23.02.

2022
ICTSI vs. The City of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 185622, October 17, 2018 – Payment of
Docket Fees
FACTS
1. International Container, a corporation with its principal place of business in Manila,
renewed its business license.
2. The property was assessed for two (2) business taxes: one for which it was already
paying, and another for which it was newly assessed. It paid the additional assessment,
but filed a protest letter.
3. When the City Treasurer failed to decide International Container's protest within 60 days
from the protest, International Container filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order against the City Treasurer and Resident Auditor of Manila.
4. The City Treasurer and the Resident Auditor of Manila moved for the dismissal of the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on the ground that International Container had no
cause of action, since it had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 187 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
5. The Regional Trial Court granted the City Treasurer and the Resident Auditor's motion
and dismissed International Container's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
6. International Container appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals, which set aside
the Regional Trial Court's dismissal and ordered the case remanded to the Regional Trial
Court for further proceedings.
7. However, was also dismissed by the RTC, so International Container appealed it to the
Court of Tax Appeals for Motion for Reconsideration, in which its jurisdiction over the
case was questioned by the respondent for non-paying of docket fees.
8. Petitioner argued when it filed the Amended and Supplemental Petition, it was not
ordered by the Regional Trial Court to pay additional docket and filing fees. Citing Lu v.
Lu Ym,it argues that cases should not be automatically dismissed when there is no
showing of bad faith on the part of the filing party when insufficient docket fees were
paid. In any event, it undertakes to pay any additional docket fees that may be found due
by this Court.
9. In the Comment of Treasurer, they argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over this case because petitioner failed to pay the docket fees for the
additional claims within the reglementary period. They claim that petitioner purposefully
avoided paying these docket fees
10. The Court of Appeals En Banc denied International Container's Motion for
Reconsideration for having no jurisdiction over International Container's claim for refund
onwards due to non-payment of docket fees before the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE
 Whether the Court of Appeals/RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the basis
that International Container did not pay the docket fees.
HELD:
NO, Non-payment of docket fees would not be the reason for the loss of jurisdiction of
RTC or Court of Appeals over the case.
It is an established rule that the payment of the prescribed docket fees is essential for a
court to acquire jurisdiction over a case. Nonetheless, in Sun Insurance Office, the Court laid
down the principles concerning the payment of docket fees for initiatory pleadings:
Should the docket fees paid be found insufficient considering the value of the claim, the
filing party shall be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. The
clerk of court involved, or his or her duly authorized deputy, is responsible for making the
deficiency assessment.
If a party pays the correct amount of docket fees for its original initiatory pleading, but
later amends the pleading and increases the amount prayed for, the failure to pay the
corresponding docket fees for the increased amount should not be deemed to have curtailed the
court's jurisdiction.
In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals:
With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when
private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its
failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended
complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to
the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fee should be
considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent specified the amount of
P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint
In this case, respondents failed to explain why they belatedly raised the issue of
insufficient payment of docket fees before the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in 2008, even
though the issue arose as early as 2003, when petitioner filed its Amended and Supplemental
Petition. As such, they are now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court due to petitioner's insufficient payment of docket fees.
In addition, there is no showing that petitioner intended to deliberately defraud the court
when it did not pay the correct docket fees for its Amended and Supplemental Petition.
Respondents have not provided any proof to substantiate their allegation that petitioner purposely
avoided the payment of the docket fees for its additional claims. On the contrary, petitioner has
been consistent in its assertion that it will undertake to pay any additional docket fees that may
be found due by this Court. Further, it is well settled that any additional docket fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment that may be awarded.
Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013 – Exclusivity
of venue
FACTS
1. spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit line from
respondent which was secured by a real estate mortgage executed over seven of their
properties ocated in Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga, Province of Leyte.
2. After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate his widow Salud Maglasang (Salud)
and their surviving children appointed their brother petitioner Edgar Maglasang (Edgar)
as their attorney-in-fact.
3. Edgar filed a verified petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Flaviano before the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City.
4. In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court, issued a Notice to
Creditors for the filing of money claims against Flaviano’s estate.
5. The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent remained unsatisfied due to
respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s account was undergoing a restructuring.
6. In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the
Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction.
7. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to respondent.
Thus, respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount against the estate of
Flaviano, his widow Salud and petitioners.
8. RTC directed the petitioners to pay the respondent. issatisfied, petitioners elevated the
case to the CA on appeal.
9. Petitioners contended that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null
and void since the same was conducted in violation of the stipulation in the real estate
mortgage contract stating that the auction sale should be held in the capital of the
province where the properties are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte.
ISSUE
Whether the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void for not
having held in the capital of the province where the properties are located.
HELD:
NO, the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was valid even though it was
done not in the capital of the province where the properties are located.
The court agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act 3135, the auction
sale shall be held at the capital of the province if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction
of the province concerned, or shall be held in the city if the property is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city concerned; x x x.
However, "The doctrine that absent qualifying or restrictive words, the venue shall either
be that stated in the law or rule governing the action or the one agreed in the contract, was
applied to an extra-judicial foreclosure sale under Act No. 3135."
 Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity
of the agreed forum, the stipulated place should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue. As
a consequence, the stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied
alternatively.
In addition, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be done within the province
where the property to be sold is situated, viz.:
SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province which the
property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to
be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal
building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated. (Italics
supplied).
