing
herein contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the
property by any proper action. However, when the plaintiff, or the person in whose
behalf the order of delivery was issued, is the Republic of the Philippines, or any
officer duly representing it, the filing of bond shall not be required, and in case the
sheriff or the officer executing the order is sued for damages as a result of such
execution, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor,
the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer
out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose.

The remedy is identical to that granted to strangers in a proceeding on preliminary attachment or execution
of judgments.

In lieu of, or in addition to the filing of a terceria, the third party may, as Section 7 points out, vindicate
"his claim to the property by any proper action." This effort at vindication may take the form of a separate
action for recovery of the property, or intervention in the replevin action itself.

It was thus imperative for the Trial Judge, before ultimately resolving the motion for leave to intervene as
party defendant of the person identifying himself as "Tee Chin Ho," to determine the precise status of said
"Tee Chin Ho:" whether he was indeed a stranger to the action, as he claims, and could therefore avail of

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the remedy of intervention as a party defendant, or he was in truth a proper party defendant, who had
been mistakenly and inadvertently referred to as "Te Tien Ho", and who therefore only had the alternative
remedies aforementioned of either (a) objecting to the replevin bond or the surety or sureties thereof or
(b) posting a counter-bond to compel return of the property.

There were thus circumstances of record, of which Her Honor was charged with knowledge, that tended
to show that La Tondeña's proffered thesis was not entirely far-fetched: that the real target of its replevin
suit was a junk dealer at Estrada Street, Singalong, Manila, who was in unlawful possession of a large
number of its empty bottles, whose name and address had been mistakenly stated in the original complaint
but could nonetheless be ascertained. At the very least, therefore, it was a matter of preferential priority
for the Judge to determine whether "Tee Chin Ho" is in fact "Te Tien Ho," and thus enable her to know in
turn, whether or not the remedy of intervention was proper in the premises, instead of that provided in
Section 5 of Rule 60, supra. In other words, unless there were a prior determination by Her Honor of
whether or not "Tee Chin Ho" was a proper party defendant or a stranger to the action, she was in no
position to adjudge that this intervention as party defendant was correct. But this is what respondent Judge
did. Without first making that prior determination, she proceeded to pass upon the motion for intervention;
she just simply assumed and declared that Tee Chin Ho was not Te Tien Ho. She thus appears to have
acted without foundation, rashly, whimsically, oppressively.

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CASE 26
EULOGIO MASALLO vs. MARIA CESAR
G.R. No. L-12449
November 13, 1918

Facts: Masallo-appellee brought an action of eviction in the lower court against Cesar-appellant averring
that he is the owner of the subject land.
On March 8, 1915, while Cesar was in possession of the land in question, one Mateo Crispin
executed a deed to sell and transfer to Masallo. Crispin admitted that she has not been in possession of
the land when she executed the deed and that the said land was mortgaged by her to a certain Eugenia
Perez who testified that she had been in possession of the land from 1889 until 1914.
After the execution of the deed, Masallo commenced to plow the land. He alleged that Cesar
approached them, insisted that the land was hers and in her possession, and ordered Massallo and his men
away. After that, he brought an action of desahucio [eviction] and the lower court gave judgment in his
favor.
Issue: Whether the contentions of Masallo was meritorious.
Held: No, it was without merit. Under the law, the plaintiff in an action of this character must prove a prior
possession in himself. Which means that as between the two contending parties, the right of action is
conceded to be in the party whose actual and peaceful possession antedates that of the other.
In this case, the defendant Maria Cesar is shown to have had the prior peaceful possession of the
disputed parcel of ground for an indefinite period of time in the part. Therefore, when the plaintiff, after
acquiring a deed to the land from a third person, entered upon the premises with his laborers and began
plowing the land, it was he who was guilty of the wrongful seizure of the property and not Cesar. Where a
dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual possession, as between
them, is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted in section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The remedy of forcible entry and detainer was intended to be used against the usurper and not
against the person wronged. The rule may be summed up by saying that the plaintiff in an action of forcible
entry and detainer cannot succeed where it appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter
had a possession antedating his own. The decision of the trial court is reversed, and the action dismissed.

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CASE 27
Segundo vs The Hinigaran Sugar Plantation

Facts: On Sept. 18, 1924, case No. 299 wAs instituted in the Justice of the Peace of Court of Hinigiran.
The Philippine National Bank intervened therein, filing its pleading in intervention on October 18, 1924.
Plaintiff Segundo Monteblanco amended his complaint on the same date praying that the defendant
Hinigaran Sugar Plantation be ordered to return to him the land described therein. Allegedly in plaintiff's
former complaint that said defendant and its co-defendants Nicetas Siguenza and Agustin Coruña have
been detaining it since the month of August, 1924. That in the meantime a preliminary injunction be issued
against them and their agents to prevent them from continuing to perform acts in violation of his right of
possession, and that they indemnify him in the sum of P500 with the costs of the suit. On December
11,1924 the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran, considering that the trial of the case devolved upon
the CFI of Occidental Negros, forwarded it to the latter court. But the CFI remanded the case to the Justice
of the Peace of Court. The justice of the peace of court dismissed the case. Plaintiff appealed from this
decision to the CFI, after due hearing again ordered the case remanded to the justice of peace, directing
said court to try it and pass because it merely involved forcible entry and detainer which is the nature of
those coming under its exclusive jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not Justice of the Peace of Court have jurisdiction to try cases of forcible entry and
detainer.