In this case, since the auction sale was conducted in Ormoc City, which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Leyte, then the Court finds sufficient compliance with the above-
cited requirement.
People’s General Insurance Corp., vs. Guansing, et al., No. 204759, November 14, 2018 –
Voluntary Appearance
FACTS:
1. Lizaso, Guansing's employee hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama's (Yokohama)
Isuzu Crosswind. The strong impact caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles,
rendering it beyond repair.
2. Yokohama's Isuzu Crosswind was insured with People's General Insurance Corporation.
Thus, People's General Insurance Corporation claimed to have been subrogated to all the
rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing.
3. People's General Insurance Corporation sought from Guansing reimbursement of the total
amount paid to Yokohama, less the salvage value. Despite repeated demands, Guansing
failed to reimburse the amount claimed.
4. People's General Insurance Corporation filed a Complaint for a sum of money and
damages against Guansing and Lizaso in RTC, Manila City.
5. The sheriff served the summons on Guansing's brother, Reynaldo Guansing. The sheriff's
return did not explain why summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing.
6. Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
He alleged that he did not personally receive the summons. However, People argued that
it was substituted service.
7. Motion to dismiss was denied, however, after being denied he filed his answer containing
a general denial of the material allegations and causes of action in People’s General
Insurance Corporations’ Complaint. RTC favored People’s General Insurance
Corporation.
8. In Guansing’s Motion for Reconsideration, he reiterated that RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person due to invalid service of summons.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Edgardo Guansing, in filling his Answer and other subsequent
pleadings, voluntarily submiited himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
HELD:
YES, the respondent Edgardo Guansing, in filing his answer and other subsequent
pleadings, voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
In Navale et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.:
Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filing of an answer to
the complaint.
In G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation:
There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of
jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before the
court without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection
regarding lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.
In this case, by filing his answer and other pleadings, respondent Guansing is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Young Builders Corp. vs. Benson Industries. G.R. No. 198998, June 19, 2019 – Specific
Denial – actionable documents
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff-appellee Young Builders Corporation filed before the RTC in Cebu City a
complaint for collection of sum of money against defendant-appellant Benson Industries,
Inc.
2. In its complaint, YBC claimed BII failed to pay its account constraining YBC to filed the
collection case.
3. After YBC rested its case and formally offered its exhibits. BII filed Demurer to
evidence, however the RTC denied it. RTC ruled in favor of YBC.
4. BII appealed the case to CA, contending that YBC failed to substantiate its claims. It
claimed that the Accomplishment Billing is not an actionable document because it is not
in the nature of a contract which could be the source of rights and obligationnd, pursuant
to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the requirement of a denial under oath does not apply
 when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. BII considers it
self-serving.
5. CA found meritorious to the appeal of BII, ruling that YB failed to prove that it was
entitled to collect any balance from BII. The CA noted that the only evidence showing
YBC 's alleged monetary claims against BII was its Accomplishment Billing. The CA
ruled that apart from the Accomplishment Billing, which was self-serving, YBC failed to
submit other credible evidence to prove the actual expenses and amount of work it
claimed to have accomplished such as receipts, payrolls or other similar documents. The
CA further ruled that the Accomplishment Billing, which was a private document, could
not be given probative weight considering that its due execution and authenticity was not
duly proven in accordance with procedural rules.
ISSUE
Whether the CA abused its discretion when it set aside the formal requirements of law on
specific denial by not giving probative value to YBC’s Accomplishment Billing even though it
was offered by BII as its own evidence.
HELD:
The Court finds that the subject Accomplishment Billing is NOT an actionable document.
Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules provide:
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. -Whenever an action or defense is based
upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or . document
shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to
the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said
copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. -When an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the
adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument – DO not READ this on
recitation, included it for you to understand.
As provided in the Rules, a written instrument or document is "actionable" when an
action or defense is based upon such instrument or document. While no contract or other
instrument need not and cannot be set up as exhibit which is not the foundation of the cause of
action or defense, those instruments which are merely to be used as evidence do not fall within
the rule on actionable document.
To clarify, not all documents or instruments attached or annexed to the complaint or the
answer are actionable documents. To qualify as an actionable document pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 8 of the Rules, the specific right or obligation which is the basis of the action or defense
must emanate therefrom or be evident therein.
If the document or instrument so qualifies and is pleaded in accordance with Section 7 -
the substance thereof being set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof attached
to the pleading as an exhibit -then the genuineness and due execution thereof are deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 8. Thus, a simple specific denial without
oath is sufficient:
(I) where the instrument or document is not the basis but a mere evidence of the claim or
defense;
(2) when the adverse party does not appear as a party to the document the instrument;
and
(3) when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
The complaint filed by YBC is an action for a sum of money arising from its main
contract with BII for the construction of a building. YBC 's cause of action is primarily based on
BII' s alleged non-payment of its outstanding debts to YBC arising from their main contract,
despite demand. If there was a written building or construction contract that was executed
between BII and YBC, then that would be the actionable document because its terms and
stipulations would spell out the rights and obligations of the parties.
However, no such contract or agreement was attached to YBC's Complaint. Clearly, the
subject Accomplishment Billing is not an actionable document contemplated by the Rules, but is
merely evidentiary in nature. As such, there was no need for BII to specifically deny its
genuineness and due execution under oath.
Besides, even where the written instrument or document copied in or attached to the
pleading is the basis of the claim or defense alleged therein, if the party against whom the written
instrument or document is sought to be enforced does not appear therein to· have taken part in its
execution, such party is not bound to make a verified specific denial.
Since BII does not appear to have taken part in the execution of the Accomplishment
Billing, a verified specific denial of its genuineness and due execution is therefore unnecessary.
Therefore, The CA correctly ruled that the Accomplishment Billing, being a private
document, was not admissible considering that its due execution and authenticity were not duly
proven in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules
Lui Enterprises vs. Zueillig Pharma, et al., G.R. No. 193494, March 07, 2014 –
Requirements to regain standing after default
FACTS
1. Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of
lease over a parcel of land located in Barrio Togatto, Buhangin, Davao City.
 2. Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming
to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent
directly to it. They informed Lui Enterprises regarding the rent fee, however, due to
conflicting claims between Philippine Bank of Communications and Lui Enterprises,
Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the RTC of Makati.
3. The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer to the complaint. However, Lui
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged
representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the
corporation.
4. Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to
dismiss should be denied for having been filed late. Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the required time
given to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15 days from service of summons on
the defendant. Considering that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15-
day period to file an answer, Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in
default.
5. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to
dismiss within the reglementary period. So,The Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled that
Lui Enterprises "was barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments"
6. One year after the issuance of the order of default, that Lui Enterprises filed a motion to
set aside order of default40 in the Makati trial court on the ground of excusable
negligence. Lui Enterprises argued that its failure to file a motion to dismiss on time "was
caused by the negligence of [Lui Enterprises’] former counsel." This negligence was
allegedly excusable because "[Lui Enterprises] was prejudiced and prevented from fairly
presenting [its] case."
7. Appealed in CA, but CA ruled in its motion to set aside default, they found that Lui
Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence that prevented it from filing its
motion to dismiss on time.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to set aside the default should be granted on the basis that there was
excusable negligence.
HELD:
NO, the motion to set aside the default should not be granted because the petitioner did
not established that there was an excusable negligence in the filling of relief.
A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. He or she is "deprived
of the right to take part in the trial and forfeits his [or her] rights as a party litigant," has no right
"to present evidence [supporting his or her] allegations," and has no right to "control the
proceedings [or] cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, he or she "has no right to expect that [the
court] would [act] upon [his or her pleadings]" or that he or she "may [oppose] motions filed
against him [or her]."
 However, the defendant declared in default "does not [waive] all of [his or her] rights."
He or she still has the right to "receive notice of subsequent proceedings."108 Also, the plaintiff
must still present evidence supporting his or her allegations "despite the default of [the
defendant]."
Default, therefore, is not meant to punish the defendant but to enforce the prompt filing of the
answer to the complaint. For a defendant without good defenses, default saves him or her "the
embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the indefensible."
As this court explained in Gochangco v. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch
On the other hand, for a defendant with good defenses, "it would be unnatural for him [or
her] not to set x x x up [his or her defenses] properly and timely." Thus, "it must be presumed
that some insuperable cause prevented him [or her] from [answering the complaint]."
Excusable negligence is "one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against."
In which case, his or her proper remedy depends on when he or she discovered the
default and whether the default judgment was already rendered by the trial court.
After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the default
judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default. The
defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Rule 9,
Section 3, paragraph (b) of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Default; declaration of. – x x x x
(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice
thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default
upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
interest of justice.
If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to the judgment becoming
final and executory, he or she may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1,
paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure If he or she discovers his or her default after
the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be filed.119
RELIEFS FOR DEFAULT
i. Appeal is also available to the defendant declared in default. He or she may appeal the
judgment for being contrary to the evidence or to the law under Rule 41, Section 2 of the
 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.120 He or she may do so even if he or she did not file a
petition to set aside order of default.121
ii. A petition for certiorari may also be filed if the trial court declared the defendant in
default with grave abuse of discretion.122
iii. The remedies of the motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, and petition
for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive, not alternative or cumulative. This is to
compel defendants to remedy their default at the earliest possible opportunity. Depending
on when the default was discovered and whether a default judgment was already
rendered, a defendant declared in default may avail of onlyone of the three remedies.

Thus, if a defendant discovers his or her default before the trial court renders judgment,
he or she shall file a motion to set aside order of default. If this motion to set aside order
of default is denied, the defendant declared in default cannot await the rendition of
judgment, and he or she cannot file a motion for new trial before the judgment becomes
final and executory, or a petition for relief from judgment after the judgment becomes
final and executory.

Also, the remedies against default become narrower and narrower as the trial nears
judgment. The defendant enjoys the most liberality from this court with a motion to set
aside order of default, as he or she has no default judgment to contend with, and he or she
has the whole period before judgment to remedy his or her default.

With a motion for new trial, the defendant must file the motion within the period for
taking an appeal123 or within 15 days from notice of the default judgment. Although a
default judgment has already been rendered, the filing of the motion for new trial tolls the
reglementary period of appeal, and the default judgment cannot be executed against the
defendant.

iv. A petition for relief from judgment is filed after the default judgment has become final
and executory. Thus, the filing of the petition for relief from judgment does not stay the
execution of the default judgment unless a writ of preliminary injunction is issued
pending the petition’s resolution.