Held: Yes, the Justice of the Peace of Courts alone have jurisdiction to try cases of forcible entry and
detainer, when the action arising therefrom is commenced within one year from the time said acts took
place under Acts Nos. 3881 and 4115.

It appears that the detainer took place in the month of August 1924 and filed the complaint on September
18,1924. If the complaint had been filed after the lapse of one year from the month of August 1924, the
Justice of the Peace of Court would not have jurisdiction to try the case. When the case was remanded to
it on June 15,1925 the Justice of the court still had eleven months which conferred jurisdiction upon it, to
try the case. But nearly eight years to elapse without making any effort or taking any action to terminate
the case. For purposes of the law, the case had died in the Justice of the peace of court.

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CASE 28
Sps. Benitez vs. CA
[G.R. No. 104828. January 16, 1997]
PANAGNIBAN, J.:

FACTS:

On July 17, 1989 private respondents, Spouses Renato Macapagal and Elizabeth Macapagal,
purchased a 285.70-square-meter lot adjacent to the real property of petitioners, Spouses Rafael Benitez
and Avelina Benitez. After relocation survey, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters
of their property was occupied by petitioners’ house. Through verbal and written notice, private
respondents demanded to petitioners to vacate the encroached lot. However, the latter refused to vacate
the said lot.

The private respondents then filed civil case for ejectment against petitioners with the MeTC of
San Juan. The said court decided in favor of the private respondents holding that the controversy is not an
encroachment or overlapping of two adjacent properties owned by parties but rather a case where part of
the house of the petitioners is constructed on a portion of the property of the private respondents.
Therefore, private respondents, as the owner of the lot, has the right to demand that petitioners shall
remove the portion of their house standing on former’s realty.

The petitioners then appealed the same issue in RTC of Pasig, but the latter ruled in favor of the
private respondents. Bringing the same issue, petitioners appealed to Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed the MeTC ruling holding that petitioners were fully aware that part of their house encroached on
their neighbor’s property, while private respondents became aware of it only after purchasing said property.
Petitioners cannot claim good faith as against the respondents.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the possession of the portion of the private respondents’ land encroached by
petitioners’ house can be recovered through an action of ejectment?

RULING:

Yes. The possession of the portion of the private respondents’ land encroached by petitioners’
house can be recovered through an action of ejectment.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court allows a person deprived of the
possession of any land by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or persons against whom the
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld may, at any time within one year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper lower court
against the persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, for the restitution of
such possession.

In the case at bar, after the private respondents discovered that a portion of their land was
encroached by petitioners’ house: notices to vacate were sent to petitioners, the last one being dated
October 26, 1989; and private respondent filed the ejectment suit against the petitioners on January 18,
1990 or within one year from the last demand. That petitioners occupied the land prior to private
respondents’ purchase thereof does not negate the latter’s case for ejectment. Prior possession is not
always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. Thus, in this case, prior physical possession is not required.
Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of
the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary.

Considering that private respondents are unlawfully deprived of possession of the encroached
land and that the action for the recovery of possession thereof was made within the one- year
reglementary period, ejectment is the proper remedy.

Hence, the petition is denied.

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CASE 29
City of Manila v Gerardo et.al.

Article 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of
health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show
that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified.

FACTS:
City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont
and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered
upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class
materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits
from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present until action was instituted against them.
In 1947, the presence of the defendants squatting having been discovered, they were given by
Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in
the property upon condition that they will be charged for rentals.
In 1961, Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, adjacent to the property herein came the
need for school's expansion. The City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters'
houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction
or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant,
for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days.
Defendants refused to vacate with the defense that they are tenants. Hence, this suit to recover
possession.
ISSUE: Whether the defendants are considered tenants thus can’t be ousted..
HELD:
No. The defendants herein are squatters, not tenants. They have entered upon these premises
without plaintiff's knowledge and consent which makes them illegal settlers.

Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have
permits from the mayor is weak since the mayor cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the
simple expedient of giving permits or executing leases. The city's right to throw defendants out of the
area cannot be denied because the city's dominical right to possession is supreme.

Furthermore, Squatting is unlawful and grant of the permits fosters moral decadence. The State,
in the exercise of police power, may abate nuisances, whether public or private, whether per se or per
accidens.