Upon the grant of a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a petition
for relief from judgment, the defendant is given the chance to present his or her evidence
against that of plaintiff’s. With an appeal, however, the defendant has no right to present
evidence on his or her behalf and can only appeal the judgment for being contrary to
plaintiff’s evidence or the law.

v. Similar to an appeal, a petition for certiorari does not allow the defendant to present
evidence on his or her behalf. The defendant can only argue that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in declaring him or her in default.
 Thus, should a defendant prefer to present evidence on his or her behalf, he or she must
file either a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a petition for
relief from judgment.
In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the
ground of excusable negligence.
However, Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not
immediately take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a
motion to set aside order of default.
However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure must first be complied with. The defendant’s motion to set aside order of default
must satisfy three conditions.
First is the time element. The defendant must challenge the default order before
judgment.
Second, the defendant must have been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Third, he must have a meritorious defense. As this court held in SSS v. Hon. Chaves:132
In this case, Lui Enterprises never explained why its counsel failed to file the motion to
dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default.
Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its representative and counsel had to fly
in from Davao to Makati to personally appear and manifest in court its meritorious defense, Lui
Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises did not do.
Ng Ching Ting vs. Phil. Business Bank, G.R. No. 224972, July 09, 2018 – Dismissal due to
fault of plaintiff
FACTS:
1. Philippine Business Bank, Inc. for Recovery of Sum of Money against Jonathan Lim,
Carolina Lim and Ng Ching Ting also known as Richard Ng.
2. It appeas that Jonathan, owner of Teen’s Wear Fashion, obtained several loans from the
respondent, which were all covered by promissory notes.
3. Jonathan defaulted in the payment of his monthly amortizations and failed to settle the
same despite repeated demands. Thus, the respondent bank filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property.
4. Subsequently, a public auction was conducted by the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Imus, Cavite and the subject property was awarded to the highest bidder Since the
amount realized from the auction sale was way below the amount of the obligation, the
respondent, through counsel, sent a demand letter to Jonathan, Carolina and the petitioner
 to settle the deficiency in the amount but they refused. By reason of said refusal to pay,
the respondent filed a collection suit against Jonathan, Carolina and the petitioner.
5. Almost a year thereafter, the RTC issued an Order motu proprio dismissing the case by
reason of inaction of both parties.
6. Subsequently, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondent bank,
asseverating that they are still interested in pursuing the case and explained that the
reason for their inaction was due to the resignation of its two (2) in-house counsels.
7. The petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for reconsideration. Shortly thereafter, he
filed an Urgent Manifestation showing that the motion for reconsideration was filed , it
was already filed out of time and the order of dismissal had already become final and
executory.
8. RTC granted the Motion for Reconsideration, so Petitioner appealed it to CA, to which
sustained the decision of RTC of dismissing the complaint due to inaction of the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint must be dismiss because of the inaction of the plaintiff or the both
parties.
HELD:
YES, the complaint must be dismiss because of the inaction of the plaintiff.
On the basis of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply
with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court.
In V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. vs. Municipality of Parañaque, the Court rejected the petitioner's
plea for relaxation of the rules on the reglementary period, specifically for failing to file the
motion for reconsideration on time due to lack of counsel. It ratiocinated, thus:
It is incumbent upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the services of new counsel.
VCP knew since August 29, 2006, seven months before the CA rendered its Decision,
that it had no counsel. Despite its knowledge, it did not immediately hire a lawyer to
attend to its affairs. Instead, it waited until the last minute, when it had already received
the adverse CA Decision.
In the same way, in this case, the respondent cannot simply lay the blame on the
resignation of its in-house counsels since it is incumbent upon it, as the complainant, to promptly
hire new lawyers to represent it in the proceedings. Much vigilance and diligence are expected of
it considering that it is the one who initiated the action. Upon the resignation of its in house
counsels, it should have taken immediate steps to hire replacements so it may be able to keep up
with the pending incidents in the case. However, the respondent dilly-dallied for almost a year
until the court, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute.
In conclusion, that the respondent went into unexplained inaction for almost a year from
the time the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC in its Order. Despite
receipt of the copy of the order, it failed to actively pursue its case or take the proper steps until
the case reaches conclusion, which was a ground for dismissal according to section 3, rule 17 of
Rules of Court. Therefore, the complaint must be dismissed.
Chingkoe vs. Republic, G.R. No. 183608, July 13, 2013 – Failure to appear to pre-trial
FACTS
1. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) filed
collection cases before the RTC of Manila.
2. The republic alleged that Chiat Sing Cardboard Inc., a corporation that imports goods to
the Philippines, secured in 1997 fake and spurious tax credit certificates from Filstar
Textile Industrial Corporation (Filstar). It claimed that Chiat Sing utilized the
fraudulently-acquired tax credit certificates to settle its customs duties and taxes on its
importations.
3. During the pre-trial setting, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the
Republic, failed to appear. The counsel for defendant Filstar prayed for a period of 10
days within which to submit his motion or manifestation regarding the plaintiff’s pre-trial
brief. The trial court granted the motion, and ordered a postponement.
4. During the June 30, 2006 pre-trial conference, the OSG again failed to attend. A certain
Atty. Bautista Corpin, Jr. (Atty. Corpin Jr.), appearing on behalf of BOC, was present,
but was not prepared for pre-trial.
5. He merely manifested that the BOC failed to receive the notice on time, and moved for
another re-setting of the pre-trial, on the condition that if either or both lawyers from the
BOC and OSG fail to appear, the court may be constrained to dismiss the
abovementioned cases of the BOC for failure to prosecute.
6. However, At the hearing conducted, notwithstanding the warning of the judge given
during the previous hearing, that their failure to appear will result in the dismissal of the
cases, neither the OSG nor the BOC attended the hearing. Thus, as moved anew by the
respective counsels of the three defendants, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the
case.
7. Petitioner appealed it to CA. CA granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC
for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint must be dismissed for the repeatedly failure to appear during the
pre-trial.
HELD:
YES, the complaint must be dismissed for the repeatedly failure to appear during the pre-
trial.
The Rules. Rule 18, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court clearly states:
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
In this case, it is fairly obvious that the trial court gave the Republic, through the OSG
and the BOC, every opportunity to be present during the pre-trial conference. The hearings had
to be reset six times due to various reasons, but not once was the OSG and BOC properly
represented. Too, not once did the OSG and BOC offer a reasonable explanation for their
absence during the hearings. Despite the express warning by the trial court during the
penultimate setting on June 30, 2006, the OSG and BOC still failed to attend the next scheduled
setting.
Despite the leeway and opportunity given by the trial court, it seemed that the OSG and
BOC did not accord proper importance to the pre-trial conference. Pre-trial, to stress, is way
more than simple marking of evidence. Hence, it should not be ignored or neglected, as the
counsels for respondent had.
In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, the Court held
that pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it
serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed
its dispensation.
Therefore, the Court should dismissed the case.
Angelina Chua, et al., vs. Cheng, et al. G.R. No. 219309, November 22, 2017 – Reservation
of additional witnesses
FACTS
1. Jose Ma. Cheng Sing Phuan, Santiago Cheng, and Petra Cheng Sing are siblings who are
the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land situated in Iloilo City.
2. Santiago, together with his wife, Avelina Sihiyon (Avelina) (collectively, Respondents)
sent Jose and his wife Angelina several written and verbal demands for the physical
partition of the Iloilo Lands.
3. In their Answer, Jose and Angelina averred that they advanced the funds necessary for
the acquisition of the Disputed Properties, and that Santiago and Petra failed to reimburse
them for the cost of their respective shares.
4. After submission of the parties' pre-trial briefs and the conduct of a pre-trial conference,
the Presiding Judge of the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order states that “All evidence to be
adduced and presented by both parties shall be limited to those identified below.”
5. After the issuance, none of the parties manifested any intent to revise the Pre-Trial Order.
6. Jose passed away after having given his direct testimony in open court.
 7. Petitioners, filed a Notice of Substitution of Party Defendant, which were duly noted by
Judge Ruiz in his Order. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion praying that Jose’s
testimony be stricken from the records since he passed away before cross-examination,
which was denied by Judge Ruiz.
8. During the hearing, Petitioners orally manifested in open court that they would be
presenting six (6) additional witnesses in place of Petra, and sought leave for this
purpose. These additional witnesses were not among those listed in the Pre-Trial Order,
nor were they identified in Jose's Pre-Trial Brief. Respondents opposed, and later filed
their written objection. RTC judge denied the oral motion.
9. Petitioners filed the CA Petition. Petitioners asserted that Jose, through counsel, reserved
the right to present additional witnesses in his Pre-Trial Brief. By completely ignoring
such reservation made by Jose prior to his death, Petitioners averred that Judge Maniba
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. CA
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC Resolution and Order denying
Petitioner’s oral motion to present witnesses not listed in the Pre-Trial Order.
HELD:
NO, CA did not commit an error in affirming the RTC Resolution and Order denying
Petitioner’s oral motion to present witnesses not listed in the Pre-Trial Order.
Paragraph (A)(2)(d) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does not apply. To support this assertion,
Petitioners quote A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, otherwise known as the Proposed Rule on Guidelines to
be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures (Pre-Trial Guidelines), particularly paragraph A(2)(d) thereof,
which states:
Pre-trial
A. Civil Cases
XXXX
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs
containing the following:
XXXX
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof. (No evidence
shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party’s
evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during
the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown.)
Petitioners' reliance on the purported exception under paragraph A(2)(d) is misplaced.
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the exception under paragraph A(2)(d) may be invoked as
basis to allow the presentation of witnesses not listed in the pre-trial order, its application
remains contingent upon a showing of good cause sufficient to justify the same. Petitioners
attempted to satisfy this condition by citing "special and extraordinary circumstances" which
they claim should have impelled the RTC to allow the presentation of their additional witnesses.\
However, neither Jose nor his counsel Atty. Leong took the necessary steps to cause the
revision of the Pre-Trial Order to reflect the general reservation in Jose's Pre-Trial Brief,
notwithstanding the explicit directive to make such necessary corrections in the Colatilla portion
of the Pre-Trial Order.
Moreover, Petitioners do not deny that they sought leave to present their six (6)
additional witnesses only on January 16, 2008, one (1) year and five (5) months after the
additional hearing dates were set. If Judge Ruiz did in fact grant Jose leave to present witnesses
excluded in the Pre-Trial Order.