In the instant case, the houses built by the defendants are public nuisance per se. Thus, they can
be summarily abated, even without the aid of the courts. The squatters/defendants can therefore be
ousted.

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CASE 30

Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajirallaga

G.R. No. L-53788
October 17, 1980

Facts:
Certiorari to review the actuations of the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 8126 of the City Court of
Cabanatuan which the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, initiated for the purpose of ejecting the private
respondents from a piece of land.

The facts and the law as understood by the respondent judge are set forth in his "Decision" which is hereby
reproduced in full:

This is a complaint for Ejectment filed by the plaintiff against the defendant. The plaintiff in its complaint
alleges that on November 12, 1977, the defendant Sergia A. del Rosario executed in favor of the plaintiff
a Deed of Sale with Right to repurchase over a piece of land duly registered and situated at Cabanatuan
City, together with all improvements, that the defendant Sergia del Rosario executed to exercise her right
of redemption in accordance with the Provision of Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, which expired
November 12, 1978, and despite notice to her, the plaintiff was constrained to file a petition for
consolidation of ownership that on April 3, 1979, the Honorable Virgilio D. Pobre-Yñigo, promulgated a
decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring the plaintiff to be the full owner of
the property and ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City, to cancel the old title; and issue a
new title in the name of the plaintiff; that on June 8, 1979, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant and
all person claiming ownership, to vacate the premises in question; that despite receipt, by the defendant
on June 13, 1979, she failed and refused and still fails to vacate the premises without justification.

On November 28, 1979, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleading, on the ground that the
defendant admitted all the material averments of the complaint and does not tender at all an issue. The
defendant filed an opposition to the motion of judgment on the pleading, and a motion to dismiss. The
complaint filed by the plaintiff is for ejectment. There are three kinds of action in ejecting a person from
the land. It is clear in the complaint that the plaintiff is intending to eject the defendant from the land
under the kind of ejectment, forcible entry or detainer, but it must be alleged in the complaint prior
possession of the land by the plaintiff. But in the complaint it is alleged that the defendant is in possession
of the land and not the plaintiff, and therefore the complaint should be for recovery of the right to possess
the land, and the action should be filed in the Court of First Instance and not in this Court. The three kinds
of action are the following: (1) The summary action for forcible entry or detainer by denominated action
interdictal, under the former law of procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of
only physical possession, and is brought within one year in the Justice of the Peace Court; (2) The accion
publiciana which is intended for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary
civil proceeding, before the Court of First Instance and (3) Action de revindication which seeks the recovery
of ownership which of course included the Jus utendi and jus fruendi also brought in the Court of First
Instance. Of these three kinds of action should be brought under No. 2 which is accion publiciana intended
to recovery of the right to possess possession from the defendant, because it is the defendant who is in
possession of the premises.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the proper remedy is ejectment.

Held:
The proper remedy is ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and not accion publiciana. Sec. 1 of
said Rule provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor,
vendee, or other persons, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against
the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or

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 persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs. The complaint must be verified.

It should be noted that the summary action provided above is one to obtain possession only, filed in a
municipal court within one year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession complained of
has taken place. It should also be noted that the remedy provides for two distinct causes of action: (1)
forcible entry in which the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, and (2) unlawful
detainer wherein the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of
his right to possess.

The present case which is to obtain possession only is one for unlawful detainer because Sergia A. del
Rosario, the vendor a retro, failed to repurchase the property and after the consolidation of title in favor of
the vendee a retro had been confirmed, she refused to vacate the property upon demand and after her
right to possess it had ceased to be lawful. That a demand to vacate was made on Sergia A. del Rosario
on June 13, 1979, and the action to eject was filed on October 22, 1979, well within the one-year period,
are borne by the record.

Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer, prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non. This
is especially so where a vendee seeks to obtain possession of the thing sold to him from the vendor. But if
prior possession be insisted upon, Pharma Industries, Inc. had it before the suit for unlawful detainer was
filed. Art. 531 of the Civil Code provides: "Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or
the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right. (438a)" And according to Tolentino, "proper acts and
formalities" refer "to judicial acts, or the acquisition of possession by sufficient title, Inter vivos or mortis
causa, onerous, or lucrative. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples
of these are donations, succession, whether intestate or intestate, contracts, such a sale with right of
repurchase, judicial possession, execution of judgments, such as when a sheriff, pursuant to a decision or
order of the court, places certain parties in possession of property, execution and registration of public
instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles." (II Civil Code of the Philippines, 246-247
[1972],)

Pharma Industries, Inc. acquired possession when Sergia A. del Rosario executed in its favor on November
12, 1977, the deed of sale with right to repurchase over the land in question and the vendee's title was
confirmed upon failure of the vendor to repurchase the property.

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