The importance of pre-trial in civil cases cannot be overemphasized. Time and again, this
Court has recognized "the importance of pre-trial procedure as a means of facilitating the
disposal of cases by simplifying or limiting the issues and avoiding unnecessary proof of facts at
the trial, and x x x to do whatever may reasonably be necessary to facilitate and shorten the
formal trial." The need for strict adherence to the rules on pre-trial thus proceeds from its
significant role in the litigation process.
This is not to say, however, that the rules governing pre-trial should be, at all times,
applied in absolute terms. While faithful compliance with these rules is undoubtedly desirable,
they may be relaxed in cases where their application would frustrate, rather than facilitate, the
ends of justice. The relaxation of these rules, however, is contingent upon a showing of
compelling and persuasive reasons to justify the same.
Heirs of Jose Lagon vs. Ultramax Health Care Supplies, et al., G.R. No. 246989, December
7, 2020 – Pre-marking of evidence/exceptions
FACTS
1. Spouses Jose and Nenita Lagon (the Lagon Spouses) are the registered owners of two
parcels of land in Marbel, Koronadal City.
2. The Lagon Spouses discovered that both titles were cancelled by the Registry of Deeds of
South Cotabato and were replaced by a TCT issued in the name of Ultramax Healthcare
Supplies, Inc.
3. This prompted the Lagon to file a Complaint against Ultramax for annulment of the new
titles. They denied selling the lands, alleging that the cancellation and subsequent transfer
of titles were caused by a falsified deed of absolute sale in favor of Ultramax.
4. In their Answer, Ultramax recounted that the spouses got a loan from Margie Huan, one
of the directors, who allegedly used their two properties as collateral. They later informed
Huan that they could not pay their loan and agreed to cede the two properties to Huan,
but with Ultramax as transferee.
 5. Jose Lagon dies while the case was pending, so his heirs substituted him. His heirs
moved to have the Deed of Absolute Sale examined by a forensic handwriting expert
from the NBI, was found out the signatures were indeed falsified.
6. So, afterwards. Jose’s heirs filed their Formal Offer of Evidence and rested their case. All
the pieces of evidence they presented were admitted by the trial court.
7. Then, Ultramax filed a request for admission addressed to Nenita, asking for the
admission of two documents, a Real Estate Mortgage and a Deed of Absolute. Jose’s heir
objected, stating that the documents were immaterial.
8. Ultramax filed a Supplement Judicial Affidavit which introduced a Deed of Mortgage,
signed by the Lagon Spouses. Jose’s heirs objected, stating that the Deed of Mortgage
was never alleged in Ultramax’s Answer and may not be introduced so late in the case.
9. The RTC granted the motion of Ultramax and admitted the evidence.
10. Consequently, they filed a Petition for Certiorari, before the Court of Appeals, alleging
that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted Ultramax’s
Motion since the document was never mentioned in the previous pleading.
11. The CA dismissed the Petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Mortgage is inadmissible by the trial court since it was not
mentioned by Ultramax in their Answer and pleadings.
HELD:
NO, the Deed of Mortgage is inadmissible by the trial court since it was not mentioned
by Ultramax in their Answer and pleadings.
In Cruz v. People, in affirming the finding of guilt, this Court held that under A.M. No. O3-1-
O9-SC,52 the admission of evidence not pre-marked during pre-trial is not absolutely prohibited.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, sec. I(A)(2) provides that:
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-trial
briefs containing the following:
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof. (No
evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a
party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked
during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown)[.]
The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and pre-
marked during trial. This provision, however, allows for an exception: when allowed by the court
for good cause shown. There is no hard and fast rule to determine what may constitute "good
cause," though this Court has previously defined it as any substantial reason "that affords a legal
excuse."
Here, the Regional Trial Court found it appropriate to admit the Supplemental Judicial Affidavit
which introduced the Deed of Mortgage to allow respondents an opportunity to refute petitioners'
evidence. To recall, petitioners moved to have a forensic handwriting expert examine the Deed
of Absolute Sale during the presentation of evidence. When the forensic examination results
were presented in court, only then did respondents discover that it had to repudiate the findings.
Thus, the need to introduce the separate but related Deed of Mortgage only arose after the pre-
trial. As the main issue pending before the trial court is the alleged falsification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the trial court admitted the Deed of Mortgage and allowed its examination. This
was not to prove an existing obligation on petitioners' part, but to compare the signatures found
in the document to those supposedly forged signatures on the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale.
Thus, petitioners' claim that the Deed of Mortgage is irrelevant does not hold water.
The main question of the Complaint before the trial court is the falsification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, and the signatures on the Deed of Mortgage may establish the probability of such
falsification.
Carpio vs. Judge Dimaguila., A.M. No. MTJ-17-1897, November 21, 2018 – CAM and JDR
FACTS
1. Respondent presided over a case for Grave Coercion against complainants Ma. Victoria
S.D. Carpio and John Persius S.D. Carpio (complainants), docketed as Criminal Case.
2. During the proceedings, respondent allegedly refused to refer the case to the mandatory
Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution, pursuant to A.M. No. 11-1-6-
SC-PHILJA, otherwise known as the "Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to
Implement the Expanded Coverage of Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) and Judicial
Dispute Resolution (JDR)."
3. Complainants filed a Joint Complaint Affidavit4 for Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Manifest Bias and Partiality, Patently Erroneous and Serious Irregularity of Judgment,
and Grave Abuse of Authority/Discretion against respondent before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA).
4. In her Comment, respondent maintained that she is aware of the Court's guidelines under
A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA but opted not to refer Criminal Case to the mandatory
CAM and JDR in order to avoid further delay, considering that complainants
categorically declared in open court that they were no longer interested in settling the
civil aspect of the case.
5. In the Memorandum, OCA pointed out that the Criminal Case was indeed among the
cases which require mandatory referral to the CAM and JDR, and that it was incumbent
upon respondent to strictly comply therewith under pain of administrative sanction.
6. In a Resolution, the Court adopted and approved the findings and recommendation of the
OCA, and accordingly, found respondent guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law.
7. Respondent moved for reconsideration, she insisted that her actions were not brought
about by her utter lack of familiarity and disregard of the rules, since she readily issues
orders directing the parties in other cases to report to the CAM mediator after the
accused's arraignment.
ISSUE
 Whether Judge Carpio is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law for not referring the case
to the CAM and JDR.
HELD:
YES, Judge Carpio is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law for not referring the case to
the CAM and JDR.
Records reveal that she is fairly acquainted with the guidelines prescribed for the CAM
and JDR, as in fact, she readily implements the same by ordering the parties in other cases to
report to the CAM mediator after arraignment.
The fault of respondent, however, lies in her belief that an exception to the foregoing was
warranted by the circumstances. Respondent pointed out that the parties had unequivocally
expressed their disinterest in settling the civil aspect of the case.
Thus, to her mind, referring the same to the CAM and JDR would be a mere exercise of
futility, and would then cause further delay in the disposition of the case. As such, respondent
decided to deviate from the normal course of procedure in order not to hamper and frustrate the
ends of justice.
While respondent had good motives in not referring the case to the CAM and JDR, the
Court still finds her administratively liable for not complying with the provisions of A.M. No.
11-1-6-SC-PHILJA.
It bears stressing that under the said rules, cases involving less grave felonies, where the
offended party is a private person, are required to be referred to the CAM and JDR proceedings,
as in this case.
Such requirement did not carve out any explicit exception and hence, evinces its
mandatory nature, notwithstanding the parties' desire to forego with the settlement of the civil
aspect of the case.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent administratively liable.
Iloilo Jar Corp. vs. Comglasco Corp./ Aguila Glass, G.R. No. 219509, January 18, 2017 –
Judgment on the pleadings/Summary judgment
FACTS
1. Petitioner Iloilo Jar Corporation (Iloilo Jar), as lessor, and respondent Comglasco
Corporation/Aguila Glass (Comglasco), as lessee, entered into a lease contract over a
portion of a warehouse building. The term of the lease was for a period of three (3) years.
2. Comglasco requested for the pre-termination of the lease effective on the same date.
Iloilo Jar, however, rejected the request on the ground that the pre-termination of the
lease contract was not stipulated therein.
3. Despite the denial of the request for pre-termination, Comglasco still removed all its
stock, merchandise and equipment, and from that time Comglasco no longer paid rentals.
 4. Iloilo Jar sent a final demand letter to Comglasco, but it was again ignored.
Consequently, Iloilo Jar filed a civil action for breach of contract and damages before the
RTC.
5. Comglasco filed its Answer7 and raised an affirmative defense, arguing that by virtue of
Article 1267 of the Civil Code (Article 1267), it was released from its obligation from the
lease contract. It explained that the consideration thereof had become so difficult due to
the global and regional economic crisis that had plagued the economy. Likewise,
Comglasco admitted that it had removed its stocks and merchandise but it did not refuse
to pay the rentals because the lease contract was already deemed terminated.
6. Iloilo Jar filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that Comglasco
admitted all the material allegations in the complaint.
7. The RTC granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. It opined that Comglasco's
answer admitted the material allegations of the complaint and that its affirmative defense
was unavailing.
8. The CA reversed the amended order of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not a judgment on the pleadings is valid and appropriate.
HELD:
NO, not a judgment on the pleadings but summary judgment
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Court governs motions for judgment on the
pleadings. It reads:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answers fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. XXXX
On the other hand, under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party may move for summary
judgment if there are no genuine issues raised.
In Basbas v. Sayson,25 the Court differentiated judgment on the pleadings from summary
judgment in that the former is appropriate if the answer failed to tender an issue and the latter
may be resorted to if there are no genuine issues raised, to wit:
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment
is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint.
When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material
allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party's
pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a
judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.
 On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the
complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary
judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine.
In the case at bench, Comglasco interposed an affirmative defense in its answer. While it
admitted that it had removed its stocks from the leased premises and had received the demand
letter for rental payments, it argued that the lease contract had been pre-terminated because the
consideration thereof had become so difficult to comply in light of the economic crisis then
existing. Thus, judgment on the pleadings was improper considering that Comglasco's Answer
raised an affirmative defense.
Although resort to judgment on the pleadings might have been improper, there was still
no need to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
In Wood Technology Corporation v. Equitable Banking Corporation (Wood
Technology),27 the Court ruled that summary judgment may be availed if no genuine issue for
trial is raised, viz:
A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a
genuine issue for trial.
Similar to Wood Technology, the judgment rendered by the RTC in this case was a
summary judgment, not a judgment on the pleadings, because Comglasco's answer raised an
affirmative defense. Nevertheless, no genuine issue was raised because there is no issue of fact
which needs presentation of evidence, and the affirmative defense Comglasco invoked is
inapplicable in the case at bench.
Neptune Metal vs. Manila Electric Co., et al., G.R. No. 204222, July 4, 2016 – Intervention
FACTS
1. Neptune traces its roots to the criminal case filed against Rolando Flores (Flores) and
Jhannery Hupa (Hupa) (the accused).
2. The accused were driving a trailer truck with a container van towards the Manila
International Container Port when men from the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group flagged them down on suspicion that they were illegally transporting electric
power transmission scrap copper wires owned by the Manila Electric Company
(Meralco).
3. The accused were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon with theft
of electric power transmission lines and materials
4. Neptune filed its entry of special appearance with motion for leave to permit the
inspection, examination, and photographing of the seized container van (entry with
motion). Neptune argued that it owned the contents of the container van.
5. The RTC granted Neptune's motion and ordered the inspection of the container van and
its contents.
6. Neptune continued to participate in the RTC proceedings.
 7. The RTC ordered the quashal of the information.5 The RTC noted that no Meralco power
transmission scrap copper wires were found in the container van during the two ocular
inspections. The RTC also ordered the return of the keys and the container van to
Neptune
8. Meralco filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. Meralco then filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA asking to reinstate the information; it did not include
Neptune as a party. Thus, Neptune filed a motion for leave to intervene and to admit its
comment-in-intervention.
9. The CA denied Neptune's motion for leave to intervene. The CA ruled that: (a) Neptune
failed to demonstrate its legal interest on the subject matter in litigation; (b) the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the case; and (c) Neptune failed to timely file
a motion for intervention before the RTC and to directly and actively participate in the
RTC proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in denying Neptune’s motion for intervention.
HELD:
YES, the CA erred in denying Neptune’s motion for intervention.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, who is not originally impleaded in a
proceeding, becomes a litigant for purposes of protecting his or her right or interest that may be
affected by the proceedings.
Intervention is not an absolute right but may be granted by the court when the movant
shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention.The allowance
or disallowance of a motion to intervene is within the sound discretion of the court.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules provides that a court may allow intervention
(a) if the movant has legal interest or is otherwise qualified, and
(b) if the intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the
original parties and if the intervenor's rights may not be protected in a separate proceeding. Both
requirements must concur.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules requires a movant to file the motion for intervention
before the RTC's rendition of judgment and to attach a pleading-in-intervention.The court may
allow intervention after rendition of judgment if the movant is an indispensable party
first, whether Neptune has a legal interest to intervene in the present case. Is Neptune's
ownership of the allegedly stolen items sufficient to grant intervention?
A movant for intervention must have legal interest either
(i) in the matter in litigation,
(ii) in the success of either of the parties, or
 (iii) against both parties.15 The movant may also intervene if he or she is
(iv) so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the court's custody.16 Legal interest is present when the intervenor
will either gain or lose as a direct effect of the judgment.17 The legal interest
must be actual and material, direct, and immediate.18 In a theft case, the subject
matter in litigation is the item alleged to have been stolen.19chanrobleslaw
In the present case, Neptune argues that it has a legal interest in the subject matter in
litigation, particularly, the scrap copper wires in the container van. The RTC found Neptune to
be the owner of the contents of the container van; hence, it released these contents to Neptune.
As the owner of the scrap copper wires, Neptune undoubtedly has legal interest in the subject
matter in litigation.
Second, we determine whether Neptune's intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the accused and of the State. We also consider whether Neptune's,
rights may be protected in a separate proceeding.
In the present case, the OSG failed to allege or present any evidence showing that
Neptune's intervention Will delay the proceedings and that Neptune may protect its rights in a
separate case.
Additionally, allowing Neptune's intervention is even beneficial to the courts in
ascertaining whether theft indeed occurred. The information filed before the RTC alleges that the
accused committed theft against Meralco. Lack of owner's consent is an essential element of the
crime of theft. Neptune's intervention will assist the CA in ascertaining the owner of the scrap
copper wires - whether Meralco or Neptune - and in determining whether the rightful owner gave
its consent to the accused's act of taking the scrap copper wires. It should be stressed, too, that
granting the intervention would reduce the suits filed in court.
Third, we verify whether Neptune timely filed its intervention. As we noted above, a would-be
intervenor must file the motion for intervention before the RTC renders its judgment.
In the present case, Neptune filed a motion denominated as "motion for intervention"
only before the CA or only after the RTC had rendered its judgment. Neptune argues that the
entry with motion it filed with the RTC is tantamount to a motion for intervention. The OSG, on
the other hand, argues that the entry with motion cannot constitute as a motion for intervention
because it lacked the pleading-in-intervention required by the Rules.
The court rules in Neptune's favor and hold that the entry with motion effectively
constitutes a motion for intervention.
The rules on intervention are procedural rules, which are mere tools designed to expedite
the resolution of cases pending in court.Courts can avoid a strict and rigid application of these
rules if such application would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.
 In the present case, Neptune only filed a special appearance with a motion to inspect the
container van before the RTC. At that time, Neptune was still uncertain whether it owned or it
had legal interest over the container van's contents. After the inspection, however, it ascertained
that it indeed owned the scrap copper wires and thus continued to participate in the case.
Notably, the RTC allowed Neptune to appear, file pleadings, and represent itself in the court
proceedings. All these amount to intervention as contemplated under the rules.